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Revisioning Philosophy: An Inquiry into Better Ways of Knowing—in the Humanities, in 
the Arts, in the Sciences, and in the World 
 
A dissertation by 
Nickolas Knightly 
Abstract 
An inquiry into the cultivation of an ethically-, aesthetically-, ecologically-rooted way of 
knowing and a meditation on philosophy as a way of life. This text considers how the climate 
crisis and general ecological degradation (along with other phenomena) indicate the need for a 
better way of knowing. The text begins with the multidisciplinary scientist Gregory Bateson’s 
suggestion that “the most important task today is . . . to learn to think in [a] new way.” This may 
sound like a platitude, but Bateson was a careful scientist who was sensitive to the unprecedented 
social and ecological challenges humanity now faces. His suggestion was meant as a sober, 
perhaps even a sobering imperative. He was not alone in making this suggestion. Perhaps 
philosophy always demands this of us, and it seems to have become incredibly important, given 
the state of the world. But how can we actually think differently, and what is wrong with our 
current ways of thinking and known? To find out, the dissertation engages in a “philosophical 
meta-analysis,” a kind of archaeology of the soul, considering various spiritual artefacts from 
western and non-western, Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultures, including insights from Eihei 
Dogen, Plato, Buddha, Blackfoot epistemology, C.G. Jung, John Dewey, Friedrich Nietzsche, E. 
Richard Sorenson, Gregory Bateson, and others. The inquiry offers steps toward an ethically and 
aesthetically embodied, ecologically and spiritually embedded epistemology of practice and 
realization that amounts to a paradigm shift out of the forms of life and forms of discourse not 
only of the western academy, but of the dominant culture as a whole. 
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The multidisciplinary scientist Gregory Bateson said that “the most important task today is . . . to 
learn to think in [a] new way” (Steps, 469). This may sound like a platitude, but Bateson was a 
careful scientist who was sensitive to the unprecedented social and ecological challenges 
humanity now faces. His suggestion was meant as a sober, perhaps even a sobering imperative. 
He was not alone in making this suggestion, and in conducting the research for this project and 
presenting some of the findings, I have encountered a sincere interest in new ways of thinking 
and knowing, both within the academy and beyond. Because of the evident success of the ways 
of thinking and knowing we already employ in science and scholarship, some of the findings of 
this dissertation have come as a surprise, and this has allowed a deeper appreciation of what 
Bateson and other scientists and philosophers have been asking for when they called for—or 
tried to introduce—a “new way of thinking.” In fact, the continued surprise involves both the 
ease with which one can slip into old ways of thinking, and the challenges of not only thinking 
more wisely and effectively, but conveying to others how we might go about doing so. 
 
The call for a new way of thinking and knowing in the sophisticated sense Bateson and others 
had in mind has its source in one of the most important philosophical insights of all time—a 
philosophical insight that became one of the greatest scientific discoveries of all time just last 
century. The discovery is this: Knowledge depends on our way of knowing. Scientifically, this 
discovery is central to cybernetics and quantum physics, and it plays a key role in ecology, 
biology, evolution, cognitive science, and developmental systems theory—indeed, any 
developmental theory seems to need to take it into consideration. In a strange twist of fate, this 
crucial discovery has not really sunk into the culture. It has become almost stale, passé, or 
something dismissed as a fascination of new-agey thinkers. However, as our inquiry will 
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indicate, we haven’t really come to terms with the meaning and implications of this finding, 
especially as it relates to epistemology, ethics, and philosophy in general. This book tries to get 
at the philosophical meaning of this discovery, and it does so while considering various reasons 
for suspecting that our current ways of thinking and knowing need improving, and both of these 
things in turn unfold in the process of trying to offer and exemplify a new epistemology—a 
practical theory of knowledge—that can help us accomplish the task of thinking and knowing in 
a genuinely new way. Developing this epistemology required a somewhat unconventional 
approach to scholarship, and it yielded some unanticipated implications. It in fact demanded a 
shift in forms of discourse and even forms of life.  
 
One of the issues at play has to do with the paradoxes that can arise when we try to shift to a new 
way of thinking and knowing. The case I try to make draws on non-western philosophy, but it 
can be approximated with a western philosophical analogy. If we take our current epistemology 
as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense, then the theoretical and empirical challenges discussed in in 
the work can be seen as anomalous data. As anomalous data builds up, it may indicate an 
impending paradigm shift. However, as Kuhn argued, the new paradigm will be nonsensical 
from the standpoint of the present paradigm. But it would make for a useless book if all I could 
offer were nonsense. How can we try to accomplish something here? We somehow need to think 
ourselves into a new paradigm, and the situation is far more challenging than a paradigm shift in 
a scientific discipline, which itself often takes genius-level insights. A cultural shift is another 
order of challenge altogether, one that requires that we metabolize significant scientific and 
philosophical insights. Such a shift, if we can draw near to it, will have many immediate 
implications for science and for every other aspect of the culture. How could we shift our whole 
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way of thinking and knowing—not merely our particular theory about this or that, but our 
manner of theorizing in the first place? 
 
For the past several years I have been working on how to get at the importance of this shift, why 
it seems necessary, what it would mean for philosophy and the broader culture, and how we 
could get it to happen. This has resulted in a series of relative failures and relative successes 
(very relative in the latter case), along with a series of significant insights, often humiliating 
ones. I have in fact begun to stress the importance of the relationship between human, humus, 
humility, homo sapiens, and (somewhat more poetically perhaps) Om, the sacred syllable that 
holds such an important place in many philosophical and spiritual traditions of the east. These 
words all share a common root (more mysteriously in the case of Om, since no one seems to be 
able to agree on its meaning and etymology . . . but we can certainly hear “Om” in “humus” if 
we have an ear for poetic resonance—and a heart for spiritual or philosophical resonance). It 
began to seem to me that philosophy needs more rootedness in humus, and that philosophical 
growth involves a certain degree of humiliation that gives rise to a gentle humility in place of the 
hyper self-criticism and even self-loathing cultivated by many a western mind. 
 
As I discussed my work with extremely supportive readers, we kept wrestling over issues of style 
and structure. It became clear to me that I could not accomplish the work using more academic 
forms of discourse, but I could not seem to explain what I was trying to do with the forms I 
developed to replace the academic forms. These were not “stylistic” choices in the usual sense. It 
seemed that something deeper directed me to philosophize in a certain way, and this will make 
more sense as we proceed in our inquiry together. Suffice it to say, I was trying to use the new 
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epistemology in the process of doing the textual discussion of it, and it kept proving difficult in 
ways that writing doesn’t usually seem so difficult. I found that I could explain things in person 
in a much clearer way, but this seemed to be due to two factors: On the one hand, I would tend to 
oversimplify to fit something into a timed talk or into the rhythms of conversation, and on the 
other hand, I had the advantage that always comes with intimacy. This is more important in 
philosophy than many of us want to admit, even though Socrates, a great patriarch of western 
wisdom, made such a big deal about it. If I could just deliver an oral dissertation on this subject, 
we might all feel better about it—except of course for those pesky simplifications, the 
transcendence of which would make the oral dissertation a totally impractical event (it would 
take too many hours). There was also the crucial issue that I myself have not, by any means, 
mastered a new way of knowing. I often struggle as much as anyone to get out of old habits, and 
need much more practice to realize a better way of knowing. As Nietzsche warns us,  
Beauty no accident. The beauty of a race or family, their grace and graciousness 
in all gestures, is won by work: like genius, it is the end result of the accumulated 
work of generations. One must have made great sacrifices to good taste, one must 
have done much and omitted much for its sake . . . and good taste must have 
furnished a principle for selecting company, place, dress, sexual satisfaction; one 
must have preferred beauty to advantage, habit, opinion, and inertia. Supreme rule 
of conduct: before oneself too, one must not “let oneself go.” The good things are 
immeasurably costly; and the law always holds that those who have them are 
different from those who acquire them. All that is good is inherited: whatever is 
not inherited is imperfect, is a mere beginning. (TI 47) 
 
Though we can find problems in this formulation, we can acknowledge a difference between, on 
the one hand, growing up in a family completely devoid of musical interest, and then maybe by 
age 20 or 30 becoming interested in music and trying to teach oneself, and on the other hand 
having parents who were musicians, played music while we were in the womb, financed a 
Suzuki style musical education, and supported and encouraged us to grow up with this most vital 
mother tongue.  
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Nietzsche wrote in the preface to Antichrist: “Some are born posthumously.” In light of Tibetan 
philosophy (e.g. the so-called Book of the Dead), that’s a funny comment. If we take it to mean 
interest in the recognition of one’s “work,” it sounds, in his case, sad but true, and in the case of 
most of us a mere wishful thinking. If we take it as an interest in the realization of results in 
one’s philosophical practice, one’s whole way of life, it’s something we should keep an eye on. I 
am not so worried about this sort of book as a book, as something that may or may not draw 
attention and interest, but I am interested in trying to fulfill the demands it makes on me to live 
more beautifully—in this life. Maybe even as part of that demand, I would like to write at least 
successfully enough that someone could find something genuinely valuable here, something 
useful. But what to make of the struggle to communicate when I kept setting out to be ever more 
precise? 
 
I finally managed to write a draft of the work, and to deliver a talk, that seemed much more 
functional for most of my current audience. But it had problems, in part related to what I saw as 
a lack of precision in the language. I also felt that the audience were still missing some of the key 
things I was trying to get across.  
 
One of my readers, Dr. Heather Shearer, suggested that perhaps if we thought of the work as a 
kind of meta-analysis, this would give people a framework for making sense of it. I began to 
think about what a philosophical meta-analysis would entail. At first, I simply used the term to 
provide an academic description of what I was trying to do. In so doing, I found I had run the 
risk that people might think the substance of the work as academic—even though it actually 
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presents a challenge to academic ways of thinking, and thus does not seem very academic, but 
rather seems to disrupt (or invite disruption of) academic ways of knowing. Of course, an 
academic description of dancing does not mean one will dance in an academic fashion, or merely 
describe without ever dancing—not if one wants to demonstrate dancing and invite others to 
experience dancing. It may seem we in academia don’t dance, but rather we comment on dancing 
or analyze it or muse on the conditions that make it possible. This is maybe not quite the analogy 
we need here, but I wouldn’t mind a reader’s receiving this project an invitation to dance, as the 
description of a few basic moves—for the purpose of trying them, to experience dance. 
 
In any case, I hadn’t committed to making the term “philosophical meta-analysis” a part of the 
text itself. In general, it seems easier to play with words than to come to insights that transform 
us in a deep way—part of Plato’s criticism of poetry, and one that many other philosophers have 
made. However, we can try and clarify the term and make some advantage of its meaning as a 
way of orienting toward and within the text and its attendant epistemology. Reading the text in 
light of the term will hopefully help the reader to navigate the project—with the caveat that the 
term itself matters very little.  
 
So, what is a philosophical meta-analysis?1 
 
First, let’s recall the common meaning of the term, which is not “philosophical” but more 
mathematical and scientific. Meta-analysis is a powerful tool in the sciences for resolving 
                                                 
1 It will seem as though we are going to speak about the meta-analysis, and then engage in it. We 
have already begun it. Introductory remarks in this and other works are already the heart of the 
matter, just in a certain arrangement. 
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apparent contradictions and tensions in sets of data. Meta-analyses can be very interesting. They 
do not provide a “last word,” because surprises do happen, and we have a talent for perpetuating 
unskillful ideas. But they can help. Just as scientists may find apparent contradictions in their 
data and their theories, we humans, and we professional philosophers too, have apparent 
contradictions and tensions in our philosophical ideas about knowledge. (Terms like “ideas” and 
“knowledge” already have problems, but let’s keep going, and we can come back to some of 
those concerns later.) These ideas are not “empirical” data in the usual sense, and are thus not 
amenable to the statistical study a standard meta-analysis would employ. Though we will draw 
from various sciences in this work, the mix of theory and empirical findings does not allow for 
computation. Philosophical meta-analysis takes a relatively large set of thinkers and empirical 
findings as offering conceptual “data points”. That may not be the right term. Maybe we should 
call them “philosophical data points,” or maybe and even “philosophical artefacts”. In any case, 
this set of artefacts does two things: It offers a criticism of the general way of knowing that 
manifests throughout the dominant culture while ultimately revealing a shared space, a pluralistic 
space, that can be defined as the space of a new and inclusive epistemology (many valid ways of 
knowing, many beautiful ways of life). Let us clarify that “philosophical artefacts” does not 
mean material exclusively intellectual or academic, and it includes insights, suggestions, 
inspirations, images, and more from a wise variety of human and non-human beings, including 
humans who worked with or produced texts in ways quite different from the ways academics do, 
and also including those who didn’t produce any texts at all (it would be hard to include, for 
instance, Socrates or Siddhartha (the Buddha) if we had to rely on written texts, because they 
didn’t produce any, and we would have a hard time including works of art (painting, poetry, 
dance, and so on), which a fuller meta-analysis should include). The “data points” of our meta-
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analysis are not as much “empirical” in terms of “scientific” “data” as they are qualitative and 
philosophical. They are still experimental in an important sense, and more properly scientific 
(when “science” gets revalued), but our meta-analysis appreciates “data” in the sense of what is 
given—in the philosophical or spiritual sense of what is given to us like a gift or an act of grace. 
This sense of givenness has to do with realization, and with a sense of sacredness. These things 
will become clearer as we proceed. 
 
This is not quite the way to put it, but we can helpfully say the meta-analysis invites us to sense 
the need for concrete practices (beyond the analysis and production of texts or arguments) that 
allow us to access this different way of knowing, and it shows that these practices can serve as a 
bridge to shifting into a new way of thinking and being. This shift is important. Let us recall that 
any apparent contradictions in the data, any apparent anomalies, may signify that we stand on the 
threshold of a paradigm shift. It seems possible—probable—that we need one.  
 
This new thinking and living we seek to get some sense of can be seen as the new epistemology 
in action, grounded in our embedded, embodied nature. But, we still need to understand the role 
of “practice” in the new epistemology. As we will see, the epistemology that will interest us here 
is an epistemology of practice and realization. So, we are not just talking about “practices” in a 
conventional sense. For instance, I take a conventional discussion of practices to be something 
like the growing field of contemplative science. Scientists and philosophers are working hard to 
show how meditation can improve cognitive performance and help us be more rational and more 
compassionate. We will consider a few artefacts from that research, but it merely forms a small 
part of a proper philosophical meta-analysis. Lots of people have described, from a more 
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conventional standpoint, the practices we shall also describe. We need to get at deeper issues in 
our way of knowing, and I will try to explain this further.  
 
First, let me mention some of the “data points” this project seeks to integrate and account for. 
The book is part of a whole program of research. That program of research would not merely 
extend the meta-analysis itself. It would begin to apply the new epistemology, both inside and 
outside of the academy. So, the data points listed here are not all the data points I would prefer to 
have in the analysis itself or as influences in its application. Some valuable things did not or 
could not make it into this text. But here are some examples of the disparate thinking and 
knowing the present version of the meta-analysis does seek to connect: Plato’s general views on 
philosophy and knowledge and those of the Japanese philosopher Dogen; Dewey’s concepts of 
habit and use, the Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi’s ideas about spontaneity and uselessness, and 
ideas about cognition developed by Francisco Varela, J.J. Gibson, and others; the thinking of 
physicists David Bohm and John Wheeler, the collaboration between Wolfgang Pauli and Carl 
Jung, and the epistemologies and linguistic patterns found in the Blackfoot and Navaho 
traditions; the work of those involved in horse-human epistemology and the work of Sorenson, 
Levi-Strauss, and other anthropologists; the work of ecologists like Paul Shepard and 
psychologists like James Hillman and Chellis Glendinning. Many of these connections are 
obvious, but they all include subtleties that future work could elaborate. In any case, these sets of 
relations are in turn related to each other, interwoven with each other, so that all these figures 
and more come together to delineate (to sketch and adumbrate, to scry and descry) a space of 
inclusiveness that can bring new vitality to our ways of thinking and knowing, allowing for 
advances in science, scholarship, and education. The work actually includes more figures, 
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especially in terms of influence, but also in terms of direct presence, as in the case of Nietzsche. 
A fuller meta-analysis would include many more. And we should get clear that these data points 
are more than merely “conceptual,” since they attempt to get at experience—and that is the sense 
in which they show up as philosophical artefacts. Because of this intimate relationship with 
experience, the meta-analysis involves our basic relationship to time, space, mind, body, 
emotions, perceptions, self, agency, health and healing, creativity, Nature, and more. All of these 
dimensions will need further development, but they receive enough attention to convey, evoke, 
or conjure what we might call “the image” of the meta-analysis, that which it tries to help the 
reader sense, touch, taste, see in some way—even if just to “sense its presence,” the presence of 
something that remains at a distance. 
 
Art, broadly construed, has had a major influence on the meta-analysis, and the work could not 
be what it is aside from artists such as Hakuin, Rikyu, Ikkyu, Andy Goldsworthy, John Daido 
Loori, Minor White, Henri-Cartier-Bresson, Isadora Duncan, Loie Fuller, Martha Graham, 
Jackson Pollock, Leonard Cohen, Duke Ellington, Howlin’ Wolf, Gary Snyder, and many, many 
others, as well as my own creative practice, however embarrassingly modest. But more works of 
art should be overtly included, and this marks another, major limitation of the present version—
as well as a limitation in current ways of knowing in much of science and philosophy. A 
principal recommendation of this text is that research should be conducted in teams that include 
scientists, artists, and philosophers in particular, along with members of the local community, 
meeting often outside of offices and laboratories, in natural places, responsive to the land. 
Perhaps one of the most important things we can do in order to know better is to contentiously 
cultivate more ecologically balanced (diverse) and mutually nourishing communities of 
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researchers. But, it will not help as much if those researchers try and apply the old epistemology, 
just in a new group setting, or even a “natural” one. They will need to also make use of a shared 
vision, ethical orientation, and practices of knowing that may carry them to potentially startling 
insights. Thus, they require the openness to suddenness, openness to being startled and to being 
in some sense at risk, which goes beyond the “open mind” that all academics proclaim they have. 
 
Suffering also has a central role in the meta-analysis, as suffering has in various philosophical 
traditions been related to ignorance—in other words, bad ways of knowing, or what we might 
call active misknowing of ourselves and reality. Though it appears throughout the meta-analysis, 
it needs to eventually have its own more concentrated discussion, which tentatively I would call, 
“Why We Need a Philosophy of Suffering.” There is a reason why the basic teachings of the 
great philosophers are called basic teachings. As we mature in our lives, we come to understand 
these basic teachings ever more intimately, and with increasing appreciation.  
 
As a subject for academic study, such a wide range of thinkers could be written off as “mile 
wide, inch deep” scholarship, mere dilettantism, or the worst kind of hodge-podge. However, we 
have here a conscientiously curated and carefully arranged constellation of philosophical 
artefacts—not an academic analysis. Thus, the seemingly disconcerting breadth is meant to serve 
as the source of the work’s cogency, because, although the work examines a broad range of 
theories and phenomena, insights and experiences, it remains focused on a single question: How 
can we implement better ways of thinking and knowing? (It thus also carries the question: In 
what sense and in what ways might our current processes of knowing be problematic?) We must 
be clear that it does this in the context of noting tensions in the data, noting ways in which we 
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might be misknowing ourselves and the nature of reality, ways in which we might grasp at 
limited and limiting habits of thinking, speaking/writing, and moving in the world. It is as if the 
meta-analysis were a kind of archaeology of the soul, and we were inquiring into a large cache of 
artefacts and trying to see trends, resolutions, resonances, correspondences—not quite as simple 
as doing something mathematical, but somehow analogous. I say this having experienced a 
certain amount of disappointment when reading Foucault’s attempt at archaeology. He seems to 
hold up a series of artefacts without making a very compelling case for anything. Having 
engaged in the present version of philosophical archaeology, I can better appreciate the 
challenges he faced, even though I still disagree with Foucault in some fundamental ways. To 
put it too strongly, he leaves alternative ways of knowing something like a matter of personal 
whim, and he seems to reduce philosophy as a way of life to a matter of style, but in the more 
pejorative or limited connotation of doing something “in style” as opposed to a deeper sense of 
living “with style.” Kurt Vonnegut, drawing from Nietzsche, makes this distinction in Sirens of 
Titan, and the one I make here is even more rigorous than what he and Nietzsche meant. 
Foucault, also influenced by Nietzsche, didn’t seem to see that Nietzsche’s greatest failure was 
his inability to express what a fully non-dualistic philosophy offers us as a vision and demands 
from us as a way of life. Philosophy is about our uniqueness, but that uniqueness only fulfills 
itself in, through, and as a process of attunement with something that transcends us. Another way 
to say it is that someone like Hadot seemed to favor the analogy of life as a sculpture, in which 
we uncover something that seems to be “there,” in the stone, waiting to be freed from its 
encasement, and someone like Foucault seemed to favor the analogy of life as a painting, a blank 
canvas which we paint however we fancy. The meta-analysis suggests neither analogy captures 
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the fullness of life, and neither analogy gives us a sufficient answer to the question of how we 
can know better. 
 
Our inquiry seeks to give a certain kind of concrete answer or set of answers to that question 
(How can we know better?), answers that can function in our research and our everyday lives, 
answers that in some cases seem startling, and have equally startling empirical data to support 
them. However, it also gives something like a non-answer. I mean that two things happen: Our 
inquiry makes a concrete recommendation of practices that will help us become more rigorous 
philosophers and begin to know better right away, and at the same time it offers an insistence 
that these practices are not, in themselves, any kind of genuine medicine. I want to put that 
stronger: Anything that seems like a concrete answer comes with a stringent warning that should 
be put in bright red 100 pt. font. I will spare the font but give the warning: This is not the answer, 
and if you just pick it up and start “using” it (i.e. using yourself and the world) the wrong way, 
you will likely create trouble for yourself and others. Any concrete answers can only come by 
means of a holistic practice-and-realization, in a process of co-discovery and co-creation. In 
other words, we have to shift into this space of new ways of knowing, with all of the attendant 
issues of ethics, aesthetics, and worldview that it evokes, and thereby, together, make the world 
better, in a process that is not only mutual (i.e. it is itself interwovenness), but (for that reason) is 
both discovery and creation at once. There are simply no short-cuts of the kind we might wish 
for, including any short-cuts of understanding the meta-analysis and the epistemology it seeks to 
help us shift into. 
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Given the central status of our ways of thinking and knowing, the work’s admittedly broad net in 
fact must be broad. I mean that first and foremost to indicate that it catches up everything in its 
web, and it tries to present a broad vision of the dominant culture and the possibility for 
alternatives. It should help explain knowledge in the current paradigm, help us understand how 
insights happen in general. But it must do this as it challenges that paradigm, holistically, 
showing how extensive our revolution must be if we want to truly know better. In this work of 
challenging our current ways of thinking, it extends the insights we have already had in our 
culture. Philosophers like Nietzsche, Jung, and even analytic figures like Quine, Davidson, and 
Danto have come remarkably close to the space we are talking about (I argue that they all drew 
from it, but I mean they got close to being able to talk about what it is). I am less interested in the 
analytic figures. It might be genuinely interesting to me and to some analytic philosophers if we 
could undertake a study of how the analytic tradition has in its own way traced the edges of the 
space the meta-analysis seeks to help us enter. The difficulty is entering though, and I have not 
seen any reliable tools of entry in the western analytic tradition (based on a limited sampling, the 
continental tradition does not seem any better), and this seems to me to have cut off a certain 
kind of understanding. The “toolkit” of mainstream western philosophy (analytic or continental) 
seems less rigorous than it needs to be, and showing this is part of the meta-analysis. 
 
At any rate, by locating a common space for such a broad range of ideas, practices, experiences, 
and even languages—many of which were completely isolated from each other as they were 
developed—the insights of a variety of cultures and individual thinkers (an inclusive, ecological 
diversity) get carried forward into our present historical moment, so that we can make the best 
use of them. I am in fact much more excited by the prospect of doing further work (i.e., in the 
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future, as a way to continue the program of research initiated here) to help western philosophers 
understand, for instance, the epistemology of the Blackfoot people and that of someone like 
Dogen, than I am in doing further research in analytic philosophy per se. That is in part a matter 
of personality, so to speak, for the view here is inclusive . . . it’s just that one cannot do 
everything one might like or wish to do. But I also need to emphasize the fact that one of the 
basic tensions at work in the meta-analysis is the tension between how philosophy is currently 
done in the academy and how it has been done in other contexts, and further how it could be 
done in our own revitalized context. So, as part of its uniqueness, the meta-analysis importantly 
incorporates us. 
 
In fact, it does this in two ways, and we need to understand them both in order to understand 
what a meta-analysis is—perhaps it surprises the reader that we still haven’t defined it! We have 
attempted to define it in part, but we need further clarification. 
 
The meta-analysis of this book works with tensions and resonances between ways of knowing 
(“apparent tensions and contradictions in the data”). The principal tension lies between the 
current way of doing things and what we might need to do instead, if we want the conditions of 
life to begin to flourish again, if we want to navigate climate collapse with greater skill and 
poise, if we want to be more realistic, rigorous, and so on (in scholarship and science too), and if 
in general we want to cultivate greater wisdom, love, beauty, creativity, peace, and general well-
being. The meta-analysis is novel in several ways. For one thing, it incorporates tensions not 
only “outside” of us, “out there” in “the data,” but tensions “inside” of us, tensions in the soul 
that have to do with our own unconscious, with the imperatives of spiritual growth, with the 
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empathy distress we feel in relation to the world, with the ways the sickness of the world 
manifests itself in us, with the ways the sickness in us manifests in the world, and so on. This is 
crucial. I cannot overstate its importance, and the reader will very quickly detect a strong 
emphasis on psychology, without which I would have no idea how to even begin. This also 
explains why many psychologists and neuroscientists have influenced the work, and why some 
appear quite prominently in this version. 
 
Maybe the reflections so far have helped to clarify to some degree what we will mean by a meta-
analysis. But we should consider a few more things. Since this is a philosophical meta-analysis, 
the reader needs to understand the meaning of philosophy the work here encourages us to open 
up to, before we can get going, as it were. But, as we consider that meaning, we are already 
underway. We will find ourselves trying to sense the tension between the more narrow kind of 
philosophizing we do in the academy, and something more rooted in experiment, experience, and 
practice-realization (all of these are in some sense “technical” terms we will have to define). In 
other words, the meta-analysis is not only oriented toward experience, but it is already something 
from the new epistemological space, a new practice of reading and thinking. It is contentiously 
done, not weird for the sake of being “avant garde”. So, a philosophical analysis is experiential 
(invites us to taste, touch, enter more fully our own experience), and a text like this has its 
success as our own experience, not in the apparent “logic” of its “arguments,” nor in the 
“analysis” of “terms” or in the activity of “making distinctions” or describing “conditions of 
possibility”. 
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We have touched on this before, but let’s say again that this project emphasizes interwovenness. 
Grasping this is essential for any proper understanding of what the meta-analysis seeks to reveal 
(offer as an experience), and what the new epistemological space demands (or will demand)—
again, it’s a space of many ways of knowing, each unique but meeting a shared set of demands. 
We could happily call interwovenness the core idea of the project, and the meta-analysis comes 
to a way of bringing out the tensions that arise when we try to escape, ignore, or actively deny 
interwovenness. In any case, each step and each turn of our inquiry is interwoven with the rest, 
and each in its own way tries to explain and even in moments to embody interwovenness, as well 
as to evoke a greater awareness of interwovenness and its consequences in the reader.  
 
In our inquiry, we seek a non-local epistemology. The meta-analysis is as much “in” the reader 
as “in” this text. In fact, it is “in” neither, but arises relationally, in, through, as practice-
realization, which means the meta-analysis is in the world and of the world. The Japanese 
philosopher Dogen touches (or invites us to touch, taste, feel, fully enter) the essence of this in a 
profoundly challenging essay that itself seems to express (or invite us into) the essence of his 
philosophy as well as any text of his might be said to do so. These lines get at certain key aspects 
of a non-local epistemology: 
To carry the self forward to verify [or, practice-realize] myriad things is delusion. 
That myriad things come forth and verify the self is enlightenment. 
 
. . . . To study [to practice] philosophy is to study [to practice] the self. To study 
the self is to forget the self. To forget the self is to be verified by all things. When 
verified by myriad beings, your body and mind and the body and mind of myriad 
beings fall away. A traceless trace of verification [realization] remains—
ungraspable. The traceless trace of verification expresses itself without end. 
(translation adapted from Waddell and Abe)2 
                                                 
2 In all cases of Dogen’s work, multiple translations have been consulted, and in some cases a 
painstaking character by character examination has been attempted, but I have no fluency in 
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We ordinarily try to localize knowledge in the knower, and we then have the problem of justified 
true beliefs and so on. We relate to the world as an object, and we go “out there” to poke at the 
world and verify it (“know” it, “save” it, take from it). Dogen seems to indicate here that the 
essence of a non-local epistemology expresses itself as we realize ourselves, paradoxically by 
forgetting ourselves. Forgetting the self is not the same as “losing oneself”. We might lose 
ourselves in addiction, in a movie, in all sorts of hedonic pursuits and medications. We might 
also lose ourselves in doing science, in practicing politics or activism, in designing computers, in 
reading books. One of my own university science teachers in fact described science as an 
extremely pleasurable form of escape, and I think the life of the mind allows for a significant 
degree of escapism (that teacher had a very successful laboratory, and thus initiated many 
graduate students into the practice and realization of science-as-escapism—and I would suggest 
he is not alone, and that consciously or unconsciously many scientists practice this way). 
Forgetting the self is radically different from anything like this or anything like our typical 
experience. We could call it an achievement, a consummation of philosophical practice. It is an 
experience that is a realization. It is the consummation of knowing, knowing as consummation or 
realization. Many subtleties appear here, and the meta-analysis has to do with trying to help us 
understand just these sorts of things. 
 
                                                 
Medieval Japanese or Classical Chinese, and only a basic competence in Dogenese (many who 
claim fluency in the former two have no idea what to make of the latter). As far as I can tell, I 
have consulted every available translation, including the rarely cited, but incredibly helpful, 
collection done by Hee-jin Kim. Carl Bielefeldt’s group pulled all of their translations off the 
internet because they will be published, supposedly in the next year or so. These were 
tremendously useful, and I look forward with great excitement to their publication.  
19 
 
In the end, “philosophical meta-analysis” is not a term that one defines in the manner of 
supplying a proposition of the form, “Philosophical meta-analysis is ___________.” Though 
Heather Shearer deserves credit for helping me coin the phrase, I must take responsibility for its 
meaning, and that meaning comes from the new epistemological space, and my own still-limited 
practice within it. I therefore expect misunderstandings. This is not an evasion or obfuscation. It 
is very easy to begin to hide behind an alternative way of knowing, to begin to “mystify” things, 
not because of real subtleties and nuances, but because one doesn’t know what one is talking 
about, and also because of the general problems of human fallibility, including thinking we know 
what we’re talking about when we don’t and also including all the daunting phenomena captured 
by the term “spiritual materialism”. Genuine mystical insight defies explanation not because the 
mystic seeks to “mystify,” but because the insight ruptures paradigms, and that is what we are 
after here, something that ruptures paradigms, a kind of divine madness. But, it is in fact rather 
easy to understand this notion that “philosophical meta-analysis” defies initial understanding. It 
means something like how marriage or tango dancing defy any preliminary understanding, and 
almost laughingly so when we have nothing but words to offer. “You are going to live with this 
person for perhaps 40 or more years. You may have to undergo some humiliation in order to 
truly appreciate them. What you call “love” now will not mean the same thing 20, 30, or 40 years 
from now. This person will shape what you become or fail to become, and vice versa.” Does that 
really capture it? 
 
Similarly, I have often said to people when they ask how I am, “Well, at bottom I am well. But I 
have lately been quite astonished at the extent of my own stupidity. Thankfully, I have recently 
begun practicing philosophy, and I feel rather inspired.” People of course laugh because I say 
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this as a philosopher. Yet, however strangely, these words seem more true when I say them 
today than when I would say them ten years ago (and I have been truthfully saying it for over 15 
years now—an incredibly short time that can seem like a long time). Those receiving a black belt 
in Aikido may hear from their teacher, “Now you can really begin to practice Aikido.” Begin, 
mind you. Ueshiba, the founder of Aikido, said in his seventies, “From now on, I can perform 
real aiki” (Sunadomari 2004: 128).  Previously he could rely on physical strength (something 
“personal” rather than transpersonal; something controllable rather than inspired), and this, in the 
aikido context, means a danger of self-delusion and a set of limiting ideas that still have us in 
their grasp (with a strong unconscious dimension . . . it is like a highly intelligent person who can 
rely on cleverness where they lack wisdom). We all face these dangers, and we all enjoy the 
possibility of transformative insights. Suddenly realizing that, “Before, I was not really 
practicing philosophy,” or, “Hey! That was Tango just now,” or, on one’s third marriage, “I 
finally understand how to love someone” . . . such experiences are part of our general experience 
of life, and they are the essence of a genuine spiritual, philosophical, and I would specifically say 
mystical approach to life.  
 
With respect to these and other aspects of what I mean by meta-analysis, two very short poems 
by Gary Snyder come to mind: 
The Trail Is Not a Trail 
 
I drove down the Freeway 
And turned off at an exit 
And went along a highway 
Til it came to a sideroad 
Drove up the sideroad 
Til it turned to a dirt road 
Full of bumps, and stopped. 
Walked up a trail 
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But the trail got rough 
And it faded away— 
Out in the open, 
Everywhere to go. (from Left Out in the Rain) 
 
 
How Poetry Comes to Me 
 
It comes blundering over the 
Boulders at night, it stays 
Frightened outside the 
Range of my campfire 
I go to meet it at the 
Edge of the light (from No Nature) 
 
We look for things close to the fire, because we think we can see there. In philosophy, Sophia 
Herself invites us to meet Her at the furthest edge of the light, to begin to enter the darkness. We 
can work with this text as a voice calling us into darkness, into wilderness, into Rumi’s, “Out 
beyond ideas of wrongdoing and rightdoing, there is a field. I’ll meet you there.” We don’t just 
have everywhere to go; we also have somewhere to go. It is something specific. For each of us it 
is unique for the life we live and the particular landscape we have to find our meaning in.  
 
When the text calls the reader into the darkness, it asks them to give up their ordinary notion of 
understanding. By venturing into the darkness, we may come to “understand” things not 
currently understandable if we remain close to our cozy campfire. More significantly, we might 
enter a way of knowing that involves a nonduality of the knower and the known, such that a not-
knowing emerges. When we walk into darkness, our senses heighten—because of the darkness. 
The hundred sacred senses come alive and alove; we ourselves come alive and alove (we are not 
our senses, but not apart from them . . . and sentience is inherently sense-making). This coming 
alive and alove is the heart of philosophy, and it is through this, as this, that we make real the 
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things we wanted to understand in the first place, but which would have died there by the 
campfire (and in the World), while we too sat wilting to death (there and everywhere). We have 
to go into the wilderness, to make a vision quest, to find the soul’s nourishment, to arrive at 
“Wonderstanding” that goes beyond ordinary “understanding,” where Wonderstanding includes 
the inconceivable, includes our becoming real in, through, as the inconceivable (all of which 
should become clearer as we go).3 It is a knowing, even though it does not fall under the umbrella 
of “the known” as we now use that term. Many things, endless things, can be brought under the 
branches of the known (the “known” as revitalized and revalued), but it always comes with an 
unknown. We seek a nondualistic mode of being, in which darkness and light appear in their 
interwovenness. This nondualistic knowing underlies all the “knowing” we have ever done, and 
now we may try and work with it more directly, allowing it to transform us.  
 
All of this is another way of saying a true philosophical inquiry should invite us to sense, to 
verify, the universality of wisdom, love, and beauty. The philosophical artefacts of any work that 
fulfills the spirit of what we endeavor here shows that wisdom, love, and beauty function as a 
common ground. While the Dalai Lama has done a tremendous amount of work trying to show 
the universality of compassion, to show how compassion (an aspect of love) can function as a 
secular, scientific common ground of ethical awareness (“secular, scientific” here indicating, first 
and foremost, inclusiveness, not “atheisticness”), I think we can do the same with wisdom and 
beauty. No serious spiritual, philosophical, or religious tradition lacks a reverence for these or 
                                                 
3 As a Gnostic text puts it, “If one does not stand in the darkness, he will not be able to see the 
light.” 
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fails to give them a central place. These are not universals in the spirit of a rigid “truth” or 
absolute. But they function as a common ground.  
 
By the time we in the west get to talking about knowledge as we do now, things have gone 
seriously wrong, because our focus should be on this common ground. Epistemology is almost a 
symptom from the outset, in that it functions as if wisdom had been abandoned. We want 
wisdom, but we don’t feel up to it, and we attempt to mimic wisdom with science and 
technology—with knowledge and cleverness. To foreshadow our discussion of Hadot: 
Philosophers become professors of philosophy. 
 
We want to consider philosophical artefacts and practices that lead to wisdom, not 
“knowledge”—wisdom, love and beauty, since the three are totally interwoven. A better way of 
knowing must be a way of living—one that seeks to practice and realize wisdom, love, and 
beauty—which in turn has to involve cultivating healthy ecologies, ecologies of practice and 
realization. All of this the meta-analysis seeks to help us to sense. But, again, we are speaking of 
something in a different mode of philosophizing. 
 
With respect to that, it will help to read the text with the understanding that it embodies an 
alternative hypothesis regarding the nature of language and argument. Indeed, the text can be 
seen as rejecting the notion of “argument,” inviting us to see “argument” as an artifact of the old 
epistemology, and inviting us to experiment with a different sensibility. While we seem to 
naturally engage in a kind of “exchange of reasons,” we end up limiting ourselves and the world 
if we get captured, colonized, conquered by the “principle of reason.”  
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In place of argument, we experiment according to the hypothesis that language is the activity of 
inviting resonance and intimacy, rather than the sending of messages. I do not mean the sorts of 
gestures I have seen discussed in literary theory, rhetoric, and writing studies. Though I am not 
an expert in these fields, I have not encountered there the kind of spiritual-ecological practice we 
will try to evoke the outlines of in our inquiry, and try in some moments to practice ourselves. 
We might call it an activity of synchronization, in ourselves and between ourselves, one that 
ultimately opens us into synchronicities. This is a synchronization of heart-mind-body-world-
cosmos that depends on a spiritual way of life.  
 
In a more simplified form, we could consider the example of Tango dancing, which does not 
involve a sending of messages between the partners, but a synchronization of heart, mind, body, 
and world. The training of heart, mind, and body are more limited in this case, since Tango is 
rarely taken up as a spiritual discipline—e.g. Self, World, and Cosmos are left spiritually 
unexamined for the most part, and things like ethics and meditation are not considered integral. 
Nevertheless, each dancer must learn a degree of attunement of the heart, mind, and body, and in 
dancing each dancer already attunes themselves, and must open to mutual attunement, and this 
often reaches remarkable levels of skill. It is all in mutuality, which is not easy to understand. 
But let us at least say that the dancers can—only in, through, as synchronization—experience 
Tango, a certain consummation of Tango. Tango can happen, almost “to” them, but more “as” 
them. An experience of resonance and intimacy arises, thus empowering a co-creation, co-
discovery of the dance. The leader doesn’t simply “send” “signals” to the follower as to what to 
“do”. Rather, a kind of mutual attunement arises, so that invitations to feel the music in particular 
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ways, invitations to experience life in particular ways become practiced and realized. This arises 
not only “within” and “between” any two dancers, but also in, through, as, with the other dancers 
on the dance floor, and the ones watching, and the band playing, and the Earth supporting them, 
and the trees outside, and the moon and stars and wind. To experience Tango is not to understand 
an argument. The same holds for philosophy. 
 
An argument is usually a clumsy attempt at attunement. A more general sense of attunement 
might contrast it with an attempt to convince, and even an attempt to conquer (again, 
contemporary challenges might also agree, but without more of the elements of our meta-
analysis, they do not seem to offer us enough to dispel the dominant epistemology—within us 
and outside of us). An attunement (in any form) invites us to allow the tuning fork of the soul 
(the soul’s aspect as tuning and tuned, as mutual resonance) to resonate in particular ways. The 
reader of a text can begin to allow such resonance, and an experience can then begin to emerge. 
It is not something to be told or explained, but something coming alive through the hundred 
sacred senses, something brought to fruition as one’s one body, mind, life, and World, something 
we could even call Cosmic.  
 
We must experiment in order to test this out, to verify if such an orientation helps us 
philosophize better and ultimately live better. We could say we have decided to restrict 
experimentation for the most part. We seem to think we can only function with “arguments” and 
“evidence” as we have so far emphasized them. We didn’t understand the need for attunement 
(so the present hypothesis goes), even though such a vision runs through much of ancient 
philosophy, including Indigenous traditions, where it can be more clearly understood as 
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involving an experience of initiation (the tuning of our attunement—and we can note Plato’s 
modeling of philosophy on this template of initiation, or what we could call “mysticism”). If our 
activity has to do with attuning ourselves to life and to all the living beings, we don’t have an 
argument on our hands. Bears don’t offer us an “argument” for how we should live. When Aldo 
Leopold wrote about “Thinking Like a Mountain,” he related an experience, a conversion, a 
transformation in his thinking, and a becoming-attuned. A person might choose to offer what 
look like “arguments” to orient us toward and bring us closer to such an attunement. In any case 
we need to allow the tuning fork of the soul to resonate, in our own octave, in our own unique 
music and dance, and “argument” all by itself will not likely accomplish this, which is why we 
find arts of awareness revered and centrally rooted in all spiritual, philosophical, and religious 
traditions outside of the style that gradually took hold in the west. We have to presence the 
thinking of the mountains, the wolves, the deer, the trees. All of this is our unique thinking, the 
unique thinking of the Earth. 
 
At this point, having given some sense of the difficulty in saying what a meta-analysis is, but 
having still tried to give some helpful discussion of it, we have entered into the question, What 
does a meta-analysis look like? In the present case, not quite as I would prefer, but it does have 
some major features intact. Again, our inquiry is already underway. As it proceeds, the 
experience of engaging with it could be likened to walking a labyrinth or entering a mandala. To 
appreciate a mandala, we have to see the whole, see how the major parts relate to one another. 
As the inquiry makes its way, philosophical artefacts emerge, often in the form of long 
quotations. Presenting long quotations is somewhat analogous to curating insights and 
inspirations. The longer passages allow for more meaning to come through, exhibiting the 
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interwovenness of things. It is sort of like organism and environment in some cases, as if one 
might be tempted to focus down to a line or two, or even a few words (the organism) but then 
begin to see how more of the text carries meaning than one might at first feel comfortable 
admitting (the environment). Of course, even larger webs could be sensed by various historians, 
anthropologists, psychologists, and other specialists. But these long passages have been chosen 
so that they can hang together and give a sense of the mandala our inquiry invites us to enter. 
The elements gathered here are insufficient for the fuller understanding we will eventually need, 
but they can still render the spirit of the image. It is like something pixelated or loosely sketched 
that we can still recognize. Higher resolution, or a detailed painting or sculpture or dance, might 
give us a clearer image, a clearer feel, a deeper insight, with much rewarding fullness, but we can 
still make sense of what we are seeing, and helpful insights may come in time.  
 
The meandering feeling of the inquiry relates to making turns in a labyrinth. When walking a 
labyrinth, we seem to draw close to the center, but then move back out to the periphery. The 
slow process of meandering, walking mindfully, walking in sacredness, for some reason helps us 
enter a different way of knowing, and insights suddenly arise. One can try reading as if walking a 
labyrinth. In many ways, knowing better involves revitalization of habitual practices. We can 
notice that something which seems like a tangent is just a bend in the path, and also that we are 
seeing something fractal-like in the vision the inquiry offers. This fractal-like quality is rather 
meaningful. A fuller inquiry would bring it out in more detail. 
 
As a side note, one of the readers of this text mentioned that it has an oral quality which comes 
alive when a text-to-speech program is used. It may prove helpful to have the text read in a 
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neutral voice and follow along with your eyes, or to read it out loud or have someone else do so 
(part of the issue has to do with avoiding prejudice we might project into the text when we 
project into the voice of the text).  
 
By the end of our inquiry, we will have some deeper appreciation for the possible limits of our 
epistemic situation, and some concrete suggestions regarding how to move forward. Though we 
will make some concrete suggestions, the inquiry overall is evocative, and it asks for philosophic 
license to get at some subtle points that need to hang together to make more sense.  
 
The discussion of arts of awareness in this version of the inquiry has changed from its original 
intention. I had wanted to include something that one of my readers has been enthusiastic about 
for some time, namely a kind of catalogue of maybe 20 arts of awareness which, upon reading it, 
might provoke an analytic philosopher to say, “Wow! There really are all these other ways of 
knowing, and real people, and even actual philosophers have used these in order to know. Maybe 
there is something to this . . . . Maybe I should look into it further . . . .” That would surely be 
helpful. At the same time, I also think we need to get at the essence of what an art of awareness 
is and how these arts function in a philosophical sense (after all, lots of people engage in these 
practices, often with little in the way of truly “revolutionary” results, so we need to get clear on 
how more significant results can come about). Why we need these arts of awareness and what 
they are (in a general sense) should come across as the inquiry proceeds, and we should also 
sense why they might fail to function in any given case 
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In an appendix the reader will find the outline of one essential practice that I teach to all my 
students, one that has a lot of scientific and cultural support, namely compassion practice. It is 
given in enough detail that it might be tried by any reader. A few other practices will be given in 
enough detail in the inquiry itself that the reader can get a feel for them, but they will require 
other resources in order to go further into them. We focus our energy on a sense of what the arts 
of awareness do. This happens by keeping in mind an example Dewey gives (discussed below), 
as a touchstone for considering a version of Meno paradox: How do we know better, how do we 
get out of our stuckness in doing the wrong thing, as a deeply rooted misknowing? Everything 
we “do” might be just a different version of wrong if we haven’t shifted in the ways the meta-
analysis seeks to invite, and which it invites us to see many traditions of philosophy—east, west, 
and beyond—as also inviting us to see.  
 
The challenges of our inquiry can be more vexing and subtle than we at first might think, and 
because they go so thoroughly into our way of living and our sense of what philosophy is and 
how to properly do it, considering them can feel strange. This gets amplified if the process of 
inquiry draws on things that come from the perspective of a different way of knowing, because 
that different way of knowing will itself seem strange to the current way of knowing. For these 
and other reasons, our work will present possible frustrations, and, in a way, I find them 
humorous and embarrassing. We question here the meaning of philosophy, and we challenge an 
entire way of knowing (an entire culture, really—not as if every single aspect of it needs 
repudiation, but still in a way that seems radical), doing so in language that may often feel all-
too-human, all-too-breezy, all-too-simple. In trying to understand other ways of knowing and a 
new epistemic space that includes them, we will almost inevitably try to do so through the lens of 
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our current way of knowing—in other words, trouble is practically a guarantee, no matter how 
we handle these things, and the best we might hope for in our present context is to try and remind 
ourselves of that fact. We are not just going to read a book like this and suddenly become better 
knowers. That fact is explained in the structure of the epistemology the book invites us to 
contemplate. However, the situation is far from helpless. We can indeed become better knowers, 
become more wise, loving, and beautiful. 
 
To get more properly going into our work, let us say again that we will inquire together into 
knowledge. But “knowledge” is already a problematic term. I might rather say we will inquire 
into “ways of knowing,” and how our “ways of knowing” are failing us. But then we will need to 
understand “ways of knowing,” and what it means that they are “failing us”. We further need to 
understand how a “Revisioning of Philosophy” would help us to know better. With regard to all 
of these things, I find what I want to say rather difficult to say, not least because a genuine 
challenge to any form of “knowledge” would unsurprisingly appear radical from within the 
accepted forms of discourse that take that “knowledge” or “way of knowing” somehow as given. 
For instance, as we already see, to talk about knowledge we need to employ terms, but the terms 
we use in academic discourse (and even in ordinary discourse) come with a particular kind of 
baggage in the case of “knowledge,” “knowing,” “experience,” and other items of interest in 
epistemology. And, as Wittgenstein noted (to a certain extent, within the old epistemology, or 
reflecting its limits), “It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life” (PI 241). How can we 
work together to skillfully and productively challenge our very form of life—in a way that feels 
like progress, or the amelioration of suffering, or both? 
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Though all philosophers struggle with terms in one way or another, John Dewey gives us an 
excellent example of one who struggled with them in relationship to 
epistemological/ethical/aesthetic themes and radical suggestions that may yet reverberate 
throughout the whole of philosophy, and even throughout the culture, including science. In a 
letter to Arthur Bentley, his collaborator on the major work, Knowing and the Known, Dewey 
wrote, 
“Organism” as “an organized body” is as late as the middle of the nineteenth 
century; harmless enough as a synonym for a living creature, but I’d be inclined 
to bet that it was through use in anatomical study of the living body that 
“organism” got so overloaded on the isolated side that even the hyphenated 
expression, organism-environment, fails to strike people as a name for what 
anyone can directly see when he opens his eyes. . . . I am inclined to think we 
should try to find and use a word that wouldn’t be handicapped, as the word 
“organism” (like other Isms) has now been loaded down. I’ll bet ninety readers 
out of a hundred wouldn’t stop to think twice, coming across the expression “a 
dead organism.” The damn “body” has got away with it. (in Ratner & Altman, 
1964, p. 592, cited in Palmer 2004: 336) 
 
The reserved Dewey swearing over terms . . . Isn’t that funny? But Dewey seemed to seek a 
revolution in philosophy, and in a real revolution, terms can get extremely tricky, because we 
face everyone’s habitual tendency to think with old connotations. The Dalai Lama said 
something interesting that weaves together the very notion of revolution with the need to 
challenge the duality of “organism” and “environment”—the very duality that provokes Dewey 
to swear. These words appear in a book appropriately titled, A Call for Revolution: 
I have been inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution that were adopted as 
the motto of the French Republic: Liberté, équalité, fraternité. I adopted the same 
motto. As a Buddhist, the aim of my spiritual quest is to free myself of the 
fundamental ignorance that has led to the notion that there is a division between 
people and the natural world, which is at the root of all our suffering. (2017: 36-8)  
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Trying to accomplish a revolution that overturns this kind of separation (and I think Dewey in his 
own way tried to do this—though he may have lacked the spiritual vision to see it as the root of 
all suffering, which itself marks a radical suggestion), one would naturally encounter all sorts of 
difficulties with language and terms. Thus, “organism” is not the only term Dewey may have 
sworn over, and in the end, his use of terms like “knowledge” and “experience” may have 
forestalled (and in some cases stalled) a wider interest in his work.  
 
Dewey’s style didn’t help. I don’t think of him as a stylist in the manner of Nietzsche or Plato, 
but his challenge to major currents in philosophy may have contributed to a style of writing that 
does not exhibit the kinds of argument we have come to expect in academic philosophy. And he 
did, after all, claim that, “philosophy like art moves in the medium of imaginative mind” (LW 
10: 301). What an interesting suggestion—one that resonates with the sense of “vision” we will 
get at here, as part of Re-Visioning Philosophy. But, such a sense of philosophy could rub some 
readers the wrong way. 
 
Defending Dewey’s style, Aldrich (1944) argued that at least some philosophers should be given 
“philosophic license” in a manner analogous to the “poetic license” granted the artist. For 
Aldrich, “philosophic license” did not imply any distortion of reality (of which we might naïvely 
accuse the poet), but rather allowances made because a philosopher may philosophize quite 
explicitly to “induce the having of those experiences that I called achievements—the task of 
calling into being (evoking) those impressions of mind and its place in nature and of nature and 
its place in mind, the having and preserving of which are necessary conditions of important and 
sane philosophizing” (270). We might call these consummatory experiences (as Dewey does in 
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Art as Experience and elsewhere). Experience in general plays an important role in our inquiry, 
one not too far from its role in Dewey’s work—I would even go so far as to say that certain 
experiences that merit the term “achievement” play a central role, even if we will not analyze or 
embrace Dewey’s technical notion of consummatory experience—and thus it, too, can very 
easily become misunderstood, or may even begin as misunderstood. We will need some degree 
of philosophic license in order to proceed, and we will have to clarify things slowly. As Aldrich 
suggests, a certain mode of philosophizing has as its function “to evoke experiences to be tasted 
and seen, like the Lord, for what they are worth, experiences not to be stretched on the rack of 
‘discursive reason.’ Thus [Dewey’s] notion of philosophy tends to coalesce with the classical one 
of philosophy as vision” (269). That doesn’t mean our inquiry will lack reason—but Dewey 
placed “reason,” too, in his alchemical retort, and he ended up finding the term too problematic 
to maintain, and I have come to agree (at times I, like Dewey, transmute the lead of “reason” into 
the revalued term “intelligence,” “total intelligence,” “original mind,” or “original thinking,” but 
that will come later).  
 
We thus proceed on no firm ground here, and the groundlessness may get worse before it gets 
better—I say that in part because some of the things we will consider in a serious way together 
would have struck me as rather weird even a few years ago. But, this is a quite reasonable 
situation if we really do want to inquire into apparently “deep” epistemic issues, and if we want 
to do so in a way that may lead to some sort of philosophical, scientific, or cultural progress. 
Every step we take needs some qualification, because each step will become inflected by later 
steps, as we attempt to draw closer to new experiences, new experiences that count as new 
achievements for us, and thus may require a new kind of philosophical effort. 
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To begin with a very simple step, we can accept that there are various kinds of knowledge. We 
could talk about a priori knowledge, “knowing how,” “knowing about,” and so on. In a general 
way, like a lot of contemporary philosophers, I have long looked to science as a gold standard of 
knowledge in perhaps the most “serious” sense. To this day, if I want to “know” about a topic, I 
look to available scientific research—not as the last word, and maybe not even as the first word, 
but certainly as a touchstone. As an undergraduate, intending to specialize in philosophy of 
science, I spent many hours in science classes and laboratories. I found physics, biology, 
astronomy, and psychology as fascinating as anything I studied in philosophy courses. The 
philosophical training, it seemed, offered a way to critically reflect on the methods and the 
knowledge claims of the sciences, and perhaps most importantly to try and understand the 
meaning of scientific theory in human life.  
 
Maybe such a view marks off an important task in philosophy. By sticking close to the sciences, 
one might in effect make philosophy more “scientific” or “naturalistic,” keeping away from 
metaphysical speculation (however well-argued) and remaining rooted in the apparent success 
science has demonstrated in its methods. On the other hand, philosophy might help resolve some 
of the issues that a wide range of philosophers have noted in the sciences themselves as well as 
in the culture. With respect to some of these issues, I have at times found the reflections of 
Dewey and Husserl rather helpful, and they do not stand alone in some of their criticisms and 
concerns. Both gave interpretive histories of the rise of science and the development of modern 
philosophy. Husserl spoke of the “crisis” of European sciences, but he made it clear that he did 
not really mean a crisis as far as the fundamental methods of science: 
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A crisis of our sciences as such: can we seriously speak of it? Is not this talk, 
heard so often these days, an exaggeration? After all, the crisis of a science 
indicates nothing less than that its genuine scientific character, the whole manner 
in which it has set its task and developed a methodology for it, has become 
questionable. This may be true of philosophy . . . . But how could we speak 
straightforwardly and quite seriously of a crisis of the sciences in general—that is, 
also of the positive sciences, including pure mathematics and the exact natural 
sciences, which we can never cease to admire as models of rigorous and highly 
successful scientific discipline? (3-4) 
 
In contrast to the admirable stature of science, Husserl suggested that “the ‘unscientific’ 
character of philosophy is unmistakable,” even in the case of comparison to the somewhat 
lowlier humanistic sciences (4-5). Perhaps some philosophers dislike the comparison to begin 
with, but the question remains whether more than a few philosophers have a measure of “physics 
envy” (maybe physicists have it too). Given the stature of science, Husserl wanted to make clear 
that the “crisis” of science had to do with “the loss of its meaning for life” rather than any crisis 
of method per se (5). By a “crisis,” then, he meant, “that of the general lament about the crisis of 
our culture and the role here ascribed to the sciences,” and his inquiry had to do with “subjecting 
the scientific character of all sciences to a serious and quite necessary critique without sacrificing 
their primary sense of scientific discipline, so unimpeachable within the legitimacy of their 
methodic accomplishments” (5). Husserl’s interests seemed to lie not in “the scientific character 
of the sciences but rather what they, or what science in general, had meant and could mean for 
human existence” (5).  
 
In this same lecture, Husserl proceeds to give a provocative summary of the move from the 
medieval period to the Renaissance to the modern period. Conventionally, we think of the 
Renaissance as the rebirth—idealistically speaking, a rebirth out of superstition and oppression 
and into rationality and freedom (one might ask, “If you think you are in a womb of delusion, 
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what will become of you when you are born?”). “Freedom” and “reason” somehow get linked in 
this movement, at least in our interpretation of it. But Husserl emphasizes that the rebirth had to 
do with birthing anew the vision of Ancient philosophy. Husserl asks, What did the Renaissance 
hold to be “essential to ancient man”? He answers that, after a certain degree of “hesitation” 
(perhaps we could call it cultural hesitation, or the hesitation of the collective psyche?), the 
Renaissance comes to embrace,  
nothing less than the “philosophical” form of existence: freely giving oneself, 
one’s whole life, its rule through pure reason or through philosophy. Theoretical 
philosophy is primary. 
A superior survey of the world must be launched, unfettered by myth and 
the whole tradition: universal knowledge, absolutely free from prejudice . . . 
Philosophy as theory frees not only the theorist but any philosophically educated 
person. And theoretical autonomy is followed by practical autonomy. According 
to the guiding ideal of the Renaissance, ancient man forms himself with insight 
through free reason. For this renewed “Platonism” this means not only that man 
should be changed ethically [but that] the whole human surrounding world, the 
political and social existence of mankind, must be fashioned anew through free 
reason, through the insights of a universal philosophy.  
In accordance with this ancient model, recognized at first only by 
individuals and small groups, a theoretical philosophy should again be developed 
which was not to be taken over blindly from the tradition but must grow out of 
independent inquiry and criticism. 
It must be emphasized here that the idea of philosophy handed down from 
the ancients is not the concept of present-day schoolbooks, merely comprising a 
group of disciplines; in the first centuries of the modern period—even though it 
changes not insignificantly as soon as it is taken up—it retains the formal 
meaning of the one all-encompassing science, the science of the totality of what 
is. Sciences in the plural, all those sciences ever to be established or already under 
construction, are but dependent branches of the One Philosophy. In a bold, even 
extravagant, elevation of the meaning of universality, begun by Descartes, this 
new philosophy seeks nothing less than to encompass, in the unity of a theoretical 
system, all meaningful questions in a rigorous scientific manner, with an 
apodictically intelligible methodology, in an unending but rationally ordered 
progress of inquiry. Growing from generation to generation and forever, this one 
edifice of definitive, theoretically interrelated truths was to solve all conceivable 
problems—problems of fact and of reason, problems of temporality and eternity. 
(9) 
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So, on this interpretation, the Renaissance has to do with a rebirth of the philosophical form of 
life—at least, a certain conception of that life. The crisis Husserl invites us to contemplate, the 
general crisis of European culture, has to do with the relative success of science precisely as it 
contrasts with the relative failure of philosophy itself—in spite of the fact that philosophy 
somehow gave us the motivating image that fostered science and its cultural context (as if we 
could separate the two). It may seem unfair to say philosophy “failed,” but Husserl means, very 
loosely speaking, the proliferation of systems and ideas in philosophy, with no sense of how to 
evaluate them (who’s got the best theory?), in contrast to an apparent series of successes in the 
sciences, a capacity to explain more and more phenomena in clear, testable theory, and the 
concomitant appearance of practical applications that ordinary people come to rely on (Einstein 
gives us a compelling, testable theory, and we also end up with radar systems and microwave 
ovens . . . we could ask of philosophy, “What have you done for us lately?”).  
 
Over time, Husserl suggests, scientists became increasingly “unphilosophical” people in some 
sense, and maybe the whole culture did, in that we got oriented to “facts” and began to find 
ourselves living in what Jung (following William James) repeatedly referred to as a “nothing 
but” world. Nietzsche had already called our attention to the “nihilism” that this whole situation 
presented us with, and though opinions may vary, it does not seem unjust to interpret our current 
historical moment as plagued with some significant degree of nihilism, perhaps symptomatic of a 
relative failure of philosophy. This talk of failure needs more context to make sense, I think, but 
we can certainly entertain the notion. 
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Of course, historians of all kinds might vigorously deconstruct such sweeping claims as Husserl 
makes, but one can still hold open the possibility that they capture something that might yet 
affect us. Aside from nihilism, we might suggest that, somehow, what we could refer to as 
“theōria” got seized upon as the essence of philosophy. That seems to form part of Husserl’s 
diagnosis. But does the characterization of ancient philosophy Husserl gives—one that, surely, 
we all can at least admit we recognize and sense running through modern and contemporary 
intellectual life, perhaps even recognize in ourselves—does this accurately capture ancient 
philosophy to begin with? Dewey argues that it does, in an important way (at least once we get to 
the divide between the Eleatic and Heraclitean schools of thought), and that it thus leads us to 
error. As we shall see, the French philosopher Pierre Hadot thinks that this characterization fails 
to capture ancient philosophy, perhaps in an even more important way (one that Dewey might 
have taken great interest in), and thus leads us into error. Either way, what might such an error, if 
it exists, mean for philosophy today, and for the broader western culture?4  
 
I am surprised to find myself suggesting that there is a kind of deep and systemic error here, and 
that it relates to a potentially significant epistemological/ethical/aesthetic problem. Nothing I 
want to say hinges critically on the historical claims made by Husserl or Dewey or Hadot, but 
those historical framings can give us a way to at least begin to picture the problem I would like 
us to try and see. I don’t rest anything on their particular claims, but I do find some interesting 
resonance between some of the things they wanted to get at and some of the things I would like 
us to consider.  
                                                 
4 “western culture” is not monolithic, but we shall see that a certain style of consciousness might 
legitimately be said to prevail among the collective of cultures we could call “western” 
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So, let us turn to Dewey now, as a way to frame some key features of our inquiry into 
knowledge. If Dewey could time travel to our historical moment, he might express some dismay 
at contemporary philosophy in the sense that he would wonder why, as science has continued to 
arrive at knowledge of all sorts of things since Dewey’s time, we still have debates about 
whether knowledge is even possible, and we seem to remain entangled in certain “dualisms” that 
Dewey sought to dispel, such as the dualism of mind and body, organism and environment. In 
this way, he echoes the diagnosis that Husserl makes of our general cultural crisis. 
 
In the book Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, Dewey gives his own sweeping 
history of western thought. In a move that resembles one of Nietzsche’s criticisms of philosophy, 
Dewey tells us that Plato and Aristotle framed their philosophies in a way inflected by their 
culture. No surprise there. But he wants to say that, in particular, both of them let their 
aristocratic status shape their philosophical vision. They both end up valorizing theōria, 
celebrating the intellect, while condemning the body—as if Plato really did take the musings in 
the Republic more literally, he (and Aristotle too) project a “higher” and “lower” of the society 
onto reality itself. Nietzsche put the matter this way: 
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: 
namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and 
unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every 
philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had 
grown. 
 
Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a 
philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what 
morality does all this (does he) aim? Accordingly, I do not believe that a “drive to 
knowledge” is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has, here as 
elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere instrument. 
But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may 
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have been at play just here as inspiring spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find 
that all of them have done philosophy at some time—and that every single one of 
them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of 
existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive wants 
to be master—and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit. (BGE 6) 
 
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche also speaks of the ascetic impulse that lodges itself in the 
philosopher and the scientist, a will to truth, and those reflections are companions to these. They 
also resonate with Dewey. In a line that Dewey claims paraphrases William James, he warns us 
that, “The sickliest way in which a student of philosophy can approach his subject-matter is that 
of a search for ultimate impersonal revelation of truth” (16)—precisely Nietzsche’s diagnosis of 
western philosophy’s and western science’s disease. On the same page, Dewey tells us that 
philosophy is not “one with” science, but that we can justifiably hold that philosophy must 
somehow be “at one” with science, not as much in the conclusions that science has drawn, but in 
its intellectual attitude and methods. Dewey wanted philosophers to become scientific, but not 
scientists. However, Dewey’s own work certainly raises questions about whether science itself 
searches for an “ultimate impersonal revelation of truth,” following in the “Platonic” mode 
(which, perhaps even Plato would have qualified).  
 
For Dewey, ancient Greek thought told its people “the story of Nature as an embracing whole, 
operating according to principle in all its varied changes, a story in which traditional beliefs were 
revised in the light of new observations” (24). But, by the time we get to Plato and Aristotle, 
something has shifted. Dewey’s criticisms hold for both giants of the ancient world, but here he 
frames it specifically around Plato, since Dewey might very well accuse many a modern 
philosopher and scientist of Platonism in his pejorative sense: 
Plato may have erred. But at least for well over a millennium of years Europe trod 
the path he marked out. A corrupt and fallen world could be organized and ruled 
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only by principles drawn from a supernatural realm of Being. It is, at all events, 
not for those who accept the traditional Christian theology to rail at Plato’s 
metaphysics. Special revelation was substituted for the disciplined reason of 
Plato, but the conception of the relation of the natural to the transcendent is the 
same in both systems. The modern Platonist, he who accepts the intuition of 
essences apart from existence, may reject the Christian scheme as well as the 
Platonic idea of philosophy as the supreme political art. But in so doing he only 
repeats in himself acceptance of the modern tradition of an egoistic individualism 
of mind, and adopts also that isolation of knowledge from action which 
demarcates modern thought from Platonic assertions of their indivisible union. 
(43) 
 
Dewey’s history links the intellectualist tradition he sees running from at least Plato with an 
atomization of human beings, a rise and entrenchment of dualities like mind-matter, organism 
-environment, individual-collective, and more. We may not see how all these things go together, 
but we will consider further suggestions later. For now, we might at least notice the possibility 
that, seen from a certain perspective, “reason” in western culture takes on a kind of 
“supernatural” quality that looks very ironic given the conscious impulses of the Renaissance 
and the “age of enlightenment” or “age of reason.” Did western science and philosophy become 
inadvertently “Platonic,” in a way that helped keep the broader culture very “unmodern,” as 
Dewey claims?5 After all, many of our scientists still seek a grand unified theory, and our various 
equations and abstractions do resemble Platonic forms in a way. More specifically, we maintain 
the hierarchical dualisms of a narrowly interpreted Platonic view: Theory-practice, reason-
                                                 
5 To be clear, the quotations around “Platonic” have to do with my own sense that Plato is 
consistently misread by most philosophers (particularly after the decline of Neo-Platonism), in 
part for reasons suggested by Hadot, and, perhaps relatedly, because of the gradual default 
readings that ignored the mystical dimension of Plato’s vision. It seems Dewey, too, misreads 
Plato. The oversimplified “Plato,” which those of an Aristotelean or rationalistic bent like to 
make fun of, then becomes an ironic figure, because it looks like the will to truth that Nietzsche 
rightly critiques (and the “quest for certainty” Dewey rightly critiques). Oddly, that “Plato” also 
sounds a bit fascist, which makes it possible for scientists, analytic philosophers, and many avant 
garde intellectuals (including continental-style philosophers) to evade certain suggestions and 
challenges a more spiritual reading of Plato presents us with. 
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emotion, reason-labor, mind-body, pure-applied, civilized-primitive, city-wilderness, and so on. 
The God of many western philosophers seems to have been a sort of pure rationality, and we 
cannot simply brush off the possibility that our commitment to science and rationality has 
remained a matter of faith, a dogmatic religion in which “science” and “reason” become gods, 
and we become like gods for having eaten from their fruit. 
 
Even if we aren’t sure what to make of these claims, we might still turn to Dewey for a nice 
statement of the clash between the modern and the unmodern, which Dewey, in Art as 
Experience, frames as a clash between the vision of the world science seems to give us on the 
one hand, and the vision of the world we inherit particularly from the Christian tradition: 
Science has brought with it a radically novel conception of physical nature and of 
our relation to it. This new conception stands as yet side by side with the 
conception of the world and man that is a heritage from the past, especially from 
that Christian tradition through which the typically European social imagination 
has been formed. The things of the physical world and those of the moral realm 
have fallen apart, while the Greek tradition and that of the medieval age held them 
in intimate union— although a union accomplished by different means in the two 
periods. The opposition that now exists between the spiritual and ideal elements 
of our historic heritage and the structure of physical nature that is disclosed by 
science, is the ultimate source of the dualisms formulated by philosophy since 
Descartes and Locke. These formulations in turn reflect a conflict that is 
everywhere active in modern civilization. From one point of view the problem of 
recovering an organic place for art in civilization is like the problem of 
reorganizing our heritage from the past and the insights of present knowledge into 
a coherent and integrated imaginative union. 
The problem is so acute and so widely influential that any solution that 
can be proposed is an anticipation that can at best be realized only by the course 
of events (LW10: 340-1). 
 
Given the course of events since Dewey’s death, we may need to actively acknowledge that this 
problem remains acute, and that whatever solutions we thought we proposed have failed 
spectacularly—at least in light of things like the collapse of ecologies and the rise of a post-truth 
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politics. It may also serve us well to recall that the vast majority of the people on this planet are 
religious, and that even so-called “non-religious” people may not think of themselves as atheists. 
If atheism somehow goes together with a secular, scientific, rationalist view of the universe 
(which in some ways it might, even by unconscious association), then we must realize the clash 
of worldviews holds for vast numbers of people. And all of us face issues related to the meaning 
of life, even though such questions as “the meaning of life” don’t seem to occupy philosophers in 
the manner they used to. For Dewey, such a shift away from “the meaning of life” might be part 
of how unmodern we modern philosophers remain. 
 
But Dewey seems to emphasize how our unmodernness manifests quite clearly in epistemology. 
Arguably, everything we do depends on knowledge in some way, such that, if we thought we had 
a systematic problem with how we know things (maybe one that somehow pervaded all the 
forms of knowledge we distinguish), then we might have a very big problem indeed. That is what 
we will consider in our inquiry. And we will try to see how our current way of knowing 
contributes to our spectacular failure to find a workable solution to the “acute” and “widely 
influential” problem Dewey and Husserl describe. But, in a way, we will go further than Husserl 
and say that the crisis actually implicates science more than we might think it could. Given that 
many of us share Husserl’s and Dewey’s respect for science, and that many philosophers actually 
hold philosophy itself in a rather high regard as a rigorous and rational discipline, some of the 
strangest possibilities we will uncover have to do with problems in science as a way of knowing, 
and philosophy too. This follows naturally once we really see and accept that we question forms 
of life as we question forms of discourse and epistemic practices. It is not merely the meaning of 
the world that we must turn toward, but, turning toward that, we turn toward the meaning of 
44 
 
science itself, and philosophy too. Once we see them clearly, we will be able to suggest that, in 
an important sense, our science and our philosophy lack rigor, and what we think we know, 
scientifically or philosophically, has some deep, systemic issues, with serious ethical import.  
 
Perhaps we could begin by mentioning a few aspects of the new epistemology. One might think 
we would need to undertake a major critique of current epistemological theories and practices 
first, and then make suggestions for a new way of knowing. But it will serve us to plant a few 
seeds that will have a chance to germinate as our inquiry moves along. The basic epistemology 
offered here requires a few deeply interrelated terms to describe it, none of which is easy to 
explain beyond a surface understanding. For one, this epistemology is the epistemology of 
practice-realization. The term already brings out a problem: We will tend to think of practice, 
and then realization. That is an error. However, it also offers us a way to begin to understand the 
epistemology. So, we can try in a preliminary way to work with the error.  
 
To do that, let us first note that “realization” carries two connotations, and one way to understand 
the difference realization makes to knowing abides in the difference between them. We might 
say to someone, “I realize that what you are saying has to do with an epistemological problem.” 
There it functions like a synonym for “know,” so that we could have said, “Now I know what 
you mean.” But the other connotation of “realize” allows us to say, “My dream has finally been 
realized.” A bringing-to-fruition has occurred.6  
 
                                                 
6 Nishitani Keiji (last name first) makes a similar distinction. See his Religion and Nothingness. 
He also deals with the problem of nihilism as diagnosed by Nietzsche. Both Religion and 
Nothingness and The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism are worth reading in this regard. 
45 
 
We will eventually want to see that what we know amounts to what we practice-realize, and that 
we never avoid this, no matter if we practice skillful knowing or unskillful ignorance. What we 
practice is what we realize. In ordinary experience, we could distinguish three aspects of this 
movement to knowing something: Receiving, reflecting, and realizing. At any stage, we might 
talk about a certain measure of “knowledge,” but we will find it helpful to begin to say that we 
only really know something when we reach the stage of realization. In the case of learning 
philosophy, we first receive a philosophical teaching, resolving basic questions. With a text, we 
might ask, “Do I understand the thesis? Did I misread anything? Do I have a basic sense of what 
the author tried to say?” Just as we wouldn’t want our students to think they “know” very much 
about a certain book or article because they can state the thesis and basic arguments of the work, 
we wouldn’t want to call this anything more than a preliminary understanding. From reception 
we turn to reflection. Although we might read the text critically all along, reflection involves 
more extended sitting with the ideas, invitations, suggestions, evidence, nuances, and alleged 
conclusions of the text. Here we might apply careful analysis, engage in discussion and debate 
with others, turn to a commentarial literature if available, and do all that we can to test the text 
and its ideas. In the modern academy, we typically stop there (this is what we practice, and thus 
it is what we bring to realization), and one suggestion of our inquiry comes to this: Leaving the 
process of knowing at these two stages involves a lack of rigor, leading to consistent 
misunderstanding of at least some philosophers, and constituting a systematic limitation of our 
epistemic situation.  
 
Before saying more about realization, let us pause to note another term: epistemic situation. Let’s 
not obsess over any of the terms in this text, but we will pause for some of them when helpful. 
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For now, let us say that our epistemic situation has to do with what we know along with our state 
as knowers and the context in which we find ourselves. To improve our epistemic situation 
would mean to improve ourselves as knowers, to improve the context of our knowing (a context 
which must extend to the larger cultural and natural ecologies), and thus improve our 
understanding and our experience of life, reducing negative side-effects from our way of 
knowing. It means coming-to-know something we find significant, and which we did not 
previously know. 
 
This brings us back to our stages of knowing. The third stage is realization, and we will need 
some extended contemplation of it in order to genuinely appreciate (perhaps to realize) what it 
means for epistemology. Realization tends to involve the application of specific practices 
(usually non-textual ones) that carry us from a more intellectual understanding (which marks a 
preliminary or provisional understanding) to a fuller insight—as if all reason could possibly do, 
in the end, was to bring us to the gateway of true understanding, and then some sort of 
“transrational” process had to carry us across the threshold. It will take some time to explain 
what any of this means and why it might be important.  
 
Again, we noted that one way to understand the difference realization makes to knowing abides 
in the word itself. In the case of saying, “My dream has finally been realized,” we may ask: What 
dream? and, What does it feel like to realize a dream? It may feel very differently from what we 
thought or what we told others or ourselves. Realization in this second sense cuts through words 
and ideas, and may then restore them, giving them a depth of meaning they previously lacked. 
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Among other things, I want to suggest that our way of using words—and in general our thought, 
speech, and activity—can become something like a froth that covers over the potential clarity of 
experience and the possibilities for more intimate experience, a froth that obscures certain 
aspects of what we are and what life is.7 Thought, speech and activity do not have to function 
this way. Even Indo-European languages do not have to act as rubble covering over a priceless 
treasure, but these languages in particular, and the culture of conquest in which they have been 
practiced and which they perpetuate, may both embody and encourage (seduce us into) a kind of 
ignorance (even, a pattern of insanity) that we need to overcome. Furthermore, there may be 
things in various cultural and philosophical traditions (even our own)—and there may be things 
yet for us to discover—that in some significant way defy our words and concepts, things that 
burst the boundaries of language, identity, logic, and worldview—and perhaps any time we even 
draw near such things, we keep them at bay, busy as we make ourselves with knowing, labeling, 
analyzing, critiquing, tidying up, making things expedient, reading in “causal” links, reasoning, 
rationalizing, and so on.  
 
We will deal with some of these issues of language increasingly as our inquiry proceeds, but let 
us sense at the outset that it takes time to deal with language as a froth—not just here, but in our 
lives—and the froth keeps us at a distance from the deep waters of the soul. We become trapped 
in the froth, trapped at a distance from things we may very much like to know, even need to 
know, as a matter of survival and/or maturation. And there is just no “easy way around” these 
                                                 
7 This is like an inversion of the claim that all experience is theory-laden. We can begin to see 
how all theory is experience-laden, and we may conclude that, if we suffer from an 
impoverishment of experience, we will produce impoverished theories about ourselves, others, 
and the world. Impoverished experience means impoverished knowledge. What are the richest, 
most vitalizing kinds of experience? 
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challenges—though there are practices that can at least temporarily blow the froth aside, so that 
we may glimpse some new clarity, touch some heretofore unknown intimacy—which, again, we 
designate as realization. 
 
We might say that all the discussion here (the whole of the book) in the end amounts to a bit of 
froth that somehow might invite us into the water rather than keeping us at the surface, that it 
could lead to a moment of blowing the froth aside and glimpsing a new clarity and even touching 
or entering the water to experience a new intimacy. We might say that all spiritual or 
philosophical traditions engage in this froth-making, which in skillful cases seduces people into 
the water, and in less skillful cases keeps them clinging to the cliffs, covered in foam. We can 
live immediately, but in many cultures (maybe all of them) the spiritual or philosophical 
traditions must mediate for us, becoming a gateway to our own life, our own fresh experience.  
 
In our own culture, time grinds on, developing in us a resistance to realization. We get into a 
groove of habit and routine, a groove that can become so deep we might despair of ever knowing 
differently—or maybe the groove seduces us into simply resting easy in our skepticism regarding 
anything beyond the procedures for knowing we already employ. In our culture, too, the 
philosopher could function as a medial figure, one who mediates between realms, so to speak, 
mediating the process of realization. Think of Socrates, who described himself as a midwife of 
the soul, but also gave us, through Plato, the image of the philosopher mediating between our 
imprisonment in a cave of delusion, our bondage in suffering, and the bright light of “Goodness,” 
which he seemed to revere as something sacred, and something deeply healing and 
transformative for the psyche. That sort of mediation can make us think we should devalue this 
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world, but “this world” remains a delusion. We might say that the “ultimate realm” is always 
“reality,” however we might try to understand that, and, in many traditions, this “reality” is here-
and-now—this world, this heart and mind, this body, this cosmos, these fellow beings, all our 
relations. The philosopher thus mediates an intraworldly transcendence (as opposed to an 
“otherworldly” one). Even a Christian philosopher may mediate such a transformation—such 
that the divine becomes realized here-and-now, in, through, as this moment, arrived at when we 
cut through, dive through the froth of words and habits that cover over our own nature, cover 
over the sacred, cover over reality, cover over the living world. 
 
All of this may sound a bit woo-woo. But we can try to treat it very pragmatically, as it is 
intended. For instance, the Buddha as a philosopher did something truly wondrous: He made 
explicit his medial function, even more beautifully than Plato did. In the famous Water Snake 
Discourse (Majjhima Nikaya 22), Buddha did two incredible things: He put a warning on his 
teachings, and he put a caveat on them. The warning gives the discourse its name: He said we 
should handle his philosophy the way we would handle a poisonous snake. What a thing to say! 
And yet, every philosopher from every tradition should say the same thing, for every philosophy, 
every religion, every concept, every practice, every political orientation, every idea can be used 
to perpetuate and even deepen structures of domination and oppression, both “inside” of us (the 
psychological, the spiritual, etc.) and “outside” of us (the social, the political, the familial, etc.). 
This is called the problem of spiritual materialism, and it seems to me the most troubling of 
philosophical issues, the fertile ground for countless evils and delusions, and something every 
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rigorous epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics should seek to address. Buddha’s direct facing of 
this problem stands as yet another example of his sophisticated genius.8  
 
So does his caveat, which appears throughout the Buddhist spiritual and philosophical traditions 
as the concept of Upaya or Skillful Means. Buddha said we should treat his philosophy like a 
raft. He made it with what he found lying about, not from any special components, and he made 
it just for the purposes of crossing a river—let us think of it as the crossing from ignorance to 
relative wisdom, from not knowing something important to knowing it such that we can embody 
it . . . we can even think of it as getting out of the cave of delusion. We are talking about 
something concrete here, the concreteness of our suffering and confusion, and how we might 
transform that. We are just talking about a process of mediation, practice-realization, that gets us 
to know something we currently don’t know—something significant enough that our feeling for 
life somehow shifts. It is like a shift in how everything seems to hang together, a shift in our 
                                                 
8 It’s all-too-easy to point at, for instance, Christian rationalizations for war or for economic 
policies that perpetuate inequality as examples of spiritual materialism, or to point out that yoga, 
once a serious spiritual practice or set of practices, has become mere exercise and socialization, 
something trendy and distracting, or that hedge fund managers and coders practice meditation. 
But it would behoove us to see that, even though Buddha addressed this problem directly, 
Buddhists can still get hooked by it. Though Buddhism has no equivalent of the Crusades that I 
can think of, Buddhist philosophy was distorted incredibly in Japan during WWII, and it 
continues to be distorted in places like Burma. This precisely proves Buddha’s point. Christians, 
militant atheists, and all “scientific” thinkers should remind themselves of this problem of 
spiritual materialism with respect to their own traditions and their own lives, and also with 
respect to Islam, which, in relationship with the dominant culture, has often been distorted in 
incredible ways. In speaking of such distortion, we never need to get pulled into notion of a “one 
true religion,” such as created bloodshed between Protestants and Catholics, as well as between 
Christians and Muslims, for we mean by spiritual materialism anything that leads to 
rationalizations for violence, control, conquest, domination, inequality, aggression, and so on. 
Many misreadings of Plato that would accuse him of fascism may themselves be a brand of 
spiritual materialism, for Plato’s spiritual tendencies present challenges to internal and external 
domination which some part of us may prefer to avoid. 
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basic vision of life, our basic feel for life. Perhaps an analogy would be the shift from Newtonian 
physics to relativity and quantum theory. In an important sense, the latter put us in a very 
different world. In philosophical or spiritual matters, this shift should feel healing, invigorating, 
inspiring, insightful, and heart-opening. We will say a little more about that below. 
 
The point for now is that, once we get to the “other side,” once we experience realization, we 
would err if we carried the raft around with us. It would only weigh us down and become a new 
kind of bondage. Likewise we err in treating the raft as precious and carrying it around with us 
on this side of the river—never bothering to put it in the water and undertake the crossing. The 
raft must carry us across—to the here-and-now (as if arriving in our lives for the first time), to 
our own true nature, to reality, to skillful and realistic living, to attunement with wisdom, love, 
and beauty, to atonement with Sophia. We use the raft to arrive at a beautiful life, not to show off 
the raft as a beautiful thing—though it can be essential to value and revere sacred teachings. 
 
These extensive contemplations related to realization signify its importance. That stage matters 
the most, but we cannot start there. Perhaps we can leap into some taste of realization at any 
moment of our lives. But the practices that “lead to” realization are often powerful, and they can 
end up getting us further into delusion rather than helping us become truly wise, loving, and 
beautiful, and making the world more beautiful, loving, and wise in the process. This is why the 
most philosophical of these practices have not been taught without a great deal of ethical 
grounding and the framing of a worldview.  
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The epistemology we inquire into is thus relative, relational, and non-local (even though it 
emphasizes rootedness in place, in landscape, in moments). It does not deal in ultimate truth in 
the way the west has typically pursued this notion, and we cannot simply take up these “arts of 
awareness” and think we can apply them willy-nilly to solve our problems or come to insights. 
Or, let us say that we can in fact do that (we most certainly can, and even western science has 
documented instances of this, for at least some of the practices), but, considered from a broad 
perspective, it will likely create more suffering and ultimately perpetuate a pattern of insanity (as 
evidenced, for instance, in the case of all the meditating hedge fund managers, or the techies who 
micro-dose or go on ayahuasca vacations in South America). All of this also matters because a 
thoroughly relational epistemology is actually so strange that we must remind ourselves again 
and again that we misunderstand it until we bring it to realization, and this only happens 
relationally, dependent on our ethical practices and our basic intentions and vision of life.  
 
To make the strangeness of a relational epistemology clear, let us consider an excerpt from a 
lecture Gregory Bateson delivered: 
Look at your hand now . . . very quietly, almost as part of meditation. And 
try to catch the difference between seeing it as a base for five parts and seeing it 
as constructed of a tangle of relationships. Not a tangle, a pattern of the 
interlocking of relationships which were the determinants of its growth. And if 
you can really manage to see the hand in terms of the epistemology I am offering 
you, I think you will find your hand is suddenly much more recognizably 
beautiful . . . I am suggesting to you, first, that language is very deceiving, and, 
second, that if you begin even without much knowledge to adventure into what it 
would be like to look at the world with a biological epistemology, you will come 
into contact with concepts biologists don’t look at at all. You will meet with 
beauty . . .  
It’s not a new idea that living things have immanent beauty, but it is 
revolutionary to assert, as a scientist, that matters of beauty are really highly 
formal, very real, and crucial to the entire political and ethical system in which we 
live. 
. . . . Is the word “possession” applicable at all to relations? 
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Perhaps it will suffice to show that what I am saying, if taken seriously—
and I say it in all seriousness—would make an almost total change in the way we 
live, the way we think about our lives, and about each other and ourselves.  
Perhaps a curriculum is like a hand in that every piece and component of 
what they would call a curriculum is really related ideally to the other components 
as fingers are related to each other and to the whole hand . . . . we Anglo-Saxons 
do not learn to live in a language because we believe that it is made of separate 
parts . . . We have lost by the time we are twelve the idea of language as a living 
organized pattern. 
. . . . And now, perhaps because you are Anglo-Saxons, and I am an 
Anglo-Saxon, you will want to ask me, “But how are we to achieve . . . a holistic 
education?” . . . The question springs from an already dissected universe, and 
therefore asks for an answer which cannot be the answer. It asks for an answer in 
terms of a dissected universe, and that answer I will not give you. It would not be 
an answer. 
We face a paradox in that I cannot tell you how to educate the young, or 
yourselves, in terms of the epistemology which I have offered you except you first 
embrace that epistemology. The answers must already be in your head and in your 
rules of perception. You must know the answer to your question before I can give 
it to you. I wish that every teacher, schoolmaster, parent, and older sibling could 
hear the thunderous voice out of the whirlwind: “Who is this that darkeneth 
counsel by words without understanding? . . . Dost thou know when the hinds 
bring forth? . . . Where wast thou when I set up the pillars of the earth”? I mean 
the thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth, and fortieth chapters of the Book of Job. The 
pietistic silly old man thought he was pretty good and thought God was just like 
him, but finally he was enlightened by an enormous lesson, a thunderous lesson in 
natural history and in the beauty of the natural world. 
Of course natural history can be taught as a dead subject. I know that, but I 
believe also that perhaps the monstrous atomistic pathology at the individual 
level, at the family level, at the national level and the international level—the 
pathology of wrong thinking in which we all live—can only in the end be 
corrected by an enormous discovery of those relations in nature which make up 
the beauty of nature. (Steps: 310) 
 
This puts a great deal of our epistemology—and the incredible challenges of attempting to arrive 
at it—on the table, up front, even if we will eventually have to unpack quite a lot over the course 
of our inquiry. We will clarify a few of the issues slightly in a moment, but first I want to make a 
suggestion: If we follow Bateson carefully above, we will understand why he also says this: 
If I ask you how many fingers you have, you will probably answer, “Five.” That I 
believe to be an incorrect answer. The correct answer, I believe, is, “Gregory you 
are asking a question wrongly.” In the process of human growth, there is surely no 
word which means finger, and no word which means five. There might be a word 
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for “branching” . . . . You should be counting not the things which are related, but 
the relationships . . . 
 
I want to suggest that things are stranger than Bateson indicates. He himself falls back into 
“counting”. He properly challenges us to question whether “possession” applies to relationships, 
but that in part has to do with their status as non-things, and as non-local. We can’t possess what 
we can’t count, so to speak. The two go together in some deeper sense, in a certain style of 
consciousness or way of thinking and knowing. Relationships should not be reified, and mind 
should not be localized. 
 
But let us link this passage to the one from Dewey we considered above. We might say that, 
“ninety readers out of a hundred wouldn’t stop to think twice, coming across the expression ‘a 
dead organism,’” and we might say that ninety readers out of a hundred wouldn’t stop to think 
twice, coming across the expression, “I have five fingers,” or even, “I know how many fingers I 
have on my right hand.” We will eventually want to carry this same basic epistemic conversion 
into something like this: “Though ninety readers out of a hundred wouldn’t stop to think twice 
about the phrase, ‘We know how to put a human being on the moon,’ I want to suggest that the 
answer to the question, ‘Do we know how to put a human being on the moon?’ is something like, 
‘You are asking wrongly—and terribly so,’ or we may go so far as to say the answer is better put 
as ‘No!’ than even a qualified ‘yes.’” This will take time to appreciate, but let the seed begin to 
germinate. An admittedly strange suggestion, it indicates the strangeness of our inquiry. 
 
I said I would clarify a few more things now regarding what Bateson lays out for us. A relational 
way of knowing is actually more properly called ecological (not merely “biological,” and I think 
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Bateson would agree), one that somehow roots itself and us in a kind of intimacy with Nature, as 
if it returns us to Nature or puts us into a more participatory mode in relation to the natural 
world. We could call it a style of thinking or a style of consciousness, a general attitude and 
worldview, a way of life, experienced holistically. There is a sense of wonder in it, the wonder 
that marks the beginning of philosophy, as well as the path and the goal of philosophy. The 
relations we are talking about actually constitute us, thus knowing in a relational manner means 
the realization of ourselves, not simply a knowing of the world, as if the world were an object or 
consisted of objects. Subject and object no longer remain in a dualistic separation. Relations are 
not a tangle, but a kind of creative ordering, which we might sense with a feeling of awe, 
wonder, even sacredness.  
 
Bateson, a lifelong atheist, emphasized the sacred and might call what we inquire into here an 
epistemology of the sacred, or a sacred epistemology—both terms I hope to make acceptable to 
the reader in time, along with another, the epistemology of the soul. Bateson tries to approach 
sacredness in many ways, including the following: 
We are beginning to play with ideas of ecology, and although we 
immediately trivialize these ideas into commerce or politics, there is at least an 
impulse still in the human breast to unify and thereby sanctify the total natural 
world, of which we are. 
            Observe, however, that there have been, and still are, in the world many 
different and even contrasting epistemologies which have been alike in stressing 
an ultimate unity, and, although this is less sure, which have also stressed the 
notion that ultimate unity is aesthetic. The uniformity of these views gives hope 
that perhaps the great authority of quantitative science may be insufficient to deny 
an ultimate unifying beauty. 
            I hold to the presupposition that our loss of the sense of aesthetic unity 
was, quite simply, an epistemological mistake. I believe that that mistake may be 
more serious that all the minor insanities that characterize those older 
epistemologies which agreed upon the fundamental unity. (MN:18) 
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The goal of our inquiry includes helping to make accessible the notion that we can all—in our 
own ways, in our own religious, spiritual, and philosophical traditions—we can all agree that we 
share the possibility, the potential of touching a sacredness in Nature and in ourselves. We will 
speak more about how Bateson and other non-religious thinkers can help us all, theist and atheist 
alike, to productively work with a sense of sacredness, shifting our understanding of how what 
we might call religion or spirituality might play a vital role in a better way of knowing. 
 
The earlier, longer passage from Bateson puts something else on the table: The epistemology of 
practice-realization is also experimental and experiential, which means we have two other 
critical terms to manage. We will have to say at least a few key things about them, drawing from 
Nietzsche and Dewey. They will help us understand why we are so trapped in a way of knowing 
that might be very problematic, and they will help us to see how we can make philosophy more 
rigorous, realistic, skillful, and graceful. But obviously a term like “experience” is vast, and 
eventually merits its own dissertation. We will say only enough about any of these terms to make 
the epistemology comprehensible in a basic way. The epistemology itself indicates their 
understanding comes only in the practice of the epistemology itself (something Bateson mentions 
above as well). We do not understand this way of knowing until we know by means of it. Thus 
Bateson has touched on much of value to us in our inquiry, and he has perhaps presented the 
great challenge of the inquiry: How can we get suspicious enough about our current way of 
knowing that we could actually let go of it, let go even of ourselves (what we think we are, what 
we cling to) sufficiently to change our way of knowing? Can we raise enough sincere questions 
about our current way of thinking that we might, even in the process of this questioning, begin to 
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let go a little, and perhaps glimpse (if not fully see) things from a significantly shifted 
perspective?  
 
It’s worth giving this a little more emphasis, as part of understanding the difficulties of our 
epistemic situation. Let us turn again to Dewey. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey offers a 
delightful inquiry into habit, and we must deal with habits of thought, speech, and action if we 
want anything to improve about our way of knowing—a problem that applies even within the 
dominant epistemology, and all the more so if we want to enter into a better way of knowing. 
The passage we will look at is so astonishing in its simplicity that we will consider a lengthy 
excerpt, after a few framing remarks. Part of what we may accomplish by looking at it now has 
to do with planting the seed for another term we will employ to describe the new epistemology: 
Use.  
 
We all know how challenging it can be to learn to use a new device. We had to learn how to use 
smart phones, laptops, ATM’s, and even had to relearn how to use cars as they have changed. 
For instance, one doesn’t use the brakes on a car with anti-lock brakes as one does the old type of 
car.  
 
Imagine if a group of scientists from various fields announced a press conference. A team of 
archaeologists, astrophysicists, quantum physicists, psychologists, ecologists, and many others 
had gotten together because of a remarkable finding, a discovery so surprising that all of these 
experts joined forces to verify an astonishing hypothesis. They found a device, an artefact, and 
after a series of surprising discoveries about it, they began to probe it with ever greater care and 
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nuance. It seemed to give off a mysterious energy, and after a tremendous amount of work, 
everyone had agreed that, whatever this thing might be exactly, it gave clear evidence of having 
the capacity to destroy the planet. However, it also gave exceedingly optimistic evidence that it 
could actually “save” the planet—meaning that this device seemed to have the capacity (and the 
scientists could barely stand the strangeness of saying so) to do the following: Stop the mass 
extinction of species, stop the general collapse of the conditions of life, end war, end poverty, 
end consumerism, end racism and all forms of discrimination, and in general lead to a period of 
relative peace, compassion, wisdom, and well-being, as well as a flowering of creativity and 
intelligence, perhaps even a revolution in science and the arts. The scientists felt practically 
embarrassed by these claims, and this in part explained why so many experts had been brought 
into the project, each to verify these claims as far as possible. After saying all of this, and getting 
everyone in the room worked into a frenzy, the scientists presented an unfortunate caveat: They 
could not for the life of them figure out how to use this artefact. They tried yelling at it. They 
tried shocking it with various kinds of energy. They tried pushing on it in various places. They 
analyzed its composition in countless ways, put it into every scanner they had. They could get it 
to do various things, but they had become convinced that, if they only knew how to use it 
properly, it would mark a turning point. On the other hand, continuing to do the things they had 
so far been doing, they admitted, might trigger the destructive side. Of course, doing nothing, we 
all still face the crises the device seems to have the capacity to help us avoid or at least mitigate.  
 
Obviously, the artefact is the human being. And the story creates problems in the sense that it 
deals with an object, and not an ecology or a living system of relations, interwoven with Nature. 
However, it serves to frame our epistemology in that a better way of knowing would see our 
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current way of knowing the way we might see someone hitting their touchscreen with a hammer: 
They don’t know how to use the thing. It’s bad use to pump anti-lock brakes, or to fail to change 
the oil in a standard engine, or to drive at high speed in very wet conditions, to clean a laptop by 
taking it in the shower, and so on. Though we may think we know how to use our car, our phone, 
and our laptop, the history of philosophy and science together with the present state of the 
ecologies on our planet suggest that we don’t know how to use whatever it is that uses the car, 
the phone, and the laptop. And, perhaps despairingly, the problem presents a lot of subtle 
challenges—including ethical and aesthetic ones. Dewey tries to get at some of those in the 
following passage: 
Recently a friend remarked to me that there was one superstition current 
among even cultivated persons. They suppose that if one is told what to do, if the 
right end is pointed to them, all that is required in order to bring about the right 
act is will or wish on the part of the one who is to act. He used as an illustration 
the matter of physical posture; the assumption is that if a man is told to stand up 
straight, all that is further needed is wish and effort on his part, and the deed is 
done. He pointed out that this belief is on a par with primitive magic in its neglect 
of attention to the means which are involved in reaching an end. And he went on 
to say that the prevalence of this belief, starting with false notions about the 
control of the body and extending to control of mind and character, is the greatest 
bar to intelligent social progress. It bars the way because it makes us neglect 
intelligent inquiry to discover the means which will produce a desired result, and 
intelligent invention to procure the means. In short, it leaves out the importance of 
intelligently controlled habit. 
We may cite his illustration of the real nature of a physical aim or order 
and its execution in its contrast with the current false notion. A man who has a 
bad habitual posture tells himself, or is told, to stand up straight. If he is interested 
and responds, he braces himself, goes through certain movements, and it is 
assumed that the desired result is substantially attained; and that the position is 
retained at least as long as the man keeps the idea or order in his mind. Consider 
the assumptions which are here made. It is implied that the means or effective 
conditions of the realization of a purpose exist independently of established habit 
and even that they may be set in motion in opposition to habit. It is assumed that 
means are there, so that the failure to stand erect is wholly a matter of failure of 
purpose and desire. It needs paralysis or a broken leg or some other equally gross 
phenomenon to make us appreciate the importance of objective conditions.  
 Now in fact a man who can stand properly does so, and only a man who 
can, does. In the former case, fiats of will are unnecessary, and in the latter 
60 
 
useless. A man who does not stand properly forms a habit of standing improperly, 
a positive, forceful habit. The common implication that his mistake is merely 
negative, that he is simply failing to do the right thing, and that the failure can be 
made good by an order of will is absurd. One might as well suppose that the man 
who is a slave of whiskey-drinking is merely one who fails to drink water. 
Conditions have been formed for producing a bad result, and the bad result 
will occur as long as those conditions exist. They can no more be dismissed by a 
direct effort of will than the conditions which create drought can be dispelled by 
whistling for wind. It is as reasonable to expect a fire to go out when it is ordered 
to stop burning as to suppose that a man can stand straight in consequence of a 
direct action of thought and desire. The fire can be put out only by changing 
objective conditions; it is the same with rectification of bad posture. 
 Of course something happens when a man acts upon his idea of standing 
straight. For a little while, he stands differently, but only a different kind of badly. 
He then takes the unaccustomed feeling which accompanies his unusual stand as 
evidence that he is now standing right. But there are many ways of standing 
badly, and he has simply shifted his usual way to a compensatory bad way at 
some opposite extreme. When we realize this fact, we are likely to suppose that it 
exists because control of the body is physical and hence is external to mind and 
will. Transfer the command inside character and mind, and it is fancied that an 
idea of an end and the desire to realize it will take immediate effect. After we get 
to the point of recognizing that habits must intervene between wish and execution 
in the case of bodily acts, we still cherish the illusion, that they can be dispensed 
with in the case of mental and moral acts. Thus the net result is to make us 
sharpen the distinction between nonmoral and moral activities, and to lead us to 
confine the latter strictly within a private, immaterial realm. But in fact, formation 
of ideas as well as their execution depends upon habit. If we could form a correct 
idea without a correct habit, then possibly we could carry it out irrespective of 
habit. But a wish gets definite form only in connection with an idea, and an idea 
gets shape and consistency only when it has a habit back of it. Only when a man 
can already perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to 
have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required for proper 
execution. The act must come before the thought, and a habit before an ability to 
evoke the thought at will. Ordinary psychology reverses the actual state of affairs. 
(MW14: 23-5) 
 
There is more nuance than some readers might at first notice, partly because we don’t turn our 
attention to activity with enough clarity and patience, busy as we are with other philosophical 
practices. This example should be held as something sacred, for it gets at the essence of our 
inquiry. We somehow need to see the profundity of asking, “With what mind will I stand up 
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straight?” We will hold this example as a touchstone, and along the way try to illuminate its 
meaning. 
 
For the time-being, let’s consider a few details. We can notice, for instance, how Dewey seems 
to prefigure here what he will say a few years later in his Terry Lectures, which come to us as the 
book, A Common Faith. There Dewey tells us, “The emphasis that has [in these lectures] been 
put upon intelligence as a method should not mislead anyone. Intelligence, as distinct from the 
older conception of reason, is inherently involved in action” (LW 9: 53). As we alluded to 
previously, a contrast between “reason” and “intelligence” will prove fruitful. There is something 
in our current set of habits, the habits of thought, speech, and action, the habits of knowing that 
we employ even in the academy, that we need to somehow see as bad “use” of ourselves and our 
world. But—it currently feels right. When we engage in a habit, even if the habit constitutes bad 
use of ourselves, it often still appears phenomenologically with an inherent rightness to it—an 
experience of rightness—and doing something different can often at first feel wrong. Of course, 
as Dewey makes clear, once we get the sense that we have practiced a bad habit (a bad way of 
knowing, a bad way of living), doing anything can amount to just another “doing,” another way 
of getting things wrong. We can’t think our way out of bad thinking or knowing any better than 
we can do our way out of any other bad doing. And our attempts to try amount to magical 
thinking in the pejorative sense. Instead, we will have to get in touch with something that bears 
the same relation to knowing that knowing itself bear to all our activities. 
 
As the example Dewey gives shows us, we cannot really formulate the idea of knowing better 
until we can know better. However, consider that one who stands properly does not do so by 
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means of an idea, but by means of proper standing. Thus, while only such a person could 
formulate a full and rich idea of standing that might somehow prove useful, that very person has 
little use for the idea, because, if we might put it poetically, they take refuge in standing itself, in 
activity, in the wholeness of activity, and not in a stepping out of activity to “think” about it. This 
is what we shall try to get at as the contrast between intelligence and reason. Reason in the old 
sense involves a distance that in fact doesn’t function in a living world. Meanwhile, intelligence 
is a kind of living thinking that does not operate on the basis of “ideas,” which are a matter of 
mind in a narrow sense. Instead, this thinking functions on the basis of the ecology of mind, 
meaning loops or circuits or networks of mind (forgive the mechanical analogies) that of 
necessity transcend our habitual consciousness. This will become clearer as our inquiry 
progresses, and, again, we just plant a few seeds now. 
 
If we cannot productively tell someone to, “Stand up straight,” how much less productive must it 
be to say, “Know better,” or, “Fix the problems of the world,” or, “Be a better person”? We 
return here, in general, to a very old question of philosophy and religion: Why do people do 
unethical things? Aristotle had a notion of “weakness of will.” Dewey clarifies even further why 
this is a bit silly: Willing our way into “the good” (whatever good we want to aim at) amounts to 
just another kind of doing—and, put in religious terms, doing simply expresses our original sin 
(we will clarify this later by means of a story from Bateson, our resident atheist). We cannot 
correct our original sin by means of original sin. Of course, the original sin itself can be nothing 
other than our actual nature, whatever that may be, but this is a matter of spiritual tautology, not 
anything functional or ethical.  
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Some of that may be hard to understand until later in the inquiry. Let’s put it this way: Aristotle 
did us no small disfavor in speaking about weakness of will, because correct or realistic effort is 
an altogether sort of thing (a come-and-see thing—as in, “come and find out for yourself, 
because I cannot tell you about it,” as with “the Good” in Plato), and when we think we have got 
weakness of will or anything less than a holistic problem, an ecological problem that includes 
context, we end up doing more of the same—at least on a fundamental level. A person who 
drinks too much when they go out to a bar does not have a problem of akrasia, or weakness of 
will. Rather, they have a problem with the way they organize their life (we could say, more 
poetically yet more precisely, a problem with the way they attune their soul), and transformation 
will come when they stop putting themselves in bars, where they will face the repeated defeat of 
their alleged conscious purposes. Such a person needs new friends and new interests, not more 
“will power”. Whatever Dewey may say about the place of concepts like “self” and “personality” 
in ancient Greece (and they most certainly differ from our own), we can nevertheless sense how 
Aristotle may here be putting us on the road to disaster as he tempts us to locate certain problems 
“inside” of us, without clarifying the way that “inside” goes altogether with “outside”. In any 
case, we do not transform by “willing” transformation, because we cannot “do” what we are. 
This is perhaps what Dewey is trying to get at when he writes above, “Conditions have been 
formed for producing a bad result, and the bad result will occur as long as those conditions 
exist.” Such reflections lead us almost into that “conditions of possibility” talk of the continental 
philosopher. Perhaps we do work in that spirit. What are the conditions of possibility for 
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collapsing the conditions of life? Well, what if they turn out to be the conditions of academic 
philosophy, and more generally the conditions of western culture?9 
 
No matter what we think of that question, the issue surely still relates to the central question of 
LoveWisdom: Who am I, and How should I Live? We can no more tell someone Who they are 
than we can tell them to stand up straight or to fix the problems of the world. “Stand up straight, 
be who you are, heal the world.” However we spell out what we think any of that means, it will 
never touch the come-and-see thing that we actually are and that the world is. It will never itself 
be realization.  
 
To recap, we now have a very general sense of where we are headed. First we have further 
contemplation of the sorts of issues just sketched, so that we can appreciate with some sensitivity 
the problems we face in an inquiry like this, and so we can begin to understand the problems 
with our way of knowing and the sorts of things a relational epistemology of practice-realization 
invites us to consider. Our inquiry brings up all sorts of problems with the way we do philosophy 
in the west, and those problems are the problems of our way of knowing, systemic problems that 
we will not easily undo. Any healthy rejuvenation of the dominant culture and its philosophies 
will take generations. Likewise, any of the problems we will consider could become a 
dissertation. We need a broader vision though. That, indeed is part of our problem right now: 
                                                 
9 In other words, a critique of the form of discourse of the academy is (by a kind of ecological 
necessity) the critique of a whole form of life—not merely the “life of the mind” cultivated in the 
university, but the whole ecology of mind cultivated by western civilization, embodied in and 
encouraged by its languages. Our inquiry involves evoking a sense that the form of life may have 
deep, systemic issues.  
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Everyone is a mile deep in their drill-hole of scholarship, with no idea how to talk to someone 
even one or two drill-holes away (perhaps with no awareness that someone else is so close by) 
and meanwhile the conditions of life are collapsing. I sometimes think of Gil Scott-Heron’s 
poem: 
A rat done bit my sister Nell. 
(with Whitey on the moon) 
Her face and arms began to swell. 
(and Whitey’s on the moon) 
 
I can’t pay no doctor bill. 
(but Whitey’s on the moon) 
Ten years from now I’ll be payin’ still. 
(while Whitey’s on the moon) 
 
The man jus’ upped my rent las’ night. 
(‘cause Whitey’s on the moon) 
No hot water, no toilets, no lights. 
(but Whitey’s on the moon) 
 
I wonder why he’s uppi’ me? 
(‘cause Whitey’s on the moon?) 
I was already payin’ ’im fifty a week. 
(with Whitey on the moon) 
 
Taxes takin’ my whole damn check, 
Junkies makin’ me a nervous wreck, 
The price of food is goin’ up, 
An’ as if all that shit wasn’t enough 
A rat done bit my sister Nell. 
(with Whitey on the moon) 
Her face an’ arm began to swell. 
(but Whitey’s on the moon) 
 
Was all that money I made las’ year 
(for Whitey on the moon?) 
How come there ain’t no money here? 
(Hm! Whitey’s on the moon) 
 
Y’know I jus’ ’bout had my fill 
(of Whitey on the moon) 
I think I’ll sen’ these doctor bills, 
Airmail special 
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(to Whitey on the moon)10 
 
I once started sketching a version for our situation in the academy: 
 
The multi-generational migration of the monarchs is collapsing 
and whitey on the brain 
Our addictions spreading and relapsing 
and whitey on the brain 
 
Things are falling apart—and we keep reading Kant. All the old dead white men languish on the 
brain. The syllabi surely change in many of our courses. And we in philosophy rely (perhaps too 
much) on the fact that we have colleagues in feminist studies and various other programs who 
may introduce students to thinkers other than Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and the other usual 
suspects of the western philosophy department. But do we need to do more than we now do? 
Should we get whitey off the brain, or at least engage with some kind of more genuinely 
transformative way of realizing the highest ideals of our own traditions? 
 
While I have no question regarding value of philosophy, that also comes from a somewhat 
different approach to it than the one dominating the academy. And perhaps that very confidence 
in philosophy itself makes it painful for me to write a book like this and to discuss it with a such 
a respected group of readers, for it feels terrible to discuss this dissertation with intelligent and 
caring people when we all could instead sit and discuss how to properly deal with the collapse of 
the conditions of life and the other problems our society faces. Since the epistemology we 
inquire into here offers a diagnosis of our many crises as well as ways to work with them such 
that we might mitigate some of the suffering and even begin to heal, maybe we can feel good 
about at least considering it. Something of our conversation may in some way help us to navigate 
                                                 
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goh2x_G0ct4 
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the suffering we have already made inevitable, given how far we have let climate collapse, 
economic inequality, and other symptoms of ignorance proceed. 
 
To say it again, I have no question regarding the value of philosophy—indeed, no question 
regarding its inescapability for us. But this comes from a particular view of what philosophy is. 
If a change in how we do philosophy might help us to know better and ultimately live better, we 
should reflect a bit on its meaning and purpose. Since the meta-analysis involves some 
potentially strange elements of form (such as using quite a few long quotations and, as the reader 
can sense by now, moving more in the manner of Montaigne than Quine, though certainly not 
with the skill of either), let me say again that all of these considerations carry tremendous 
salience for me as a philosopher. They in fact weigh heavily on me at times, especially with 
respect to what I might most like to convey about the possibility for better ways of knowing. I 
would go so far as to say that all of this feels like a life-and-death matter. None of what we will 
discuss here feels to me like mere speculation or conjecture or some sort of intellectual 
indulgence, and I invite the reader to join me in some sense of urgency, because of the state of 
the world, and for the sake of people we love and people we don’t even know who suffer now 
and will suffer tomorrow—suffer more intensely if we cannot know better and live better. I know 
that all of you suffer too, in your own ways and also just as I do. You are perhaps too busy, too 
overstimulated, caught up in various agendas that seem inescapable; you all have experienced the 
insanities of the dominant culture, including its university system; you all love philosophy in 
your own way, and want to understand things. I have no idea how we will actually help with the 
larger crises we face together. But we must now philosophize in conditions that should have 
remained unimaginable—and these conditions may get worse, even in the next few months, to 
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say nothing of the next 5, 10, or 20 years. For us, that time will go surprisingly quickly. For the 
moment, let us think through things with as much patience as we can muster. How can 
philosophy help? And in what ways has philosophy contributed to the crises we face? 
 
 
 
All professional philosophers know that “philosophy” comes from the Greek, philo-sophia (φιλο-
σοφία). “Philo” indicates Love, and “Sophia” indicates Wisdom. But it often seems that what 
professional philosophers mean by the activity of philosophy has little if anything to do with 
what most people might have in mind or in heart when they think of “Love” or “Wisdom”. This 
remains puzzling, especially given that professional philosophers do love, and they in fact, at 
least sometimes, love what they do for a living. It is not clear how many professional 
philosophers seek “wisdom,” or seek to become genuinely “wise,” or what that would even mean 
to them. Again, the activity of professional philosophy just doesn’t seem to align with what 
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many ordinary people might think of if asked to imagine a “quest for wisdom” or a “love of 
wisdom”. 
 
This disconnect, between “philosophy” on the one hand, and love and wisdom on the other, 
perhaps relates to the larger disconnect between academic philosophy and the general public, 
which we might find tragic, especially to the extent that we think we deal with beautiful things in 
the academy, beautiful theories, insights, inspirations. Yet most people I meet think of 
philosophy as something either high-brow, useless, or both. The words “philosophy,” 
“philosophize,” and “philosophical” often carry varying degrees of derogatory connotation, 
depending on the context (phrases like, “I don’t have time to philosophize about this,” or, “That 
sounds a bit philosophical; we need to be practical here,” and many others . . . the range of 
dismissals at times surprises me). This derogatory connotation makes little sense from the 
standpoint of the meaning of philosophy as we will work with it here, but it will take a little time 
to develop that enough so that we can apply it more directly at the aim of our inquiry, which has 
to do with knowing better and living better. Again, our reflections on the nature of philosophy 
and the challenges of “doing” philosophy are themselves already reflections on the essence and 
heart of our inquiry.  
 
How do we do philosophy? Pierre Hadot, one of the great French philosophers of the 20th 
century, examined and in many ways endorsed Thoreau’s suggestion in Walden that, “There are 
nowadays professors of philosophy, but not philosophers” (Hadot 2005). Hadot showed how 
Thoreau’s charge aligned quite closely with some of the specifics of Epicurean and Stoic 
philosophy, and how it aligned in general with the spirit of much of Ancient philosophy in the 
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west. We might suspect that the difference between the practice of philosophy on the one hand, 
and the practice of professing philosophy on the other, mark off some sort of potentially 
important issue in relation to knowing. Maybe these are two ways not merely of “doing” 
philosophy, but, given what philosophy might be, different ways of knowing what we are and 
what the world is. Indeed, they might mark off different ways of knowing altogether—knowing 
anything, including knowing what this or that philosopher was trying to say, knowing what 
science is or should be, knowing what a human being is or could be, knowing what the world is 
or could be. 
 
A few years ago, Robert Zaretsky, a historian and rather philosophical fellow, wrote on the 
occasion of the 20th anniversary of one of Hadot’s books, What Is Ancient Philosophy? It seems 
telling that a non-professional philosopher (a mere historian, we might say with tongue in cheek) 
wrote a piece like this, which appeared in the Chronical of Higher Education. Quite a few 
professional philosophers might endorse some or all of the content of Zaretsky’s piece, but 
embracing Hadot with any zeal means going against the grain of academic philosophy in general. 
Perhaps it should grate the ear to have to say, “academic philosophy,” and grate the heart that 
this differs from what philosophy seems to have meant for people like Socrates, Epicurus, 
Nietzsche, Simone Weil, and many others in the west, as well as differing (in similar ways) from 
what analogous terms meant for people like Siddhartha (Buddha), Kongzi (Confucius), Dogen 
(perhaps the greatest giant of Japanese philosophy), Machig Labdron (a revered Tibetan 
philosopher), Rumi, the Peacemaker of the Haudenosaunee, and many others around the world.  
 
Zaretsky tells the following story: 
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Several years ago, I chaired a search committee for a humanities postdoctoral 
position at my university. Inevitably, this involved chauffeuring the candidates to 
and from the airport, blathering about the advantages of life at our university and 
in our city, all the while carefully skirting anything at all about the candidate’s 
own life. 
 
With all but one applicant, that is. When I met Michael at the gate, he reached out 
to shake my hand. Both of us realized, with a laugh, that he was still holding a 
book with his. Expecting to see a monograph on the Carolingian Church — his 
field — I instead glimpsed the name of an author and work I’d never seen before. 
It was a well-worn, dog-eared copy of Pierre Hadot’s Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie antique? (What Is Ancient Philosophy?) 
 
While Michael’s curriculum vitae had already suggested a number of professional 
bruises, I later learned that those paled in comparison with the bang-ups he had 
known in his private life. This, it happened, was why he was reading Hadot. Not 
only had the French scholar changed Michael’s understanding of the ancient 
schools of philosophy, but Hadot had also changed, well, his life. Through 
Hadot’s discussion of the Epicureans and Stoics, Platonists and Aristotelians, 
Michael had found a framework to better understand his past and shape his future. 
 
As we mark the 20th anniversary of the book’s publication, I can’t help recalling 
that moment. “This book changed my life”: This is not only the sort of remark one 
doesn’t make at a job interview, but it is the sort of remark one doesn’t make 
about scholarly works in general . . . . 
 
 . . .  many of us who work outside philosophy departments — or, for that matter, 
outside universities — still carry the confused yet persistent idea that philosophy 
is a discipline apart. That philosophy is nothing if not a close articulation between 
one’s work and one’s life. 
 
In part, Hadot’s work was revolutionary because he gave lay readers solid textual 
and historical reasons to insist upon that deep expectation for the discipline. His 
audience was hungry for that — the book’s commercial success, in fact, led 
Hadot’s publisher, Gallimard, to launch a series of “what is?” books devoted to 
other fields in philosophy.11 
 
Hadot’s work emphasizes the strangeness of philosophy, but not the strangeness people typically 
sense about philosophy, the strangeness that sent my entire extended family into paroxysms 
when I first announced, at the age of 18, an intention to become a philosopher—something I had 
                                                 
11 https://www.chronicle.com/article/Lived-Philosophy/234426 
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never heard of before I went to college. To my family, as to many people I have met, and also 
according to many accounts and references I have come across, a philosopher has little or 
nothing to contribute to society, in part because they epitomize the absent-minded professor and 
the mere intellectual, one who has endless questions and critiques but no answers or practical 
insights into daily life and ultimate questions. Philosophers are strange to most of society 
because they speak in jargon, seem highly clever and critical (in a pejorative sense), and concern 
themselves with minutiae that few in the university truly comprehend, let alone anyone in the 
general population.  
 
I cannot think of a scholarly work other than Hadot’s that I would hand to anyone at all with the 
intention of helping them as a human being.12 Academic philosophy remains too strange for that. 
It seems useless, in a rather pejorative sense. Many a student has remarked on this uselessness, 
even those who majored in philosophy—lured in by one of the introductory courses that 
sometimes deal with the “cosmic questions” of philosophy—and later came to regret their 
decision, as they learned the bitter truth about what academic philosophy actually involves, its 
strangeness to life, to love, to wisdom and meaning in a more “cosmic” sense (the meaning of 
terms and propositions is, of course, debated to exhaustion—which makes it an ironic 
engagement with meaning from the more lived sense of “meaning” . . . an inquiry into meaning 
that ends up feeling meaningless in some way). I am not sure if enough professional philosophers 
realize how their students feel, or how the general public really feel about these matters. They 
have perhaps become so strange in their own way that they either misunderstand or, to some 
                                                 
12 But I would probably not recommend Hadot right off the bat anyway, in most situations. It 
would be far better to go with non-academic philosophers if the aim is to truly help someone as a 
human being. 
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degree, no longer concern themselves (surely for very good reasons). I think with sadness about 
all the students excluded from the riches of philosophy because of the way it is taught, and this 
exclusion is reflected in declining enrolments and declarations of major in departments already 
tiny relative to majors like business and the STEM majors—not to mention the failure to get a 
highly diverse population of students to enroll and declare. Socrates would probably reel in 
shock and horror at how philosophy’s strangeness keeps so many people from studying it.  
 
But Zaretsky touches another kind of strangeness, one that goes back to philosophy’s ancient 
roots—and, ironically, returns it to what many university students hunger for, what would get 
them to enroll in more courses, what gets some of them hooked when they declare their intention 
to study philosophy. In some cultures, these roots have remained vibrant and have produced full 
ecologies of living philosophy (again, the word differs in other cultures). Zaretsky gets at the 
strangeness of the philosopher as a figure representing a vitalizing rupture. 
 
In Philosophy as a Way of Life, one of Hadot’s other books (perhaps a much a better place to 
begin for most readers), Hadot gives a brief history of some of western philosophy, after which 
he writes the following: 
But as a history of ancient philosophia, our history of Hellenistic and Roman 
thought is less focused on studying the doctrinal diversities and particularities of 
these different schools than it is on attempting to describe the very essence of the 
phenomenon of philosophia and finding the traits shared by the “philosopher” or 
by “philosophizing” in antiquity. We must try to recognize in some way the 
strangeness of this phenomenon, in order then to try to understand better the 
strangeness of its permanence throughout the whole history of Western thought. 
Why, you may ask, speak of strangeness when philosophia is a very general and 
common thing? Doesn’t a philosophical quality color all of Hellenistic and 
Roman thought? Weren’t the generalization and popularization of philosophy 
characteristics of the time? Philosophy is found everywhere - in speeches, novels, 
poetry, science, art. However, we must not be deceived. These general ideas, 
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these commonplaces that may adorn a literary work, and true “philosophizing” are 
separated by an abyss. Indeed, to be a philosopher implies a rupture with what the 
Skeptics called bios, that is, daily life, when they criticized other philosophers for 
not observing the common conduct of life, the usual manner of seeing and acting, 
which for the Skeptics consisted in respecting customs and laws, practicing a craft 
or plying a trade, satisfying bodily needs, and having the faith in appearances 
indispensable to action. It is true that even while the Skeptics chose to conform to 
the common conduct of life, they remained philosophers, since they practiced an 
exercise demanding something rather strange, the suspension of judgment, and 
aiming at a goal, uninterrupted tranquility and serenity of the soul, that the 
common conduct of life hardly knew. 
This very rupture between the philosopher and the conduct of everyday 
life is strongly felt by non-philosophers. In the works of comic and satiric authors, 
philosophers were portrayed as bizarre, if not dangerous characters. It is true, 
moreover, that throughout all of antiquity the number of charlatans who passed 
themselves off as philosophers must have been considerable, and Lucian, for 
example, freely exercised his wit at their expense. Jurists too considered 
philosophers a race apart. According to Ulpian, in the litigation between 
professors and their debtors the authorities did not need to concern themselves 
with philosophers, for these people professed to despise money. A regulation 
made by the emperor Antoninus Pious on salaries and compensations notes that if 
a philosopher haggles over his possessions, he shows he is no philosopher. Thus 
philosophers are strange, a race apart. Strange indeed are those Epicureans, who 
lead a frugal life, practicing a total equality between the men and women inside 
their philosophical circle - and even between married women and courtesans; 
strange, too, those Roman Stoics who disinterestedly administer the provinces of 
the empire entrusted to them and are the only ones to take seriously the laws 
promulgated against excess; strange as well this Roman Platonist, the Senator 
Rogatianus, a disciple of Plotinus, who on the very day he is to assume his 
functions as praetor gives up his responsibilities, abandons all his possessions, 
frees his slaves, and cats only every other day. Strange indeed all those 
philosophers whose behavior, without being inspired by religion, nonetheless 
completely breaks with the customs and habits of most mortals. 
By the time of the Platonic dialogues Socrates was called atopos, that is, 
“unclassifiable.” What makes him atopos is precisely the fact that he is a “philo-
sopher” in the etymological sense of the word; that is, he is in love with wisdom. 
For wisdom, says Diotima in Plato’s Symposium, is not a human state, it is a state 
of perfection of being and knowledge that can only be divine. It is the love of this 
wisdom, which is foreign to the world, that makes the philosopher a stranger in it. 
(56-7) 
 
We find a thread of strangeness woven through our conversation. It is strange to offer such a 
long quote (we shall enjoy many more), and the quote itself has to do with the strangeness of 
philosophers. I am strange in many ways, though all-too-human in my modest love of wisdom 
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(strangeness gives us no guarantee of good philosophical practice). Recall the strangeness that 
Zaretsky noted, the strangeness of saying a book by a scholar, a modern book of philosophy, had 
changed one’s life. And reflect on the possible strangeness of that life, the life of the man 
Zaretsky met: Michael had experienced professional bruises far exceeded by the bruises he 
experienced in his personal life; he was not a professional philosopher, but he found he could 
turn to the tradition of philosophy for actual help in his life, actual relief from suffering. This 
seems exceedingly strange, given the context of academic philosophy. 
 
The themes of strangeness, rupture, and atopia run through the inquiry we will make together 
here. But because of the state of philosophy in the academy, we must control them—thus 
running the risk of defying and even insulting Sophia herself, who may demand the rupture into 
strangeness, the disorientation into an atopia, a placelessness that leaves us feeling confused and 
perhaps even afraid. We could put this another way: Because of the state of the academy, a 
certain kind of philosopher or philosophy must appear not only strange (maybe even outlandish), 
but actually dangerous to the academy and to certain structures of power in the larger culture. 
And even if certain philosophers endorse in spirit some, much, or practically all of what Hadot 
suggests, they may still feel a rational inclination to control strangeness, if for no other reason 
than the one Hadot himself gestures toward: a simple fear of charlatans . . . and perhaps no 
means of determining the charlatan from the atopos philosopher or sage, or (setting aside the 
issue of judging philosophers) at least a philosophy that comes from and invites us into atopia.  
 
I happen to feel like neither a charlatan nor a sage. I engage in our inquiry here with sincerity, 
and with a sense that something important is at stake, something we could come to discover and 
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create together, so I hopefully avoid charlatanism. On the other hand, the bar is set so high for 
the atopos philosopher that one can only turn red with embarrassment at any comparison there, 
any suggestion that one’s work might threaten the academy or the society for the best or most 
proper reasons. Eliot wrote, “I am no prophet — and here’s no great matter,” which I might twist 
to say, “I am no Socrates—and yet here is some great matter.” The matter we face at this 
historical moment seems so great as to induce despair—and philosophy itself always seems a 
great matter indeed, perhaps only presencing itself most fully at moments of despair, when the 
ego finally has to let go of what it thinks it knows, and entrance into placelessness—at least a 
glimpse of it—might happen mysteriously, as an act of grace from Sophia herself. 
 
Hadot’s work is much more scholarly than my own, and I would like to address that issue in 
brief. First of all, let us acknowledge that his scholarly care and clarity have not spared him from 
marginalization. As Zaretsky points out: 
Despite, or perhaps because of, Hadot’s iconoclastic interpretation and limpid 
language, influence has been greater on those working outside his field than on 
those within. This odd state of affairs was brought home to me when I began to 
ask those who specialize in ancient philosophy about Hadot. Gradually I started to 
feel like a private eye in a noir detective tale pursuing a case where there are no 
witnesses, and no body, either. 
 
An Aristotelian scholar, who told me she had never read Hadot, referred me to a 
second specialist whose “broad interests” might include Hadot. It turned out that 
this individual had, in fact, read Hadot — but only his early philological study of 
Marius Victorinus, a fourth-century neo-Platonist. This specialist was kind 
enough, however, to suggest that I contact another colleague, one who had 
recently written a book on the ancient schools of philosophy, but that scholar 
never replied to my query. 
 
It seemed Hadot was as atopos in the profession as Socrates was in the agora. 
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I do not mean this as a cop-out, but as a genuine expression of disconcertion: I could try to put 
what I want to say in a more “scholarly” manner, but, given what I have to say, that seems 
unlikely to convince many of the people I might like to convince—worse yet (and this is the 
more important point), what I have to say in some sense demands a certain amount of defiance, 
rebellion, revolt against scholarly forms, to at least some degree, because they both arise from 
and perpetuate some fundamental problems in our way of living, speaking, thinking, and 
knowing, and these problems are part of our inquiry together. This latter issue, the main issue, 
actually has two interwoven dimensions: That the present way of knowing arises from and 
perpetuates a pattern of insanity goes altogether with how strange a new way of knowing must 
look, feel, and sound from within the current way of doing things. Not only are the forms of 
discourse in the academy at stake in any genuinely open-minded inquiry into our way of 
knowing, but essential features of language and identity could become suspect. To use Quine’s 
metaphor, we may find ourselves sincerely questioning relationships, objects, or concepts very 
much at the core of our functional “web of belief”—doing so not for the sake of an intellectual 
exercise or abstract skepticism, but maybe with the sincerity Descartes asks us to believe he had 
in his skepticism (and that maybe he did in fact have, given his life circumstances, though his 
inquiry seems like a rather blundering attempt at philosophy as we shall mean it here). We may 
face the challenge of Quine’s indeterminacy of translation even in cases when someone 
communicates with us in our native or otherwise-understood tongue, and this problem perhaps 
becomes ironically worsened if they speak in a way which we at first think we understand, 
because we will miss the fact that every time we think we understand, we have likely 
misunderstood, having applied our habitual ways of understanding (as if each sentence says to 
us, “Think differently” in the same way we might say to someone, “Stand up straight,” with all 
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the attendant problems Dewey pointed out). The more what I write here looks like what the 
reader knows, the further it gets from helping the reader to understand what it invites us into, let 
alone to help the reader themselves to know in a new way. So, I must apologize for every slip 
into apparent clarity. 
 
Let us consider the matter of philosophical form a bit more in a moment. First, let us sit with the 
questions that the above passage from Zaretsky might raise, given its description of the apparent 
marginalization of such a talented scholar with seemingly important and rather radical things to 
tell us. Surely we could find other examples of such marginalization, perhaps even better ones. 
But, as far as philosophy goes, Hadot might serve as a decent example to start with: He wrote 
books that could feel genuinely helpful, and they seemed helpful precisely because of his work to 
show how philosophy as a way of life differs from philosophy in the academy, thus challenging 
academic philosophy in a significant way. What does any of that say about academia? About 
philosophy as it is and as it was—and as it might be?  
 
Zaretsky wanted to answer questions like these, so he called up Arnold Davidson, a professional 
philosopher at the University of Chicago who has perhaps done more than anyone else to 
introduce Hadot to a U.S. audience, having translated Hadot, interviewed him, and engaged in 
other activities to bring attention to his work. Davidson told Zaretsky that contemporary 
philosophers should recognize both Hadot’s “philological rigor” and also his “philosophical 
vision,” one that, in Zaretsky’s words, “has struck a deep and lasting chord among those outside 
the profession. (As far outside as jazz: Davidson mentioned that one of Hadot’s admirers, the 
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composer, trombonist, and scholar George Lewis, recorded a piece titled Les exercices 
spirituels.)” Vision. That, too, will come to play a role in our inquiry into knowing and living. 
 
Zaretsky also relates that Davidson interviewed Hadot in 2007—their last interview (Hadot died 
in 2010). Davidson asked about “spiritual exercises,” perhaps the single most important idea 
Hadot sought to convey regarding ancient philosophy and philosophy as a way of life in general. 
Arguably, there is no full rupture brought about by philosophy, no genuine or authentic 
strangeness in the philosopher, no realization of the atops philosopher who abides in wisdom and 
happiness, serenity and wonder, without these exercises that make such a realization possible—
exercises like the various forms of meditation one finds in the Buddhist philosophical traditions 
(the ancient west seems to have discovered nothing quite as sophisticated, and this may help 
explain why philosophy as a way of life dwindled and almost died out in the mainstream of what 
we continued to refer to as “philosophy”—it of course held on in many Christian traditions, 
especially those characterized as “mystical”). Davidson wanted to know whether Hadot thought 
such exercises, and thus philosophy as a way of life in a more robust sense, might have a place in 
the academy. Hadot gave a qualified no. He felt that the traditional exercises are, let us say, too 
strange. But that perhaps students and professors could find ways to turn reading texts into a 
spiritual exercise. Some readers may feel excited by this prospect, while others may find it 
farfetched, and they may agree with Zaretsky’s general characterization that, “The university has 
long been the place where we live for examinations, not where we examine our lives.” Similarly 
the great psychologist C.G. Jung said of himself, 
I am a physician and deal with ordinary people, and therefore I know that the 
universities have ceased to act as disseminators of light. People have become 
weary of scientific specialization and rationalistic intellectualism. They want to 
hear truths which broaden rather than restrict them, which do not obscure but 
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enlighten, which do not run off them like water, but penetrate them to the marrow. 
This search threatens to lead a large, if anonymous, public into wrong paths. (CW 
15, para. 86) 
 
We can more fully receive these words when we realize that Jung shared the same feeling for 
ancient philosophy that Hadot and many others do (“many,” but a relative minority—a small and 
largely marginal one, but seemingly on the rise, and ready for co-opting at every turn). Jung 
thought of himself not as a “psychologist” in a technical or scientific sense, but as a philosopher; 
not a “physician” in the manner of a doctor of the body, but a doctor of the soul, which captures 
the old meaning of philosophy as a therapy for the soul: 
I can hardly draw a veil over the fact that we psychotherapists ought really to be 
philosophers or philosophic doctors—or rather that we already are so, though we 
are unwilling to admit it because of the glaring contrast between our work and 
what passes for philosophy in the universities. We could also call it religion in 
statu nascendi, for in the vast confusion that reigns at the roots of life there is no 
line of division between philosophy and religion. (CW 16, para. 181) 
 
In an interview, Jung said,  
 
Man’s soul is a complicated thing, and it takes sometimes half a lifetime to get 
somewhere in one’s psychological development. You know, it is by no means 
always a matter of psychotherapy or treatment of neuroses. Psychology has also 
the aspect of a pedagogical method in the widest sense of the word. It is an 
education. It is something like antique philosophy, and not what we understand by 
a ‘technique.’  It is something that fixes upon the whole of man, and which 
challenges also the whole of man in the patient . . . as well as in the doctor. (1977: 
255) 
 
In the academy, it would be strange indeed to speak about the “soul”. It would be even stranger 
to speak about philosophy as a pedagogical method that fixes upon one’s whole being and aims 
at the development of the soul, and to speak of majoring in philosophy as critically examining 
and engaging with such a pedagogical method—without which engagement, the philosophy 
remains misunderstood. That latter point should really give us pause, because it suggests 
limitations on our ability to understand philosophy (and thus ourselves and our world), 
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limitations arising from our very way of framing and doing philosophy, our way of life, our way 
of talking to each other and even of moving around. The way we do things in the academy (and, 
we must emphasize this, this means the whole of it: not only the way we read and teach and talk, 
but the way we organize our schedules, go to conferences, move about the campus, the way we 
relate to loved ones, the way we work on problems alone or together . . . the whole thing) might 
cut us off from certain important kinds of knowledge (though, we can hardly think of them as 
important or evaluate them at all if we don’t know what they are). There are things we cannot 
know, and misunderstandings or failed understandings that must persist, simply because of the 
way we organize doing philosophy and living our lives.  
 
What can we make of such divergent views, that of the philosopher and that of the professor of 
philosophy? Let us speak inclusively (a prime virtue of philosophy as a way of life) and say that 
philosophy consists of pluralism and variety—a variety of contexts, a variety of forms or modes, 
a variety of content and experiences, and a variety of ways of relating one or more of those 
things to the rest of life.  
 
We can think of the forms or modes of philosophizing as the variety of outputs. These outputs 
range across a surprisingly broad spectrum: long dialogues, such as we find in Plato; little 
vignettes, such as we find in Zhuagnzi; discourses such as we find with Socrates, Epictetus, and 
Siddhartha (Buddha); exchanges such as we find in the Confucian Analects; fiction, such as we 
find with Albert Camus, Iris Murdoch, Kurt Vonnegut, and countless other highly philosophical 
writers; poetry such as we find with Rumi, Milarepa, Basho, Walt Wittman, and others; visual art 
such as we find with William Blake, Hildegard of Bingen (who should get counted in music and 
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poetry too), Kandinsky, Andy Goldsworthy, and the Japanese Zen philosophers like Hakuin, 
Sengai, and others. One could go on and on.  
 
Let the record show that any form outside of the standard book or essay gets some measure of 
criticism in the dominant discourse of the academy. In my experience, Plato’s dialogues are read 
almost exclusively for their arguments, thus missing—as Hadot clearly shows—the most 
important points of those dialogues (some of which might remain occluded without refined 
practices or spiritual exercises, something like running the experiments of science as a method of 
verification, but a verification upon which full and proper understanding hinges decisively). 
Meanwhile, I have heard philosophers say things like this: “Why would I teach Camus? Indeed, 
how could I teach Camus? Where are the arguments?” All the worse then for the painters, poets, 
and dancers—despite that fact that, for instance, dancers like Isadora Duncan felt deeply inspired 
by philosophers (in the sense that dance seems to have been a philosophical activity, the practice 
of philosophy for at least some dancers), and despite the fact that even a contemporary 
philosopher, Alva Noe, found that dancers had taken up one of his technical philosophical texts 
(Action in Perception) as a framework for creating and exploring dance. For the record, in many 
courses I have taught, students have told me that some of the major points I kept trying to make 
only made sense after they were exposed to the arts, for instance after watching Rivers and Tides 
(a documentary about the work of Andy Goldsworthy), learning Japanese Tea Ceremony or 
calligraphy, practicing Tango, or making photographs or other works of art (as philosophical 
practice, and thus done in a particular way). 
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We can find here a difference not merely in form but also in content. In this regard we should 
first acknowledge Martha Nussbaum’s cogent argument that we perhaps cannot fully separate 
form from content. We needn’t rehearse it here. The reader seeking detailed analysis can peruse 
works like Love’s Knowledge. Suffice it to suggest that we might not be able to express 
everything important about life if we restrict our expressions to rational analysis. For instance, 
how better to explore the philosophical significance of tragedy than to put on a tragic play? We 
can talk about it all day, but the magic of theater can bring it to life, and even allow us to “work” 
on the problem of tragedy (assuming the presence of appropriate “spiritual exercises” and a 
functional philosophical framework for them).13 As another example, a painter might easily tell 
us, “If I thought I could express it in words, I would have done so.” And, we all know the 
difference between, “I love you” and a warm embrace. They may seem to come to the same 
basic point, but some of us clearly incline to the embrace, at least sometimes. Infants who don’t 
get enough touch can experience developmental interruptions, even death, and it won’t help to 
merely sit and tell them, “I love you.” What do we make harder to express when we restrict 
philosophizing to the dominant discourse of the academy? 
 
But, we may also ask what we marginalize as content, what we make harder to experience and to 
philosophize about in the first place, when we restrict the discourse as we do, and restrict the 
practices of philosophy almost exclusively to the analysis and production of text. Naturally, we 
                                                 
13 So-called playback theater provides a sort of limited example of the therapeutic dimension of 
theater, which relates to coming-to-know something that allows for transformation. In this form 
of theater, the actors improvise scenes based on events from the lives of the audience. A person 
might have their own personal tragedy or other experience played out, thus allowing for a shift in 
knowing those experiences. Playback theater could be seen as a kind of “spiritual exercise” in 
Hadot’s sense of the term. 
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will tend to work on problems amenable to the theories (the general vision) and the tools or 
practices at hand, and thus something that doesn’t yield to our tools or practices may never even 
come up for consideration, lying as it might outside of the imagination, the vision, the sense of 
the world that created and/or employs the tools.14  
 
The very idea of philosophical tools can seem odd. Wiley-Blackwell published a book called The 
Philosopher’s Toolkit (Baggini and Fosl 2010). In our inquiry here, we will have an interest in 
this question: What do philosophers build with their tools? What do philosophers make? Do they 
build soil? Do they build clean air or clean water? Do they build forests or oceans? Do they build 
any living ecologies in vitalizing ways? It seems most non-human beings do just that kind of 
work with their toolkits of mind and body. But the embodied philosopher, whose “mental” 
“experience” depends on the living world, employs tools in relative isolation from the living 
world, while extracting from it constantly (however “indirect” the extraction may seem) in order 
to produce and consume books, buy laptops and phones, drive cars, fly to conferences and 
interviews, store their ever-expanding, digitized verbiage on servers, and so on. What kind of 
world do we philosophers make with our activity? Does the world itself, the world and all its 
sentient beings, place any conditions on our philosophizing that we should feel an ethical 
demand to fulfill? From the perspective a more ecologically rooted culture (a more realistic 
culture), what is the point of philosophy, and what must philosophy include, what must 
                                                 
14 Recall here Aldrich’s suggestion that Dewey engaged in a kind of visionary mode of 
philosophizing, and recall too Bateson’s suggestion that we made a major epistemological error 
when we lost the sense of aesthetic unity, as well as Husserl’s a Dewey’s concerns about a 
vitalizing sense of the world we have not yet given birth to, in light of several centuries of 
“scientific” inquiry. 
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philosophizing look like? These will perhaps come to strike us as not only valid questions, but as 
important ones, perhaps threatening the center of our web of beliefs. 
 
But back to this funny little text about the tools of philosophy. It has two references to 
meditation, which we might see as a major form of “spiritual exercise” in Hadot’s sense, and a 
tremendously important method for taking up experience itself or mind itself as the content of 
philosophy. One mention of meditation comes in the entry on the “transcendental argument”. 
The authors write, “Despite its name, this sort of argument has nothing to do with Eastern 
religion or meditation. It is, rather, a cool, calm analytic procedure most notably used by 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)” (281). The other comes in the entry on art as a way to “do” 
philosophy: “Roger Scruton, following Plato [the authors, and perhaps Scruton too, notably fail 
to mention Confucius or other non-western traditions], has even argued that music is important 
for our ethical development. Through music, we can ‘enter into a state of frenzy’ or ‘enter a state 
of meditation’, and these, he argues, ‘are character-forming experiences’” (256). Neither of these 
actually deal with meditation as a tool of philosophy, as a way to “do” philosophy. Meditation is 
used as a contrast in one case, and a comparison in another. But the tools are argument and 
music. 
 
Of course, we should give thanks that music and the arts do get mention as tools. But it’s a 
largely academic discussion. The authors do admit that, 
It may also be, however, that the arts can take our thinking forward in ways 
formal arguments cannot. Philosopher Stanley Cavell, for example, has written 
influential essays on the way Shakespeare explores the issue of scepticism, not by 
putting philosophical dialogues into the mouths of his characters, but by literally 
dramatizing problems of scepticism and their solutions. Similarly, films, plays 
and novels may show us things about ethics more truthfully and powerfully than 
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they can be told. Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons (1954), for example, shows 
us things about living life according to an ethic of duty rather than consequences 
which, arguably, formal treatises cannot. (255) 
 
Fair enough, on the surface. But this “tool” is located in a section of the book titled, “Tools at the 
Limit,” which in practice means mostly beyond the limit of what is acceptable in the academy. 
It’s all well and good for a philosopher of Cavell’s status to say nice things about Shakespeare, 
but quite another for any philosopher (let alone one less established) to turn in a play or dialogue 
as work that should help them earn tenure—with prospects looking worse for students of 
philosophy who wish to turn in anything too “creative” or “artistic” for a course or a degree. 
 
The closest we get to meditation as a tool comes in the entry on “Mystical experience and 
revelation,” another tool “at the limit”—which in this case in particular pretty much means, “has 
no place in the academy as a way of ‘doing’ philosophy.” The entry feels largely dismissive. At 
the end, the authors muse that, “perhaps, paraphrasing Shakespeare (Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 5), 
there’s more in Heaven and Earth than ever dreamed about by philosophy. Then again, perhaps 
not” (258). Yes: Perhaps not. But is that “perhaps not” because philosophy in the academy has so 
much imagination, or so little? 
 
One might interject here an interesting artifact from the philosopher John McTaggart Ellis 
McTaggart, in the conclusion of his Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic: 
Thus it is not reality which is abstract, but only our knowledge of it. And this is 
not surprising, since all imperfect knowledge must be abstract, and it is a matter 
of common notoriety that our knowledge is as yet imperfect. 
 Nor need we regret such a limitation of the province of philosophy. For if 
our present knowledge were completely adequate to reality, reality would be most 
inadequate to our ideals. It is surely at least as satisfactory a belief, if we hold that 
the highest object of philosophy is to indicate to us the general nature of an 
ultimate harmony, the full content of which it has not yet entered into our hearts 
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to conceive. All true philosophy must be mystical, not indeed in its methods, but 
in its final conclusions. (1859: 258-9) 
 
We can appreciate the humor of this artifact, which practically implies the essential presence of 
mysticism, in an unexpected way. All philosophers are thus mystics, but McTaggart has clearly 
understood mysticism in as fragmented a way as the authors of the Toolkit. We should not find 
this surprising. So many people who use words like “mysticism,” “mystical,” and even “esoteric” 
in a derisive and dismissive manner have only intellectual assumption and speculation to support 
their dismissal. 
 
The same seems to hold with the authors of the Toolkit. We should note that meditation receives 
no entry as a tool, even a tool “at the limit,” and that mantra is likewise not listed, even though 
mantra has the literal meaning of “instrument (-tra) of mind (man).” The closest we come to 
these tools is the entry on “mystical experience,” but with this entry the authors have perhaps not 
really given us a tool, per se, have they? Can we just start “having” “mystical” “experience”? 
How would we apply or work with such a tool? Are they serious about it as a tool or not? Can 
we try and work with it, or can’t we? 
 
We might in a preliminary way call meditation a tool or technique of experience, and we might 
want to hold off on calling experience itself a tool, unless we clarify what we mean—which 
presents challenges. At first, we might better say that philosophy always has to do with the 
cultivation of experience—which, if we follow Dewey’s (1905) somewhat radical claim of 
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“immediate empiricism,” suggests that philosophy has to do with the cultivation of what is—
ultimately, the cultivation of the world (a corollary of the epistemology of practice-realization).15  
 
The ancient philosophers of the west (along with both ancient and modern philosophers from all 
over the world, in living traditions running up to the present day) thought philosophy should 
cultivate experiences like wisdom, love, beauty, meaningfulness, well-being, true joy, peace or 
equanimity, and so on. This amounts to saying we can live in a meaningful, healthy, peaceful, 
wise, and loving world—if we will do the necessary work to make it so. Philosophy, on this 
understanding, has to do with the practice-and-realization of a kind of experience of life, and a 
kind of reality we can share together.  
 
Let us allow “mystical experience” to mean the realization of the loftiest aims of philosophy as a 
way of life. From one perspective such experience does not itself make for a tool with which we 
then do philosophy. Rather, the doing of philosophy brings us to the mystical experience, a 
knowing not captured in our understanding prior to the experience. However, experience might 
still be thought of as a method in a broad sense (something akin to Dewey’s sense of experience 
as method, which we needn’t worry about here), and (pace Dewey) it might also be thought of as 
the content or subject matter of philosophy. Meditation would become an Art of Experience, or 
an Art of Awareness, something like a refinement for the general method of empiricism, 
experiment, or experience (let us see these as roughly synonymous for our purposes). Even 
arguments can get reframed as attempts to invite us to experience something in a certain way, a 
                                                 
15 “Immediate empiricism postulates that things—anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-
technical use of the term ‘thing’—are what they are experienced as” (393). 
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way to walk us up to the gateway of experience rather than an attempt to “convince” or to 
“change our beliefs” or something like that. We can never leave experience, and this marks the 
beginning and end of philosophy. 
 
We will return in a moment to this consideration of experience and tools. But let us add just a 
few additional reflections on the form and content of philosophy. Among other things, our 
reflections may bring up the duality between scholarly and unscholarly, academic and non-
academic, philosophy and non-philosophy. Walter Kaufmann writes in his own way about these 
issues in his book, Faith of a Heretic. He begins by sharing portions of a somewhat famous letter 
written by Wittgenstein, who offered these thoughts to his friend Norman Malcolm: 
I then thought: what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is 
to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of 
logic, etc., and if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions 
of everyday life, if it does not make you more conscientious than any ... journalist 
in the use of the dangerous phrases such people use for their own ends. You see, I 
know that it’s difficult to think well about ‘certainty,’ ‘probability,’ ‘perception,’ 
etc. But it is, if possible, still more difficult to think, or try to think, really 
honestly about your life and other people’s lives. And the trouble is that thinking 
about these things is not thrilling, but often downright nasty. And when it’s nasty 
then it’s most important. (from Kaufmann 2015: 36). 
 
Kaufmann finds this a marvelous general statement about the study of philosophy. He only 
suggests that thinking about your life and other people’s lives is very thrilling indeed (though, 
perhaps Wittgenstein had in mind the discomfort these reflections can provoke in us, and 
Kaufmann would surely agree about that)—and that this orientation to philosophy seems to have 
lost its place in the academic version of philosophy, which, on a certain reading, concerns itself 
far more with ever-narrowing, abstract, jargon-filled inquiry into things like “certainty,” 
“probability,” and so on.  
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Kaufmann was not alone in feeling some concern about this trend. Writing in the London Review 
of Books, the iconoclastic philosopher Richard Rorty related the following story: 
‘I had hoped my department would hire somebody in the history of philosophy,’ 
my friend lamented, ‘but my colleagues decided that we needed somebody who 
was contributing to the literature on vagueness.’ 
 
‘The literature on what?’ I asked. 
‘Dick,’ he replied, exasperated, ‘you’re really out of it. You don’t realise: 
vagueness is huge.’ 
 
Commenting on this as an aspect of the general rise of analytic philosophy (the essay is a kind of 
review of a two-volume, 900+ page history of analytic philosophy, the second volume of which 
bearing the title, “The Age of Meaning,” which, given our reflections so far, may feel ironic), 
Rorty offers the following: 
My friend’s judgment is confirmed by Scott Soames’s 900-page history of 
analytic philosophy. In an epilogue titled ‘The Era of Specialisation’, Soames 
cites ‘the investigation of vague predicates’ as an area of philosophical inquiry 
that has ‘exploded in the last thirty years’. The intensity with which such 
specialised inquiries are being pursued is, he says, indicative of the fact that ‘the 
discipline itself – philosophy as a whole – has become an aggregate of related but 
semi-independent investigations, very much like other academic disciplines.’ 
 
Soames welcomes this change. He ends his book by saying that ‘what seems to be 
the fragmentation in philosophy found at the end of the 20th century may be due 
to more than the institutional imperatives of specialisation and professionalisation. 
It may be inherent in the subject itself.’ Philosophers used to think that the point 
of their discipline was to attain a synoptic vision – to see how everything hangs 
together. But, Soames seems to suggest, they may finally be disabusing 
themselves of this millennia-long misunderstanding of their own enterprise. 
 
To see what philosophy may look like in the future, consider the problem that 
gave rise to the huge literature on vagueness: the paradox of the heap. Soames 
formulates it as follows: ‘If one has something that is not a heap of sand, and one 
adds a single grain of sand to it, the result is still not a heap of sand . . . if n grains 
of sand are not sufficient to make a heap then n+1 grains aren’t either.’ So it 
seems that ‘no matter how many grains of sand may be gathered together, they are 
not sufficient to make a heap of sand.’ 
 
 . . . . An educational administrator (a dean in the US, a pro-vice-chancellor in 
Britain), asked to ratify the appointment of someone who has produced a brilliant 
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new theory of heaps, might be tempted to ask whether this sort of thing is really 
philosophy. Most analytic philosophers would think this a dumb question – as 
silly as whether inquiry into the neural processes of squids is really biology.16 
 
Notice here the contrast between Dewey as a more “visionary” philosopher, and what we have 
today; Bateson’s sense of the fundamental epistemological error of losing touch with the 
aesthetic unity of things, and what we have today. Compare also Hadot, who claims that, “No 
one has described the relationship between the ancient sage and the world around him better than 
Bernard Groethuysen” (a French philosopher). He then gives us Groethuysen’s description: 
The sage’s consciousness of the world is something peculiar to him alone.  Only 
the sage never ceases to have the whole constantly present to his mind.  He never 
forgets the world, but thinks and acts with a view to the cosmos. . . . The sage is a 
part of the world; he is cosmic.  He does not let himself be distracted from the 
world, or detached from the cosmic totality. . . . The figure of the sage forms, as it 
were, and indissoluble unity with man’s representation of the world.17 
 
Hadot comments on this by saying, “This is particularly true of the Stoic sage, whose 
fundamental attitude consisted in a joyful “Yes!” accorded at each instant to the movement of the 
world, directed as it is by universal reason” (251). Such a joyful “Yes!” does not seem to echo 
through the halls of academic philosophy, nor does one find it easy to sense how analysis of 
heaps would give rise to it.  
 
Thus, the Students too interested in finding their own joyful Yes, the meaning of life (as opposed 
to the meaning of “heaps”), students too interested in synoptic vision or anything too visionary, 
students too interested in how everything “hangs together,” students too interested in doing 
philosophy in alternative modes (painting, poetry, dance), students seeking work with alternative 
                                                 
16 https://www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n02/richard-rorty/how-many-grains-make-a-heap 
17 Let us note the resonance here with contemporary cognitive science: “World and perceiver 
specify each other.” Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (2015: 172) 
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methods (anything non-textual, including meditation and “mystical” or other sorts of 
experience), students too interested in Indigenous cultures and epistemologies, students too 
interested in female philosophers . . . all of these and more will either never consider becoming 
philosophers, or, having tried to enter the field, will eventually get disabused of their naïve 
notions of what philosophy is about and how it might be done (nor would they find it easy to 
obtain mentorship even if they could pursue these non-academic passions).  
 
This is not to say we have any sort of overt tyranny or dogma. It functions in part as a zeitgeist, 
and one can sometimes feel like the powers that be have taken the fun out of philosophizing (I 
sense this in students all the time, even hear them express it directly). It also functions the way 
what Chomsky and Herman have described as the “manufacture of consent” functions (1988). 
Chomsky and Herman directly implicate academics as responsible for maintaining structures of 
domination and oppression. On a certain political reading, it is the job of philosophy to avoid 
anything at all like what Socrates did. Philosophy must not “corrupt the youth,” and thus, in any 
society with structures of power and domination in place, in any society that involves itself in 
conquest and extraction, inequality and exception, the education in that society must protect the 
youth from the kind of philosophy Socrates did (the kind Hadot says he and many others did) 
because that sort of philosophy has indeed proven to “corrupt the youth,” and thus Socrates 
served as an esteemed model for revolutionaries like Gandhi and Martin Luther King.  
 
How does this controlling of philosophy work? In a free society like ours, structures of power 
tend not to rely on a bludgeon except in extreme cases or with marginalized populations (and 
even then, it doesn’t compare to a brutal dictatorship). One must employ other threats and other 
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means. In the most sophisticated case, one never has to do much of anything to control 
philosophizing, because philosophy itself simply never takes a threatening form. For instance, in 
the case of journalism—the major focus of Manufacturing Consent (the book by Chomsky and 
Herman; there is also a documentary by the same name that focuses more on Chomsky as a 
figure, but effectively conveys the model developed in the book)18—one may find occasional 
application of the more clumsy strategy of shelving a story. This happened recently in the 
famous case of Jane Mayer, who uncovered information threatening to Trump’s presidential run. 
The overlords at Fox News told her to shelve it. Fox News has perhaps approached the crudity of 
state television, at least at times (which might mean our society has degraded more than some of 
us suspect). But maybe that makes it all the more helpful in employing the other, more 
sophisticated strategies. For one thing, if the New York Times is the epitome of crazy liberal 
thinking, then we are never going to have a serious conversation about anarchy—or even single-
payer healthcare and a return to a top tax rate of over 90% (the recently proposed 70% already 
got framed as a socialist nightmare that would destroy “America”). But the most sophisticated 
issue comes to this: Anyone who is going to try and do real journalism that holds power 
accountable and attempts to genuinely inform the public is not going to get a job at the New York 
Times to begin with. People who get into journalism and stay in it, especially with careers in 
institutions like the New York Times, already have an implicit agreement on what sorts of views 
are realistic, and what sorts of questions and investigations one should launch. If you are going to 
                                                 
18 I would like to recommend the documentary for one sequence in particular, in which an editor 
at the New York Times claims that he, with apparent due diligence and sincerity, looked into 
some of the charges made by Chomsky and, after investigating, cleared the Times of these 
charges—meanwhile the film dramatizes the apparent blindness of this investigation. We can 
hear a critique, appear to take it seriously, and end up proving the critique by finding it baseless 
or misguided, or in some other way essentially doing nothing differently. 
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ask the President of the U.S. really tough questions, you just won’t make it into the White House 
press corps. So goes the model proposed by Chomsky and Herman. They make a convincing 
case.  
 
We can at least wonder if something like this holds in philosophy, where people have all agreed 
not to, as Kaufmann puts it, “stick their neck out” in any way that would resonate with the kind 
of philosophizing done by some of the great philosophers in western history—or, indeed, might 
seriously challenge them in any radical way. Kaufmann includes in his mention of great 
philosophers many I find too intellectual, and I think things are all the worse in the mode of 
philosophy as a way of life. I am trying to gesture toward implicit biases that may first of all be 
quite invisible to us (we might not have a place in the academy at all unless they remained 
invisible or largely repressible), and which, even if we can begin to talk about them, may lead us 
to rationalize. Certain kinds of philosophers and philosophies just don’t fit the academic 
worldview, the academic way of life or the western way of life. And, beyond that basic 
acknowledgement, we must take a deep breath and ask to what degree the practices of academia 
end up “manufacturing consent” in the sense Chomsky and Herman meant, thus perpetuating 
domination and degradation. To the extent that philosophy remains “useless” from a practical 
point of view, it remains powerless to transform the culture of consumption; to the extent that 
philosophy is useful, in this culture, its permitted use must pose no threat to any of the core evils 
of the structures of power. Again, the university must protect the youth and the culture more 
broadly from philosophy itself (at least some versions of philosophy). McCarthyism showed that, 
even in a relatively free society, radical views in the university can get rooted out, and the 
economic realities of the society and the university in particular put daily pressure on thinkers to 
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conform. The “cost of living” and the cost of paying for one’s education cannot be easily 
ignored. Nor can we easily ignore the investments we have made in a career and in a certain line 
of research, which may feel “doable” in the same way our typical way of standing up or sitting 
down may feel very doable. 
 
Kaufmann seems to have felt some dismay at the proliferation of the sort of philosophizing 
Soames apparently valorizes—a rise he witnessed during his too-brief career. One might see the 
work on heaps as eminently friendly to structures of power. Working on heaps, we offer no 
mobilizing critiques of power, and the jargon of those working on issues closer to a critique of 
power may mean they will have no audience in the general public, perhaps in large part because 
those academics explicitly interested in power and domination of necessity spend much if not 
most of their time publishing in academic journals and interacting with other academics. 
 
In his book, Kaufmann goes on to endorse a pluralism regarding how one might think well about 
our life and other people’s lives, and that letter from Wittgenstein forms a nice context for his 
considerations, but it will also come back again when we return to more specific reflections on 
content. As for form, let us be strange and enjoy yet another long passage, since Kaufmann does 
such a fine job of reflecting on many aspects of form, and it seems worthwhile to emphasize that 
careful thinkers have reflected on form and endorsed pluralism regarding both form and content: 
Let some philosophers favor the monograph, and others more artistic forms. 
Clearly, the scholarly monograph is the best way of making some kinds of 
contributions; but it would be a pity if the monographic mind monopolized the 
field. Let us remember that most of the finest philosophic classics were not 
monographs . . . . 
 
Each form has its dangers. They are too numerous to catalogue. One obvious 
danger of the monograph is pedantry . . . But pedantry will always be with us . . . .  
96 
 
 
Some philosophers want to get across their experience of philosophy, too—that 
way of life in which the particular problems they treat are merely episodes. They 
recall, and take seriously, Plato’s disdain, in his Seventh Letter, for “those who 
are not genuine philosophers but painted over with opinions” and his insistence 
that there neither was nor ever would be any written work of his containing his 
own philosophy: “for this cannot be formulated like other doctrines; but through 
continued application to the subject itself and living with it, a spark is suddenly 
struck in the soul as by leaping fire, and then grows by itself” ( 340 f.). 
A philosopher may try to communicate what, as he knows, cannot be 
communicated to everybody. He may exert himself to strike a spark here and 
there in a mind that is ready. He may hope that, though some readers will merely 
browse, whether to take offense or pleasure, others may, as it were, live with his 
book until the spark leaps over.  
Nor is there only one way of sticking with a point—the monographic way. 
One may want to show how one point is related to others, how a judgment derives 
part of its meaning from its relation to other judgments, how a view that is 
seemingly clear appears in a different light when seen in a wider context. 
Microscopic work can be of the greatest importance; but it has no monopoly on 
importance, and not everything macroscopic is necessarily popular in the bad 
sense—or popular at all. The gadfly’s function is hardly a paradigm of popularity. 
One can take up a single point and worry it as a dog worries a bone, 
though occasionally with more fruitful results. One can also ask oneself about the 
significance of a whole trend in philosophy . . . . To be sure, the effort is more 
hazardous than a painstaking and detailed analysis of a single problem, and it is 
more likely to fail. But as Whitehead remarked in Modes of Thought, “Panic of 
error is the death of progress” (22). As long as one is aware of the dangers and 
warns one’s readers, instead of wearing the mantle of omniscience, the risk is 
hardly excessive: if the prose is clear, errors can be corrected. (62-3). 
 
Perhaps the most important thing he says in these reflections: “No form is a panacea,” and we 
should perhaps take that to also mean much more latitude than even Kaufmann himself seems to 
allow in these reflections. He seems strangely conservative.  
 
In any case, I cannot offer a form of discourse or a form of life that will appeal to everyone. But 
academia has gotten rather entrenched in particular forms of discourse, and I have come to see 
this as more significant a problem than we might at first think, or more significant than I myself 
thought not so long ago. We have good reasons for valuing the forms of discourse we currently 
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prize, and I do not say we should throw them out altogether. At the same time, if we look at our 
situation and say, “Something has to give,” we might wonder if the forms of discourse in the 
academy need to give much more than a little—and that with them might come many aspects of 
our forms of life.  
 
In this regard, we might wonder if the most important thing in the passage above comes not from 
Kaufmann, but from Plato, who clearly and succinctly expresses the sorts of things Hadot tried to 
get us all to recognize about philosophy as a way of life. Plato might say that there are nowadays 
many who “are not genuine philosophers but painted over with opinions,” and it should perhaps 
gives us pause to think, as I do about this book, that for some philosophers, no written work can 
contain their philosophy, and that the meaning they intended could not come from textual 
analysis alone, and in fact could not even be “formulated,” but rather the meaning of some 
philosophies, the knowledge or knowing they invite, might only arise by means of a kind of 
“continued application to the subject itself and living with it,” by means of spiritual exercises, 
such that “a spark is suddenly struck in the soul as by leaping fire, and then grows by itself.” 
This book has its interest in such sparks first and foremost, and I must confess doubts about 
being able to strike them, at least in a text like this one. But, as a consolation, we may perhaps 
get ourselves to wonder if such sparks might have a special value, and we might seek them—
outside of a book like this, which maintains so many limitations of the dominant culture. 
 
Let us conclude these general meditations on form and content with a little reflection from 
Kaufmann about content itself, so to speak (again, form and content may go more closely 
together than we might like to admit). Kaufmann quotes a little book by Geoffrey Warnock, a 
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philosopher who lauded the so-called “analytic” “revolution” in philosophy: 
Warnock says: “It is at any rate certain that questions of 'belief -questions of 
religious, moral, political, or generally ‘cosmic’ variety-are seldom if at all 
directly dealt with in contemporary philosophy. Why is this so? The first part of 
an answer to this question can easily be given: There is a very large number of 
questions, not of that variety, which philosophers find themselves more interested 
in discussing.” 
One might doubt whether a mere shift of interest deserves to be called a 
revolution, until one realizes what most of these philosophers are prepared to 
relinquish: they no longer “try to think really honestly about your life & other 
people’s lives.” And they do not only abdicate one of the noblest functions of 
philosophy as a matter of individual choice but they hail this surrender as a major 
advance and discourage others from carrying the quest for honesty into less 
academic questions. Since so many highly intelligent and deeply humane people 
take this view, it will be well to consider their reasons, if only briefly. 
“Religious, moral, political, or generally ‘cosmic’” questions are not 
considered the business of philosophers because philosophers do not seem to 
possess any special qualifications for dealing with them; and if one holds a post in 
a university, along with natural and social scientists, one ought to have some 
specialized professional competence, else one is an impostor. (43) 
 
This book invites philosophers to cultivate the specialized competence to deal with the “cosmic” 
questions, the global questions, the questions of heaven-and-earth that we must face to navigate 
the catastrophe we have already created, and to perhaps mitigate the extremes to which that 
catastrophe may flare. This competence comes altogether with the epistemology of practice-
realization. It demands experimentation that leads to a capacity to speak with authority about the 
only thing that matters, the only thing we can ever “get at” with any way of knowing: The 
possibilities for experience—especially experiences of wisdom, love, and beauty, as well as 
peace, healing, and joy. 
 
Returning to Kaufmann again, he notes that we have an abundance of journals and other 
publications in philosophy. If he could see the general publishing glut we have today, in all areas 
(to the extent that we have a “replication crisis” in some of the sciences, and publishing across 
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the board, including academic and non-academic works, amounts to a staggering volume of 
words and data), he might feel astonished. He might see us as so strange. Kaufmann draws our 
attention to the influence this can begin to have on the form and content of philosophy: 
The main reason for our many philosophic journals is, of course, that suddenly 
there are thousands of men [and women . . . but the discipline still seems to suffer 
from white privilege and male privilege—n.k.] professionally engaged in the 
subject—thousands who have to publish now and then to gain some recognition, 
to win raises and promotions, and to show themselves and fellow members of 
their “association” that they are both physically and mentally alive. Quotation 
from a letter of recommendation in 1960: “During the last year he has published 
three times.”  
What used to be a rare vocation for uncommon individuals who took a 
bold stand has become an industry involving legions. Naturally, the whole tone 
and level of discussion had to change. When there are over a thousand colleges in 
one country, and most of them have departments of philosophy, many of them 
with a dozen or more members, it would be ridiculous if every professional tried 
to emulate Spinoza’s Ethics; or if they urged millions of students in their courses 
to write something like Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to 
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. But the 
reason why it would be absurd is not that these books were written by amateurs, 
perhaps in armchairs; nor even that the Treatise, like some other philosophic 
classics, was the work of a young man in his twenties. It would be bizarre only 
because these books are so great and so bold. (47) 
 
We have to do what we can to get a degree, to get tenure, and so on. If any psychological shadow 
material affects our choices of how we work, they will likely remain unconscious—a too-
neglected point: that what is unconscious is literally unconscious. It seems we might want to 
really sit with that. The ways we constrain ourselves and our students likely have an unconscious 
dimension, and the work of Freud, Jung, and so many brilliant therapists, theorists, and indeed 
serious “scientific” researchers19 shows us that unconscious bias does appear as an all-too-real 
phenomenon. We will—in academia we must—have all sorts of rationalizations for doing things 
                                                 
19 Howard Shevrin’s work has been especially valuable here, but all the work on the variations of 
“dual process” accounts of the mind or brain support the suggestion that we need to face up to 
the unconscious dimension of the psyche. 
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the way we do them. We must have reasons. We must use reason. But, setting all our reasons 
aside, are we doing philosophy in the way the current context demands? I really wish we would 
wrestle with this, wrangle with it, let it become a barrier to further movement, and then become 
so at-one with this barrier that a new way of philosophizing, a new way of knowing might dawn 
upon us. I say all of this because it bears directly on our inquiry. I am trying to say that this 
inquiry could be framed as a struggle “against” our current way of knowing. But then what do 
we expect a new way of knowing to look like? And if it looks like what we expect, haven’t we 
gotten nowhere?  
 
And I think it would help more than we can imagine if would more openly discuss and more 
directly confront the potential psychological provocations of challenging our way of knowing, 
especially if we start to inquire into whether some of the more fundamental things we take for 
granted might have unethical consequences attached to them, as well as thorny entrapments that 
arise from our attachment to them and/or our inability to see how or why we should actually 
change them.   
 
For instance, consider the case of Semmelweis. Importantly, Semmelweis does not seem to be 
remembered as a great genius, but someone who nevertheless discovered something quite 
valuable—in fact life-saving. Semmelweis found that child mortality rates skyrocketed in 
conjunction with the advent of dissection, and the rates were much higher than that of midwives 
operating in the same geographical area. Doctors would go from dissecting cadavers to 
delivering babies—without washing. This unfolded in the mid 1800’s, before the work of Lister 
and Pasteur, so they had no germ theory of disease to tell them to do otherwise. Somehow, 
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Semmelweis got the idea that washing would help, and he documented this empirically, 
publishing results showing that it functioned. In part because he had no theory with which to 
interpret the data, his findings received a strong negative reaction—so much so that he ended up 
having a breakdown, and on one interpretation of the events he died rather young because he had 
found out something that could save lives, but the establishment refused to listen. Again, he is 
not remembered as some great “genius;” he simply noticed something about a set of practices 
that happened to be sensitive to those engaged in them. Although we may see this as a case of 
not having a good theory, it may also have a lot to do with unconscious dynamics. No one wants 
to think they are “dirty,” and no one wants to think they are killing mothers and newborns. These 
were all “scientifically” trained people, and yet they refused to accept what seems like 
uncontroversial data.  
 
Our inquiry here seems to involve a good measure of not very controversial data and suggestions 
(though, they may not seem so from the point of view of this or that established web of belief), 
and only given the seemingly extreme circumstances we find ourselves in regarding ecology and 
politics does it seem important, and yet it still could carry a certain psychic charge. For instance, 
some of our inquiry could be harshly interpreted this way: When we move from dissecting 
concepts to functioning as midwives of the soul (which as educators we do so function, whether 
we like it or not), we might end up making those souls unwell somehow. If we read the text that 
way (or even in a much gentler, more charitable, and more open-minded way), we may face 
certain unconscious dynamics, because none of us (I include myself) want to hear that we might, 
in the course of our dissection of concepts, theories, matter, and so on, contaminate the psyches 
of our students and the general public.  
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Admittedly, in some way I do want to suggest that philosophy corrupts, and not in the way 
Socrates was accused of, but in the way Socrates accused his culture’s philosophy of corrupting. 
The culture itself seems corrupt and corrupting, and philosophy in some ways perpetuates this 
and even helps constitute it. As we attempt to give birth to our own souls, so to speak (in the 
manner of midwifery, as Socrates invited us to see the process), do we experience a high rate of 
infant mortality, a high rate of ontogenic interruption, a high rate of soul degradation, soul 
sickness, soul loss, and relative soul death? Has the collective soul (or collective psyche, if we 
prefer that term) also gotten contaminated, infected by abstractions, dualities, and all manner of 
unskillful views and practices that come not only from academia but from the general social, 
political, and economic environment? In other words, a culture is not “pure” or “antiseptic,” 
(indeed, the “pure” and the “antiseptic” appear in one form or another in the dominant culture, 
including in its universities), but it must nurture life, and must contain those sorts of elements 
that bolster the spiritual or philosophical immune system, just as a mother passes this on to her 
child. Moreover, it must contain some vision of health—the vision of a healthy mind, and 
healthy ecologies too. 
 
Even the contrast between “philosophy as a way of life” on the one hand, and “philosophy as it 
tends to appear in the academy” could provoke a certain level of defensiveness, as if I were 
suggesting that no one is doing philosophy except those engaging in philosophy as therapeia. 
But the view here is inclusive, and only seeks to point out the need for making a concerted effort 
to create space for philosophy as a way of life, while also pointing out the dangers of failing to 
do so, and the challenges of doing so in the midst of our particular historical situation. We have 
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lots of uncomfortable things to consider—no surprise given the state of the world, but no more 
pleasant (and perhaps less so) just on account of the possible urgency. 
 
 
In light of these reflections, let us consider one last excerpt from Kaufmann’s book—broken into 
two pieces. It may seem strange to consider yet another long passage, but there are reasons for 
using these long passages. This one in particular brings us back to strangeness again, quoting as 
it does a wonderful passage from Nietzsche. These reflections bear directly on the endeavor at 
hand, because I have to write this book in the modern academy, a place that may be less 
conducive to it than any of us can fully grok—and in part I mean that it may limit me more than 
it even limits my readers, thus making it challenging indeed for me to help them understand 
anything. There are subtle and unconscious dimensions at work, some of which may become 
more conscious as our inquiry progresses. But some of these reflections can leave a 
contemporary philosopher rather stymied. 
The new, professional philosopher does not vie with the great 
philosophers of former ages but with other men in his own age group in the other 
departments of his college. He may well be older than Berkeley and Hume were 
when they wrote their masterpieces, but he would be likely to make a fool of 
himself if he stuck out his neck as they did. It is far safer and much more prudent 
to insist on being a professional. One publishes papers in learned journals, often 
employs symbols even when they are dispensable, and uses a jargon that stumps 
everybody but fellow professionals. Perhaps the average paper now is better than 
the average paper fifty years ago: that would hardly be a great compliment . . . . 
In a fine passage in Beyond Good and Evil (§212), Nietzsche says that, 
traditionally, the great philosopher has always stood “in opposition to his today.” 
Philosophers have been “the bad conscience of their time.” They knew “of a new 
greatness of man, of a new untrodden way to his enhancement. . . . Confronted 
with a world of ‘modern ideas,’ which would banish everybody into a corner and 
a ‘specialty,’ a philosopher—if there could be any philosophers today—would 
be forced to define the greatness of man, the concept of ‘greatness,’ in terms 
precisely of man’s comprehensiveness and multiplicity, his wholeness in 
manifoldness.” After some illustrations from the sixteenth century and some 
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remarks about Socrates, Nietzsche continues: “Today, conversely, when only the 
herd animal is honored and dispenses honors in Europe, and when ‘equality of 
rights’ could all too easily be converted into an equality in violating rights—by 
that I mean, into a common war on all that is rare, strange, or privileged, on the 
higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and on the 
wealth of creative power and mastery—today the concept of ‘greatness’ entails 
being noble, wanting to be by oneself, being capable of being different, standing 
alone, and having to live independently. . . .” Thus, in 1886. Wittgenstein would 
have fully understood. 
In some ways the so-called revolution in philosophy is 
counterrevolutionary: its influence leads men away from trying to stand alone; it 
would banish philosophers “into a corner and a specialty.” It teaches young 
philosophers not to become heretics or revolutionaries because they lack any 
special qualifications for that. Yet it might be part of a philosopher’s task to 
acquire the necessary qualifications. Of course, not everybody can do that; but to 
say that what not all can do, none should even try to do, is a recipe for mediocrity, 
“a common war, on all that is rare, strange, and privileged.” (48-9) 
 
It seems best for someone in my position to let a mature and highly intelligent philosopher make 
these sorts of charges. Thankfully, I actually feel a great deal of encouragement and support for 
the inquiry we are engaging in. I feel my own collegial advisers and committee members have 
gone out of their way to not banish me into a corner, and rather to encourage me to come out of 
the corner and speak. The problem comes when the speaking appears even stranger than 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra—not because of some desire to sound like Nietzsche, Zhuangzi, Dogen, 
or other philosophers whose work can at times seem so challenging to enter, but because of the 
demands of what one wishes to express, which seems to have been the reason those philosophers 
wrote the way they did. 
 
Staying with Zarathustra for a moment, let us consider something Jung wrote in the introduction 
to a book of essays on Zen Buddhist philosophy by the famous D.T. Suzuki. Recall that Jung saw 
himself as a philosopher, and thus saw psychotherapy as a way of doing philosophy. I myself 
wrestled for a long time with the possibility that my commitment to philosophy might be better 
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served by getting a Ph.D. in clinical psychology rather than philosophy. Anyone who has any 
sense of the kinds of things that might have gone on in Jung’s consulting room (and—quite 
crucially for us—the kinds of practices Jung had his patients engage in, and which he himself 
engaged in to develop the foundation upon which all his major work depends) will appreciate 
how strange this way of doing philosophy would seem in the academy (and thus my hesitancy in 
trying instead to recover this meaning of philosophy within the current academic context, and its 
meaning of “philosophy”).  
 
We will see that, because of his own orientation to philosophy and psychology, Jung properly 
frames Buddhist philosophy as therapeia, therapy for the soul—the kind of framing Hadot gives 
to ancient western philosophy (with whom Jung would surely have agreed). Philosophy on this 
view has to do with healing, wholeness, even holiness (something Socrates seemed intent on 
emphasizing, and which we can most assuredly interpret and work with in a secular way, not 
least because “healing,” “wholeness,” and “holiness” share the same etymological root, and thus 
may orient us toward a particular kind of experience of the world—the aesthetic unity Bateson 
gestured toward, as part of realizing the sacredness of life).  
 
Since encountering the work of Hadot, I have been fond of keeping in mind Epicurus’s 
Philosophical Imperative, the Prime Directive of Philosophy as it were: Vain is the word of the 
philosopher that heals no suffering. This imperative guides our inquiry here, and we are trying to 
get at how difficult it makes things, especially if the medicine seems most bitter, or if the 
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medicine promises to affect one more like ayahuasca than aspirin.20 We might further that 
directive: Vain is the word of the philosopher that does not heal suffering, and does not thereby 
reveal the sacredness of life. Jung’s reflections here may seem strange, but they may also come 
to seem significant, especially in relation to such a vision of philosophy on the one hand, and the 
crises of our culture on the other:  
the psychotherapist who is seriously concerned with the question of the aim of his 
therapy cannot remain unmoved when he sees the end towards which this Eastern 
method of psychic “healing”—i.e., “making whole”—is striving. As we know, 
this question has occupied the most adventurous minds of the East for more than 
two thousand years, and in this respect methods and philosophical doctrines have 
been developed which simply put all Western attempts along these lines into the 
shade. Our attempts have, with few exceptions, all stopped short at either magic 
(mystery cults, amongst which we must include Christianity) or intellectualism 
(philosophy from Pythagoras to Schopenhauer). It is only the tragedies of 
Goethe’s Faust and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra which mark the first glimmerings of 
a break-through of total experience in our Western hemisphere. And we do not 
know even today what these most promising of all products of the Western mind 
may at length signify, so overlaid are they with the materiality and concreteness 
of our thinking, as moulded by the Greeks. Despite the fact that our intellect has 
developed almost to perfection the capacity of the bird of prey to espy the tiniest 
mouse from the greatest height, yet the pull of the earth drags it down, and the 
samskaras [mental formations] entangle it in a world of confusing images the 
moment it no longer seeks for booty but turns one eye inwards to find him who 
seeks. Then the individual falls into the throes of a daemonic rebirth, beset with 
unknown terrors and dangers and menaced by deluding mirages in a labyrinth of 
error. The worst of all fates threatens the venturer: mute, abysmal loneliness in the 
age he calls his own. What do we know of the hidden motives for Goethe’s “main 
business,” as lie called his Faust, or of the shudders of the “Dionysus 
experience”? . . . And this, in shadowy hints or in greater or lesser fragments, is 
what the psychotherapist is faced with when he has freed himself from over-hasty 
and short-sighted doctrinal opinions. If he is a slave to his quasi-biological credo 
he will always try to reduce what he has glimpsed to the banal and the known, to a 
rationalistic denominator which satisfies only those who are content with 
illusions. But the foremost of all illusions is that anything can ever satisfy 
anybody. That illusion stands behind all that is unendurable in life and in front of 
all progress, and it Is one of the most difficult things to overcome. If the 
psychotherapist can take time off from his helpful activities for a little reflection, 
                                                 
20 Aspirin relieves pain, while ayahuasca involves a journey that can feel intensely confusing and 
uncomfortable before a breakthrough into insight and concomitant feelings of peace, clarity, and 
well-being finally happens.  
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or if by any chance he is forced into seeing through his own illusions, it may 
dawn on him how hollow and flat, how inimical to life, are all rationalistic 
reductions when they come upon something that is alive, that wants to grow. 
Should he follow this up he will soon get an idea of what it means to “open wide 
that gate / Past which man’s steps have ever flinching trod.” (CW11, para. 905) 
 
Perhaps we can open ourselves to the possibility that this “something that is alive, that wants to 
grow” is like the spark Plato mentions in his letter, when he says that his philosophy “cannot be 
formulated like other doctrines; but through continued application to the subject itself and living 
with it, a spark is suddenly struck in the soul as by leaping fire, and then grows by itself” ( 340 
f.). If Plato could, in good conscience, have given us “rationalistic reductions,” he probably 
would have. 
 
The remembrance of Plato is intentional. In the same essay, Jung describes psychotherapy this 
way: 
Psychotherapy is at bottom a dialectical relationship between doctor and patient. 
It is an encounter, a discussion between two psychic wholes, in which knowledge 
is used only as a tool. The goal is transformation—not one that is predetermined, 
but rather an indeterminable change, the only criterion of which is the 
disappearance of egohood. No efforts on the part of the doctor can compel this 
experience. The most he can do is to smooth the path for the patient and help him 
to attain an attitude which offers the least resistance to the decisive experience. 
(CW11, para. 904) 
 
This can bring to mind the dialectical method mentioned in Plato’s Republic. Recall that the 
whole of that dialogue takes place “in the cave,” “in the Matrix” we might say. The whole 
discussion comes from Socrates’s or Plato’s pharmacy of the soul. It is a medicine meant to help 
us on our way, a medicine offered not as “knowledge,” but from a certain kind of knowing. And 
Socrates explicitly tells us that he cannot possibly explain the most important thing—what we 
might call the most important knowledge or truth. He wants us, perhaps needs us to experience 
“the Good,” the highest realization of philosophy. Any normal person might say, “The highest 
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realization of philosophy? Well, tell me about it!” Socrates says, “I can’t. No one can.” What he 
does say makes no sense, especially in the context of Ancient Greek philosophy, for he says the 
Good is beyond being and non-being, beyond truth and knowledge (see 508e-509b, which come 
before the allegory of the cave—though the allegory itself makes the point, perhaps more 
effectively). What on earth does that mean? While we may offer all sorts of arguments and 
interpretations about the matter, it defies the text itself, which seems pretty much like mystical 
talk—in the original sense of the term, the “mystic” being one who has been initiated, one who 
has experienced, one who knows the taste of wine because they have tasted it, and knows one 
cannot explain that taste or offer it as knowledge. Thus, however confoundingly, Plato seems to 
insist here that he cannot tell us what we most need to know. I think this is why an 
Aristotelean/Kantian mood dominates the academy—or, we may say, why Hadot might claim we 
have mostly become professors of philosophy and not philosophers.21  
 
                                                 
21 On a certain reading, we could blame this on how we interpret and work with the philosophies 
of Aristotle and Kant, for we could certainly find ways to follow an Aristotelean or Kantian 
philosophy as a way of life. The point comes to this: These authors don’t seem to have 
reservations about trying to tell us how things really are, and thus a certain kind of intellectual 
orientation appears in their work, one that allows us to dispense with any practices outside of 
reading texts (a slight exception occurs for both authors in the case of ethical development, but 
this is also a matter more for the education of youth in some sense, and in any case, at least with 
Kant, reason seems to remain the only practice we really need, if we can reason well enough, and 
for Aristotle, a certain kind of reasoning is the highest kind of happiness, trumping everything 
else—Kantian scholars may find other exceptions, for instance in his aesthetics, and perhaps 
Aristotelean scholars know of exceptions in his work . . . I am an expert on neither). Again, all of 
this may come to a certain kind of interpretation we make of them, but arguably the trend of 
“professor of philosophy,” a more “intellectualist” trend, starts as early as Aristotle and seems 
clearly in place by the time Kant gets a job at the University of Konigsberg. It may be that 
Plato’s Academy differed in spirit from Aristotle’s Lyceum as much as a sincere vision quest 
differs in spirit from the pursuit of a B.A. in philosophy. Even if that contrast seems too much for 
the philosophers in question, we will understand Hadot’s overall distinction of philosophy as a 
way of life to carry that sort of energy. 
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This might not seem as important as I want to suggest it is. In the movie The Matrix, when the 
protagonist Neo meets the somewhat sagely Morpheus, they are all still in the Matrix. When 
Morpheus offers the red pill, they are still in the Matrix. When Neo takes the red pill, he is still in 
the Matrix. When things begin to get strange, he is still in the Matrix. When we are in the Matrix, 
everything we look at is the Matrix. We don’t simply step out of the Matrix just because 
someone tells us we are in it. No intellectual maneuver will work.  
 
If Plato is right, if the philosophy as a way of life approach has any rightness to it (not as 
“ultimate truth,” but as a source of truths or knowing that we would treasure if we attained them, 
and which we might badly need most especially at our historical moment), then we need some 
sort of rupture, and I don’t think Hadot emphasized properly what this means. Yes, there is a 
kind of rupture in, let us call it, home-leaving, wherein we decide to take the leap out of our 
conventional life. But this is just deciding to meet Morpheus, and maybe deciding to take the red 
pill. It is not yet the real rupture, which is something that must remake us and the world, 
something that must bring us to the realization of the way of life we have decided to practice. In 
the movie it would be not only the process of leaving the Matrix and seeing the real world, for 
that is merely a disorienting and even frightening step. The bigger rupture comes in seeing the 
nature of the Matrix, when Neo experiences a kind of transcendence and becomes “the one,” and 
here of course the movie breaks down if we want it to “explain” anything to us about what this 
rupture really is and reveals. In any case, the rupture is needed because, somehow (on this view), 
there is something systematically misleading or ignorant about our whole pattern of thought, 
perception, communication, and action. There is some kind of active misknowing of life, 
wherein we take shadows for reality. Our whole inquiry is interpreted through this active 
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misknowing. We are in the Matrix, talking about the Matrix, and everything we look at is the 
Matrix. Every sentence I write appears in the old way of knowing, not the new one we may find 
we need. What a funny situation. 
 
So, to say it again, we remember Plato here to help make sense of the whole project of our 
inquiry, and to make sense of Jung’s statements which bear on this inquiry. Jung sounds as 
mystical as Plato. The disappearance of egohood? What does that mean? And what is this 
“decisive experience,” this “breakthrough of total experience”? Maybe it’s analogous to escaping 
the cave and seeing the Sun. However, one remains a bit confused . . . was Socrates talking about 
a “rational” procedure when he spoke of “dialectic” in the Republic? If so, why could he not 
simply give us a rational account of “the Good”?  
 
Dewey might have something to offer us here: 
It is frequently remarked that the Greeks had no word that corresponds to our 
“personality.” Neither did they have a single word for what we call 
“consciousness,” and much less did they connect reason with the idea of selfhood, 
the ego, or with consciousness . . . . If we turn from these general considerations 
to philosophy proper, we find we have the key to its constant problem. Modern 
thought is so preoccupied with the question of the relation of subject and object, 
in knowing and in action, that it is at once a relief and a perplexity to find that 
question conspicuous by its absence in Greek thought. Its problem was the 
relation of the abiding principle to the concrete scene of actual transformations. 
(UPMP: 23) 
 
This actually brings ancient western philosophy much more in line with eastern philosophies that 
predate Socrates and have living lines of practice right up to the present day. In light of Jung’s 
mention of the disappearance of egohood, I want to emphasize in particular this appearance of 
the ego and its association with mind, and later with science. Here’s Dewey again: 
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There was another factor that combined with that just stated to create the problem 
of knowing as it has been dealt with by modern philosophy. This was the rise of 
individualism in politics, industry, and Protestantism. The private character of the 
mental states (which were the only means of knowing the physical world was set 
over against them) might be viewed as a factor in the epistemological problem as 
that has just been stated. But it may be doubted whether the sense of their 
intrinsically private character would have been so especially acute had it not been 
for the rise of individualism. It is noteworthy that both Descartes and Berkeley 
speak of the mind or self. It is the more noteworthy because they make the 
identification in an incidental way as if it were something that could be taken for 
granted and that needed no justification. Yet it is safe to say that such an idea 
would not even have been understood, much less accepted, in either Greek or 
medieval philosophy. Independently of the rise of individualism in other quarters, 
the conditions under which the new science arose promoted its rise in the 
intellectual class. For the old beliefs were institutionalized to such an extent that 
new conceptions were in effect a revolt against established intellectual and moral 
authority. At the present time, the individual investigator is backed up by an 
extensive body of ascertained facts and principles and the methods he employs 
have the sanction of successful use as well as of the practical utilities that have 
arisen from application of what has been found out. Pioneers in the new science 
were in the opposite condition. From the standpoint of scientific orthodoxy they 
were heretics. Nothing is more natural than that they should appeal to the powers 
of the individual mind freed from the benumbing influence of tradition, custom 
and institutions that claimed authority over belief. (UPMP: 74) 
 
It will help us to hold in mind a possible connection between the rise of science and the 
entrenchment of individualism and ego. Dewey does not grapple with the possibility that the 
ancient Greek way of therapeia might have had to heal by means of some version of ego 
transcendence, like the Buddhist tradition Jung commented on above. Healing might involve a 
transcendence of ego, and of our habitual notions of mind, self, and nature. In Dismantling 
Discontent, Charles Fisher analyzes Buddhist philosophy and practice in light of what we know 
about biological evolution and the history of human culture. He makes the interesting argument 
that the rise of civilization brought with it the rise of discontent, the rise of neurosis that called 
for philosophical therapy to put us back into attunement with ourselves and with Nature. Even 
though Dewey might correctly describe certain aspects of ancient Greek culture, this does not 
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mean that they had no ego-centric suffering. He may be quite right that the development of 
philosophy got us precisely off on the wrong track, entrenching the ego, conflating mind with 
self, and furthering along other dualities. But he may miss the possibility that what we needed 
was somehow to stay in touch with a more therapeutic approach, and not merely a scientific one, 
which Dewey at times seems to understand a bit too conventionally (maybe his own form of 
discourse did not allow him to get at the more radical dimensions of his own work). In any case, 
it matters a lot that we keep in mind the way the western style of consciousness developed along 
lines that emphasize dualities and their social realities: we conceive subjects not only in contrast 
to objects, but in contrast to objects the subjects can possess, and thus the public-private 
dichotomy involves private property as well as private mental states. And any suggestion of the 
need to transcend the ego provokes centuries of obdurate habit, habit that binds up the ego with 
one’s sense of identity, possessions, comfort, mind, accomplishment, and so on. To threaten the 
ego means threatening a great deal, and to threaten a way of thinking itself already threatens the 
ego. We face the possibility that we use rationality as a principal tool to maintain these dualities, 
rather than to discover the nature of things. And thus, rationality as we know it becomes suspect, 
and it becomes suspect precisely in relation to the prospects of healing ourselves and our world, 
according to philosophy as a way of life. Realizing “the Good” means transcending things we 
might cling to in deep and unconscious ways. Any rigorous epistemology will have to face this 
prospect. 
 
Speaking from experience, and from his own inquiry into “antique philosophy,” Jung expresses 
this same frustrating notion: That somehow this Good, or whatever we want to call the “decisive 
experience” or the “breakthrough of total experience” goes beyond rationality. That leaves us in 
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the uncomfortable situation of potentially having to think ourselves toward something that 
currently seems irrational—even if, after the “decisive experience,” we might not call it 
irrational anymore. Jung makes that pretty clear in the paragraph above, but he dramatizes it 
here: 
. . . therefore, after many years of the hardest practice and the most strenuous 
demolition of rational understanding, the Zen devotee receives an answer—the 
only true answer—from Nature herself . . . As one can see for oneself, it is the 
naturalness of the answer that strikes one most . . . (CW11, para. 901) 
 
This seems quite important, since rationality, argument, and rational linguistic practices 
dominate our discourse. I want us to note and gently hold in our hearts this “true answer—from 
Nature herself,” this apparent “return to Nature,” we might call it, a return to “naturalness” in 
some sense—but one which, I invite us to eventually see, does not rest on a “myth of the given.” 
This return to Nature is something that Dewey would probably endorse in some sense, and I 
always think of him as committed to common sense. Thus, the “demolition of rational 
understanding” perhaps requires some caveat. 
 
So, let us linger a moment on this notion, this provocative suggestion that we may need a 
“demolition of rational understanding.” We can both make too much and not enough of it. On the 
one hand, the Dalai Lama, someone who knows far more about Buddhist philosophy than Jung 
ever found out, wrote a book with the subtitle, Faith Grounded in Reason. I can think of no 
greater champion of reason than the Dalai Lama. At the same time, he often acknowledges the 
limits of language and reason, and the founder of his order, the revered philosopher Tsongkhapa 
discovered, most wondrously, that his years of careful reasoning had given him precisely the 
wrong understanding of central notions of Buddhist philosophy. Robert Thurman (1984) 
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describes the realization of Tsongkhapa, his “decisive experience,” his “breakthrough of total 
experience” this way: 
At that instant, the perfect realization of the central way arose within him 
effortlessly—the essential keys of the dialecticist view, the criteria of the logical 
negatee, and so on—all with profound certitude. All his “sign-habit-orientations” 
dissolved, and all his perplexities about the import of ultimate Thatness 
disappeared. He said later that his view of the world changed radically, that it had 
been exactly upside down before, and that the authentic view was precisely the 
opposite from what he had expected. (85) 
 
All his habits of language use, his habits of thought, speech, and action somehow fell away and 
became transformed (or else, how did he continue to function?). And the decisive experience of 
transformation, the decisive entrance led him to a sense of things precisely the opposite of what 
he thought. This should perhaps not come as a surprise in a philosophical tradition that tells its 
students that some of the teachings it offers have so freaked people out that they had heart 
attacks and even vomited blood.22 I am talking about the concepts, not any crazy ascetic exercise 
that brings one to physical extremes. Thus some of the Buddhist philosophical traditions 
themselves emphasize the problems we are getting at here. And so, the philosopher Dogen, 
perhaps the greatest philosopher in the history of Japan, wrote the following: 
When you realize [the teaching of the Buddha], you do not think, ‘This is 
realization just as I expected it.’ Even if you think so, realization inevitably differs 
from your expectation. Realization is not like your conception of it. Accordingly, 
realization cannot take place as previously conceived . . . Reflect on this: What 
you think one way or another before realization is not a help for realization. 
(Tanahashi, 876, with slight modification)  
 
And the philosopher-poet Rumi danced out this poem: 
 
When you eventually see 
through all the veils to how things really are, 
you will keep saying again 
and again, 
 
                                                 
22 See Karl Brunnholzl’s The Heart Attack Sutra for some discussion of this. 
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  “This is certainly not like 
we thought it was!” 
 
In the same poem, Rumi says: 
 
It’s foolish of me 
to try and say this. If I did say it, 
it would uproot our human intelligences. 
It would shatter all writing pens.23 
 
I want to suggest that we need to enter just this kind of territory. No true lover of wisdom, no 
true lover of life should be able to say that their highest realization was exactly what they 
thought it would be, and yet we cannot get our heads around this, and cannot seem to allow the 
heart cross the abyss.  
 
It is worth noting that Rumi did literally dance at least some of his poems. After his own 
“decisive experience,” his own “breakthrough of total experience,” he would dance and sing, and 
his students would write down what he sang.  So many of Rumi’s poems return us to silence, 
ending on a note that asks us to just quiet the mind, so that we might have our own decisive 
experience. Thus Rumi “did” philosophy by means of dancing and by means of silence—not the 
silence of ordinary “thinking,” but the silence somehow prior to thinking, the origin of thinking 
in some sense, which is the space of knowing our epistemology will help us to enter for 
ourselves.   
 
Perhaps all of us have had some taste of this sort of shift in our lives, some experience of saying, 
“This is not at all like what I thought it would be.” It might have been as simple as the taste of 
                                                 
23 The Essential Rumi, Translations by Coleman Barks, HarperCollins, New York, 2004, pp. 
165-8.  
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wine, the first sexual experience, a trip to Europe, or countless other experiences profound or 
mundane. As far as philosophy goes, as far as any significant leaps in knowing go, the work of 
philosophers from Plato, to Kierkegaard, to Nietzsche and right through to Thomas Kuhn and 
others today, reminds us again and again that it must be this way, that genuinely transformative 
and growth-producing insight must land us in a space of experience we would not have thought 
possible. As a general rule, we must keep the experiences of the great philosophers and mystics 
near to our heart, and affirm them along with Jung, who writes: “It is always possible that what 
lies in the darkness beyond our consciousness is totally different from anything the most daring 
speculation could imagine” (CW 8, para. 617). 
 
The question is: Do philosophers today really acknowledge this possibility? (The words of the 
authors of the Toolkit suggest at least some do not—and we must keep in mind that such a text is 
intended not for advanced professionals, but for the purpose of indoctrinating those new to 
philosophy, and thus perhaps—consciously or not—to foreclose not only on the imagination, but 
to foreclose on what might exceed even imagination’s reach.) How do we work with such a 
suggestion in the academy? What if the well-being of people close to us depends on our working 
with it, working with the darkness that lies beyond our consciousness—what not only lies there, 
but what does not yet lie there, and will not lie there until we approach, until we enter the 
darkness and only then find something vitalizing has come to life to meet and transform us? 
What if the well-being of many, many sentient beings, human and non-human, depends on our 
finding a way to really leap into something different? How would we do it? Most pressingly, 
how would we do it while maintaining a discourse and a form of life like the one that now 
dominates? What will it take for us all to revolt? A good argument that the conditions of life are 
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on the verge of collapse? Or will that tempt us only to apply the same basic kind of thinking that 
put them on the verge of collapse? 
 
Let’s go back to the Dalai Lama as part of wrapping up these considerations related to Jung. 
Again, I see the Dalai Lama as a paragon of the rational philosopher, and most of our university 
scholars would likely salivate over the scholarly traditions of Tibet if they could come to know 
them. The Dalai Lama made some remarks that may help to illuminate what Jung invites us to 
see, including this notion of the dissolution of the ego. These remarks also relate to a point of our 
inquiry related to how we philosophize in the academy. In his book, The Universe in a Single 
Atom, the Dalai Lama says the following: 
After having talked to numerous scientist friends over the years, I have the 
conviction that the great discoveries in physics going back as far as Copernicus 
give rise to the insight that reality is not as it appears to us. When one puts the 
world under a serious lens of investigation—be it the scientific method and 
experiment or the Buddhist logic of emptiness or the contemplative method of 
meditative analysis—one finds things are more subtle than, and in some cases 
even contradict, the assumptions of our ordinary common-sense view of the 
world. 
 
One may ask, apart from misrepresenting reality, what is wrong with believing in 
the independent, intrinsic existence of things? For Nagarjuna [a revered Buddhist 
philosopher], this belief has serious negative consequences. Nagarjuna argues that 
it is the belief in intrinsic existence that sustains the basis for a self-perpetuating 
dysfunction in our engagement with the world and with our fellow human beings. 
By according intrinsic properties of attractiveness, we react to certain objects and 
events with deluded attachment, while towards others, to which we accord 
intrinsic properties of unattractiveness, we react with deluded aversion. 
 
In other words, Nagarjuna argues that grasping at the independent existence of 
things leads to affliction, which in turn gives rise to a chain of destructive actions, 
reactions and suffering. In the final analysis, for Nagarjuna, the theory of 
emptiness [a core theory of Buddhist philosophy, perhaps the core theory, which 
the spiritual exercises of Buddhist traditions invite us to verify by means of 
experiment or experience] is not a question of the mere conceptual understanding 
of reality. It has profound psychological and ethical implications. 
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I once asked my physicist friend David Bohm this question: from the perspective 
of modern science, apart from the question of misrepresentation, what is wrong 
with the belief in the independent existence of things? His response was telling. 
He said that if we examine the various ideologies that tend to divide humanity, 
such as racism, extreme nationalism and the Marxist class struggle, one of the key 
factors of their origin is the tendency to perceive things as inherently divided and 
disconnected. From this misconception springs the belief that each of these 
divisions is essentially independent and self-existent. Bohm’s response, grounded 
in his work in quantum physics, echoes the ethical concern about harbouring such 
beliefs that had worried Nagarjuna, who wrote nearly 2000 years before. 
 
Granted, strictly speaking, science does not deal with questions of ethics and 
value judgements, but the fact remains that science, being a human endeavour, is 
still connected to the basic question of the well-being of humanity. So in a sense, 
there is nothing surprising about Bohm’s response. I wish there were more 
scientists with his understanding of the interconnectedness of science, its 
conceptual frameworks and humanity. (2004: 50-1) 
 
Bohm began life as a physicist, and ended up experiencing the marginalization that can happen 
even in the sciences if one tries to challenge the dominant paradigm.24 He ended up spending 
much of the latter part of his life as a philosopher, and his work has to me often felt incredibly 
resonant with the kind of work we are doing here. Among other things, Bohm tried to develop a 
better way of knowing, a particular dialogical process he dedicated himself to for many years. 
Bohm saw very clearly the grave problems with our current ways of thinking and knowing, and 
this activity of dividing plays no small part. It runs right through our very language, and thus 
every attempt at speaking comes as a temptation to further think in dividing ways. That bears 
heavily on us in the academy, where we spend so much time making distinctions, analyzing, 
separating, and so on. The question arises: Though philosophers, unlike scientists, seem to deal 
with questions of ethics and value judgements, does a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
interconnectedness of things—especially the interconnectedness of our conceptual frameworks 
                                                 
24 This BBC interview with Bohm gives some sense of his work and the challenges he faced: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI66ZglzcO0 
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and the problems we face as a global species—does that misunderstanding block us from really 
seeing potential problems with the way we do philosophy, and further obstruct our ability to 
arrive at some “decisive experience,” some “breakthrough of total experience” that might 
transform philosophy, philosophizing, and the dominant culture in general, in a way that would 
benefit us all? 
 
Let us keep in touch with the fact that we are inquiring into what we, together, can accomplish in 
a more radical critique of knowing, and an opening to possibilities for knowing better. What can 
we productively accomplish? What can it even look like? Have we already shut something off, 
made certain that we cannot touch what is most important to touch? What might keep us from 
taking very seriously the possibility that we need a different way of knowing, or that we need 
arts of awareness or some kind of spiritual exercises in order to do a better job at philosophizing 
and living our lives? Can we arrive at some kind of “decisive experience” that might seriously 
shift things for us? Jung thinks we lack the context for it. In the following passage, let “Zen” be a 
stand-in for the “healing” process Jung described above, a stand-in for philosophy as a way of 
life as Hadot describes it: 
The mental education necessary for Zen is lacking in the West . . . respect for the 
greater human personality is found only in the East. Could any of us boast that he 
believes in the possibility of a boundlessly paradoxical transformation experience, 
to the extent, moreover, of sacrificing many years of his life to the wearisome 
pursuit of such a goal? . . . . let a “Master” set us a hard task, which requires more 
than mere parrot-talk, and the European begins to have doubts, for the steep path 
of self-development is to him as mournful and gloomy as the path to hell. (CW 
11, para. 902) 
 
Perhaps even more mundane considerations enter here. For instance, we don’t have time to 
meditate or to engage in some of the other practices we will examine. Some of them demand a 
context we may lack, for instance a community of fellow inquirers, who all agree already to the 
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framework of inquiry. And we have our own projects, that look sufficient to get us the next 
advancement in our career, or get us the result we want intellectually. We only have time, or 
barely have time, to do the kinds of things we already want to do, in the ways we already want to 
do them, or think we are capable of, and imagine to suffice quite well indeed, thank you very 
much. But there seems to be a serious set of issues here. They remind me a bit of Peggy 
McIntosh’s reflections on white privilege and male privilege. Before quoting her remarks, let me 
clarify a little of my sense of identity politics. This is one of those bends in the labyrinth that 
could make us wonder if we have begun to move away from the center, but we can keep in mind 
that each step does in fact get us closer to insight. 
 
A lot of the discussions around identity, race, gender, origin, religious belief, and more serve at 
least in part (often in large part) to maintain structures of power. To take a simple example, both 
rounds of graduate student contract negotiations during my time as a doctoral student were 
serious failures in various ways. The negotiating teams expended a great deal of effort 
formulating demands for gender-neutral bathrooms, for instance, and they succeeded in getting 
them. But, they failed to secure a living wage. It seems to me that, just as structures of power are 
happy to indulge all manner of inquiry into heaps, those same structures similarly benefit from 
having a lot of our energy invested in seemingly righteous debate about gender-neutral 
bathrooms, and then to finally supply them, because it conveniently distracts from the deeper 
systemic issues that, for instance, queer studies or feminist studies at its best tries to bring 
attention to, and it makes us feel as though we have achieved a measure of victory. We look into 
these things as part of our inquiry, as part of how we know political reality, the reality of our 
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working lives, and so on. We are looking at our style of life and mind, how we use our mind, 
body, and world. 
 
Similar questions come up with respect to the control of language and pedagogy—including the 
standards applied to syllabi, learning outcomes (which ones are even allowed, and then how we 
will measure them), teaching, research, and of course things like writing dissertations. It is as if, 
having already given up on the prospects of making radical changes to structures of power and 
domination, we will do everything we can to regulate how others speak to us when they oppress 
us, and how we will speak to each other in the midst of our mutual oppression. Control of 
pronouns, for instance, gives us a lot to fuss over, exhaustively so, but it doesn’t do much to 
affect the larger structures. Having a diversity statement in one’s job application does little to 
demonstrate how one’s teaching will help students to become more wise and loving.  
 
It may give us a sense of moral authority to claim our students can “feel” “safe” in our classes, 
but a more profound ethical practice would help our students to be safe, while taking great 
existential risks, involving moments when their ego did not feel safe at all. This sort of practice 
includes opening ourselves to the fundamental wildness and precariousness of life, sensing our 
real vulnerability, and through this discovering a spiritual invulnerability that allows us to meet 
the ignorance of others with true equanimity and compassion. 
 
Admittedly, it can bring a certain amount of awareness to have someone remind us that, “If you 
have met one person with autism, then you have met one person with autism.” But, if you have 
met one white male, you have met one white male—and on we could go. This sort of talk, by 
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itself, does little to cultivate compassion, which requires more rigorous and precise philosophical 
or spiritual practices, not merely a change in language or “thinking”. Nor does any labelling or 
resistance to labelling accomplish significant realization. To define oneself as neuro-atypical 
does not turn one into the atopos, which indicates the practice-realization of something about us 
that exceeds all concepts and identity constructs. Such a realization marks the highest meaning of 
liberation, and we will not liberate ourselves by getting more restrooms and pronouns.  
 
Evasion of deeper challenges—deeper challenges of practice and deeper challenges to structures 
of power—can all-too-easily go together with these sorts of issues of identity politics. I recall a 
few years ago having a student in a class who seemed quite distinctively odd. The student 
seemed interested in compassion in a certain abstract sense, and yet seemed to resist any careful 
philosophical inquiry and experimentation to verify compassion. They seemed to think their 
activism and politically-rooted modes of dialogue and community-building totally sufficient. 
And yet, the student consistently revealed themselves to be caught up in the very forms of 
anxiety, stress, and suffering that philosophy as therapy for the soul has long promised to heal, 
and which their fellow students already found healing. I felt myself confronted with something 
unfamiliar to me in the way this student rooted their criticism of philosophical practice in a 
particular kind of political language. But by coincidence or perhaps synchronicity, a month into 
the course I was looking for a video to show the students in class, and I came across a video with 
“SJW” in the title. I had never heard of “SJW,” but the title of the video clearly meant it in a 
pejorative sense. I was curious, and clicked the link. I saw someone who sounded very much like 
my student! I thought, “My goodness, is this a personality type of some sort? A cult? What is 
this?” Looking into the term, I realized that my student was indeed a “social justice warrior” of 
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some kind. One’s practice certainly can get one into habitual ways of thinking, speaking, and 
acting that fall under categories we conventionally call “types”. And it seemed quite odd that this 
“type” appears to distance people who are just as caught up in structures of power, and who 
should be on the same side, so to speak. Yet, our ways of speaking, thinking, and acting maintain 
“sides”. 
 
People have suffered real traumas, such that they have become sensitive and sensitized to things. 
But giving “trigger warnings” doesn’t change the fact that the students live in a traumatizing 
culture. Nor does it offer them any practices for healing the trauma and becoming resilient, 
practices for going to the places that scare us and expanding our soul. Nor does a trigger warning 
change the fact that most of us have become numbed, otherwise no philosophy course could be 
taught without trigger warnings, since a philosophy course should indeed empower us to go to 
the places that scare us. Everyone needs that warning. The notion that a philosophy course might 
trigger or provoke us should go without saying, but in fact I would bet the vast majority of 
students only experience philosophy courses that have no need to offer a trigger warning. Even if 
they did, the larger issue has to do with creating a healthy culture, which we currently lack. That 
we now have unwell students who might reasonably require trigger warnings only demonstrates 
that lack. 
 
But again, we must confront the suffering of our culture. There is something tremendously 
important in the suffering of any being, something we must turn toward and become skillfully 
responsive to. And there is something important in philosophies that bring our attention to 
systemic violence. Let me say that I find the present version of the meta-analysis incomplete for 
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the conspicuous absence of figures like W.E.B. Dubois, Martin Luther King Jr., Ida B. Wells, 
and other figures I would very much like to include in a larger study, and I would like to include 
much more from James Cone and Cornel West, who have only a few spiritual artefacts in our 
inquiry.  
 
We can consider one such artefact now, highly relevant to the contrast the meta-analysis invites 
us to see between a certain limited and limiting way of knowing on the other, and something 
more intimate, expansive, and even wild on the other. James Cone wrote, in the preface to his A 
Black Theology of Liberation, 
It is my contention that Christianity is essentially a religion of liberation. The 
function of theology is that of analyzing the meaning of that liberation for the 
oppressed community so they can know that their struggle for political, social, 
and economic justice is consistent with the gospel of Jesus Christ. Any message 
that is not related to the liberation of the poor is not Christ’s message. Any 
theology that is indifferent to the theme of liberation is not Christian theology.  
In a society where persons are oppressed because they are black, Christian 
theology must become black theology, a theology that is unreservedly identified 
with the goals of the oppressed community and seeking to interpret the divine 
character of their struggle for liberation. 
 
Properly understood, I would happily, even enthusiastically suggest that philosophy is essentially 
a path of liberation, and that the function of philosophy is to practice and realize that liberation in 
ways that allow for expressions of it that offer genuine help to suffering beings, so that they can 
sense, in their own way, how their struggle for peace, joy, and vitalizing well-being (which may 
include political and economic dimensions) is consistent with the teachings of philosophy and 
spirituality in their own culture as well as in the culture of their kin from other lands.  
 
To get to a proper understanding of something like that, we must keep our discernment as we 
recognize that this holds for the whole of what we may call the divine creation—taking “divine” 
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as poetically as we need to, depending on how certain we are in our knowledge that “atheistic” is 
the right characterization of reality. It cannot be otherwise for two reasons: First, that the well-
being of all humans depends on the well-being of the whole of the divine creation, which the 
divine wove us into, rooted us into; and secondly, that the whole of the divine creation is itself 
sacred, and it cannot be said to stand apart from the divine in any ultimate sense. Given these two 
insights, we can say that we need a theology both Black and Wild. We must turn toward and care 
for not only with non-whites, but also with non-humans, in one and the same gesture. As Chief 
Oren Lyons said, 
We went to Geneva—the Six Nations, and the great Lakota nation—as 
representatives of the indigenous people of the Western Hemisphere. We went to 
Geneva, and we spoke in the forum of the United Nations. For a short time we 
stood equal among the people and the nations of the world. And what was the 
message that we gave? There is a hue and cry for human rights—human rights, 
they said, for all people. And the indigenous people said: What of the rights of the 
natural world? Where is the seat for the buffalo or the eagle? Who is representing 
them here in this forum? Who is speaking for the waters of the earth? Who is 
speaking for the trees and the forests? Who is speaking for the fish—for the 
whales, for the beavers, for our children? We said: Given this opportunity to 
speak in this international forum, then it is our duty to say that we must stand for 
these people, and the natural world and its rights; and also for the generations to 
come. We would not fulfill our duty if we did not say that. It becomes important 
because without the water, without the trees, there is no life.25 
 
The majority of oppressed beings in the world are still non-human. The majority of oppressed 
humans in the world are still non-white. Those whites who are oppressed (and there are many) 
become non-white in their oppression, and also non-human (often in a double sense). Oppression 
happens to whites by means of the same process that it happens to others: Distancing and 
delusion (essentially the same movement). One group begins to see another group as less human 
                                                 
25 http://www.worldwisdom.com/public/viewpdf/default.aspx?article-
title=Our_Mother_Earth_by_Oren_Lyons.pdf 
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or, at the extreme, non-human. If the “superior” group (who are either “more human” or the only 
“real” humans) happen to be “white,” then non-white people become immediately inferior, and 
all who are seen as inferior are essentially excluded from full whiteness. This is the very process, 
the very practice of knowing ourselves and others—it is our practice of knowing reality, and all 
that we know is affected by such delusions.  
 
In human cultures, the “lesser” group may often be associated with wildness, because the lesser 
group are not as “civilized,” not as “evolved,” not privilege to the “special gifts” of the 
“superior” group. This association holds in the dominant culture for both people of color as well 
as for women. Thus, we may say that Sophia Herself is Black and Wild.  
 
We may practice so that we see the Black Sophia of the alchemists as pure and compassionate, or 
we may practice so that we see ourselves as Black and Wild. Cone says that white people must 
become black. This means many things, but it seems in no small part to mean that we must all 
see the truth of suffering, see how our suffering connects us, see how our practice of suffering 
creates misery for ourselves and others in mutuality, see how the PracticeRealization of 
liberation creates well-being for ourselves and others (all others) in mutuality, and in interwoven 
ecologies. “We’re all in this together” means we all suffer, and some of us have contributed to 
the suffering of others in ways that must change. Everything we “get” from life comes at a cost. 
In ceremony and celebration, we receive and we give in return, while in what we might call 
Sorrowville, we take—and others suffer for it. No matter how little we take, our taking is 
suffering itself. 
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Nothing here is “ours,” to do whatever we like with it. Everything is given, and our job is to take 
care of it—hence the crucial importance of the Euthyphro, lost in all discussions of it that get 
entangled in the “logic” of the “arguments” about whether “x” is righteous because it is “f’d” by 
the gods, or whether the gods “f” it because it is righteous. We can certainly arrive at a limited 
and limiting learning outcome if we stick to that—with no fear of triggering anything. 
 
In a wonderful talk, James Cone says this: 
God is present in people struggling for life, and not in the abstract metaphysical 
world of reason, which is only inhabited by philosophers and theologians and 
other privileged intellectuals. The Christian God is not the God of the 
philosophers, not the God of Plato, Kant, and Hegel, but rather the God of the 
Exodus, the Prophets, and Jesus. If God is in the world where people are abused 
and exploited, what then is God doing?26 
 
Again, I would invite us, with great respect, to say this all again, with Sophia in the place of God, 
and with Love of Sophia as philosophy’s sacred imperative. This recovers philosophy from the 
pejorative sense Cone gives to it, the one we have discussed at length and continue to inquire 
into, continue to place in tension with other visions, as per the intention of our inquiry. The 
inspiration for quoting Cone here thus seems obvious. He continues: 
Christians are called by God to plunge themselves into the world on behalf of 
those who are voiceless and hurt. The great Russian writer Dostoevsky said, 
“There is only one thing I dread: not to be worthy of my suffering.” And as I 
reflected on that saying in relation to black suffering, I said, “There is only one 
thing I dread: not to be worthy of the life that the suffering of black people has 
made possible for me.” I wanted to be a faithful witness to the redemptive 
meaning of nearly 400 years of black people suffering. I am at Union Seminary, 
and I am here at Yale talking to you tonight, because black people suffered and 
died for me and others like me. 
 
                                                 
26 https://youtu.be/kyP7BrmII9U 
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We should first say that philosophers are called by Sophia, called by wisdom, love, and beauty to 
plunge themselves into the world on behalf of all beings, most especially those who remain 
voiceless and hurt. But we should also see how these contemplations from Cone get us oriented 
toward the meaning of “karma” that a fuller inquiry should like to help us to realize. There is a 
sense of responsibility here to one’s ancestors, a sense of responsibility for their rights and 
wrongs, a sense of the multi-generational nature of trauma that our science has only begun to 
uncover. And we can welcome a broader vision. Every white person in the U.S. owes as much to 
the suffering of black people as Cone does. Moreover, all of us owe much to the suffering of 
white people of the past. And we all owe an incredible debt to the suffering of non-human 
beings. Human slavery might well be modeled on the enslavement of horses. In any case, horses 
have been the slaves of human beings for over 4000 years—likely much longer, but evidence of 
bit-wear dates back at least that long (Anthony 2007). The world we have was built on the backs 
of horses—as well as dogs, elephants, whales, and countless other beings—and they collectively 
suffered so much that any turning toward it might sear the unprepared heart. Philosophy must 
first and foremost prepare us to turn toward that suffering, for without preparation we will not 
even look. Rather, we will look away, ceaselessly. And if we do look, lacking that preparation, 
we will soon enough pull away in empathic distress. Thus we prevent ourselves from knowing 
suffering, our own and the suffering of others. Cone continues: 
Cain killed his brother Abel. But Abel’s blood spoke. The Lord said to Cain, 
‘Where is your brother Abel?’ He said, ‘I don’t know; am I my brother’s keeper?’ 
And the Lord said, ‘What have you done? Listen: Your brother’s blood is crying 
out to me from the ground!’ Now, Cain can be viewed as a metaphor for white 
people, and Abel for black people. God is asking white Americans, especially 
Christians, ‘Where are your black brothers and sisters?’ And white people 
respond, ‘We don’t know; are we their keepers?’ And the Lord says, ‘What have 
you done to them for four centuries?’ The blood of black people is crying out to 
God and to whites from the ground in the United States of America. 
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We can open our heart here, sitting quietly with this sort of suggestion. How can we let all of this 
sink in? We might reflect a little . . . or maybe we could go so far as to suggest that we can allow 
the heart and soul to speak to us, and we might then sense an intimate truth in what Cone says. 
And we might sense that not only Black people in the U.S. have suffered for us, but that Black 
people in Africa continue to suffer for all of us today, every day. We can see that Indigenous 
people of the past and present suffered and suffer for us. Our lives are possible because of 
countless sentient beings who suffered, who screamed, cried, yelped, whimpered, groaned, 
winced, writhed, withered, died—and who do this every day. Not just millions of human beings, 
but millions of horses, whales, dogs, wolves, eagles, elephants, dolphins, redwoods, honey bees, 
butterflies, beetles, bats, and more. Countless sentient and sensitive beings suffered and died, and 
whole cultures and even species were driven to extinction, and this suffering and extinction 
continue every day. Who can hold the horror of all of that? All of that horror so that we could 
live. What will we do with the life they gave us, the life we are given each moment? 
 
What do we do when we really allow ourselves to register the suffering of sentient beings—
suffering we may even benefit from? What do we do when the state of the world actually 
registers with us? The problems we now face seem unmanageable. Indeed, as our inquiry will 
soon begin to suggest, “managing” things has driven us into this mess. People talk about “forest 
management.” It’s absurd. Forests got along for millions of years by means of their own 
management, which we might call the management of wisdom, love, and beauty—for we mean 
these as “naturalistic” terms. We might begin to suspect we should let sacredness manage the 
forests and rivers. How can we do this? Philosophy for me means nothing if it does not get us to 
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engage in activity on behalf of the voiceless and the suffering. When everything we do seems 
connected to suffering, how do we move forward? What do we do? 
 
In the Gospel of Thomas, Jesus says, “If you bring forth what is within you, what you bring forth 
will save you. If you do not bring forth what is within you, what you do not bring forth will 
destroy you” (Pagels 2003: 25). The religious scholar Eileen Pagels, who brilliantly titles her 
book on this Gospel, Beyond Belief, also notes that, in the Gospel of Thomas, Jesus says that the 
Kingdom of God is both inside and outside of us. It is a nondualistic kingdom—which the most 
divine kingdom must of course be. When we come to know ourselves, then we are known, and 
we see that we are indeed the children of the living divine. But if we do not know ourselves, we 
dwell in poverty—and we ourselves are that poverty (Pagels, 25). This feeling of lack, of 
lackingness, of scarcity, of not truly belonging to and receiving abundance is altogether with our 
delusion, our pattern of insanity. Our original sin is othering, distancing, lacking, fragmenting. 
We ate the fruit because we got tricked into a feeling of lack, a feeling of otherness, a feeling of 
being out of attunement with the divine. 
 
In our contemplation of white privilege, we may helpfully relate to “whiteness” as a stand-in for 
a style of consciousness often typified by the west in many of its instances and in its overall 
trajectory. As we will see, the anthropologist Richard Sorenson calls it “conquest 
consciousness,” and he points out that non-western cultures have also practiced and realized it. 
The west has managed to bring it to a planetary scale, and it remains fundamental to the 
dominant culture. The acknowledgement of things like “white privilege” has to do with 
acknowledging the karma associated with this style of consciousness. Those whose heritage 
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traces back primarily in the west have many things to celebrate, many things to receive with 
gratitude and to practice and bring to fruition—philosophy exists in the western traditions 
(emphasis on the plural), and wisdom, love, and beauty have as central a place in those traditions 
as any other. But the west currently lacks a pervasive and deeply held commitment to practice-
and-realize wisdom, love, and beauty. This has nothing to do with something like verifying the 
boiling point of water, or verifying the cleverness of investing in the stock market, or verifying 
the relative material stability provided by getting a job in tech, or verifying the pattern of, “get a 
degree, get a job, get a car, get married, get a mortgage, have kids, send them to get a degree . . .” 
Valorizing laboratory experiments over the lived experimentation of verifying wisdom, love, and 
beauty marks an anemia of the soul, and the laboratory is comparatively boring and useless once 
we begin to touch the wonders of life. This anemia is exacerbated as professors of philosophy 
keep philosophy as a way of life out of the academy, and they perpetuate education as career 
preparation rather than care of the soul. Socrates would say the same things to us in the academy 
today as he said to the most bone-headed Athenians—perhaps with incredulity on both sides. 
 
I have Greek roots—I am a first-generation Turtle Islander on the Greek side of my human 
family. I can celebrate the path of LoveWisdom laid down by my own ancestors, and can count 
Socrates as an ancestor in a rather intimate sense. But I also carry the wound of logos, because 
“philosophy” has been co-opted for the purposes of conquest, for the practice-realization of a 
style of consciousness that amplifies suffering. 
 
In relation to these reflections on “white” as a stand-in for something, it is worth noting that the 
human species, going back millions of years, shows a tendency to kill others of our species that 
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one does not find at the same rate in other mammals. Gomez et al. (2016) report that lethal 
violence accounts for a death rate of 2% in ancestral humans, while it accounts for roughly .3% 
in all other mammals. But anthropologist Brian Ferguson offers a much-needed critique of the 
Hobbesian position the study authors seek to support: 
the 2% through-line would not in itself indicate an inherited genetic proclivity, 
rather than a species capacity, for killing. An innate tendency to kill, and an 
ability to kill, are very different things, the latter more plastic in response to 
environmental influences. “Phylogenetic Roots” [a shortening of the title of the 
submission from Gomez et al.] finds that across clades, the two socioecological 
factors of sociality and territoriality are significantly correlated with rates of 
killing. Pagel comments on this. “The increases in lethal violence coincide with 
species having increasing amounts of group living and territoriality. Group living 
places individuals routinely in close contact, and territoriality means that groups 
might potentially compete over resources.”  
 
 . . . . rates of killing increase dramatically over archaeological time periods, 
jumping upward in the Old World Iron Age, and the New World Formative 
periods. This is consistent with previous arguments against war being common 
throughout the archaeological record, although I put the increase much earlier 
than the Iron Age (See Ferguson, “Archaeology, Cultural Anthropology, and the 
Origins and Intensifications of War”). 
 
. . . . rates of killing increase dramatically with developing social complexity and 
political hierarchy. Prehistoric bands and tribes come in around that 2% marker, 
but the chiefdom bar looks like 8 or 9%. This finding is consistent with a wide 
spectrum of anthropological writing, that social complexity leads to more war. 
Their measured fall-off in killings with historic and contemporary states is not a 
surprise, since war in pre-state societies involves combat participation for 
virtually all fighting-age men, whereas states use specialized armies representing 
a much small fraction of the population. And as Max Weber told us and Gomez et 
al. reaffirm, state governments claim and enforce “a monopolization of the 
legitimate use of violence.” 
 
 . . . rates of killing indicate that deadly violence in prehistoric bands and tribes is 
dwarfed by kill-rates in “contemporary” or “present day” bands and tribes. They 
suggest that this may be due to higher population density, “or because they have 
contacted colonial societies where warfare or interpersonal violence is frequent.” 
This is precisely the point argued by “Tribal Zone” theory (Ferguson and 
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Whitehead 1992): expanding colonial systems generate high levels of killings 
such as are not found in earlier archaeological remains.27 
 
We shall see that anthropologist Richard Sorenson makes a similar case: Colonial consciousness 
or conquest consciousness goes altogether with violence. Moreover, Sorenson makes the case 
that conquest consciousness goes altogether with a breakdown in ways of knowing, ways of 
living, that seem to bring people into the epistemic space our inquiry seeks to invite us into. We 
thus stand in tension with our own heritage and with the condition of “civilization” itself—not 
the condition of Culture, or humaneness, or ethical vitality, or non-savagery, or non-
primitiveness, or anything like that. We are talking about a style of consciousness, a way of 
knowing the self and the world, a way of living that does not practice and realize “bad” things 
exclusively, but practices and realizes everything in a certain way—with serious negative side 
effects for its members and all other beings. We are talking about a problem of ignorance, a way 
of knowing things, a practice of active misknowing, the evidence of which one finds in the 
consequences of all the collective activity of knowing. We get more violence and degradation 
everywhere as this consciousness spreads. 
 
Taking into account liberation theology and the deeper philosophical insights identity politics 
tries to get at but ends up ironically co-opting into the pattern of insanity, we allow “white” 
people to see that they too have gotten caught up and oppressed by this style of consciousness. 
Again, we need to include all sentient beings, both “white” and “non-white,” “human” and “non-
human”. 
                                                 
27 https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/war-scholar-critiques-new-study-of-roots-of-
violence/ 
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We also need to clarify there is not a “purveyor” of this style of consciousness. It is a style of life 
that, historically, we fell into, and it has a well-put-togetherness and a stability that resists insight 
that might dispel it. We do have to recognize that a small number of very wealthy and powerful 
people actively seek to manipulate us, that there are rich and powerful people sitting in rooms 
deciding how to expand and stabilize their power, but it’s not helpful to think of it as a 
“conspiracy of the illuminati” or something like that.28 The dominant culture is constituted by 
converging interests and a way of thinking that together make for easy coordination of efforts. 
But, more significantly, everyone participates, and even the most powerful people in the society 
are victims of this style of consciousness rooted in ignorance. It does not appear as ignorance to 
them. It appears as knowledge, as rightness, as the way to do things. We can no more tell them to 
just stop doing what they do than we can just tell someone to stand up straight and think it will 
turn out well. This is just their consciousness, and it is ours too.  
 
It’s pointless to villainize “white” people, because the issue has nothing to do with race, and the 
whole mindset of blaming seems integral to the consciousness our inquiry places in tension with 
itself and with potentially vitalizing alternatives. The concept of race got co-opted into a style of 
consciousness, a way of knowing, a way of living, and we can no more tell someone to stop 
presencing this consciousness than we can tell them to stand up properly or dance tango. To 
challenge identity politics itself, we might provocatively suggest that, in the most practical terms, 
it’s no more a “choice” for a person to be “white,” and to practice the elements of conquest 
                                                 
28 See, for instance, Jane Mayer’s Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind 
the Rise of the Radical Right (2016). 
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consciousness they do, than it is for a person to “choose” heterosexuality—at least not until we 
make transformation more possible, for while we may never find it possible or even acceptable 
to make homosexuality a matter of choice, there is something about conquest consciousness that 
makes it amenable to transformation, just as there is something about a criminal lifestyle that 
makes it amenable to transformation, once we see it as a problem of organizing life, not a 
problem of choosing to not commit a crime (all ecological degradation is a problem of 
organizing life, not a problem of choosing not to commit a crime or do some act or set of acts). 
Similarly, it is not much of a choice for a person who is gay to participate or not participate in 
many of the elements of conquest consciousness, even if their particular suffering and 
marginalization by conquest consciousness makes them highly sensitive to its ignorance, and 
quite open to transformation—they may seek it and even think they have accomplished it, when 
in fact many of its elements continue to live in, through, and as their very lives. 
 
We come back to this again and again: “Just like me!” The vast majority of us know in ways that 
don’t help, in ways that lead to suffering. The “White” person is “Just like” the “Black” person, 
the “Mexican,” the “Chinese,” the “lesbian” person, and so on, in this key philosophical respect: 
They experience suffering, and worse yet they experience suffering as a result of their own 
activity, despite the fact that their activity was not aimed at making them suffer, and is typically 
meant to make them happy in some way; furthermore, they often cause suffering to others, also 
without intending it, but at least sometimes by actually intending it, however subtly, in however 
“civilized” a form.  
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The universality of the problem doesn’t change the fact that, as with poetry, we may need to look 
for specifics as a way to get at skillful resolutions and realizations. Given our current context, 
perhaps the most appropriate way to practice-realize “All Lives Matter” is to practice-realize 
“Black Lives Matter” and “Honey Bee Lives Matter”. This we should try to find out by means of 
arts of awareness, not by means of argument. We need emphasis just now on how rational the 
activities of conquest consciousness are from their own standpoint. All of us, whether captains of 
finance and industry or professors of philosophy or ecology, do things that seem right and 
justified. Today’s “capitalist” (what an abused term, as are its dualistic contrasts) operates 
rationally. They have no problem making arguments to defend that they do. While we might 
hope to out-reason them, our reasonings still seem to come to, “Stand up straight!” 
 
We need a practice of “stand up straight” that allows for uprightness in our Culture, an ecology 
of uprightness (in the ethical sense, as Confucius/Kongzi discussed it). We may begin to see such 
a practice as the practice of Indigenizing, and we may thereby connect it with all of these 
contemplations of race, politics, identity, and identity politics. Gary Snyder offers us some nice 
reflections that will help us segue back to more direct considerations of “white privilege,” now 
with a better understanding of what we are up to. In his Mountains and Rivers without End, he 
writes: 
Ghost bison, ghost bears, ghost bighorns, ghost lynx, ghost 
pronghorns, ghost panthers, ghost marmots, ghost owls: swirling  
and gathering, sweeping down, 
 
Then the white man will be gone. 
butterfly on slopes of grass and aspen — 
thunderheads the deep blue of Krishna 
rise on rainbows 
and falling shining rain 
each drop — 
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tiny people gliding slanting down: 
 a little buddha seated in each pearl — 
and join the million waiving grass-seed buddhas 
on the ground. (80-1) 
 
As part of our karma, those of us in the mindset called “white” must to turn toward these ghosts, 
and take up the work of rejuvenation, the work of honoring what we have made extinct, healing 
the suffering we have created and that our ancestors created, in their ignorance, spreading the 
grass-seeds of wisdom, love, and beauty. To clarify what this means, Snyder offers the following 
note on the poem: “‘White man’ here is not a racial designation, but a name for a certain set of 
mind. When we all become born-again natives of Turtle Island, then the ‘white man’ will be 
gone” (161). This thought in turn resonates with the thinking of John Mohawk, a philosopher 
from the Seneca Nation: “I think that when we talk about re-indigenization we need a much 
larger, bigger umbrella to understand it. It’s not necessarily about the Indigenous people of a 
specific place; it’s about re-indigenizing the peoples of the planet to the planet” (in Nelson 2008: 
259). Daniel Wildcat of the Muscogee Nation of Oklahoma defines indigenizing as, “a set of 
practices that results in processes in which people seriously reexamine and adopt those particular 
and unique cultures that emerged from the places they choose to live today” (Wildcat, 2005, 
419). A set of practices. A set of practices that results in a process. Practices that give rise to 
processes of inquiry. It is activity all the way down, interwoven activity rooted in a place, with a 
history, with an ancestry of good and bad ways of practicing. All of us are originally 
indigenous—only we have gotten cut off from this. Even if we follow the Old Testament, we see 
that the divine made a place for us. Even if we follow an atheistic scientism, we can come to 
some lived sense of sacredness.  
 
With all of this in mind, we can return to McIntosh. She writes: 
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The denial of men’s overprivileged state takes many forms in discussions of 
curriculum change work. Some claim that men must be central in the curriculum 
because they have done most of what is important or distinctive in life or in 
civilization. Some recognize sexism in the curriculum but deny that it makes male 
students seem unduly important in life. Others agree that certain individual 
thinkers are male oriented but deny that there is any systemic tendency in 
disciplinary frameworks or epistemology to overempower men as a group. Those 
men who do grant that male privilege takes institutionalized and embedded forms 
are still likely to deny that male hegemony has opened doors for them personally. 
Virtually all men deny that male over reward alone can explain men’s centrality 
in all the inner sanctums of our most powerful institutions. Moreover, those few 
who will acknowledge that male privilege systems have over empowered them 
usually end up doubting that we could dismantle these privilege systems. They 
may say they will work to improve women’s status, in the society or in the 
university, but they can’t or won’t support the idea of lessening men’s. In 
curricular terms, this is the point at which they say that they regret they cannot use 
any of the interesting new scholarship on women because the syllabus is full. 
When the talk turns to giving men less cultural room, even the most thoughtful 
and fair-minded of the men I know will tend to reflect, or fall back on, 
conservative assumptions about the inevitability of present gender relations and 
distributions of power, calling on precedent or sociobiology and psychobiology to 
demonstrate that male domination is natural and follows inevitably from 
evolutionary pressures. Others resort to arguments from “experience” or religion 
or social responsibility or wishing and dreaming.29 
 
These sorts of considerations should weigh on us. I take them seriously and carry them even 
further, for I think there is also a human privilege that we in the academy (and beyond) indulge 
far too unconsciously. It matters that this sort of privilege has a strong unconscious dimension, 
even if it also has certain conscious dimensions (for instance, the way men in the west long had 
stories and theories and labels for women that perpetuated their marginalization). We might go 
so far as to suggest that white privilege actually goes together with human privilege (in part, 
because the dominant culture has a long history of separation from Nature and a sense of 
superiority; it is a culture of conquest, both of Indigenous People and of Nature), and that it goes 
                                                 
29 
https://nationalseedproject.org/images/documents/White_Privilege_and_Male_Privilege_Persona
l_Account-Peggy_McIntosh.pdf 
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further with something we might call intellectual privilege (not least because the abstractions and 
patterns of thinking of the dominant culture go together with separation from and conquest of 
Nature and Indigenous cultures; abstractions and logic function efficiently in maintaining control 
over property and populations, in justifying oppression, extraction, degradation, war). With the 
term “intellectual privilege” we try to capture some of the problems with contemporary 
philosophy that we have tried to confront.  
 
Another aspect of these problems relates to the way intellectualizing becomes something like an 
addiction, a distraction, an escape or evasion, or (in whatever proportion) all three. We have 
often in western philosophy made a distinction between hedonia and eudaimonia, with the 
former considered “mere pleasure,” and the latter considered “true happiness” or “true well-
being” or “meaningful happiness” or something like that. But starting at least with Aristotle, we 
have needed to add another term: theōria. Eudaimonia thus becomes a middle way between the 
extremes of hedonia and theōria. In this way of thinking, theōria should signify “merely 
intellectual” pleasure (though the intellectual—and we include scientists there, and even 
engineers in many cases—would take offense to the “merely”). Like its mirror, hedonia, it leaves 
something out. The “meaning” seems to be there, because the concepts we contemplate have 
apparent meaning. But that meaning casts a shadow. It actually eclipses a larger meaning, with 
which we need to participate. I will say more about that in a moment, because it’s crucial to our 
inquiry. 
 
But first, I want to probe for the possibility of this intellectual privilege, connected with human 
privilege. Mcintosh gives a list of 46 symptoms or indicators of white privilege that she bravely 
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tried to confront in her own experience. Leaving out any of them comes with risks, but here are a 
few of them: 
5. I can go shopping alone most of the time, fairly well assured that I will not be 
followed or harassed by store detectives. 
6. I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the paper and see people 
of my race widely and positively represented. 
7.When I am told about our national heritage or about “civilization,” I am shown 
that people of my color made it what it is.  
14. I could arrange to protect our young children most of the time from people 
who might not like them. 
15. I did not have to educate our children to be aware of systemic racism for their 
own daily physical protection. 
18. I can swear, or dress in secondhand clothes, or not answer letters, without 
having people attribute these choices to the bad morals, the poverty, or the 
illiteracy of my race. 
21. I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group. 
22. I can remain oblivious to the language and customs of persons of color who 
constitute the world’s majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such 
oblivion.  
23. I can criticize our government and talk about how much I fear its policies and 
behavior without being seen as a cultural outsider. 
24. I can be reasonably sure that if I ask to talk to “the person in charge,” I will be 
facing a person of my race. 
25. If a traffic cop pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax return, I can be sure I 
haven't been singled out because of my race. 
34. I can worry about racism without being seen as self-interested or self-seeking.  
35. I can take a job with an affirmative action employer without having my co-
workers on the job suspect that I got it because of my race. 
41. I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against 
me. 
44. I can easily find academic courses and institutions that give attention only to 
people of my race. 
45. I can expect figurative language and imagery in all of the arts to testify to 
experiences of my race. 
 
Let us consider some possible indicators of intellectual and human privilege, keeping in mind 
that, as McIntosh does with indicators or symptoms of white privilege and male privilege, these 
things actually make us less than what we might otherwise be, that these forms of privilege are 
not healthy for us, for a variety of reasons, and yet they function as “an invisible package of 
unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to 
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remain oblivious.” We are meant to not see these, to not see how our intellectual pleasure 
depends on and perpetuates a wide variety of assumptions and practices, including the 
degradation of ecologies.  
 
Before looking at the list of indicators, I want to emphasize that we are talking about a relation to 
knowledge. Intellectual privilege goes along with the way of knowing we are trying to 
understand as limited. Dewey offers an interesting reflection: 
Knowledge and effort to achieve it have never occupied in fact a very 
distinguished position in the constitution of societies nor has the class of persons 
professionally engaged in knowing ever been given a place of superior privilege. 
When the intellectual class has held such a position it has been in the capacity of 
priests, and the fact that homage went to them in virtue of their being the 
guardians and distributors of the supernatural is indirect testimony to the 
revelatory [low] estate in which search for knowledge is held. It may truly be said 
that the prestige of science and the status of scientific men have greatly advanced 
during the last century and a half. But this is a recent matter; moreover, it is still 
doubtful whether such honor as is conferred is a tribute to their pursuit or to the 
utility of knowledge for the purposes of industry and war. A cynic might say that 
the separate and supremely high place given knowledge is an expression of the 
fact that intellectuals constitute the writing class and like others suffering from an 
inferiority complex have taken advantage of the position given them to over-
compensate. (UPMP 345) 
 
Nietzsche’s thoughts about the “priestly class” in Genealogy of Morals, and his various 
criticisms of philosophers, should be welcomed to mind here. There are serious questions about 
what the intellectual class seeks to maintain, for themselves and for the elites of a society. Utility 
of knowledge for industry and war seem like such a principal interest of the society that one can 
hardly keep from thinking that, taken as a whole, it is the function of universities to further these 
pursuits above all else—hardly an encouraging definition of education. Intellectuals (again, 
including scientists and even engineers) may have various vested interests in maintaining their 
relative comfort and prestige, maintaining, in short, a kind of privilege. 
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In considering the incomplete list (below) of possible indicators of intellectual and human 
privilege, it behooves us to keep in mind that many of these items appear on the list precisely 
because they feature prominently in non-western or more holistic (less purely “intellectual”) 
epistemologies/ways of life. It also behooves us to keep in mind that this is not an indictment, 
and that there is nothing inherently wrong with theōria any more than there is something 
inherently wrong with hedonia. The situation is somewhat nuanced, and in part we could think of 
ourselves as examining the spiritual materialism of theōria. The main question has to do with 
whether we can detect any ethical, epistemological, or aesthetic reason for seeing a contrast 
between theōria and eudaimonia that mirrors the contrast between hedonia and eudaimonia. This 
is a long list, in part because of the subtlety of the problem. The reader may skim, trusting that 
attention will land upon at least one or two items worthy of contemplation. 
 
1) I operate my life on the basis of conscious purposes 
2) I spend most of my day indoors, and I don’t see this as compromising my epistemic situation 
(all of these items can also be considered from the standpoint of one’s aesthetic and ethical 
situation) 
3) I am in general surrounded by plastic: For instance, I eat from plastic containers, handle 
plastic throughout the day, wear plastic clothing (e.g. polyester or nylon), sit on plastic chairs—
and these things often seem to make my life easier, they seem to facilitate my work by saving me 
time and money and making my life more comfortable and convenient 
4) When I think, I usually do so indoors, often alone 
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4a) When I think with others, it is almost exclusively with other human beings (many of whom 
are, at bottom, quite similar to me—e.g. they are all philosophers, or they are all scientists or 
academics, or they are all in my area of specialization, or we share much in common in our 
thinking, we are all “materialists” of some variety, etc.) 
5) I do not regularly go on spiritual retreats or retreats in wild or relatively remote nature for 3 
days or more—and, (likely) I have no serious concern that a failure to spend such extended 
periods of time in nature or other forms of retreat might compromise my epistemic situation, nor 
any real confidence that engaging such retreats would significantly improve my epistemic 
situation (though, maybe I would admit it could benefit my health in some way, and thus rather 
indirectly affect my epistemic situation) 
6) I do not have a consistent spiritual practice that involves daily spiritual exercises such as 
meditation 
6a) Whether I have these or not, I not think I need them in order to improve my epistemic 
situation 
7) I do not have an active and ongoing relationship with Nature and non-human beings; I have 
never tried to learn from a non-human being and apply that learning to my activity as a scholar 
7a) I do not think of interaction with non-human beings as “doing” philosophy, and I do not see 
how one could significantly improve their epistemic situation in such interactions 
8) I do not have a consistent creative practice  
8a) I have never made art as a way of “doing” philosophy (or intellectual or scientific research), 
and I have never tried to improve my epistemic situation by means of artistic activity 
9) I do not regularly contemplate my dreams  
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9a) I do not conscientiously try to resolve problems in my work or my life by dreaming about 
them 
9b) I do not try to dream lucidly  
9c) I do not regularly draw on the activity of dream to improve my epistemic situation  
9d) I do not regularly speak with others about dreams as guidance for daily life 
9e) I do not regularly dream about wild beings, whether animals like Tiger or Eagle, or plants 
like Redwood or even Yggdrasil  
10) My epistemic practices are confined largely to the analysis and production of rationally 
organized text 
10a) I learn primarily through linguistic means, either through books, journals, lectures, or 
discussions 
10b) I do not regularly practice ways of knowing that go beyond “reasoning” and “argument” 
11) I think the world is made up of matter—matter that doesn’t really matter, so to speak (this 
symptom may also appear as: I live in a “dead” world with life growing on it here and there, as a 
kind of cosmic accident—other variations could present themselves as well, and they may sound 
less harsh, more skillfully rationalized)—and I have no concerns that this worldview might 
compromise my epistemic situation 
12) While I may experience coincidences from time to time, I do not experience synchronicities, 
meaning a coincidence that is no mere coincidence, but rather an event that ruptures the illusion 
of time and space, revealing a deeper, hidden order (I may even suspect that the experience of 
synchronicity indicates apophenia, and thus either relative superstition in the best case, and 
possible mental illness in the worst) 
13) I think in terms of dualities 
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14) I cannot quite see how my practice at each and every moment gives rise to my experience of 
life; living better has to do with reasoning better and keeping oneself in accord with reason, not 
with some sort of embodied, moment-to-moment practice of life 
15) I don’t know how to grow food (beyond perhaps a few garden vegetables) 
15a) I do not grow or hunt the majority of my food, and I am not genuinely clear about how the 
food I eat was produced 
16) I live my life in a massively degraded natural world 
17) I think there is hope that we can use technology to resolve the problem of climate collapse 
18) I have hope for a Green New Deal 
19) We don’t need to do anything about ecology or climate collapse 
20) Climate collapse, the various ecological crises, and ecology in general are “not in my 
wheelhouse”—I don’t know much about ecology 
20a) . . . and I probably don’t really need to, or can’t see any professional reason why I need to 
20a) . . . in any case, I am not going to study ecology 
21) I rarely if ever interact with non-western epistemologies 
22) I rarely if ever study the epistemologies of Indigenous Peoples and try to apply them to a 
critique of my own way of knowing, thinking, speaking, and living 
22) I would rather read a book than be out in Nature without books (especially “wild” places) or 
interact with non-human beings 
23) I almost never make significant room in my syllabi for non-western sources, including 
Indigenous sources 
24) I have never used plant medicines like ayahuasca or peyote to improve my epistemic 
situation 
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24a) admittedly, I cannot really understand how they might do so, even if I remain open to the 
possibility 
25) I think travelling is a good way to improve my epistemic situation 
26) I think going to academic conferences is a good way to improve my epistemic situation  
27) I don’t speak, attempt to study, or even make myself aware of some of the basic functioning 
of any non-western or Indigenous languages 
28) I have no concerns that my world view, in and of itself, will trigger skepticism about the 
subject matter of a talk I want to give or a book or article I would like to publish 
29) I have no concerns that any of my views will be thought of as primitive or superstitious 
30) I have no concerns that the sources I want to interact with have not been read, perhaps even 
heard of, by any of my colleagues 
31) I have no concern that my colleagues will think that what I do is NOT philosophy (or 
science) 
32) I have invested a lot of energy into texts: reading them, purchasing them, prizing them, 
talking about them 
32a) I do not try to “live” those texts, in the sense of having them change my moment-to-moment 
experience 
33) I have never seriously considered the Earth my mother 
34) I have never stopped what I was doing to try and listen to a non-human (non-pet) being, 
because I thought they were trying to “tell” me something 
35) I have not thought about the distinction between an “adult” and an “Elder,” where the latter 
indicates someone of significant dignity and wisdom to be particularly valued in the community 
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35a) . . . nor do I worry that I might be merely an adult in years but somehow quite immature in 
terms of genuine wisdom or spiritual depth; I have no serious concerns that my ontogeny has 
been interrupted by civilization 
36) In my interactions with non-human animals, a sense of juvenilizing prevails—always, “Good 
boy!” or “Good girl!” or “You’re so cute!” or something along those lines, and never, “My 
brother” or “My Elder sister” “My teacher” or something along those lines 
37) I have not experienced a sense of direct participation in Nature 
38) I have not ever seriously entertained the idea that humans can communicate with plants 
39) I have not seriously entertained the idea that forests can think 
40) I have never experienced a transforming vision of the fundamental wholeness and unity of 
the Cosmos and/or of the Earth and all its beings 
41) I do not ever feel a concern that my epistemic situation might be compromised to some 
significant degree by poor synchronization of my mind and body, or of my mind, body, and the 
world 
42) I have no serious concerns that unconscious dynamics compromise my epistemic situation  
42a) I have not ever tried to actively work with unconscious or shadow material 
43) I feel I can pursue my intellectual interests “for their own sake” or as part of participating in 
“the great conversation,” with no serious concern for how they might or should affect ordinary 
people and non-human begins, to whom I bear a great responsibility.  
44) I can come and go as I wish, and I am never trapped in a small space for 8 or more hours a 
day, a space that I cannot leave unless a person who inherently sees themselves as superior to me 
comes to let me out 
45) I do not spend much time working on non-verbal communication 
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46) I have never thought significantly about how much of my own thinking and even my own 
life that I “owe” to non-humans, and I do not seriously think of non-human beings as having 
something significant to teach me 
47) On a daily basis, I interact with more objects (toys, tools, furniture) than non-human living 
beings 
47a) I perpetuate this pattern of living by getting my children lots of manufactured toys and other 
manufactured objects 
48) There is nowhere I want to go on any regular basis that I realize I cannot go because another 
species has dominated that place, even if I really want or need to go there, for instance for food, 
companionship, or shelter 
49) I never have to worry that another species will make a decision that will put members of my 
species at serious risk, perhaps even at risk of extinction—and sheerly for its comfort and not for 
its need 
50) I have never seriously thought of a non-human being as “my relation” 
51) I don’t have to pause before leaving my home in the morning to look out for a dangerous 
species 
51a) I don’t have to be mindful as I journey throughout the day, lest I encounter a species I know 
to be a threat to my own 
51b) basically, I can come and go as I please, because my species dominates the planet 
52) I have no serious concerns that the principal language I speak may have basic structural 
features that compromise my epistemic situation 
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53) There is no place in Nature that I visit because it is sacred, and because I think being there 
with the right attitude will improve my epistemic situation (for instance, the place might speak to 
me in some way and help me to know something significant) 
54) Other than obvious fruit trees or shrubs, I cannot identify any edible plants growing wild 
within a hundred yards of my home (i.e. I wouldn’t know it if there were something edible 
growing near me, other than something obvious, like the oranges on a tree) 
55) I do not know the name Indigenous people had for the place I live 
55a) I am not sure how close my current home is to a former Indigenous settlement, and I am not 
sure what tribe or nation would have lived there, if one did 
56) I cannot name ten—or, let us even say 5—great philosophical figures outside the western 
tradition and summarize a few of the most salient features of their thinking 
57) When I am hungry, I can go to a store and obtain food; when I am thirsty or need to bathe, I 
do not have to go far to get water, and I don’t have to carry that water any great distance to use it 
58) I have never participated in a ceremony that attempted to put me in attunement or proper 
relation with the energies or forces of life (I may not have much of an idea what that would even 
mean) 
59) My consciousness or mind is located inside my skull 
59a) Communication or information exchange between my consciousness and that of others is 
always mediated by mechanical processes—there is no “perceptual channel for information 
exchange” that could operate between two minds physically separated (with no “means” of 
communication) or which would give me access to knowledge I would normally have to get by 
going someplace and looking (or doing some sort of research, etc.) or perhaps knowledge I 
simply could not get by means of the five conventional senses plus the intellect 
150 
 
60) I have no idea what the current rate of species extinction might be 
60a) I would admit that I cannot see how this extinction compromises my epistemic situation, 
which is to say that I cannot see how the existence or non-existence of trees, turtles, whales, or 
wolves has any impact on anything I know or care to know 
61) I am not aware that, because of soil degradation, there may only be 60 harvests left 
61a) I have no idea what we will do about the situation, given that it takes roughly 1000 years to 
produce an inch of topsoil 
62) I thoroughly enjoy “the life of the mind,” and I take tremendous pleasure in reading and/or 
constructing texts 
63) When driving, I don’t seriously think about how the human road has cut through what might 
be a home and rangeland for other species—I may, for instance, fear that a deer might jump out 
and damage my car, but I don’t fear that I have damaged the deer’s home, simply for my own 
convenience 
64) I can’t say that I feel I belong to the landscape, and that it is likewise an essential part of me 
65) Though I may feel satisfied with my work in many ways, I cannot say that it brings me 
lasting peace of mind, wisdom, or deep joy 
65a) Though I get excited about the ideas I think about, and though they make me feel happy in a 
certain sense, I cannot say that I still don’t sometimes feel something is missing for me to be 
truly well, wise, joyful, or at peace 
66) I never have to worry that my work will offer no stimulation for my mind 
67) I rarely if ever have to walk, dig in the earth, or otherwise engage in manual labor in order to 
survive 
68) I don’t have to push my body on a daily basis to what feels like a limit in order to survive 
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69) My work is does not feel communal and celebratory; my work lacks a feeling of sacredness 
to it, and someone observing me could likely make a pretty easy distinction between work and 
play 
70) I participate in my society mainly as a consumer of essential goods, goods needed for life, 
but not so much as a creator of them (though I may see myself as a contributor of knowledge or 
education) 
71) My day largely ignores natural rhythms that might arise from within my body or between my 
body and the natural world—in other words, my day takes direction from the clock and the 
calendar, to which I must pay fairly close attention  
72) I don’t know how to make the basic tools and objects I most rely on every day (e.g. my 
laptop, my car, my coffee mug) 
73) My life could probably be best characterized as sedentary 
74) I think getting exercise is important, even if I don’t get enough 
75) Going to the gym is a reasonable way to get exercise 
 
This list is as much a confession as McIntosh’s. Many of these items appear here because they 
are or have been true in my own case, and they eventually began to raise ethical and 
epistemological concerns—and here we face the crucial problem McIntosh mentions in terms of 
men’s recognition of their privileged status: “They may say they will work to improve women’s 
status, in the society or in the university, but they can’t or won’t support the idea of lessening 
men’s.” We have to find a way to actually give back to non-humans some of what we have 
taken, and in general giving up some of our privilege. 
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Some of the items may seem strange, and some of their dynamics operate invisibly, in part 
because, for instance, we may not see is just how addicted we might be to our theōria, how much 
we are willing to do to perpetuate that addiction, and how much we disconnect it from any 
obligation to or relationship with non-human beings and non-western cultures. In his 1929 essay, 
“Surrealism,” Walter Benjamin offers some interesting reflections that relate to this aspect of 
theōria: 
The most passionate investigation of telepathic phenomena, for example, will not 
teach us half as much about reading (which is an eminently telepathic process), as 
the profane illumination of reading about telepathic phenomena. And the most 
passionate investigation of the hashish trance will not teach us half as much about 
thinking (which is eminently narcotic), as the profane illumination of thinking 
about the hashish trance. The reader, the thinker, the loiterer, the flâneur, are types 
of illuminati just as much as the opium eater, the dreamer, the ecstatic. And more 
profane. Not to mention that most terrible drug—ourselves—which we take in 
solitude. ‘To win the energies of intoxication for the revolution’—in other words, 
poetic politics? ‘We have tried that beverage. Anything, rather than that!’ Well, it 
will interest you all the more how much an excursion into poetry clarifies things. 
For what is the programme of the bourgeois parties? A bad poem on springtime, 
filled to bursting with metaphors. (Benjamin 1999: 216) 
 
In other words, we can get “stoned” on our equations, abstractions, arguments, and texts (thus 
deadening us to . . . to what?), and, like any addict, we will not stop just because others start 
paying the cost of our addiction. Moreover, as much as we may endeavor (or, as much as we do 
not even have to endeavor) to keep poetry out of philosophy, perhaps academic philosophy is 
just a variety of poetry—which to some ears sounds like not the most elegant poetry (though to 
others it might sound lovely).30  
 
                                                 
30 As a side note, the “magical experiments” Benjamin discusses, which we tend to refer to as 
“surrealist games” can, in the right context, function as an art of awareness. The experiments 
seem “magical” in part because of the surprising kinds of knowing that seem to arise from 
bypassing ordinary conscious purposes and reasoning processes. 
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It will benefit us to think a little about thinking as addiction. Nietzsche often comes to mind 
regarding how our creatureliness might shape our philosophy and our science: 
As you see, they are not unbiased witnesses and judges of the value of the ascetic 
ideal, these philosophers! They think of themselves—what is “the saint” to them! 
They think of what they can least do without: freedom from compulsion, 
disturbance, noise, from tasks, duties, worries; clear heads; the dance, leap, and 
flight of ideas; good air, thin, clear, open, dry, like the air of the heights through 
which all animal being becomes more spiritual and acquires wings; repose in all 
cellar regions; all dogs nicely chained up; no barking of hostility and shaggy-
haired rancor; no gnawing worm of injured ambition; undemanding and obedient 
intestines, busy as windmills but distant; the heart remote, beyond, heavy with 
future,, posthumous—all in all, they think of the ascetic ideal as the cheerful 
asceticism of an animal become fledged and divine, floating above life rather than 
in repose. (GM III, 8) 
 
We will return to these suggestions. It helps to hold them together with Nietzsche’s insightful 
suggestions regarding the relationship of scientific truth and “civilization”—that we essentially 
made “knowledge” central to our way of life as part of the project of “making people 
responsible.” The Genealogy of Morals is a Genealogy of Science, but also something like a 
critique of a style of thinking, one to which we may exhibit signs of addiction. This should not 
surprise us if any of Nietzsche’s suggestions hold, for it comes to no more than the suggestion 
that we can become addicted to our own comforts, and we don’t want to let them go. 
 
But I would like to look at this notion of addiction from a perspective informed by cognitive 
science, especially the view offered by enactive cognition.31 And we can keep in mind here the 
view of addiction that neuroscientist Marc Lewis has developed. In relation to our present 
                                                 
31 The work of Gregory Bateson, Francisco Varela, Ezequiel Di Paolo, and others stands out. The 
Embodied Mind, by Varela, Rosch, and Thompson, and Mind and Life by Thompson serve as 
good philosophical/scientific introductions to this stream of research. Though Bateson did not 
consider his theories part of the approach of enactive cognition (the term comes into its own only 
after his death), his views certainly harmonize with this approach. 
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inquiry, Lewis has essentially made a convincing case that addiction is not so much a disease as 
a matter of practice-and-realization. His work supports the notion that we are what we practice, 
and that our practices can become like addictions in the sense of shifting our orientation to 
reality, shifting the way we metabolize experience and nutrients, shifting what our bodies and 
minds think of as nutriment.32 As the Buddha makes clear: All things depend on nutriment, and 
as we feed something, it begins to take on its own logic, its own well-put-togetherness, such that 
we can get trapped in a cycle of craving even though we see, consciously or unconsciously, that 
it doesn’t function. 
 
But there is also something we can get here from Dewey, whose theory of inquiry seems to be 
based on a view of life that presages contemporary enactive theory. Dewey puts it in what I 
would call an intellectual way, seeming to see “reflection” as a stepping back from things, and he 
does not, as far as I have seen, demonstrate a truly vitalizing vision of thinking in activity, which 
our inquiry invites us to verify.  
 
Working with ideas from these streams of research (enactivism, “addiction” research, and 
Deweyean as well as Buddhist philosophy), we could suggest, in a preliminary way, that life 
means processes that sustain life. An organism engages with the world (so to speak—there 
                                                 
32 I understand the importance of Lewis’s argument that addiction is not a disease. It arises in 
part because of the current cultural context. I would prefer that we think of the deeper problem as 
a lack of vision regarding health and healing. In the proper context, in a healthier ecology, 
addiction would be considered a disease, but that would not medicalize it and thus bring with it 
all the attendant problems Lewis rightly raises concern about. For an introduction to Lewis’s 
views, see his Biology of Desire, an excerpt of which appears online: 
https://www.alternet.org/2015/07/our-brains-are-designed-addiction-and-thats-not-necessarily-
bad-thing/ 
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should be a nondualistic view here) to sustain the conditions of its own existence (thus the 
organism shapes the environment and itself, and the environment shapes the organism and itself, 
all in mutuality). Where there is life, there is mind, and thus some sort of experience, no matter 
how primitive. In a Deweyan sense, we could say that every experience arises in a continuum of 
life-sustaining activity. We should adjust this to say that, in practice, every experience arises as 
activity carrying life forward, or transforming/cultivating life forward, without necessarily 
thinking of the transformation as a linear sequence. In this activity-experience, every feature of 
experience is conditioned by, or arises in dependence upon, the sense-making activity of the 
organism, or what we might call the organism’s life-directing goals (an organism must 
continually “make sense” of the world, in, through, as sensitiveness, sentience). Experience is 
made sense of in relation to what sustains the conditions required for the life of the organism. In 
terms of basic feeling, every experience arises as positive, negative, or neutral. Negative 
experiences feel unsettling, because in the basic sense-making of the organism, negative 
experiences ultimately threaten the processes of sustaining life.  
 
Dewey felt that organisms, including humans, would typically tend to take action on the basis of 
habit. When activity became blocked because habitual reactions failed to function, this would 
then trigger a process of inquiry. We humans experience this blockage of activity as doubt, 
uneasiness, ungroundedness, anxiety, imbalance, tension—something negative. These 
experiences indicate that our habits appear inadequate to respond to some kind of life situation. 
That may be due to the fact that the life situation is quite novel, or it could arise from the fact that 
each moment is unique, and thus habit must always already include a dimension of 
improvisation.  
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In some sense, in one time scale or another, the continuous unfolding of life, its ongoing co-
discovery-creation means that all the sense-making activity of all the organisms alive will 
become part of an ongoing development. But, (again, in a manner that ironically seems 
“intellectual”) Dewey focused on a process of reconstruction that occurs especially in human 
experience, in which we come up against doubt, frustration, and so on, then take a step back, so 
to speak, and develop new habits of action that reconstruct the old ones so that activity can flow 
again. This process of activity-blockage-doubt-reconstruction-activity is understood by Dewey as 
the logic of inquiry. It is inherently experimental, or, we could say, scientific. 
 
Dewey felt that, when our habits function well enough (we might say, habits along with our 
intelligence-in-action or living thinking—which, in its most vital and vitalizing form, we could 
call sagehood, and see it as liberated and liberating activity . . . Dewey did not offer such a 
vision), we remain in a mode or, perhaps better said, a dimension of experience he called 
primary experience. In this dimension our tacit goals adequately direct our activity, and this 
gives rise to a more or less fluid field of experience which feels more or less whole or holistic. 
However, when certain obstacles arise that habit cannot deal with, our activity becomes 
frustrated or stuck, and we experience uneasiness, doubt, anxiety, and so on. This triggers, often 
immediately, a shift into a secondary dimension of experience, characterized by reflectiveness, 
which can feel like a distance or delay in action. It is like taking a step back from a frustrating 
situation in order to focus and to better activate discernment. We need to bring an intentional 
awareness to the features of experience in order to better understand the relationships of those 
features (we usually think of these as “causal” features). As we inquire into those features, we 
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may arrive at insight, or re-cognition—a renewed thinking, a fresh view of the situation. In a 
“scientific” way of speaking, we might say that we get a new cognitive map or explicit cognitive 
understanding of the situation, and this allows us to better plan and control (all of that is a rather 
horrible way to put the matter, but at times Dewey sounds like this, and mostly our contemporary 
“science” as well as our politics, economics, and more sound like this). What we now have is an 
enriched experience, either experience “enriched” (perhaps dubiously so) by cognition and 
understanding, or, if we are lucky, experience enriched with some measure of wisdom, love, and 
beauty. 
 
A major spiritual issue Dewey did not seem to acknowledge—one that needs not only 
acknowledgement but extensive discussion and practice—is that the human ego is especially 
good at developing its own abstract notions about what we need in order to sustain our existence. 
Another way of putting the same point is that we as organisms will work hard to maintain the 
conditions of our existence, even if the conditions of our existence are diseased and deluded. If I 
think that I need chocolate to go on living, then I experience the loss of chocolate as no small 
frustration. Not only doubt but fear and anxiety and hope all arise in me, and I begin to do 
anything I can to get more chocolate. Thinking of heroin in place of chocolate might make the 
point more starkly, but many, many things that are as non-essential as chocolate drive our 
reactions in the continuum of experience, and we react to many, many things that are not really a 
threat to our existence as if they somehow were potentially deadly. We can react to a request 
from a loved one as if they had asked us to poke a needle in our eye, even though they may only 
have asked us to make an extra stop on the way home, or to finish washing the dishes, or to make 
an important phone call. The same holds for considering evidence that goes against our cherished 
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beliefs. If I am a “liberal,” a “white male,” a “Buddhist,” a QAnon follower, or anything at all 
that I can reasonably label, I may experience a conscious or unconscious existential threat in the 
face of, or even at the hint of, evidence that might challenge the beliefs that go with that identity.  
 
Any membership in a team, tribe, family, party, or institution of any kind can produce this effect, 
which arises from the fact that the basic processes of life are themselves dependent on what we 
may call “higher-order” processes that themselves arise out of the more basic processes. The 
basic processes of life simply empower living beings to recreate what they are and carry 
themselves (and all of life) forward. The processes inside a cell take in nutrients that allow the 
cell to keep itself intact, which means keeping the cell wall and other structures in good shape 
and keeping out potential toxins. The good can come into the cell and is kept there; the bad is 
kept out. There is a barrier between self and not-self, good and bad. The cell’s activities all go to 
making itself, sustaining itself.  
 
Many of us are familiar with the fact that almost our entire material body gets replaced every 7 
years. Some cells actually take longer to wear out, but those cells also do work to maintain and 
repair themselves. Some cells are replaced very quickly, on the order of days. For instance, the 
tongue and digestive tract regenerate quite quickly. Red blood cells are also produced at a fairly 
quick pace. Our body makes itself, and it makes sense of the world, in some sense constructs the 
world, on the basis of what allows it to keep constructing itself effectively—a co-discovery-
creation of self and world.  
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But, it does this not on some mindless, mechanical basis. Body is already mind. Thus what we 
call body (speaking dualistically) responds to our learning, because, when learning functions 
well, it allows us to do the work of life more skillfully. Learning can become rather 
“conceptual,” and, when our concepts function as delusion, they co-opt the processes of life for 
unhealthy purposes. Our total intelligence gets co-opted into getting the job, the tenure, the car, 
the shoes, the jewelry, the stock deal, the book deal, the drilling permit, the partner, the 
reputation, the money that some small part of us has learned to think of as important for 
sustaining our life. And this total process involves a mutuality, an interwovenness of what we 
divide up as “organism” and “environment,” as well as what we divide up as “top-down” and 
“bottom-up”. These distinctions do have their place. It helps to have a sense that my foolish 
addiction to chocolate or to reading Descartes will in various ways co-opt, so to speak, 
unconscious processes in the system—not only in “my” “body,” but more broadly, in “my” 
“department,” and in widening circles, to Africa where the beans for the chocolate grow and 
where the environmental degradation that keeps books in print and data in servers may be more 
keenly felt than in my comfy office on campus. 
 
Moreover, these contemplations show us the dangers in arts of awareness that lack proper vision. 
Again and again, contemporary teachers of mindfulness and meditation like to remind us that we 
are no longer at risk of being eaten by wild animals. They treat this as a rational explanation for 
our suffering. They tell us that we are “wired” to be on the look-out for man-eating tigers, and 
not finding any, those processes that scan for problems turn themselves on us. We start thinking 
something is wrong, and it must be “me”! But I have yet to hear a single meditation teacher 
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acknowledge the possibility that something is wrong, and that it is me.33 In other words, the 
bottom-up processes do detect something off in the environment, and the meditation teacher 
shows me how to override this rather than inquiring into it. What do those processes detect? 
Maybe that the air is not clear, the water is not clean, the weather is too bizarre, my job takes up 
too much energy and feels meaningless . . . that life feels meaningless, that species are going 
extinct, that we don’t see enough birds or spend enough unstructured time in wild places, that we 
are not rooted in the landscape, that we spend too much time reading books, that we are too tired, 
that we cannot see the night sky as our ancestors did. Indeed, we could say that the modern 
scientific story about our neuroses gets things wrong in an ironic way: Those ancient processes 
send warnings not because they (stupidly) think a tiger might be lurking behind a parking meter, 
but precisely because there are no tigers at all. The tiger is not merely a threat, but a friend, a 
highly esteemed member of the family, and we rightly feel uneasy, longing to see our loved and 
esteemed Elder. As Carl Safina (2015) points out, even today we see that human beings can 
make agreements with lions and tigers: You don’t eat us, we won’t eat you or bother your share 
of the food. We have had intimate relationships with other beings, who are now suffering and 
vanishing because of our way of being in the World. What kind of meditation practice would 
teach us to deny our experience of suffering for what we have done to the World? And yet, this 
seems de rigueur.  
 
In any case, this too illustrates one of the points we have made here: We can always transform 
our experience—of self and world—with, on balance, positive or negative consequences. In this 
                                                 
33 I mean something different here than the general philosophical teaching that we ourselves are 
the source of our suffering. Most every meditation teacher is in fact trying to make that point in 
some way—not always with sufficient ecological sensitivity. 
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sense, philosophy has to do with rebirth, renewal, rejuvenation. We birth ourselves anew, seeing 
the world and seeing ourselves with fresh eyes—the eye of wisdom-love-beauty. This does not 
mean accepting the now-degraded world as the way things should be. It means a rebirth into the 
work of rejuvenation, in which, as James Cone put it, we “plunge [ourselves] into the world on 
behalf of those who are voiceless and hurt.” Indeed, we plunge ourselves into the world for the 
sake of all beings.  
 
When we do this, everything changes, and the basic processes of life become increasingly 
attuned to wisdom-love-beauty. It becomes our vitalizing addiction, which just means a well-put-
togetherness-in-liberation—no longer “addiction” in the normal sense, but true well-being. This 
shift happens the very moment we enter the path of wisdom-love-beauty (or, we could say, the 
path of philosophy as a way of life . . . we are getting at the centrality of wisdom, love, and 
beauty in every major tradition). Dogen encourages us to make no distinction between intention, 
path, and fruition (or worldview, arts of awareness, and activity in, through, as the world)—even 
if we do at times need to accept that our practice at any given moment remains shaky and tender. 
Nevertheless, each moment we presence the heart of love, the heart of wisdom, the heart of 
beauty, the heart-mind-body-world-cosmos of wisdom-love-beauty (again, because self and 
world are mutually specified in, through, as our basic activity), we make our very life processes 
about wisdom-love-beauty, and these things we seek to carry forward, to renew, rebirth, 
revitalize, just as we now might seek to maintain, hold onto, perpetuate, or further our addictions, 
fears, cravings, hopes, and so on. 
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What we might call the shift into love that our inquiry will recommend involves transformational 
insights of wisdom, love, and beauty that sometimes prove painfully elusive, and we can think of 
it as trying to shift our whole metabolism. It relates to the basic processes of life, and how those 
processes get co-opted by delusions of all kinds—our beliefs, concepts, distances, fears, 
neuroses, ways of trying to be happy that fundamentally don’t function. The resilience of these 
delusions relates to the way the processes of life manifest a powerful energy of resistance to 
disturbance—a seeming necessity of life as we know it. We can call it “self-correcting,” “self-
preserving,” “self-reproducing,” or something else. The basic idea is that a living system has a 
kind of integrity. It has to keep itself going, and it needs some differentiation from what we call 
“the environment”. In order for the play of life to unfold as it does with living beings, beings 
must differentiate themselves. In order for the dance of life to become endless spirals of dance, 
there must be dancers.  
 
After all, a primary thing to wonder at is how strange it is that there are “individual beings,” 
given the wholeness of life—or, given the way Dewey and other more non-dualistic philosophers 
tried to undermine our conceptual dualities (in other words, we could take their arguments 
seriously, and then naturally ask them, “Okay, but then why does it seem like there are all these 
‘organisms’ moving around?”). We usually come from the other direction: We think that 
interwovenness is something strange, some peculiar philosophical concept, and meanwhile we 
think we understand individuality quite well—when in fact we cannot understand individuality 
without insight that radically disrupts our assumptions about it.  
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And we certainly come to a tremendously liberating insight when we see that things are not-two, 
that reality is not a collection of atomized individuals. This naturally changes our understanding 
about “individuality”. Nevertheless, we have at that point yet to achieve insight into why/how 
things are not-one, and why/how they are not-two-not-one. We don’t really understand (we 
should say wonderstand) so-called individuality without this fuller insight. 
 
But the main point here has to do with the utter resilience of foolish notions, ways of living that 
do not truly function—whether we feel that disfunction quite directly (for instance, the suffering 
of hangovers and broken relationships) or must try and sense it with a broader vision (for 
instance, seeing how our everyday activity arises altogether with human and non-human 
suffering, perhaps far away from us, but also quite locally and intimately—or, more to our 
general point just now, seeing how our thinking is not thinking in a robust sense but rather an 
intellectualism, that this intellectualism might put us at a distance from life, that it might function 
more or less like an addiction, like a disease, while failing to function in a way that will cultivate 
life forward in a vitalizing and mutually nourishing manner). The most “obvious” things in the 
world can be invisible to someone if that obvious thing seems to threaten the integrity that the 
“self-correcting” processes of life our systems naturally seek to perpetuate. Or, we can say that 
skillful and realistic views can appear very obviously wrong if they threaten the integrity our 
system seeks to preserve. Changing one’s mind becomes a matter of shifting one’s entire 
metabolism, one’s entire pattern of sense-making. 
 
We can put this another way: We fail to think holistically and skillfully if we imagine that 
“reason” and “evidence” are enough to “change people’s minds” in ways that matter deeply, 
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especially if we might be in rather deep trouble. We think atomistically if we think we can just 
“reason” with someone to get them to let go of a view that seems to cause them suffering or 
seems to lead to more suffering in the world. The processes of life seek to minimize the effects 
of perturbations or disturbances of the system. We all experience this psychologically too, 
whether we are the sort of person who chronically resists changes of any kind, or if we have just 
had times when we wanted to do nothing at all, just to relax in non-disturbance. We may put up a 
Do Not Disturb sign on our hotel door when we manage to sneak off for a holiday, and we may 
wish we could put a Do Not Disturb sign that would actually function at home or at the office. 
We often want nothing more than to be left undisturbed, to feel in complete control of our time 
and our perception. 
 
Our systems do have a certain inertia which in ideal cases involves a conservation of energy, but 
in practice this can mean that we look for ways to keep things as they are—another case of the 
bottom-up processes being co-opted by top-down processes that rationalize in order to seem 
reasonable. No matter how promising and beneficial a change may seem, if it appears that the 
change will take a lot of energy, or feels like too much of a disturbance in any way, we will resist 
the change—with good reasons. It may be that, over time, we will waste tremendous energy and 
experience a lot of suffering by keeping things as they are (a pattern which might itself include a 
lot of chasing after things, for instance extensive travel or pursuit of adrenaline rushes), but the 
initial barrier of energy output for a radical change in the system (whether real or imagined—it 
almost always has an imaginary component) can keep us stuck. 
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What tends to happen is that we will not even notice things that threaten our delusions. Quite the 
contrary: Things that feed our delusion become salient to us. Salience and intelligence seem to 
arise together, as salience goes immediately with sense-making (a bacteria is intelligent, and its 
intelligence makes sense of a sugar gradient—i.e. sugar is salient to the bacteria, while the 
sounds of tango music might not be). We just do not see that which might be threatening to the 
system of delusions that runs our life (they do not ever become salient), or we see it as 
something that threatens the integrity of that system, and thus we react to it, to keep it at a 
distance, lest it destabilize our patterns. We see the “liberal” as a “lib-tard” or some other 
derogatory notion, or we see the “conservative” as a “redneck,” or we see someone’s work as 
non-academic or unscientific, and so on.  
 
Suffering always carries the threat of disruption, whether our own suffering or that of others. 
When we see another human being, we may not vulnerably and openly see a being who suffers 
like we do and who just wants to be happy—and in many respects may do no worse a job at that 
fundamental project than we do (an issue of particular threat as we contemplate the tension 
between philosopher and professor of philosophy, one that implicates the whole of the academic 
enterprise). In a spiritual sense, everyone on this side of enlightenment, apotheosis, sagehood, or 
the status of atopos does a foundationally bad job of trying to be happy—though our spiritual 
sense also helps us to see the importance of doing better at it, which involves making less 
suffering for ourselves and others, while cultivating the well-being of all. 
 
We have considered habit here, and Lewis summarizes the distinction between habit and what 
we call addiction this way: 
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What makes [addiction] different from what we might call more benign habits? 
Three things. First, it’s a habit of thinking and feeling—a mental habit—not just a 
behavioural habit. It’s easier to stop singing in the shower than it is to stop seeing 
the world as violent or unfair. Second, the feeling part of addiction always 
includes the feeling of desire, which is of course the theme of this book. And 
third, it’s a habit that becomes compulsive. Perhaps all habits, once formed, are 
compulsive to some degree. The brain is certainly built to make any action, 
repeated enough times, into a compulsion. But the emotional heart of addiction—
in a word, desire—makes compulsion inevitable, because unslaked desire is the 
springboard to repetition, and repetition is the key to compulsion. 
 
Like all habits, addiction quite simply grows and stabilizes, in brain tissue that is 
designed (by evolution) to change and stabilize. Yet addiction belongs to a subset 
of habits: those that are most difficult to extinguish. . . .34 
 
In fact, it can be rather challenging to stop singing in the shower if we have made singing in the 
shower something that carries emotional charge. But another issue here has to do with the energy 
that comes up in us. Think of the energy that emerges when we read a text. We can start to get 
the heebie-jeebies when something happens in a text that annoys us, or seems like the wrong way 
to think, to write, or whatever. If it comes from or expresses a worldview we find strange or 
unacceptable in any way, an emotional tone of negativity, dismissal, even disgust and hatred can 
arise. In Buddhist philosophy, the so-called near-enemy of love is not hate. Rather, the near-
enemy of love is attachment. Hatred is actually the near-enemy of knowledge—an insightful 
suggestion. The activity of knowing can enact a hatred, and our addiction to intellectual 
knowledge can (as Nietzsche tried to get us to see) enact a kind of hatred of life, and also of other 
beings who will not submit to our way of knowing (in the double sense). The unknown presents 
a kind of threat to us. 
 
                                                 
34 https://www.alternet.org/2015/07/our-brains-are-designed-addiction-and-thats-not-necessarily-
bad-thing/ 
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What, in general, is threatening to us? We are all familiar with the ways in which political views 
become threatening. Of course, the pattern of insanity operates in such a way that we do not 
always perceive contrary views, arguments, and evidence as “threatening”. Reason prevents this. 
We suppress our emotional reaction. Instead, we perceive what we don’t like as plain wrong—
though with reason’s objective nuances: wrong-headed, confused, ill-informed, poorly reasoned, 
not well-argued, unscientific, and so on. None of this means I think the activity of reasoning is 
useless, or that our only alternative is “the irrational” or “the mystical” (certainly not as the latter 
term is typically understood). But it helps us to see how the processes of life protect us from 
even having to consider some things with any sincerity and depth—while allowing us to claim 
that we have an open and critical mind, that we consider evidence, that we are being rational, and 
so on.  
 
This holds rather pervasively. All our relationships arise in a matrix of the self-preservation of 
our delusions. So, with a romantic partner, for instance, we may have keen insights into the ways 
they delude themselves, into their self-limiting habits, into their foibles of thought, speech, and 
action, while seeing much less clearly into ourselves. Our intelligence shows up not only in some 
occasionally keen perceptions of others, but it also shows up in the endless cleverness and 
imagination needed to keep our own delusions going along as we do. Of course, some or even 
most of what we think we see about our beloved ones may in fact be laced with biases, and 
sometimes the very thing we think we see so clearly in them has more to do with us. We see their 
stinginess as we ourselves are the most stingy one in the relationship, and they may in fact be 
quite giving, or giving at the limit of what they are capable of, contextualized in our mutual 
practice together.  
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The aspect of this issue that relates to our personal, political, social, economic, and ecological 
woes matters a great deal, but we must keep our eye on the fact that this is essentially a spiritual 
problem, and not one of “politics” narrowly or typically construed. The better we get at seeing 
how political disfunction arises from spiritual disfunction, the better we may get at turning 
toward the spiritual for resolution, reconciliation, and rejuvenation. It is a matter of remembering 
ourselves and spiritualizing our lives—touching the sacredness in all our engagements with life.  
 
We may think, in this regard, that the ultimate threat in all of this is threat of meaning—and we 
are not far off the mark. If we have the wrong ideas about life, and we have identified with those 
ideas, then our life and our identity face a crisis. What are we if we are wrong about our “liberal” 
or “conservative” political views? Who would we be without our membership in this or that 
group? Who would we be without our drinking or our social media habits? Who would we be 
without our books, our articles, our causes, our agendas? Who would we be without our fMRI 
machines—and how would we ever do science without these and other accoutrements that add 
up to such a massive intervention into the natural world? When our fears run wild, we may even 
think that all of life is meaningless. This we can call the threat of nihilism. It certainly makes 
almost every single energy barrier seem daunting: Why should we practice our lives at all if 
nothing matters, if our little life doesn’t make a difference, and if, anyway, spiritual practice 
doesn’t really make a difference for us or for anyone else? There is nothing to be known from 
spiritual practice, right? 
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While nihilism does seem to have a real hold on us—and we will look into it further—it may be 
that in some ways what threatens us most deeply is not the meaninglessness of life, for then we 
could still do whatever we want—including clinging to the patterns of insanity that we have 
grown so accustomed to. The real threat of spiritual practice is that everything matters, and that 
in some very profound sense, our lives are not ours, that our lives don’t “belong” to us, but that 
we belong to something inconceivable, something that transcends us. The ego fears that this 
means death or the loss of “individuality” or “specialness”. In fact, we only realize ourselves—
our unique purpose—in, through, and as this immanent transcendence. But it is not something 
we can capture with concepts or even formulate or hold on the basis of ordinary consciousness. 
 
The threat that everything matters feels like a big disturbance, because it means we cannot ever 
hang up the Do Not Disturb sign on the door of our life. We cannot expect Sophia to pay any 
heed to such a sign. We cannot expect the mystery, the sacred, the divine to go away. We cannot 
expect the Dance to stop while we read our books or get our act together. And, ironically, we 
may say that we would do anything to heal, that we would do anything to gain true insight, to 
realize wisdom, love, and beauty, to help the world, to make things better. And yet, how many 
times does it happen that, when Anything comes knocking at our door, we desperately want to 
shout: “Go away!”35 Our inquiry will suggest that opening—no matter what has come 
knocking—marks a proper spiritual/philosophical orientation. It is the practice and realization of 
our interwovenness. 
 
                                                 
35 Thanks to Laura Ferry for drawing out this metaphor with me in dialogue. 
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We are interwoven with each other, but we allow our delusions, we allow our suffering to isolate 
us. Oppressed people know that suffering actually connects us. Their oppressors try to suppress 
this fact, as all of us do when we try to use isolation to cure isolation, fragmentation to cure 
fragmentation. We suffer, and thus feel cut off. We suffer because of a mirage of distance, a 
mirage manufactured from distraction and delusion. To medicate our suffering, we apply more 
distance, distraction, delusion. To medicate our suffering, we may villainize a group of people. 
We may hate them, attack them, take their land, hang them from trees. We may also drown 
ourselves in text, the way others drown themselves in drink. 
 
Somehow, things might shift if all we did is sense that our suffering connects us. We are 
interwoven both in our suffering and in our basic goodness, our basic nature. These things are 
our interwovenness with all beings. White people are already interwoven with Black, Red, 
Yellow, Brown people. The white person who does not see institutionalized racism, who actively 
tries to deny it, applies spiritual materialism to this fact. Such a person realizes that they, too, 
suffer. They realize that we all suffer. But this does not excuse us from seeing structures of 
power and domination that focus suffering on particular groups—always at the expense of all, 
including the oppressors, whose souls are degraded in the process. We humans degrade our own 
souls as we degrade the world, and we degrade the world in particular ways when we live the life 
of a typical academic, including the typical scientist and the typical professor of philosophy. 
 
We are responsive beings, sensitive beings. All of the suffering of the world threatens us, 
especially any suffering in which we sense our own contribution. What threatens us most right 
now, perhaps more so than at any time in human history, is that the meaningfulness of our 
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connection to all beings might force us to stop what we are doing, stop key aspects of the life we 
think we need. Socrates simply asked people to STOP. Buddha asked people to STOP. Can we 
STOP the academic machine? Can we STOP the political-economic machine of the dominant 
culture? Why not? And what happens if we don’t? 
 
And, What if we want a new kind of sobriety? All this talk of addiction . . . what do we make of 
sobriety? Could we—and how would we—give up the addiction to theory and to ourselves as we 
know ourselves? What if we want that “decisive experience” Jung and so many other 
philosophers have invited us to verify by means of our own experimentation, the experience that 
would herald a genuinely new and vitalizing way of knowing—so different from what we are 
used to that we almost cannot help keeping it at bay, in a thousand ways so clever and protean 
that we do not see them in operation? Returning to Jung’s reflections on the decisive experience 
or the “breakthrough of total experience,” we can note that he feels a little skeptical about our 
prospects, though not completely hopeless: 
There is nothing in our civilization to foster these strivings, not even the Church, 
the custodian of religious values. Indeed, it is the function of the Church to 
oppose all original experience, because this can only be unorthodox [could the 
same be said for academia?—n.k.]. The only movement inside our civilization 
which has, or should have, some understanding of these endeavours is 
psychotherapy. (CW11, para. 903) 
 
That may sound cocky, but he seems to mean it as a gesture of modesty regarding western 
culture. He clarifies that aspect of it here: 
it frequently happens with us also that a conscious ego and a cultivated 
understanding must first be produced through analysis before one can even think 
about abolishing egohood or rationalism. What is more, psychotherapy does not 
deal with men who, like Zen monks, are ready to make any sacrifice for the sake 
of truth, but very often with the most stubborn of all Europeans. (904) 
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In other words, we westerners aren’t really up to the task of anything too radical. We’re a bit too 
juvenile and neurotic, a bit too stubborn and skeptical or cynical (in a pejorative sense). While 
we may say we will make any sacrifice for wisdom, love, and beauty, in practice we have our 
limits—including the limits of time, patience, and a thousand constraints placed on us by the 
culture and its institutions.  
 
The issue of ontogeny feels troubling. Paul Shepard (e.g., 1982, 1995) and Chellis Glendinning 
(1994) have invited us to sense the possibility that we humans became interrupted in our 
developmental process, perhaps with the invention of large-scale agriculture (humanity’s biggest 
mistake, according to Jared Diamond), but at least with the development of “civilization” as we 
know it, which eventually included capitalism, the industrial revolution, and neo-liberalism as 
high points. This interruption comes from a breakdown of an intimate awareness of our 
interwovenness with each other and the natural world—perhaps we could call it an awareness of 
symbiosis with the natural world and with each other. But even such turns of phrase can lead us 
into thinking we could functionally suggest a separation, a duality between organism and 
environment, which itself stands as a prejudice, perhaps of intellectual privilege. If Shepard and 
others have a point, and if something about civilization does in fact interrupt our development, 
then at least some of us do not fully mature. In some sense, we remain juvenile, even as we 
continue to age. Shepard called this “ontogenetic crippling,” indicating that we may have 
damaged ourselves in some important way, and he tries to help us see how this might hold true. 
Glendinning went further with the concept of the original trauma, claiming this separation from 
nature has resulted in collective trauma that underlies (in some cases perhaps gives rise to) much 
of the other trauma we experience. If Glendinning has a valid point, one that goes together with 
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Shepard’s, then perhaps a great deal of our philosophizing arises as the attempts of a confused 
and traumatized mind to make sense of its situation, from the standpoint of a limited 
development. What kind of commentary does that make on our philosophizing? Does any of it 
feel like an attempt to reconnect with Nature or a sense of the sacred? But if that’s what actually 
drives it—if at a deep level we seek and even need reconnection, atonement, attunement—then, 
maybe much of it amounts to an astonishing web of rationalized distraction.36 
 
These might feel like strange speculations, but we move with them further into Dewey’s idea of 
context, which he frames as the philosophical fallacy. Before moving more into that territory, let 
us think of another way he framed that fallacy: as intellectualism.  
 
We have suggested that philosophy has to do with cultivating certain kinds of experience—the 
experience of wisdom, love, beauty, peace, joy, and general well-being for oneself and others 
(overall we might suggest a function of healing and good health, a health and healing inclusive 
of “individuals,” but ecologically understood)—and we can say it fundamentally shares this 
characteristic with myth, art, religion, and all of “spirituality”. We cultivate experience so as to 
make it skillful, realistic, creative, and so on, such that life carries forward in rich and delightful 
ways, in mutual nourishment and mutual illumination. This kind of experience has generally 
                                                 
36 It may be worthwhile here to recall the Dalai Lama’s words, from A Call for Revolution: 
 
I have been inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution that were adopted as the motto of the 
French Republic: Liberté, équalité, fraternité. I adopted the same motto. As a Buddhist, the aim 
of my spiritual quest is to free myself of the fundamental ignorance that has led to the notion that 
there is a division between people and the natural world, which is at the root of all our suffering. 
(2017: 36-8)  
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been taken variously as an experience of how things really are, or the experience of reality, or 
even the experience of mystery or sacredness.  
 
In criticizing philosophers for making a most fundamental fallacy of ignoring “context,” Dewey 
seems to want to say that philosophers fail first and foremost by “intellectualizing” everything, 
or interpreting everything as some facet of epistemology. One sees this all the time in 
introductory courses of philosophy, most clearly when students are taught Plato.  
 
We eventually need to ask, What is the proper “context” of “knowledge”? Dewey doesn’t quite 
get to this in the way we may need to. We might say we need to “contextualize” the process of 
knowing, but we might then say there is no “context” for this. In other words, we might try to 
“situate” something called “knowledge” in the living world and/or in our lived experience. 
However, according to the definition of mind and life we find in certain strains of rigorous 
cognitive science, the living world is not alive if it isn’t a process of knowing. Experience is 
blind if it is not already, let us say, luminous-and-knowing (to borrow a term from Buddhist 
philosophy). So, we cannot “contextualize” anything (most especially any thing) called 
“knowledge,” but we must instead transcend all our unskillful and unrealistic ways of knowing 
and return to life—as Jung implies in the quote above about getting our ultimate answers “from 
Nature herself,” and which Dewey, too, suggests very clearly, though in his own way, in works 
like A Common Faith and Experience and Nature. The former of Dewey’s works allows us to 
say that this return to life, this return to Nature is a gesture of sacredness, the realization of any 
proper meaning of “religion”. More poetically we could call this return to sacredness, this return 
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to experience and Nature, a return to the richness and goodness of being alive and alove, inspired 
and insightful, a state of serenity and wonder.  
 
The epistemology we seek is thus a proper “Philosophy of Experience,” or “The Practice-
Realization of Experience.” In such an epistemology, the “meaning of life” is not about 
knowledge. It is not an item of knowledge, and thus cannot be told, and cannot ultimately be 
evaluated or understood by procedures for evaluating the truth or falsity of “propositions”.  The 
sage, the realized philosopher in all of us, dedicates themselves to the richness of experience, the 
beautiful possibilities of meaningfulness that can emerge from the mystery of life, which we 
might technically call, following David Bohm, an “implicate order,” a sort of living potential that 
arises or happens explicitly in, through, and as our experience (which means our experience 
constitutes the explicate order), according to our manner of practice, which includes the tools and 
forms of philosophy we employ. But we also need to make clear that this epistemology applies to 
what we should want to call science, and thus becomes a critique of what we now call science, 
because what we now call science does not include sufficient responsiveness to the meaning of 
life (which includes what we might call the conditions of life—more poetically, the alive and 
alove quality of Nature, its mindfulness, its mindedness, and the demands that Nature places on 
us) and the proper cultivation of experience. That will still take time to clarify, but, to plant a 
seed now, we may come to a place, a vision, a sensibility from which we would judge our 
current science as something of an epistemological failure.  
 
Dewey may have wanted to develop what we could call a “cultural naturalism,” in which 
“culture” serves as a substitute for whatever he meant by “experience” (he wrote in the second 
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introduction to Experience and Nature that he might have rather called the work Nature and 
Culture—again, the endless struggle with terms, most especially when one wants to do radical 
philosophy, transformation at the base, so to speak). We might understand Dewey’s sense of 
“experience” as our shared, embodied, “symbolic life,” perhaps taking poetic and also 
philosophic license to resonate there with Jung’s notion of the symbolic life: 
You see, man is in need of a symbolic life—badly in need. We only live banal, 
ordinary, rational, or irrational things—which are naturally also within the scope 
of rationalism, otherwise you could not call them irrational. But we have no 
symbolic life. Where do we live symbolically? Nowhere, except where we 
participate in the ritual of life. But who, among the many, are really participating 
in the ritual of life? Very few. And when you look at the ritual life of the 
Protestant Church, it is almost nil. Even the Holy Communion has been 
rationalized . . . . 
Have you got a corner somewhere in your house where you perform 
the rites, as you can see in India? Even the very simple houses there have at least 
a curtained corner where the members of the household can lead the symbolic life, 
where they can make their new vows or meditation. We don’t have it; we have no 
such corner. We have our own room, of course—but there is a telephone which 
can ring us up at any time, and we always must be ready. We have no time, no 
place. Where have we got these dogmatic or these mysterious images? Nowhere! 
We have art galleries, yes—where we kill the gods by thousands. We have robbed 
the churches of their mysterious images, of their magical images, and we put them 
into art galleries. That is worse than the killing of the three hundred children in 
Bethlehem; it is a blasphemy. 
You see, we are in need of a symbolic life—badly in need. Only the 
symbolic life can express the need of the soul—the daily need of the soul, mind 
you! And because people have no such thing, they can never step out of this 
mill—this awful, grinding, banal life in which they are “nothing but.” In the ritual 
they are near the Godhead; they are even divine. Think of the priest in the 
Catholic Church, who is in the Godhead: he carries himself to the sacrifice on the 
altar; he offers himself as the sacrifice. Do we do it? Where do we know that we 
do it? Nowhere! Everything is banal, everything is “nothing but”; and that is the 
reason why people are neurotic. They are simply sick of the whole thing, sick of 
that banal life, and therefore they want sensation. They even want a war; they all 
want a war. They are all glad when there is a war: they say, “Thank heaven, now 
something is going to happen—something bigger than ourselves!”  
These things go pretty deep, and no wonder people get neurotic. Life is 
too rational, there is no symbolic existence in which I am something else, in 
which I am fulfilling my role, my role as one of the actors in the divine drama of 
life. 
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I once had a talk with the master of ceremonies of a tribe of Pueblo 
Indians, and he told me something very interesting. He said, “Yes, we are a small 
tribe, and these Americans, they want to interfere with our religion. They should 
not do it,” he said, “because we are the sons of the Father, the Sun. He who goes 
there,” (pointing to the sun)—“that is our Father. We must help him daily to rise 
over the horizon and to walk over Heaven. And we don’t do it for ourselves only: 
we do it for America, we do it for the whole world. And if these Americans 
interfere with our religion through their missions, they will see something. In ten 
years Father Sun won’t rise anymore, because we can’t help him any more.” 
Now, you may say, that is just a sort of mild madness. Not at all! These 
people have no problems. They have their daily life, their symbolic life. They get 
up in the morning with a feeling of their great and divine responsibility: they are 
the sons of the Sun, the Father. and their daily duty is to help the Father over the 
horizon—not for themselves alone, but for the whole world. You should see these 
fellows: they have a natural fulfilled dignity. And I quite understood when he said 
to me, “Now look at these Americans: they are always seeking something. They 
are always full of unrest, always looking for something. What are they looking 
for? There is nothing to be looked for!” That is perfectly true. You can see them, 
these travelling tourists, always looking for something, always in the vain hope of 
finding something. On my many travels I have found people who were on their 
third trip round the world-uninterruptedly. Just travelling, travelling; seeking, 
seeking. I met a woman in Central Africa who had come up alone in a car from 
Cape Town and wanted to go to Cairo. “What for?” I asked. “What are you trying 
to do that for?” And I was amazed when I looked into her eyes-the eyes of a 
hunted, a cornered animal-seeking, seeking, always in the hope of something. I 
said, “What in the world are you seeking? What are you waiting for, what are you 
hunting after?” She is nearly possessed; she is possessed by so many devils that 
chase her around. And why is she possessed? Because she does not live the life 
that makes sense. Hers is a life utterly, grotesquely banal, utterly poor, 
meaningless, with no point in it at all. If she is killed today, nothing has happened, 
nothing has vanished-because she was nothing! But if she could say, “I am the 
daughter of the Moon. Every night I must help the Moon, my Mother, over the 
horizon”—ah, that is something else! Then she lives, then her life makes sense, 
and makes sense in all continuity, and for the whole of humanity. That gives 
peace, when people feel that they are living the symbolic life, that they are actors 
in the divine drama. That gives the only meaning to human life; everything else is 
banal and you can dismiss it. A career, producing of children, are all maya 
compared with that one thing, that your life is meaningful. 
That is the secret of the Catholic Church: that they still, to a certain extent, 
can live the meaningful life. For instance, if you can watch daily the sacrifice of 
the Lord, if you can partake of his substance, then you are filled with the Deity, 
and you daily repeat the eternal sacrifice of Christ. Of course, what I say is just so 
many words, but to the man who really lives it, it means the whole world. It 
means more than the whole world, because it makes sense to him. It expresses the 
desire of the soul; it expresses the actual facts of our unconscious life. When the 
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wise man said, “Nature demands death,” he meant just that. (CW 18, para. 625-
31) 
 
We will see that Jung, like Dewey, demands experiment, a setting out to discover and create for 
oneself in a vitalizing process of verification. This experience which nothing can take away from 
us is more important even than Galileo’s supposed “And yet it moves,” for we speak here of 
something that affects our whole way of being in the world, and not merely our “picture” of it. 
This notion of “symbolic” does not deal in abstractions and written jargon. Here, the phrase 
“symbolic logic” takes on new meaning, indicating not the dry logic that students suffer through 
every school year in universities across the country, needlessly forcing themselves to master 
forms that will do nothing for their growth as human beings, all the while neglecting the living 
symbols of the psyche, and repressing any empathic response to the collapse of the conditions of 
life that goes on while they learn what are for them meaningless translations into predicate logic. 
Logic becomes another way we drain the meaning from education. The symbolic logic of myth, 
dream, art, archetype—the sense of “cosmic meaning” that philosophy in the academy no longer 
deals with—all of this could help us and our students, could get us all on a Quest that might lead 
us to get in touch with the meaningfulness of life, and also lead to real solutions for the real 
problems of the world (not the pseudoproblems of how to run a business or how to get a job at a 
tech firm, but the problems related to spiritual development and the conditions of life—the latter 
of which, granted, may be somehow helped by a tech firm, but this would not change the 
diagnosis of our current situation). All of this could be part of philosophy, and we shall want to 
think of dreaming, for instance (or dance, ritual, ceremony, and so on), as a viable philosophical 
practice which most philosophers not only leave largely untouched, but do not even conceive in 
its fuller potentials.  
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We should note here that, as rituals like the ones Jung mentions disappear, so do the conditions 
of life. One simple-minded interpretation of “the symbolic” might be: The symbol is totally 
different from the symbolized. Another might be: The symbol is exactly the same as what is 
symbolized. The truth might be a middle way: These rituals matter, and we must face the fact 
that, as they degrade, we approach a time at which the sun no longer comes up on the world as 
we have known it. We somehow need a symbolic life for life to function, because a symbolic life 
in the proper sense is life.  
 
We shall return to these ideas again and again, but the basic sense of them comes to something 
like this: A skillful life is constituted by the inherently meaningful ways we are informed and 
transformed (in-formed and trans-formed) by what Hume might have called the secret powers 
and hidden causes of our lives (we might better call them sacred powers and inconceivable 
causes); as D.H. Lawrence put it, we are “lived by powers we pretend to understand,” and we 
should take that further to get at the mutuality of our life in this world, the way we “inhabit the 
world” while it simultaneously “inhabits us”.37 These may seem rather strange assertions, but 
even someone as reserved as Dewey wrote that, “the closer man is brought to the physical world, 
                                                 
37 From another perspective, we must recall here, as we shall need to do elsewhere, Nietzsche’s 
comments, which remind us that we do not simply “do philosophy,” but we are philosophized, 
by powers we pretend to understand—most especially when we call them by the name “reason”: 
 
I do not believe that a “drive to knowledge” is the father of philosophy; but rather that another 
drive has, here as elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere 
instrument. But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may 
have been at play just here as inspiring spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find that all of them 
have done philosophy at some time—and that every single one of them would like only too well 
to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the 
other drives. For every drive wants to be master—and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit. 
(BGE 6) 
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the clearer it becomes that his impulsions and ideas are enacted by nature within him” (LW10: 
341). Even this, when we reflect on it, seems stranger than Dewey indicates, for he takes it as a 
rather plain fact, whereas Jung has offered this to us as a sort of mystical revelation of “the only 
true answer—from Nature herself.” Such seemingly strange notions will get clearer as we rethink 
the nature of thinking, drawing as we will on some very concrete analogies and on the empirical 
foundations of cognitive science. For now, we want to at least emphasize again the suggestion 
that experience transcends all our concepts, including the biological and psychological concepts 
that might reduce “experience” to a matter of “sensations,” “nerve stimulations,” “stimulus-
response” events, or “brain” events. And this experience reaches the sacred, even for Dewy (as 
far as he might allow the use of the term), as it reaches Nature, which we should think of as 
manifesting most robustly, most as itself so to speak, in events or happenings such as dancing, 
playing jazz, making a work of art, falling in love, practicing compassion, bringing wisdom to 
realization, and so on. It doesn’t manifest robustly in particle accelerators. Something like 
physics perhaps cannot alter experience as significantly as Dewey may have thought we want 
and need, and it may be too intellectual to reveal Nature in her fullness, and thus to serve as a 
revelation of ourselves (as part of Nature). Not that Dewey would ever suggest we stop doing 
physics. But, I want to suggest that the way we do it certainly qualifies for the grand fallacy of 
context. 
 
We need to go into that more clearly. The error of context is not simply a philosophical error or 
fallacy. It is a blindness. And the error is not best put as a failure to “recognize” something we 
could call “context”. Rather, it is a failure to recognize—to rethink even, to think totally 
freshly—on the basis of rootedness in Nature and rootedness in wisdom, love, and beauty. We do 
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not need merely to “contextualize” ourselves, which is quite an abstract notion, especially as 
utilized in the contemporary academy. Rather, we need to Indigenize ourselves, to become 
rooted in the world. Here we should cite Pierotti’s discussion of Traditional Ecological Knowing: 
It is so rooted in “place” (in real ecologies that give us a sense of “place” and a sense of 
belonging, in mutuality) that it does not “transfer,” does not become part of a system of global 
control. As Pierotti puts it: 
One definition of Traditional Ecological Knowledge38 is “the sum of the data and 
ideas acquired by a human group on its environment resulting from the group’s 
use and occupation of a specific region over many generations” (Mailhot 1994). It 
is only possible to know a limited area in the kind of detail required for true 
Indigenous knowledge. Thus by definition many of the specific results obtained 
can only have local application (Brody 1982). 
In contrast, the Western “scientific” tradition seeks “global” solutions—
that is, results that can be generalized across all localities, or “so that it could be 
used by groups of people who did not necessarily live in the same region” (Alessa 
2009). This can create problems in that solutions and results that are assumed to 
be global in scope turn out instead to be local. For example, when I was an 
undergraduate in the early 1970s I listened to an endless, sometimes acrimonious 
debate between two graduate students, one of whom studied Steller sea lions, 
Eumetopias jubatus, in Alaska, whereas the other studied the same species in 
California. The investigator who worked in Alaska insisted that parental care 
lasted for more than a year in this species, whereas the California investigator 
insisted with equal assurance that offspring were weaned at the age of three to 
four months. Both insisted that their view of parent-offspring relationships in 
these sea lions was correct and that the other must be wrong. When I suggested 
that they both might be right and that ecological conditions in different locations 
might require different responses, both investigators dismissed me as a naïve 
undergraduate who “did not understand how science worked.” 
In the long run it turned out that both views were correct. Harsher 
conditions in Alaska favored extended parental care, whereas milder conditions in 
California allowed sea lions to wean their young at younger ages. To me as a 
larval-stage scientist, this debate revealed the limitations of the Western 
typological, single “global solution” approach to science. The irony, of course, 
was that given the proclivity of Indigenous peoples to accept unusual observations 
and incorporate them in their understanding of the world, if an Aleut from Alaska 
had met with a Yurok from California and presented these different results, both 
                                                 
38 TEK for short. “Traditional Ecological Knowledge” is one of the technical terms used to refer 
to what has become a growing academic discipline, one that perhaps seeks to defy academic 
disciplinarity. 
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would have completely accepted the statements made by the other as factual, and 
both would have presented solid explanations based upon their knowledge of 
local environmental conditions for why this should be the case. 
The important point to take from this example is that an individual’s 
worldview—the way that this individual sees the world—has a major impact on 
the way that he or she interprets it. (Pierotti, 2011: 9-10) 
 
In Quest for Certainty, Dewey writes,  
 
Abstraction from use in special and direct situations was coincident with the 
formation of a science of ideas, of meanings, whose relations to one another 
rather than to things was the goal of thought. It is a process, however, which is 
subject to interpretation by a fallacy. Independence from any specified application 
is readily taken to be equivalent to independence from application as such; it is as 
if specialists, engaged in perfecting tools and having no concern with their use 
and so interested in the operation of perfecting that they carry results beyond any 
existing possibilities of use, were to argue that therefore they are dealing with an 
independent realm having no connection with tools or utilities. This fallacy is 
especially easy to fall into on the part of intellectual specialists. (148) 
 
Perhaps the “it is as if specialist . . . were to argue . . .” needs special emphasis. To the extent that 
we get caught up in the spiritual materialism of theōria, we don’t necessarily argue that our work 
has no connection with the lived and living world—we simply don’t concern ourselves about it. 
We don’t “need” to argue for any absence of obligation to apply the tools of philosophy to 
reducing suffering, cultivating souls, cultivating soils, making clean air and water, liberating 
people, cultivating compassion, and so on. We might make such arguments if pressed (perhaps 
we at times have been, and so we have the arguments at hand if needed, even for our own 
comfort), but we often don’t even think about them in the first place, as if the perfection of the 
abstractions speak for themselves or as if the obvious importance of “the great conversation” 
should go without saying, and this marks a significant problem. In some cases, if we do 
acknowledge that we have no idea how any of what we do would translate into ordinary living, 
we shrug it off, perhaps making something like a “knowledge for knowledge’s sake” sort of 
argument, almost a trickle-down knowledge theory, even sillier than trickle-down economics 
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(and, it does not even bother to present itself as trickle-down wisdom, but really some kind of 
knowledge). Even if we reject the “trickle-down” analogy (because maybe knowledge is an 
inherent good) this sort of knowledge already has an intellectualist orientation, which means it 
does not seem to have a realistic understanding of experience—or of life (ecologically illiterate 
as it seems to be). In other words, we can’t justify “knowledge for knowledge’s sake” if our 
whole epistemology gives evidence of bias and of negative side-effects. What is the knowledge 
we are talking about? Maybe some knowledge cannot be justified simply on the basis of being 
knowledge—certainly not without considering the context of its acquisition, and the costs and 
consequences. But we don’t tend to do that, and so, even when philosophers step in to, for 
instance, collaborate with scientists (we are often more willing to help other academics, 
especially those in the sciences, than we are the broader public), this leaves unquestioned the 
basic epistemology we already share with them, which itself seems bound up with the 
degradation of the conditions of life. We then find ourselves even more isolated in theōria, 
because, while we theroeticians understand the problems of the world and how to rationally deal 
with them, the irrational mob have elected another demagogue, and they continue behaving in 
ways that keep us on the road to disaster. There is nothing more for us to do but keep our faith in 
science and technology, and return to our abstractions. The growing number of philosophers 
interested in a kind of public outreach for philosophy also face the charge of perpetuating the 
current epistemology—and even seducing students into theōria—because they often focus on 
teaching people a fairly limited sense of what philosophy is, at times leaving philosophy as a 
way of life out of the conversation, and at other times talking about, say, Stoicism as a way of 
life, but not challenging the fundamental way of knowing of the dominant culture, which itself 
already conditions how we will try to live Stoicism as a way of life. Many people will then 
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become “Stoics” while keeping their job at Google or Exxon (the difference between these two 
in their general level of evil-doing seems non-existent at this point, as we shall later try to show). 
Any of us teaching anything in the academy face these problems, because so much of what we 
teach has gotten fully entangled with “learning outcomes” that cannot themselves get 
disentangled from the ills of the larger culture. One might find it tempting to add, “All the more 
so when university education has become reduced to mere career preparation,” but that misses 
how all of these things go together. Bad philosophy drives the whole mess, and intellectualism is 
just a sin of bad philosophy—as it is lived, not merely reasoned about. It makes spiritual 
materialism of even our best philosophical texts and traditions. Again and again we must remind 
ourselves that this is a problem of knowing. We are talking about an epistemological problem, 
and we verge into seemingly ethical, educational, aesthetic and other concerns not because 
epistemology pervades those other areas, but because of the altogetherness or interwovenness of 
these things. There is no epistemology outside of these other dimensions, and vice versa. 
 
Dewey certainly tried to shift our epistemology. Part of the point of our inquiry is to show why 
he may have failed. The challenges he faced, the challenges we face, are dense and deeply 
psychological. If a giant like Dewey could not get philosophy reconstructed in a more vitalizing 
way, we will have little chance to succeed unless we more directly confront some of the 
problems I think Dewey faced, including issues he might not have understood. In any case, it 
remains helpful to draw from him. For instance, in the passage above, Dewey almost seems to 
want to walk an admirable middle path between a simple-minded “global solution” approach 
criticized by TEK on the one hand, and any simple-minded thought that TEK would never accept 
any form of “common denominators” of experience, which he describes, and then qualifies, here: 
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In arriving at statements which hold for all possible experiencers and 
observers under all possible varying individual circumstances we arrive at that 
which is most remote from any one concrete experience. In this sense, the 
abstractions of mathematics and physics represent the common denominators in 
all things experienceable. Taken by themselves they seem to present a caput 
mortuum. Erected into complete statements of reality as such, they become 
hallucinatory obsessions. But in practice, there is always an accompanying 
reverse movement. These generalized findings are employed to enrich the 
meanings of individualized experiences, and to afford, within limits of 
probability, an increased control of them. 
 It is in this sense that all reflective knowledge as such is instrumental. The 
beginning and the end is the things of gross everyday experience. But apart from 
knowledge the things of our ordinary experience are fragmentary, casual, 
unregulated by purpose, full of frustrations and barriers. In the language 
previously used, they are problematic, obstructive, and challenges to thought. By 
ignoring for a time their concrete and qualitative fullness, by making abstractions 
and generalizations, we ascertain certain basic relations upon which occurrence of 
the things experienced depends. We treat them as mere events, that is, as changes 
brought about in a system of relationships, ignoring their individualizing qualities. 
But the qualities are still there, are still experienced, although as such they are not 
the objects of knowledge. But we return from abstractive thought to experience of 
them with added meaning and with increased power to regulate our relations to 
them. 
 Reflective knowledge is the only means of regulation. Its value as 
instrumental is unique. Consequently philosophers, themselves occupied in a 
fascinating branch of reflective knowledge, have isolated knowledge and its 
results. They have ignored its context of origin and function and made it 
coextensive with all valid experience. The doctrine was thus formed that all 
experience of worth is inherently cognitive; that other modes of experienced 
objects are to be tested, not here and there as occasion demands but universally by 
reduction to the terms of known objects. This assumption of the proper ubiquity 
of knowledge is the great intellectualistic fallacy. It is the source of all 
disparagement of everyday qualitative experience, practical, esthetic, moral. It is 
the ultimate source of the doctrine that calls subjective and phenomenal all objects 
of experience that cannot be reduced to properties of objects of knowledge. 
(LW4: 174-5) 
 
We can see Dewey teetering at moments. Does he offer us the insight that our typical way of 
relating with life essentially amounts to suffering? Or does he mean to imply that life, in and of 
itself, arises as frustration and obstruction? Why does he say, “Reflective knowledge is the only 
means of regulation”? Beavers, wolves, and starfish regulate entire ecosystems, at times with 
incredibly far-ranging effects, and they do so without “reflective knowledge” as human beings 
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narrowly understand it. At times, Dewey speaks about reflection in a way that almost takes it into 
the territory of trying to stop the sun in the sky—the general territory of typical human purposes.  
 
We humans can become quite attached to reflective knowledge and its apparent power, and our 
scientists and philosophers, as well as our politicians, economists, and “captains of industry,” get 
seduced comprehensively by “the great intellectualist fallacy.” Taking this seriously demands a 
paradigm shift in the philosophy of the dominant culture, which means a paradigm shift in 
science, economics, politics, and all the rest. 
 
Dewey also seems to miss the possibility that myth, poetry, and art in general attain whatever 
broad embrace of our souls they do by means of their concrete specificity. It is not in comparing 
one’s beloved to “something pretty” that one writes poetry. Rather, the beloved is a flower, and 
not only a flower but a blue mountain flower in the early light of spring. In fairness, we could 
say that Dewey addresses some of this in Art as Experience, but even there I think he and I 
differ, because he seems almost beholden to science, and at times almost seems to presage the 
infamous views espoused by the Churchlands (that we will one day so embody our scientific 
theories that we will no longer speak of “feeling sad,” but speak of “a relative decrease of 
serotonin in my system”). Maybe Dewey would find the view endorsed by the Churchlands 
rather misguided (it’s called “eliminative materialism” for how it will eliminate folk psychology, 
and perhaps in some way a few fundamental aspects of experience). Nevertheless, we can make 
it clearer that mythology represents (to use Dewey’s words to challenge him) “the common 
denominators in all things experienceable” far better (that is, more skillfully and realistically—
more wisely and compassionately, when we look with care and acknowledge all negative side-
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effects arising from our practices)—than “the abstractions of mathematics and physics.” This is 
why someone studying TEK might argue that myths and stories can encode the scientific 
knowledge of the people. Jung also helps here: 
What we are to our inward vision, and what man appears to be sub specie 
aeternitatis, can only be expressed by way of myth. Myth is more individual and 
expresses life more precisely than does science. Science works with concepts and 
averages which are far too general to do justice to the subjective variety of an 
individual life. (MDR 17) 
 
A properly functioning mythological orientation bridges the duality between the “individual” and 
the “collective,” the “general” and the “particular”. Today’s intellectual, today’s purveyor of the 
intellectualist fallacy or the fallacy of ignoring context, thus naturally feels suspicion regarding 
the mythological and the mystical, because these challenge us to avoid such fallacies or else to 
fail to bring our own concrete potentials to their most precise realization.  
 
Thus, when Dewey says, “These generalized findings are employed to enrich the meanings of 
individualized experiences, and to afford, within limits of probability, an increased control of 
them. It is in this sense that all reflective knowledge as such is instrumental,” it seems to me he 
betrays a western consciousness (though, again, what he imagined but did not even bother to hint 
in his work, I cannot be sure). He will go on to suggest even stranger things, but these lines 
already show an orientation toward life which I think we will comes to diagnose as 
fundamentally unwell. The obsession with control does us no more good than an obsession with 
certainty, which Dewey himself critiqued in the very text from which we quote. 
 
However, he also gestures toward some very nice things there: The generalized findings of any 
proper science, any proper spiritual or philosophical tradition, serve to enrich the meaningfulness 
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of each of our lives and all of our lives. These findings (perhaps we should call them discovery-
creations) are not things told, but things we practice-realize, things we bring to fruition and 
verification ourselves, thus enriching those very findings, carrying them forward as part of 
cultivating life forward. Everything in life is like this.  
 
How do we know how to live? We turn to images, visions, metaphors, and various thinkings-
through (by which I mean living-through, active experimentation, the dance of ecologies of 
mind), and we find these in our spiritual, philosophical, and religious traditions. These give us a 
basic material, a set of generalized findings. They are not “facts” or “findings” in the sense of 
absolutes. Rather, they are something like a fire we use to transmute the raw materials of our 
lives, in a manner described by alchemy (I mean, actually described there—in western and also 
Daoist alchemy— but we could just as well say “described in the tantric traditions of India and 
Tibet”). This is like a scientific theory that serves to transmute the various kinds of data and 
questions we have into the magic of theories and technologies we have all around us.  
 
Even the way to make bread and the meaning of “bread” has to do with practice-realization (I 
should rather write PracticeRealization). In our own lives, we may taste something and say, 
“Now this is good bread,” or, “This is such a good beer.” We may kiss someone and sense, “That 
was a really wonderful kiss!” A beloved one may do something for us, and we may sense, 
“That’s what it means to be thoughtful.” None of this differs fundamentally from what happens 
in “science,” but we get confused. In our inquiry, we may focus often on seemingly 
“philosophical” matters, but we critique current western science with every step. 
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Staying with our experience of ignorance, uncertainty, and the unknown is like staying with an 
experience of impatience: It opens up the world of the mind. We stay in the rawness, and we 
begin to open to the soul. I mention this now because we also take further steps into the unknown 
as we proceed—we have taken steps that can provoke confusion and impatience—and the reader 
may find it a strange experience. And yet I must ask that we continue, with only the suggestion 
that things will get clearer in time. 
 
In his essay, “Reality as Experience,” Dewey seeks to grant reality to experience even if 
experience seems to us a late-comer to the dance. What Dewey seems to want us to see (i.e., 
what he gets right even if we are militant atheists) is something I would call the never-not-
nownesss, the never-not-hereness of life (in contrast to a “givenness,” a solidity or fixedness). 
That may seem complicated, but it becomes essential to touch this if we are to truly understand 
an epistemology of practice-realization, which means a thoroughly experimental epistemology. 
Reality in an important sense is not “pre-given,” but itself must be alive, in transformation, in 
evolution. Dewey gets at the ceaseless cultivating forward of life, an “always more”. This all 
becomes quite real in and through practice. 
 
All of this amounts to some general considerations of the fallacy of context. We will need to turn 
toward a more specific sense of context—perhaps sense of context more robust and honest, given 
our historical moment. But maybe it’s worthwhile to consider a few final, general things about 
what Dewey says regarding context, because of the connections he intends between this fallacy 
of ignoring context on the one hand, and his whole orientation toward lived experience on the 
other. We will consider this, and then push it to asking what our lived experience is like, given 
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our current context. What fallacies of thought arise if the context of thought itself has become 
degraded? This question should give today’s philosophers an inspiration to pause, to really 
STOP. But first, some final reflections with Dewey. 
 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey offers us experience as the fundamental method of 
philosophy—a radical suggestion. This has to do with both avoiding the fallacy of context, by 
explicitly orienting ourselves to the evaluation of so-called knowledge on the basis of 
experience, and also with the need to face the fact that we can never step outside of experience, 
and that we should thus find ways to actually work with our experience. It’s something of a 
phenomenological turn, but I think a bit richer—more the phenomenology of Meleau-Ponty than 
Husserl (or maybe, the later Husserl rather than the earlier). It is interesting of course to consider 
the fact that Husserl sought common denominators of experience too, and sought to ground the 
sciences on their foundation—seeing, as he did, the sciences in a crisis (relative to the culture, of 
course). In any case, Dewey writes, 
a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is offered us: Does it end in 
conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and 
their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make 
our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things 
of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them 
of having in “reality” even the significance they had previously seemed to have? 
Does it yield the enrichment and increase of power of ordinary things which the 
results of physical science afford when applied in every-day affairs? Or does it 
become a mystery that these ordinary things should be what they are; and are 
philosophic concepts left to dwell in separation in some technical realm of their 
own? It is the fact, I repeat, that so many philosophies terminate in conclusions 
that make it necessary to disparage and condemn primary experience, leading 
those who hold them to measure the sublimity of their “realities” as 
philosophically defined by remoteness from the concerns of daily life, which 
leads cultivated common-sense to look askance at philosophy. (LW1: 18) 
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We can ask, Does philosophy today render our lives more luminous and fruitful? And how about 
science? Microwaves make things easier—relative to our current context. But do they make the 
world itself more luminous, the world as we experience it? We have to ask this without making a 
duality between “theory” and “practice”. Dewey worked hard to undermine such dualities. Has 
science given us knowledge, if knowledge has something to do with increasing the luminosity of 
experience, or, as Dewey puts it in the preface to the book, if knowledge is defined as 
“intelligently directed experience” (v)? How intelligent is it to direct experience to the collapse 
of the conditions of life? Have we done this altogether with an intellectualist fallacy? 
 
In contrast to the method of experience, Dewey describes this “intellectualism” for which we 
must each search our own souls: 
In the assertion (implied here) that the great vice of philosophy is an 
arbitrary “intellectualism,” there is no slight cast upon intelligence and reason. By 
“intellectualism” as an indictment is meant the theory that all experiencing is a 
mode of knowing, and that all subject-matter, all nature, is, in principle, to be 
reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms identical with the characteristics 
presented by refined objects of science as such. The assumption of 
“intellectualism” goes contrary to the facts of what is primarily experienced. For 
things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, 
even more than things to be known. They are things had before they are things 
cognized.  
The isolation of traits characteristic of objects known, and then defined as 
the sole ultimate realities, accounts for the denial to nature of the characters which 
make things lovable and contemptible, beautiful and ugly, adorable and awful. It 
accounts for the belief that nature is an indifferent, dead mechanism; it explains 
why characteristics that are the valuable and valued traits of objects in actual 
experience are thought to create a fundamentally troublesome philosophical 
problem. Recognition of their genuine and primary reality does not signify that no  
thought and knowledge enter in when things are loved, desired and striven for; it 
signifies that the former are subordinate, so that the genuine problem is how and 
why, to what effect, things thus experienced are transformed into objects in which 
cognized traits are supreme and affectional and volitional traits incidental and 
subsidiary.  
“Intellectualism” as a sovereign method of philosophy is so foreign to the 
facts of primary experience that it not only compels recourse to non-empirical 
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method, but it ends in making knowledge, conceived as ubiquitous, itself 
inexplicable. If we start from primary experience, occurring as it does chiefly in 
modes of action and undergoing, it is easy to see what knowledge contributes 
namely, the possibility of intelligent administration of the elements of  
doing and suffering. We are about something, and it is well to know what we are 
about, as the common phrase has it. To be intelligent in action and in suffering 
(enjoyment too) yields satisfaction even when conditions cannot be controlled. 
But when there is possibility of control, knowledge is the sole agency of its 
realization. Given this element of knowledge in primary experience, it is not 
difficult to understand how it may develop from a subdued and subsidiary factor 
into a dominant character. Doing and suffering, experimenting and putting 
ourselves in the way of having our sense and nervous system acted upon in ways 
that yield material for reflection, may reverse the original situation in which 
knowing and thinking were subservient to action-undergoing. And when we trace 
the genesis of knowing along this line, we also see that knowledge has a function 
and office in bettering and enriching the subject-matters of crude experience. We 
are prepared to understand what we are about on a grander scale, and to 
understand what happens even when we seem to be the hapless puppets of 
uncontrollable fate. But knowledge that is ubiquitous, all-inclusive and all-
monopolizing, ceases to have meaning in losing all context; that it does not appear 
to do so when made supreme and self-sufficient is because it is literally 
impossible to exclude that context of non-cognitive but experienced subject-
matter which gives what is known its import. (LW1: 28-9) 
 
Let us first acknowledge this “non-cognitive” dimension Dewey wants us to admit. Dewey wants 
to say that what we call “knowledge” simply doesn’t apply to the greater part of life, and yet we 
keep trying to “know” everything. Again, Dewey seems more optimistic about current science 
than I am—but I want to suggest that he has failed to apply his own insights broadly enough. 
Either way, this suggestion regarding intellectualism seems to imply a rather serious indictment 
of contemporary philosophy and science, and perhaps western culture in a pervasive way.  
 
Dewey stumbles here by referring to “things” and to “things had”. One needn’t experience the 
world that way (recall Bateson’s question: Is “possession” even applicable to relations?), and this 
kind of thingification of the world may go altogether with the crisis of western culture. But in his 
own way, Dewey seems to be getting at how intellectualism contributes to the creation of a 
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“nothing but” universe. Recall that Dewey’s empiricism insists that things are what we 
experience them as, and in the context of an epistemology of practice-realization, this means we 
make the world—either a dead, mechanical universe made up of “nothing but” matter that 
doesn’t matter, or a living Cosmos brimming with meaningfulness and infused with sacredness 
(the etymological relationship between “matter” and “mother” comes into play here).  
 
Again, it was James who originally characterized this state of affairs as “nothing but,” and it is 
worth noting the relationship between Dewey’s intellectualist fallacy and James’s 
“psychologist’s fallacy,” which he describes in his Principles of Psychology: 
The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with 
that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call 
this the ‘psychologist’s fallacy’ par excellence. For some of the mischief, here 
too, language is to blame. The psychologist, as we remarked above (p. 183), 
stands outside of the mental state he speaks of. Both itself and its object are 
objects for him. Now when it is a cognitive state (percept, thought, concept, etc.), 
he ordinarily has no other way of naming it than as the thought, percept, etc., of 
that object. He himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in his way, gets 
easily led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in the same way in 
which he knows it, although this is often very far from being the case. The most 
fictitious puzzles have been introduced into our science by this means. The so-
called question of presentative or representative perception, of whether an object 
is present to the thought that thinks it by a counterfeit image of itself, or directly 
and without any intervening image at all ; the question of nominalism and 
conceptualism, of the shape in which things are present when only a general 
notion of them is before the mind ; are comparatively easy questions when once 
the psychologist’s fallacy is eliminated from their treatment,—as we shall ere 
long see (in Chapter XII). 
 
Another variety of the psychologist’s fallacy is the assumption that the mental 
state studied must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it. The 
mental state is aware of itself only from within; it grasps what we call its own 
content, and nothing more. The psychologist, on the contrary, is aware of it from 
without, and knows its relations with all sorts of other things. What the thought 
sees is only its own object; what the psychologist sees is the thought's object, plus 
the thought itself, plus possibly all the rest of the world. We must be very careful 
therefore, in discussing a state of mind from the psychologist’s point of view, to 
avoid foisting into its own ken matters that are only there for ours. We must avoid 
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substituting what we know the consciousness is, for what it is a consciousness of, 
and counting its outward, and so to speak physical, relations with other facts of 
the world, in among the objects of which we set it down as aware. Crude as such a 
confusion of standpoints seems to be when abstractly stated, it is nevertheless a 
snare into which no psychologist has kept himself at all times from falling, and 
which forms almost the entire stock-in-trade of certain schools. We cannot be too 
watchful against its subtly corrupting influence.39 
 
In our ways of thinking, writing, speaking, and living: To what degree do we abandon 
experience? To what degree do we abandon the world? Do our ways of thinking, speaking, and 
living cover over Nature and our need for rootedness in living ecologies? Do concepts and words 
become rubble covering over a precious natural artefact? Jung offers us a few reflections that 
might help just now. The italicized words are questions or comments from an interviewer: 
The French writer Colette once said to her husband about some bit of animal 
behavior, “Maurice, there’s just one animal, just one animal!” 
 
I wasn’t familiar with that but it’s exactly the same idea, the same sense of 
totality, expressed in the language of someone very close to the animal world. 
There are so many possible forms of the truth. We must find simple words for the 
great truths; we must try to approach the living truth behind things, it’s mankind’s 
oldest effort.  
In our time, it’s the intellect that is making darkness, because we’ve let it 
take too big a place. Consciousness discriminates, judges, analyzes, and 
emphasizes the contradictions. It’s necessary work up to a point. But analysis kills 
and synthesis brings to life. We must find out how to get everything back into 
connection with everything else. We must resist the vice of intellectualism, and 
get it understood that we cannot only understand. . . . 
I remember a marvellous sight I beheld one evening in India at the 
Darjeeling observatory. Sikkim was already in shadow, the mountains blue to 
about four thousand meters, violet to about seven thousand. And there in the 
middle of that ring of mountains was Kanchenjunga in all its glory, resplendent as 
a ruby. It was the lotus with the jewel without price in its center. And all the 
savants and scientists, lost in wonder at this spectacle, said “OM” without 
realizing it. That’s the primal word, the sound that passes from mother to child, 
and what some primitives say when they approach a stranger. And after the 
learned men had regained consciousness, they felt the need of a word and they 
asked me to recite part of Faust. 
Faust—you know how Goethe spoke of that work, of the research into the 
essential that it meant? As “das Hauptgeschaft,” the main thing, the essential. 
                                                 
39 https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin7.htm 
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Man has need of the word, but number is a much more important thing. In 
essence, number is sacred. Lots of important things might be said about it. The 
quaternity, above all, is an essential archetype. The square, the cross. The 
squaring of the circle by the alchemists. The cross in the circle, or, for Christians, 
Christ in “glory.” It is not I who have made up all that. It exists, and it’s 
important. 
 
What can men do, and especially we Swiss, to prepare ourselves and help 
everyone prepare himself to face a future already disturbing in its immediacy? 
There is no entirely simple, thoroughly rational recipe. Most of us are too 
academic-minded to come face to face with living reality in its wholeness, its 
totality. We prefer to deny it because that’s easier, and because we can find such a 
lot of good, honest, reasonable arguments for doing so. What would you have me 
do? I say what I know, what I believe, how I see things. But I know very well that 
truth is ineffable and all our approaches to it, gross. (JS, 419-21) 
 
Here again the irony of the “intellect,” and reason functioning as a barrier requiring a 
“breakthrough” in order to realize “total experience”. We speak of the age of enlightenment as a 
turn to reason, but Jung invites us to sense how reason may have created an age of endarkenment 
and fragmentation, shutting us out from total experience. We shall touch on this again. While we 
earlier saw Jung suggesting that Faust and in Zarathustra “mark the first glimmerings of a 
break-through of total experience in our Western hemisphere,” (and, again, he saw Zen as a 
practice that could help us realize total experience), here he relates something strange: A group 
of scientists swept up in Natural beauty, spontaneously intoning the sacred syllable Om, and 
asking for a reading from Faust. Jung might caution us that we need to do more than merely try 
and “understand” something like this. Somehow, we ourselves must attend to “the main thing, 
the essential,” “living reality in its wholeness” which many of us, maybe especially the 
“academic-minded,” would rather evade. 
 
It will help to turn now to more specific reflections on our context, and how this relates to the 
alleged intellectualism, the alleged evasions that created and perpetuate it. To do that, let us 
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return to a class of items on the “intellectual and human privilege inventory” we considered 
above. The inventory included these items: 
 
2) I spend most of my day indoors, and I don’t see this as compromising my epistemic situation 
3) I am in general surrounded by plastic: I eat from plastic containers, handle plastic throughout 
the day, wear plastic clothing (polyester and nylon), sit on plastic chairs—and these things often 
seem to make my life easier, they seem to facilitate my work by saving me time and money and 
making my life more comfortable and convenient 
4) When I think, I usually do so indoors, often alone; when I think with others, it is almost 
exclusively with other human beings (many of whom are, at bottom, quite similar to me—e.g. 
they are all philosophers, they are all academics, they are all in my area of specialization, we 
share much in common in our thinking, we are all “materialists” of some variety, etc.) 
5) I do not regularly go on spiritual retreats or retreats in wild or relatively remote nature for 3 
days or more—and, (likely) I have no serious concern that a failure to spend such extended 
periods of time in nature or other forms of retreat might compromise my epistemic situation, nor 
any real confidence that engaging such retreats would significantly improve my epistemic 
situation (though, maybe I would admit it could benefit my health in some way, and thus rather 
indirectly affect my epistemic situation) 
 
Why these might raise concern involves subtleties and also experience. It seems a relative 
minority of people have experienced the shift in mind that only begins to happen after 3 or 4 
days of retreat in Nature or 3 or 4 days of intensive spiritual practice—a shift that can seem 
frankly astonishing when we experience it profoundly enough. Even fewer people experience the 
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shift that arises as part of what we may call a “transformational insight,” a realization, a 
“breakthrough of total experience”. Such shifts dawn on us as if we suddenly realized we had 
been walking around in a kind of daze. We may feel we have suddenly woken up, or at least 
come more alive, even though we were not technically sleeping or dead. We should recall 
Socrates here again, who said the strangest thing: That people wanted to kill him because they 
were asleep, and he came around trying to wake them up, and they resented him for it, preferring 
to remain asleep—even if it meant the collapse of their culture.  
 
To put this awakening experience a bit too poetically, we may feel in some sense that the song of 
the heart, the song of our being, the song of HeartMindBodyWorldCosmos had been coming out 
of us off key—or that our song had been somehow repressed, hindered, or even silenced. We 
realize at such a moment that, although this shift in mind seems subtle in one sense, it also feels 
profound, radical, like a night and day change, something revolutionary and important. We can 
feel intimately that everything might be very different if only we could keep practicing-and-
realizing this mind, this synchronized ecology of heart, mind, body, world, cosmos. And we may 
also sense that we have not plumbed the depths of this mind, this heart, and that it may have a 
great deal of creative potential that we should get in touch with. 
 
We needn’t remain in a too-poetic mood, for our scientists have begun to research some aspects 
of this, based on the experience of many who have spent time in retreat. To capture this 
phenomenon, cognitive neuroscientist David Strayer coined the term “three-day effect,” 
signifying that it takes some time to, shall we say, begin to come home to ourselves and to begin 
to leave the habitual context behind. Meditators have noticed this too: That the first 1-5 days of a 
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formal meditation retreat do nothing more than settle the mind into a place from which the real 
practice can begin—as if one arrived at the retreat unable to properly think in the most concrete 
and practical sense (even though one may have just come from a job one imagined to involve 
thinking, such as working as an engineer, a lawyer, a politician, or a philosopher), and needed 
first to settle into something at least approaching sanity (the meditator would take realization and 
the healing processes noted by Jung as a deeper sanity, which one must bring to fruition, in, 
through, and as practice). Such a contemplation should naturally bring a philosopher to wonder. 
We might imagine the shift here to seem, in certain respects, subtle, for clearly engineers, 
lawyers, and philosophers can think well enough to do the jobs they now do. But philosophers 
especially should find subtle discernments of momentous value in at least some cases, and in 
some of those cases the subtlety turns out to be profound, so that one would say, “Yes, I was 
thinking before, but I was quite out of my mind . . . it was the thinking of someone asleep in their 
lives, and so misdirected that I should prefer to call it the antithesis of thinking, or if it were 
thinking, I should prefer to call it thinking of such an unhealthy kind that I would rather have not 
been thinking at all.” 
 
As for time in Nature bringing us more into thinking, more into a more healthy mind, Strayer 
realized that some of his best ideas came after backpacking trips into Nature of 3 days or more. 
In an interview he said,  
Having hiked around the desert for years, I noticed in myself, and from talking to 
others, that people think differently after being out in the desert. Their thoughts 
are clearer, they’re certainly more relaxed, they report being more creative. If you 
can disconnect and experience being in the moment for two or three days, it 
seems to produce a difference in qualitative thinking.40   
 
                                                 
40 https://www.rei.com/blog/camp/the-nature-fix-the-three-day-effect 
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If we recall Hadot’s mention of the rupture with the bios, meaning the habits of daily life, the 
limited and limiting way of life for which philosophy offered therapeia, then we confront here 
the possibility that rupture with the bios can become accomplished as reunion with Nature. In 
other words, we face the possibility that civilized life as we know it stands in a tension with 
Nature, and that this civilized life goes altogether with a measurably degraded thinking—and 
perhaps also a thinking degraded in ways we currently cannot measure. Of course, one needs to 
validate these sorts of anecdotal findings and suggestions—the best way being through practice-
realization in, through, and as experience. But current science has its own ways of working with 
experience, and they are not all bad. Strayer his co-investigators set up an experiment, the results 
of which they published under the delightful title, “Creativity in the Wild: Improving Creative 
Reasoning through Immersion in Natural Settings.” They might better have subtitled it, 
“Improving Creative Intelligence through Immersion in Natural Settings,” or maybe “Improving 
Intelligence . . .” or even, “Returning Intelligence to its Place . . .” Anyway, the researchers 
found something relatively astonishing: 
four days of immersion in nature, and the corresponding disconnection from 
multi-media and technology, increases performance on a creativity, problem-
solving task by a full 50% in a group of naive hikers. Our results demonstrate that 
there is a cognitive advantage to be realized if we spend time immersed in a 
natural setting. We anticipate that this advantage comes from an increase in 
exposure to natural stimuli . . . (Atchley, Strayer, and Atchley 2012: 1)41 
 
Interestingly, Leong et al. (2014) found that, “Students who were more connected with nature 
preferred innovative and holistic cognitive styles, while controlling for their general emotional 
status and well-being” (57). They note that their findings, “are the first to establish the link 
between connectedness with nature and cognitive styles” (57). It is interesting that connectedness 
                                                 
41 https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0051474&type=printable 
200 
 
to nature may somehow relate to our being more innovative and holistic thinkers. That and the 
fact that these researchers refer to this as a style of consciousness seems significant for our 
inquiry. The same holds for the finding of Zelenski et al. (2015) that connecting with nature 
facilitates cooperative, prosocial, and environmentally sustainable behaviors—and this is 
precisely in contrast to behavior influenced by the built environment. In a meta-analysis 
including over 2400 individuals, Shutte and Malouf (2018) found a significant relationship 
between mindfulness and connectedness with nature. In other words, the built environment 
seems to go with a style of consciousness that makes us less cooperative, less mindful, less 
ecologically sustainable. The style of consciousness arising from rootedness in nature seems 
more innovative, more holistic, more cooperative, more sustainable, more present and aware. 
 
Other researchers have looked into things like “forest therapy,” “nature therapy,” and other 
interventions that support or replicate the findings of Atchley, Strayer, and Atchley. All of these 
lines of research can fall into the trap of keeping the findings and suggestions tame or even co-
opting them into our pattern of insanity. For instance, so-called “forest therapy” may encourage 
us to take up “forest bathing,” which some authors suggest we can accomplish even in city parks 
or short walks in relatively tame wooded areas. In an absolute sense, this is true. But the spirit of 
this sort of therapeutic intervention is not the same as the therapeia of philosophy, which would 
demand that we see a deeper problem than the need to occasionally “get away from it all,” and 
would encourage the more significant rupture that “forest bathing” might actually forestall. 
Therapy treats symptoms, while therapeia calls for rebirth, rejuvenation, a reorientation, a 
reorganization of experience. If extended exposure to Nature gives such startling gains in 
intelligence, along with other benefits, we have to pause and reflect on the whole organization of 
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society, not try to take better advantage of its current forms of organization by seeking out 
nearby parks. What ongoing clarity and coherence, what ongoing intelligence does our current 
context cut us off from?  
 
If this were a new finding, we might hesitate. But, if nothing else, we can recall that retreat into 
closer communion with Nature sparked Thoreau’s accusation that, “There are nowadays 
professors of philosophy, but no philosophers.” Such a finding runs through many philosophical 
and spiritual traditions, even in the west. In a similarly Nature-inspired vein, Emerson wrote, in 
“Nature,”: 
In the woods we return to reason and faith. There I feel that nothing can befall me 
in life—no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot 
repair. Standing on the bare ground—my head bathed in the blithe air and lifted 
into infinite space—all mean egotism vanishes.42 
 
Here Emerson properly associates Nature with whatever good thing we would want from what 
we call “reason” and what we call “faith”. These are problematic terms, and “reason” has almost 
become a disease. But we do want the positive benefits from the delusion we called “reason”. 
We find these in our own rootedness, rootedness in the sacred, which we well practice and 
realize (which we discover-create) in forests, mountains, oceans, deserts, and all sentient 
beings—all of sentient being. And both Emerson and the article get at the essence of what we 
seek: Transcendence of the ego. This is what we wanted from “reason,” but the west got lost, 
perhaps in the fallacy of intellectualism, and the dualities of path-goal, organism-environment, 
and so on.43  
                                                 
42 http://transcendentalism-legacy.tamu.edu/authors/emerson/nature.html 
43 In a letter to his brother, Emerson struggles in an attempt to revalue the term “reason,” 
seemingly striving to get close to what Dewey may have meant by “intelligence,” and maybe 
coming close as well to what I would like us to understand by terms like “intelligence,” “original 
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Why would Emerson speak of a return to reason and faith? Because of the way a proper 
attunement with Nature accomplishes a single gesture of rupture and reunion. We can think 
about this in evolutionary terms. As the Australian philosopher Glenn Albrecht notes: 
We used to get positive psychoterratic feedback between the Earth and ourselves 
as a natural part of being alive and human. But now if you go to the beach or try 
to breathe in the clean air in Oregon, you’re going to have plastic, rubbish, and 
smoke from wildfires all around you. It alienates us from our natural connections 
in a world that is polluted.44 
 
We cannot know, from inside out current epistemology, how we could know in a nurturing 
psychoterratic feedback loop, a loop that unifies Mind and Nature in a manner that activate our 
intelligence and other capacities in ways we currently access in degraded fashion or not at all. It 
seems that people hunger for this feedback loop, and for the kind of Mind that emerges in a 
context more rooted in Nature. For instance, speaking in 1870 about the ways of his ancestors, 
Homli of the Wallawalla Nation said, “When they hunted for happiness, they searched the 
ground first” (from Philip 1997: 32). Is this our instinct? We can consider the more recent 
                                                 
thinking,” and “non-thinking.” Particularly telling is the bind our “understanding” places on us: 
Total skepticism or accusations of falsehood on the one hand, or the weak-hearted and 
conscience-abandoning accusation of impracticalness on the other: 
 
Reason is the highest faculty of the soul—what we mean often by the soul itself; it never reasons, 
never proves, it simply perceives; it is vision. The Understanding toils all the time, compares, 
contrives, adds, argues, nearsighted but strong-sighted, dwelling in the present the expedient the 
customary . . . The thoughts of youth, & ‘first thoughts,’ are the revelations of Reason[,] the love 
of the beautiful & of Goodness as the highest beauty the belief in the absolute & universal 
superiority of the Right & the True[.] But Understanding[,] that wrinkled calculator[,] the 
steward of our house to whom is committed the support of our animal life contradicts evermore 
these affirmations of Reason & points at Custom & Interest & persuades one man that the 
declarations of Reason are false & another that they are at least impracticable. (from Richardson, 
1995: 166). 
44 https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/yw978y/the-farmosopher-creating-language-for-
our-climate-doom-and-rebirth 
203 
 
example of Miriam Lancewood, a woman living in the wild in New Zealand—by which I mean a 
woman who lives with her partner in a light, moveable shelter, who hunts and gathers, who must 
make a campfire for heat, no cellphones or internet, and so on. She does occasionally hike to the 
nearest road and then hitchhike into town where she plays guitar on the street, using the money 
to get a few fruits and vegetables when such things are hard to come by, but other than this, she 
and her partner live off the land. Miriam originally lived in Holland, and she was a school 
teacher by profession. She met a man who shared her passion for leaving civilization and living 
in the wild, and off they went. 
 
As part of a recent interview, she read from a letter to her sister: “Dearest Sophie, Can you image 
a way of life so quiet, so timeless, so abundant and full that watching a single leaf fluttering from 
a tree, lifted into the air by a little breeze, turning silver in the sunshine, is meaningful?” When 
the interviewer asked, “What do you think of the way we live our lives?” She replied, 
I don’t really know how you can stand it. How can you deal with sleep 
deprivation . . . you have all these things, and so much pressure, and how do you 
deal with that without becoming so dull? How can you keep clarity? How can you 
keep vital? How do you deal with a monotone existence . . . running around the 
clock, how do you deal with it?45 
 
Again, the issue of clarity of mind should stand out for anyone interested in how we know. A 
simple google search will turn up the literature on state-dependent learning, and that has some 
bearing on our inquiry. But we are talking about something bigger, a way of life, a style of 
consciousness. It is interesting to hear such words from a seemingly ordinary person who was 
                                                 
45 It is worth noting how well this resonates with the fuller passage from Walden in which 
Thoreau not only charges that there are nowadays professors of philosophy and no philosophers, 
but specifically ties this to vitality and the vital heat of the body. 
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born and raised in an urban environment. I don’t think most of us in the dominant culture can 
really understand this, since we haven’t spent much time in truly wild places. 
 
Jung suggested that we might get in touch with this psychoterratic feedback loop by making 
some beginning, some kind of working our way back to Nature, even as modest as gardening. 
His comments evoke a larger context as well. We should bracket his comments with the 
awareness that “tilling the earth” is arguably part of conquest consciousness, that the notion of 
“owning” land is almost certainly so (let’s read this as an imperative to be truly connected with 
the land, and that Jung only uses this phrase given the western context), and that in general these 
suggestions might be overly optimistic, since we may need more of a change in our relationship 
to the land and each other than the dominant culture can handle without becoming something 
quite different from what it is: 
Every man should have his own plot of land so that the instincts can come to life 
again. To own land is important psychologically, and there is no substitute for it. 
We keep forgetting that we are primates and that we have to make allowances for 
these primitive layers in our psyche. The farmer is still closer to these layers. In 
tilling the earth he moves around within a very narrow radius, but he moves on his 
own land. The industrial worker is a pathetic, rootless being, and his remuneration 
in money is not tangible but abstract. In earlier times, when the crafts flourished, 
he derived satisfaction from seeing the fruit of his labor. He found adequate self-
expression in such work. 
But this is no longer the case. First of all, he is responsible for only a small 
part of the finished product. Secondly, the product is sold, it disappears, and he has 
no further stake in it. Because the psychological reward is inadequate, the worker 
rebels against his employer and against “capitalism” as a whole. We all need 
nourishment for our psyche. It is impossible to find such nourishment in urban 
tenements without a patch of green or a blossoming tree. We need a relationship 
with nature. I am just a culture-coolie myself, but I derive a great deal of pleasure 
from growing my own potatoes. People tend to look for the Kingdom of God in the 
outer world rather than in their own souls. This is particularly true of socialism. 
Individuation is not only an upward but also a downward process. Without any 
body, there is no mind and therefore no individuation. Our civilizing potential has 
led us down the wrong path. All too often an American worker who owns only one 
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car considers himself a poor devil, because his boss has two or three cars. This is 
symptomatic of pointless striving for material possessions. 
Yet, we need to project ourselves into the things around us. My self is not 
confined to my body. It extends into all the things I have made and all the things 
around me. Without these things, I would not be myself; I would not be a human 
being, I would merely be a human ape, a primate. Everything surrounding me is 
part of me, and that is precisely why a rented apartment is disastrous. It offers so 
few possibilities for self-expression. In a standardized apartment, in a standardized 
milieu, it is easy to lose the sense of one’s own personality, of one’s individuality. 
A community is based on personal relationships. No community can evolve 
where people can easily move households from one place to another. The one-
family house, the house owned by its inhabitants, is much better because it 
necessarily engenders a sense of permanence. 
If man has a hand in shaping his environment, it will reflect his personality. 
A Soviet collective farm lacks soul, and the people who live on it are a dull, 
unhappy lot because they have been deprived of any opportunity for personal 
expression. 
When capitalism takes everything out of the hands of the worker, he feels 
he has been robbed. Therefore our economic system must put something else within 
his grasp. In particular, the worker must be enabled to have a personal leisure-time 
occupation, and this again is best suited to the private dwelling, the family, the 
garden. The economic drawbacks of fixed permanent residence are less important. 
Life in a small city is better than life in a large one, politically, socially, and 
in terms of community relations. Big cities are responsible for our uprootedness. 
The Swiss are mentally more balanced and not so neurotic as many peoples. We 
are fortunate to live in a great number of small cities. If I do not have what my 
psyche needs, I become dangerous.  
Because in our country the government is reluctant to aid community 
projects, the projects that do materialize are all the more genuine and valuable. 
A captive animal cannot return to freedom. But our workers can return. We 
see them doing it in the allotment gardens in and around our cities; these gardens 
are an expression of love for nature and for one’s own plot of land. As our working 
hours become shorter, the question of leisure time becomes increasingly essential 
to us, time in which we are free of commands and restraints and in which we can 
achieve self-realization. I am fully committed to the idea that human existence 
should be rooted in the earth. (JS: 202-4)  
 
Perhaps the most important suggestion occurs at the end: Our existence is rooted in the Earth. 
Although Jung offers us many other helpful suggestions here, it’s good to see how many things 
might be potentially wrong with these reflections as might be helpful. Why should we think we 
must till the Earth? Why should that not seem foolish? Because we got used to it? The no-till 
revolution in agriculture may do much good. The Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island seem to 
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have found the white man’s predilection for tilling the soil an aberration. One of the more 
extreme responses comes from Smohalla, of the Wanapam Nation: 
You ask me to plow the ground! Shall I take a knife and tear my mother’s bosom? 
Then when I die she will not take me to her bosom to rest You ask me to dig for 
stone! Shall I dig under her skin for her bones? Then when I die I cannot enter her 
body to be born again. (from Philip 1997: 28) 
 
Indigenous peoples are not against farming per se, but they do invite us to see how invasive 
agriculture goes altogether with a certain mindset.  
 
It may help us to consider the words of an actual farmer. Wendell Berry invites us to consider the 
necessary relationship between mind, body, soul, and soil—his emphasis on health aligns his 
with Jung’s reflections on health and healing above, though he first begins with the sense of a 
quest into wilderness before coming back to growing food, a movement linked by the notion of 
health. This is one of our largest conceptual data points because it brings out the fractal-like 
quality of our meta-analysis. The passage brings out many themes, including wildness, ecology, 
health, and more. The reader is encouraged to read the whole chapter, because as liberal as this 
quotation is, there is more to savor. He really begins with a feel for something like vision, close 
to the sense implied in the Revisioning of Philosophy: 
The question of human limits, of the proper definition and place of human beings 
within the order of Creation, finally rests upon our attitude toward our biological 
existence, the life of the body in this world. What value and respect do we give to 
our bodies? What uses do we have for them? What relation do we see, if any, 
between body and mind, or body and soul? What connections or responsibilities 
do we maintain between our bodies and the earth? These are religious questions, 
obviously, for our bodies are part of the Creation, and they involve us in all the 
issues of mystery. But the questions are also agricultural, for no matter how urban 
our life, our bodies live by farming; we come from the earth and return to it, and 
so we live in agriculture as we live in flesh. While we live our bodies are moving 
particles of the earth, joined inextricably both to the soil and to the bodies of other 
living creatures. It is hardly surprising, then, that there should be some profound 
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resemblances between our treatment of our bodies and our treatment of the earth. . 
. . 
 
Until modern times, we focused a great deal of the best of our thought upon such 
rituals of return to the human condition. Seeking enlightenment or the Promised 
Land or the way home, a man would go or be forced to go into the wilderness, 
measure himself against the Creation, recognize finally his true place within it, 
and thus be saved both from pride and from despair. Seeing himself as a tiny 
member of a world he cannot comprehend or master or in any final sense possess, 
he cannot possibly think of himself as a god. And by the same token, since he 
shares in, depends upon, and is graced by all of which he is a part, neither can be 
become a fiend; he cannot descend into the final despair of destructiveness. 
Returning from the wilderness, he becomes a restorer of order, a preserver. He 
sees the truth, recognizes his true heir, honors his forebears and his heritage, and 
gives his blessing to his successors. He embodies the passing of human time, 
living and dying within the human limits of grief and joy. . . . 
 
[Speaking of a letter he received] My correspondent went on to say: “Healing, it 
seems to me, is a necessary and useful word when we talk about agriculture.” And 
a few paragraphs later he wrote: “The theme of suicide belongs in a book about 
agriculture . . .” I agree. But I am also aware that many people will find it 
exceedingly strange that these themes should enter so forcibly into this book. It 
will be thought that I am off the subject. And so I want to take pains to show that I 
am on the subject—and on it, moreover, in the only way most people have of 
getting on it: by way of the issue of their own health. Indeed, it is when one 
approaches agriculture from any other issue than that of health that one may be 
said to be off the subject. The difficulty probably lies in our narrowed 
understanding of the word health. That there is some connection between how we 
feel and what we eat, between our bodies and the earth, is acknowledged when we 
say that we must “eat right to keep fit” or that we should eat “a balanced diet.” 
But by health we mean little more than how we feel. We are healthy, we think, if 
we do not feel any pain or too much pain, and if we are strong enough to do our 
work. If we become unhealthy, then we go to a doctor who we hope will “cure” us 
and restore us to health. By health, in other words, we mean merely the absence of 
disease. Our health professionals are interested almost exclusively in preventing 
disease (mainly by destroying germs) and in curing disease (mainly by surgery 
and by destroying germs).  
But the concept of health is rooted in the concept of wholeness. To be 
healthy is to be whole. The word health belongs to a family of words, a listing of 
which will suggest how far the consideration of health must carry us: heal, whole, 
wholesome, hale, hallow, holy. And so it is possible to give a definition to health 
that is positive and far more elaborate than that given to it by most medical 
doctors and the officers of public health.  
If the body is healthy, then it is whole. But how can it be whole and yet be 
dependent, as it obviously is, upon other bodies and upon the earth, upon all the 
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rest of Creation, in fact?46 It immediately becomes clear that the health or 
wholeness of the body is a vast subject, and that to preserve it calls for a vast 
enterprise. Blake said that “Man has no Body distinct from his Soul...” and thus 
acknowledged the convergence of health and holiness. In that, all the 
convergences and dependences of Creation are surely implied. Our bodies are also 
not distinct from the bodies of other people, on which they depend in a 
complexity of ways from biological to spiritual. They are not distinct from the 
bodies of plants and animals, with which we are involved in the cycles of feeding 
and in the intricate companionships of ecological systems and of the spirit. They 
are not distinct from the earth, the sun and moon, and the other heavenly bodies.  
It is therefore absurd to approach the subject of health piecemeal with a 
departmentalized band of specialists. A medical doctor uninterested in nutrition, 
in agriculture, in the wholesomeness of mind and spirit is as absurd as a farmer 
who is uninterested in health.47 Our fragmentation of this subject cannot be our 
cure, because it is our disease. The body cannot be whole alone. Persons cannot 
be whole alone. It is wrong to think that bodily health is compatible with spiritual 
confusion or cultural disorder, or with polluted air and water or impoverished soil. 
Intellectually, we know that these patterns of interdependence exist; we 
understand them better now perhaps than we ever have before; yet modern social 
and cultural patterns contradict them and make it difficult or impossible to honor 
them in practice. 
To try to heal the body alone is to collaborate in the destruction of the 
body. Healing is impossible in loneliness; it is the opposite of loneliness. 
Conviviality is healing.48 To be healed we must come with all the other creatures 
to the feast of Creation. Together, the above two descriptions of suicides suggest 
this very powerfully. The setting of both is urban, amid the gigantic works of 
modern humanity. The fatal sickness is despair, a wound that cannot be healed 
because it is encapsulated in loneliness, surrounded by speechlessness. Past the 
scale of the human, our works do not liberate us—they confine us. They cut off 
access to the wilderness of Creation where we must go to be reborn—to receive 
the awareness, at once humbling and exhilarating, grievous and joyful, that we are 
a part of Creation, one with all that we live from and all that, in turn, lives from 
us. They destroy the communal rites of passage that turn us toward the wilderness 
and bring us home again.  
 
Perhaps the fundamental damage of the specialist system—the damage 
from which all other damages issue—has been the isolation of the body.49 At 
some point we began to assume that the life of the body would be the business of 
                                                 
46 A most crucial philosophical question—disturbingly germane to an inquiry into knowing. 
47 And both are as absurd as a philosopher uninterested in ecology (including our relationship 
with food), psychology (a branch of ecology), and medicine (another branch of ecology). 
48 The old, “Convivio, ergo sum.” 
49 Academic specialization receives indictment here as well . . . Why do we think it plausible to 
run a university in which students do not engage in growing food, receiving education in how to 
survive in wilderness, receiving support to go into wilderness? 
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grocers and medical doctors, who need take no interest in the spirit, whereas the 
life of the spirit would be the business of churches, which would have at best only 
a negative interest in the body. In the same way we began to see nothing wrong 
with putting the body—most often somebody else’s body, but frequently our 
own—to a task that insulted the mind and demeaned the spirit. And we began to 
find it easier than ever to prefer our own bodies to the bodies of other creatures 
and to abuse, exploit, and otherwise hold in contempt those other bodies for the 
greater good or comfort of our own. 
The isolation of the body sets it into direct conflict with everything else in 
Creation. It gives it a value that is destructive of every other value. That this has 
happened is paradoxical, for the body was set apart from the soul in order that the 
soul should triumph over the body. . . . 
 
The soul is thus set against the body, to thrive at the body’s expense. And so a 
spiritual economy is devised within which the only law is competition. If the soul 
is to live in this world only by denying the body, then its relation to worldly life 
becomes extremely simple and superficial. Too simple and superficial, in fact, to 
cope in any meaningful or useful way with the world. Spiritual value ceases to 
have any worldly purpose or force. To fail to employ the body in this world at 
once for its own good and the good of the soul is to issue an invitation to disorder 
of the most serious kind. . . . 
 
You cannot devalue the body and value the soul—or value anything else. The 
prototypical act issuing from this division was to make a person a slave and then 
instruct him in religions “charity” more damaging to the master than to the slave. 
Contempt for the body is invariably manifested in contempt for other bodies—the 
bodies of slaves, laborers, women, animals, plants, the earth itself. Relationships 
with all other creatures become competitive and exploitive rather than 
collaborative and convivial. The world is seen and dealt with, not as an ecological 
community, but as a stock exchange, the ethics of which are based on the 
tragically misnamed “law of the jungle.” This “jungle” law is a basic fallacy of 
modern culture. . . .50 
 
By dividing body and soul, we divide both from all else. We thus 
condemn ourselves to a loneliness for which the only compensation is violence—
against other creatures, against the earth, against ourselves. For no matter the 
distinctions we draw between body and soul, body and earth, ourselves and 
                                                 
50 Another basic fallacy. It resonates with Dewey’s reflections, not only on the intellectualist 
fallacy, but also something we shall see later. Berry’s basic fallacy of modern culture seems to 
resonate with the one the Dalai Lama invites us to see: “As a Buddhist, the aim of my spiritual 
quest is to free myself of the fundamental ignorance that has led to the notion that there is a 
division between people and the natural world, which is at the root of all our suffering.” Berry’s 
comments in the next paragraph elaborate this fallacy, the one Berry and the Dalai Lama seem to 
see as so central to our suffering. I am not sure if Berry understands this as I invite us to try and 
understand it. 
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others—the connections, the dependences, the identities remain. And so we fail to 
contain or control our violence. It gets loose. Though there are categories of 
violence, or so we think, there are no categories of victims. Violence against one 
is ultimately violence against all. The willingness to abuse other bodies is the 
willingness to abuse one’s own. To damage the earth is to damage your children. 
To despise the ground is to despise its fruit; to despise the fruit is to despise its 
eaters. The wholeness of health is broken by despite.  
If competition is the correct relation of creatures to one another and to the 
earth, then we must ask why exploitation is not more successful than it is. Why, 
having lived so long at the expense of other creatures and the earth, are we not 
healthier and happier than we are? Why does modern society exist under constant 
threat of the same suffering, deprivation, spite, contempt, and obliteration that it 
has imposed on other people and other creatures? Why do the health of the body 
and the health of the earth decline together? And why, in consideration of this 
decline of our worldly flesh and household, our “sinful earth,” are we not 
healthier in spirit? . . . . 
 
 . . . it is clear to anyone who looks carefully at any crowd that we are wasting our 
bodies exactly as we are wasting our land. Our bodies are fat, weak, joyless, 
sickly, ugly, the virtual prey of the manufacturers of medicine and cosmetics. Our 
bodies have become marginal; they are growing useless like our “marginal” land 
because we have less and less use for them. After the games and idle flourishes of 
modern youth, we use them only as shipping cartons to transport our brains and 
our few employable muscles back and forth to work.  
As for our spirits, they seem more and more to comfort themselves by 
buying things. No longer in need of the exalted drama of grief and joy, they feed 
now on little shocks of greed, scandal, and violence.51 For many of the churchly, 
the life of the spirit is reduced to a dull preoccupation with getting to Heaven. At 
best, the world is no more than an embarrassment and a trial to the spirit, which is 
otherwise radically separated from it. The true lover of God must not be burdened 
with any care or respect for His works. While the body goes about its business of 
destroying the earth, the soul is supposed to lie back and wait for Sunday, keeping 
itself free of earthly contaminants. While the body exploits other bodies, the soul 
stands aloof, free from sin, crying to the gawking bystanders: “I am not enjoying 
it!” As far as this sort of “religion” is concerned, the body is no more than the 
lusterless container of the soul, a mere “package,” that will nevertheless light up 
in eternity, forever cool and shiny as a neon cross. This separation of the soul 
                                                 
51 Recall Jung’s suggestions about the symbolic life: Without it, everything is banal, and we 
desperately seek after and cling to the silliest things so that we can feel as if something is 
actually happening. In fact, the dominant culture is characterized by the stark absence of 
happenings, amidst an endless stream of fake events. The post-truth era simply emerges as a 
symptom of this illness. Before the advent of “fake news,” we already had the ceaseless stream 
of fake news that we ourselves fed into and fed off of: My team won, I got my degree, I landed 
my first career job, my boss gave me a raise, I’m going on vacation . . . All of these events, and 
nothing happening. 
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from the body and from the world is no disease of the fringe, no aberration, but a 
fracture that runs through the mentality of institutional religion like a geologic 
fault. And this rift in the mentality of religion continues to characterize the 
modern mind, no matter how secular or worldly it becomes.  
But I have not stated my point exactly enough. This rift is not like a 
geologic fault; it is a geologic fault. It is a flaw in the mind that runs inevitably 
into the earth. . . . 
 
I do not want to speak of unity misleadingly or too simply. Obvious distinctions 
can be made between body and soul, one body and other bodies, body and world, 
etc. But these things that appear to be distinct are nevertheless caught in a 
network of mutual dependence and influence that is the substantiation of their 
unity. Body, soul (or mind or spirit), community, and world are all susceptible to 
each other’s influence, and they are all conductors of each other’s influence. The 
body is damaged by the bewilderment of the spirit, and it conducts the influence 
of that bewilderment into the earth, the earth conducts it into the community, and 
so on. If a farmer fails to understand what health is, his farm becomes unhealthy; 
it produces unhealthy food, which damages the health of the community. But this 
is a network, a spherical network, by which each part is connected to every other 
part. The farmer is a part of the community, and so it is as impossible to say 
exactly where the trouble began as to say where it will end. The influences go 
backward and forward, up and down, round and round, compounding and 
branching as they go.52 All that is certain is that an error introduced anywhere in 
the network ramifies beyond the scope of prediction; consequences occur all over 
the place, and each consequence breeds further consequences. But it seems 
unlikely that an error can ramify endlessly.53 It spreads by way of the connections 
in the network, but sooner or later it must also begin to break them. We are 
talking, obviously, about a circulatory system, and a disease of a circulatory 
system tends first to impair circulation and then to stop it altogether. Healing, on 
the other hand, complicates the system by opening and restoring connections 
                                                 
52 Seeing the interwovenness of things, we shift out of Hume’s skepticism regarding the “secret 
powers and hidden causes,” and we begin to intimately touch what we can poetically refer to as 
the sacred powers and inconceivable causes that rupture the boundary between mind and matter, 
body and soul, self and world, self and other, organism and environment, philosophy and 
ecology, Nature and Culture, and so on. Here again we could bring the Dalai Lama’s 
fundamental fallacy to mind.  
53 In this and the previous sentence, Berry gets at the concept of a feedback loop, a concept that 
forms part of the key scientific insights that Gregory Bateson called, “the biggest bite out of the 
fruit of the Tree of Knowledge that mankind has taken in the last 2000 years” (Steps, 461). As 
Berry points out—and Bateson would agree—Error cannot ramify endlessly (scientists link this 
to “the great filter” of life in the cosmos). This is precisely what our inquiry invites us to see, and 
it further invites us to see how the level of error currently evident in our way of knowing 
indicates that way of knowing must be transcended by a better way of knowing. That Berry 
implicates an altogetherness of inadequate visions of health, inadequate visions of the Earth, the 
spread of specialization, and more resonates strongly with the meta-analysis as a whole. 
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among the various parts—in this way restoring the ultimate simplicity of their 
union. When all the parts of the body are working together, are under each other’s 
influence, we say that it is whole; it is healthy. The same is true of the world, of 
which our bodies are parts. The parts are healthy insofar as they are joined 
harmoniously to the whole.54 What the specialization of our age suggests, in one 
example after another, is not only that fragmentation is a disease, but that the 
diseases of the disconnected parts are similar or analogous to one another. Thus 
they memorialize their lost unity, their relation persisting in their disconnection. 
Any severance produces two wounds that are, among other things, the record of 
how the severed parts once fitted together. . . . 
 
What I have been trying to do is to define a pattern of disintegration that is at once 
cultural and agricultural. I have been groping for connections—that I think are 
indissoluble, though obscured by modern ambitions—between the spirit and the 
body, the body and other bodies, the body and the earth. If these connections do 
necessarily exist, as I believe they do, then it is impossible for material order to 
exist side by side with spiritual disorder, or vice versa, and impossible for one to 
thrive long at the expense of the other; it is impossible, ultimately, to preserve 
ourselves apart from our willingness to preserve other creatures, or to respect and 
care for ourselves except as we respect and care for other creatures; and, most to 
the point of this book, it is impossible to care for each other more or differently 
than we care for the earth. (2002: 93-118) 
 
In our inquiry we seek connections that are indissoluble though obscured, by our way of 
knowing, which goes together with conscious human purposes (“modern ambitions”).  
 
The wholeness Berry speaks of . . . It invites us into expansiveness inconceivable to our habitual 
mind. If we cannot heal except in wholeness, if we cannot know better without knowing more 
holistically, then what is the wholeness of our being, what is the wholeness of our thinking, what 
is the wholeness of our activity that we must surely, in our present state, fail to touch, practice, 
realize?  
 
                                                 
54 Health—wholeness—here becomes some sort of attunement and at-one-ment. There is no 
wholeness apart from the whole. 
213 
 
Paul Shepard, among others, invites us to see that wild beings are indispensable to our 
wholeness, and thus to our thinking, to our meaning. In his book, The Others: How Animals 
Made Us Human, Shepard invites us to see how “the human species emerged enacting, 
dreaming, and thinking animals and cannot be fully itself without them” (4). Wild beings 
facilitated self-knowing and provided metaphors for transformation—in other words they helped 
ground our spiritual/philosophical life, either out of their divine imperative or simply as part of 
the wonder, the mystery of the sacredness we all are (or both). Wild beings of all kinds embodied 
our cosmologies—not in the sense that we merely projected onto them, but in the sense that we 
learned those cosmologies from the activity, the living thinking, of those beings . . . we touched 
cosmology directly in our relationships with them. Thus they enriched our language, not only 
with these teachings, but with their own sounds, their styles of communication and communion, 
and in the ways we tried to speak with and listen to them, to live with them and allow them to 
live through us. They constituted our being as they helped us practice and realize our place, our 
purpose in living ecologies. Domestication, as Shepard sees it, involved the disrupted of this 
mature relationship with mature beings, mature presences and ways of life, ways of thinking and 
knowing. Again, domesticated animals seem to Shepard as immature examples, constrained 
examples, and they began to displace the wild beings in our souls as well as in the landscape. 
This, in turn, resulted in an ontogenetic crippling of the human, thus degrading social bonds in 
the human community, which became increasingly isolated from wildness. Shepard ends his 
book with a letter from The Others, delivered by Bear: 
Dear Primate P. Shepard and Interested Parties: 
We nurtured the humans from a time before they were in the present form. 
When we first drew around them they were, like all animals, secure in a modest 
niche. Their evident peculiarities were clearly higher primate in their obsession, 
social status, and personal identity. In that respect they had grown smart, subtle, 
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and devious, committed to a syndrome of tumultuous, a seasonal, erotic, 
hierarchic power. 
Like their nearest kin, they had elevated a certain kind of attention to a 
remarkable acuity which made them caring, protective, mean, and nasty in the 
peculiar combination of squinched facial feature and general pettiness of 
monkeys. 
In ancient savannas we slowly teased them out of their chauvinism. In our 
plumage we gave them aesthetics. In our courtships we tutored them in dance. In 
the gestures of antlered heads we showed them ceremony and the power of the 
mask. In our running hooves we revealed the secret of grain. As meat we courted 
them from within. 
As foragers, their glance shifted a little from corms and rootlets, from the 
incessant bickering and scuffling of their inherited social introversion. They 
began looking at the horizon, where some of us were both danger and greater 
substance. 
At first it was just a nudge—food stolen from the residue of lion kills, 
contended for with jackals and vultures, the search for hidden newborn gazelles, 
slow turtles, and eggs. We gradually became for them objects of thought, of 
remembering, telling, planning, and puzzling us out as the mystery of energy 
itself. 
We tutored them from the outside. Dancing us, they began to see in us 
performances of their ideas and feelings. We became the concreteness of their 
own secret selves. We ate them and were eaten by them and so taught them the 
first metaphor of their frantic sociality: the outerness of themselves, and ourselves 
as their inwardness. 
As a bequest of protein we broke the incessant round of herbivorous 
munching, giving them leisure. This made possible the lithe repose of apprentice 
predation and a new meaning for rumination, freeing them from the drudgery of 
browsing and the grip of relentless interpersonal strife. Bringing them into 
omnivorousness, we transformed them forever and they entered the game as a 
different player. 
Not that they abandoned their appetite for greens and fruits, but enlarged it 
to seeds and meat, and to the risky landscapes of the mind. The savanna or tundra 
was essential to this tutorial, as a spaciousness open to infinite strategies of 
pursuit and escape, stretching the senses to their most distant reference. Their 
thought was invited to a new kind of executorship, incorporating remembrance 
and planning, to parallels between themselves and the Others and to words—our 
names—that enabled them to share images and ideas. 
Having been committed in this way, first as food and then as the imagery 
of a great variety of events and processes, from signs in dreams to symbols in 
metaphysics, we have accompanied humans ever since. Having made them 
human, we continue to do so individually, and now serve more and more in 
therapeutic ways, holding their hands, so to speak, as they kill our wildness. 
As slaves we stay close. As something to “pet” and to speak to, someone 
to be there and need them, to be their first lesson in otherness, we have shared 
their homes for ten thousand years. They have made that tie a bond. From the 
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private home we have gone out to the wounded and lonely, to those yearning for 
unqualified devotion—to hospitals, hospices, homes for the aged, wards of the 
sick, the enclaves of the handicapped and retarded. We now elicit speech from the 
autistic and trust from those in prison. 
All that is well enough, but it involves only our minimal, domesticated 
selves, not our wild and perfect forms. It smells of dependency. 
They still do not realize that they need us, thinking that we are simply one 
more comfort or curiosity. We have not regained the central place in their thought 
or meaning at the heart of their ecology and philosophy. Too often we are merely 
physical reality, mindless passion and brutality, or abstract tropes and symbols. 
Sometimes we have to be underhanded. We slip into their dreams, we hide 
in the language, disguised in allusion, we mask our philosophical role in “nature 
aesthetics,” we cavort to entertain. We wait in children’s books, in pretty pictures, 
as burlesques in cartoons, as toys, designs in the very wallpaper, as rudimentary 
companion or pets. 
We are marginalized, trivialized. We have sunk to being objects, 
commodities, possessions. We remain meat and hides, but only as a due and not 
as sacred gifts. They have forgotten how to learn the future from us, to follow our 
example, to heal themselves with our tissues and organs, forgotten that just 
watching our wild selves can be healing. Once we were the bridges, exemplars of 
change, mediators with the future and the unseen. 
Their own numbers leave little room for us, and in this is their great 
misunderstanding. They are wrong about our departure, thinking it to be a part of 
their progress instead of their emptying. When we have gone they will not know 
who they are. 
Supposing themselves to be the purpose of it all, purpose will elude them. 
Their world will fade into an endless dusk with no whippoorwill to call the owl in 
the evening and no thrush to make a dawn. 
–The Others 
 
Something in this letter from The Others resonates with various speeches and writings of 
Indigenous peoples, at least here on Turtle Island. For instance, in response to a missionary who 
sought to convert Indigenous peoples to Christianity, the great orator Red Jacket of the Seneca 
Nation said the following: 
. . . . your forefathers crossed the great waters, and landed on this island. Their 
numbers were small; they found friends, and not enemies; they told us they had 
fled from their own country for fear of wicked men, and come here to enjoy their 
religion. They asked for a small seat; we took pity on them, granted their request, 
and they sat down amongst us; we gave them corn and meat; they gave us poison 
in return. The white people had now found our country; tidings were carried back, 
and more came amongst us; yet we did not fear them, we took them to be friends; 
they called us brothers; we believed them, and gave them a larger seat. At length, 
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their numbers had greatly increased; they wanted more land; they wanted our 
country. Our eyes were opened, and our minds became uneasy. Wars took place; 
Indians were hired to fight against Indians, and many of our people were 
destroyed. They also brought strong liquor among us; it was strong and powerful, 
and has slain thousands. 
 
Brother, our seats were once large, and yours were very small; you have now 
become a great people, and we have scarcely a place left to spread our blankets; 
you have got our country, but are not satisfied; you want to force your religion 
upon us. . . . 
 
Brother, we are told that you have been preaching to the white people in this 
place. These people are our neighbors; we are acquainted with them; we will wait, 
a little while and see what effect your preaching has upon them. If we find it does 
them good, makes them honest and less disposed to cheat Indians, we will then 
consider again what you have said.55 
 
Another artefact comes to mind here. Not long after becoming President of the U.S., Andrew 
Jackson wrote the following letter to the Muscogee Nation—actually, he seems to have stopped 
looking at the various tribes as Nations and lumped them all together, as others—and the rhetoric 
is in its own way frightening, all the more so given what followed when the Indigenous peoples 
naturally refused to obey: 
Friends and Brothers — By permission of the Great Spirit above, and the voice of 
the people, I have been made President of the United States, and now speak to 
you as your Father and friend, and request you to listen. Your warriors have 
known me long You know 1 love my white and red children, and always speak 
with a straight, and not with a forked tongue; that I have always told you the truth. 
I now speak to you, as my children, in the language of truth—Listen. 
 
Where you now are, you and my white children are too near to each other to live 
in harmony and peace. Your game is destroyed, and many of your people will not 
work and till the earth. 
 
Beyond the great River Mississippi, where apart of your nation has gone, your 
Father has provided a country large enough for all of you, and he advises you to 
remove to it. 
 
There your white brothers will not trouble you; they will have no claim to the 
land, and you can live upon it you and all your children, as long as the grass 
                                                 
55 http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5790/ 
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grows or the water runs, in peace and plenty. It will be yours forever. For the 
improvements in the country where you now live, and for all the stock which you 
cannot take with you, your Father will pay you a fair price. 
 
Where you now live, your white brothers have always claimed the land. The land 
beyond the Mississippi belongs to the President and to no one else; and he will 
give it to you for forever.... 
  
Chief Speckled Snake gave this reply to the Muscogee Indians: 
 
Brothers! When the white man first came to these shores, the Muscogees gave 
him land, and kindled him afire to make him comfortable. And when the pale 
faces of the south [the Spanish] made war on him, their young men drew the 
tomahawk and protected his head from the scalping knife. 
 
But when the white man had warmed himself before the Indian’s fire, and filled 
himself with the Indian’s hominy, he became very large. He stopped not for the 
mountain tops, and his feet covered the plains and the valleys. His hands grasped 
the eastern and western sea. 
 
Then he became our great father. He loved his red children; but said, ‘You must 
move a little farther, lest I should by accident tread on you. With one foot he 
pushed the red man over the Oconee, and with the other he trampled down the 
graves of his fathers. 
 
But our great father still loved his red children, and he soon made them another 
talk He said much; but it all meant nothing, but ‘move a little farther; you are too 
near me. 
 
I have heard a great many talks from our great father, and they all began and 
ended the same. 
 
Brothers! When he made us a talk on a former occasion, he said, ‘Get a little 
farther. Go beyond the Oconee and the Ocmulgee. There is a pleasant country.’ 
He also said, ‘It will be yours forever.’ 
 
Now he says, ‘The land you live on is not yours. Go beyond the Mississippi. 
There is game. There you may remain while the grass grows or the water runs. 
 
Brothers! Will not our great father come there also? He loves his red children, and 
his tongue is not forked.56 
 
                                                 
56 https://www.nps.gov/ocmu/learn/historyculture/.../SB38-Creek-Indian-War-of-1836.doc 
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When Jackson didn’t get what he wanted from his letter, he opened debate on the Indian 
Removal Act, and thus followed the incredible suffering of the Trail of Tears. 
 
In his book, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Shepard writes: 
When we grasp fully that the best expressions of our humanity were not invented 
by civilization but by cultures that preceded it, that the natural world is not only a 
set of constraints but of contexts within which we can more fully realize our 
dreams, we will be on the way to a long overdue reconciliation between opposites 
which are of our own making. (5) 
 
This reconciliation of opposites means a healing of the wound in the Earth, the geological fault 
Berry invites us to see. It will come up again below, courtesy of Jung. One sees it everywhere: 
Where we make dualities, we make a wound. It is not that one needs to give up discernment, it is 
that true discernment, true wisdom liberates us from practicing and realizing dualities as if they 
were solid. Not only does the degradation of nature follow from this kind of duality, the 
fundamental fallacy the Dalai Lama mentions, but we in the university are lived by it, and we 
perpetuate it.  
 
For instance, we in the university perpetuate the specialization that Berry rightfully associates 
with isolation and disintegration. Consider the incredible incoherence of our specializations from 
the most practical point of view: There is an almost total lack of coherence in how these 
disciplines relate back to, or relate us back to Nature—and yet we depend on the Natural world, 
and our wholeness, our healing has an intimate relationship with the living world and its beings. 
We might more coherently establish colleges or departments such as the Department of 
Mountains and Rivers, the Department of Oceans, the Department of Deserts, the Department of 
Forests, the Department of Vitalizing Agriculture, the Department of Human-non-Human 
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Relations, the Department of Indigeneity, and so on. A Department of Mountains and Rivers 
might, for instance, employ philosophers intimate with the PracticeRealization of works by 
Emerson, Thoreau, Kohak, Muir, Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, Dogen, Milarepa, Shabkar, 
Gary Snyder, Mary E. Power, Val Plumwood, Freya Mathews, Andy Goldsworthy, Betsy 
Damon, Cathy Fitzgerald, Escif, Mary Oliver, Ansel Adams, and others. However, we don’t 
organize departments and “majors” this way. We not only drive students into incoherently 
specialized majors, but we insist on isolating the students from the natural world. We also isolate 
the variables of learning, so that we can properly measure learning outcomes. We localize these 
outcomes “in” the students rather than cultivating larger ecologies. We don’t put the students in 
much of a vitalizing relationship with each other or the natural world. We work mainly in 
classrooms, and almost never in the woods, on hikes, on vision quests, and so on—even in terms 
of assignments we give (for instance, we don’t tend to give students, as part of a philosophy 
course, an assignment to spend time in Nature, perhaps involving the creation of art works as an 
offering to the natural world and as part of experiences in Nature that are achievements or 
consummations in some sense, and not something “passive”). We don’t have students work 
together, as if collaboration and cooperation were a matter of course, since that would make it 
hard to measure the localized learning (we are fearful of cheating, plagiarism, and so on, even 
though these seem to occur as a symptom of fragmentation itself and of problems not properly 
localized in the students who fall into them). But when we back away and look at the state of the 
world, we see what we teach them, we see what human beings have learned to do. As David Orr 
writes in his book, Earth in Mind: 
The conventional wisdom is that education is good, and the more of it one has, the 
better . . .The truth is that without significant precautions, education can equip 
people merely to be more effective vandals of the earth. If one listens carefully, it 
may even be possible to hear the Creation groan every year in May when another 
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batch of smart, degree-holding, but ecologically illiterate, Homo sapiens who are 
eager to succeed are launched into the bio-sphere . . . [We need to address] the 
problem of education rather than problems in education. (2004: 5) 
 
What if it is impossible to presence wisdom, love, and beauty differently for each other than we 
do for the Earth? What does that say about how academia functions, how education in general 
functions? Once we really sense what wisdom, love, and beauty mean for us, this becomes not 
only inclusive of but a more important question than, What does that say about our current ways 
of knowing—in science, politics, economics, religion, and so on? 
 
Berry invites us to see the importance of changing our whole way of life, our whole way of 
knowing ourselves, each other, and the world. Experiences with gardening, farming, hiking, 
meditating, and so on can easily become co-opted into the dominant culture. They do grant us 
access to other ways of knowing. We may access them intermittently in robust forms—in 
experiences of profound insight—but these do not abide, and the abiding may make all the 
difference. Here we may quote Milarepa: 
In the beginning, nothing comes; 
In the middle, nothing stays; 
At the end, nothing goes. 
 
The passage contains a double meaning, but the meaning from the perspective of gradualism 
goes something like this: At first when we practice, nothing happens, and our spiritual activities 
may even seem to go nowhere; after some time, refreshing insights arise, peace arises, true joy 
arises, but nothing stays, and we quickly revert back into typical kinds of neurosis, even though 
these states of confusion have themselves become altered by practice; finally, we arrive at an 
abiding fresh state of mind. We are getting at two things here: That “trying” these other ways of 
knowing may produce almost nothing significant at first (that varies . . . some people will have a 
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fairly early sense that something important is happening, and they may even experience some 
degree of conversion), but even when something does seem to happen, it remains a far cry from a 
totally reorganized way of life. Thus, this “In the beginning” to which Milarepa refers happens 
not only in the beginning of our spiritual life, but every time we sit down to meditate (for 
instance), and then every time we go on retreat: In the beginning, we seem to be meditating (or 
not meditating), but we aren’t (and . . . we are), and the true mind of meditation will not fully 
appear until we accomplish the rupture. Nature can help us, the Earth can help us, countless 
beings and experiences may help us, but it may take more to get at the depths Nature-and-
Experience, Mind-and-Nature has to offer than mainstream western culture has understood. 
 
Granted, western culture has its share of Nature-based spiritual traditions and Nature-inspired 
philosophers, but even eastern cultures may rival the generalized west, not to mention the many 
Indigenous cultures that clearly do. We briefly noted Charles Fisher’s Dismantling Discontent. 
Fisher wrote a follow-up called, Meditation in the Wild, which documents the role of wild nature 
in a variety of Buddhist philosophical traditions. Though he expresses admiration for Thoreau, 
Fisher would, I think, evaluate Thoreau as at least a little on the namby-pamby side, getting his 
solitude without having to be very far from town, without the kind of wildness and vulnerability 
that many Buddhists have practiced. Fisher invites us to imagine a more radical entrance into 
Nature and, let us say, the “wild mind,” this mind of greater sensitivity, acuity, stability, 
creativity, insight, and general intelligence than the one we have come to think of as “normal” 
and to employ in all our thought, speech, and action. I say Fisher invites us to imagine, but not 
because he invites a mere flight of fancy. Rather, he documents the long history of this mind. In 
the oldest layers of Buddhist philosophy, retreat into the wilderness was seen as the gold 
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standard of practice. Recall that Fisher sees the therapeia of Buddhist philosophy as in large part 
made necessary by civilization itself.57 We have two ways, then, to interpret the Buddhist 
tradition: It makes it possible for us to find a way to live a healthy version of “civilization,” or it 
makes it possible for us to see that no healthy version of “civilization” is possible, but that we do 
not have to retreat into “savagery” or a “state of nature” or any other sort of crudity. Rather, we 
would need to invent, to discover-and-create a form of society, a form of life, a form of Nature-
Culture, Nature-Experience, Mind-Nature that functions to bring to fruition healthy minds and 
healthy ecologies—healthy ecologies of mind. Either way, the Buddhist traditions of practice-in-
the-wild give us a lot to think about as far as the current context of western thinking, and thus 
western thinking itself. Again, what do we cut ourselves off from, what is not possible for us to 
think as philosophers in the contemporary academy and as citizens in the midst of western 
culture? Reading texts like the 100,000 Songs of Milarepa (one of the greatest realized 
philosophers of Tibet), or even texts like Fisher’s, might make us wonder deeply. 
 
We should also consider the three-day effect as it relates to spiritual retreats that do not take 
place in the wild. While many retreat centers exist at a remove from ordinary life, and while 
                                                 
57 We can sense a difference here between Miriam Lancewood’s experience and what the 
spiritual traditions refer to. Lancewood suggests a basic clarity of mind and body can emerge in 
the wild, a coordination of heart, mind, body, and world not possible in “civilized” life. But, if 
that were enough to practice and realize whatever it was that, for instance, Siddhartha the 
Buddha realized, then all such wilderness folk would be sages, and Buddha would only have 
prescribed living in the wild, not an altogether spiritual life. The same goes for any practice. The 
arts, for instance, cultivate the dimension of beauty so deeply that, given its altogetherness with 
wisdom and love, they readily reveal the intimacy of art and philosophy/spirituality. But, if art, 
all by itself, were enough, Socrates would have recommended we all just become artists in the 
narrow sense, not artists of life, and he would not have found the artists he spoke with so lacking 
in wisdom. Plato brings our attention to the spiritual materialism of art, and that is not the same 
thing as a rejection of art. Indeed, it acknowledges the power of and importance of art. 
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entrance into such a retreat can mark the rupture to which Hadot referred, one can go on retreat 
with many of the comforts of civilization, including running water, soft cushions and beds, food 
that one doesn’t have to store or even procure for oneself, and so on, and still accomplish this 
rupture. In theory, one might accomplish it in the midst of everyday life, depending on the 
manner in which, and the intentions with which, one engages in everyday life. In any case, a 
meditation retreat can certainly bring about a relative rupture, and retreats lasting 3 days or more 
may have special effects that a daily practice of meditation may not typically bring about. Some 
of the findings on the effects of meditation that bear on thinking would be worthwhile in a longer 
version of our inquiry. But here, we can at least mention some of the effects observed in relation 
to this shifted context of thinking.  
 
One study, known as the Shamatha Project, recruited experienced meditators, randomly 
assigning them to either a wait-list control condition or to a 3-month intensive meditation retreat. 
Everyone eventually went on the retreat, but the control group helped to keep the data clean. All 
the participants were measured before, during, and after the retreat, as well as in follow-ups at 6 
months, 18 months, and 7 years later. In the course of the project, the experimenters inquired into 
a wide variety of operational variables, including things like levels of telomerase (they found that 
meditation seems to produce increased telomerase, a measure of healthy aging, where lower 
levels indicate increasing breakdown). It’s one of the finest, most comprehensive long-term 
studies on meditation available in western science. Among other things, the study showed that, 
during and following the retreat, there were significant improvements in things like perceptual 
discrimination, response inhibition, vigilance, and response time variance as measured in a 
response inhibition task. What seems particularly compelling is that these improvements were 
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maintained for as much as 7 years after the completion of the retreat. Older participants did 
experience age-related declines in accuracy, however those declines did not occur in participants 
who reported significant continued meditation practice after they completed the initial retreat. 
Might our thinking improve if we could improve our basic capacities of perceptual 
discrimination and vigilance?58 
 
We might ask more broadly how an ongoing spiritual practice might alter our general 
experience, including even the basic experience of our body and mind. For instance, Wielgosz et 
al. (2016) found that long-term mindfulness training correlates with reliable differences in 
resting respiration. Spending time in mediation may make us breathe differently, move 
differently, think differently. Baird et al. (2019) found that lucid dreaming occurs more 
frequently in long-term meditators than in those with no meditation practice. They also found 
that, in those who don’t have a mediation practice, the occurrence of lucid dreaming correlated 
with a tendency to verbalize experience. This did not hold for the meditators, for whom lucid 
dream frequency correlated with aspects of what is called trait mindfulness, which is meant to 
capture abiding features or qualities of relating as opposed to transient states. One can think of 
being in a state of mindfulness or a state of concentration on the one hand, and having a basic 
tendency to be mindful or to be focused on the other. Consistent practice of states can give rise to 
resilient traits. The researchers here found a kind of coherence of mind between waking and 
sleeping which links meditation practice with a special mode of awareness that allows one to 
notice the dream state as a dream state, and to open one’s dream life up for further and deeper 
                                                 
58 See Zanesco, et al., 2018, “Cognitive Aging and Long-Term Maintenance of Attentional 
Improvements Following Meditation Training” and, MacLean et al. (2010) “Intensive Meditation 
Training Improves Perceptual Discrimination and Sustained Attention” 
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spiritual practices. As we shall see, dream work has an important place in the new epistemology, 
as does a sense of coherence and continuity in experience that correlates with a quality of 
wonder. 
 
Another study on the effects of a 3-month intensive meditation retreat on cognitive ability 
showed findings of “large and lasting” effects. The researchers confirmed the finding that 
meditation can prevent age-related declines. Among other measures, they relied on an inventory 
called MINDSENS, which has consistently separated meditators from non-meditators with 82% 
accuracy. Higher MINDSENS scores correlate with meditative experience. The researchers 
report that: 
Compared to controls, retreatants showed increases in non-attachment, observing, 
MINDSENS, positive-affect, balance-affect, and cooperativeness; and decreases 
in describing, negative-others, reward-dependence and self-directedness. Non-
attachment had a mediating role in decentring, acting aware, non-reactivity, 
negative-affect, balance-affect and self-directedness; and a moderating role in 
describing and positive others, with both mediating and moderating effects on 
satisfaction with life. 
 
A 1-month Vipassana meditation retreat seems to yield improvements in 
mindfulness, well-being, and personality, even in experienced meditators. Non-
attachment might facilitate psychological improvements of meditation, making it 
possible to overcome possible ceiling effects ascribed to non-intensive practices. 
(Montero-Marin et al. 2016: 1) 
 
Though the path of “reason” taken by the west has emphasized a “detached” perspective, this 
meditative path may help us to practice-and-realize a non-attached style of relating, one that can 
feel fully, richly, responsively, without getting “hooked”. The biases that reason is susceptible to, 
and which the approach of detachment may not be capable of addressing (particularly without 
the cost of becoming like a robot or being at war with oneself in some way), may be better 
overcome by means of the practice-realization of non-attachment. We will have to save a fuller 
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discussion of non-attachment for another time. The question here remains whether this kind of 
heightened awareness, non-reactiveness, cooperativeness, balance, and overall well-being would 
help us philosophize, and if their pervasive presence would have helped us avert climate 
collapse. What kind of ecology gives rise to such a fruit as global climate collapse, and what 
kinds of ecologies would make such fruit unlikely or almost impossible? Our inquiry invites us 
to see how the sorts of states and traits that constitute healthy ecologies come altogether with a 
better way of knowing, and it invites us to wonder if the fact that we philosophize without 
practices that conscientiously cultivate them indicates compromises or systemic limitations in 
our way of thinking and knowing. 
 
When we taste, even in a limited way, a mind that transcends our usual mind, we can begin to 
see the unhealthy nature of our typical thinking, and we can begin to see the delusion of our 
typical orientation to life. For instance, we can see the delusion of trying to function on the basis 
of conscious human purposes, and we sense more intimately what we might call the soul’s 
purpose and its interwovenness with the purpose and purposes of the world, the meaning and 
purpose of life.  
 
Synchronicities and spiritual insights tend to rupture time, space, and the many beliefs, the many 
prejudices and conceptual dualities that keep us in a limited and limiting frame of mind, keep us 
restricted to our typical mind rather than entering and presencing a more original mind. But even 
our contemporary science and philosophy have ways of explaining some of the things on our 
inventory of human and intellectual privilege, explaining them so that we can begin to 
understand why they might be symptoms of a disorder of the soul, and problems of context.  
227 
 
 
Thus we come more directly to one of the items on our inventory that might seem particularly 
strange, namely the first one: I operate my life (or, we could say, organize my life) on the basis 
of conscious purposes. Because of the western context, this amounts to a localization of mind 
and knowledge, a reification of knower and doer. It is a style of mind and a style of life that we 
can call doing. I’ll bet ninety readers out of a hundred wouldn’t stop to think twice, coming 
across the expression “conscious human purpose,” or “I achieved my purpose,” or something 
along those lines. But does such a notion hold up? Is it an intellectualist fantasy that ignores a 
larger context? 
 
For instance, in the most basic common sense of western science, we can point out that 
consciousness can only ever present a sampling of our total intelligence, our total mind. Bateson 
saw this as a matter of simple logic: “Of course, the whole of the mind could not be reported in a 
part of the mind. This follows logically from the relationship between part and whole” (Steps, 
439). From this follows a troubling issue: What gets reported comes with an agenda that itself 
does not arise as fully “conscious”. So, whatever we say about our intentions and purposes 
cannot tell the whole story of our intentions and purposes.  
 
The considerations here seem to come close to those offered by Peirce in his famous Harvard 
Lectures on Pragmatism: 
But the sum of it all is that our logically controlled thoughts compose a small part 
of the mind, the mere blossom of a vast complexus which we may call the 
instinctive mind, in which this man will not say that he has faith because that 
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implies the conceivability of distrust, but upon which he builds as the very fact to 
which it is the whole business of his logic to be true.59 
 
The notion of control seems to appear naturally when we think about thinking. What else do we 
do with our thinking but attempt to control? Can we do more, or do otherwise? We certainly 
cannot control synchronicities. And perhaps this “vast complexus” goes beyond our own 
cranium. Perhaps we should most assuredly not restrict it to the notion of “instinct” as we 
typically conceive it. We should also note here something rather incredible: Peirce essentially 
describes logic as in service to something non-conscious, and we have to ask, If logic serves 
something not conscious, can I really tell the difference between its serving a non-conscious 
wisdom versus a non-conscious ignorance? After all, the logic itself, as a movement, may still 
look logical in either case. If we cannot have it otherwise, if the nature of our own minds makes 
things somehow like what Peirce may gesture toward, then what do we make of thinking? 
 
We can also consider this inherent limitation of ordinary consciousness and conscious control in 
the manner of information theory or scientific sampling: If we go to the beach with a teacup, fill 
it with ocean water and then go back to the lab, we will report that there are no whales in the 
teacup, and we may then assert that there are no whales in the ocean. We can fill thousands of 
teacups, and even wheelbarrows full of ocean water, but these will only ever be samples, and we 
will never find a whale in those samples, and, not knowing what to look for, we also won’t find 
any evidence of whales that our instruments can reliably detect. We may now and then find 
ambergris or some other evidence of a whale, but that is not a whale, and we can possibly guess 
                                                 
59 From Lecture 7, available online: http://mesosyn.com/peirce-Harvard.html 
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at or infer a whale, but we won’t have a whale. The whale will never be in the teacup, nor will a 
great many other things.  
 
The image below gives an impression of our epistemic situation: 
 
 
 
Our typical consciousness is like a little box, within which we constrain ourselves. We can only 
see what seem like straight lines of thought, but proper thinking, a better way of knowing, would 
put us in touch with larger loops of mind. This seems to be the challenge we face: How to get 
attuned with loops of mind large enough, and of the right kind, that our activity becomes more 
wise, loving, and beautiful. By any reasonable standard, for instance in terms of the scientific 
criteria we just considered, it seems to require an overcoming of the ego, which by definition can 
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only manage snippets or fragments of mind, and not living loops and larger ecologies of mind. 
Arts of awareness function by putting us in touch with these larger networks of mind—by 
liberating us into these larger ecologies, allowing these larger ecologies to liberate us (it is a 
gesture of mutual liberation, mutual illumination, co-discovery-creation). We forget the box and 
become intimate with nonlocal mind, thus yielding a nonlocal knowing. All of this happens, can 
only happen, as part of a better Way of knowing, or else we have merely found another way to 
foist our agenda onto life. 
 
We will return to these considerations, but we may now at least wonder, and we can at least 
begin to doubt the viability of conscious human purposes. Are we really being skillful and 
realistic when we try to operate our lives—and the life of the world—on such a basis? Bateson, a 
careful scientific thinker, found this an unacceptable basis, something we should not really rely 
on. And, perhaps shockingly, this would hold even for seemingly nice ends and purposes. Dewey 
draws close to this Insight when he remarks,  
Joshua’s reputed success in getting the sun to stand still to serve his desire is 
recognized to have involved a miracle. But moral theorists constantly assume that 
the continuous course of events can be arrested at the point of a particular object; 
that men can plunge with their own desires into the unceasing flow of changes, 
and seize upon some object as their end irrespective of everything else. (HNC; 
MW14: 157) 
 
At times, Dewey too, seems to want to stop the sun in the sky. We will inquire further into the 
matter elsewhere. 
 
For now, let us contemplate further the symptoms on our inventory. We find a general and 
pervasive problem in them. One way or another, we seem to need to see that thinking well means 
allowing mind to manifest ecologically (while Bateson wrote about “Steps to an Ecology of 
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Mind,” we also need to make Steps to a Mind of Ecology). This follows rather directly from 
several contemporary scientific theories or sets of theories, such as enactive cognition, quantum 
physics, evolution, and ecology. Thinking properly, we would think like a forest, because mind 
is more like a forest, and human beings are more like forests, than they are like machines. Oddly, 
we invented machines, and then decided that our own invention was a better metaphor for mind 
and body than anything in Nature, even though machines as we conceive them don’t exist in 
Nature, and even though mind and body are natural phenomena, living phenomena. Paul Shepard 
offers us some reflections that may help just now: 
In one aspect the self is an arrangement of organs, feelings, and 
thoughts—a “me”—surrounded by a hard body boundary: skin, clothes, and 
insular habits. This idea needs no defense. It is conferred on us by the whole 
history of our civilization. Its virtue is verified by our affluence. The alternative is 
a self as a center of organization, constantly drawing on and influencing the 
surroundings, whose skin and behavior are soft zones contacting the world instead 
of excluding it. [Better to say co-discover-create over and above “contacting,” but 
if we allow contact to mean intimacy, especially embodied intimacy, then the 
term might function.] Both views are real and their reciprocity significant. [But 
the logic of “both” doesn’t function here.] We need them both to have a healthy 
social and human maturity. [Again: Not both—also not neither, nor one, nor the 
other.] 
The second view—that of relatedness of the self—has been given short 
shrift. Attitudes toward ourselves do not change easily. The conventional image 
of a man, like that of the heraldic lion, is iconographic; its outlines are stylized to 
fit the fixed curves of our vision. We are hidden from ourselves by habits of 
perception. Because we learn to talk at the same time we learn to think, our 
language, for example, encourages us to see ourselves—or a plant or animal—as 
an isolated sack, a thing, a contained self. Ecological thinking, on the other hand, 
requires a kind of vision across boundaries. The epidermis of the skin is 
ecologically like a pond surface or a forest soil, not a shell so much as a delicate 
interpenetration. [Dogen’s Entwining Vines resonates here, as does the work of 
anthropologist Tim Ingold, on walking in the Earth.] It reveals the self enobled 
and extended rather than threatened as part of the landscape and the ecosystem, 
because the beauty and complexity of nature are continuous with ourselves. (from 
Sessions 1995: 132)60 
                                                 
60 In another essay, originally intended as part of the present inquiry, the following passage from 
Ingold appears: 
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These are Steps toward an Ecology of Mind and a Mind of Ecology. Before cultivating them 
forward in our inquiry, it would help to note how Shepard relates these steps to the ones Wendall 
Berry invited us to take. These words follow right after the ones above: 
And so ecology as applied to man faces the task of renewing a balanced 
view where now there is man-centeredness, even pathology of isolation and 
fear. It implies that we must find room in “our” world for all plants and 
animals, even for their otherness and their opposition. It further implies 
exploration and openness across an inner boundary—an ego boundary—an 
appreciative understanding of the animal in ourselves which our heritage of 
Platonism, Christian morbidity, duality, and mechanism have long held repellent 
and degrading. The older countercurrents—relics of pagan myth, the 
universal application of Christian compassion, philosophical naturalism, nature 
romanticism and pantheism—have been swept away, leaving only odd 
bits of wreckage. Now we find ourselves in a deteriorating environment which 
breeds aggressiveness and hostility toward ourselves and our world. 
How simple our relationship to nature would be if we only had to choose 
between protecting our natural home and destroying it. Most of our efforts to 
provide for the natural in our philosophy have failed-run aground on their 
own determination to work out a peace at arm’s length. Our harsh reaction 
against the peaceable kingdom of sentimental romanticism was evoked partly 
by the tone of its dulcet facade, but also by the disillusion to which it led. 
                                                 
To be honest, though, I do not believe we need draw any analogy between mind and ground. For 
in truth they are one and the same. Far from being confined within the skull—the bulbous 
concavity of which is so readily likened to the global convexity of the planetary surface—the 
mind extends along the pathways or lines of growth of human becoming, just as do earthy roots 
and aerial foliage. Thus the ground of knowing—or, if we must use the term, of cognition—is 
not an internal neural substrate that resembles the ground outside but is itself 
the very ground we walk, where earth and sky are tempered in the ongoing production of life. 
Walking along, then, is not so much the behavioural output of a mind encased within a 
pedestrian body as a way of thinking and knowing—an activity, according to Rendell, ‘that takes 
place through the heart and mind as much as through the feet’. Like the dancer, the walker is 
thinking in movement. ‘What is distinctive about thinking in movement’, writes dance 
philosopher Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, ‘is not that the flow of thought is kinetic, but that the 
thought itself is. It is motional through and through.’ The motional thought, however, runs along 
the ground . . . the ground is an instrument, not only in the blunt sense that we need it to stand 
on, but also in the sense that without it we would lose much of our capacity to know. If its 
variations were erased and covered over by a hard surface, we would still be able to stand and 
walk but could no longer know as we go along. (2015: 48-9) 
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Natural dependence and contingency suggest togetherness and emotional 
surrender to mass behavior and other lowest common denominators. The 
environmentalists matching culture and geography provoke outrage for their 
oversimple theories of cause and effect, against the sciences which sponsor 
them and even against a natural world in which the theories may or may not 
be true. Our historical disappointment in the nature of nature has created a 
cold climate for ecologists who assert once again that we are limited and 
obligated. Somehow they must manage in spite of the chill to reach the centers of 
humanism and technology, to convey there a sense of our place in a universal 
vascular system without depriving us of our self-esteem and confidence. 
Their message is not, after all, all bad news. Our natural affiliations define 
and illumine freedom instead of denying it. They demonstrate it better than 
any dialectic. (133) 
 
Again we see that shifting our way of knowing involves overcoming tremendous inertia—
culturally, ecologically, psychologically, experientially. Our ego can feel threatened, for reasons 
we only begin to understand by means of spiritual practice that turns us toward our grasping, 
clinging, aversion, and so on, while liberating our capacity for perception and discernment, 
liberating our capacity to actually see and accept reality. But we have all this apparent affluence 
to comfort us, to serve in place of more rigorous verification. Although Shepard, like Berry, 
speaks of the isolation and suffering that come with our dualities, it does not seem so easy to 
make a shift out of our loneliness, our fear, our clinging, our self-doubt—in part because our 
confusion manifests in just these sorts of states, and they do not make for a mind conducive to 
wisdom. Moreover, as we discussed previously, our way of life has an inertia, a habit energy 
holding it together. Furthermore, shifting our thinking, our way of knowing, comes with an 
enobling of ourselves that also entails some degree of humiliation. We have to admit the 
humiliating defeat implied in saying, “Okay . . . in a fundamental sense, we really don’t know 
what we’re doing. We really don’t know. I don’t know. I’m lost. We seem to be lost on a large 
scale. We may seem to know a lot, and in some sense we must know something, but some kind 
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of root ignorance still has its way with us. It is destroying the conditions of life. We are 
destroying the conditions of life by knowing ourselves and our world this way. What is this?” 
 
In resonance with Jung who suggested that we can only find our true answer “from Nature 
herself” (who, we may say, speaks as the voice of the divine), and in resonance with all the 
spiritual traditions that sent practitioners into wilderness to resolve “the great matter,” Shepard 
suggests that Nature herself embodies and expresses (embodies, presences, manifests) the more 
noble way of thinking we seek better than any dialectic—and thus we ourselves are that 
thinking, if only we can return to it, in a single gesture of rupture and reunion, in an altogether 
practice of co-discovery-creation. We return home to ourselves, in remembrance and recognition. 
In speaking of re-membering and re-cognition, we can have in mind Nietzsche’s great question, 
which is the great question of our inquiry: “To what extent can truth endure incorporation? That 
is the question; that is the experiment” (GS 110). If we have so far incorporated error as we 
incorporated the unskillful thinking of dualities like human-nature, self-other, body-soul, body-
mind, and all the rest (we can think of how Berry described such incorporation: “weak, joyless . . 
. the virtual prey of the manufacturers of medicine and cosmetics”), how can we incorporate 
something that, according to some of our best science and philosophy, seems truer—something 
we cannot truly know anyway until we incorporate it? We have to re-member ourselves, re-
embody, arrive at a new thinking, re-cognition of ourselves in, through, as the world—thus 
transforming forward the thinking of the world. 
 
Similarly, we return here to Dogen, who must always stay with us on our journey of re-
cognition: 
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To carry the self forward to verify [or, practice-realize] myriad things is delusion. 
That myriad things come forth and verify the self is enlightenment. 
 
. . . . To study [to practice] philosophy is to study the self. To study the self is to 
forget the self. To forget the self is to be verified by all things. When verified by 
myriad beings, your body and mind and the body and mind of myriad beings fall 
away. A traceless trace of verification [realization] remains—ungraspable. The 
traceless trace of verification expresses itself without end. (translation adapted 
from Waddell and Abe) 
 
When Shepard (like Jung, and like so many others in our inquiry) relates our challenge to the 
presence of an ego, we can, if we contemplate carefully, begin to sense how profound a 
challenge we face here. How do we get over ourselves? We have incorporated on the basis of a 
sense of self that directs itself in relation to its conscious purposes. How do we forget that self, 
which is all we “know,” because it is what we have incorporated? How do we allow for knowing 
to happen by means of the World—by means of Sophia, by means of sacredness and mystery? 
We do this in part by sensing how it always does anyway. But this takes experimentation, an end 
to holding the World at arm’s length, as Shepard suggests we do, as Dewey suggests we do, as 
Berry and so many others suggest we do. A fundamental duality lives itself through us, with all 
sorts of negative consequences. Dewey gets at this duality here: 
The material and spiritual, the physical and the mental or psychological; body and 
mind; experience and reason; sense and intellect, appetitive desire and will; 
subjective and objective, individual and social; inner and outer; this last division 
underlying in a way all the others. (LW 16: 408) 
 
We can perhaps read this as a way of expressing both the intellectualist fallacy that Dewey 
thought philosophers so badly need to address, and also the fundamental fallacy the Dalai Lama 
invites us to overcome. I think Dewey’s collaborator Arthur Bentley puts this general problem in 
terms quite resonant with our inquiry: 
Human skin is the one authentic criterion of the universe which philosophers 
recognize when they appraise knowledge under their professional rubric, 
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epistemology. By and large—except for a few of the great Critics and Sceptics—
they view knowledge as a capacity, attribute, possession, or other mysterious 
inner quality of a “knower”; they view this knower as residing in or at a “body”; 
they view the body as cut off from the rest of the universe by a “skin”; all of 
which holds for philosophizing physicists and physiologists even as for the 
professionals of the arcanum itself. If this assertion seems crude, one may recall 
that there are times when a bit of crudity is a fair physic for an inflamed subtlety. 
In the case before us the factual crudity lies in the use of “skin” for a criterion, not 
in our calling attention to the fact. (Bentley 1941)61 
 
Bentley invites us to sense the crudity of our epistemology—a great irony given that our 
intellectualism endows us with a sense of sophistication. But many so-called “primitive” 
Cultures had well-established practices for realizing the wispiness of skin, for realizing that our 
skin is not even like the soil of a forest, but that skin can cover over the sense that we are more 
like a forest than an acorn. Various rites, rituals, ceremonies, celebrations, prayers, vision quests, 
and other arts of awareness (including a wide range of spiritual and shamanic practices) help 
individuals and cultures to orient themselves in a way that doesn’t get hooked on or ensnared by 
the “one authentic criterion of the universe.”  
 
We may not think of this criterion as a criterion. We may protest that we do not hold this as “the 
one authentic criterion,” but such a protest betrays the subtlety of the disease, while evidence of 
its inflamed nature we find everywhere we look—for what else do we agree upon so universally 
in our actual practice of life but that we can hide inside our skin, that a knower and a doer dwell 
here, in this organic capsule? Again, we are saying in part that, because “philosophy” really 
amounts to “how we do things,” we suffer from a case of bad philosophy, emerging out of the 
                                                 
61 The title and the subtitle Bentley gave to the article bears significance in our inquiry: The 
Human Skin: Philosophy’s Last Line of Defense. Today’s professors may be hiding from a 
nonlocal epistemology, and from the decentering of ego that such an epistemology demands. 
But, given that even our science has carried us into this territory, there may be no line of defense 
left for any conscientious person. 
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incorporation of duality, the incorporation of distance from Sophia, difference from Nature, 
disengagement from the World. In the dominant culture, we might suggest, along with Alan 
Watts, that transcending the skin becomes a matter of taboo—thus showing the “primitiveness” 
of so-called “civilized” society. As Watts puts it in the preface to The Book on the Taboo 
Against Knowing Who You Are: 
This book explores an unrecognized but mighty taboo—our tacit conspiracy to 
ignore who, or what, we really are. Briefly, the thesis is that the prevalent 
sensation of oneself as a separate ego enclosed in a bag of skin is a hallucination 
which accords neither with Western science nor with the experimental 
philosophy-religions of the East—in particular the central and germinal Vedanta 
philosophy of Hinduism. 
This hallucination underlies the misuse of technology for the violent 
subjugation of man’s natural environment and, consequently, its eventual 
destruction. We are therefore in urgent need of a sense of our own existence 
which is in accord with the physical facts and which overcomes our feeling of 
alienation from the universe. 
 
Watts does well to characterize his sources of inspiration as “experimental,” and even 
“philosophy-religions” in the sense that they rely on experiment and experience, they offer 
themselves for verification, and they demand a philosophical/spiritual attunement. The findings 
of these experimental traditions so nullify the theories upon which the dominant culture is 
founded that they must remain taboo. Such findings exist in marginalized traditions of the 
dominant culture as well, and they also appear in the science of the dominant culture. They 
remain unmetabolized, kept at a distance by means of “the one authentic criterion” that allows us 
to rationalize or evade a great deal of insanity. 
 
The capsule epistemology that arises from this “authentic criterion” of our lives seems to come 
with negative side-effects. We might be tempted to think that this root criterion is perfectly 
acceptable, and that what we “do” with it creates trouble. But therein lies our confession: This 
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epistemology is the epistemology of a doer, of a doing orientation to life, which is what our 
inquiry seeks to understand—through the tensions it creates in us, through the degradation it 
seems to give rise to in ourselves and the world—and which it seeks to help us transcend. That 
this doing epistemology pervades our activity matters first and foremost, because we can then 
understand that it naturally pervades our science. It does this in countless ways, including the 
inclination of theory and practice toward atomization. For instance, consider how “ninety readers 
out of a hundred wouldn’t stop to think twice, coming across the expression ‘we put each 
participant in an fMRI scanner,’” while in another culture we might find ourselves coming across 
that expression and saying, “How odd . . . instead of studying an ecology, these experimenters 
isolated ‘organisms’ and put them in a scanner all alone . . . valid findings in a certain sense, but 
not very ecologically valid, not very true to a rich, lived experience . . .” Experiments have been 
done with pairs of “individuals,” but, as far as I know, only Joy Hirsch and her team have 
pioneered inquiry into relational beings engaged in relational activity (relational dynamism). 
Similarly, Theise (2009) offers a critique of “the cell doctrine,” the assumption that the body is 
made up of “cells”. It is not that the cell doctrine gives us nothing or renders a senseless 
interpretation of “biological” “phenomena,” but that it reflects and perpetuates knowing 
ourselves in atomized pieces, and by means of the intellectualist and psychologist fallacies, we 
begin to overwrite our experience, unable to get in touch with ourselves as a flow of energy, 
wind, or something like what certain Asian cultures refer to as chi, ki, lung, or prana. Something 
like acupuncture then gets relegated to the fringe, and the more holistic approaches to medicine 
practiced in the Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese traditions become a matter of “alternative” 
approaches. We obviously want “science-based” medicine, but those who most militantly argue 
for it rarely seem to question the current paradigms dominant in western science. While on the 
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one hand we should see these as mere details (in other words, we don’t need to think we must all 
“convert” to Tibetan medical practices), on the other hand we do seem to have here a crisis of 
worldview. 
 
We needn’t panic over this “crisis”. It does seem we have to acknowledge some level of crisis in 
the dominant culture. But for now, we could maybe just try to imagine a possibility for an 
epistemology not founded on a bag of skin, to feel what it may evoke in us. We could use 
Shepard’s imagery in an expanded form, and we could say that thinking, especially creative 
thinking, is like a forest, a living ecology exploring potential connections (in the manner of an 
ecology of roots, seeds, pollens, insects, and so on, all exploring in, through, as relational 
dynamism). The connections may be nearby in physical space, or just in conceptual space. They 
may even be “separated” in such a way that insight involves a rupture of apparent separation (for 
instance, the synergy that gives rise to cells with mitochondria, or the synchronicity between a 
dream and a “later” event in a waking state). Even so, an insight is in some sense a living 
constellation of connections or relations. Similarly, a psychological “complex” is a persistent 
constellation of connections, a habitual way of practicing and realizing something that might be 
unskillful, limited, and limiting in harmful ways. Such a complex is not merely “in” us, but must 
manifest outside us in various ways, either in the stuckness of our lives, or, as Jung put it, “The 
psychological rule says that when an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside, as 
fate.” This applies in all sorts of life situations, and we may find that what appears like an 
“accident” over which we had no control . . . if we could reflect deeply enough, perhaps with the 
help of a guide, and often only by means of certain arts of awareness that would allow us to see 
it, we might find a troubling synchronicity, an unsettling sense that the “accident” was no mere 
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accident. In the most general sense, the state of the world reflects the state of our souls. 
However, while Jung would certainly agree with this general feeling for his point, he also 
intended a more focused kind of meaning that in turn applies broadly to western culture. Thus, a 
fuller quotation may prove helpful, especially if we reflect on it in relation to the geological fault 
Wendell Berry spoke of, and the dualities suggested by Shepard, Dewey, Bentley, and Dogen—
each in turn representative of wider networks or ecologies of conceptual data points: 
The irreconcilable nature of the opposites in Christian psychology is due to their 
moral accentuation. This accentuation seems natural to us, although, looked at 
historically, it is a legacy from the Old Testament with its emphasis on 
righteousness in the eyes of the law. Such an influence is notably lacking in the 
East, in the philosophical religions of India and China. Without stopping to 
discuss the question of whether this exacerbation of the opposites, much as it 
increases suffering, may not after all correspond to a higher degree of truth, I 
should like merely to express the hope that the present world situation may be 
looked upon in the light of the psychological rule alluded to above. Today 
humanity, as never before, is split into two apparently irreconcilable halves. The 
psychological rule says that when an inner situation is not made conscious, it 
happens outside, as fate. That is to say, when the individual remains undivided 
and does not become conscious of his inner opposite, the world must perforce act 
out the conflict and be torn into opposing halves. (CW9ii, para. 126) 
 
Nietzsche comes at this same split not only from a certain cultural perspective, but from a kind of 
biological suggestion that we do not necessarily evolve over lifetimes or develop in the course of 
one lifetime in order to grasp “the way things are,” but rather we will incorporate what functions 
to keep us going. We will return to this. But let us contemplate a little further some broader sense 
of thinking, elaborating a bit Shepard’s image of the self as a forest—a relational openness. 
 
We can consider, as a way to ease into this notion, the image of plants growing in the rain forest. 
Some plants will begin to explore white, sandy soil, and find out what is possible in connection 
with this soil, thinking through possibilities. Eduardo Kohn, an anthropologist who spent four 
years living with the Indigenous Runa of the Amazon, tried to get in touch with forest thinking 
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during his time there, and then tried to theorize about his experience in terms of Peirce’s 
semiotics. The discussion of representation seems a bit distracting, but just as Dewey tried to 
mean something we aren’t quite used to with terms like “experience,” Kohn recognizes the 
significant baggage hanging onto “representation,” yet still tries to rescue the concept. It may 
prove better to talk about thinking, and not worry about the “semiotics” for now. Kohn tries to 
explain how the thinking of a tropical forest of necessity involves a great deal of discernment: 
For example, a number of tropical tree species have evolved as specialists that 
grow only on white-sand soils. Tropical white-sand soils, as contrasted to tropical 
clay soils, are nutrient-poor, do not hold water well, and have characteristics such 
as high acidity that can slow plant growth. However, it is not the soil conditions in 
themselves that account for the fact that there are specialists that live on white-
sand soils. Rather, the fact that there are such specialists is the result of their 
relation to another set of life-forms: plant-eating organisms, or herbivores 
(Marquis 2004: 619). 
Because of the extremely poor conditions of these white-sand soils, plants 
have difficulty repairing themselves fast enough to sustain the levels of nutrient 
loss incurred by herbivory. Thus there is great selective pressure for plants living 
on such nutrient-poor soils to develop highly specialized toxic compounds and 
other defenses against herbivory (Marquis 2004: 620). (2013: 81-2) 
 
While we could call this “selective pressure” “on the plants” which gets them “to develop” 
something, it seems a more narrow characterization. Bateson puts it much better: Evolution is a 
mental process (see his Mind and Nature). What we refer to as evolution has to do with the 
living thinking of Nature. I don’t mean this in any “mystical” sense that should carry a pejorative 
connotation. I mean that we don’t always recognize mind or thinking when we see it, since we 
trap ourselves outside of the “vast complexus” of mind that the limited ego knows nothing about 
and cannot control. We see then, not a “selective pressure” and so on, but a process of thinking, a 
relational epistemology in action—which we should remain open to seeing if we remain 
committed to philosophy, committed to wisdom, love, and beauty. Our epistemology should 
attune us to life, and does not seem properly characterized as a matter of “knowledge,” 
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something “internal” to “humans,” something about “beliefs,” or any of a number of other more 
limited and limiting notions. As Nature’s beings, whether because we “evolved” with, through, 
as Nature, and/or because the divine made us altogether with Nature, perfectly fitted to live here 
in attunement with the sacredness of the divine creation, it seems reasonable the we should try 
and attune our way of knowing to the way of knowing expressed in, through, as Nature—
because, again, that is what we are. This is not a simple-minded notion. It’s an experiential 
achievement or consummation, a matter of PracticeRealization. We are trying to glimpse 
something by means of such suggestions, trying to approach a fresh state of being, a space of 
knowing.  
 
In a paper titled, “Herbivores Promote Habitat Specialization by Trees in Amazonian Forests,” 
Fine, Mesones, and Coley (2004) describe an experiment in which they took plants from white-
sand soil and transplanted them to clay soils, and they took plants from clay soils and 
transplanted them to white-sand soils. They first protected all the plants from herbivores. In that 
situation, the plants from the clay soil grew better, even when they were transplanted to the 
white-sand soil. But, when the researchers let the herbivores back in, the plants who had evolved 
to grow in the white-sand soil thrived in that soil type, and the clay soil plants thrived in their soil 
type. Again, this is not a matter of herbivores exerting some kind of pressure, but a thinking 
through of relational possibilities, possibilities of mutual illumination and mutual nourishment. 
Growing in the white-sand soil is possible, but it takes collaborative thinking, a process of co-
discovery-creation to cultivate it to realization. The plants, soil, fungi, bacteria, herbivores, and 
other beings all think together, in loops of mind or ecologies of mind that always transcend 
anything we localize in a bag of skin, a bag of bark, or the designation “organism”.  
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We should remember that we are looking here at context, mindful (sati, awareness, 
remembering) of how our forgetting of context (in place of forgetting the self) becomes the 
fundamental philosophical fallacy—the fundamental human fallacy. The thinking of the plants, 
the herbivores, the soil (loaded as it is with fungi, bacteria, and other thinking constituents), and 
other beings gives us the validity of the way the plants in the white-sand soil organize their lives. 
It is relational. It is a relational way of knowing and being, an intimate presencing of non-local 
mind. We could point out, for instance, that such differences in soil types wouldn’t make a 
difference to the plants if it weren’t for the other beings who live with them, think with them, co-
discover-create the world with them, making the forest, cultivating and transforming it forward.  
 
Kohn wants to interpret this using the term “representation,” but we only need to see mind and 
thinking here—not “mind” as a substance, but mindfulness, mindedness, the unity of mind and 
life, Mind and Nature, a membering and remembering together, a mutual incorporation. So, we 
could also say that plants in the tropics have to become more discerning, have to be able to think 
with more nuance, than perhaps some other plants do, where there are fewer species, even in 
relatively varying terrain. Given that there are more species in a few acres of Amazonian 
rainforest than in the whole of “North America,” if someone from Turtle Island moved to the 
Amazon, they would have to develop a lot of discernment about what to eat, what not to eat, 
where to walk, when to walk, how to walk, and so on. But living in wild conditions anywhere 
likely provokes more thought and discernment from us than does our monotonous life in 
“civilization”—in spite of the hectic pace. Some people have remarked on the vast difference 
that seems to separate the wild boar and the domesticated pig (Paul Shepard for instance). 
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Domestication seems to involve a making-stupid, as part of a making-docile, making-juvenile, 
and making-controllable. In the self-domestication of humans, we may have accomplished a kind 
of numbing of our own capacities for discernment and vitality, and this is part of what Shepard 
seems to want to get at with the notion of “ontogenetic crippling.” As we put ourselves in office 
spaces, cars, and classrooms, we take ourselves out of what Kohn calls “a relatively denser web 
of living thoughts” (82).  
 
It will help us to back out of the rainforest for awhile, and consider how unlike a forest our 
current context of thought appears. Kohn himself offers a segue from these reflections on forest 
thinking back to the habitual thinking we seek to question: 
Selves, in short, are thoughts, and the modes by which such selves relate to one 
another stem from their constitutively semiotic nature and the particular 
associational logics this entails. Considering the logic by which these selves relate 
in this ecology of selves challenges us to rethink relationality—arguably our 
field’s fundamental concern and central analytic (Strathern 1995). 
If selves are thoughts and the logic through which they interact is 
semiotic, then relation is representation. That is, the logic that structures relations 
among selves is the same as that which structures relations among signs. This, 
in itself, is not a new idea. Whether or not we are explicit about it we already 
tend to think of relationality in terms of representation in the ways we theorize 
society and culture. But we do so based on our assumptions about how human 
symbolic representation works (see chapter 1). Like the words that exist in the 
conventional relational configurations that make up a language, the relata—be 
these ideas, roles, or institutions—that make up a culture or a society, do not 
precede the mutually constitutive relationships these relata have with one another 
in a system that necessarily comes to exhibit a certain closure by virtue of this 
fact. 
Even posthuman relational concepts, such as Bruno Latour’s “actant,” the 
networks of actor-network theory, and Haraway’s “constitutive intra-action” 
(Haraway 2008: 32, 33), rely on assumptions about relationality that stem from 
the special kinds of relational properties we find in human language. In fact, in 
some versions of actor-network theory the relational networks that connect 
humans and nonhuman entities are explicitly described as language-like 
(see Law and Mol 2008: 58). 
But representation, as I have been arguing, is something both broader than 
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and different from what we expect given how our thinking about it has been 
linguistically colonized.62 (83) 
 
To summarize a few of the branches of thinking about thinking we have wandered along, 
including these suggestions from Kohn, we can say ecology matters in our thinking in many 
ways, including the so-called “environment” “in which” “I” “think”. Our very language may 
cover this over (again, presenting all sorts of challenges for our inquiry), and thus an entire 
culture may orient itself to occlude rather than bring to realization the true nature of our thinking, 
or the nature of skillful, realistic, wise, loving, and beautiful thinking—and it may do this 
occluding in the form of a scientific mysticism, which means a seemingly rational and cogent 
way of knowing that amounts to mysticism in the pejorative sense, because it is a relatively 
narrow and even dogmatic activity of obscuring something profound and essential rather than 
helping people to realize and presence it. If thinking is already ecological, then speaking of an 
“environment” “in which” “I” “think” gives us a bad idea with negative consequences. Even “we 
think” would not quite get at it. Rather, ecologies think (which includes the “inner” and “outer” 
realms—e.g. the microbiome of a human being as well as how integrated Nature and non-human 
beings are in the human’s living and thinking).  
 
This means we need to cultivate creative ecologies, which, in risky, limited terms, means 
“rooting ourselves” “in” “environments” that “mimic” a creative or vitalizing “network 
signature”. In other words, we need to think in (with, through, as) places—places alive and 
                                                 
62 A rather significant choice of words. The dominant culture has not only perpetuated conquest 
of other peoples and lands; it has perpetuated the conquest of its own peoples and lands, and of 
its own mind. The dominant culture has not only self-domesticated, but self-conquered—an 
activity coming to a moment of global crisis as the conditions of life collapse. 
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alove, places that are themselves vitalizing ecologies, that are relational openness, not “things”.63 
This wisdom makes so much sense that we can find limited and limiting attempts to approach it 
in the dominant culture, attempts that of course get co-opted to the ends of the culture, and thus, 
ultimately, do not liberate us from the pattern of insanity. Simple examples of this include places 
like Google, Apple, 3M, Gor-tex, MIT, the Manhattan Project, Bell Labs, and similar relatively 
vitalizing, artificial ecologies that mainly thrive as ecologies of insanity, ecologies that 
perpetuate the pattern of insanity that lives itself through us (the “genius” of the insights that 
arise in these places is relative to the larger culture, and these ecologies produce fruits the larger 
culture wants to consume, but which may prove toxic to life). We often give pride of place to 
individuals—like Einstein, Edison, Martin Luther King Jr.—and we thereby miss the role of the 
broader ecologies, such as the conversations Einstein had with Michel Besso (whom he openly 
credited) or the general climate of the Menlo Park lab, where Edison worked and got others to 
work for him. We could say that all ecologies are ecologies of thinking, ecologies of mind. In 
any case, the ecology of thinking (even if we find ourselves tempted to limit the notion to human 
ecologies) depends on biodiversity, which means the nature and variety of minds, skills, 
sensibilities, sensitivities that come together in co-discovery-creation.  
 
Ultimately, the most enriched and enriching context seems to be Nature, or (in the healthy case) 
Nature-Culture. Thinking like a forest happens best in, with, through, as a forest (hence 
Buddha’s realization under a tree, near a river, after years of forest wandering, in a pattern of 
living inquiry that formed the gold standard of many strands of eastern philosophy for millennia 
                                                 
63 I can imagine a reader saying, “What do you mean by ‘relational openness’?” to which a most 
sane reply seems to be, “Yes, exactly.” There are surely many such exchanges, in relation to 
many phrases and suggestions in our inquiry.  
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after his realization of sagehood, the locally rooted atopos). As the magnificent Tibetan 
philosopher-sage Longchenpa wrote: 
I see the truth that this life won’t last and is swiftly heading toward ruin, 
That even this body which I’ve so lavishly cared for will be lost, 
And I’ll have to head off alone to parts unknown. 
So now, I’m off to the wildwoods. 
 
When I get distracted, I lose sight of the path to freedom — 
Which is solely responsible for prolonging my saṃsāric suffering. 
Now that I’ve seen the plague of conceptual thinking, 
I’m off to live in the unborn peace of the wildwoods. 
 
The busy cities are bonfires of desire. 
I see now that if I catch the terrible plague of existence, 
I’ll just keep wandering in the canyons of saṃsāra. 
So, I’m off right now to the wildwoods. 
 
Every being in existence is threatened by affliction 
And totally bound by terrifying chains of duality. 
Because each one has at some point or another been my mother or father, 
To free them, I must go to the wildwoods. . . . 
 
. . . . Those who live an ethically impeccable life with 
Abundant study, 
Good meditation, 
Life in the wildwoods, 
And training in what is virtuous 
Shall fearlessly discover great joy in the face of death. 
 
The cause of their joy is exactly life in the wilds. 
Thus, I am leaving to meditate there. 
Nobody could know for certain 
If the time when I shall be no more will come tomorrow or not. 
On the morning of my death, 
Nothing will protect me other than the Dharma. 
For the Dharma is my protector, my home, and my friend. 
It points me to the fine manor of the higher realms. 
 
Thus, mind, remember that death is coming! 
I must go to live in the wildwoods for the love of Dharma. 
 
My mind sent this letter to itself. 
Mind, if you’re listening, you are fortunate in the Dharma. 
This message, spoken for your benefit, came straight from the heart. 
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Mind, take it, and head to the wildwoods. 
 
This song of the enchanting wildwoods 
Was penned by the man from Samyé 
Whose mind was turned to liberation by renunciation, 
On the highest mountain peak of Being at Ease in the Nature of Mind, 
So he would wholeheartedly head to the wildwoods. 
 
Through any virtue arisen from this, 
May all beings extract their minds from the city of saṃsāra 
And find freedom all together 
In the enchanting wildwoods of omniscient liberation.64 
 
Most of us today do not send such letters to ourselves. What kind of exercise would it be to write 
a caring letter from our own soul to our little ego?  What would it be like to send a caring letter 
to our own soul? What would it be like to write a Love Letter to the Earth?65 We do not seek out 
the “enchanting wildwoods of omniscient liberation” (what an incredible phrase!), for we think 
we know so much from within our closed rooms with artificial lighting, plastic surfaces, right 
angles, glaring screens, fMRI scanners, microscopes, and so on. We think and know through 
abstract concepts, and we think and know through journals and books so as to produce more 
abstract concepts, more journals more books—and more aircraft carriers, nuclear missiles, 
fashion campaigns, automobiles (what a word!), and all the fuel for the bonfires of desire that 
currently engulf the conditions of life. We think in the midst of busyness and business that we 
perpetuate at every turn. We produce more words, more tech, and more busyness—abstract mind 
reproducing itself the way living mind does, precisely because living mind got co-opted by 
                                                 
64 Longchenpa lived from 1308-1364, about a century after Dogen, his Japanese counterpart, 
who lived from 1200-1253. If Longchenpa found the cities of his time busy “bonfires of desire,” 
one could barely guess what he might think if he saw New York. The full poem is available here: 
https://www.lotsawahouse.org/tibetan-masters/longchen-rabjam/enchanting-wildwoods 
65 Thich Nhat Hanh’s Love Letter to the Earth has been a consistent favorite among my students, 
whatever their major or religious orientation. I highly recommend it, along with many of his 
other books, rooted as they are in practice, in a way of life. 
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abstractions, by “higher” order processes that drive the “lower” processes onward, against 
whatever wisdom the “lower” processes may want to express. Meanwhile, the conditions of life 
need us to produce more healthy soil, air, water. But our thinking and knowing happens in 
degraded conditions and produces more degradation, however “indirectly”. The logician who 
may think his hands clean of this degradation, because he merely teaches logic and writes books 
on epistemology, lives in a state of denial, a refusal to see. Same with the scientist doing “pure” 
research. 
 
Our social ecology also exists in a degraded form. For one thing, “social ecology” will, for most 
thinkers, bring to mind human relations almost exclusively. Humans do their thinking without 
any attempt to think with other kinds of beings, even though other beings are our Elders when it 
comes to the history of thinking in this World we share and make together. But, as Paul Shepard 
has cogently suggested, non-human beings, especially wild beings, constitute human meaning, 
human thinking, human being, human activity—which in its wholeness is only designated 
“human” in relative terms. We are the thinking of the World, the thinking of Sacredness itself, 
the thinking of Wisdom, Love, and Beauty (which constitute the meaning of all our thinking). 
But we must allow—in the manner of an achievement, a consummation—we must allow those to 
be the powers that live themselves through us, as us. Even if we indulge this wrong-headed 
human exclusivity, we find that most social ecologies have all sorts of negative pressures on 
them. People work too hard, have too many commitments, have too much of a burden to 
“produce” whatever it is they produce (almost always, in one way or another, a commodity, 
something belonging to a brand—a fact that holds, in its own way, even in academia, as anyone 
seeking funding for a project, or tenure, or even a job knows all too well).  
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Somehow it seems we might be drawing near to this kind of sensibility, by means of our inquiry: 
The context of Others is the context of Wonder, the context even of Magic, the context of the 
Inconceivable. Why is it inconceivable? In part because it is whole already, and we are divided 
and dividing. There is something genuinely difficult to get at here, because it stands so far 
outside our experience, and we follow the method of experience. We can keep trying to at least 
realize an experience of the incoherence of, or even the deeper limits to our way of knowing, and 
draw near to a strangeness we may not yet be able to seriously and sensitively consider.  
 
We can admit to some degree that creativity and insight cannot be controlled, and they require 
that we throw out our clocks and our agendas—a truly horrifying thought from the perspective of 
the dominant culture, which only indicates how important it is, and how challenging it will prove 
if we want to sincerely inquire into it—to begin to more deeply practice it, for there is no other 
way to know it. Not only do we face the unseen indoctrinations of the culture that are meant to 
domesticate out of us any wild thinking, but the conservativity of so many social institutions 
(many of which functioning in vital support of the general agendas of the dominant culture—
despite any protests those in the institutions voice to the contrary) makes it extraordinarily 
challenging to invite, to allow genuine transformations to happen. They can only happen. We 
don’t manufacture them. Yet they arise in dependence on our practice. 
 
Admittedly, every culture must face the challenge of balancing conservative and revolutionary 
tendencies. Conservation of patterns is natural, because if we focus on pattern transcendence in a 
narrow way, we end up with mere chaos. Genuine pattern transcendence is the ceaseless 
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unfolding of the cosmos, but our “search” for “transcendence” tends to cut us off from this 
unfolding.  
 
Nevertheless, pattern maintenance, or the conservative forces of any culture, often operate out of 
fear, clinging, and attitudes of control. Therefore, creativity and insight have a history of arising 
in an interplay of liminality, which means creativity and insight happen at the edge, at a 
threshold, even in a deliberate leaving home, a seclusion from some aspects of the culture, a 
journey inward that often includes some concrete dimension, like hiding away in one’s home, or 
going into forest or desert, or finding solitude in a cottage closer to Nature (perhaps in the 
countryside or in mountains), or even entering into retreat at a monastery or other spiritual 
center. As far as the symptoms above—the symptoms that we listed in our inventory on human 
privilege and intellectual privilege, symptoms of a degradation of the context of philosophy, the 
context of thinking and knowing—we must emphasize that in the midst of the dominant culture, 
in the midst of its indoctrinations and its noise, we can at this point suggest that maybe, just 
maybe, we cannot really think, and in general we do not manifest a good mind, a good spirit 
(genuine eudaimonia). We will continue to bring this out in our inquiry, but by now we can at 
least feel more open to the suggestion that perhaps the soul itself, the psyche, might have become 
unwell in at least one or more subtle ways that remain inescapable as long as we stay in the 
dominant culture and its noise. When we consider examples like the saints and sages of old (and 
to some extent more modern examples, people like Thoreau or Miriam Lancewood), if we 
consider those who went into Nature and into retreat in order to heal the soul, to hear the soul, to 
see visions, to taste wisdom and love, to touch life and experience beauty, if we bring to mind 
especially the saints and sages, we may reflect on how much worse off we might be as we sit 
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around and try to “think” in our present context—as it continues to degrade. We are, most of us, 
trapped in contexts that have no solid track record for cultivating healing and holistic insight. 
Who thinks of the modern university as a place to get a job or take up a major that will heal 
one’s soul and produce a clarity of mind so wondrous that it goes altogether with peace, joy, and 
compassion? Who thinks of the modern university as the heart and soul of making healthy 
ecologies? Who thinks of universities as ecologies of bliss? Who thinks of universities as 
ecologies of serenity and wonder? We could call our inventory of human privilege a means of 
diagnosing a disorder of the soul, something like soul scurvy, or an anemia of the soul, or simply 
a degradation of the soul that goes altogether with the degradation of Nature we ourselves 
perpetuate in our activities at the university, and as participants in the dominant culture. 
 
A certain measure of resistance or rebellion thus comes with any sincere desire to heal our own 
soul and the soul of the world, because we must go against strong currents in the culture. James 
Hillman has some delightful reflections on this need to Resist and Renounce, as part of a critique 
of the deluded notions of endless “growth” one finds in the dominant culture—the idea that we 
will all keep “growing,” which we need to see in relation to the delusions of endless economic 
“growth”: 
Jung says individuation is becoming more and more oneself . . . And becoming 
more and more oneself—the actual experience of it is a shrinking, in that very 
often it’s a dehydration, a loss of inflations, a loss of illusions . . . shedding is a 
beautiful thing. It’s of course not what consumerism tells you, but shedding feels 
good. It’s a lightening up [we could say, enlightenment—n.k.] . . . Shedding 
pseudoskins, crusted stuff that you’ve accumulated. Shedding dead wood. That’s 
one of the big sheddings. Things that don’t work anymore, things that don’t keep 
you—keep you alive. Sets of ideas that you’ve had too long. People that you don’t 
really like to be with, habits of thought, habits of sexuality. That’s a very big one, 
’cause if you keep on making love at forty the way you did at eighteen you’re 
missing something, and if you make love at sixty the way you did at forty you’re 
missing something. All that changes. The imagination changes. Or put it another 
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way: Growth is always loss. Anytime you’re gonna grow, you’re gonna lose 
something. You’re losing what you’re hanging onto to keep safe. You’re losing 
habits that you’re comfortable with, you’re losing familiarity. That’s a big one, 
when you begin to move into the unfamiliar. You know, in the organic world 
when anything begins to grow it’s moving constantly into unfamiliar movements 
and unfamiliar things. (Hillman and Ventura, 1992: 8) 
 
We continue to move into the unfamiliar—with unfamiliar movements. We somehow have to 
lose and gain familiarity at the same time, for we must lose familiarity with the dominant culture 
in the same gesture of gaining familiarity with what we are, even as we realize what we are is not 
a “thing,” and so cannot be known as we try to know things in the habitual way (so, our old 
knowing becomes unfamiliar and a new knowing becomes increasingly intimate). And, if we 
want this movement into the unfamiliar to become vitalizing, our work becomes the cultivation 
of vitalizing ecologies of practice and realization. The more we do this, the more fruits of true 
genius we will produce. For this to happen, it seems many more of us—in some sense all of us—
need more unstructured time in Nature, more opportunities for seclusion and retreat, as well as 
the material support to be able to give ourselves in a sustainable way to spiritual practice. Proper 
thinking means throwing out the clock, the agenda, and all sorts of habits, reactions, and limiting 
notions, leaving us on “shaky tender” legs, to use Chögyam Trungpa’s characterization. Proper 
thinking demands unstructured time and a cultivated spaciousness, with proper material support 
for all citizens (a matter of ecology, not “economics”). And yet the culture finds every way 
possible to overload and distract us, and to increase economic inequality and perpetuate an 
unwise and unskillful distribution of resources so that spiritual life (and its concomitant original 
thinking) gets no priority.66 
                                                 
66 Thus Socrates asked for, but could not get, a free lunch from his culture. The Buddha managed 
to somehow presence a wisdom, love, and beauty that succeeded where Socrates failed, and a 
free lunch has long remained part of many Buddhist traditions in many cultures. However, as we 
all know, in U.S. culture, there is no free lunch, an expression of an inherent animosity to 
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Consider an example of the insanity of the dominant culture that may seem small at first: So-
called daylight savings time. What a bizarre symptom. Nature’s Rhythms be damned! We will 
put the civilized agenda on top of life, and ignore Life, ignore Nature. We will live unnaturally. 
We will live apart from Nature. We will send people to the hospital with heart attacks if we must. 
We have appointments to keep. We have extraction operations to manage. We have ad 
campaigns to run. Migrations? Cycles? Circles? Bah! Humbug!  
 
One of the problems we face in changing our way of knowing is that better ways of knowing go 
against the very tendency to have an agenda. In more limited terms: we don’t have time for 
spiritual practice, just as few had any real time to speak with Socrates. In general, the more we 
need spiritual practice, the more reasons we have for not practicing: Too tired . . . not today . . . 
maybe tomorrow . . . maybe a retreat next month . . . maybe if I didn’t have so many errands . . . 
it’s not my fault that I had to take that extra shift, and then I had to go to the doctor, and . . . . 
 
We don’t see the collusion, the way we and the pattern of insanity work together to keep us busy. 
If we had leisure time, we might see the pattern of insanity for what it is, and we would “have 
time” to disrupt it. As it stands, we have so many things to do. We need to stop doing. The clock 
                                                 
spirituality. The Regan era defunding of the University of California system, arguably one of the 
finest university systems in the world prior to his intervention, indicates there is no free lunch for 
anyone in academia, and thus the corporatization of the university and the funding 
gamesmanship that pervades, and despoils in various ways, all of the activity in higher 
education. There should be a free lunch for everyone—or so it should feel, based on proper 
organization, proper attunement of Nature-Culture. 
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encourages a doing orientation to life, and thus it limits our ways of knowing. How could we 
ever think we can do life? 
 
Zhuangzi, one of the great sages of non-doing, writes of a massive bird who can fly 90,000 li—
roughly 40,000 miles: 
The cicada and the little dove laugh at this, saying, “When we make an effort and 
fly up, we can get as far as the elm or the sapanwood tree, but sometimes we 
don’t make it and just fall down on the ground. Now how is anyone going to go 
ninety thousand li to the south!” 
 
If you go off to the green woods nearby, you can take along food for three meals 
and come back with your stomach as full as ever. If you are going a hundred li, 
you must grind your grain the night before; and if you are going a thousand li, you 
must start getting the provisions together three months in advance. What do these 
two creatures understand? Little understanding cannot come up to great 
understanding; the short-lived cannot come up to the long-lived. 
 
How do I know this is so? The morning mushroom knows nothing of twilight and 
dawn; the summer cicada knows nothing of spring and autumn. They are the 
short-lived. South of Ch’u there is a caterpillar which counts five hundred years as 
one spring and five hundred years as one autumn. Long, long ago there was a 
great rose of Sharon that counted eight thousand years as one spring and eight 
thousand years as one autumn. They are the long-lived. Yet P’eng-tsu alone is 
famous today for having lived a long time, and everybody tries to ape him. Isn’t it 
pitiful! 
 
The clock takes away the possibility for experiences that might appear laughable from within the 
confines of our scheduled lives and their many pressures. The clock takes our orientation and 
ordering out of the living world, placing it into human agendas that grope in every direction, 
conscious purposes that justify any means and ignore any unpleasant side-effects, cravings on the 
march, throughout the day and night, with no interruption, always at war with something, even 
ourselves. The clock invites invasion, makes space for the colonization of the Soul by the pattern 
of insanity. The clock is a mandala of madness—not the divine madness inherent in sacred 
sanity, but madness in the pejorative sense, one in which beliefs assert themselves against reality, 
256 
 
dualistic delusions make an assault against the union of opposites that characterizes what we may 
poetically refer to as the sacred-creative ordering of life, the sacred-creative necessities and 
potentials of Nature.  
 
We can at least entertain the possibility that the clock cuts us off from life, from each other, as 
Plato showed it cutting people off from wisdom.  
 
The clock cuts us off from the moment. Time, as lived, is moment—not a line, not a “moving” 
“thing”. Time is existence, momentary and open. The clock pushes for closure against the 
openness. Openness swallows all attempts at closure. That is why the ego fears it, fears the 
openness we are. 
 
The clock presents an argument, an analysis, a conceptual manner of relating, placing a grid over 
experience. Life relates only in living ways, beyond minutes and hours yet danced in rhythms, 
beyond words and ideas yet expressed as an inherent meaningfulness, a play of meanings. 
 
Perhaps we got hoodwinked into thinking there is something scientific about time, or perhaps 
science got hoodwinked into thinking there is something scientific about time, even though time 
as we know it in the west seems inextricably bound with commerce and conquest. Sadly, we 
rarely try to get in touch with rhythms we might sense in ourselves, in relation to Nature. But 
even if we did, we might not know how to look, since we would have to rebel against intense 
contemporary pressures as well as centuries of social-psychological-political-economic inertia 
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that has become busy-mindless habit. Writing about the anthropology of time, Dinwoodie (2006) 
gives an overview of the development of the western notion of time: 
Curiously, those who search for time in knowledge of nature tend to see 
nature in the time of clocks and watches, and if we read their work closely they 
tend to use some version of clock time as their model for “real time.” This is 
particularly surprising when we consider that Western time concepts as expressed 
on clocks and watches developed not as results of increasing sensitivity to nature 
as such, nor in a milieu of “neutral and inevitable technological change,” but as 
expressions of “the most far reaching [socio-cultural] conflict” (Thompson 
1967:93–94). During the Middle Ages the church bell provided the standard 
indicator of social rhythm. In the heart of medieval European society, work 
rhythms and in fact all other rhythms of life were subordinated to the cycles of 
aggregation to worship marked by town bells. On the one hand, the bells indicated 
the rhythms of activity, and on the other, they served as reminders of the 
predominance of the Church in the matter of religion and polity, understood as a 
single undifferentiated sphere of life. 
With the rise in significance of markets and industry came the need for 
new forms of “time” better suited to measuring the value of the work of 
individuals. In other words, labor, a category of abstract, commodified, social 
activity that could be bought and sold by analogy to gold, could not be 
instantiated without a new form of “time.” Clocks with circular dials 
metaphorically representing “the rhythms of social life” in terms of an infinite 
sequence of equal spaces, every one of equal value, made it possible for work to 
be measured as a summation of activity units. And with this a new form of time 
was born. The “problem of the duration of the working day was especially acute 
in the textile sector,” writes Jacques LeGoff; “where cloth does not occupy a 
dominant position, we do not observe the appearance of the Werkglocke” 
(1980:46). LeGoff continues: “in the cloth manufacturing cities” of the fourteenth 
century, “the town was burdened with a new time, the time of the cloth makers. 
This time indicated the dominance of a social category. It was the time of the new 
masters” (1980:46). 
The “time” of these new capitalists spread relatively quickly. Initially 
clocks were situated in factories, behind closed doors. They were used to 
demarcate periods of active labor and to place values on the contributions of 
workers. Only factory owners and their direct representatives had access to the 
clocks. Workers began to worry that the owners would slow the factory clocks in 
order to get more labor than they were paying for. Workers had no way of 
independently evaluating whether they were being treated fairly. What they 
needed were clocks of their own. Thus a market demand emerged for cheap 
portable clocks. 
Up until that time watches had been expensive and unreliable. They had 
been curiosities of the rich. With the interests of workers in mind, however, 
watchmakers began to produce more accurate and affordable timepieces. As 
workers began to acquire these watches and exert some control over the 
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conditions of their servitude they also began to acquire “time” in another sense: 
they began to accept the time of the workplace as the standard for the measure of 
activities more generally. By the middle of the eighteenth century the clock had 
penetrated to the realm of personal regime. Thompson cites Laurence Sterne’s 
novel Tristam Shandy (1759–67) as evidence. Tristam’s  
 
father—one of the most regular men in everything he did . . . that 
ever lived—had made it a rule for many years of his life,—on the 
first Sunday night of every month . . . to wind up a large house 
clock, which we had standing on the back-stairs head. He had 
likewise gradually brought some other little family concernments 
to the same period, and this enabled Tristam to date his conception 
very exactly. [1967:57] 
 
And so the new time penetrates, if you will pardon the expression, the domestic 
sphere. 
Time management of the capitalistic variety was also extended into 
schools and even into religion. As Thompson again observes, the “very name of 
‘the Methodists’ emphasizes this husbandry of time,” (1967:88).  Though the 
Church resisted, the “time” of capitalists began to challenge the “time” of the 
Church, and clocks began to replace bells in town squares. Sundays, the period of 
highest intensity of societal participation, began to be subsumed within 
“weekends,” periods of ritualized leisure, that is, periods of liminal reversal 
within the market system. 
At this point the “time” of the textile industry had succeeded in 
supplanting other “times” so well that we have difficulty registering the fact that 
fairly recently there had been other idioms of temporality. Church bells in fact 
once represented the standard measure of temporality, though they do not, 
obviously, represent “time” as we have come to know it.  
The matter is further compounded by the widespread use of celestial and 
other “natural” rhythms to stand above and lend credence to our social rhythms. 
Obviously, many temporalities underlie the workings of the natural world, and 
these all underlie the workings of the social world. In this sense time is certainly 
inherent in celestial rhythms. Upon reflecting on the situation, however, most 
would agree that these natural rhythms are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for interpreting the “times” used to measure social rhythms within specific social 
groups. When a natural rhythm happens to be used to mark an important social 
juncture, it does not do so naturally; it does so because people resolve to use it 
accordingly. And doing so requires resolving who chooses which rhythm. To 
understand the social workings of such a rhythm we have to consider who made 
the decisions and how. In our everyday lives, however, it is normal for us to 
simplify the matter and to literally accept the metaphors implicit in time 
representations. We confuse the use of natural rhythms as higher order 
metapragmatic symbols of social rhythms with natural rhythms as such. 
In summary, the basic problematic of the anthropology of time dates back 
to Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1916). What we generally 
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refer to as time, the standard time of the West, goes back to the industrial age. It 
represents a culturally and historically specific temporal system, and it serves 
poorly as a model for temporalities. Thus in the anthropology of time it is 
conventional to distinguish between time as the dominant form of representation 
of social rhythms in the West and temporality as social rhythms and their 
representation in general. With this in mind, it would be extraordinary for a non-
Western society to have “time” as we know it prior to its contact with Europeans. 
After all, “time as we know it,” is effectively a variety of European temporality. 
No one familiar with the anthropology of time would misinterpret such a 
statement with the claim that the so-and-so have no temporal concepts. (334-6) 
 
The west, in other words, has a remarkably weird notion of time, a notion that seems mechanical 
and monetary. We might call it industrialized time, or time 2.0, or manufactured time (and, given 
that it long predates modern science—Galileo wasn’t born until 1564—we might think of our 
science as industrialized or manufactured and economized from the outset). Granted, there are 
lots of ways to practice and realize temporality. Indeed, that’s part of the point here: On what 
basis will we practice and realize the experience of time, the experience of moment? We can 
admit that a certain kind of “knowledge” appears when we deal with clocks. But what is that 
knowledge really worth? What does it do for us? And do we thereby marginalize other sorts of 
experience? This is not some sort of post-modern critique of science. It is not to say our form of 
science is “merely” “political” or “economic” or something like that. We can surely begin to 
sense the interwovenness of science, politics, economics, and more. Science emerges from 
Nature-Culture. But, we can set as a standard for science its capacity to put us in attunement with 
Nature, its capacity to make Nature and Experience more luminous. We may find our current 
science lacking there, and only our imagination limits the possibilities of co-discover-creating 
something more vitalizing. Thankfully, we can turn to may spiritual traditions for inspiration, 
including the many traditions of Turtle Island. As Dinwoodie puts it, 
In pursuing the experience of temporality, we might ask what contribution 
Native American studies can make. The backdrop to the ethnography of Native 
North America, Edward Sapir once suggested, is the “extreme psychological 
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distance between the aboriginal American cultures and the kind of life they are 
expected to live today” (Darnell 1990:303). Thus viewed, Native North America 
offers up the experience of temporal spectra, traditional and modern, in a way that 
no other ethnographic area does. After all, to generalize grossly, what 
distinguishes Native North America among all ethnographic areas is the 
contiguity and sometimes confluence of practices hypermodern, archaic, and 
everything in between. This approach, the exploration of temporal spectra as 
epitomized in the experiences of representative Native Americans, would not be 
entirely new. A start was made in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly in the life-
history work supervised by Edward Sapir and John Dollard. It has also been 
developed implicitly in actor-centered anthropology (Basso 1990, 1996; Fogelson 
1974, 1984, 1989; Hallowell 1955) and in Native American literature (Erdrich 
1984; Momaday 1968; Silko 1977; Welch 1979). 
For reasons that I do not fully understand, however, North America 
continues to be primarily associated in the general literature not with anything as 
interesting or palpable as the experience and management of temporalities but 
with a retrograde version of the question of whether time is relative. Stated 
simply, this question reads: Do the Hopi have “time” (Black 1959; Gell 1992; 
Malotki 1983; Munn 1992)? In order to show how an undue emphasis on this 
approach has impoverished not only Native American studies but also the 
anthropology of time, I will discuss a recent incarnation of this debate and 
compare the sort of material on which it is based to the evidence on temporality 
from one revisited life history. Rather than closing the book on Native American 
time, so to speak, I hope to show that we have only begun to learn about the 
Native American experience of temporality and that a genuine understanding of 
Native American temporality has the potential to reinvigorate Native American 
studies and the anthropology of time more generally. (327-8)67 
 
Other cultures have a sense of temporality. But for us to think they have western “time” seems 
presumptuous, as does the assumption that they cannot experience timelessness. What their 
experience might be, of time or timelessness (or their interrelation) . . . that we would have to 
practice in order to realize. The “management of temporalities” itself sounds like a notion from 
conquest consciousness, but western cultures are not the only ones to fall prey to conscious 
purposes and attempts at conscious control. The question in part comes to how leaving the clock 
                                                 
67 The work of Calvin Luther Martin would be illuminating here, and in a more comprehensive 
inquiry we would consider some additional artefacts here and elsewhere. This caveat holds in a 
general way, for the present inquiry is far from comprehensive enough, but, to say it again, the 
image of the inquiry does have enough support to come through. 
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might go altogether with leaving conquest consciousness, and how the clock and conscious 
purpose may reinforce one another. 
 
Leaving the clock, we enter the moment. Renouncing the agenda, we receive our purpose. 
Forgetting the deadening hours and workdays, we remember the aliveness and aloveness of a 
working World, a functioning World in which we fulfill our function. 
 
Must we not rebel against civilized time? Does it not seem we must mutiny against Captain 
Clock and his constant colonial raiding of the soul and the living world? Captain Clock and his 
conquest of life must end.  
 
Surely we have places to be! Surely we will still need to go to the doctor at such-and-such an 
hour. But only by means of placelessness and timelessness (atopos and atempos) can we arrive at 
our place in life, and only by such means can we arrive at any appointed place or time, to do the 
work of life. 
 
LoveWisdom means discernment—the realization of the difference between the encumbered and 
the unencumbered. Captain Clock weighs upon the heart and soul, cracks his whip at mind and 
body: Stroke! Stroke! Stroke! He whips us to carry his artificial ship onward.  
 
To carry life forward, to realize life, we need to leave the clock and enter the moment. Entering 
the moment, we can make plans when needed. Living the moment, presencing what we might 
call the being-moment (existence as a moment, moment as living experience), does not mean 
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living for “the moment,” which just means another kind of agenda, one of impulse and hedonic 
medication.68 
 
Again and again, Socrates Shows us: Sophia demands we throw out the clock; wisdom-love-
beauty will not abide by our agendas, our notions of time, our stuckness in the past and the 
future. Again and again, Socrates gives himself to the moment, gifts himself to life, gifts himself 
to, with, through, as intimacy, with no fear of temporal pressures that “civilization” uses to 
control us, to tame us, to make us more stupid and stuck. Even on his way to his own indictment, 
on charges that carry the threat of the death penalty, Socrates stops to speak with Euthyphro, who 
seems nothing more than a bonehead, and yet Socrates seems willing to keep the inquiry going, 
with a heart wide open to Euthyphro’s capacity for insight. But Euthyphro will not allow his 
foolish agenda to get interrupted by anything, including insight, and he tells Socrates he has no 
more time to contemplate righteousness, holiness, sacredness, and service to the divine. He must 
hurry off to have his own father killed. 
 
Do we think we have no time for Wisdom, Love, and Beauty? Do we think we have no time to 
stop the pattern of insanity that has us in its grips, that we must hurry off to do the things that 
make our families sick, that make species extinct, that make a handful of people “wealthy”? Who 
has time for a book like this? Who has time for the soul, for the sacred, for dispelling the pattern 
of insanity? 
                                                 
68 With the term being-moment I have in mind Dogen’s essay Uji, 有時 We could call the essay 
“ExistenceMoment,” or “BeingMoment,” or “MomentBeing,” perhaps even 
“HappeningMoment” or “BeingOpportunity,” or even (in light of Dogen’s essay on the Nature of 
Awakeness), “YesMoment”.  
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The clock, so essential to our context, helps constitute the system of closure and clinging, the 
systemic sickness that has us, that drives us. The clock moves and manipulates us, and by means 
of the clock we carry the intellectualist and maybe also the psychologist’s fallacy into time. We 
thereby miss the circulation of life. The heart has an inherent variability, as the literature on heart 
rate variability shows. For instance, Kirby et al. (2017) note that compassion practice is, 
“connected to activity of the vagus nerve and corresponding adaptive heart rate variability 
(HRV). HRV is an important physiological marker for overall health, and the body–mind 
connection. Therefore, there is significant value of training compassion to increase HRV and 
training HRV to facilitate compassion” (1). Other studies have found positive changes in HRV as 
a result of meditation practice, for instance in relation to a 10-day meditation retreat (Krygier et 
al. 2013). 
 
Natural cycles are life. The clock is the noisiest order, while the heart desires the silent noise of 
life. The silent noise of life helps us to see the need for non-local ways of knowing. 
 
Researchers have produced evidence suggesting a potentially integral linkage between mind and 
something called pink noise (also known as 1/f ᵝ type noise, or 1/f scaling). The literature on this 
is sometimes technical, but we don’t need the technicalities here. We can rely on Dotov et al. to 
give us what we need to make our way. They cite work by van Orden et al. (2003) and Holden et 
al. (2009) that supports the hypothesis that: 
1/f ᵝ noise found in an inventory of cognitive tasks is a signature of a softly 
assembled system exhibiting and sustained by interaction-dominant dynamics, 
and not component-dominant dynamics. In component-dominant dynamics, 
behavior is the product of a rigidly delineated architecture of modules, each with 
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pre-determined functions; in interaction-dominant dynamics, on the other hand, 
coordinated processes alter one another’s dynamics, with complex interactions 
extending to the body’s periphery and, sometimes, beyond. (3) 
 
Even this sounds highly technical. We see a contrast: interaction-dominant versus component-
dominant. A clock is made of components. The universe is like a clock. Humans can be 
manipulated like clockwork. If there are components, there are atomized parts and pieces, 
isolated individuals. Components means something “functional” in a rationalistic sense, as in, 
“Are we using our resources rationally?” (as opposed to, “Are we using our resources 
relationally?”)  
 
What is this rationality that burns the candle of the soul at both ends? Why do we feel tired? 
Why are we so busy? Why can our workaday world reach us at any hour? Why can we stay up 
all night and binge-watch distracting nonsense, taking in endless streams of entertaining noise? 
Maybe we have a component-dominant vision of ourselves and the world, which goes altogether 
with a component-dominant vision of time. Maybe all of this goes together with a vision of lack, 
of competitiveness, a need to defend a certain territory, a feeling of disconnection, a loss of 
meaning. 
 
What if time is relation? Not a “thing” “in which” objects move and interact (i.e., “things” 
“unfold” “in time,” and other conceptions), but being itself—our being-together.  
 
Interaction-dominant dynamics should mean something like relationality. The meaning of 
“interaction” and “dynamics” transforms the sense. We cannot mean “isolated parts interacting.” 
We mean relationality-dynamism or relational-dynamism. It is the whole-working. Each moment 
265 
 
is whole-working. Each moment presences the circulation of life, as if we are all integrated as a 
single body, an interwoven openness, luminous and knowing.  
 
We can, conceptually, distinguish “bare physical interactions” on the one hand, and the relational 
dance of mind, the interwoven symphony of the soul on the other (we could refer here to 
“cognitive systems,” or something like that—but we should mean Mind, Life, Ecology, Mutual 
Illumination, Mutual Arising, a Total Altogetherness . . . capitalized words to help us remember 
that they need to have new meanings, not the ones we got used to).  
 
Once we recognize or at least entertain the possibility of relational-dynamism, we may see that 
we can draw no strict boundaries, including any strict boundary of where thinking “takes place,” 
where mind arises. In such visioning, mind (more properly, heart-mind-body-world-cosmos) has 
to do with relationality, and we see mind as nonlocal, even if we may discern patterning or 
functioning asymmetrically organized around this or that “organism”. In such visioning, we may 
sense how the clock that comes altogether with borders and barriers must make us unwell or 
even insane. We may sense how “localizing” minds, bodies, and times does not mean finding our 
place, but becoming unrooted. We cannot enter the moment with gestures of “localization” in the 
sense implied by the clock. If we let ourselves become cogs in the machinery of civilized 
insanity, we lose the relations of the soul. We no longer relate to life and to each other. We no 
longer dance—as the dance. Instead, we “interact”. 
 
With this notion of relational-dynamism we can construct an operational indicator for detecting 
the presence of mind, or, more technically speaking, a “cognitive system” with certain 
266 
 
“facultative characteristics” which we can measure in clearly defined ways (all of this apparent 
precision, this kind of “scientific” language, as of now, largely expresses the pattern of insanity). 
Specifically: If we want to know if a particular system is cognitive, if we want to know if we 
stand in the presence of mind (so to speak), we can look for pink noise. If we have a genuinely 
cognitive system, it should exhibit pink noise, and we may find it unlikely that a system would 
exhibit pink noise if it were not a genuinely cognitive system—assuming we can differentiate 
these cases. 
 
We should note that the matter is not as neat as we might like it. As van Orden et al. note in 
another article (2005): 
Criticality, as in self-organized criticality, predicts emergent 1/f scaling or pink 
noise, which should be widely observed in human performance. Pink noise is 
widely observed in human performance. Does the inverse of this deduction hold 
true? Does the presence of pink noise strictly imply self-organization? No. As 
stated in our original article, “Ubiquitous pink noise is not sufficient evidence for 
self-organized criticality; it is simply a necessary consequence” (Van 
Orden et al., 2003, p. 343). (121) 
 
These researchers seem to think pink noise appears as a “signature” of cognitive systems, in that 
it arises as a “necessary consequence” of the functioning of such systems. But they give us a 
clear caveat that the presence of pink noise alone does not mean we have a cognitive system on 
our hands (something else could present the same signature). However, if we set up the 
laboratory conditions properly, the emergence of pink noise may make a compelling case for the 
self-organization of a cognitive system that includes elements from outside the constitutional 
boundary of the organism—e.g. beyond the skin—and this would demonstrate the relationality of 
mind. Dotov et. al sought to do exactly this, to show the beyond-the-skin nature of mind. We 
have of course contemplated this notion in various ways, but here we do it in the supposedly 
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precise terms of an operationalized science that isolates variables and measures them with 
alleged rigor. We can use the gold standard of the old epistemology to raise challenges to our 
assumptions, and even to record “data” that must be clearly anomalous with respect to that very 
epistemology, as in the case of Puthoff and Targ’s 1976 documentation of, as they put it, “A 
Perceptual Charnel for Information Transfer over Kilometer Distances,” by which they meant a 
signal not sent by any means that fits in our current paradigm. In other words, they ran a 
scientific experiment to demonstrate so-called extra-sensory perception (ESP), which we only 
refer to as “supernatural” because of our own assumptions about “nature,” not because of 
anything we can claim to truly “know” “about” “nature”. Consider the words of the journal’s 
editor with respect to this publication, comments which probably seemed necessary given the 
prestige of the journal as a “scientific” publication: 
In a series of experiments carried out at Stanford Research Institute, both 
experienced subjects and inexperienced volunteers were able to describe scenes 
being viewed at unknown remote locations by other members of the experimental 
team-sometimes with great accuracy, and always under carefully designed 
experimental protocol. The possible existence of such an ESP channel is 
significant to electrical engineers, who have the background and knowledge 
to exploit statistically described channels through the principles of 
communication and information theory. The great potential importance of this 
work, should it be substantiated by replication and further research, weighed 
heavily in the carefully considered decision to publish this paper in the 
PROCEEDINGS. We realize that many of our readers will think this an ill-
considered decision, as did one of the engineers we consulted who said, “This is 
the kind of thing that I would not believe in even if it existed.” However, it is our 
opinion that the majority of electrical engineers believe that the investigation of 
ESP is a legitimate scientific undertaking, regardless of their belief in its ultimate 
existence. Furthermore, we believe that the authors have been careful and sincere 
in the design and reporting of this experiment. Their work deserves scientific 
consideration and objective criticism. We would encourage others to repeat these 
experiments and to report their results, whether they be positive or negative. 
We would also welcome critiques of the experiment itself. In any event, the paper 
itself may be the most readable ever published in this journal, and few readers 
will finish without wondering for at least a moment if indeed ESP might be 
possible after all. What a difference it would make to us all! (191) 
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Indeed, what a difference it would make—if we used such anomalous data to think ourselves into 
a paradigm shift in our way of knowing, which not only this but many experiments support. 
However, given the skin as “the one authentic criterion of the universe,” most of us, consciously 
or not, would side with the engineer—surely a devoutly scientific person—who said, “This is the 
kind of thing that I would not believe in even if it existed.” We may as well say, “I would not 
practice another way of knowing even if one can know things by means of it—perhaps essential, 
life-changing, life-saving things.” So, in the end, it perhaps does little, for a good number of us, 
to consider strange phenomena, no matter how well-documented. The skin bag has us trapped. 
 
But, we may find a little bit of wonder in us . . . What if? What might a non-local Cosmos, the 
one our own sciences (e.g. quantum physics and ecology) tell us we have, what would such a 
Cosmos be like? After all, we must ask, since we live in the world we practice, and we do not 
practice a non-local world—except in the sense of the great fallacy of context. Maybe we can 
begin to hear pink music if we listen quietly. 
 
We should note that, from a certain view, pink noise makes a lot of sense as a signature of 
cognitive systems, a signature of mind. A gentle noise emerges with mind. Why? Because life 
involves precariousness. Loosely speaking, mind arises in the midst of precariousness. Mind 
arises as a moment, a fleeting moment that shines and then shifts, perhaps discontinuously, 
“into” another moment, almost as if each moment, with its own completeness (a completeness 
without closure), its own perfection, simply vanishes, and another moment arises, as a now that 
contains in its perfection anything we could skillfully call past or future.  
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Life unfolds as ceaseless “flow,” ceaseless practice, ceaseless realization. We call these 
realizations events or happenings. They presence endless nuances, inversions, insights, shifts, 
transitions, transformations, perturbations, and surprise. The “flow” is the dynamism of wonder, 
not a “thing” that “flows” or a “flowing” “thing”.   
 
In this flowing, what we call organisms must actively maintain their identity in the midst of the 
precariousness, the relational-dynamism of life, and this requires responsive, adaptive activity.69 
When we actively engage our lives, which means the PracticeRealization of what we will come 
to call an EcoSensual Awareness (the term will emerge as a term a bit later), a living relational-
dynamism with ecologies of PracticeRealization (what we would call, in a limited way, 
“interaction” “between” “organism” and “environment”), we must adaptively respond to flowing 
of happenings we thereby co-discover-create. If we reacted randomly, the signature of our 
activity would presence white noise. If we reacted in repetitive, rigid, or formulaic ways, the 
signature of our activity would presence linearity in one way or another—something like 
clockwork, something Cartesian, controlled, controllable, domesticated, monetized. Pink noise is 
nonlinear: Neither random nor linear, it suggests an engaged, adaptive responsiveness in the 
midst of the precariousness, what we might call the fundamental groundlessness of life (there is 
ultimately nothing to stand on, since its relationality all the way down, and we find no 
                                                 
69 As a virtue, let us see basic responsiveness in the midst of the precariousness of life as a 
hallmark of mind and of wisdom. Wisdom in the spiritual sense means the PracticeRealization of 
our responsiveness, which arises in the midst of our functioning, our living interrelatedness, our 
relations (kin), and our “ontological responsibility” to realize ourselves in, through, as this total 
dynamism. We must keep discovering and creating better ways of expressing it. We must 
experience it, live it, first and foremost. And this marks the philosophical or spiritual virtue of 
responsiveness: The aliveness and aloveness of life, as ourselves presencing the mystery 
moment-to-moment, for the sake of all beings (whether “near” of “far”). This is a virtue of life, 
to which human beings attune themselves and thus express their natural virtue. 
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substances, no selves, no inner, no outer). It’s just the kind of thing we might want to look for in 
order to identify cognitive systems. 
 
After mentioning the work of Puthoff and Targ, it might seem all the more dry to consider the 
work of Dotov et al., but let us briefly describe the experiment. They set up a simple computer 
task. The task involved the manipulation of a computer mouse to play a simple game displayed 
on the computer screen. The computer game was specifically designed as a kind of transposition 
of the task of balancing a pole in one’s palm. The mouse was designed to function as a normal 
computer mouse would, but at a random time the mouse would appear to function improperly. A 
basic hypothesis tested by the experiment is that an interaction-dominant system will emerge as 
the tool (in this case the mouse) becomes integrated into the “cognitive system” and functions 
transparently, the way our fingers function transparently until they get a cramp, and we have to 
look at them as if they were separate from us. Fully integrated, fingers function from the heart, in 
the way a pianist might simply play from the heart, not “with their fingers.” We should find this 
altogether with the emergence of pink noise, which the experimenters measured with a motion 
sensor near the interface of the human and the computer—and indeed the experimenters found 
this. As the participants used the mouse in its normal functioning, pink noise emerged, and when 
the mouse appeared to malfunction, the tool became cut off from the larger system of mind, and 
the pink noise dropped away. The results of the experiment, we could say, confirm the 
hypothesis that mind possesses nonlocal and impermanent characteristics, detectable as sense-
making nonlinearity.  
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We can see a separation of the constitutional boundary of the organism from that of the computer 
system. But the findings support a reading of the experimental happening as the enactment of 
mind in, through, as the “incorporation” of the computer system. Strictly speaking, mind means 
relationship, relational-dynamism (not a thing, but dynamic relational openness) constituted by 
the computer system and the human organism (and, we must go beyond this too, to speak of 
widening circles, horizons of ecology). It is fleeting but ordered, self-organized and precarious. 
As events trigger the breakdown of the transparency of the “tool,” the impermanent mind, the 
precarious cognitive system dissipates, and mind shifts. This all feels much more boring and dry, 
and perhaps much less challenging, than trying to study mind as it emerges in, through, as tango 
dancers embracing each other and co-discover-creating the dance, or as philosophers embracing 
Sophia in mutuality, embracing Nature in mutuality, embracing sentient beings and sentient 
being in mutuality and co-discover-creating ecologies of practice-realization, ecologies of 
wonder and bliss, ecologies of insight and inspiration. That is the sort of mind we need to know. 
The “scientific” instruments of scanners and other devices that cost us millions upon millions of 
dollars in aggregate, and which constitute an incredible intervention into the natural world for 
their construction and use, may not be the best tools for the job just now, even though we rushed 
to build them and push to use them, in our hurried schedules. We may like them, we may even be 
addicted to them, but they come from our agendas, not from the demands of Nature, the real 
demands of our present context. In the race to get “universally” “valid” “knowledge,” we make 
the fundamental error. 
 
This experiment leads us to ask, What is mind when we incorporate devices like computers? 
What is mind when we incorporate things like fMRI scanners, particle accelerators, microwave 
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ovens, grocery stores, stock portfolios, and so on? We can also ask the question that may go 
together with those questions: What is mind when we incorporate clocks, the clocks outside of 
our skin, and also outside of the soul, so to speak, outside of the rhythms of Nature? What is 
mind, what has mind become, what do we turn mind into as we change the time of day, based not 
on the living World, not on the sacred sun, not on the Mind of Nature, but on the basis of 
conscious human purposes? What are we when we incorporate “time,” rather than incorporating 
rhythm, synchronicity (including the nonlocal and atemporal), and the dance of life? What are 
we when we cut ourselves off from life, from Nature, from living beings (including wild beings), 
from each other, from ourselves, from relational-dynamism?  
 
If you need to take a nap now, will you? If you need to have a breakdown now, will you? If you 
need to call your mother now, if you need to call a friend, if you need to walk in the forest, if you 
need to sit in silence or rest in the sun, will you? Are we cut off from our own heart-mind-body-
world-cosmos? Does the clock cut into the soul?  
 
Does the divine wear a wristwatch? Does Sophia care about daylight savings time? Does Sophia 
care about school calendars and shareholder meetings? Does Sophia care how much the U.S. will 
spend on its next presidential election, or how long it will run?  
 
And . . . How easy would it be to suddenly sense the manipulations, to suddenly sense the false 
transparency of the clockwork world we have constructed? To sense the confection? To sense 
our addiction to its seeming sweetness? 
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Recall again the Dalai Lama’s comments in his book, The Universe in a Single Atom. Here is a 
condensed version: 
After having talked to numerous scientist friends over the years, I have the 
conviction that the great discoveries in physics going back as far as Copernicus 
give rise to the insight that reality is not as it appears to us. When one puts the 
world under a serious lens of investigation—be it the scientific method and 
experiment or the Buddhist logic of emptiness or the contemplative method of 
meditative analysis—one finds things are more subtle than, and in some cases 
even contradict, the assumptions of our ordinary common-sense view of the 
world. 
 
One may ask, apart from misrepresenting reality, what is wrong with believing in 
the independent, intrinsic existence of things? For Nagarjuna [a revered Buddhist 
philosopher], this belief has serious negative consequences. Nagarjuna argues that 
it is the belief in intrinsic existence that sustains the basis for a self-perpetuating 
dysfunction in our engagement with the world and with our fellow human beings. 
By according intrinsic properties of attractiveness, we react to certain objects and 
events with deluded attachment, while towards others, to which we accord 
intrinsic properties of unattractiveness, we react with deluded aversion. 
 
In other words, Nagarjuna argues that grasping at the independent existence of 
things leads to affliction, which in turn gives rise to a chain of destructive actions, 
reactions and suffering. In the final analysis, for Nagarjuna, the theory of 
emptiness is not a question of the mere conceptual understanding of reality. It has 
profound psychological and ethical implications. 
 
Grasping at an independent existence . . . this means grasping in direct contradiction to the 
Nature of mind, which is inherently relational, interwoven. To grasp in contradiction to our own 
Nature . . . does that not seem the essence of ignorance? And don’t we grasp in time? Don’t we 
even grasp after time? 
 
This independent existence of things goes altogether with time and with our delusions. Of all the 
forms of delusion and self-deception, the subject-object duality seems most difficult to dispel. 
Nietzsche wondered if the truth could ever be incorporated—Can we really grok the truth of 
reality and live in attunement with it? Or will we keep trying to satisfy ourselves with attunement 
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to our agendas? We might deduce some aspects of reality, as Nietzsche did, and as contemporary 
science does too—and on this the scientists and many saints and sages agree: Inquiring with care, 
we find no isolated, fixed entities, but rather flux, impermanence, surprise (really, Wonder), 
discontinuity, nonlocality, interwovenness. Plenty of scientists might think we must ultimately 
see our individuation as highly relative and, from some perspective, delusory. Not only Einstein 
in his famous letter, but many other scientists might see things this way. Einstein’s thoughts have 
become fairly well-known, but worth reviewing here: 
February 12, 1950 
 
Dear Mr. Marcus: 
 
A human being is a part of the whole, called by us “Universe”, a part limited in 
time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something 
separated from the rest — a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. The 
striving to free oneself from this delusion is the one issue of true religion. Not to 
nourish the delusion but to try to overcome it is the way to reach the attainable 
measure of peace of mind. 
 
With my best wishes,  
sincerely yours,  
 
Albert Einstein.70 
 
Mr. Marcus’s son had died, and he sought counsel from the great scientist. Perhaps ordinary 
philosophers and spiritual figures had failed him. In any case, we can sense here the living 
LoveWisdom dimension at work: Seeing through or cutting through our supposed limitedness 
often gets framed as a Great Liberation, a Great Peace.  
 
At the same time, we need to admit that we fear the profound unknown of such an insight, since 
it would seem to dissolve us into nothingness, perhaps by dissolving us into everything. We thus 
                                                 
70 http://www.lettersofnote.com/2011/11/delusion.html  
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experience self-doubt about what we are—and we may even feel comfort in the defacto taboo 
against knowing who we are, what we are.  
 
What are we outside of time, outside of schedules, aims, agendas, career goals, political parties, 
and all the rest? We cling to our self and all the coordinates that define it, and we fear any 
loosening of our grip or leaving the Cartesian coordinate system and the clocks that keep the “I 
think” running about. The ego will only be pried from our cold, dead hands, one might guess.  
 
And yet spiritual practice can occasion the “Great Death” that marks the soul’s Birth, the insight 
by which we let go of this optical delusion of consciousness. We must stress again and again the 
seeming impossibility or inconceivability of this kind of insight, which happens not by means of 
any drug or blunt force. We have to see the total relationality of ourselves, and this terrifies us 
since we think it will turn us into nothingness, and maybe make us let go of our cravings, habits, 
and so on. Who wants liberation if it means giving up pumpkin spice lattes or Chicken 
McNuggets—or maybe giving up reading so much academic philosophy? Who wants an 
unknown Joy when we have the known suffering?  
 
Ironically, if we can confront this terror and get through it, life becomes more beautiful, more 
Wondrous than all our cravings, all our beliefs about what we need to be happy—at least this is 
what so many philosophical/spiritual traditions assure us (why would all these people lie?). This 
terror exceeds the terror of most of the examples we find in the scholarly literature on so-called 
“motivated reasoning,” one of the terms scholars use for certain kinds of self-deception.  
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David Bohm, the great physicist mentioned above by the Dalai Lama, offered some wonderful 
suggestions about time and its relation to our incoherence, self-deception, and the many maladies 
of “civilized” life, all of which go together with a misunderstanding of time, and the employment 
of time as a mechanism of manipulation and control. In dialogues collected in the well-titled 
book, Thought as a System, Bohm says the following: 
the very notion of time itself is misunderstood. Even in physics it is not 
adequately being understood as an abstraction, as a representation. In a certain 
area this will not be too important, because physical processes are regular enough 
that they can be measured by time. Therefore, even though you have this 
misunderstanding you are not going to come to a serious practical incoherence. 
For instance, if we have all timed our watches together and we say that we are 
going to meet at a certain time, then, if our watches work properly, we will be in 
the same place. If they don’t work properly we will not. So you can see that, 
physically, the concept of time implies that there is a great order of nature in the 
whole universe. From the most distant stars to here, every atom vibrates at a 
certain rate which is the same as it is here. There are all sorts of regularity that 
constitute a vast system of order, which the concept of time is tapping into, as it 
were. If that order were not there time would not be of much use. If the rate of 
atoms were to become contingent and sort of jump around, then you might as well 
give up the notion of time. If there were nothing which would follow that order, 
there wouldn’t be any use to think of it. (232) 
 
Time and agenda mimic or tap into the deeper ordering (cosmos) of Nature—with significant 
negative side-effects, since we do not actually PracticeRealize that ordering of Nature, the 
ordering of the sacred, the sacred cosmos. In ancient Greek, the word “cosmos” signified an 
order, an ordering, and also an adornment, in the sense that Sophia shows Her beauty outwardly, 
not only in what Bohm would call an implicate order.  
 
Ordering already arises. But narrow human thinking attempts to apply its own ordering on top of 
that Cosmos, that cosmic ordering, that sacred-creative-ordering-and-adorning (a complicated 
construction in words . . . it is not easy to be precise, especially in English). We think we can 
snap our fingers and make the clock go back an hour, or build nuclear weapons, or launch 
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rockets into space, or make a mountain of plastic coffee pods. In the same way time and agendas 
mimic or tap into the deeper ordering of Nature, science and technology mimic or tap into certain 
dimensions of wisdom, love, and beauty—with tremendous negative consequences, since we fail 
to actually presence, fail to PracticeRealize wisdom-love-beauty, but instead practice and realize 
fragments and fragmentation. 
 
Bohm continues: 
 . . . every thought assumes time. Whether we discuss thought or anything else, we 
always take time for granted. And we take for granted the notion that everything 
exists in time. We don’t take for granted that time is an abstraction and a 
representation, but we take for granted that time is of the essence—reality—and 
that everything is existing in time, including thought. There’s some correctness to 
that, in the sense that its order of succession can be put in terms of time. (233) 
 
Time is the essence. We find that in our practice. We practice-and-realize “time is the essence,” 
and yet it means we practice and realize a delusion, a misunderstanding. We actively misknow 
our situation.  
 
We use time as an essence, and this unskillful relationship with the rhythms of life and with the 
Nature of moment goes altogether with the misuse of ourselves and our world. We use time as 
part of using our body, our mind, our heart, our soul. We use ourselves and our world 
unskillfully and unrealistically. We don’t ask if a crop is ripe and ready based on the rhythms of 
life, for we must get the crop to market. We might never delay a harvest to allow the crop to 
reach a peak of nutritional value if we would lose money in the process, and if we could get it to 
market looking decent enough—even if that means we must use chemicals to process it. We may 
ship it thousands of miles, irrespective of optimal nutrition and irrespective of whether that sort 
of pattern, that sort of agenda works for life. We pass “Earth Overshoot Day” either without 
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notice, as part of attending to another day’s worth of appointments, or with fleeting lament that 
we don’t know how to deal with. Earth Overshoot Day is the day we have already reached the 
estimated annual carrying capacity of the planet. This is an even more absurd notion than 
“daylight savings time,” and at the point we need to calculate such an event as “Earth Overshoot 
Day,” we should declare a crisis in our way of knowing, and we should likely realize that we 
would best abandon all attempts to “manage” the carrying capacity of the Earth, for it has its own 
cycles and relative boundaries, the edges of which we should never verge near. According to 
overshootday.org, we surpassed the planet’s carrying capacity in 2018 on August 1st of that year, 
and thus we lived at a deficit in a situation in which we cannot rationally think of ourselves as 
being able to have one. It is a crisis in reason that we continue carrying forward in such a pattern 
of insanity. As we have all grown tired of hearing, there is only one planet, not the 1.7 we 
currently live off of, or the 5 we might need if everyone lived as people in the U.S. live (where, 
of course, massive inequality also means a small group of people use quite an inordinate amount 
of natural “resources”). There can be no wise, skillful, realistic deficit spending with respect to 
ecologies (what a strange phenomenon that many of us have heard something like this often 
enough to grow tired of it). 
 
This notion also applies to ourselves as ecologies. As a consulting philosopher, when people 
come to me asking about certain physical, psychological, or spiritual pains, and we work 
together to discover and create a way beyond the symptoms, they will often say in regard to the 
new way: “That’s too inefficient!” What irony. A person may, for instance, experience pain in 
their back or elbow because of how they do their job. Observing their relational-dynamism, 
observing their coordination or synchronization of heart-mind-body-world-cosmos, it may 
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become plain that they essentially misuse themselves, that they suffer from unskillful 
synchronization, and this results in something like a repetitive stress injury or some other 
negative side-effect. Therefore, the way they express their total dynamism involves a lack of 
grace, dignity, or poise, a lack of realistic and skillful relationship (i.e. open relational activity of 
life), and ultimately comes altogether with injury, troubles, suffering in themselves and the 
world. 
 
One might call using oneself into injury an inefficient use. But “efficiency” in ordinary parlance 
relates to the ego’s agendas, and typically relates to time and impatience. In Nature, things take 
as much time as they take, so to speak. Wolves wear no watches, birds don’t consult egg timers. 
No sentient being other than the human tries to apply this sort of concept of time, with its 
“rational efficiencies”. The efficient way to make an apple is, apparently, a process on the order 
of billions of years, in terms of conventional notions of time. We humans want to make apples in 
the laboratory in a matter of months. The efficient way (I mean a Way, a Dao, a Cosmos, a 
sacred-creative-ordering) to make a tomato involves roundness, but to the human agenda, a cube-
shaped tomato is more efficient: One can pack more of them in the rectilinear boxes we use, and 
one can rationally proportion the tomato to square bread.71 Similarly, we can get a BA and a PhD 
in less than a decade, but even a decade of serious spiritual practice seems like a lot, and we 
                                                 
71 We have in fact engineered cube-shaped tomatoes and watermelons. Many modified 
organisms exist now—by which we tend to mean, “modified to fit human agendas,” something 
that should strike us, by now, as quite reasonably suspicious from the outset, suspicious as a 
matter of structure, suspicious as a matter of systemic currents. A genetic engineer who 
developed a cube-shaped tomato, upon being told it didn’t taste like a real tomato, allegedly 
replied, “Yes, but very soon, everybody who knows what a real tomato should taste like will be 
dead, and nobody will know.” 
https://www.democracynow.org/2013/12/4/video_extended_interview_with_vandana_shiva 
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imagine we have nothing to learn from such a practice, we imagine no radical shift in our way of 
knowing could really come from it, and we assume, in practice, that we can learn anything we 
really want to learn from concepts and arguments and experiments in laboratories, that we can 
learn in the abstract, taking in information and using time as we see fit. 
 
The Daoist philosopher Liu I-Ming wrote: 
The human mind is the progenitor of all mundanities; once the human mind is 
gone, accumulated mundanities evaporate, “light arises in the empty room,”72 and 
true celestial energy gradually approaches restoration. But before refinement of 
the self is perfected, the mind is not empty and the light is not true; negativity and 
mundanity still have not withdrawn completely, and one cannot seek their end in a 
hurry. If one does not know the firing process and rushes to achieve settlement, 
this is still the human mentality acting, working with false understanding . . . As 
long as the human mentality is not gone, [the Mind of the Way] does not become 
manifest. (translation by Cleary, 1986: 233). 
 
This is like saying that, with our habitual mind and our typical thinking, we produce 
mundanities, and we do this altogether with time. Time is a mundanity and also a precondition 
for mundanity. Likewise, mundanities are a precondition of time. It all goes altogether. And we 
might say that something else goes altogether as the realization of sacredness. Bohm invites us to 
see that we cannot function coherently according to this misunderstanding of time that goes 
altogether with the mundane and its sufferings: 
Bohm: What suggests itself is that psychologically—and perhaps eventually for 
the deepest level physically—we can’t use time as the essence. Rather, the 
moment now is the essence, because all the past and the future that we ever will 
know are in this moment. The past and the future are now—namely, in so far as it 
has left any impression, whatever has happened is now. And our expectations are 
now. Thus we could say that now may be the starting point.  
 
                                                 
72 Rumi would say, “Music arises from the empty lute.” Sophia does not want to play an 
instrument with mundanities packed in where spaciousness should be. Sophia plays only the 
empty lute. 
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One picture you could make of an electron would be that it sort of flashes into and 
out of existence so fast that when picked up in the usual equipment it looks 
continuously existent. It might have a certain regularity, so that it appears to obey 
an order of necessity. But it might be that it is basically creative; the creative act 
may create this order of necessity. 
 
Q: Would that mean that any time we escape from the now we are trying to 
change what is necessary? 
 
Bohm: We are trying to push the order of necessity into the time order. We’re 
trying to make a change in this order. But we are in an area where that sort of 
abstraction, or that sort of representation, cannot work. Even in physics we have 
to admit that this was always a representation, that the actual experience was 
always now. (237) 
 
Captain Clock commands us to make our insanity a necessity. We try to make the time order the 
ordering of Nature, the sacred-creative-ordering of Sophia. But, again, Sophia will not tolerate 
our agendas. She demands that we attune ourselves to Hers. 
 
We thus live in a system of thinking—an ecology of mind, an ecology of thinking, an ecology of 
heartmindbodyworlduniverse—organized on the basis of cutting itself and us off from life, from 
the living, loving, sacred-creative-ordering of necessity, the lively patterning of relationality. It is 
an ecology of insanity, an ecology of delusion, for we do not have the choice to place our agenda 
on top of the necessities of life—and oh how our culture loathes the thought of not having all the 
choices in the universe, not having the illusion of choice (for instance, as manifest in 15 different 
kinds of toothpaste and 30 different SUVs —US News had a piece on “30 SUVs Worth Waiting 
for in 2019, a rather asinine suggestion, though perhaps quite a few readers out of a hundred 
would not find the headline silly enough73). 
 
                                                 
73 https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/suvs-worth-waiting-for 
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The limiting necessities of ignorance—including fear, craving, self-doubt, and all the 
medications we use to treat them, like war, debt, political circuses, doctor’s bills, family fights, 
endless agendas, endless “choices” in the marketplace that functions as our ecology, and the 
rampant degradation of Nature and the soul—none of these necessities can override the 
necessities of life, and only when we attune with that will we fulfill our function, receiving it 
from Nature herself (Jung’s “only true answer,” coming from the very sacredness of Nature, 
coming, in religious terms, intimately from the divine). Instead of synchronizing our clocks with 
arbitrary time, we need to Synchronize the Soul with being-time, the living moment, the Nature 
of life. That puts things too poetically, but puts them precisely enough if we turn to verification 
by means of practice-and-realization. What would we verify? Among other things, a different 
experience of time, one that itself requires a rebellion against the clock to practice-and-realize. 
 
Dogen’s invitation to enter the moment, the yes-moment, the being-moment, echoes something 
we can find in the ancient west as well. Hadot was fond of Goethe’s line, “The present alone is 
our joy.” It comes from Part II of his Faust, in a lovely scene in which Goethe and Helen speak 
to each other in rhyme, in rhythm and song. Faust says to Helen, “And so the spirit [or mind, or 
soul] looks neither ahead nor behind. The present alone . . .” And Helen answers, “is our joy.” 
She later says she is, “trusting myself to the unknown” (from Hadot 1986: 62). Hadot sees in this 
a reflection of Goethe’s understanding of philosophy as a way of life: 
For Goethe, in fact, who says so in a letter to Zelter, this is characteristic of 
ancient life and art: knowing how to live in the present, knowing what he calls the 
“the health of the moment”. In Antiquity, he says, the instant was “pregnant”, that 
is filled with significance, but also experienced in its full reality, in all its fullness 
and richness, sufficient unto itself. We no longer know how to live in the present, 
Goethe continues. For us the ideal lies in the future and can only be the object of a 
nostalgic desire, while the present is considered trivial and banal. We no longer 
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know how to take advantage of the present, we no longer, as the Greeks did, know 
“trusting myself to the unknown” (63-4). 
 
Hadot thus reveals a sensibility to time that resonates with the one Dogen invites us to practice 
and realize—and we must emphasize that this is a realization, an achievement, a consummation, 
and not merely a “conception”.74 Hadot offers some further thoughts in this regard, and we can 
allow “antique” and “antiquity” to resonate with Jung’s reflections. Thus “antique Beauty” is 
also “antique Wisdom,” “antique philosophy”. It is LoveWisdom. 
And in fact, if Faust  speaks to Helen as a man of Antiquity, it is because the 
presence of Helen, that is, the presence of antique Beauty, reveals to him what the 
present is in itself: what the present of the world is, “the splendid feeling of the 
present”, Herrliches Ferfühl der Gegenwartas the Oriental Divan says.  
And this is why the dialogue between Faust and Helen can be understood 
at a third level. It is no longer the dialogue between two lovers, it is no longer the 
dialogue between two historical figures, but it is the dialogue of man with 
himself. The encounter with Helen is not just the encounter with antique Beauty 
which emanates from nature: it is also the encounter with a living wisdom, with a 
way of living, this “health of the moment” we just mentioned.  
 
We must now define the experience of time in Antiquity as expressed in the 
verses of Faust we have just discussed. We might think, looking at Goethe’s letter 
to Zelter mentioned earlier, that it is a general experience common to Antiquity 
and that it was natural for men of Antiquity to know what Goethe called “the 
health of the moment”. Moreover, following Goethe many historians and 
philosophers, from Oswald Spengler to the logician Hintika, have alluded to the 
fact that the Greeks “lived in the present moment” more than did representatives 
of other cultures. In his book Die Zauberflöte, Siegfried Morenz summarizes this 
idea when he writes, “This particular feature of Greece has never been better 
characterized that by Goethe . . . at the occasion of the dialogue between Faust 
and Helen: ‘And so the spirit looks neither ahead nor behind. The present alone is 
our joy’”. It must certainly be admitted that the Greeks in general paid special 
attention to the present moment, attention that could also assume several ethical 
and artistic meanings. Popular wisdom counselled both being content with the 
present and knowing how to use it well. On the one hand being content with the 
present meant in particular being content with earthly life, and this is what Goethe 
admired in ancient art, especially funerary art. The deceased was not represented 
with eyes raised toward heaven but accomplishing acts from his normal daily 
existence. On the other hand, knowing how to use the present well meant 
                                                 
74 Forgive the play on words, but one wonders again and again about the abstractions of vitality 
in an ecology of insanity. 
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knowing how to recognize and make use of the favorable and decisive moment, 
kairos, that is, all the possibilities contained in one or another moment. The 
strategist knows how to strike at the right moment, and the sculptor fixes in 
marble the most significant instant of the scene he wished to bring to life. The 
Greeks, it seemed, paid particular attention to the present moment. But we should 
not, like Winckelmann, Goethe or Hölderlin, imagine an idealized Greece whose 
citizens lived in the present moment and as a result were constantly bathed in 
beauty and serenity. In fact men of Antiquity were distressed and they worried 
quite like we do. Ancient poetry often reflects their anxiety, which sometimes 
even becomes despair. Like us they bore the burden of the past, the uncertainty of 
the future, a fear of death. It is this human anguish which ancient philosophies, 
particularly Epicureanism and Stoicism, sought to remedy. They were therapies 
destined to heal anguish or to provide liberty and self-control, a means of freeing 
one-self from the past and from the future so as to live in the present. The 
experience of time is totally different from the common and general one we just 
described. And this experience, as we shall see, corresponds exactly to that 
expressed in the verses of Faust: “The present alone is our joy”. “Do not reflect on 
your destiny. To exist is an obligation”. This is a philosophical conversion which 
implies a voluntary and radical transformation of one’s way of living and of 
seeing the world. This is the true “health of the moment” leading to serenity. (64-
5) 
 
Hadot tries to show that, despite significant differences in doctrine, the Epicurean and Stoic 
traditions share a commitment to a practice of life that involves a different way of knowing self, 
world, and time. There is a completeness and a great perfection in the moment, and many 
philosophical/spiritual traditions invite us to touch it, to enter it as a more skillful and realistic 
practice and realization of life. It seems to have to do with something more real than our 
agendas. And simply “thinking” this will not suffice. Though ancient Greek society may have 
had a place for the general notion of being-moment or yes-moment, the ancient philosophers 
realized that, in practice, this meant a rebellion against a culture already at odds with the spirit of 
such wisdom. They realized the need for practice and transformative insight to make an 
alternative way of knowing real. 
 
With the help of these suggestions, we can return to Dogen: 
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Firewood becomes ash, and it does not become firewood again. Yet, we should 
not regard firewood as the before and ash as the after [of “some thing”]. 
Understand that firewood Dwells in the Reality Place of firewood, which fully 
includes before and after and is free of before and after. Ash Dwells in the Reality 
Place of ash, which fully includes before and after. Just as firewood does not 
become firewood again after it is ash, a human being does not return to birth after 
death. 
 
This being so, the traditional way in Buddhist LoveWisdom denies that birth turns 
into death. Accordingly, birth is understood as no-birth. It is an unshakable 
teaching in the Buddha’s discourse that death does not turn into birth. 
Accordingly, death is understood as no-death. 
 
Birth is an expression complete this moment. Death is an expression complete this 
moment. They are like winter and spring: We do not think winter turns into spring 
or say spring turns into summer. (adapted from the translation by Abe and 
Waddell) 
 
Dogen’s view of “things not becoming something” can at first seem strange. But in fact it not 
only seems familiar to many spiritual traditions (and perhaps familiar to someone thinking as 
Bohm invited us to think about, for instance, the being of electrons), it might seem matter-of-fact 
in some Indigenous Cultures. For instance, compare Dogen’s contemplations with Dorothy Lee’s 
discussion of Trobriander Culture: 
. . . there is a series of beings, but no becoming. There is no temporal connection 
between objects. The taytu [a species of yam] always remains itself; it does not 
become over-ripe; over-ripeness is an ingredient of another, a different being. At 
some point, the taytu turns into a yowana, which contains over-ripeness. And the 
yowana, over-ripe as it is, does not put forth shoots, does not become a sprouting 
yowana. When sprouts appear, it ceases to be itself; in its place appears a silasata. 
Neither is there a temporal connection made—or, according to our own premises, 
perceived—between events; in fact, temporality is meaningless. There are no 
tenses, no linguistic distinction between past or present. There is no arrangement 
of activities or events into means and ends, no causal or teleologic relationships. 
What we consider a causal relationship in a sequence of connected events, is to 
the Trobriander an ingredient of a patterned whole. (1950: 91) 
Just as Dogen invites us to see that firewood does not become ashes, the Trobriander Culture 
invites us to see that a ripe yam does not become an overripe yam (and perhaps a certain kind of 
scientist would invite us to sense the discontinuities in radiation or certain other quantum 
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phenomena—and, of course, we now have some awareness that quantum phenomena may play a 
surprising role in biology). Lee tries to get around “become” by using “turn into,” but this only 
shows the limits of both typical western thinking and a typical western language. In the passage 
from Dogen, we find both a rejection of “become” and a rejection of “turn into.” Lee herself 
acknowledges some of this:  
We who are accustomed to seek lineal continuity, cannot help supplying it as we 
read . . . but the continuity is not given in the Trobriand text; and all Trobriand 
speech, according to Malinowski, is “jerky,” given in points, not in connecting 
lines. The only connective I know of in Trobriand is the pela which I mentioned 
above; a kind of preposition which also means “to jump.” (Lee, 1950: 92) 
 
The potentially discontinuous Nature of reality must strike us as strange (and, it may prove all 
the more challenging to resist thinking of this in a simple dualistic opposition to “continuous”). 
That strangeness comes from our having gotten hooked by certain habits of mind. As Nietzsche 
put it: 
Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of 
these proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon 
or inherited these had better luck in their struggle for themselves and their 
progeny. Such erroneous articles of faith . . . include the following: that there are 
things, substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is 
free; that what is good for me is also good in itself. It was only very late that 
such propositions were denied and doubted; it was only very late that truth 
emerged-as the weakest form of knowledge. It seemed that one was unable to live 
with it: our organism was prepared for the opposite; all its higher functions, sense 
perception, and every kind of sensation worked with those basic errors which had 
been incorporated since time immemorial. Indeed, even in the realm of knowledge 
these propositions became the norms according to which “true” and “untrue,” 
were determined down to the most remote regions of logic. (GS 110, emphasis 
added) 
 
Returning to the strange question: Firewood doesn’t become ashes? No. Not if there is no 
firewood (no such “thing” as “firewood”), not if time is not “time” but moment, the being-
moment. Everything that is is moment, and moment is everything that is. We ordinarily project 
onto our experience. But each moment is unique. Things cannot be grasped. We cannot lay a 
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hand on this Now, cannot lay a hand on any “thing,” yet the sheer intimacy means we cannot not 
touch it.  
 
Don’t we “see” “things” though? Don’t we “refer” to “things” when we speak? In the Perfection 
of Wisdom literature (Prajnaparamita), we see references to “no perception,” “no conception,” 
“no conventional expression”. Language cannot circumscribe reality.75 It is interwoven into 
reality, which is meaningfulness “all the way down,” so to speak.  
 
Nietzsche speaks about language as a narrowing force, if we are not careful with it, and he means 
by that our tendency toward a mindless use of language that takes away from the lived vitality of 
experience, in which meaning can never be “fixed,” and thus we turn the rare and beautiful into 
the coarse and common. We can begin to see how “time” and everything that goes with it drives 
mindless talking. We don’t have time to speak. So we chit-chat, mindlessly. And quickly, while 
looking at the clock. 
 
Since life is fresh and new, perfect and complete as each moment, then if I use an expression you 
understand in any habitual manner, it cannot express what arises Now. Expressions can be 
appropriate or skillful or liberating, but they cannot capture—all the more so since experience 
continues fleetingly, and there is always More. We only need liberation into this impermanence, 
                                                 
75 Heidegger’s notion that “language is the house of being” gets sensibly transformed into “Being 
is the Home of Language,” or perhaps, “language is the house of ego.” In any case, the typical 
notions of language that rule in the dominant culture seem inadequate, and we need more 
emphasis on the limitations these impose on the HeartMindBodyWorldCosmos. The function of 
language is compassion. The essence of meaningfulness is wisdom. But indeed meaning is 
always constituted by wisdom-love-beauty. 
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this open relationality, this ever-more. Experience doesn’t “exist” anywhere as something solid, 
and therefore nothing can lay hold of it. Thus there is no “deferral” either. There is no need to 
“defer” anything. The experience has no root, therefore it doesn’t “refer” to any “thing”. It 
doesn’t refer to “me” or “you”. When some experience arises, if we project subject and object, 
then we think the language refers to one or refers between.  
 
If we want to find the fragrance of a rose in the Cosmos, we should not look in the rose or in the 
person smelling the rose. The fragrance of rose, the smelling-of-rose, co-arises as the Cosmos, 
co-arises as the sacred-creative-ordering, presencing the archetypal, the synchronistic, the 
interwovenness of all things. It is not even something arising “between” the rose and the person 
smelling it. Those entities are not solid. It is not an interaction between “things” (we can recall 
here Dewey’s efforts, and Bentley’s too, to get us to move beyond “interactionism,” a vision of 
the universe as “things” “interacting,” and to invite us to sense what we might call a 
“transactional cosmos,” a sacred-creative-ordering that unfolds in mutually dependent 
transformation, mutually dependent moment-happenings or being-moments). The fragrance of 
rose is the Cosmos. It is all of time, right Now. It is PracticeRealization. As the being-moment, 
the YesMoment, the one smelling the rose is the fragrance of the rose, and the rose, and the Sun, 
sky, mountains, rivers, Earth, the rain that fell, the bugs that aerated the soil, the soil, the soul, 
the bliss of just this.  
 
The smell of the rose is not a concept, nor an activity that “takes place” “in time”. We may 
project concepts onto this miracle, this moment of magic, this mandala of the soul, but this 
always means missing the rose, missing our life—we are missing something all the time, and we 
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usually do everything we can to repress the grief of it, to medicate the whole mass of suffering 
that is this missing, to push away the soul’s call to STOP this missing.  
 
Life does not function by means of concepts as we think of concepts. Life has manifested 
tremendous creativity without concepts and equations. We have written books, and life invented 
the being who can write books—without arguments or abstractions, and without clocks or 
agendas. If we think the divine made everything, the same holds true.  
 
We have begun to develop dynamical systems theories and tools, but how can we cultivate the 
kind of science that can put us in touch with this? Our current science lacks the sophistication to 
do this. Plenty of mythologies have all the sophistication we would need in order to become 
wise, compassionate, present, and thus to unleash the healing, hallowing flow of wisdom, love, 
and beauty into the barren landscapes of the soul and the battered landscapes of the World. 
 
We should of course acknowledge again that there is an aspect of life that allows something like 
generalization. Life is not mere “chaos”. Life is unique, and yet has regularities. There is nothing 
but practice-realization, and thus even Cosmic Habits can emerge. This acknowledgement itself 
involves practice-realization, and it does not allow us to control or manage the world. Instead it 
challenges us with the spiritual imperative to cultivate wisdom, discernment, attunement, so that 
we can align ourselves with vitalizing powers of the sacred-creative-ordering of life. 
 
Because of our clocks (better put: altogether with our clocks), we have little time to touch this 
sacred-creative-ordering. Its jubilance can seem like chaos to us, for it does not always coincide 
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with human notions of “order,” and it does not cater to human agendas, to fears, desires, and 
self-doubts. We feel too rushed to just sit, just commune and communicate with forests, rivers, 
mountains, oceans, places alive and alove. In a relative sense, we have to slow down. We have to 
stop all our doing, which takes place in time. But, in the midst of our doings, the doings of time, 
purpose, and agenda, the world can seem chaotic, and its chaos in fact further “justifies” our 
attempts at management and exploitation (we actually speak of “natural resource management,” 
as if we clever humans can manage the world, and as if the world amounted to a store of 
“resources” available for us to manage and distribute as we see fit). As Hans Peter Duerr puts it:  
People do not exploit a nature that speaks to them. But a nature that, as two 
famous nineteenth-century ethnocentrics expressed it, ‘faced humans initially as 
an entirely foreign, all-powerful and unassailable might, towards which they 
behaved as animals, and which they allowed to lord it over them as if they were 
brutes’; such a nature has no language of its own any more, it is merely matter. 
(1985: 92) 
 
It takes a leap beyond time in order to commune with the World, to hear its voice, to arrive at 
intimacy with the sacred-creative-patterning—by which we mean those larger loops, circles, and 
networks as depicted in the image we contemplated in light of Bateson’s reflections on the 
problems of conscious human purpose.  
 
Let us Consider the way Nietzsche puts our deafness, and his somewhat unskillful attempt to 
challenge it:  
The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos—in the sense 
not of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, 
and whatever names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms . . . Let us 
beware of attributing to it heartlessness and unreason or their opposites: it is 
neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it wish to become any of these 
things; it does not by any means strive to imitate man . . . Let us beware of saying 
that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is nobody who 
commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses.  (GS 109) 
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Here Nietzsche manages cleverness, but not much wisdom. He verges into nihilism and cynicism 
(in the pejorative sense). The passage holds value for the way in which it expresses the sort of 
bad thinking Nietzsche seemed to want us to liberate ourselves from. But, because he found 
ways to tap into what we might call the wondrous creative mind, he mimics the great Chinese 
sage Laozi: 
When people see some things as beautiful, 
other things become ugly. 
When people see some things as good, 
other things become bad. Being and non-being create each other. 
Difficult and easy support each other. 
Long and short define each other. 
High and low depend on each other. 
Before and after follow each other.  
 
Therefore the Master 
acts without doing anything 
and teaches without saying anything. 
Things arise and she lets them come; 
things disappear and she lets them go. 
She has but doesn’t possess, 
acts but doesn’t expect. 
When her work is done, she forgets it. 
That is why it lasts forever. (Dao De Jing, chapter 2)76 
 
Laozi shows how the living Cosmos arises as a unity of opposites (a version of which Nietzsche, 
and later Jung—in part under Nietzsche’s influence—sought to PracticeRealize and express). 
The Cosmos itself “does not take sides,” (as Laozi puts it in chapter 5 of his work), but that does 
not mean it lacks wisdom or sacred-creative-ordering. Rather, no human can realize wisdom 
unless they attune themselves with that. What we call “wisdom,” “love,” “beauty,” and all the 
other good and bad things we wring our hands over have to do with a mind out of attunement 
with the Way (Dao, dharma, logos, Sophia, LoveWisdom, the sacred), and we can call the Arts 
                                                 
76 https://terebess.hu/english/tao/mitchell.html#Kap81 
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of Awareness (or “spiritual exercises”) the PracticeRealization of Attunement. Nietzsche perhaps 
let himself go into polemics and provocations. He seems to have struggled valiantly to arrive at a 
functional nondualistic philosophy, but he never quite managed it. 
 
In any case, we can say the world may appear chaotic and amoral to us. Freud, in Future of an 
Illusion, went so far as to claim that, “the principal task of civilization, its actual raison d’ȇtre, is 
to defend us against nature” (19). To defend against, as if we shall maintain a state of war with 
the necessities of life, putting ourselves at war with ourselves—because we have no time to 
listen, to learn, to feel, to sense, to attune? 
 
Confronted with a seemingly mute and meaningless Nature, uninterested in or intimidated by the 
sacred-creative-patterning, the necessities of Nature, we foist our agenda onto the world, 
including our sense of time. Nietzsche puts it in the most general terms: 
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live—by positing 
bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; 
without these articles of faith nobody could now endure life. But that does not 
prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error. (GS 
121) 
 
He left out time. And he faltered in his dancing a bit: We arranged a world that we think we need, 
the world we think we need in order to live comfortably and “happily” (the “happiness we chase 
as part of our delusion), by a process of cutting ourselves off from life and treating the rootless 
necessities of our ignorance, the anxious necessities of our hopes, fears, angers, jealousies, 
greeds, and self-doubts as “natural law” or some other false image of the necessities of life. 
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Nietzsche also errs here in suggesting that the conditions of life include “error”. Error does not 
appear in any ordinary sense, and the sense of error we most need to attend to has human foci. 
For instance, Darryl Gwynne and David Rentz published a paper in 1983 in Austral Entomology 
titled, “Beetles on the Bottle.” The two scientists had come across male jewel beetles trying 
desperately to mate with beer bottles—so desperately they were allowing themselves to be eaten 
by ants in the process. It seemed that little bumps (tubercles) on a certain kind of brown glass 
beer bottle tricked the male beetles into seeing incredibly voluptuous and enticing females. They 
would cling to the bottles and not let go in their attempt to cultivate life forward, to Realize life. 
We may say the beetles erred: They saw females where we see beer bottles. But beer bottles—
especially those strewn about the landscape as garbage, and even more especially ones that look 
like beetles, perhaps in no small part because there are such beetles whose souls attune with said 
tubercles and whose souls co-arise with ours (i.e. beetles who do not exist in separation from the 
human psyche)—such beer bottles do not “belong” in the landscape, as a matter of sacred 
necessity. I recall sitting in a conference, listening to a talk by a very intelligent cognitive 
scientist who had the whole room laughing over this poor beetle’s apparent “stupidity,” and no 
one for a moment paused to ask if the stupidity belonged more to humanity than to beetles. If we 
find errors of perception in the story, we must ask why, and then where we should inquire to 
dispel them. 
 
Similarly, the typical horse’s reaction to plastic—especially in the form of plastic bags, plastic 
tarps, plastic clothing (e.g. a poncho), or umbrellas—seems “irrational” to us clever humans: the 
typical horse will want to bolt. But, while we rational geniuses mock this supposed irrationality 
of Horse, while we may say that Horse has apparently incorporated error in some way, deeper 
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inquiry can open us to the insight that Horse’s response makes sense—far, far more sense than it 
makes to release so much plastic into the landscape, into the living World, into living ecologies 
where the absence of plastic attunes with sacred necessity and the presence of plastic leads to so 
many negative side-effects, including an alarming number of wild animal deaths and general 
intoxication. We are murdering wild animals and making them unwell—not because of any 
necessity, but simply because of our stupidity. 
 
What has this to do with time, with clocks? It has everything to do with time, first and foremost 
because humans have incorporated their misunderstanding of time, and the misunderstanding of 
time affects our use of ourselves and our World. Our incorporated misunderstanding of time 
perpetuates Sorrowville’s pattern of insanity.  
 
For instance, plastic saves time.77 How many of us, even those who have thankfully begun to 
respond to plastic as Horse does, have given in to a plastic this or that, because of apparent 
necessity—often a necessity that comes to, “I don’t have time for any reasonable alternative”? I 
have in certain moments behaved almost as if the soul had a violent repulsion to plastic, and yet 
too often found myself giving in to this or that item, such as an herbal remedy for allergies too 
insufferable to sleep and work well, or, of course, the plastic in the few bits of technology I own, 
and obviously the plastic that becomes garbage as a result of a medical procedure, such as having 
blood work done. In writing this book, I could not use the trackpad on the laptop in a skillful way 
                                                 
77 We might add that seeing the stupidity of plastic, once we have become insane enough to 
make it and let it pervade the World, demands timelessness that goes together with a sense of 
deep time (we now try to rush toward the latter, as a way of counterbalancing our stuckness in 
the hedonic present and in limited notions of time, but this new “deep time” is often just a 
refiguring of clocks, not a rebellion against them). 
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given the amount of work I needed to do with it in the time available, and my body began to 
manifest negative side-effects (significant pain in “hand,” “fingers,” “wrist,” “arm”). It made 
sense to get a plastic mouse. The plastic mouse simply goes together with the laptop, and the 
work could proceed quite well after that, much more efficiently. That seems to me a mildly 
horrifying story, since the plastic from the mouse might end up being around for thousands of 
years, even if I attempt to recycle it when it eventually breaks. If we think of the whole lifecycle 
of the laptop and mouse, it puts a heavy demand on each writer to say something quite rebellious 
and meaningful. I am not sure I am up to the task.  
 
All of this nonsense works efficiently, rationally. The efficient and the rational go together in 
practice, and this too shows the altogetherness of time in our thinking, which allows us to think-
with-plastic, to engage in plastic thinking, the artificial, cut-off-from-life thinking that gives us 
no pause as we exploit and degrade the living World, including our own ecologies. It seems as 
though we somehow operate as if we are just thinking—admittedly, on the clock, with plastic 
around. We don’t seem to open up enough to the possibility that the incorporation of thinking-
on-the-clock and thinking-with-plastic amounts to a degraded thinking, and that we cannot see 
this very clearly because of the incorporation. We just call it “thinking”. It’s “invisible” in a way. 
Dewey invites us to evaluate this thinking on the basis of all of its consequences, which we see 
evident in the state of the world. It is like stopping the thinking with a computer mouse because 
the mouse seems to be malfunctioning, but it is much more intimate, because we must somehow 
see that we are malfunctioning. 
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Even in realms of wisdom we can find thinking-with-plastic and its concomitant 
misunderstanding of time. A monastic community whose founder I deeply admire sells a 
meditation cushion made of “memory foam.” The cushions have been available for over a 
decade, and perhaps by now they make use of so-called “green” polyurethane, but they don’t 
advertise it that way, and most memory foam comes from petroleum (and historically that came 
first), which means it will not biodegrade—a resistance to “time”. A meditation cushion, or 
anything else, that doesn’t functionally biodegrade makes no real sense. We could clarify this: 
We should see as unwise anything humans produce that doesn’t nourish the conditions of life. 
(Where does our production of texts stand from such a perspective? How about our production of 
equations, theories, data? What do we make—what do we co-discover-create—with our living 
practice of LoveWisdom?) 
 
Again, these things arise with our misunderstanding of time. Where there is time, there is 
eventually busyness—too much busyness to pause, to dispel any deep delusions. We have 
incorporated the delusions, and thus they do not easily dispel, even if they would dispel in a 
moment, upon our entrance of moment, our realization of moment. 
 
In his book Against His-Story, Against Leviathan, Fredy Perlman offers us some provocative 
contemplations that bear on these aspects (and others) of our inquiry: 
The !Kung people miraculously survived as a community of free human beings 
into our own exterminating age. R.E. Leakey observed them in their lush African 
forest homeland. They cultivated nothing except themselves. They made 
themselves what they wished to be. They were not determined by anything 
beyond their own being — not by alarm clocks, not by debts, not by orders from 
superiors. They feasted and celebrated and played, full-time, except when they 
slept. They shared everything with their communities: food, experiences, visions, 
songs. Great personal satisfaction, deep inner joy, came from the sharing. 
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(In today’s world, wolves still experience the joys that come from sharing. Maybe 
that’s why governments pay bounties to the killers of wolves.) 
 
S. Diamond observed other free human beings who survived into our age, also in 
Africa. He could see that they did no work, but he couldn’t quite bring himself to 
say it in English. Instead, he said they made no distinction between work and 
play. Does Diamond mean that the activity of the free people can be seen as work 
one moment, as play another, depending on how the anthropologist feels? Does he 
mean that they didn’t know if their activity was work or play? Does he mean we, 
you and I, Diamond’s armored contemporaries, cannot distinguish their work 
from their play? 
 
If the !Kung visited our offices and factories, they might think we’re playing. 
Why else would we be there?78 
 
Why else? Why would we punch a timecard or otherwise record our presence someplace, in 
order to engage in physically and mentally repetitive work, typically with no spiritual context 
and often antithetical to the spiritual values we claim to hold dear, and lacking any practices that 
would further our spiritual development? Of course, we can keep in mind here Dinwoodie’s 
account of the development of western time, as an industrial practice. 
 
How hard would we have to work if we attuned Nature and Culture? Anthropologist Jared 
Diamond offers some thoughts in his infamous essay on “The Worst Mistake in the History of 
the Human Race”. Though developing and employing—and then proliferating—nuclear weapons 
or bringing the global climate into collapse might seem like examples of almost 
incomprehensible ignorance, Diamond suggests that many of such subsequent errors may be 
seen as consequent errors, depending crucially on the foundation of this rather significant one: 
That we traded the hunter-gatherer lifestyle (exemplified by the !Kung) for our “civilized” life. It 
may seem that we have derived all manner of benefits; the case does not seem easy to weigh: 
                                                 
78 https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/fredy-perlman-against-his-story-against-leviathan 
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While the case for the progressivist view [that agriculture was true progress, and 
that we have made all manner of progress only because of it—n.k.] seems 
overwhelming, it’s hard to prove. How do you show that the lives of people 
10,000 years ago got better when they abandoned hunting and gathering for 
farming? Until recently, archaeologists had to resort to indirect tests, whose 
results (surprisingly) failed to support the progressivist view. Here’s one example 
of an indirect test: Are twentieth century hunter-gatherers really worse off than 
farmers? Scattered throughout the world, several dozen groups of so-called 
primitive people, like the Kalahari bushmen, continue to support themselves that 
way. It turns out that these people have plenty of leisure time, sleep a good deal, 
and work less hard than their farming neighbors. For instance, the average time 
devoted each week to obtaining food is only 12 to 19 hours for one group of 
Bushmen, 14 hours or less for the Hadza nomads of Tanzania. One Bushman, 
when asked why he hadn’t emulated neighboring tribes by adopting agriculture, 
replied, “Why should we, when there are so many mongongo nuts in the world?” 
 
 . . .  In one study, the Bushmen’s average daily food intake (during a month when 
food was plentiful) was 2,140 calories and 93 grams of protein, considerably 
greater than the recommended daily allowance for people of their size. It’s almost 
inconceivable that Bushmen, who eat 75 or so wild plants, could die of starvation 
the way hundreds of thousands of Irish farmers and their families did during the 
potato famine of the 1840s. 
 
 . . . . Skeletons from Greece and Turkey show that the average height of hunger-
gatherers toward the end of the ice ages was a generous 5’ 9" for men, 5’ 5" for 
women. With the adoption of agriculture, height crashed, and by 3000 B. C. had 
reached a low of only 5’ 3" for men, 5’ for women. By classical times heights 
were very slowly on the rise again, but modern Greeks and Turks have still not 
regained the average height of their distant ancestors. 
 
 . . . . At Dickson Mounds, located near the confluence of the Spoon and Illinois 
rivers, archaeologists have excavated some 800 skeletons that paint a picture of 
the health changes that occurred when a hunter-gatherer culture gave way to 
intensive maize farming around A. D. 1150 . . . Compared to the hunter-gatherers 
who preceded them, the farmers had a nearly 50 per cent increase in enamel 
defects indicative of malnutrition, a fourfold increase in iron-deficiency anemia 
(evidenced by a bone condition called porotic hyperostosis), a threefold rise in 
bone lesions reflecting infectious disease in general, and an increase in 
degenerative conditions of the spine, probably reflecting a lot of hard physical 
labor. 
 
We may think that we have solved some of these problems. Clearly, we have better longevity 
and less malnutrition today, right? Diamond’s essay can provoke us to pause and think about 
“progress”. What does it really mean? And what has come along with it? Furthermore—and 
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perhaps this question matters most of all—what progress might arise if we cultivated life forward 
in a totally different way? In other words: Though “civilized culture” claims “progress,” what 
might have happened if the developmental process had unfolded with the spiritual approach of 
the best Indigenous Cultures, rather than the culture of the west? And what happens if we keep 
any of our more important progress (e.g. the expansion of ethical responsibility) and shift with it 
into a more vitalizing context? 
 
Consider the story of bread as an illustration of the pattern of insanity that grips western culture, 
infecting its so-called progress. Maggie Beidelman captures an aspect of the pattern of insanity 
very well in an article that appeared on Alternet: “modern wheat flour is causing us to lose our 
ability to digest modern wheat flour.”79 This is a crucial philosophical insight—and we must 
allow it to carry us much further. It is not wheat itself that makes trouble, but our idea of wheat, 
our way of knowing what wheat is and how to “use” it “efficiently”—in other words, “wheat” as 
bound up with our misunderstanding of time. Time, agenda, purpose, efficiency . . . the way of 
knowing of the Cartesian coordinate system, an ordering of a mechanistic universe.  
 
All thinking is cosmological, but some thinking comes from a mechanistic universe, and some 
thinking presences as Cosmic Thinking. Any thinking caught up in a pattern of insanity, any way 
of knowing that is a pattern of insanity, will get pulled into furthering the pattern of insanity. 
Know-how will amount to knowing how to further that pattern of insanity—efficiently. 
 
                                                 
79 https://www.alternet.org/2013/06/gluten-intolerance/ 
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Let’s make that a little clearer by thinking through recent developments in the story of bread. 
There is a research project called Plant Resources in the Paleolithic. This collective of 
researchers have published interesting evidence about the diets of our ancestors. For instance, 
Revedin et al. (2010 and 2015) describe evidence that humans have been grinding up plant 
matter, in the manner of making flour, for at least 30,000 years. The starches found on ancient 
mortar-and-pestle artifacts come from plant roots such as cattails, which store nutrients in 
rhizomes. Our ancestors would have pulled these from the earth, cleaned them up, and ground 
them. Then they would cook the “flour,” perhaps on hot stones, something like an ancient kind 
of flatbread. At some point, wheat must have been used, and at some point humans must have 
discovered what happens when the wheat flour or dough is allowed to ferment. 
 
Maybe we should never have used wheat. Maybe that has more to do with our subsequent 
problems than any other single factor—if we want to try and isolate factors. But the real issue 
seems to be the style of consciousness that goes altogether with the development of a certain 
kind of agriculture and the centrality of bread. Wheat in some way came altogether with what we 
might call invasive agriculture. Let us indulge the notion that agriculture per se does not seem 
problematic. But invasive agriculture (perhaps marked by such characteristics as the tilling of the 
soil, planting monocrops, and certainly the use of vast tracts of land relatively far outside of the 
main areas of communal living) and the associated consequences themselves illustrate the pattern 
of insanity. We are in some ways looking at a pattern within a pattern when we look at bread. 
 
For millennia, bread was made with freshly milled grain. Anyone familiar with wheat germ oil 
knows why: wheat germ goes rancid quite quickly, so time becomes accentuated, and 
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misunderstandings of time may eventually become amplified. The wheat kernel that gets milled 
has three major components: the bran, the endosperm, and the wheat germ. All three offer 
important nutrients to our bodies. Bread made with truly fresh, whole grain flour, especially 
when produced with sufficient fermentation, seems relatively easy to digest, at least for those of 
us who have adapted to eating bread.  
 
We should keep in mind that bread might, in the end, be a pretty bad idea—already evidence of a 
pattern of insanity. It might not be anywhere as nourishing as freshly picked or freshly caught 
food. But let us also keep in mind that traditional breads might have offered far more nutrition 
than today’s common loaf, and some kind of bread (perhaps even non-wheat bread, or perhaps a 
whole grain fermented wheat bread) might have made for a decent supplementary component in 
a varied diet in places where less invasive agriculture could provide such supplements to hunting 
and gathering. There would be many differences between a more ideal bread and what we have 
today. Among other things, traditional breads may have been left to rise for far longer than a few 
hours (we don’t have time for that), and the composition of microbes, and thus the composition 
of metabolites and micronutrients, would have been quite unique, and possibly nonexistent in 
industrialized production—not to mention the degraded soils we have today. We certainly took a 
hit when we went into invasive agriculture, but we did adapt and work out some of the kinks so 
that we could make relatively healthy and nourishing foods. We might still be far better off with 
a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, but agriculture remains a workable solution as we try to sensibly 
balance the human population with the carrying capacity of Earth—something we may perhaps 
never, ever accomplish without significantly reducing global population (by ethical means, like 
intelligent family planning, and widespread ethical awareness that leads many, many couples to 
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have no children, and leads almost all others to have only one child, until the population comes 
down and other factors get in balance). 
 
But back to bread. As a consequence of the industrial revolution, food would inevitably become 
industrialized. We should perhaps consider this very notion a symptom of the pattern of insanity, 
bound up with time. The industrialization of bread unfolded on many levels, including milling. 
Industrial milling grinds and sifts the bran and the germ out of the wheat, thus robbing it of vital 
nutrients—but, we may recall, also changing the flour’s temporal dimension, because the germ 
gets ground out and the resulting flour becomes more resistant to time. Industrial baking 
probably further robs bread of vital nutrients. And industrial farming has already robbed the 
wheat of vital nutrients, because of soil depletion. Thus, by the time it gets to us, bread is no 
longer food in the richest sense (we need a philosophical “rectification of names” here). 
 
We use the same word for the stuff that gets to us, the stuff that often makes life convenient: we 
still call it “bread”. How quick and easy to pop some bread in the toaster to eat with coffee in the 
morning—coffee from a plastic machine, perhaps even a single-serving plastic pod. How simple 
to pack a sandwich for lunch (sealed in a plastic container to keep it fresh and protected), a 
welcome bit of nosh we can manage without utensils, while sitting at our plastic-finished desk, 
unable to take a proper lunch break. How medicating to eat good bread with dinner after a long, 
stressful day, sitting on vinyl or polyester seats that thankfully don’t stain (placemats too, 
perhaps).  
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We call that stuff we eat “bread,” but it doesn’t have the same meaning as it would have had for 
people living a few hundred years ago, and, as with many of our foods today, one wonders if our 
ancestors might bite into it and say, “You call this bread?” or, “You call this an apple?” or what 
have you. Here, too, we need to rectify names. Many people do not eat bread but instead eat 
“bread 2.0” or “Frankenbread” or at least “industrialized bread,” and thus we should rather 
expect that our systems might begin to get sensitive and send us signals to stop eating this stuff. 
It’s not really bread, and if we believe in the dictum that Food should be Medicine, then it isn’t 
Food either. It’s not truly nourishing. 
 
The fact that we had, in some sense, killed bread became evident when malnutrition began to rise 
after the introduction of industrialized bread. Once human beings realized they had done 
something insane with bread, we might imagine they would respond something like this: “Well, 
it looks like we shouldn’t do that. Maybe we need to take a great deal of care when we get the 
idea to industrialize something. This has taught us an important lesson. Let’s go back to the old 
way of making bread, and in general do some further contemplation.” But the pattern of insanity 
held them securely, and instead people decided to add synthetic vitamins to bread. It is essential 
to see how this works, and how well it works. Producing wheat flour that one can ship all over 
the world, without worrying that it will go rancid, means one can make a lot of money, and one 
can pull all the old-fashioned millers into new forms of industrialization. Moreover, this also 
opens up the possibility for chemical manufacturers to make more money by producing synthetic 
vitamins. It’s a win all around for the pattern of insanity: the pattern gets strengthened and also 
furthered along; we double down on its “progress”. One obviously sees this in the case of 
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breakfast cereals too. When we look at the ingredients we find synthetic vitamins added to an 
otherwise starkly unnourishing “food”.  
 
That pattern of insanity then continues. As more people develop gluten sensitivity or even full-on 
celiac disease, it might dawn on us that we need to fundamentally change our relationship with 
life, with food, with medicine. We might decide to see into the sacredness of the soul, which 
directs us away from what sickens and weakens us. But, instead, the pattern of insanity holds 
fast: We have an industrial revolution in gluten free “products,” and they flood the marketplace, 
not with food or medicine, but with more industrialized products. It is not necessarily better 
nourishment to eat a cookie or any other product made with potato flour in place of wheat. Soon 
we will have new ailments that arise from treating the potato as we have treated wheat, and 
treating ourselves and our world as the pattern of insanity dictates. 
 
The example of bread doesn’t capture everything about the general pattern of insanity that has us 
in its grips, but once we get the feel for this sort of simplified example we can find it replicated 
in how we have developed industrialized agriculture in various cases, how we have developed 
antibiotic use, and so on. We can also find it in academia. It seems important for academic 
philosophers in particular to sense how this pattern of insanity gets perpetuated in university 
philosophy departments. The activity of these departments may seem rational. A department may 
want to model itself on how top departments in the field function.  
 
A department may, for instance, have lower standing in the rankings of philosophy 
departments—already a strange concept. What is the solution? The department may seek to 
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model itself on what other departments do, thus perpetuating philosophy as it is being done, 
without deep reflection on whether this is the best way to do things—because we often think we 
are trying to do things the best way possible. We say, “I don’t know any other way to do 
philosophy!” by which we mean we think we have it basically correct. Instead of looking at the 
state of the world and humiliating ourselves enough to say, “Something may be seriously wrong 
with the way we do philosophy!” we evade such a humiliating experience, evade any suggestion 
that what is wrong with the world goes together with how we do philosophy. This only furthers 
philosophy’s isolation and alienation from the larger culture and the World—it would have to be 
further isolated to not actively participate in the pattern of insanity, so goes the delusion—and 
thus, even though it seems insane to suggest that philosophy magically stands outside of the 
pattern of insanity, we behave as if this were so, and thus perpetuate the insanity.  
 
Alternatively the department might embrace the spirit of education and philosophy, which 
includes a dimension of pattern transcendence, a willingness to question authority, a willingness 
to cultivate an ecology that thrives on the basis of diversity. A philosophy department could thus 
grow by leaps and bounds (far more growth than the top-ranked programs demonstrate, caught as 
they are in the decline of humanities) if it opened itself up to what students are hungry for, if it 
opened itself up to the suffering of the World, recognizing that students at all levels in a 
university experience this suffering and want to heal it. Who wants to suffer? No one. But 
philosophers offer nothing to heal the suffering. A philosophy department could be a place where 
people come to inquire into the nature of suffering and how to heal it. It could be a place where 
people want to come, to work with their lives and to deal with the problems of the World and the 
problems of their own soul. Such a department would naturally encourage enrollment of students 
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with rather different approaches to philosophizing—even though this seems scary, and we aren’t 
sure how to navigate a situation in which people philosophize in ways we don’t feel comfortable 
with and maybe don’t feel competent to evaluate. But our inquiry invites us to cultivate new 
competencies—indeed to cultivate the old competencies in a new context, to practice-and-realize 
the old competencies of philosophy as a way of life, and to find out what a different way of 
knowing would mean—not to ask for a description of it, not to ask for a summary or explanation, 
but to engage with it, to experiment, to experience, precisely because we see we have gotten 
caught up in a pattern of insanity, that we are lived by powers we pretend to understand, and that 
they arrange our lives and our loves, our cravings, fears, self-doubts, and the degradation of our 
own souls and the soul of the World. 
 
We could have such a revolution in any philosophy department. It would mean hiring different 
people, making a stand to say, “We don’t want the same old thing—no matter how new and 
cutting-edge it appears. We precisely do not want someone who might be poached by Harvard or 
Yale in two years’ time, because all that does is perpetuate the pattern of insanity and possibly 
destabilize the ecology here when they get poached.” Instead, the department would become 
famous for doing things differently, in a radical, rebellious, revolutionary, paradigm shifting 
sense. This does not mean throwing everything away. It means genuinely opening to and 
cultivating ecological diversity, and seeking to cultivate the “major” by looking at where we are 
needed—to become responsive philosophers, to become responsive to the suffering of our own 
present student population and our own lived and living World (which means the local landscape 
as well as interwoven ecologies that may seem far away). This is our most sacred responsibility 
right now because we philosophize while the conditions of life fall apart all around us and in us. 
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How else will we address this? If we continue to do the same basic thing, epistemically speaking 
(and ethically and aesthetically speaking), how will we get a different result? Is it not insanity to 
keep rationalizing this process? 
 
Recall that, in the case of bread, humans industrialized it, and then signs of malnutrition 
appeared. In response to this, instead of thinking we needed to go back to the older way or 
somehow rethink the whole project, humans added synthetic vitamins to the bread. Similarly, at 
some point we began to change the practice of philosophy, altering it into something more 
academic and abstract, proliferating professors of philosophy rather than philosophers. Signs and 
symptoms of malnutrition of the soul begin to spread, soul scurvy set in, reflected in the 
conditions of life as well as in the humans and their now synthetic ecologies. Instead of 
rethinking the project, we supplement the product with more synthetic additives: more cars, more 
administrators, more laptops, more journals, more concepts, more conferences, more footnotes, 
more distinctions, more meetings, more professors in an industrialized philosophy. We in 
academia produce concepts and abstractions that can be shipped all over the world, and 
employed to colonize and control (even if we intend them to decolonize and liberate). We can 
sell books and articles all over the world. We can get on an airplane and fly thousands of miles 
across the planet, and make our living on the activity—make our living on the backs of countless 
sentient beings. Meanwhile, none of this has to do with cultivating vitalizing ecologies we can 
live on, in, through, as. We cultivate ecologies of abstraction—the symbolic life in a pejorative 
sense—but fail to cultivate ecologies of mutual liberation and mutual nourishment (indeed, 
precisely the opposite). Because we produce all these journals and books, because we fly to 
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conferences and then to faraway places to decompress, we need to take more oil out of the 
ground to power the servers, the printers, the laptops, the jets. It all goes together. 
 
It is not that we are alone as philosophers in degrading the culture. No, all of us do it. But 
philosophers should hold themselves to a higher ethical conscience, and somehow we all must 
come together, in communion and community, and say, “This is the only problem we can work 
on right now.” If the past 2500 years of philosophy in the west means anything, it should mean 
that we will not sleepwalk our way back to where Socrates found himself in Athens, but now on 
a global scale. Athenian culture was not monolithic, but a certain kind of monoculture spread, 
leading to the degradation of the culture, and the collapse of the civilization. Similarly, western 
culture as a whole is not monolithic. It’s a group of traditions, and not a matter of race, gender, 
or religion. But an altogetherness has arisen, one we may call conquest consciousness, and it has 
locked us in a pattern of insanity. Will we continue to produce Frankenphilosophy, philosophy 
2.0, industrialized philosophy, the monetized professing of philosophy? Or will we find a better 
way of knowing, informed by our own ancient traditions? 
 
I am not villainizing all of philosophy. I am not sure what is helpful and what isn’t. For all I 
know, the most important insight, the most life-saving insight of all time will come out of the 
current ways of knowing. I only raise the question that maybe there is something important we 
can know in another way of knowing, and that maybe there is something vital that could come 
from a different ecology, a more diverse and realistic ecology. Moreover, it is essential to see 
that professors of philosophy are good people with good hearts. This is no kind of patronizing 
remark. It is an admission that our intentions (as we tend to work with intentions) don’t always 
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suffice. By trying to do the right thing, by trying to function sincerely, by simply living our lives, 
we may yet contribute to the degradation of the conditions of life. Very intelligent and well-
intentioned people may be caught by the pattern of insanity because our intentions, too, have a 
context, one both conscious and unconscious. That context includes our vision of life, and our 
capacity to sense the interwovenness of things. Our intentions become increasingly skillful and 
realistic as they arise with a more sensitive, nuanced, discerning, wise, loving, and beautiful (and 
more beautifully embodied) feel for life. 
 
These contemplations about bread emerged from the more general contemplations about time, 
and the cultural practices that go altogether with a misunderstanding of time (and perhaps it 
bears emphasis that altogetherness does not mean linear causality . . . we need to sense the 
interwovenness of our misunderstanding of self, world, time, nature, and more with the degraded 
condition of the natural world and the human soul). Time is money in our culture. We get trained 
to see money as good, to feel a deep conscious and/or unconscious attraction to money. We get 
trained to think in time, to think about time, to time travel in our minds, rehashing the past over 
and over in guilt, regret, and anger, and spinning ourselves dizzy over the future, in widening 
gyres of hope, fear, anxiety, confusion, hatred, and self-doubt.  
 
Neurosis of various kinds comes altogether with leaving the moment and thinking about the past 
and the future. This leaving the moment—endless attempts to escape from Now, escape from 
Sophia, escape from LoveWisdom—actually makes life feel a bit disjointed. Perhaps 
paradoxically to the western mind, the experience of time Dogen invites us into feels more 
continuous (further challenging our dualistic thinking). Some of the most sophisticated spiritual 
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practices in the World come from the so-called Tantric traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism. 
The meaning of “Tantra” carries various connotations. For one, it relates to thread weaving all 
the way through. In one connotation, it suggests a warp thread that serves as a frame for the 
weaving, the continuousness of a weaving process that patterns forth all our experience (it 
patterns forth life). Another connotation suggests the basic sense of an unbroken continuum of 
mind. Even if mind arises as moment, we can experience an unbroken continuum, and even if we 
experience delusion, fear, suffering, and so on, this mind is continuous with the Nature of Mind. 
In the Tantric traditions, Nature of Mind has no beginning, and thus we can call it an unbroken, 
unborn continuum. 
If escape is what you want, 
Hide within Mind-Essence; 
If you want to run away, 
Flee to the place of Awakeness. 
There is no other place of safe refuge. 
 
Uprooting all confusion from your mind, 
Stay with me here in rest and quiet.  
    ~ Milarepa 
 
When we divide up experience into set workdays, 22-minute sitcoms, 45-minute commutes, 30-
minute yoga classes, 2 hour committee meetings, and so on, we can fall into a disjointed kind of 
experience that only feels continuous because of its incessant drain. We get little genuine rest. 
We feel a continuous barrage of stresses and strains from which we want to escape, but we do 
not have a sense of continuous clarity, ceaseless PracticeRealization. We have no true refuge. 
This happens in large part because of our own mindlessness and the mindlessness of the anti-
Culture. We get pulled from one thing to the next in rather artificial ways—the ping of a text 
message, the receipt of an administrative email, the frustration of unexpected traffic, all the 
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various manifestations of human agendas—not because of a dance with Nature or communion 
with sacredness.  
 
Our news and entertainment holds to strict temporal patterns (e.g. the “sitcom code,” the 
standard pattern for many, many television shows, and the horrifying fact that so-called “news” 
essentially gets produced as entertainment, and so never has much chance of in-forming us on 
the basis of wisdom, love, and beauty) so that our attention can get harvested continuously, 
rather than cultivated and gifted to life.  
 
In a spiritual setting, a rhythmic schedule allows practitioners to enter timelessness—the rupture 
of ordinary time. That can only happen if they forget themselves, which opens them to the 
sacred, liberates them into larger ecologies of mind. But the temporal structuring of the dominant 
culture only seeks to get us to lose ourselves, to keep us open to extraction—of all kinds, at all 
hours. One could argue that every Culture, and every anti-Culture too, relies on trance, and the 
question comes to what kind of trances a Culture makes available. Trance, we could say, 
signifies entrainment, resonance, attunement. These notions carry some kind of synchronizing 
connotation (synchronistic in some way), but they do not necessarily happen in the manner the 
western mind tends to think, based on misunderstanding time. In any case, we can ask: With 
what do we attune? With what should we attune?  
 
Other Cultures have lived radically differently, have tuned and attuned their citizens, their co-
participants, in radically different ways. Let us return to Perlman’s musings: 
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Some of our Ancient Ancestors, Wanderers, left Africa. Or perhaps Africa is not 
the only place where Human People Emerged. Who are we to say for certain? In 
any case, Perlman says of those alleged Wanderers: 
 
The wanderers went to hot lands and cold, to lands with much rain and lands with 
little. Perhaps some felt nostalgia for the warm home they left. If so, the presence 
of their favorite animals, their cousins, compensated for their loss. We can still 
see the homage some of them gave to these animals on cave walls of Altamira, on 
rocks in Abrigo del Sol in the Amazon Valley.  
Some of the women learned from birds and winds to scatter seeds. Some of the 
men learned from wolves and eagles to hunt.  
 
But none of them ever worked. And everyone knows it. The armored Christians 
who later “discovered” these communities knew that these people did no work, 
and this knowledge grated on Christian nerves, it rankled, it caused cadavers to 
peep out. The Christians spoke of women who did “lurid dances” in their fields 
instead of confining themselves to chores; they said hunters did a lot of devilish 
“hocus pocus” before actually drawing the bowstring.  
 
These Christians, early time-and-motion engineers, couldn’t tell when play ended 
and work began. Long familiar with the chores of zeks, the Christians were 
repelled by the lurid and devilish heathen who pretended that the Curse of Labor 
had not fallen on them. The Christians put a quick end to the “hocus pocus” and 
the dances, and saw to it that none could fail to distinguish work from play.  
 
Our ancestors — I’ll borrow Turner’s terms and call them the Possessed — had 
more important things to do than to struggle to survive. They loved nature and 
nature reciprocated their love. Wherever they were they found affluence, as 
Marshall Sahlins shows in his Stone Age Economics. Pierre Clastres’ Society 
Against the State insists that the struggle for subsistence is not verifiable among 
any of the Possessed; it is verifiable among the Dispossessed in the pits and on the 
margins of progressive industrialization. Leslie White, after a sweeping review of 
reports from distant places and ages, a view of “Primitive culture as a whole,” 
concludes that “there’s enough to eat for a richness of life rare among the 
‘civilized.’” I wouldn’t use the word Primitive to refer to a people with a richness 
of life. I would use the word Primitive to refer to myself and my contemporaries, 
with our progressive poverty of life.  
 
The main part of our poverty is that the richness of life of the Possessed is barely 
accessible to us, even to those of us who have not chained our imaginations.  
 
Our professors talk of fruits and nuts, animal skins and meat. They point to our 
supermarkets, full of fruits and nuts. We have an abundance our ancestors didn’t 
dream of, Q.E.D. These are, after all, the real things, the things that matter. And if 
we want more than fruits and nuts, we can go to the theater and see plays; we can 
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even sprawl in front of the TV and consume the entire world-wide spectacle. 
Hallelujah! What more could we want?  
 
Thanks to our professors, we barely have access to our dangerous, demonic, 
possessed ancestors who thought fruits and nuts were not the real things but trivia, 
who abandoned themselves to visions, myths and ceremonies. Thanks to our 
professors, we now know that visions are personal delusions, myths are fairy 
tales, and ceremonies are play-acting which we can see any time in movies.  
 
We even know a lot about Possession. Possession is ownership. We possess 
houses and garages and cars and stereo equipment, and we’re constantly running 
to possess more; there’s no limit to what we want to possess. Surely it must be 
said that possession is our central aim, not theirs.  
Rare is the professor who, like Mircea Eliade, frees himself of the armored vision 
and sees through the iron curtain of inversion and falsification. And even Eliade 
fogs what he sees by claiming to find analogies and vestiges in our world. The 
strait that separates us from the other shore has been widening for three hundred 
generations, and whatever was cannibalized from the other shore is no longer a 
vestige of their activity but an excretion of ours: it’s shit.  
Reduce to blank slates by school, we cannot know what it was to grow up heirs to 
thousands of generations of vision, insight, experience.  
 
We cannot know what it was to learn to hear the plants grow, and to feel the 
growth.  
 
We cannot know what it was to feel the seed in the womb and learn to feel the 
seed in earth’s womb, to feel as Earth feels, and at last to abandon oneself and let 
Earth possess one, to become Earth, to become the first mother of all life. We’re 
truly poor. Thousands of generations of vision, insight and experience have been 
erased.  
 
Instead of abandoning ourselves, instead of savoring what little we can of their 
powers, we define and categorize.  
 
We speak of Matri-archy. The name is a cheap substitute for the experience. It is a 
bargain, and we’re always on the lookout for bargains. Once the name is on the 
door, the door can be closed. And we want doors to stay closed.  
 
The name Matri-archy is on the door of an age when women knew themselves, 
and were known by men, as the conceivers, as the creators of life, as 
embodiments of the first being, as first beings.  
 
To know the name on the door is to know nothing. Knowledge begins on the other 
side of the threshold. Even the name on the door is wrong. Matri refers to mother, 
but archy comes from an altogether different age. Archy refers to government, to 
artificial as opposed to natural order, to an order where the Archon is invariably a 
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man. An-archy would be a better name for the door. The Greek prefix “an” means 
“without.”  
 
On the other side of the threshold, the possessed mother returns to her body and 
proceeds to share her experience with her kin, just as she shares fruits and nuts.  
 
Our tongues would be hanging out for the fruits and nuts. But her sisters, cousins, 
nieces and nephews are hungry for the experience.  
 
 
 . . . . Some of the people who left the human communities remembered some of 
the qualities. They remembered some of the joys of possession — not possession 
of things but possession of Being. 
 
They remembered — but vaguely, foggily. Surrounded by things, they lost the 
ability to express the qualities. They knew the age they had left was more 
valuable, more pure, more beautiful than anything they found since. But their 
language had gone poor. 
 
It’s good to have such long passages to contemplate. Often, we rely on certain authors to save us 
time by condensing the arguments and descriptions of all the books they have read. We don’t 
have time to read widely—and even less time to sit, to walk, to participate in Nature, and learn 
from mountains, rivers, forests, ferns, robins, ravens, whales, wolves, and all our relations, all 
our Elders. If you have time to read this book, maybe consider going walking instead. Or just sit 
quietly. 
If you have time to chatter, 
Read books. 
 
If you have time to read, 
Walk into mountain, desert and ocean. 
 
If you have time to walk, 
Sing songs and dance. 
 
If you have time to dance, 
Sit quietly, you happy, lucky idiot. 
 
~ Nanao Sakai (from Let’s Eat Stars) 
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But if we would like to read a bit, because we sense that reading could in-form a more vitalizing 
practice of life, then let us seek decisive experience, and seek a dispelment of time, a breaking of 
the spell of our misunderstanding. It is a spell of disenchantment, and only enchantment may 
heal us, an enchantment into timelessness. Let us throw out the clock and sit together, 
contemplating with care so that we can reorient our practice of life. 
 
This long passage by Perlman comes from a point of view informed by a study of Culture, a 
study of the soil of soul, which we might call “cultural anthropology,” but which we should call 
Cultural Ecology, and mean by this the interwovenness of Nature and Culture. Considering the 
matter carefully, we might hardly express our stupefaction regarding the dearth of 
“anthropological” and Ecological study in philosophy programs. It would help students 
tremendously if we designed undergraduate and graduate programs that at least made space for 
(if not required, which seems wiser) the proper study of Nature and Culture (“anthropology” not 
as the “study of man,” but as the study of Culture in its nonduality with Nature, Culture as 
Experience). Most students would gain an incredible amount of insight if we would let go of 
making them spend so much time studying Descartes, Kant, and a few other of the darlings of 
institutionalized philosophy (we could even include logic here, which, in the current university 
setting and the current global context, is perhaps one of the silliest courses for both philosophy 
majors and non-majors—excepting those who may want to do work that would presuppose it, 
and those students should be supported with gusto). We do this largely as a matter of 
“scholarship,” and not because we think these hours of study will help students to Cultivate 
Wisdom, Love, and Beauty. Indeed, one cannot easily see how these three weigh into our 
decisions. 
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In the spirit of Cultural Ecology, and sitting together without the clock, so that we may more 
intimately understand each other, let us also consider some long passages from a few remarkable 
“anthropological” accounts, stories of LoveWisdom presenced in Ecologies of practice that have 
given fruit to realizations we can perhaps only damn in western culture. Here we nod to The 
Book of the Damned (1919), by Charles Fort. Fort wrote, “By the damned, I mean the excluded,” 
and he intended his book to present a long procession of the damned, meaning strange 
experiences, the anomalous, including the appearance of objects in the sky. Fort wrote: “The 
power that has said to all these things that they are damned, is Dogmatic Science” (4).80 Does 
that seem too strong a turn of phrase? Damned?  
 
Writing about the way damnable things have appeared in popular culture, where people only 
have time to view them in the form of movies, television shows, and so on, Victoria Nelson 
suggests that contemporary “secular Westerners” are “cut off at the neck from a good portion of 
their own religio-philosophical tradition,” and so, “The greatest taboo among serious 
intellectuals of the century just behind us, in fact, proved to be none of the “transgressions” 
itemized by postmodern thinkers: it was, rather, the heresy of challenging a materialist 
worldview. And few did” (2002: 16). 
 
To challenge time in the way we must means challenging the altogetherness of western 
civilization’s insanity and its scientistic, intellectual taboos. We speak here of a cultural mind, a 
cultural unconscious, and the personal and cultural shadow material we need to confront. The 
                                                 
80 http://www.bahaistudies.net/asma/book_of_the_damned.pdf 
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“shadow” signifies the aspects of ourselves we repress, because they seem heretical or 
unacceptable to our ego. We all—scholars included, and perhaps especially so, given the dogmas 
of “science,” “objectivity,” and “reason” dominant in the academy—we all need to do a better 
job of confronting the unconscious (indeed, Jungian psychologists have written about what an 
ethical revolution would take place if only we would turn and face the unconscious more 
directly). There are unconscious dynamics in our scholarly research that we might beneficially 
inquire into. Nelson has some reflections that bear on this too: 
We should never forget how utterly unsophisticated the tenets of 18th-century 
rationalism have left us, believers and unbelievers alike, in that complex arena we 
blithely dub ‘spiritual’. Even as we see all too clearly the kitsch of New Age 
religiosity and fear the rigidity of rising fundamentalism, we remain alarmingly 
blind to our own unconscious tendencies in this same direction. Our conventional 
secular bias whispers to us that the ideas we see naively articulated on the cinema 
screen (ideas as blasphemous to secular humanists as they are to the religious 
orthodox), if they are to be taken seriously at all, signal a backward slide into 
religious oppression and intolerance. What our perspective does not allow us to 
recognize is the positive and enduring dimension of such ideas when they are 
consciously articulated in our culture. We forget that Western culture is equally 
about Platonism and Aristotelianism, idealism and empiricism, gnosis and 
episteme, and that for most of this culture’s history one or the other has been 
conspicuously dominant—and dedicated to stamping the other out. (288) 
 
Our contemplation of time has to do with getting beyond these dualities, and their back-and-forth 
jostling of the mind, a back-and-forth that unfolds in time. If we consider consciousness that 
does not unfold “in time,” we may encounter the damned, which includes people, Culture, and 
Experience that the rational, scientific mind finds itself needing to reject, reduce, write off, 
deconstruct, discount, critique, marginalize, and so on. What do we fear? 
 
Again, as part of this fear and altogether with the soul’s imperatives, the dominant culture leaves 
us no time to contemplate the strange, the uncanny, the anomalous data that threatens the 
dominant paradigms. The soul won’t let us leave these things alone, so they have no other outlet 
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but mass media, the only place we have time to interact with them, but in a simplified form that 
makes it easy to consume and dismiss. The relationship thus gets watered down, limiting us, 
colluding in some ways with the pattern of insanity. At the same time, it may create moments for 
some people, it may create small interruptions of the pattern of insanity. Overall, we would be 
much better off if philosophers and psychologists worked with this material more actively, 
intimately, and publicly, giving it the care it deserves. In part, we make some attempts at that 
together here. Perhaps, by moving with care, we can sense some of what we fear. 
 
The anthropologist E. Richard Sorenson has offered us a small treasury of consciousness, a 
treasury of ways, a treasury of how-we-do-things (how we could do things), a Treasury of 
Indigenous LoveWisdom. In his work, Sorenson documents the fact that, as he puts it, “basic 
consciousness can differ strikingly across eras” (we could better say, across ecologies, or across 
Nature-Cultures). In particular, he focuses on what he terms “pre-conquest consciousness,” 
exceedingly rare in his time, and more so now (we will consider work he wrote in the 1990’s, 
based on fieldwork that goes back even earlier). He claims that this type of consciousness 
manifested stably in the era before western conquest, and that he had both the great fortune to see 
it functioning, and also the sad misfortune (but relative gift) to see it fall apart under the 
influence of western culture. Sorenson writes, 
The type of consciousness peculiar to that era [the pre-conquest era] 
focuses liminaly, not supraliminally (as is the norm today). It spawns mental 
capabilities, and a sense-of-truth, very different from our modern type. It 
generates a way-of-life that is simultaneously individualistic and collective—
qualities immiscible in modern thought and languages.81 Their fusion in that 
earlier era is one of many indications of the profoundness of the mental gulf 
separating that era from our current one. This premodern type also spawns a 
spontaneous group rapport so alien to our 20th century that modern beings 
                                                 
81 No small point. 
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scarcely can perceive it, much less appreciate it.82 When seized by hostile or 
domineering cultures, this preconquest type of consciousness collapses.83 
The type of consciousness typical to that era focuses on direct sensory 
experience.84 Therefore cognition is not divided into clearly separable units. 
Experience being continuous, not discrete, cannot therefore be managed by syntax 
and logic, as in modern thought.85 The dialectic type of inquiry underlying our 
modern sense-of-truth is but a ship passing in the deepest darkness of the distant 
night to such mentality. Just as invisibly their sense-of-truth evades Western 
sensibility.86 Such differences pose questions not only regarding the 
reconcilability of truth across eras but about mental evolution too.87 For as yet 
there is no way to know whether today’s type of consciousness reflects a positive 
or negative turning in the evolution of mentality.88 (1997: 1) 
 
Sorenson summarizes the characteristics of this pre-conquest consciousness as follows: 
 
1) that their preconquest type of consciousness focuses liminally; 2) that it differs 
fundamentally from the supraliminal type dominant in the world today; 3) that it 
emerges from a sensually empathetic tactile infant nurture common to its era but 
shunned in ours; 4) that it spawns a coalescing of human affect in growing 
children; 5) that this affect coalescence heightens spectacularly during 
adolescence to produce an expansive hypersensual rapport both with people and 
with nature; 6) that such rapport nullifies nascent negative emotions sometimes 
triggered in the course of active living; 7) that the preconquest people are, as a 
result, largely free of negative emotions; and 8) that they are acutely vulnerable to 
negative emotions when in contact with them. (2) 
 
                                                 
82 Another major point. 
83 Yet another. 
84 Quite important. 
85 Again, the duality between the continuous and the discontinuous, and the western habit, 
enshrined in and encouraged by language, to analyze, the break up and eventually break down 
the Living World. 
86 From “scarcely perceive” to “darkness” and “invisibility.” This invisibility matters more than 
we can say. 
87 But, if Paul Shepard and others have it right, our western developmental path involves an 
“ontogenetic crippling,” which means we have in some way devolved. 
88 Far too cautious a statement. We need only look at the conditions of life. Though pre-conquest 
societies too exhibited differences in skill and poise, in their relative wisdom in relating to the 
sacred-creative-patterning of Nature, we can have no doubt regarding the unskillfulness and lack 
of wisdom exhibited by the dominant culture. And, again, the dominant culture could transform 
in ways that allow for the preservation and further cultivation of anything at all which wisdom 
validates as skillful, graceful, ethical, beautiful. 
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This liminality stands out. It may remind us of the notion of the bardo, the between of Tibetan 
Buddhist Philosophy. The book we incorrectly call “The Tibetan Book of the Dead” would more 
properly have the title in English that Robert Thurman gave it: Liberation Upon Hearing in the 
Between. This Between can connote the space between thoughts, the stopping of ordinary 
thinking, the stopping of time, the moment when the bottom drops out and we enter an existential 
free fall, the shift from an agenda-mind into choiceless awareness. Because of the impermanence 
of things, we essentially live continuously at a threshold. If we stop time, we enter, we cross this 
threshold, pass through the gateless gate. Anything could trigger this entering. Spiritual practice 
only means the Art of Entry. We enter in “the Between”—because there is nothing to “enter.” 
 
 
 
Nothing . . . not in the sense of a nihilistic “nothingness,” but in the sense of not “having,” and of 
never-not-already, never-not-complete. Hence, our inquiry can function like a bardo, like a 
Between, if we allow it. In life, we encounter In-Betweenness again and again. What matters is 
what we make with the Between. The Tibetan Sage Milarepa sang out, “The precious pot 
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containing my riches becomes my teacher in the very moment it breaks.” Many of us have 
experienced this—maybe everyone has at least tasted it, felt it in the gut, as a sudden dropping 
out, a sudden “Oh!” when what we were clinging to slipped away from us. The moment of 
bottom-dropping-out places us at the threshold, what Trungpa (1992) called the “mysterious 
ground, which belongs to neither that nor this” (4). Anything that can rupture our “this and that,” 
anything that can rupture what we take for granted (including time), and thus place us at the 
threshold.  
 
Imagine that we really do stand at a threshold—at every moment—but we cannot see it, cannot 
sense it. What would it mean? How and why do we cover it over? How could we let go of the 
covering-over? How could we self-liberate into, across the threshold? 
 
In an ongoing way, we try to get ground under our feet, in the midst of some deeper sense of the 
groundlessness of things, the sense of impermanence, the sense of “firewood gone”. Placing 
things in time and space, knowing by means of our Cartesian coordinate system of concepts, all 
based on a misunderstanding of self, world, time, space, objects . . . this all maintains the illusion 
of control, is the delusion of control, and it ensures we don’t have time to see beyond the illusion 
of time, space, control, barrier, self, object, world. The Between offers a moment of cutting 
through, passing through the barriers and delusions.  
 
What is it that, if we only had time to see, sense, feel, we would see, sense, feel? What is it that 
our busyness conspires to keep us from sensing, receiving, realizing? If we had, not merely “all 
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the time in the world” (which might just as well lead to incredible boredom), but no-time (a 
rupture of time), What might we experience?   
 
“Doing time” means imprisonment. And yet, we all do time every day. We DO time. Dogen, the 
Trobrianders, the Cultures studied by Sorenson, and many Indigenous Cultures and spiritual 
traditions invite us to stop “doing” “time”. This stopping happens in the Between. As Chögyam 
Trungpa put it, the Between itself “is the meditation experience” (1992: 4), and meditation 
experience is what Dogen means by being-moment. Being-moment means we leave the time in 
which we contrive and control, as if we had dropped the contriving of body, mind, self, world, as 
if we suddenly said, “I don’t have time for this anymore,” or, “I don’t have to do this anymore . . 
. I don’t have to live like this.” All the doing stops, the clinging and craving stops, the self-doubt 
and confusion stops. We cross the threshold, and we taste life (sapienza, wisdom as taste), 
experience it intimately—at least for a moment. Culture should provide a context for such 
moments, a context that supports us to realize them (to scientifically verify them, thus verifying 
Nature and Culture, and letting Nature-Culture verify us), and a context that supports us when 
we slip out of them. 
 
Perhaps the Cultures Sorenson studied did not, shall we say, live ceaselessly in the Between. But 
maybe they Practiced-and-Realized a more liminal awareness, an awakeness to threshold, 
awakeness in threshold, a drawing near to the numberless gates, gateless gates of reality that 
appear as each moment. In any case, Sorenson discovered what he called a “hypersensuality” 
that functioned like an energy holding the Culture together in activity. It emerged 
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developmentally in adolescence from what he termed a “sociosensuality” that itself developed in 
childhood.  
 
Sorenson does a fine job detailing the role of Eros in the pre-conquest groups he lived with. But 
let us get a broader vision and see Love at work (in various guises), and see an interwovenness at 
work that we might better term EcoSensual Awareness. Again and again Sorenson describes an 
interbeing with Nature, even if he makes some duality between Nature or the Forces of Nature 
on the one hand, and the humans he observes on the other. Relatively speaking, we can imagine 
those humans, too, can perceive dualistically. Indeed, even in a Culture rooted in wisdom-love-
beauty, realization depends on practice. Put another way: Even in the wisest Culture, not 
everyone becomes equally wise (despite their inherent capacity for wisdom). Though a pre-
conquest Culture may know far more about raising Elders (as opposed to mere “adults”), we 
need not assume sagehood becomes realized by all, or even needs to be (relatively speaking). 
 
Now, this ecosensual awareness (let us see that term where Sorenson uses “hypersensuality,” and 
think it as the aliveness of the threshold, an aliveness and aloveness in the placeless place, the 
atopos, a nonduality of place and placelessness) does not readily appear to our typical mind. It 
belongs to an altogether way of life. And this goes to the heart of our inquiry into knowing. In 
his contribution to the book Tribal Epistemologies, Sorenson brings up knowing in many ways, 
including directly: 
Most anthropologists are aware that what comprise the standard habits, 
inclinations, and activities of humankind in one culture may seem quite exotic in 
another. When the separateness of peoples is extreme, incompatible modes of 
awareness and cognition sometimes arise, as occurred between the preconquest 
and postconquest eras of the world. Basic sensibilities, including sense-of-identity 
and sense-of-truth, were so contradistinctive in these two eras that they were 
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irreconcilable. Even core features of life in one era were imperceptible to people 
in the other. While such disparate cognitive separation may be rare, a single 
occurrence is sufficient to make anthropology an epistemological problem. 
 
Moreover, when irreconcilable modes of cognition emerge within humankind, it 
becomes more obvious that sense-of-truth is the product of mental evolution 
within a particular cultural framework. Epistemology may well be a noetic 
discipline, but it also emerged as a cultural phenomenon from the early Western 
process of civilization in the Mediterranean Basin. As a product of culture, it 
becomes a subject for anthropological inquiry.89 
 
Here we find the suggestion that perception arises as conditioned, and our practices of perception 
limit what we can know, what can even become salient to our consciousness in the first place 
(and what, then, must remain invisible or even nonexistent). We cannot know something that 
never appears, because we cannot allow it to appear, cannot Practice-and-Realize it.  
 
In everyday life, for instance, we may not have a functional capacity to experience an act of 
kindness as an act of kindness. An acquaintance of mine informed me that when her daughter 
transferred schools, from, let us say, a “challenged” public school to a progressive one, she had 
to go through a special interview process. The process became necessary when students from her 
daughter’s original school reliably became violent and stressed when the children at the new 
school tried to be nice to them—not in any special way, but in treating them as they all treated 
one another. The teachers and administrators realized that the new students could not perceive an 
act of kindness, but only saw threats and harassment. The strangeness of these threats (not the 
kind they had grown used to) made them feel violent and stressed. Once they received some 
education on kindness and healthy socialization, the new students calmed down. In order to 
                                                 
89 The full text of his essay is available online as well: 
http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
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avoid problems, the school took to screening new students for the capacity to perceive kindness 
as kindness, and to providing therapeutic education when needed.  
 
This sort of basic experience arises all over the place. For instance, beginning Tango dancers 
face an incredible challenge in seeing what happens when two even slightly advanced dancers 
dance. Relational-dynamism that never occurs in ordinary life appears like sparks of embers, 
flickering briefly then fading. All sorts of things happen that the beginner simply cannot see. 
Same with a beginner in life. We need to keep a Beginner’s Mind, but learning still happens, and 
we must value it—without reifying it into “expertise”.  
 
Sorenson admits difficulty seeing. He admits that, because the “type of refined collective 
hypersensuality” he observed “does not occur in the West,” he could not be considered an adult 
in these groups (a possible case of perceived ontogenetic crippling). Developmentally speaking, 
“the capability for advanced hypersensuality comes only after adolescence,” an adolescence of 
nurturing in the womb of sociosensuality, and the larger wombs of the ecosensual awareness of 
the adults and elders as well as the womb of Nature. The roots of ecosensual awareness thus 
begin to reach into the soil and the soul (something more than what we in the west call 
“ecoliteracy,” a symptomatically western textual term, as if we cannot allow ourselves to realize 
Nature if Nature transcends our words and concepts, if we have to renounce our addiction to 
labels and labeling, if we have to quiet our chatter, forgo our cleverness, and listen with a non-
conceptual dimension of ourselves). Given this, Sorenson writes, “despite my age, I belonged 
with the children. And it’s what seemed to be expected” (1998: 47). 
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How does this development unfold? Sorenson details a remarkable kind of child rearing, with 
infants and little children cradled in the ecosensual awareness of the adults (the advanced form, 
what Sorenson calls “hypersensuality”) and of the other children (the preliminary form, 
“sociosensuality”). The children are, more properly speaking, cradled in the ecosensual 
awareness of life—not merely the ecosensuality of other sentient beings, but the ecosensuality of 
sentient being, something close to primordial awareness.90 According to Sorenson: 
The outstanding social condition is a sociosensual type of infant and child nurture 
that spawns an intuitive group rapport and unites people without need for formal 
rules. The outstanding psychological condition is heart-felt rapprochement based 
on integrated trust. This provides remarkable efficiency in securing needs and 
responding to nature’s challenges while dispensing ongoing delight with people 
and surroundings . . . 
 
. . . . in the deep New Guinea forests I was dumbfounded by the lush sensuality of 
infant care I saw . . . infants were kept in continuous bodily contact with mothers 
                                                 
90 We must, of course, take great care here. We cannot enter these Cultures, and we must avoid 
co-opting them. The question of whether Indigenous Cultures share certain commonalities of 
vision has received an affirmative answer from many Indigenous people (see the work of 
Gregory Cajete, Jeanette Armstrong, Evan Pritchard, and others). The further question of 
whether some of these commonalities also appear in various spiritual traditions has also received 
an affirmative answer (see the work of Peter Gold, Stanley Krippner, Michael Harner, and 
others). We seek here to challenge the way of knowing of the dominant culture, and we seek the 
possibility of better ways of knowing. We contemplate a certain set of possibilities, and we draw 
on a variety of sources to illuminate their potential meaning and significance. For instance, here 
we want to consider ecosensual awareness, and we look to the study of Culture for possible 
manifestations of this, for it means nothing if we cannot practice-and-realize it. We cannot 
indulge in mere hypotheticals or in mere theory. We need to know, and knowing means 
realization. If an individual or group have potentially incorporated a possibility we might want 
to open to, we should inquire into it. Through a multi-culturally enriched vision, we can sense 
the sheer conditioned nature of our experience, sense how differently we might experience life, 
and thus sense that what matters has to do with seeing this conditioned nature, seeing how 
experience depends on practice. Seeing this, we see the vital nature of practice itself, and how it 
goes altogether with realization, and thus how some practices better express this very Nature of 
practice, this co-dependent arising of our experience. In looking with humility at other cultures, 
we practice on the one hand the respect that says of another culture’s wisdom, “I accept that,” 
and we practice on the other the experience of the saint as outlined by Chesterton: We allow 
Sophia to illuminate all things for us, including other cultures, and in turn our own. We can only 
understand or wonderstand by means of Her illumination (and thus only by means of our own 
capacity to presence WisdomLoveBeauty), so let us acknowledge that, and proceed with care. 
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or the mothers’ friends—on laps when they were seated, on hips, under arms, 
against backs, or on shoulders when they were standing. Even during intensive 
food preparation, or when heavy loads were being moved, babies were not put 
down. They had priority. 
There was always a place for them against the body of a ‘mother’ or close 
associate. Loads could be shed or lightened, but babies were simply not put down, 
not deprived of constant, ever-ready, interactive body contact—even when the 
group was on the move under difficult conditions. Babies responded to this 
blanket of ever-ready empathetic tactile stimulation by tactile responses of their 
own. Very quickly they began assembling a sophisticated tactile-speech to 
transmit desires, needs, and states of mind. They didn’t whine or cry to get 
attention; they touched. While babies everywhere are liminally aware, the 
constant empathetic tactile contact required to produce a sophisticated type of 
preverbal communication is rare—except among preconquest peoples. 
Eliciting delight from babies was a desired social norm, and attentive 
tactile stimulation was the daily lot of infants. It included protracted body-to-body 
caressing, snuggling, oral sensuality, hugging, fondling, and kissing. The 
seductive aspect of the play was frequently collective as older children singly or 
in combination used their inventive wiles to delight a baby. In their hamlets 
crying might be heard in reaction to accidental pain, but I don’t recall a single 
case of disgruntled whining or demanding crying.91 
 
Elsewhere he describes what further unfolds this way: 
 
By age seven, children had started to spontaneously pool behavior and affect in 
wordless synchrony toward ad hoc common ends. It was during adolescence that 
rapport deepened to produce a rapid flow of independence merged with unity. It 
merged individualistic impulse with synchronous activity. As they moved 
together, these groups of teenagers constantly enlivened each one all the others by 
a spirited individualistic input into a unified at-oneness. In English (and other 
Western languages) such a state is terminologically contradictory—e.g., 
impossible, that is, beyond Western understanding. There are no good words for it 
even in the Oxford Unabridged. When words are used to describe it, they bump 
clumsily against each other, as in “individualistic . . . unified at-oneness”—
another indication of the gap separating preconquest mentality from that of today. 
(1997: 6) 
 
Sorenson tries to get us to see the effectively vast gap between liminal awareness and experience 
on the one hand, and the consciousness and experience of the dominant culture on the other. 
Because of the pervasiveness of the dominant culture, and because its presence leads to the 
                                                 
91 http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
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breakdown of threshold awareness and experience, we have little or no understanding of it in the 
dominant culture. We do not observe it, and we do not cultivate it, do not practice-and-realize it. 
In terms of a way of knowing, this kind of threshold awareness leads to a different sense of 
things like identity, number, space, truth, individual, collective, and more. Recall that this 
threshold awareness leads to groups that manifest a simultaneity or synchronicity of the 
“individual” and the “collective”. We cannot conceive of it, and we seem to have a hard time 
perceiving it when we might encounter it. Sorenson says, “Two unorthodox procedures going 
beyond the dialectic approach to truth of our Western culture were required to bring an important 
type of nonwestern consciousness to light.”92 In other words, he relied on a more rigorous 
practice-realization, more than analyzing and constructing texts. 
In the course of daily living in a variety of preconquest enclaves, a clear, though 
undefinable, commonalty of sensibility sometimes connected across cultural 
barriers, even in the absence of a common language. It required spontaneous, 
instinctive friendship beyond the level of ordinary discourse, as when a heart-felt 
liking for someone simply just arose. As mystical as that might seem, the affect 
exchanges then made possible led to sustained, adaptive, experiential interactions 
much deeper than those enabled merely by conversation. Experiential depth is 
what eventually revealed the major role played by affect coordination in 
preconquest life. Without this nonverbal crosscultural bridge, it would not have 
been possible to grasp why preconquest mentality was so vulnerable to anger, 
deceit, greed, and aggression. Nor would it have been possible to notice crucial 
subtleties of sense-of-name, sense-of-space, sense-of-number, sense-of-truth, and 
sense-of-emotion.93 
 
Doesn’t it seem interesting that Sorenson says this threshold awareness might appear “mystical” 
to our ordinary consciousness? And what should we make of its vulnerability to anger, deceit, 
greed, and aggression—in light of the fact that it seems every spiritual tradition in the World has 
teachings about how to work with these, often seeing this work as fundamental to spiritual 
                                                 
92 http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
93 http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
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transformation? Meanwhile the philosophy of the dominant culture seems to encourage the 
practice and realization of these very characteristics, and philosophers in the academy do little to 
teach students how to transform. The cultivation of states of anger, greed, aggression, and deceit 
go altogether with conquest, and this leads to the total breakdown of threshold awareness. We in 
the dominant culture live in a context that encourages the invisibility of threshold awareness, 
discourages its cultivation, and then encourages and even insists upon its dissolution if it were to 
somehow arise. What are we not able (or at least far from likely) to become conscious of, simply 
by living in the dominant culture? What does the culture make likely as our experience? What 
does it make likely as our world? The general answer seems to be something degraded, limited, 
limiting. 
 
Altogether with our misunderstanding of time comes a misunderstanding of space and place. 
Sorenson gives the following considerations regarding threshold awareness and space: 
Just as body language originated in empathetic responsiveness to affect, so did 
sense-of-space. These preconquest people had no standard way to partition lands, 
to measure time and distance, to project abstract boundaries onto regions, or to 
impose abstract spatial concepts. Geographic sensibility was simply affect 
relationships thrust out onto surroundings. Such geography was haphazard and 
rarely uniform. It fluctuated over time, from place-to-place and from individual-
to-individual. 
 
Meaningfulness emerged from the affect associated with a place—e.g., comfort, 
excitement, enjoyment, eagerness, interest, delicious foods, good company, etc. 
Such ‘geographical’ entities had recognizable centers, but they overlapped and 
graded imperceptibly into one another—just as did their kinship and their 
languages. Such geography, though clear enough at centers of rapport, was 
indistinct and fuzzy where affect association lessened or became ambiguous. All 
boundaries, spatial and otherwise, were therefore hazy, inconsistent, and 
ambiguous. 
 
Navigating such affect-space is not at all like barreling down the Beltway to 
Bethesda or even going to Mars. Feelings mattered, not hours, kilometers, or 
abstract directions. When I meandered through the forests within the affect-space 
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of New Guinea friends, one and then another would branch to complex, divergent 
different paths, regrouping variously along the way—because that’s how their 
affect-geographies were panning out that day. At first traveling in affect-space 
seemed entirely unworldly—much too indirect, labyrinthine, snail-paced, and 
intellectually disorderly. I conceived space through maps and compasses, 
schedules and boundaries, and was geared mentally to a Euclidean sense-of-space. 
I was map cognitive. Among these people, feelings about locales were what 
mattered, and it was feelings that defined them. Arbitrary geographical divisions 
were devoid of such meaning, so had no relevance to them and were 
unrecognized. A locale’s name varied according to the numerous affect relations 
different people had with it. There were no abstract sectionings of space, no 
geometric projections onto space, no projected boundaries to undo their sense of 
interdigitation. 
 
 
. . . . When I first went into the region I was still a somewhat cocky Westerner 
with little crosscultural sensibility. I repeatedly tried to get my point across with 
maps and compasses and even aerial photographs. All useless. Every time I tried 
to explain a-to-b directness, boundaries, or standard measures, though they 
seemed eager to get the point, they eventually just went blank. 
 
Some concluded I was playing word games and would simply laugh. In those 
days the territory was mapped only in the very crudest sense (from hastily 
produced World War II aerial photographs without ground information). So 
reliance on local friends was the only way I could find my way around. My 
overwhelming daily problem was how to guess which local friends might have the 
most favorable socio-geography for where I had to go that day. It was grievously 
perplexing at first—then it became a deeply moving introduction into the world of 
affect-geography.94 
 
The role of affect, touch, intuition, and sensitivities that go beyond abstraction, beyond ordinary 
talking, should stand out. One feels one’s way through life, through Nature. It involves a felt 
sense arising altogether with a clarity of awareness, a stability of heart-mind, a synchronicity of 
heart-mind-body-world-cosmos, a groundedness in the groundlessness, a centering that thrives as 
precariousness spontaneously unfolds. It’s a Jazz state of being, improvised by the soul, in 
concert with the souls of countless sentient beings, the soul of sentient being. 
 
                                                 
94 http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
331 
 
One shortcoming we might note in Sorenson’s description has to do with the sense of affect-
geography (perhaps already an unskillful expression) getting reduced to “projection”. While 
Sorenson rightly says that we project boundaries onto Nature, he still says the Indigenous People 
“thrust” affect into it. This seems an artifact of western thinking. Perhaps it did not occur to 
Sorenson to try and experience the interwovenness of Nature-and-Culture, of organism-and-
environment. He keeps them separate. According to the western mind, affect like this must 
reduce to a “projection,” for it could not have any reality as a co-creation-discovery of Human-
and-Nature. One must wonder how many non-western languages even have a word for “nature”. 
Why have one word for “humans” and then another word for “everything else”? To have a word 
that orients us toward the sacredness, to the sacred-creative-ordering makes sense. But western 
culture consistently dualizes “nature” and “culture,” “organism” and “environment”. Geography 
as wildness, as Nature, surely presences the precariousness of Nature, of Natural Wildness. One 
finds no paved roads. Moving, living, means way-making that is way-seeking. Why not imagine 
that the making-seeking gets guided by felt sense, or, better put, a whole heart-mind-body-world-
cosmic sense-making, a total dynamism, a wholeness of activity, and that this sense-making co-
arises as Nature, as Nature-Culture? Indeed, we would better err by calling this a process of 
reception, rather than “projection”—indeed a much more skillful error, a skillful means of 
expression in the right context, because we cannot hear the World when we will not listen, and 
have no time to listen, to sit quietly and receive our proper use and function. We cannot receive 
the World’s ceaseless invitations and inspirations of co-discovery-creation. We cannot sense the 
interwovenness of all things, and yet we must if we want a better way of knowing, because 
evidently human mind co-arises with other minds in, through, as the living landscape, the 
wholeness of Nature. This altogetherness is, much to the chagrin of conquest consciousness, 
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inconceivable, and thus attempts to conceive and control seem like a joke. And so the Indigenous 
People would laugh at Sorenson. It is as funny as, “Sell me your land.” These go altogether, and 
from this altogetherness arise many tragedies. Again, we are not narrow-mindedly picking on 
“white” people here. We inquire into a style of consciousness, one Sorenson will remind us does 
not exclusively appear in western culture, but one which the western bundle of traditions seems 
to have brought to a zenith. 
 
Perhaps a better way of knowing invites us into the Between, neither “projection” nor mere 
“reception”. Perhaps it does this in part by telling us of the one who dwells in the Between: 
The Shaman—one who knows— 
took seven steps  
into the other side 
and returned 
to tell us something 
we could not understand 
perhaps to Love. 
 
The origin of the steps 
we could not determine 
the energy of the steps 
we could not detect with our detectors, 
Geiger Counters of reason and reconstruction, 
we could not calculate with the compass of ideas 
the direction of his steps, 
nor could the transit of thought  
triangulate the location  
of the first step  
or the last. 
All conjecture failed, 
our various mental states failed, 
speech failed, for we could not label it, 
and where speech seemed driven to make distance, 
to push away and make firm boundaries, 
the Shaman Expressed Interwovenness. 
 
All extrapolation in our column-and-row assault 
failed to find a boundary, 
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we could not see any other land or is- 
land, but we knew he Spoke 
in Gestures and Incantations of Intimacy, 
we knew he Conjured the Moon and Sun. 
We knew he did not begin or end 
but he would die 
somehow like the rest of us 
or maybe more. 
Some said he carried the Blue Stone of an alchemist, 
that It Spoke to him. 
I never saw such a stone 
never heard its Voice, 
but I knew he kept a Fiery Bird 
in the branches of his chest 
and once I felt its Rhythm. 
 
We seem to launch a column-and-row assault on life, using numbers, words, beliefs, concepts to 
keep life at a distance, to overwrite Experience and maintain delusion. Number and time go 
together in the dominant culture, and Sorenson notes that the alternative Sense of Space he 
observed extends to number: 
Counting, like boundaries, took on importance only where supraliminal 
consciousness was developing, i.e., in the agricultural regions of the north where 
sweet potato had become the staple. In the forests of the south, where liminal 
consciousness was most highly evolved, few could count above five without great 
effort. They had no precise names for higher numbers, and scarcely any for the 
lower digits. The word for five was a cognate of their word for hand. Some 
understood that several hands meant larger quantities; but beyond two hands (ten) 
the word was usually ‘many’. Sometimes a foot would be added, or a nose. One 
friend added his penis in a humorous demonstration of the foolishness of taking 
the task of counting seriously. When it was erect, he said, it was worth even more. 
Quantity was impressionistic, not numerical. What mattered was the magnitude of 
collective joy produced—not how many items could be counted. Depending on 
taste and circumstance, a single unit might be more important than many units at 
another time or place. Plants and animals collected during hunting-gathering were 
rarely of the same size and kind, so counting rarely had much point. Counting was 
indeed like mixing penises with toes, and just as foolish, which was the point my 
friend was trying to make.95 
 
                                                 
95 http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
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This must sound strange to us. What would we do if we couldn’t count beyond five dollars, 
couldn’t purchase eggs by the dozen, couldn’t count private property in hundreds of acres, 
couldn’t fill oil barrels by the billions? Let’s not rush.  
 
Nietzsche has some interesting suggestions to aid our inquiry. Here he addresses himself to 
“scientists” and “scientific thinkers”: 
Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us like this—reduced to 
a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion for mathematicians? 
Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity: that is a 
dictate of good taste, gentlemen, the taste of reverence for everything that lies 
beyond your horizon. That the only justifiable interpretation of the world should 
be one in which you are justified because one can continue to work and do 
research scientifically in your sense (you really mean, mechanistically?)—an 
interpretation that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching, 
and nothing more—that is a crudity and naivete, assuming that it is not a mental 
illness, an idiocy. 
. . . A “scientific” interpretation of the world, as you understand it, might 
therefore still be one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the world, 
meaning that it would be one of the poorest in meaning. This thought is intended 
for the ears and consciences of our mechanists who nowadays like to pass as 
philosophers and insist that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and last laws on 
which all existence must be based as on a ground floor. But an essentially 
mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world. (GS 373, “Science” 
as a prejudice) 
 
Existence as “an indoor diversion” . . . an indoor diversion for mathematicians, philosophers, 
coders, gamers, binge-watchers, shoppers, gamblers, consumers of every kind . . . What a strange 
thought. What do we practice and realize? 
 
Nietzsche might have enjoyed the joke of sticking body parts into the process of counting—
embodiment as a sensitive critique of the activity of disembodying, abstracting, dividing up—
and embodiment as a return to meaningfulness. Earlier in the same section, he speaks a bit more 
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broadly, to scholars in general—many of whom think of themselves as “scientific” in one way or 
another, and who must, consciously or not, bend a knee at the altar of scientific materialism: 
It follows from the laws of the order of rank that scholars, insofar as they belong 
to the spiritual middle class, can never catch sight of the really great problems and 
question marks; moreover, their courage and their eyes simply do not reach that 
far—and above all, their needs which led them to become scholars in the first 
place, their inmost assumptions and desires that things might be such and such, 
their fears and hopes all come to rest and are satisfied too soon.  
 
We have no time to seek deeper nourishment and satisfaction. Most people in academia work on 
problems they can tackle, problems, in a sense, they can conquer and control—which might 
mean the narrowest, most boring type of question. We don’t have time for more. We don’t have 
time for boldness, but only for conquest—mistaking the self as conquistador, the presencing of 
aggression, for the self-as-refuge, the self-in-mutuality, a genuine fearlessness.  
 
This not-having-time-for-boldness has become especially problematic in philosophy. Recall how 
Walter Kaufmann put it, speaking about philosophy in particular: “What used to be a rare 
vocation for uncommon individuals who took a bold stand has become an industry involving 
legions”—an industry, an industrial lovewisdom, made up of legions (a term for armies)—and 
those legions cannot encourage themselves or their students to work on questions like the ones 
Spinoza and Hume inquired into (1972: 47). But even Kaufmann seems to miss the issue of 
practice. He does get at it in one way, but in this passage he focuses on having the time and the 
boldness for writing great books, and he says that no one in the university encourages themselves 
or their students to write such books precisely because “these books are so great and so bold” 
(47). Set the books aside: We do not have time for boldness. Nor do we have Practices for 
Realizing boldness, fearlessness, wisdom, equanimity, great love, great joy. What is boldness? 
Not mere intellectual daring. This Kaufmann sees in part, but he does not always emphasize, 
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perhaps as a consequence of his own intellectualism—though I think of him as a person of action 
as well. Nevertheless, even this criticism should give academics pause, and it applies far beyond 
the domain of philosophy. Moreover, it applies far beyond any single domain, but applies as 
much to the fact that we do not have communities of inquirers composed of philosophers, artists, 
and scientists together working on demanding questions and challenges, working alongside 
members of a local community, as part of a spiritual democracy or a spiritual “anarchy” (if we 
understand the latter term to indicate much more than mere “lawlessness” and chaos). What 
truths, what truthfulness, what knowing have we cut ourselves off from because we limit our 
Ecologies of Practice-and-Realization? In our universities, the scientists do their work, the 
philosophers do another work (at times trying to mimic the scientists), the artists yet another 
(perhaps establishing their identity in contrast to science, or in countless other ways inviting 
unconscious limitations). Two scientists, even in the same general field (say, physics), may have 
difficulty truly understanding one another, to say nothing of two scientists in relatively differing 
fields (say, physics and biology). How would an artist help the scientist? How would members of 
the community help? How might the philosopher help them all? As for the latter question, we 
could make a minimal suggestion along these lines: 
 
Every good musician can play competently. They can reliably pick up their instrument and make 
music worth hearing. But all good musicians know the difference between playing competently 
and entering a rarer space in which they transcend their ordinary mind and the music comes alive 
in a more compelling, almost miraculous way. In such a case, the musician may hear a recording 
of the performance and say, “Wow. How did I ever do that?” In fact, they know they did not 
“do” that music. Somehow, the music played itself, as if by an act of grace. And yet, perhaps 
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paradoxically in relation to our innate sense of self, the musician feels most alive, most 
empowered, and most authentic in such moments. 
 
Similarly, a painter knows what it is like to visit this same space of inspiration, such that the 
painting in some sense paints itself. The artist must not only visit this space of inspiration for the 
art to flow, but they must find ways of, so to speak, keeping the smaller parts of the psyche in 
balance when they attempt to take control of the process, for this can derail the flow of 
inspiration, and the artist would then fall into making the painting from a more narrow place. 
 
The philosopher’s job is to facilitate entrance into this space of inspiration, this bardo, this 
Between, as well as facilitating an ongoing presence in that space—as a way of life, ecosensual 
awakeness as living, loving experience. This is the space from which, through which, as which a 
better knowing arises, and we can think of it as an epistemic space, a space of more skillful 
knowing. The scientist already relies on it as much as the artist, and this is indeed part of why 
collaboration between art, science, and philosophy (artists, scientists, philosophers, and the 
general public) can function so well: Better ways of knowing, no matter what kind, arise from 
the same space of inspiration, and they arise only as we liberate ourselves into larger ecologies of 
mind, which of course already involve the interwovenness of the things we currently refer to as 
“science,” “art,” “philosophy,” and so on. They already involve the interwovenness of what we 
would call a “problem” or “question” and its “resolution” or “answer”. 
 
This is not a reified space. We cannot point to it, and there is no formula or recipe for entering it. 
There are only practices and insights cultivated in the philosophical/spiritual/religious traditions 
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of the World which help us to bring this space to realization, in, through, as our own way-
seeking/way-making. All cultures have depended on this space, this spaciousness of inspiration, 
and some of them have invested considerable resources in the cultivation of practices that 
facilitate entrance to it, liberation in, through, as this spaciousness that we already are. The west 
is unique in marginalizing such practices, relying on willy-nilly entrance to it (many people 
cannot enter it well at all, a few can enter it with some reliability, but almost no one has learned 
to dwell there for any length of time, save the atopos philosopher, the saint, the sage—and even 
these would perhaps benefit from what we have learned from all cultures up to the present day, 
including the western traditions), and this has consequently produced some rather narrow 
theories and practices that bring about significant negative side-effects, such as mass pollution, 
mass extinction, and the threat of climate collapse and global conflict. Only more skillful 
entrance into and abiding in, through, and as this spaciousness, which we may call Original 
Mind (source of all genuinely Original Thinking, as opposed to the mere novelty of “thinking 
outside the box”), can resolve the complex problems that now confront us. It is perhaps too early 
to suggest such things. We will need to contemplate further. But we have come far enough to 
make such suggestions at least tentatively, as hypotheses we would need to verify by means of 
experiment. 
 
Entrance into Original Mind relies on the synchronization, the synchronicity of heart-mind-body-
world-cosmos. Though we have used this formulation many times, it may still sound 
cumbersome or strange, but we need precision if we want to shift our own and the larger 
culture’s way of knowing, and these five dimensions have precise meanings that translate into 
precise qualities of practice. This we will need to outline in more detail in future work, but we 
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have sketched some of it already in the present inquiry, and will sketch more details as we go. 
Suffice it to say, epistemology is in one sense a study of embodiment and embeddedness. A 
better way of knowing will not truly help us (not truly be a better way of knowing) if it does not 
arise as a kind of ecosensual awareness, something that positively transforms our embodiment. 
 
Nietzsche captured a core aspect of any realistic epistemology when he asked, “To what extent 
can truth endure incorporation?” This is only to ask, “To what extent are humans capable of 
actually knowing better?”—because there can be no disembodied knowing in this World of ours, 
and better ways of knowing can only manifest by means of more skillful and poised embodiment 
(we can call this the formal transcendence of the fallacy of context). We must become more 
graceful, more fluid, more artistic and scientific in our way of moving in the World, our way of 
Cultivating the World onward (i.e. in the sense of Nature-Culture nonduality), in our way of 
relating to ourselves and others, in our way of touching and being touched, speaking and 
listening, thinking with life-promoting vision, thinking in, through, as vitalizing ecologies. And 
now Nietzsche’s question becomes more urgent, because we can see that, especially for a planet 
of almost 8 billion humans, we must also ask, “To what extent can we endure, can life as we 
know it endure, if we fail to better incorporate truth?” This is not a matter of epistemic absolutes, 
but a question of the skillfulness or unskillfulness of our whole way of life, which we cannot 
ever untangle from our way of knowing. Philosophy has only to do with knowing better by living 
better, and living better by knowing better. Philosophy and spirituality teach us the altogether 
shift into better ways of knowing, thus liberating in us our fullest capacity to cultivate the whole 
of life onward. Science and art (like all human endeavors) must be in service to life, not in 
service to any typical human agenda (what Gregory Bateson referred to as “conscious purpose”), 
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and philosophy helps all of us take up that fundamental act of service, which amounts to a 
“higher” purpose, which we need not conceive in any dogmatically “religious” sense, but which 
we can all of us—theist and atheist alike—see as the meaning of life. 
 
We should treat these reflections still as seeds, and even by the end of our inquiry they will 
remain barely germinated hypotheses. For now, let us clarify them as hypotheses by considering 
a few other characteristics in what amounts to a kind of existence proof of alternative ways of 
knowing, ways that might relate differently what we call the artistic, the scientific, and the 
spiritual. The features of naming, truth, and emotions that Sorenson outlines deserve careful 
contemplation. Let us begin with emotions: 
Emotions 
Nascent negative emotions spontaneously faded within the general ambience of 
empathetic rapport. This affected recognition of emotions. When we showed 
photographs of, for example, full-blown anger, the people least touched by 
outside cultural forces, became strangely agitated. Some went dumb. Others were 
entirely tongue-tied. Many trembled, perspired profusely, or looked wildly all 
about. Not just confounded, they were fearful too. In the communities of intuitive 
rapport, full-blown negative emotions were rarely seen (if ever). They knew little 
of such things. To see full-blown anger in our photographs left them stunned, 
frightened, and disoriented. Even in photos not intended to show anger, they 
zeroed in on subtle anger traces not noticed by people in more aggressive cultures. 
(1997: 8) 
 
Sorenson’s description brings to mind one from another anthropologist, one who spent a great 
deal of time in Ladakh, both in its pre-conquest and post-conquest state: 
At the end of one summer, I went with Ngawang Paljor, a sixty-year-old thanka painter, 
to Srinagar in Kashmir. He was traditionally dressed in woolen goncha, hat, and yak-hair 
boots, and in the Kashmiris’ eyes he was obviously from the “backward” region of 
Ladakh. Wherever we went, people made fun of him; he was constantly teased and 
taunted. Every taxi driver, shopkeeper, and passerby in some way managed to poke fun at 
him. “Look at that stupid hat!” “Look at those silly boots!” “You know, those primitive 
people never wash!” It seemed incomprehensible to me, but Ngawang remained 
completely unaffected by it all. He was enjoying the visit and never lost the twinkle in his 
eye. Though he was perfectly aware of what was going on, it just didn’t seem to matter to 
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him. He was smiling and polite, and when people jeeringly shouted the traditional 
Ladakhi greeting, “Jule, jule!” he simply answered “Jule, jule!” back. “Why don’t you 
get angry?” I asked. “Chi choen?” (“What’s the point?”) was his reply. Ngawang’s 
equanimity was not unusual. The Ladakhis possess an irrepressible joie de vivre. Their 
sense of joy seems so firmly anchored within them that circumstances cannot shake it 
loose. You cannot spend any time at all in Ladakh without being won over by the 
contagious laughter.  
At first I couldn’t believe that the Ladakhis could be as happy as they appeared. It 
took me a long time to accept that the smiles I saw were real. Then, in my second year 
there, while at a wedding, I sat back and observed the guests enjoying themselves. 
Suddenly I heard myself saying, “Aha, they really are that happy.” Only then did I 
recognize that I had been walking around with cultural blinders on, convinced that the 
Ladakhis could not be as happy as they seemed. Hidden behind the jokes and laughter 
had to be the same frustration, jealousy, and inadequacy as in my own society. In fact, 
without knowing it, I had been assuming that there were no significant cultural 
differences in the human potential for happiness; it was a surprise for me to realize that I 
had been making such unconscious assumptions, and as a result I think I became more 
open to experiencing what was really there.  
Of course the Ladakhis have sorrows and problems, and of course they feel sad 
when faced with illness or death. What I have seen is not an absolute difference; it is a 
question of degree. Yet the difference in degree is all-significant. As I return each year to 
the industrialized world, the contrast becomes more and more obvious. With so much of 
our lives colored by a sense of insecurity or fear, we have difficulty in letting go and 
feeling at one with ourselves and our surroundings. The Ladakhis, on the other hand, 
seem to possess an extended, inclusive sense of self. They do not, as we do, retreat 
behind boundaries of fear and self-protection; in fact, they seem to be totally lacking in 
what we would call pride. This doesn’t mean a lack of self-respect. On the contrary, their 
self-respect is so deep-rooted as to be unquestioned. (Norberg-Hodge, 1992: 83-4) 
 
Similarly, the linguist Daniel Everett who lived among the Amazonian Pirahãs shares these 
general impressions near the end of his book, Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: 
Groups like the Pirahãs offer novel, deeply useful, and alternative 
examples of how to deal with perennial and ubiquitous problems such as violence, 
rape, racism, the treatment of disabled members of society, child-parent relations, 
and so on. The fact, for example, that no Amazonian group that I have worked 
with has “motherese” or baby talk—that is, a special, watered-down way of 
talking to little children—is interesting. The Pirahãs lack of baby talk seems to be 
based on the belief of Pirahã adults that all members of the society are equal and 
thus that children should not be treated any differently from adults, by and large. 
Everyone has responsibility for the community and everyone is cared for by the 
community.  
Looking more closely at Pirahã language and culture, there are other, 
equally important lessons for us. The Pirahãs show no evidence of depression, 
chronic fatigue, extreme anxiety, panic attacks, or other psychological ailments 
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common in many industrialized societies. But this psychological well-being is not 
due, as some might think, to a lack of pressure. It is ethnocentric to suppose that 
only industrialized societies can produce psychological pressure, or that 
psychological difficulties are found only in such societies.  
True, the Pirahãs don’t have to worry about paying their bills on time or 
which college to select for their children. But they do have life-threatening 
physical ailments (such as malaria, infection, viruses, leish-maniasis, and so on). 
And they have love lives. And they need to provide food every day for their 
families. They have high infant mortality. They regularly face dangerous reptiles, 
mammals, bugs, and other creatures. They live with threats of violence from 
outsiders who frequently invade their land. When I am there, with a much easier 
life than the Pirahãs themselves have, I still find that there is plenty for me to get 
worked up about. The thing is, I do get worked up, but they do not.  
 I have never heard a Pirahã say that he or she is worried. In fact, so far as I 
can tell, the Pirahãs have no word for worry in their language. One group of 
visitors to the Pirahãs, psychologists from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Brain and Cognitive Science Department, commented that the 
Pirahãs appeared to be the happiest people they had ever seen. I asked them how 
they could test such a statement. They replied that one way might be to measure 
the time that the average Pirahã spends smiling and laughing and then to compare 
this with the number of minutes members of other societies, such as Americans, 
spend smiling and laughing. They suggested that the Pirahãs would win hands 
down. In the more than twenty isolated Amazonian groups I have studied over the 
past thirty years, only the Pirahãs manifest this unusual happiness. Many others, if 
not all, that I have studied are often sullen and withdrawn, torn between the desire 
to maintain their cultural autonomy and to acquire the goods of the outside world. 
The Pirahãs have no such conflicts.  
My own impression, built up over my entire experience with the Pirahãs, 
is that my colleague from MIT was correct. The Pirahãs are an unusually happy 
and contented people. I would go so far as to suggest that the Pirahãs are happier, 
fitter, and better adjusted to their environment than any Christian or other 
religious person I have ever known. (278-9) 
 
Sorenson too remarks repeatedly at the joie de vivre of the Indigenous People he lived with. Our 
whole practice of emotions in the dominant culture seems caught up in confusion and 
incoherence, and the presence of anger and aggression, even at subtle levels, perhaps cuts us off 
from ourselves, from a joy and zest for life, a peacefulness and rapport with themselves, each 
other, and with Nature that we could practice-realize. 
 
Let us turn to Sorenson’s summary of naming and truth in Ecologies of Threshold Mind: 
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Names 
There were no formal names for people or for places. Names were improvised, 
usually playfully in response to life’s circumstances. A name lasted for a while, 
then a new one came along. These new names emerged whimsically from notable 
events and situations. Individuals responded to whatever name they knew they 
might be called by. Formal names came into being only after collapse of liminal 
consciousness. 
 
Truth 
The tactile language that developed in infancy linked truth to affect. The more 
truthfully feelings were expressed, the more rewarding were responses. So true 
feelings, expressed as openly and as clearly possible, became the crucial means to 
life for infants and growing children. Their affect-talk (their tactile language) only 
worked where personal feelings were nakedly aboveboard and accurately 
expressed. So they placed their hearts-on-sleeves as faithfully as they could. In 
this way pure truth of feeling became the basis of preconquest social life. Sense-
of-truth emerged from the need for truthful affect exchange in that type of society. 
(1997: 7) 
 
We might notice how naming here resonates with Nietzsche’s understanding of the narrowing 
force of language. If life flows (not as a “thing” that flows, but if life presences as flux, flowing, 
active relational openness) if nothing remains truly fixed, then our typical use of naming (and 
navigating, and the forcing of time and human agenda) may in fact encourage misperception. If 
the self is relational (or “facultative,” using one of the technical “scientific” terms), then it 
depends in some sense on context. We might characterize the self as contextualized activity, “cut 
off” from the past in Dogen’s sense. Self arises as moment.  
 
We all have had the experience of nicknames that worked in one context, and which we either 
experienced as becoming outmoded, or we accepted as a way to fix a certain aspect of someone’s 
identity. Naming becomes a way to control the uncontrollable. Only the PracticeRealization of 
virtue can reliably give rise to the relatively reliable, the skillful, graceful, realistic 
transformation of things. We will return to these challenges of language again, as we 
contemplate Sorenson’s own struggle to turn these invisible workings into something perceivable 
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to him, and at least available to us as inspiration for our own Practice—for only by means of 
experiment can we verify and wonderstand them.  
 
We should note again that language in and of itself is not the problem—even though western 
languages do seem to place us at a disadvantage at the outset. Liberating language, even in a 
western tongue, empowers, vitalizes, and transforms life onward. The issue has to do with our 
obdurate tendency, our well-practiced habit, our karmic situation of using language in ways that 
embattle us against ourselves, each other, and reality, including the narrowing of “language” into 
“words” alone, without deep practice of wordless communion-and-communication, wordless 
resonance, synchronicity, and mutual attunement. We have suggested that the essence of 
language is attunement, not the “sending of messages”. Touching the World, touching each 
other, we speak-and-listen, we commune-and-communicate, we give-and-receive, in the same 
gesture, like stepping forward and backward at the same moment.  
 
Again, this commentary on features of preconquest consciousness has to do with sensing their 
resonance with spiritual teachings. It is as if we could look at these features and say, “Ah! This 
reveals or expresses some aspect of reality to which so many spiritual traditions seem to point.” 
It is not to say, “This reduces to that,” but to say, “Can we look and open to the impossible, the 
inconceivable things that LoveWisdom invites us to experience, to verify as our lives?” 
 
Those with a heart for LoveWisdom may find the sense-of-truth described by Sorenson 
intriguing, and perhaps either troubling (therefore, in some cases, worthy of dismissal) or 
inspiring. In western culture, Plato invited us to see that knowing depends on the knower, and 
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thus to some degree truth depends on the teller. If what we know depends on the process by 
which we come-to-knowing-and-truthfulness, then it depends on our way of living. Truth in the 
richest, most skillful and realistic sense does not arise as a function of facts or propositions, and 
we can’t simply “check” “the world” to see if our propositions somehow “mirror” an “ultimate 
reality” existing “out there”. Rather, when we Practice Original Mind, Original Thinking, we 
enter the interwovenness of things, liberate ourselves into ecologies that transcend the epidermis. 
Truth then reveals its sensitivity to context.  
 
We face this Question: Might we discover that, in some contexts, truth is not really possible, or 
at least not likely? Or, put another way: Might we discover that western culture has excluded 
itself (and its beings, the beings interwoven with it) from certain kinds of truth/truthfulness—
maybe even vitalizing kinds, desperately needed for our well-being just now, perhaps even our 
survival? This is like saying we may have become too discoordinated to presence certain kinds 
of skill and poise—at a time when skill and poise have become an imperative. Or, put yet 
another way: Given that truth depends on what we practice and make real, has western culture 
made a lot of unskillful truths readily available, while making certain potentially empowering 
truths, empowering truthfulness, relatively unavailable? 
 
What a thing to contemplate . . . That we might have to put ourselves on the line in order to 
arrive at truthfulness, that truthfulness-and-knowing demands vulnerability from us! (Ah, back to 
Plato we go, and to Christ too . . . back to that which we abandoned in the west . . . ) Truth 
demands risk and renunciation, in the sense that we must risk the ego, risk what it clings to, and 
renounce what doesn’t function, even if we feel fear, self-doubt, self-loathing, and confusion 
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(much of this Plato has Socrates embody for us in Apology, Protagoras, and Republic, among 
other places). Given that these considerations implicate our unconscious, we find ourselves in the 
worst kind of tangle, one which philosophy as it has become seems ill-equipped to handle—but 
which the spiritual traditions (including many exemplars in wester philosophy) most definitely 
invite us to face. 
 
We may find so-called “primitive” people embarrassing for their nakedness. But what if knowing 
depends on nakedness? What if it depends even on the vulnerability of the unknown and the 
precarious? What if we must meet each moment, each situation, each sentience, each Ecology of 
Sentience and Sensuality with intimacy and deep trust, however shaky-tender that trust may be at 
first? Somehow we must trust what we know and what we don’t know to function, trusting our 
own functioning, the functioning of life.  
 
But it scares us. We think we need control. Someone asks us, “What are you doing?” (or maybe, 
“Where have you come from, and where are you going?”) and somehow the truth is, “I don’t 
know.” Of course, often we have some sense of what’s unfolding. But, from a vaster vision, 
maybe we simply must say we do not know. Playing chess, our hands play. Painting a picture, 
the brush paints all by itself, along with the light, the tides, the dust in the room, the dead 
painters of the past appearing in the floorboards and the atmospheric pressure. We stand in the 
kitchen, cooking for a houseful of people. We taste the soup and say, “It needs more salt.” 
Something bigger functions there, and the ego tries to limit it. We don’t wonderstand the 
wholeness of cooking as activity of life, as thinking itself. To quiet the discursive mind and give 
ourselves, gift ourselves totally to cooking means the presencing of thinking. What happens 
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when we taste soup? Do we taste the soup, or does Mind Taste Mind, does Cooking Taste 
Cooking, does Mind Taste Cooking, does Mind Taste Living a Human Life, Taste Being with 
Ingredients, Taste Being in a World of Eating-and-Being-Eaten, allowing something to emerge 
in mutual nourishment? Is this tasting and also thinking? Do we taste gastronomy and alchemy at 
the same time—allowing alchemy to arise as tasting, allowing alchemy to arise as the play of 
Mind-and-Nature? Or do we too quickly limit things, cutting off the horizons instead of dancing 
them?  
 
We seem to uproot ourselves from Earth, cutting off our own Indigeneity, and keeping it at bay, 
keeping us clothed in concepts, time, “civilization,” control, and the known. We wear the fig leaf 
of ego, and would rather be physically naked than drop our self-centered approach to life. We 
don’t have time to be naked and vulnerable. We have so much conquest awaiting—the conquest 
of travel, the conquest of entertainment, the conquest of knowledge and experience, the endless 
conquests of the marketplace.  
 
Sorenson tries to describe a contrast between conquest consciousness and what he observed in 
more Indigenous Culture prior to sustained contact with the cultures of conquest (mainly the 
dominant culture). He saw something almost incomprehensible to the dominant culture, because 
the dominant culture cannot cultivate it, offers almost no context for its truthfulness, no Practices 
for its Realization, and thus must see it as strange, not true, not knowing, something primitive, 
superstitious, and uncivilized. The incomprehensibility of these Cultures includes the potential 
for a nonduality of the individual and the community, and much more than this, for it seems to 
include a nonduality of Nature-and-Culture, and we may call them Nature-Cultures.  
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Our inquiry into this cannot escape grave challenges. We will again and again attempt to 
understand by means of our thinking, our agendas, our sense of time, place, truth, and so on. 
Sorenson says, “No Western words exist which accurately convey the kind of deep rapport this 
is. I call it hypersensuality because it emerges out of sensuality and then surpasses it” (1995:12). 
We find here the possibility of a truth, a truthfulness, a coming-to-knowing that depends more 
explicitly on intimacy—with ourselves, with each other, with life.  
 
We are not interested in any romanticized notions. It is not that “hypersensuality” is precisely 
what we need in a better way of knowing. Whatever the better way of knowing is, we should 
allow it to include any valuable and viable aspects of western culture too, and allow it to 
transcend any limitation we might find in this or that particular expression of knowing in this or 
that Nature-Culture. We do not need to fixate, reify, romanticize, or obscure. The question 
always remains in one sense simple: Is there anything here that looks like a better way of 
knowing than what we have? But it remains subtle in that we must also look to a broad sense of 
spirituality to co-discover-create what will function now, in this context. We keep an eye on 
wisdom, love, and beauty as it appears in various traditions, and we ask if we can better practice-
and-realize wisdom, love, and beauty than we currently do, and if so how and why. The very 
notion of Nature-Culture invites us to consider our own context of truth and ask how it might be 
limited and how it might be liberated. 
 
Look at how Sorenson tries to describe the overall nature of the context of truth he witnessed: 
Any form of subjugation, even those barriers to freedom imposed by private 
property, are the kiss of death to this type of life. Though durable and self-
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repairing in isolation, the unconditional open trust this way of life requires 
shrivels with alarming speed when faced with harsh emotions or coercion. Deceit, 
hostility, and selﬁshness when only episodic temporarily benumb intuitive 
rapport. When such conditions come to stay and no escape is possible, intuitive 
rapport disintegrates within a brutally disorienting period of existential trauma 
and anomie.96 
 
And here: 
 
The community imperative is an ever-present sociosensuality uniting everyone 
but tactilely expressed mainly by the children. Among adults tactility gets 
replaced by hypersensuality. Minimally the whole community must instinctively 
(not by rule) endorse the yens and whims of all those in it. Ideally it must exude 
an empathetic heartfelt warmth by each one for all the others so that whenever 
pleasure arise in any of them it rises in them all. This enables happiness to keep 
building up so that it can culminate at adolescence in that ecstatic silent 
hypersensuality.  
The individual imperative requires that relations be consensual. Coercion  
is so deep a violation of rapport it paralyzes life as if such acts were so far beyond 
the realm of rationality that no response is possible. They have no formal rules or 
regulations nor anyone who would or could enforce such things. No one forces 
anyone against their will or demands obedience (even of children). When no 
welcoming consent to some interest or inclination is forthcoming, the impulse 
fades without sign of disappointment or annoyance, and no melancholy or chagrin 
is seen when someone’s passion does not catch on. In the grand melange of ardors 
constantly presented by these active children, something just as good will be lying 
there in wait. If the same impulse again arises, it might be entertained the next 
time around. All depends on momentary mood and context. Nothing seems to be a 
social blunder. It’s just that the mood and interests of the group whirl in different 
ways at different times. They all seem to know this, and take whatever life 
proffers at the moment. As for adults their hypersensuality constantly adjusts to 
the yens and passions of the children, remains ever ready to support whatever 
might be in their hearts.  
Imperatives such as these hold up only where formal rules are not 
imposed. On islands where mainlanders have brought rules of precedence and 
conformity, these more traditional nomads blank out, their affect temporarily 
paralyzed. Less traditional ones get drunk. (1998: 48) 
 
What can manifest prior to the disruption, the noise of the dominant culture? Sorenson details 
several fascinating happenings that we can receive and reflect with. Each case presents intimacy-
in-activity. 
                                                 
96 http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
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Agat and Oohh soon moved with synchronous, delicately executed caution toward 
a group of squid (a very skittish beast) resting on the bottom of the sea not far off. 
They came in from different sides, as if choreographed. Though Leit had been 
watching quietly from above, she lurched suddenly to left. The squid, carefully 
being stalked, moved out so fast I could not see which way they went. Agat and 
Oohh showed no sign of annoyance or regret. Instead their eyes sparkled with 
excitement as they glanced about to see what happened. A distant moving lobster 
had caught Leit’s eye and she’d quickly turned to track its movement, to keep it in 
her sight. A slight gesture showed them where it went and they dispersed so as to 
maximize the chance of keeping it in sight in case it moved again. It was En who 
finally flushed it, and Agat who speared it. Adding exquisiteness to the event (as 
they like to do), just as Agat’s spear darted toward the lobster, Oohh, who had 
been turning very slowly to his left, flipped his spear into a prized fish that had 
been retreating toward him from a steady slow advance by Leit. They had all the 
while been synchronizing movements so that the lobster and the fish could be 
speared together. Either one speared separately would have spooked the other. 
With two quarries thus obtained during complex in-synch actions, a special surge 
of ecstasy seemed to flow throughout the group. As much as they like squid, that 
loss was nothing compared to conjointly bagging a lobster and prized fish. (1998: 
53) 
 
------------------------ 
 
When Epuul was still a stripling lad in 1987,1 spied him brashly standing 
free atop the elevated pointed prow of a longtail boat throttled to the top, 
careening out along the island’s lengthy pier toward sea. He was off with pals to 
spear some fish to eat. Abruptly, with no forewarning, he leapt down off the prow 
to land hard on the starboard lip. That veered his boat straight at another coming 
in. Though collision was but seconds off, neither helmsman (nor any others) 
showed the least concern. No one made the slightest move to alter course as if 
what was happening was so commonplace that not the slightest thought was 
needed. 
As if choreographed, Epuul leapt again, this time off the boat in an upward 
arc destined for the water. That swerved his boat from head-on crash, but left him 
enroute to a dunking had not a wave, long rolling in across the bay from a distant 
passing trawler, at that very moment crested up against the approaching boat to 
push its starboard lip just under Epuul’s falling foot. He swayed there for a 
moment as the boat rocked up, then catapulted off (with another stretch of legs) 
onto the outer lip of a boat tied up at pier. Its other side jerked up to put just at his 
hand a coil of fishing line that was lying there while with his other hand he swung 
up on the pier, each move in accent to the initial rhythm. 
Out on the pier a smallish tyke, his brother, was snagging minnows with a 
friend. Upon seeing Epuul bearing down, he flicked one out. As it was arcing 
toward the pier, Epuul snatched it from the air, flipped it off his brother’s hook, 
and inserted in on his own while synchronously dropkicking the plastic bottle (on 
which the fishing line was wound) into a back-spin. Just line enough spun out to 
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let him swing the bait around his head in ever widening arcs to heave it out to 
where he’d seen a great fish shadow—all synchronized to the onset beat. 
The great fish bit. With cadenced overhand Epuul played it in, yanked it 
up, and slammed it on the pier (to knock it out) still following the rhythm. On 
rebound he twisted out the hook, hoisted up the fish and heaved it back without a 
glance across his shoulder to his tiny brother (to take to their house) as with an 
accentuated cadence he strode onward to pier’s end and stepped out into the air 
just as his chums, who’d circled round to see just what was up, were tooling past 
in front. He landed on the prow to stand just where he’d been. With that, his 
virtuoso free-form dance with nature ceased. Accustomed to such capers, his 
fishing-mates without a word turned the speeding boat outward toward their reef. 
(1995: 2) 
 
In another episode, Sorenson tells how he got thrown from a boat in the midst of tremendous 
waves and intense conditions. It seemed improbable that he could get rescued by his Indigenous 
Friends: 
Epuul soon returned [in the boat], but a wave thrust up and threw him off. 
So it was another turn across the violent windward front. This time I didn’t see it. 
Then there he was yawing, veering, skidding straight in at me, this time on my 
windward side, so that the boat would blow toward me. But its edge remained so 
high I couldn’t reach it. Then the hull bashed down and pushed me under. I came 
up choking at the stern just under the propeller which was whirling in the air. 
There was Epuul atop the steering boom jamming down with all his weight 
keeping the propeller off me. He swayed uncertainly as the boat tossed up and 
down, but he kept his perch until the wind snatched the boat away again. 
That’s when his face and stance transformed, when his motion maestroism 
vanished. He stopped looking all about, ceased his flurrying and his scurrying, his 
ramming and his jamming, seemed to close his mind to everything. He looked as 
if bewitched, as if stripped of sense impression. Overleaping common sense, 
scarcely glancing at the sea, he rammed the throttle to the top and aimed into a 
mounting tower of sea. 
Ooin instantly rigidified, went pale, froze on the spot, stared out as if his 
life were ending. It seemed an act beyond the pale, utterly irrational, out of mind. 
The boat shot up,  began its flip to upside down, when a corner of the wave 
suddenly crashed so hard upon a forward corner that it whipped the boat around in 
one great jerk. That flung Epuul off the stern, feet out over water, hands clutching 
on the steering boom. The force of flinging out that way swerved the boat onto a 
course directly at me at unnerving speed. A mounting hill of sea pushed me to the 
side, lunged up at the boat, stopped it in its tracks, though the propeller was still 
churning at full tilt. It then slithered down into the trough beside me, edge tilting 
down until I got my arms across and tumbled in. (1995: 7) 
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If one were to walk into a room in which the film of such events played on a glowing screen, one 
would likely wonder if a Marvel Comics storyline had gotten cinematic treatment. These 
happenings seem to come from the realm of the Mutant Superhero. But Sorenson got the 
opportunity to taste this for himself—just a tiny taste, but still a taste: 
Though the ship was fully laden, it started heaving high into the air, smashing 
down again and yet again into successive troughs with stupefying shudders. I 
feared it would break up. Some began to moan. The crew got seasick. In a spirit 
of the moment, and emulating island style, I loosed the rail I’d been tightly 
clutching and threw a dramatic pelvic thrust into the storm just at the apex of a 
massive rise of ship. A Westerner would think this mock defiance. Not so the 
people here. A resounding cheer broke out. To them it signified a sensual linkage 
with the storm, therefore a kinship, therefore the cheers. As if in response the 
winds slacked off. (5) 
 
What a Synchronicity! What a Rupture of time and space! But, actually, Sorenson does not make 
clear whether he truly tasted an entrance into ecosensual awareness, entrance into 
inconceivability, the inconceivability of our interwovenness—which synchronicity presences in, 
through, as, with us. He only says this: 
When my short “erotic” dance with that adventitious natural force was done, fear 
and trembling had given way, elan had broken out, friendships had been 
established. These were extraordinary findings. They showed that erotic 
synchrony with fearsome overwhelming natural forces quells anxiety, inspires 
enthusiasm, makes firm friends of strangers. (12) 
 
He seems to taste the remarkable rapport within the human realm, but he may have limited it. 
 
However he might have experienced it, he had great difficulty making sense of it, as must we it 
seems. Sorenson gives the following commentary: 
On the surface these events are but adventure stories. When examined closely, 
questions rise: What shall we make of such displays of prowess? How do such 
amazing skills emerge? What enabled Epuul to manage fierce tumult with such 
confident aplomb? Wherefrom did his trances come, apparently of two types? 
How did Ooin, a stranger from another isle, so quickly gain rapport with Epuul? 
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What enabled instant synchrony between Epuul and his tiny brother on the pier? 
Or with his fishing friends in the speeding boat? 
No sooner had I come into the region than I was confronted by 
peculiarities. I began recording as best I could without delay, for I’ve learned that 
mind does not easily retain extraordinary apperceptions. No matter how vivid an 
event might be when it occurs, those parts that are extraordinary don’t hold well 
in mind. Memory needs ordinary things to which to anchor recollection. 
Extraordinary events, by definition, don’t have much ordinariness. Therefore I 
started documenting right away to get uncommon aspects down before they might 
pass from mind which all too quickly can occur when events are odd. Though 
making records prior to understanding may seem a risky sport, the alternative is to 
skip what is unusual. Sometimes anthropologists must grasp at phenomena they 
don’t yet understand. 
The more peculiar an event, the less likely appropriate English words 
existed to describe it. There always was a gap separating actuality from words. 
The stranger the event, the wider was the gap . . . Eventually, patterns of 
occurrence could be seen. From those patterns it was clear that much of human 
interaction there was impelled by eros-based subliminal awarenesses. Often, 
words were but a froth atop unarticulated sensibilities. 
Eros, an experience difficult to pin down verbally, proved surprisingly 
accessible to this kind of subliminal inquiry. As the subliminal awarenesses 
firmed up, eros-impulses could be seen coursing widely through communities and 
beyond. (1995: 8) 
 
Here we find an example of froth-making, discussed early in our inquiry. We see a genuine 
struggle, one faced by so many mystics, to try and put into words what defies all words and 
concepts, what bursts the boundaries of language, identity, logic, and worldview—and perhaps 
reading it, we scarcely touch all of that, busy as we make ourselves with labeling, tidying up, 
making it expedient, reading in the “causal” links (as Lee mentioned regarding the Trobrianders). 
We see Sorenson struggle with the commonizing force of language that Nietzsche brought our 
attention to, but maybe we only see him “claim” to struggle, while we take it in at a distance, 
with our own worldview firmly intact. These issues can hardly be overstated. It takes time to deal 
with language as a froth, and the froth keeps us at a distance from the deep waters of the soul.  
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Sorenson seems to want to come up with a theory for all of this, a bit of froth that he hopes will 
invite us into the water rather than keeping us at the surface. We can recall here Buddha’s simile 
of the raft, and his caveat about handling philosophy the way we would handle a poisonous 
snake, treating words and concepts as skillful means. Sorenson builds a raft out of eros, to help 
us make a metaphorical crossing into some understanding of pre-conquest consciousness, and 
which we contemplate here as a way to understand Liminal Mind, Bardo Mind, Original Mind 
(these, too, are metaphors, so we capitalize them to emphasize Buddha’s caveat). Sorenson’s raft 
is a nice raft. There is something important in the acknowledgement of Eros, we could say, just 
as there is something important in Buddha’s acknowledgment that we all experience suffering of 
various kinds, his invitation for us to acknowledge our own suffering and the suffering of others. 
Similarly, we can sense the value in saying the energy of love moves life. It moves all of us. 
Even in spiritual matters, we follow a tradition or a teacher because we fall in love. We find the 
limit of our practice (thus the limit of our realization) in the limit of our love, and we could sum 
up the whole of spirituality as opening the heart, opening to love. 
 
One way or another, we do have to deal with love. As so many cultural traditions have insisted, 
we must acknowledge this power, and acknowledge how we work with it, acknowledge our skill 
or lack of skill, our grace or lack of grace. Sorenson noticed that the Cultures he observed 
provided a way for their people to allow the energy of love to manifest skillfully and 
realistically. We enter the mystery, we presence it with skill and poise. Sorenson saw Nature-
Culture that offered entry into the mystery, entry into Nature. We in the dominant culture, we 
who stand “outside” of Nature, should contemplate with care: 
Propelled by the rise of new erotic powers, adolescents surge out in quest of 
deeper contact with surroundings. An astonishing kinetic integration with habitat 
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begins occurring. This same eros-impelled playfulness injects rapture into serious 
activity, nourishes rapport, makes games of work . . . 
By adolescence’s end, a profound rapport with nature has been 
accomplished. Flamboyant displays of kinetic prowess then start declining. The 
older teenaged boys become less impulsive as younger boys, enraptured by the 
prowess of those older, gravitate to them to learn. Often enchanted by such 
attention, the older boys with humor, sometimes awe, become enthralled, even 
mesmerized, as their younger comrades spit forth, with tactile punctuation, their 
zestful whims and aspirations. Such passion mellows older youths, kindles 
empathy, lessens ego drive, opens inner hearts, engenders trust, tones down 
flamboyance. A quieter rapport shapes up within them linking psyches. It diffuses 
through youth gangs and beyond. To them it is a more wondrous type of rapport. 
No Western words exist which accurately convey the kind of deep rapport 
this is. I call it hypersensuality because it emerges out of sensuality and then 
surpasses it. As such hypersensuality is attained, adolescent slapdash starts giving 
way. (1995: 10) 
 
We see here a developmental patterning into attunement, which every true Culture should 
provide. How crucial for us to realize a more wondrous type of rapport, a wondrous attunement 
with Nature and with each other, an attunement mystery that transcends the merely “erotic”. The 
dominant culture has no widespread, useful understanding of what to do with erotic and kinetic 
energy, and it does not invite us to surge in quest of intimacy with Nature, intimacy with 
sacredness, intimacy with our own HeartMindBodyWorldCosoms—intimacy with Mind-Sacred, 
Sacred-Nature, Nature-Culture, Culture-Sacred, Sacred-Mind, Mind-Nature, Nature-Mind, 
Mind-Sacred. It offers no teachings on how erotic and kinetic energy may propel us into 
transcendence. Instead, our media overflow with images of sexuality and violence. How could 
we ever practice-realize intimacy with our own Mind? How could we ever practice-realize a 
wondrous rapport with Nature, with reality itself, with reality as Sacred? Who thinks such a 
wondrous rapport would offer more joy than we could get in sexual encounters? Who thinks 
vitalizing engagement with Nature and with Mind could offer more than we get from books, 
from research, from entertainment, from entertaining distractions of all kinds?  
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This intimacy defies words—perhaps, as Sorenson suggests, it most explicitly denies western 
words. Can we open ourselves to the possibility that we have no context for realizations that 
might transform us in ways we do not even think possible—realizations that might even save our 
lives, save our World before we degrade it beyond a tipping point which will prove catastrophic? 
Opening to possibilities we don’t think possible . . . Can we even frame them? How would we 
approach them? Perhaps we must try and think along with Krishnamurti’s suggestion:  
look, we never put the impossible question—we are always putting the question 
of what is possible. If you put an impossible question, your mind then has to find 
the answer in terms of the impossible—not of what is possible . . . But we never 
put the impossible question! The impossible question is this: can the mind empty 
itself of the known?—itself, not you empty the mind. That is an impossible 
question. If you put it with tremendous earnestness, with seriousness, with 
passion, you’ll find out. But if you say, ‘Oh, it is possible’, then you are stuck. 
(1972, Dialogue 4) 
 
Which in turn resonates with something Jung wrote: 
The unconscious always tries to produce an impossible situation in order to force 
the individual to bring out his very best. Otherwise one stops short of one’s best, 
one is not complete, one does not realize oneself. What is needed is an impossible 
situation where one has to renounce one’s own will and one’s own wit and do 
nothing but wait and trust to the impersonal power of growth and development. 
(VS 110) 
 
We find ourselves in an impossible situation with respect to the collapse of the conditions of life 
and the need for a radical shift in our way of knowing and our way of life. Facing the fullness of 
this, we may then ask an impossible question. 
 
 Let us consider two other examples—examples of a different way of knowing. These two come 
from Robert Wolff, who spent time in Malaysia in the 1960’s, working for the government as a 
psychologist. He often heard the bureaucrats describe more Indigenous people as lazy or 
stubborn or both, but it always seemed like a label based on limited and limiting assumptions. 
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At one point, the Malaysian government came up with a rational scheme for land development 
that would increase “productivity,” give people an “income,” and bolster the “gross national 
product.” Such things seem like marvelous benefits to the nation and its people. Politicians all 
over the world seek such things, and the dominant culture obsesses about such things—although, 
we might clarify by saying the real obsession has to do with increasing the income of a very 
small number of people.  
 
In any case, Malaysia’s “wealth” came largely from rubber and tin at that time. The new scheme 
would involve clear-cutting pristine jungle and planting rubber trees. The government wanted to 
make it easy for the Indigenous people to agree to the scheme and to “profit”. The government 
would do the clear-cutting, the planting, and the maintenance for the first two years (they 
planned to use arsenic to control weeds), at which point the rubber trees would reach sufficient 
maturity for tapping. The Indigenous People would then tap the trees and reap the reward. But 
the Sng’oi, the Indigenous People, refused to participate—always politely, but with no 
“explanation”. A government official implored Wolff to try and convince the people to play 
along. Wolff describes what happened: 
When next I visited an aborigine settlement and we were sitting around in the 
early evening, I told them what the government official had told me about the 
land development scheme and the role they, the Sng’oi, could play in it. What did 
they think?  
As usual there was a long silence. People looked thoughtful but nobody 
said anything for a long time. I thought that perhaps they had not understood the 
question. 
I repeated [the question, explaining the government scheme ] . . . .  
A longer silence. 
Finally one man spoke up. As usual, he obviously spoke for the group . . . 
There was a slight hesitation in his voice, then he continued, “When you cut the 
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forest, and then you plant one tree, you can grow only that one tree. After that the 
soil is dead.”  
They all nodded that yes, this was true.  
I was not sure I had understood, but that was all they would say. They 
smiled but they did not answer any further questions.  
 
Back in town, I asked my own questions. The average life span of a rubber 
tree is forty years, a rubber planter told me. After the first generation of rubber 
trees, well, yes, he guessed, they sort of let things go after that. But he thought 
you could probably plant more rubber trees, maybe with some fertilizer added or 
something. He was not too clear about the future—he was too involved getting as 
much rubber out of his trees in the forty years that they would grow. To him forty 
years was more than enough time to make his fortune, retire, and get away from it 
all.  
I went back to the government department that had asked me to explain 
the scheme to the aborigines. When I gave the very short and rather simple-
sounding answer the Sng’oi had given me, it did not make much of an impression 
on the officials in the room. Their faces showed clearly that they felt this was 
another typical aborigine evasion and not really an answer. 
In the back of the room an Englishman was on the telephone; he joined us 
a little later. I repeated that the aborigines I asked had said only that “when you 
cut the forest and grow one tree, after one generation the soil is dead.”  
He became excited, took my arm, and said, “Come with me.”  
We got in his Land Rover and went for a short ride to an agricultural 
research station just outside Kuala Lumpur. On the way there he explained that 
they had picked a small section of jungle, one hectare (about two acres), and had 
roped it off, making a grid by marking trees. Now they were doing a census of all 
the plants that grew in that small area. 
When we arrived he showed me the one-hundred-meter (about three 
hundred feet) by one-hundred-meter square, with lines marking smaller squares. 
Then he took me into a little shack where they kept the paperwork. They had 
finished counting the trees, he said, and now were counting shrubs, bushes, and 
vines. After that, he said, would come the even more difficult job of counting the 
smaller stuff on the ground the mosses, lichens, and other minuscule plants.  
“And,” he concluded with obvious regret in his voice, “we cannot even 
begin to look at the organisms in the soil.”  
I do not remember the count, but there were, say, three hundred trees 
there. Then he said, “The most amazing thing is that with all these trees, there are 
very few species with more than one individual.” The trees in the census plot 
were all different. There were at most two, rarely three of the same kind.  
He sat me down; we were going to have a lecture. He explained that 
because this jungle looks so lush, so rich in plants, all different, most people think 
it is the soil that is so fertile that it can support all that variety. “Not so.” His voice 
reverberated inside the little shack. “It’s not the soil but the variety itself that 
makes the richness possible. What one plant takes out of the soil,” he explained 
many times in different ways, “another puts back into the soil . . . 
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He sat back in his chair, our knees almost touching in the small space. 
“And as for rubber, only growing one generation . . . of course, they are right, 
those friends of yours. Absolutely right. After forty years the ground is so 
depleted you could not even grow grass on it. That is an exaggeration—grass 
grows on concrete—but you see what I am getting at. After forty years or so, that 
soil is dead.” 
 
I began to understand a little more about a people who had a completely 
different way of seeing the world . . . .  
Forty years is too far into the future for most Westerners to think about. 
We run businesses looking ahead to the next quarter . . . . 
The Sng’oi . . . did not have much use for money . . . The could not be a 
party to destroying the land. They were part of the jungle. They could no more 
kill the forest than they could destroy their own skin. 
They sometimes made jokes about people who felt they could own land. A 
child had said to me, “How can you own ground? We belong to [literally ‘with’] 
the ground.” (105-9) 
 
Gosh . . . don’t we all want to retire and get away from it all? Away from what? From the Earth? 
From the soil and the soul on which we depend? 
 
A certain kind of religious person might initially balk at the invitation to know ourselves as 
belonging to the Earth, to know the ground as sacred, and thus they might refuse to take off the 
sandals of thought, the sandals of time, the sandals of the known because we stand on holy 
ground. But they might soften upon deeper contemplation. The divine made the Earth and made 
human beings, humus beings of the Earth, with sacred inspiration breathed into us, and thus into 
our sky, into our trees, into countless flowers and grasses. The old joke goes that the Divine so 
loved birds that It made trees for them, and so loved trees that It made birds for them. Humans so 
loved birds they made cages for them, and so loved trees they cut them down to write words on 
them. Trees, birds, fungi, soil, air, water, humans, all go together, while cages and books must be 
handled as something intrusive with which we must take the utmost care, noticing how often we 
have acted out of ignorance. We could not thrive here if we did not belong—to this place, to each 
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other, to this Earth and its beings, and to the sacredness infusing it, them, and us, the divine 
presence that thrives here with us, as us. To belong to/with the ground means belonging to/with 
the sacred. We cannot live except with the land, through it, as it. But most of us do not know 
this. We don’t live in a context that pollinates such knowing, such insight.  
 
It can happen, but even when such an insight arises, it may arise much more partially than it 
might in a more Indigenous Culture. Again, the dominant culture could become Indigenous, 
could return to the Earth and to the sacred, return us to holy ground, holy mountains, rivers, 
marshes, forests, and deserts. As of now, we live in a culture of profanity, in which it makes 
sense to pursue “gross domestic product” over and above Gross National Happiness, Peace, and 
Well-Being; Gross National Wellness-of-Ecologies-and-Their-Beings; Gross National Wisdom; 
Gross National Interwovenness. What would a philosopher’s role in the Culture be if we all had 
an interest in Gross National Wisdom, Love, and Beauty? And yet, what else could we possibly 
have an interest in—especially when we see the practice-and-realization of these as the essence 
of health, holiness, peace, and well-being? 
 
Wolff Experienced another, perhaps even more remarkable case of knowing, a case of 
extraordinary knowing.97 He experienced many, but we will consider just one of them. At one 
                                                 
97 Again let me recommend, to everyone but especially academics, Elizabeth Lloyd Mayer’s 
book, Extraordinary Knowing. The reader may like to follow that up with Infinite Awareness: 
The Awakening of a Scientific Mind, by Marjorie Hines Woollacott, and perhaps Varieties of 
Anomalous Experience, edited by Cardeña, Lynn, and Krippner, or maybe Transcendent Mind, 
by Baruss and Mossbridge (published by the APA—a pleasant surpirse), or Irreducible Mind, by 
Kelly and Kelly. One might voice reservations about any of these presentations, because no 
treatment of the Extraordinary will escape great challenges, like the ones we keep trying to 
remind ourselves of here. Russel Targ’s talk on his own research involving Extraordinary 
Knowing may also prove both interesting and helpful. The fact that he mentions 
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point he had to go to Port Dickson, on the coast of Malaysia. He had been visiting a Sng’oi 
village and announced that he had to leave to go to the coast. None of these jungle dwellers had 
ever been to the coast. He asked if anyone wanted to come along. One man said he would go. 
 
At the time, Wolff did not realize this man, named Ahmeed, was something like a Shaman. He 
later explained to Wolff, “It is my work to bring new knowledge to the People [the Sng’oi—
literally, “the People”]” (141). Ahmeed had this job, but he, like the rest of the small settlement, 
was unlettered, and so his knowing had to come from other sources. 
 
Not long after they arrived in Port Dickson, Ahmeed made his way to the coast, and he stood for 
a long time among some casuarina trees near the beach. Wolff felt that Ahmeed wanted to be 
alone. Every time he looked for Ahmeed, he saw him standing with the trees, facing the water. 
 
Wolff took Ahmeed back to the jungle, then decided to stay the night. The next morning, a few 
villagers approached him. They said Ahmeed had seen some important things during his visit, 
and that they would hold a ceremony that evening in which he would share them. They invited 
Wolff to stay, and he accepted. 
 
The sharing of knowing happened in a ceremonial space, in a ceremonial context. The People 
consecrated the space using an incense resin, and they opened the ceremony with a kind of dance 
                                                 
Padmasambhava, the great Buddhist philosopher-sage should be received with wonder: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBl0cwyn5GY 
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around the space along with a particular kind of vocalizing, called keening, that makes use of 
monotonous, trilling tones. The whole thing sent chills up Wolff’s back: 
Suddenly Ahmeed spoke in an unusually loud and deeply sonorous voice. 
At first he remained seated, swaying, his eyes closed. His voice was different, not 
his normal speaking voice; it came from deep in his chest. He spoke with great 
authority.  
He began: He had gone with me to the Great Ocean. It took a long time to 
get there; even in a car, it was far away. There was a slight pause, as if he was 
thinking how to continue. By that time I could understand some of what he was 
saying; he used many Malay words, which might have been because their 
language has no words for the Great Ocean, as he called it, and many of the other 
things he described.  
The dancers sat down but continued keening very softly (it is very difficult 
to keen softly, I learned later), swaying their bodies in perfect harmony this time. 
Ahmeed continued speaking with great authority: When we had arrived in Port 
Dixon [he said “the coast”] and he got out of the car, he heard shshsh, shshsh, the 
sound of rain when it is still a little distance away, very softly, shshsh, shshsh, 
shshsh. (He heard the sound of waves on the beach, but I knew he had never 
before seen a beach or an ocean.)  
He looked up and said, “There was not a cloud in sight. The sky was clear. 
Where could that sound come from, shshsh, shshsh, shshsh?” He made walking 
motions to suggest walking a few steps from the car. “And then I saw the Great 
Ocean: AAHHhhh.”  
Briefly there was total silence, then the people continued their swaying 
and soft keening.  
Ahmeed went on: “There was great fear in this heart.” (There is no 
possessive pronoun in Malay; one cannot say my heart.) “So much water . . . 
Listen! In front of you there is water as far as you can see.” And he repeated: “As 
far as you can see.”  
The people were silent now, awed and afraid. I could feel their wonder, 
but also their fear. The Sng’oi live in deep jungle in the mountains. The only 
water they know is rainwater and the water of jungle streams. Water is feared; 
rainstorms destroy, mountain streams are unpredictable.  
Ahmeed went on: “As far as you can see there is water, and if you stand as 
far as you can see, there is still more water as far as you can see from there.” The 
people were listening, spellbound. Nobody moved; nobody made a sound. It was 
as if they were holding their breath.  
A few times Ahmeed repeated, “As far as you can see is water, and you 
stand there—again as far as you can see is more water, and again you stand 
where you cannot see any farther—again there is water as far as you can see.” 
Then he said, “The water is everywhere,” ending on a sort of sigh.  
Some people were hunched over, cringing from this concept of endless 
water. Ahmeed said again, “Much fear in this heart,” and put his hand over his 
heart. “Much fear, because all this water eats the land”—just as the water of little 
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jungle streams “eats” the land of its banks when rains swell streams to raging 
rivers.  
There was a long silence. Nobody said anything. More people were 
hunched over, some holding their hands to cover their heads. A woman, sitting in 
a corner, holding a small child, crooned softly, “Don’t cry, don’t cry . . .” 
Now Ahmeed stood up straight, looking down at the people of the 
settlement who were bent over, fearful, silent. He stood for a few minutes, then, in 
a strong voice, he said: “That night, when I go to the Real World [a Place visited 
in Dreams], I meet the Lord of the Great Ocean. Datok Laut Besar” (he used 
Malay words). The Lord of the Great Ocean told him not to be afraid, that the 
Great Ocean would not eat the land; the land was floating on the ocean.  
A sigh of relief went through the people . . .  
Then Ahmeed said a strange thing: “All that water is heavy.” He bent over 
to indicate indicate great weight; you could see his shoulders stoop with the 
heaviness of all that water. “Heavy, all around the world, very heavy.” He went 
on, “The whole world is covered with the Great Ocean.” He cupped his hands 
about eighteen inches apart, as if to mark a globe. “All of it covered with Ocean, 
and the land floats on the water.” His body movement suggested that the land was 
lighter than the ocean; that is why it would float on the water.  
“The land is so big, there is so much land floating on this Ocean that it 
does not move, or maybe only a little, and we do not feel it moving.”  
There was a long silence, as if to let the people get used to the ideas 
Ahmeed had presented so far . . . . 
“All this water,” he said, “and underneath the surface”—underneath that 
which can be seen—“is a whole world, in some ways like this world.” He used his 
hands to accompany his words. “There are mountains under what-can-be-seen, 
very tall mountains, some of them.” He motioned high, high up with one hand.  
“And there are valleys deeper than any valleys we have here. All through 
that Great Ocean there are streams, huge rivers”—currents—“that flow all around 
the world, around and around.” His hands went around an imaginary globe again.  
“These streams are so immense”—the word he used means something like 
“bigger than big”—“that they sweep all the fish around too. And there are many 
other animals as well, not just fish. There are animals so huge . . . bigger than 
elephants.”  
The people made a soft waahhhhh sound.  
“Animals that are flat”—he clapped his hands once—“and animals that are 
like snakes, but bigger, much bigger. But do not be afraid—the Big Ocean cannot 
eat the land. The land floats, and the animals in the Big Ocean can live only there; 
they cannot come on land.” He repeated in a singsong, “Do not be afraid. The 
Lord of the Great Ocean has told me, do not be afraid because the land floats on 
the water, and the animals in the ocean cannot come on land.” (134-8) 
 
Wolff naturally felt puzzled at how Ahmeed could know so much. Sure, the knowledge appears 
imperfect, but it seems odd for an unlettered person who never left the jungle to somehow know 
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that we live on a globe, that the globe is covered mostly by water rather than land, that the Great 
Ocean has mountains and valleys in it larger than any on land, that ocean animals are larger than 
land animals, that the ocean has vast currents in it, and so on. Wolff later tried to make some 
sense of Ahmeed’s knowing, and he even asked him what the Lord of the Great Ocean looks 
like: Ahmeed seemed surprised, thought about it, then said, “Datok Laut Besar is not a person. It 
is easier to tell people about the Ocean when you can say Datok Laut Besar. No . . . I did not see 
a person. I find the Great Ocean in my heart” (141). 
 
Such a claim is already damned by western science, damned before it could ever reach our 
supposedly open minds. We could organize a long parade of such stories, some appearing as 
more convincing or astonishing than others, depending on the reader. We even have them in the 
realm of academia, and in the realm of scientific and other peer-reviewed journals, in which 
phenomena such as precognition or presentiment, remote viewing, influence over random event 
generators, and other anomalous happenings have appeared with sufficient statistical power to 
warrant publication. One can look up the work of Daryl Bem, Russel Targ, Julia Mossbridge, 
Dean Radin, Etzel Cardeña, and many others to find out about these anomalies. Most of us don’t 
have time to explore these things. Those who make time for them get pushed to the margins. We 
explore Indigenous Peoples in this chapter in part because they often have a different sense of 
time, and a different sense of science. They practice a science that goes altogether with the 
conditions of life—the conditions of Nature-Culture. They don’t live under the boot of Captain 
Clock. They don’t live for a bottom line. They don’t orient their science toward anything else but 
what all science must orient: Sacredness, and the sacred activity of cultivating life onward. 
Western science is far from immune to having a bottom line. One can say our science, like 
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everything else, has become infected with bottom-line thinking, and thinking inflected by a 
conception of time that might make certain kinds of knowing highly unlikely, and all science has 
turned from gaya scienza to some species of dismal science. Consider these words from Chief 
Oren Lyons: 
I was asked one time by a reporter, “Well, Chief,” he says, “what’s your 
bottom line?” The question stumped me. I didn’t have an answer because I didn’t 
know . . . So I thought about it, and when I thought about it, it was really quite 
easy to answer: We don’t have a bottom line; we live in a circle, in a cycle. 
Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter. There’s no bottom 
line . . . bottom line is a terminology for economics . . . 
 When you live in a society where there is a bottom line, and that is what 
you’re bound with, then you have to make an effort to find the cycle, and that 
takes time. It takes real effort, and it takes being there. You can’t pick that up in a 
book. You just gotta be outside, you gotta be outdoors. It’s all there.98 
 
Jeanette Armstrong, an Indigenous Elder who also has a western Ph.D., said something in the 
same spirit, but she inverted the sense of the economic, trying to invite us to see that, while we 
attempt to control and tame Nature, Nature has unshakeable demands, with which we must 
attune or face consequences: 
The point to me seems obvious, that the root of today’s problem is how humans 
chose to live insulated from nature’s mediation of their behavior within a system 
of reciprocities in which everything that takes must also give. 
 
I can also see that it has something to do with a belief, a belief in ever increasing 
the insulation from nature’s economic requirements of us as humans in the way 
we are. 
 
. . . . Indigenous economics is a lived experience. We are socialized into that lived 
experience. It's not something we can learn about from a book or something we 
can learn about from a far distance from what we need in our lives. 
 
We are needed in that place by those things that live there in that place. 
 
So one of the things that I see is that at the level of individual, personal 
knowledge, some of those things are lost.99 
                                                 
98 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KAy5AHYIK8 
99 https://youtu.be/Ib9BVGDW6sw 
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Again, a sense of intimacy. This feel for “economy” relates to a lost connotation in the Greek 
oikos, which we can savor through metaphor: “Oikos” means home, dwelling. The economy 
does not have to do with “managing the household” (the meaning we take from the Greek), but 
rather abiding, dwelling in balance, being at home—not “ordering a household” or “ordering a 
market,” but attuning with the sacred-creative-ordering of the Cosmos, because this is our home, 
we are our home. This at-homeness does not exist in the dominant culture’s notion of 
“economics,” which has so much to do with competition, conquest, accumulation, aggression, 
and all the rest. 
 
We do not PracticeRealize abiding at peace, an abiding joy (gaya scienza), dwelling in, through, 
as our sacred home, the home fashioned for us by the divine, by the mystery. We do not 
PracticeRealize homo sapiens, who tastes life, arriving at direct knowing, constituted in, 
through, and as living, loving relationships, ecstatic relationality. Instead, we practice and realize 
homo economicus, the economic beast, the creature bound by time, constellated in inequality, 
constituted by “race” and “class” and “nation,” simultaneously limited by “science” and 
“religion,” filled with the many certainties of an indoor life, cut off from Nature, atomized and 
often lonely, the fearful craving being with the great weapon of reason (employed to make other 
weapons, of “development,” war and propaganda, the latter including what we call marketing). 
We can perhaps turn to those who don’t have time, don’t need time, don’t follow a bottom line, 
but try to “follow along with things”. The great Chinese Philosopher Zhuangzi put it this way: 
T’ien Ken was wandering on the sunny side of Yin Mountain. When he reached 
the banks of the Liao River, he happened to meet a Nameless Man. He questioned 
the man, saying, “Please may I ask how to rule the world?” 
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The Nameless Man said, “Get away from me, you peasant! What kind of a dreary 
question is that! I’m just about to set off with the Creator. And if I get bored with 
that, then I’ll ride on the Light-and-Lissome Bird out beyond the six directions, 
wandering in the village of Not-Even-Anything and living in the Broad-and-
Borderless field. What business do you have coming with this talk of governing 
the world and disturbing my mind?” 
 
But T’ien Ken repeated his question. The Nameless Man said, “Let your mind 
wander in simplicity, blend your spirit with the vastness, follow along with things 
the way they are, and make no room for personal views—then the world will be 
governed.” 
 
Nameless has no name because he got past the fixedness that goes altogether with habitual 
naming (recall here Sorenson’s comments about naming, and Nietzsche’s too). He wants nothing 
to do with the mind of control (a mind of conquest). He finds the question so foolish, and he 
perhaps wants to take no chance of getting pulled out of freedom (so to speak) to deal with a 
mind of profanity. He wants to say, “You are asking the wrong question!” He wants to just laugh 
and walk away. But, out of compassion, he tries to explain in words, though the explanation must 
necessarily limit. The Chinese Sage Laozi gave similar advice, another attempt at compassion 
that also has its limits: 
These are the Four Great Powers:  
Humans Follow Earth 
Earth Follows Cosmos 
Cosmos Follows Dao 
Dao Follows Only Itself (Dao De Jing, 25—translation adapted from Mitchell) 
 
If you want to be a great leader, 
you must Learn to Follow Dao. 
Stop trying to control. 
Let Go of fixed plans and concepts, 
the World will Govern Itself. (57) 
 
Laozi also realized that this letting go, this stopping of controlling presents profound challenges 
to us: 
Approach it and there is no beginning; 
follow it and there is no end. 
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You can’t know it, but you can be it, 
at ease in your own life. 
Just realize where you come from: 
this is the essence of wisdom. (15) 
 
Do we have time for no beginning, no end? Do we have time to just sit outside, Attuning 
to/with/as the sacred-creative-patterning? 
 
Zhuangi challenges us to contemplate our hesitation, our resistance, our thinking-we-know: 
Once a man receives this fixed bodily form, he holds on to it, waiting for the end. 
Sometimes clashing with things, sometimes bending before them, he runs his 
course like a galloping steed, and nothing can stop him. Is he not pathetic? 
Sweating and laboring to the end of his days and never seeing his 
accomplishment, utterly exhausting himself and never knowing where to look for 
rest—can you help pitying him? I’m not dead yet! he says, but what good is that? 
His body decays, his mind follows it—can you deny that this is a great sorrow? 
Man’s life has always been a muddle like this. How could I be the only muddled 
one, and other men not muddled? 
 
If a man follows the mind given him and makes it his teacher, then who can be 
without a teacher? Why must you comprehend the process of change and form 
your mind on that basis before you can have a teacher? Even an idiot has his 
teacher. But to fail to abide by this mind and still insist upon your rights and 
wrongs—this is like saying that you set off for Yueh today and got there 
yesterday. This is to claim that what doesn’t exist exists. If you claim that what 
doesn't exist exists, then even the holy sage Yu couldn’t understand you, much 
less a person like me! (translation by Burton Watson) 
 
What mind? The Mind Given. The Given Mind. Not the myth-of-the-given mind. The Mind 
Gifted in reciprocity. The Original Mind. Clearly, we have a paradox, or a muddle, or some kind 
of perplexity. We follow the mind of time, the mind of agendas, the mind of the bottom line, and 
we degrade our souls, degrade the World, desacralize and dismiss. What mind can we follow? 
And how do we follow that Mind? Can we find that Mind in books? In arguments? Or only in 
attunement? How can we, together, make some progress, using words? Zhuangzi says, we need 
to use clarity: 
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Words are not just wind. Words have something to say. But if what they have to 
say is not fixed, then do they really say something?100 Or do they say nothing? 
People suppose that words are different from the peeps of baby birds, but is there 
any difference, or isn’t there? What does the Way rely upon, that we have true 
and false? What do words rely upon, that we have right and wrong? How can the 
Way go away and not exist? How can words exist and not be acceptable? When 
the Way relies on little accomplishments and words rely on vain show, then we 
have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the Mo-ists. What one calls 
right the other calls wrong; what one calls wrong the other calls right. But if we 
want to right their wrongs and wrong their rights, then the best thing to use is 
clarity. 
 
Everything has its “that,” everything has its “this.” From the point of view of 
“that” you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, 
“that” comes out of “this” and “this” depends on “that”—which is to say that 
“this” and “that” give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be 
death; where there is death there must be birth. Where there is acceptability there 
must be unacceptability; where there is unacceptability there must be 
acceptability. Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of 
wrong; where there is recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. 
Therefore the sage does not proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light 
of Heaven. He too recognizes a “this,” but a “this” which is also “that,” a “that” 
which is also “this.” His “that” has both a right and a wrong in it; his “this” too 
has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still have a “this” and 
“that”? Or does he in fact no longer have a “this” and “that”? A state in which 
“this” and “that” no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. 
When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a 
single endlessness and its wrong too is a single endlessness. So, I say, the best 
thing to use is clarity. 
 
To use an attribute to show that attributes are not attributes is not as good as using 
a non-attribute to show that attributes are not attributes. To use a horse to show 
that a horse is not a horse is not as good as using a non-horse to show that a horse 
is not a horse, Heaven and earth are one attribute; the ten thousand things are one 
horse. 
 
What is acceptable we call acceptable; what is unacceptable we call unacceptable. 
A road is made by people walking on it; things are so because they are called so. 
What makes them so? Making them so makes them so. What makes them not so? 
Making them not so makes them not so. Things all must have that which is so; 
things all must have that which is acceptable. 
 
                                                 
100 What a profound question! 
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When Zhuangzi says, “From the point of view of “that” you cannot see it,” it should remind us of 
what Sorenson, Dogen, and so many other students of Culture and soul have said: From the point 
of view of the mind of time, the mind of this-and-that, the mind of analyzing and labeling, the 
mind of subject and object, the mind of habitual thoughts, cravings, clingings, and doubt, much 
remains invisible. The landscape itself remains so invisible to us—the landscape of Earth and the 
landscape of Soul. We don’t know our own Mind, much less the Experience we keep ourselves 
cut off from—Jung’s “breakthrough of total experience” we keep at bay—and we don’t know 
that wholeness and holiness of Experience because of not knowing the Mind, the land, the 
cycles, the sacred-creative-patterning of Nature. 
 
A poetic turn of phrase: The ten thousand things are One Horse—the Windhorse of the Soul. We 
can yet ride it. But we must get off our own high horse first. It may seem that we take too much 
care here, that we spend too much time on the challenges of an open mind, the challenges of 
language, the challenges of time itself. We don’t have time for all of this. Can’t we get to the 
point? But if we cannot see the point, then what’s the point? And if there isn’t a “point” in the 
way we mean “point,” what then? It would be like saying to Sophia, “Cut to the chase,” and Her 
replying, “There’s no chase in this story, kid.” 
 
Really: Can we take too much care? What does the question indicate? Perhaps some of us 
underestimate the challenge. Or, perhaps some readers haven’t suspected that we might suggest 
stranger things than we so far have. We merely knock at a gate here. We approach a threshold. 
To cross it, we must empty ourselves of more than we at first suspect, and that seems to take 
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time, time to give up time. We don’t sense how much we cling to, or how tightly we cling to that 
which we think we know. 
 
Zhuangzi also warns us that what Sorenson calls pre-conquest consciousness on the one hand, 
and what we may call conquest consciousness on the other (to characterize the western or 
dominant mode of mind), create each other. All things depend on PracticeRealization. We cannot 
simply “return” to a pre-conquest mind as if such a thing exists in and of itself. The mind of 
conquest has affected all things. We need to learn the spiritual lessons of its activity, including 
the way it produced a breakdown of the pre-conquest liminal awareness. Sorenson describes this 
in some detail: 
As contact increases intuitive rapport starts crumbling, followed by instinctive 
sociosensuality. Surgings spontaneously well up for some time from deep psychic 
reservoirs. They don’t last. Once expressed in the open they are struck down by 
hostility or aversiveness. Eventually these instinctive surgings emerge covertly 
within small sociosensual groups. These groups protect, sustain and enrich 
themselves by discouraging empathetic integration outside the group. They 
develop rites, rituals and initiations that establish rules of kinship and behavior. 
Tactile aversiveness replaces sociosensuality outside these groups—a 
fundamental change in the way-of-life. In the preconquest situation human affect 
remains fully in the open, entirely honest, undisguised and expressed publicly. In 
the new covert system empathy and rapport are expressed according to the rules 
worked out by kindreds. Trust, empathy, affection and rapport are norms within 
these kindreds. Outside them deception, competition, selfishness and tactile 
aversiveness are the rule. (3) 
 
 . . . . When outside contact becomes substantial, and sustained, the open sensual 
verve and spirit of traditional daily life collapses. They cannot withstand sustained 
contact with hostility, anger and selfishness. Such contact causes hypersensual 
rapport to disintegrate. When hypersensual rapport is gone, liminal consciousness 
starts converting to a supraliminal form. At first there is a shrinking from 
sociosensual contact. As aggressive contacts increase, such aversiveness 
increases. It cuts savagely at intuitive rapport, destroys it in a twinkling. 
Eventually, feeding on itself, the aversiveness suddenly balloons out in a 
catastrophic grand finale of cultural collapse in which the community-wide 
intuitive rapport collapses. 
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Following the collapse, a temporary existential abyss settles. From it the 
“savage savage” emerges. This new type of being pursues material possessiveness 
to the edge of law and beyond and extravagant elemental sex to the very limits of 
human physiological capability. Alcohol and drugs when obtainable are seized 
frantically. A comraderie sustains marauding bands (a type of covert group). They 
see themselves as jolly pirates. From outside the group they’re seen as thieves and 
murderers. (4) 
 
Sorenson offers an excerpt from his field notes, detailing the effects of western education on 
Indigenous People: 
[Students home on holiday from the western schools] strut in gangs among the 
houses, short shrift the empathetic tempers of their younger siblings, mock their 
subtle sociality, bully their attunement, ridicule their tactility. They crudely joke 
with one another, play painful tricks on happy local kids, sometimes reward their 
sensuality with crude aggressive sex. Such rudeness was not seen on the isle two 
years ago. 
 . . . . There can be little doubt that the school experience is what has 
bestialized these boys. Enforced obedience, competitiveness, and the anti-tactile 
mores of school-life erase the integrative capabilities bequeathed by early 
childhood. Modeled on the Western system, those mainland schools, at this 
instant in the history of these people, provide a natural real-life laboratory 
wherein the impact of such education on subtle empathy and compassionate 
attunement can be examined. It’s not a happy sight. 
 
Commenting on these notes, Sorenson writes: 
 
Similar progressions from joyful attunement to despondency and then bestiality 
were observed in Nepal when Jyapu children first started going to school; in 
Mexico where Tarahumara Indian children were attending a Mission boarding 
school; in Oceania, India, and Sri Lanka where children of traditional populations 
made their first forays to formal schools (5) 
 
Western education apparently realizes a breakdown of truth, intimacy, resonance with Nature, 
attunement with the sacred. Why? Does western culture mean aggression, competition, self-
centeredness, deceit, the need for medication, the pressure of time, the forcing of agendas? We 
may want to protest against such a characterization, but what do we actually practice and 
realize—considered in its fullness? How do we organize our society? We have competitiveness 
and self-centeredness built into our vision, and it manifests in the education process. Our 
373 
 
practiced vision does not realize homo sapiens, a child of wisdom, love, and beauty, a being 
living in and cultivating forward, imagining onward a sacred World. Rather, to say it again, we 
practice and realize homo economicus in place of homo sapiens. Homo economicus lives in a 
world of matter that doesn’t matter, and homo economicus manifests, “by nature,” as a 
“rational,” self-interested, atomized, and competitive being. Such a being cannot fully realize a 
nonduality of unity-and-diversity, individual-and-community, Human-and-Nature, Mind-and-
Nature, Nature-and-Culture, Nature-and-Sacredness. Homo economicus cannot realize truth 
dependent on intimacy and openness. Every attempt to practice deeper intimacy and openness 
seems to demand some measure of rebellion against the dominant culture—and the question 
comes to how consistently and coherently we will practice that rebellion. So many seemingly 
spiritual people limit it. 
 
Clearly we practice more than bullying in western culture. At the same time, we practice plenty 
of bullying, even at the level of the Oval Office, where we have placed many a bully in power. 
The history of the U.S. could perhaps get framed as a story of bullying. But, no matter what we 
have done to “civilize” ourselves, and to incorporate some semblance of sensitivity, 
inclusiveness, and even basic compassion into our educational practices, this question remains: 
Do such gestures amount to no more than making a topiary?  
 
Imagine we plant a very large and beautiful garden, with all sorts of food we need to get through 
the year. Over time, we find many plants in the garden suffering. We trace the problem to a 
strange-looking shrub with a root system extending all throughout the garden. The shrub has 
colonized the garden and weakened all the other plants. We take out the shears and begin 
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trimming away. We end up transforming the shrub into the image of a giant flower. It might look 
like an excellent topiary, but we have left the roots intact, and the whole garden remains at risk. 
We have done nothing truly revolutionary, and we did in fact find ourselves in a situation that 
demanded significant transformation—not “revolution” for the sake of “revolution,” but a need 
to uproot something. To what degree do we subtly bully ourselves, each other, and the World? 
Those who spend any time observing closely will perhaps feel shocked. Can we uproot it?  
 
The inner movements of consciousness: 
When their true nature is not realized, are ignorance itself.  
This is the root of all karma and disturbing emotions. 
When their true nature is realized, consciousness is self-aware wisdom, 
The source of all positive qualities. 
~ Milarepa 
 
Surely we have many, many things in western culture worthy of preserving. That goes almost 
without saying. We could then frame the problem as one of development, in which something at 
one stage gets preserved in a way, like the transition from atom to molecule, or the shift that 
happens in our twenties when the neo-cortex comes into a state that changes how we make 
practice and realize our experience. However we frame it, some uncomfortable degree of 
transformation might have become long overdue, as if we were a bunch of 40 year-olds behaving 
very much like teenagers. 
 
It seems worthwhile to provide just a bit more evidence about the breakdown of Liminal Mind. 
We do this in part because it goes together with a few considerations of language, and one of the 
things we might want to consider has to do with the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Loosely, 
this hypothesis suggests that language comes altogether with a different way of experiencing, 
including our way of thinking, and thus our language may constrain what we can think. 
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Researchers have been able to verify certain kinds of differences. Even time can be experienced 
differently, in ways that go together with linguistic habits. For instance, in an article called, “The 
Whorfian time warp,” Bylund and Athanasopoulos (2017) describe differences in the framing of 
time in Spanish and Swedish. Busy Swedes, like many English speakers, tend to speak of a 
“long” day, while busy Spaniards tend to speak of a “full” day, as do Greeks. The researchers 
found that, within limits, they could provoke differences in the perception of time. For instance, 
participants might watch a line grow on a screen. One group might see the line grow 4 inches in 
3 seconds. Another might see the line grow 6 inches in the same span of time. But, depending on 
their language, they might rate the time differently: Speakers of Spanish would sense roughly 3 
seconds of time no matter whether they saw 4 or 6 inches of growth, but Swedes would think 
more time had passed, seduced by the association of time with length. Obviously no one would 
think that a line growing 106 inches in 3 seconds actually took 106 seconds, or even more than 
10. But a difference somehow exists, and it’s not clear what it means.  
 
John Lucy reported in 1997 the following oddity: 
A recent set of studies has explored the relation between language and the 
incidence of occupational accidents in Finland. Occupational accident rates are 
substantially lower in Sweden than in Finland and among the Swedish-speaking 
minority within Finland despite working in the same regions with similar laws 
and regulations (Salminen & Hiltunen 1993, 1995; Salminen & Johansson 1996). 
This difference emerges even when controlling for the type, status, or hazard of 
the occupation or the rate or language of accident report. Researchers have 
attempted to account for this difference by reference to structural differences 
between Swedish and Finnish (Johansson & Str0mnes 1995, Salminen & Hiltunen 
1993).  
These language differences were first analyzed by Frode J. Stromnes, a 
Swedish experimental psychologist who became interested in why it was so 
difficult for him to learn Finnish. He contrasted comparable operators in the two 
languages and concluded that Swedish prepositions can be represented in terms of 
a vector geometry in a three-dimensional space whereas Finnish cases can be 
represented in terms of a topology in a two-dimensional space coupled with a 
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third dimension of time (or duration) (Stromnes 1973, 1974a, 1976). Stromnes 
supported this analysis with a number of ingenious experiments and observations 
(Stromnes 1974a,b). What emerges in practical terms is a Swedish emphasis on 
information about movement in three-dimensional space and a Finnish emphasis 
on more static, Gestalt relations between borders of figures. A later study of 
cinematic style found that Indo-European (Swedish, Norwegian, English) 
productions formed coherent temporal entities in which action could be followed 
from beginning to end across scenes, whereas Ural- Altaic (Finnish, Hungarian, 
Estonian) productions showed more emphasis on static settings with only 
transitory movement and formed coherent person- centered entities in which 
scenes were linked by the emotional Gestalts of persons (Johansson & Stromnes 
1995, Johansson & Salminen 1996, Stromnes et al 1982).  
Based on preliminary observations of factories, the hypothesis was formed 
that the Finns organize the workplace in a way that favors the individual worker 
(person) over the temporal organization of the overall production process. Lack of 
attention to the overall temporal organization of the process leads to frequent 
disruptions in production, haste, and, ultimately, accidents (Johansson & 
Salminen 1996, Johansson & Stromnes 1995). At the moment, concrete evidence 
for this interpretation is lacking, but research on production processes is under 
way to test the hypothesis. (303-4) 
 
I have not found the follow-up work. In any case, the suggestions are interesting, and work 
continues to the present on these sorts of considerations, and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in 
weaker forms still offers interesting pathways for inquiry. While Whorf may have gone a bit far 
in his claims, we can nevertheless appreciate that a language may seduce us into certain habits of 
thinking, as Nietzsche tried to point out with the cogito and as one might suggest with Indo-
European languages in general.  
 
Consider the case of Guugu Yimithirr, an Aboriginal language of the Indigenous people of 
Australia. The language has no words for ego-centric cardinal directions. One cannot say, “Pick 
up the stone on your right,” or, “Turn left here.” One can only say, “Pick up the stone to the 
north of you,” or, “Turn west.” This encourages a constant engagement with the landscape, a 
constant de-centering of the self—or, we might say, a more obvious constitution of the self as 
contextual activity. 
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Consider the following artefact, from E.K. Neumaier-Dargay, the translator of an important text 
of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, from the translator’s introduction to the text: 
Buddhist philosophy rejects one basic assumption made by all Indo-Germanic 
languages, that is, the assumption of the I as centre and origin of all activities and 
events. To put it bluntly, a sentence like “I read a book” is wrong from a Buddhist 
viewpoint: It is not that I do something to the book; rather, a Buddhist would 
argue, something happens in a field consisting of a book, a person (“me”), and an 
event, i.e. “reading.” Consequently a Buddhist way of saying it would be “there is 
the reading of a book with regard to me.” Indo-Germanic languages do not allow 
for such flexibility in their grammatical structures. The example sentence is bad 
English just as it would be bad Sanskrit, if I had bothered to translate it literally. 
Because of the Buddhists’ unhappiness with the active mode, the prominent 
position of the agent, etc., they preferred in their Sanskrit writings nominal 
constructions. That is, they transformed a structure essentially governed by the 
subject and its dependent verb into one that is governed by verbal nouns. Our 
example from above would then read ‘‘book-read-by-me.” In the course of time 
Buddhists developed this form of language into a true art, so that they were able 
to produce long and complex sentences consisting of nothing but verbal nouns 
and their attributes. Under the influence of such thinking the activity becomes an 
event that happens in a field of interdependent factors with none superior to the 
others. By the late 8th century C.E. the Buddhists had largely transformed the 
something to the book; rather, a Buddhist would argue, something happens in a 
field consisting of a book, a person (“me”), and an event, i.e. “reading.” 
Consequently a Buddhist way of saying it would be “there is the reading of a 
book with regard to me.” Indo-Germanic languages do not allow for such 
flexibility in their grammatical structures. The example sentence is bad English 
just as it would be bad Sanskrit, if I had bothered to translate it literally. Because 
of the Buddhists’ unhappiness with the active mode, the prominent position of the 
agent, etc., they preferred in their Sanskrit writings nominal constructions. 83 
That is, they transformed a structure essentially governed by the subject and its 
dependent verb into one that is governed by verbal nouns. Our example from 
above would then read ‘‘book-read-by-me.” In the course of time Buddhists 
developed this form of language into a true art, so that they were able to produce 
long and complex sentences consisting of nothing but verbal nouns and their 
attributes. Under the influence of such thinking the activity becomes an event that 
happens in a field of interdependent factors with none superior to the others. By 
the late 8th century C.E. the Buddhists had largely transformed the Sanskrit 
language into a tool suitable to express a Buddhist world-view. 
 
When the Indian Buddhist texts were brought to Tibet during the late 7th and 8th 
centuries to be translated into her native idiom the difficulties dwindled away. 
Tibetan was still a very young language at that time, and flexible enough to accept 
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readily Buddhist philosophy as a basis for developing a more formalized 
grammatical structure. A factor which encouraged this trend was that Tibetan did 
not belong to the Indo-Germanic languages but to the Tibeto-Burmese family of 
languages. These languages do have quite different grammatical premises. For 
instance, they do not distinguish different categories of words (a word may 
function as a noun one time and as a verb at another time); active and passive 
modes are rather the exception than the rule; and expressions which can be 
understood in only one way are considered a sign of mental immaturity. All these 
characteristics influenced the way the text is translated here. After all, the reader 
of the translation should be able to catch a glimpse of the aesthetics of this 
Buddhist text. (42-3) 
 
It employs metaphoric language, typical of the Vedic literature, when it refers to 
the ground of being as “all-creating sovereign;” it uses metonymic language 
(signifying something other than the word alleges) by interpreting the term rang 
byung ye shes, self-originated or autonomous pristine awareness, as being void of 
any object to become aware of; in its discussion of doctrinal matters of Buddhism 
the texts applies a descriptive language. These three phases, metaphoric, 
metonymic, and descriptive, are indicative of three phases in human history: the 
archaic, the scholastic, and the modern. Thus the [kun byed rgyal po, all-creating 
sovereign] is a text which aspires to include the entire literary tradition of India 
and Buddhism by transforming each of its distinctive traits into a cipher 
meaningful only within a web of paradoxes. This fabric of signs, each eluding 
rational conceptualization, is designed to lead the reader to experiencing the 
overpowering message of silence or the muteness of language. Language itself 
becomes a web of illusion veiling the depth of being. The text will take us from 
the surface of Buddhist doctrinal elements (such as the three forms of Buddha’s 
existence) to the depth of final integration where all distinctions coincide in 
oneness. (13-14) 
 
Buddhist philosophers transformed the language over time. But most significantly, they also 
cultivated a style of consciousness—one that realized itself, realized something about reality as 
in tension with linguistic practices, and then tried to reshape the language as best it could without 
inventing a new one. As we have seen, the western tradition as a collective includes varying 
conceptions of time and space, which might seem to count against the suggestions we have made 
here. But such a criticism misses the spirit of our inquiry, for all the western traditions share a 
style of consciousness which we have characterized as conquest consciousness. Such a style of 
consciousness may experience a long day or a full day, but that it experiences a busy day is more 
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than likely. Better put: More than likely, it experiences time as the clock dictates, or orders its 
experiencing on the basis of clocks and calendars, and not as natural rhythm; likely it 
experiences time as something that happens to it, rather than a function of its participation and 
attunement; quite likely, it experiences time in relation to agendas of doing, competing, planning 
strategically, obsessing about the past, worried about the future is quite likely; and it likely 
experiences the kind of ego-centrism that would make few of its speakers think it important to 
struggle against the habits of their own language. People speaking English ordinarily lack 
philosophical or spiritual reasons for rejecting the predominance of nouns and the subject-object 
structure of the language, and yet precisely these sorts of deeper issues might matter in shifting 
our way of knowing. It might present surprising challenges to resist such deep habits, and there 
seem to be languages that do not make the same sorts of errors, if we can allow ourselves, at this 
point, to consider them as possible errors. Whatever Whorf’s sins, we certainly know that some 
Indigenous languages have a very different structure that seems to go along with different 
philosophical commitments, different practices and realizations, different values, achievements, 
and consummations, and we don’t have to take the word of anyone in the dominant culture for it. 
Perhaps that was the biggest error in the controversy around Whorf’s claims: He should have let 
Indigenous People speak for themselves.101  
 
Boroditsky (2001) tested speakers of Mandarin and English. English speakers think of time 
horizontally, while Mandarin speakers think of it vertically. Time, for English speakers, spreads 
out in a horizontal line, not as a ladder. Consider Boroditsky’s summary of findings: 
                                                 
101 See, for instance, Little Bear and Heavy Head (2004), “A Conceptual Anatomy of the 
Blackfoot Word.” ReVision, Vol. 26, 3. Bastien’s Blackfoot Ways of Knowing is exceptional.  
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In one study, Mandarin speakers tended to think about time vertically even when 
they were thinking for English (Mandarin speakers were faster to confirm that 
March comes earlier than April if they had just seen a vertical array of objects 
than if they had just seen a horizontal array, and the reverse was true for English 
speakers). Another study showed that the extent to which Mandarin–English 
bilinguals think about time vertically is related to how old they were when they 
first began to learn English. In another experiment native English speakers were 
taught to talk about time using vertical spatial terms in a way similar to Mandarin. 
On a subsequent test, this group of English speakers showed the same bias to 
think about time vertically as was observed with Mandarin speakers. It is 
concluded that (1) language is a powerful tool in shaping thought about abstract 
domains and (2) one's native language plays an important role in shaping habitual 
thought (e.g., how one tends to think about time) but does not entirely determine 
one’s thinking in the strong Whorfian sense. (1) 
 
Interesting findings, but the conclusions do not fully touch what we try to approach in our 
inquiry, precisely because Sorenson establishes the altogetherness of a style of consciousness 
and a way of thinking, speaking, living. The more revolutionary effects of a shift of 
consciousness depend on context. To test speakers of English and Mandarin still keeps one in the 
realm of conquest consciousness, as does testing Spaniards and Swedes. Meanwhile, the forms of 
consciousness that might involve better ways of knowing could have a peculiar sensitivity to de-
stabilization in the presence of the conquest form, which now predominates.  
 
The good news is that we can think about time differently—or, think time differently, practice 
and realize our experience differently. But we should find it more interesting that we might 
accomplish something beyond thinking time vertically as opposed horizontally. It matters that 
Finns could learn to think of space in ways Swedes do—if they have to work in factories. But in 
the case of space and time, the possibilities of rupture matter more than these more modest 
effects. Though worker safety is not at all a modest issue in one sense, it is yet more 
revolutionary to ask about the sanity of having factories in our ecologies in the first place, and 
more revolutionary still to inquire into experiences that rupture our habitual sense of space and 
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time in ways that go far beyond lines growing on a screen. But testing is not easy, since conquest 
consciousness and its effects pervade almost universally, and even if they didn’t one would have 
a hard time maintaining ecological validity once one had gotten a very different way of knowing 
isolated from its context and situated in a brain scanner. This may be in part why so many “para-
normal” findings come with incredibly significant results, but results which often carry a more 
modest effect size. In other words: It’s happening, and it seriously challenges our paradigm, but 
it seems to be subtle, at least in the lab. Of course, the lived experience of other ways of knowing 
often veers far from mere subtlety.102 Experientially, it can change one’s whole life, and even 
save one’s own life or the life of another. In any case, we should not exclude the possibility that 
language both reflects and encourages worldviews that themselves exclude, marginalize, or make 
unlikely certain kinds of experience that would in turn challenge the worldview.  
 
These experiences tend to have an emotional energy, perhaps tapping into the Eros which 
Sorenson discusses, and maybe tapping into more than that. Wolfgang Pauli, who won a Nobel 
Prize in physics and was highly regarded among his scientific peers, thought that certain kinds of 
rupture experiences depend on emotional energy. He was particularly interested in 
synchronicities, which we will discuss later and can for now think of as coincidences that are too 
meaningful to be thought of as mere coincidence. What is now called by some the Pauli-Jung 
conjecture involves theorizing about the nonduality of mind-matter that gives rise to 
                                                 
102 We find a tension here between the statistical methods employed in various sciences and our 
lived, unique experiences. The lived experiences have an unconscious dimension that we try to 
exclude in the laboratory, and the statistical methods used from psychology all the way to 
quantum physics may cover over our ability to detect the deeper non-linear, seemingly acausal 
connectedness of things—what Bohm refers to as an implicate order, or what we make think of 
as a holographic quality to the Cosmos. 
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synchronicities, and to think into a science of the future that would allow some kind of 
unification of physics and psychology. In light of Sorenson’s fieldwork, and the above comments 
about significance versus effect size, I am reminded that some of the results in what we call the 
“paranormal” involve rather high effect sizes for certain individuals—until they get bored. The 
ecology of the lab is not the same as an ecology in which what we call the “paranormal” needs to 
be drawn from as part of an intimate and emotionally charged life situation. Gieser discusses 
some aspects of this, citing interesting letters from Pauli. Here, “the Σ concept” refers to 
Synchronicity: 
Pauli wanted to place the emotional experience of meaning and involvement, i.e. 
the affective factor, at the centre of the Σ concept. He returned to this in 
connection with his interest in the parapsychological experiments which were 
being conducted in various parts of the world at this time: by J.B. Rhine at Duke 
University and R.A. McConnell at Pittsburgh University, both in the USA, and by 
S.G. Soal and F. Bateman in England. What was interesting to Pauli was that they 
showed positive results – over the statistical average – when the experimental 
subject was emotionally involved and expected something from the experiment. 
This was often the case at the start of the study, whereas the result deteriorated – 
reverted towards the statistical average – as more experiments were conducted. 
The subject began quite simply to be bored by the experiment. This phenomenon 
was given the name of ‘fatigue (decline) effect’ (Ermüdungseffekt). Pauli also 
called it the pernicious influence of the statistical method on the synchronistic 
phenomenon. In a conversation 1957 between Pauli and Hans Bender, holder of a 
chair of parapsychology in Germany, Bender confirmed the importance of the 
affective factor in the investigation of so-called parapsychological phenomena. 
The same principle, i.e. strong feeling or involvement as an ordering 
factor, had been in action in the astrological experiments which Jung conducted in 
the course of his work on synchronicity. Jung had presumably intended to show 
that astrology is based on some kind of acausal connection between its symbol 
system and people born at particular times. Instead his astrological experiments 
resulted in a demonstration of the effect of synchronicity in the researcher and his 
interest in or expectation of a particular research result. For Jung observed that at 
the beginning of his experiment he obtained a result which statistically confirmed 
the predictions of astrology, but as material accumulated it evened out into a non-
significant, statistically average result. Pauli was rather surprised that Jung did 
this ‘experiment’ at all. To him it was obvious that one cannot establish 
synchronicity by a statistical method. He was therefore extremely satisfied that 
Jung had reached the conclusion that the statistical method erases all trace of the 
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confirmation that had at first been expected. Pauli discusses this in a letter to 
Markus Fierz. 
 
The news in your last letter that C.G. Jung’s results concerning the 
aspects ‘typical of marriage’ in the horoscope fell entirely within 
the bounds of statistically predicted variation is to me a source of 
unmitigated satisfaction. A test of this kind, in which every 
irrational factor is eliminated and the unconscious has no chance to 
operate (a comical thought that we physicists of all people have to 
draw the attention of the psychologists of the unconscious to this!) 
cannot turn out in any other way! The sciences are quite good 
enough to predict the negative outcome of such an attempt, and it 
was only the product of a mind quite without scientific training to 
expect anything else from it! For here we are concerned with the 
reproducible and not with the unique. It is about the latter that 
statements are possible which are additional to the scientific 
conclusions, but without invalidating them. (I use ‘the unique’ so 
broadly as also to include isolated groups of events, not only single 
events.) 
 
The relationship between what the synchronicity principle seeks to describe and 
what one may arrive at using a statistical method is a true complementarity 
relationship. The statistical measurement excludes precisely what synchronicity 
emphasizes: the mental state of the observer. Therefore this ought to be included 
as an essential part of the definition of the synchronicity concept. Pauli 
formulated this as follows: 
 
It actually seems to me a general and essential attribute of 
synchronistic phenomena, one that I would even like to incorporate 
into the definition of the term ‘synchronicity’; in other words, 
whenever an application of statistical methods, without 
consideration of the psychic state of the people involved in the 
experiment, does not show such a ‘pernicious influence’, then 
there is something very different from synchronicity going on. 
 
If there is one thing that Pauli has learned from quantum physics, it is that the 
statistical character of the laws of nature is the price that has to be paid in order to 
maintain reproducibility in physics. In other words the statistical method saves 
science from the detested, isolated, non-repeatable instance: it can be placed in 
brackets. By increasing the amount of measurements of individual cases one 
obtains a total statistical picture which approaches the result of the classical 
theory. The area where the results of quantum theory merge with the predictions 
of classical physics is labelled statistical correspondence. From the point of view 
of quantum theory classical causality is regarded as a special case within the 
framework of general probability calculation. (284-6) 
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It is not at all clear that we should think no Synchronicity can stand up to the statistical method, 
and Pauli will later accept a broader view of Synchronicity provided by Jung. We will need 
further contemplation of these matters later. The main issue for us now has to do with the 
possibilities for practice and realization that our culture makes less likely, and which language 
itself, in conjunction with worldview, may seduce us into. If we don’t know how to develop a 
heightened emotional-rational experience, a refined form of thinking in, through, as an 
ecological, ecosensual awareness, then we may reduce the appearance of ways of knowing that 
depend on such heightened states, states of achievement, consummatory states. If our manner of 
doing science, and our manner of thinking, speaking, and moving further rigidify and reify us 
into being cut off from such ways of being and knowing, we remain stuck. If there is any 
flexibility in languages, and if they can either reflect and encourage (presence and cultivate) the 
ways of knowing that interest us, or reflect and encourage ways of knowing that can create 
negative side-effects, then we may see at least some of our troubles in the English language and 
other languages of the dominant culture. 
 
David Bohm was interested in the connections between seemingly modest linguistic habits and 
seemingly revolutionary changes in worldview. How does language encourage bad views? How 
does it encourage a style of consciousness characterized by fragmentation and conquest? Here 
are some thoughts from Bohm’s Wholeness and the Implicate Order: 
In the previous chapter it has been pointed out that our thought is 
fragmented, mainly by our taking it for an image or model of ‘what the world is’. 
The divisions in thought are thus given disproportionate importance, as if they 
were a widespread and pervasive structure of independently existent actual breaks 
in ‘what is’, rather than merely convenient features of description and analysis. 
Such thought was shown to bring about a thoroughgoing confusion that tends to 
permeate every phase of life, and that ultimately makes impossible the solution of 
individual and social problems. We saw the urgent need to end this confusion, 
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through giving careful attention to the one-ness of the content of thought and the 
actual process of thinking which produces this content. 
In this chapter the main emphasis will be to inquire into the role of 
language structure in helping to bring about this sort of fragmentation in thought. 
Though language is only one of the important factors involved in this tendency, it 
is clearly of key importance in thought, in communication, and in the organization 
of human society in general.  
Of course, it is possible merely to observe language as it is, and has been, 
in various differing social groups and periods of history, but what we wish to do 
in this chapter is to experiment with changes in the structure of the common 
language. In this experimentation our aim is not to produce a well-defined 
alternative to present language structures. Rather, it is to see what happens to the 
language function as we change it, and thus perhaps to make possible a certain 
insight into how language contributes to the general fragmentation. Indeed, one of 
the best ways of learning how one is conditioned by a habit (such as the common 
usage of language is, to a large extent) is to give careful and sustained attention to 
one’s overall reaction when one ‘makes the test’ of seeing what takes place. . . . 
In scientific inquiries a crucial step is to ask the right question. Indeed, 
each question contains presuppositions, largely implicit. If these presuppositions 
are wrong or confused, then the question itself is wrong, in the sense that to try to 
answer it has no meaning. One has thus to inquire into the appropriateness of the 
question. In fact, truly original discoveries in science and in other fields have 
generally involved such inquiry into old questions, leading to a perception of their 
inappropriateness, and in this way allowing for the putting forth of new questions. 
To do this is often very difficult, as these presuppositions tend to be hidden very 
deep in the structure of our thought. . . . 
What, then, will be our question, as we engage in this inquiry into our 
language (and thought)? We begin with the fact of general fragmentation. We can 
ask in a preliminary way whether there are any features of the commonly used 
language which tend to sustain and propagate this fragmentation, as well as, 
perhaps, to reflect it. A cursory examination shows that a very important feature 
of this kind is the subject-verb-object structure of sentences, which is common to 
the grammar and syntax of modern languages. This structure implies that all 
action arises in a separate entity, the subject, and that, in cases described by a 
transitive verb, this action crosses over the space between them to another 
separate entity, the object. . . . 
This is a pervasive structure, leading in the whole of life to a function of 
thought tending to divide things into separate entities, such entities being 
conceived of as essentially fixed and static in their nature. When this view is 
carried to its limit, one arrives at the prevailing scientific world view, in which 
everything is regarded as ultimately constituted out of a set of basic 
particles of fixed nature.  
The subject-verb-object structure of language, along with its world view, 
tends to impose itself very strongly in our speech, even in those cases in which 
some attention would reveal its evident inappropriateness. For example, consider 
the sentence ‘It is raining.’ Where is the ‘It’ that would, according to the sentence, 
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be ‘the rainer that is doing the raining’? Clearly, it is more accurate to say: ‘Rain 
is going on.’ Similarly, we customarily say, ‘One elementary particle acts on 
another’, but, as indicated in the previous chapter, each particle is only an 
abstraction of a relatively invariant form of movement in the whole field of the 
universe. So it would be more appropriate to say, ‘Elementary particles are on-
going movements that are mutually dependent because ultimately they merge and 
interpenetrate.’ However, the same sort of description holds also on the larger-
scale level. Thus, instead of saying, ‘An observer looks at an object’, we can 
more appropriately say, ‘Observation is going on, in an undivided movement 
involving those abstractions customarily called “the human being” and “the object 
he is looking at”.’ 
These considerations on the overall implications of sentence structures 
suggest another question. Is it not possible for the syntax and grammatical form of 
language to be changed so as to give a basic role to the verb rather than to the 
noun? This would help to end the sort of fragmentation indicated above, for the 
verb describes actions and movements, which flow into each other and merge, 
without sharp separations or breaks. Moreover, since movements are in general 
always themselves changing, they have in them no permanent pattern of fixed 
form with the rheomode which separately existent things could be identified. Such 
an approach to language evidently fits in with the overall world view discussed in 
the previous chapter, in which movement is, in effect, taken as a primary notion, 
while apparently static and separately existent things are seen as relatively 
invariant states of continuing movement (e.g., recall the example of the vortex). 
(34-8) 
 
In his book, Bohm proposes experimentation with a mode of language—not a new language, but 
something recognizable as English, though in a mode of communication in which verbs 
predominate. He called this mode the rheomode, a theoretical notion developed on the basis of 
his philosophical and scientific insights (e.g. though we seem to practice and realize a 
Newtonian universe, we seem to live in a cosmos unlike that one—we actively practice delusion, 
and we call it a scientific view).  
 
Interestingly, F. David Peat, a physicist and collaborator with Bohm was later contacted by 
Leroy Little Bear of the Blackfoot Nation. Little Bear had noticed similarities between a vision 
of reality offered by quantum physics and the vision of reality offered in Blackfoot Culture, what 
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we might call its scientific/philosophical dimension. Little Bear had also been looking into 
Bohm’s work, and thought that as a scientist he might be more open to sincere conversation 
about these resonances than many other establishment scientists.103 Bohm agreed to meet with 
Little Bear and others, and as they spoke, Bohm began to learn a little about the Blackfoot 
language, he realized it sounded a lot like his rheomode, and he found their worldview resonant 
with his own. 
 
                                                 
103 Bohm suffered significantly from the politics, psychology, and bad philosophy one finds in 
academia, including science. His polite comments about it can be viewed here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI66ZglzcO0 I myself was interested to hear about a fellow 
philosopher whose science bubble was burst not so long ago. This philosopher was so eager to 
go out among the scientists, to escape “the popes” of philosophy departments and finally speak 
with rational people fully committed to evidence. He found quite a mess. One researcher seemed 
to be keeping up a line of work he knew was going nowhere, but which was central to funding 
his lab. Another researcher kept a very good scientist out of key conferences, because they had 
been in a sexual relationship that turned sour. Another researcher seemed to be fudging data, but 
no one was sure enough to try and prove it, and the researcher had enough status that mere 
suspicion, however seemingly well-founded, would not suffice. All of this is rumor. But we can 
find accusations based far less on hearsay. For instance, Professor Ian Harris, an orthopedic 
surgeon, has written a book called The Ultimate Placebo, in which he argues that, while surgeons 
do not likely recommend surgery in any consciously manipulative way, the evidence for its 
benefits might be surprisingly less convincing than one would hope, given the risks and potential 
negative side-effects. Similarly, physician-scientist John Iannadis argued that so-called evidence-
based medicine has become invaded by industry (see “Evidence-based medicine has been 
hijacked,” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology Volume 73, May 2016, Pages 82-86). The history of 
science shows there are more spiritual demands placed on the scientist than many of them are 
able to deal with, outside of spiritual/philosophical training. We speak of “science” as if it could 
exist outside of any context (ah, Dewey’s fateful error again), outside of ecologies that bring 
about the mutual development of science, societies, the scientists as full human beings, and the 
world they study and live in. Our whole inquiry again and again touches on this key notion: 
Science cannot exist in any rigorous or sustainable fashion except as part of a spiritual practice, a 
spiritual way of life in a spiritually rooted culture. The same holds for art and all other human 
practices. There is no “exclusively” human practice aside from our gifts to Nature, to Sacredness, 
as part of our participation, our fulfilling our ontological-ethical-aesthetic responsibilities. 
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Peat went on to write a book called Blackfoot Physics. He also wrote an article called, “Blackfoot 
Physics and European Minds.” Here is how he summarizes some of what he learned from the 
Blackfoot Elders: 
it could be objected that, unlike the arts, science is objective and, from a cultural 
point of view, value-free. It is for this reason, it is said, that indigenous and 
marginalized cultures cannot really co-exist beside industrialized nations and are 
doomed to extinction. I do not believe this is true. Traditional cultures have 
enormous power and may, in the end, act to transform or renew our own 
technological society. 
My test case is that of the Blackfoot people, a nation who once occupied 
an area of the North American plains east of the Rocky Mountains but now today 
live in reserves in Montana, US and reservations in Alberta, Canada. By tradition, 
they were hunters of buffalo; travelling with their tepees in the summer and 
wintering along river banks. Their language is a member of the great Algonquin 
family which runs from the Cheyenne in the central US plains though the 
Blackfoot and up into northern Canada with Ojibway and Cree finally into the 
Naskapi of Labrador.  
My encounter, as a representative of Western science, with the Blackfoot 
was neither systematic nor anthropological. It was more an ongoing friendship 
and a series of discussions about our respective world-views. In turn, this led to a 
number of circles in which Western scientists sat with Blackfoot and other Native 
American Elders. . . .  
. . . they taught me that we all possess a similar capacity and buried deep 
within the European mind lies something that may be able to temper the 
momentum of our present path. We are all indigenous people, in the sense that 
each of us is the carrier of a sacred relationship to the natural world and has 
access to a wider vision of a reality long denied.  
What is the nature of Blackfoot reality? Certainly it is far wider than our 
own, yet firmly based within the natural world of vibrant, living things. Once our 
European world saw nature in a similar way, a vision still present in poets like 
Blake, Wordsworth and Gerard Manley Hopkins who perceived the immanence 
and inscape of the world. Nevertheless our consciousness has narrowed to the 
extent that matter is separated from spirit and we seek our reality in an imagined 
elsewhere of abstractions, Platonic realms, mathematical elegance, and physical 
laws.  
The Blackfoot know of no such fragmentation. Not only do they speak 
with rocks and trees, they are also able to converse with that which remains 
invisible to us, a world of what could be variously called spirits, or powers, or 
simply energies. However, these forces are not the occupants of a mystical or 
abstract domain, they remain an essential aspect of the natural, material world. It 
is not so much that the Blackfoot live in an extended reality but that our own 
Western vision had become excessively myopic.  
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This wider reality embraces flux, movement, change and transformation. 
The creator of the land, Napi (the Old Man), is also its trickster, one who is 
constantly changing form, traversing boundaries and upsetting preconceptions. 
For example, what the West takes as the aberration of multiple personality 
becomes the acceptance that an individual is not a fixed thing but fluid, a being 
whose multiplicity is reflected in the way a person’s name keeps transforming 
during their life.  
How is one to maintain orientation in a universe in which everything is 
caught up in the river of transformation. How can anything be preserved from 
change? The answer lies in participation within the flux by means of acts of 
renewal. (566-7) 
 
I mentioned Little Bear and Heavy Head (2004), “A Conceptual Anatomy of the Blackfoot 
Word.” The title of the article deliberately evokes a tension, which we can contemplate here in 
relation to Peat’s reflections. The Indigenous authors write:  
We chose to exploit this particular metaphor, the juxtaposition of anatomical 
conceptions as an instrument for describing and understanding other complex 
experiences, to illustrate an important observation: that this association indexes a 
fundamental theme at the very heart of Western culture, as evidenced in the 
structure and utility of the modern English language. The anatomy metaphor is 
not only attractive for the English speaker; it actually makes perfect sense to him . 
. . It seems fair to claim that the anatomical metaphor is something of a Western 
imperative, in that its influence in both thought and action entirely prevalent in all 
dimensions of their experience . . .  Not all peoples make sense of the world in 
this way . . . (31) 
 
They seem to see the English universe and the Blackfoot Cosmos as incommensurable, the 
former composed of “solids within solids,” and the latter a “flux dynamics of massive fluidity” 
(32). Thus, they say they cannot possibly explain Blackfoot in the medium of English, since the 
English language reflects so well a metaphysical orientation toward objects and analyses. We 
should perhaps pause here to consider the entire sensibility of “analytic” “philosophy,” and 
perhaps ask ourselves if the whole thing is founded on and/or expresses bad metaphysical 
assumptions (even though some of its practitioners eschew “metaphysics”). As for Little Bear 
and Heavy Head, they seek to “relay merely the existence of another intellectual tradition, one 
that could very well be of some relevance in contemporary discussions of such important 
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concerns as the nature of cognition and the explanatory dilemmas of quantum physics” (32). To 
do that, they say they need to thoroughly distance themselves from  
all of those familiar categories of language structure and, foremost of these, that 
which is known in the common form of English as the word. Our reason for this 
departure is that there simply is nothing of this order in the Blackfoot tongue. One 
could not argue, without considerable imposition, for the existence of any 
recognizable morphemes, lexemes, or sentences, nor of such classes as nouns and 
verbs. In fact, there must be very little carryover from science founded on Indo-
European models of speech and thought if we are truly to approach any Blackfoot 
sense of meaning . . . (32) 
 
They consider the example of the word “chair”: 
One common Blackfoot equivalent of the abstract English singular “chair” is 
asóópa’tsisi . . . most directly transcribed to English as become-sit-facilitate-ing 
[note that it has four dimensions—n.k.]. There is nothing in this breakdown which 
could be equated with the static quality of the “chair” as known to the English 
speaker, and no indication of its concrete existence in a real world outside the 
human experience. It is not a noun (a thing) nor a verb (an interaction between a 
subject and either himself or an object). Instead, what we register in asóópa’tsisi 
is a facilitating event, logically interrelated and dependent upon a human event 
that is in-fact cited as an aspect of asóópa’tsisi as a happening. (33) 
 
Consider how Little Bear and Heavy Head try and transcribe from Blackfoot a sentence that in 
English indicates something like “that boy brought this chair”: “by-way-of-transfer-move-ing 
that-familiar-ing young-yet-state-of-ing this-near-ing become-sit-facilitate-ing” (37). Something 
in us may want to say, “Alright, but we still get the meaning.” What does it indicate when we 
want to close down like this? Why do we find it so tempting? Why do we have a hard time 
wonderstanding the difference a different worldview can make, in the most practical and intimate 
sense? 
 
Interestingly, some of us may make fun of Whorf for claiming that, to put it in crude terms, since 
Hopi has no word for time, then the Hopi do not experience time. But why should we think that 
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alternative experiences of time are not possible? Speaking from experience in the practice-
realization of Indigenous ways of knowing, Little Bear and Heavy Head suggest that something 
inconceivable to conquest consciousness might arise in a Liminal Awareness with a different 
experience of life: 
Upon thorough examination, it becomes apparent that time or tense, in the view 
position of the [“completed saying” linguistic structure], is experienced 
differently by the Blackfoot speaker than it is in the linear Western past-present-
future ensemble. We could even go so far as to assert that there is no encounter 
with “time” (as such) in Blackfoot world view and, therefore, disclaim any 
existence of tense in the language. (34) 
 
Little Bear and Heavy Head conclude their article with the suggestion that Western languages—
perhaps, we could suggest, as a reflection of a style of experience or a style of consciousness—
seem to create obstacles for the incorporation (in Nietzsche’s sense) of the findings of 
contemporary physics. They do not put it this way, but we might say we remain stuck in a 
Newtonian universe, even though our own science suggests that we live in a different reality. 
But, without the capacity to practice-and-realize such a reality, to run the experiment of 
incorporation, we don’t really know that reality. We may claim to know about it, or claim to 
speak about it. But we ourselves remain stuck, and the general epistemology of practice-
realization suggests this marks a direct, even if unintentional admission of ignorance. This is just 
a part of why Gregory Bateson wrote a memorandum when he was a University of California 
Regent that claimed the UC education is (like most education in western culture) obsolete.  
 
Again, this has to do with practice. We can try and work with a couple of examples that may 
give us a feel for how, by the standards of practice-realization, we live an outdated epistemology. 
First, let us say we make a photographic image in the old-school way, using non-digital media 
like film or a photographic plate. We can develop the plate or the film and produce what is called 
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a negative—not a print, but the developed medium that recorded the image. Once we have that 
negative, even if we don’t hold it up to a light source, we can often recognize an image. Once we 
hold it up to the light, the image may become even clearer. If we then cut the film or plate in 
half, we get only half the image in each piece. If I make an image of you, and we cut the image 
in half, we will see only half of you in each piece of the plate or film.  
 
Making a hologram involves us in a very different process. First of all, consider the way 
holographic film looks: If we look at the photographic plate on which the image is held, we see 
diffraction patterns, not an image. It may look like nonsense to our ordinary eyes in the context 
of incoherent light. We may go so far as to say the totality is inconceivable to us. And, again, 
ordinary, incoherent light will not help, no matter how bright. We need to know how to know the 
image, and that requires a coherent light source, like a laser. Coherence made the image, and 
coherence reveals it. 
 
If we cut the film or photographic plate in half, we get two pieces, and each piece contains the 
whole image. It is not two halves, but two wholes. If we make a hologram of an apple, and we 
look at the film plate, we would only see a diffraction pattern. It doesn’t look anything like an 
apple or even a “scrambled up” apple. If we shine a light through the plate, we get a 3-
dimensional apple. If we cut the plate in half, and we shine a light through just that half, we still 
get a whole 3-dimensional apple. 
 
Now, imagine that we could make a hologram of a place in Nature, maybe one with a broad view 
in the background. Just after we make that image, a beautiful butterfly lands on a tree branch 
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near enough to the camera that we could easily see it in the image, and we decide to make 
another image. If these were ordinary photographs, we would think that just one part of the 
image had changed, namely the place where the butterfly is. But looking at the diffraction 
patterns of the two images, they are totally different. We know that if we take the image with the 
butterfly and cut it in half, each half contains the whole image. We could cut that half in half, and 
again the whole image would be there. Thus, the little butterfly is in the whole image. The 
butterfly affected every aspect of the whole. The butterfly is interwoven into the whole.  
 
Check your own intuitions. Does it seem like, in the practice of everyday life, you live as if the 
world functions like ordinary film, or like a hologram? If we are honest and rigorous about what 
it means to know and what we can claim to know on the basis of lived experience, it seems we 
have such a limiting and limited view that we don’t truly wonderstand that the presence (or 
absence) of the butterfly changes everything. We tend to live and think as if the world were like 
an ordinary photograph. Such a view has certainly received intellectual criticism—and how 
could it not if things don’t seem to actually be that way? For instance, Rorty’s Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature could have been called Philosophy and the Photographic Image of Nature. 
Even though some people may agree with some, much, or even all of the spirit or substance of 
Rorty’s critique, we still practice and realize a representational theory of mind and a 
correspondence theory of truth. In practical terms, we live in a photograph, not in a living 
ecological hologram (an ecogram?). In most cases, we live as if we make an image “in the 
brain,” and we then check to see how well the image matches up to reality. We certainly like to 
pretend this isn’t the case, and, to say it again, we may make all sorts of intellectual criticisms 
about it, as we do with theories of language and other things based on such a feel for life. But we 
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miss that this is a feel for life, a style of mind that no amount of intellectual critique seems likely 
to uproot. Functionally, we behave as if we have a brain that receives “data” from the “outside” 
“world,” and we hide behind our own skin, not aware that the outside world really does come 
alive “in” us. We are hooked by an “image,” an image that itself embodies distance rather than 
intimacy, and one that thus keeps us outside of the symbolic/religious/spiritual/philosophical life 
we need, a life of vitalizing imagination, which does not mean mere fancy or whimsy but the 
visionary capacity of intelligence. An image in the proper sense is not restrained to the “visual”. 
 
Returning to the hologram, we could imagine making a holographic movie. In such a case, we 
would understand the whole pattern shifts moment to moment, even if something small comes in 
from outside of the frame. A single leaf falling in the scene would transform the entire seen at 
once. Every rustle of wind, every shift of light would change the whole scene. And if we could 
see the living hologram of that scene, see it without having to resort to a hologram but instead to 
somehow touch the intimacy of the living interwovenness of things, see it in ceaseless 
transformation as everything moves, growths, shifts, thinks its way into being, then we ourselves 
would become liberated into that fuller ecology of mind. 
 
In our own lives, we make barriers with the mind. We block our capacity to sense this living 
interwovenness. We make barriers against sensing, barriers against reality, barriers against 
interwovenness, barriers between ourselves and the nonduality of unity and diversity, self and 
other. The butterfly has its own life, and yet it cannot have its own life without its 
interwovenness, without your life and my life. The butterfly cannot exist without trees, wind, 
grass, sun, moon, river, human. Job had to learn this lesson as well: We can’t manipulate the 
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World, and even the Divine finds the World startling and wondrous, and the Divine seems to 
imply that Job could learn a lot by simply wondering at Creation, studying and learning from the 
sentient beings inhabiting it with great natural perfection. 
 
In a similar manner, it seems that you exist “over there,” which for you is “here”. I exist “here,” 
but it is your “there”. If we could sit at a table together and enjoy some tea, I could ask, “Where 
am I?” You would naturally point at me and say, “You are there.” But, in fact, I am located at 
your “here,” and you would do better to point at yourself, saying, “You are here.” You might do 
even better and just laugh at the question. Our cognitive science indicates that we show up for 
each other in the intimacy of awareness, in a nonlocal way. But our localized epistemology, the 
one we naïvely practice and realize, gives us a world of parts, times, and barriers. By means of 
practices of Liminal Awareness, by means of the cultivation of Arts of Awareness, we can 
escape this sort of obsolete thinking, liberating ourselves into a sense of health and wholeness 
that goes beyond any mindless assertion that “we are all one”. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a not-two-not-one that seems important to practice-realize, and which 
allows us to correct an error. Recall that Bateson somehow sees the loss of a sense of unity, a 
loss of an aesthetic and sacred sensibility, as an epistemological mistake. A wide range of 
experiences seem to trigger a self-healing process with respect to this wound of twoness, of 
distance, of subject-object/self-world/Culture-Nature/Mind-Nature/profane-sacred split.  
 
Through these sorts of considerations, we try to get at the stuckness of our habitual way of 
knowing. Everything we try to do to “fix” the problems of the world or of our own soul will 
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come up against this epistemological mistake. In a non-local epistemology, we realize we cannot 
“locate” “myself” “someplace”. Again, we can try to evoke a sense of this, and some vague 
sense of an alternative. Let’s say we see a photograph of ourselves, a portrait for instance, of our 
head and shoulders. If someone asks us, “Who is that?” We would naturally say, “That’s me.” 
But does this really hold up? Thought experiments about brains in vats aside, if we cut you off at 
the shoulders, you won’t likely function. You won’t still be you. Worse yet, of course, the photo 
is just the surface of you, as is an image in a mirror—which makes it puzzling that we think of a 
mirror as a test of self-awareness which we then apply to non-human beings to see if they are as 
clever as we. Why do we think we are what we look like, or that we are what we see in a mirror? 
 
We have discovered that the microbiome influences mood, appetite, and weight. The 
microbiome has been connected to depression, autism, and the performance of elite athletes. It is 
not “I” who wins the race, but an ecology. “My” “mood” seems like mine. But if the microbiome 
constitutes it, what shall we make of it? If we could “zoom in” on ourselves to examine our lung 
capacity and the strength of our diaphragm, the composition of our microbiome, the epigenetic 
state of our cells, we would see all sorts of things that clearly constitute our experience. Can we 
locate ourselves in any of them?  
 
If we “zoom out,” our body would appear again. As we keep zooming out, we would see the 
room, the air and lighting which constitute our experience—no air, no experience reportable in 
this realm. We zoom out further to see the Earth, with sky and oceans. We get increasingly 
inclusive.  
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When someone looks at us up close, they may only see our eyes. If they could only see our eyes, 
that would be all they could point to in order to locate us. Would they be correct? Are we “in 
there”? They might magically make our eyes vanish, but we could still carry on. We are not in 
the eyes. If they back up, they see our whole body. That’s more of us. But, they might magically 
take certain parts of it without thereby disrupting us catastrophically. Meanwhile, we have just 
been looking out, so to speak. Perhaps we were looking up at the sky. Perhaps we were looking 
at the Sun for a moment, just glimpsing it. At such a moment, are we the Earth looking outward, 
just as on a different scale we are something looking out of eyes that are themselves composite, 
made up of millions and millions of living cells? If a person could stand on the Sun and look 
back, the Earth would be like our body, with an “awareness” somewhere “in there” looking out. 
They would point and think, “My friend is there.” If they magically made the atmosphere of the 
Earth vanish, we would be done for. If they made the Sun vanish, we would be done for. Those 
things seem much more intimately us, in that sense of a deep, deep interdependence.  
 
In order to have experience, we need air, water, Sun, soil. As we include more, we include what 
is quite essential. Wiping out the microbiome would have all sorts of negative consequences, but 
wiping out the ecology ruins us. Yet we so easily forget that somehow or other, we are the 
ecology. There is an undivided wholeness, one that both Bateson and Bohm seem to think we 
need to realize in order to correct our way of knowing. 
 
Little Bear and Heavy Head agree. They cite Bohm and note that his view and the Blackfoot 
view arise from a sense of reality as “an unfragmented, unbounded whole,” and that “theoretical 
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discussions between cultures” might ease some of the problems we face. But this is not another 
mindless praise of “wholeness”. We have to think our way into knowing better. 
 
As Bateson suggested (and Nietzsche would applaud), it somehow has to get into our instincts. If 
we know that our water comes from a well, and someone is about to poison it, we may feel that 
keenly, one might say at an instinctive level. We realize, perhaps intimately, that we depend on 
that well, that our experience goes altogether with whatever is going on deep in the ground “over 
there” (we should pause just there: Our experience arises dependent upon what goes on deep 
underground . . . how foolish to go carelessly digging things up . . .). Somehow we can realize 
our interwovenness with that water, because it feels intimate. But we are such linear thinkers, by 
practice, that we forget all the time. We habitually try to localize ourselves, and we thus cover 
over a nonlocal reality. 
 
Imagine that we could zoom out of the Earth and look at it, and that we could say, “That’s me! 
That’s us!” Even then, it is part of us. We need to keep zooming out. As far as someone goes 
outward, our awareness remains at the center of the picture. We aren’t a “thing,” but neither is 
the rest of it. It’s all relational. Every “thing” we see is constituted by what isn’t there. The 
microbiome depends on the Sun as much as “I” do.  
 
The inability to find something non-relational, the inability to find something that will persist 
through observation, becomes the realization of what we are.  
 
The scientist says, “I’m going to do science.”  
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The philosopher asks, “Who is?”  
“I am.”  
“Who are you?” asks the philosopher. 
 
Why such a question? Because, how can we do “science” if we don’t know who is doing it—and 
therefore what this “science” even is or needs to be? Next thing we know, we will begin running 
experiments on ourselves—but without realizing it.  
 
That indeed has happened. We are the guinea pigs, the rats in a self-made cage that we think we 
rather fancy, because we call it “civilization” and “technology”. The experiment we are running, 
or a few aspects of it: What is it like to increase toxicity in the body, what is it like to drink 
degraded water, what is it like to breathe degraded air, what is it like to live in degraded 
ecologies? We think we are running an experiment “here,” in the lab, but the experiment happens 
in a nonlocal Cosmos, and thus comes altogether with a way of life, with a way of practicing and 
realizing how to cultivate life onward, and thus goes everywhere and comes right back, not to the 
“here” of the experiment, but the “here” of the body and mind, the heart and soul of the 
experimenter. It is not like someone sitting on a branch, sawing off the branch. It is the tree 
cutting itself down, not knowing it is a tree. We breathe the air of the experiments. We may 
admit we have to breathe the air, but this still localizes ourselves. 
 
How will I allow myself to be in you, and how will allow you to be in me? This is a central 
question in nonlocal epistemology—not some naïve question of, “What do I know?” but, “How 
am I with, for, as you? How do I let relationships constitute me and the World? How do I 
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presence the mystery? How will I be lived by sacred powers and inconceivable causes that fools 
may pretend to understand?”  
 
These are pragmatic questions, because they are spiritual. They can only be scientific by being 
spiritual, by connecting to meaning and emotional or spiritual energy. It’s very concrete: How 
will we show up in the forest, and how will we let the forest show up in us? How do we allow 
ourselves to show up in those we love, in those we don’t love, in those to whom we are 
indifferent? In part, a nonlocal epistemology reveals that a localized way of knowing is just too 
stupid to answer certain kinds of questions, and too dull to recognize the intelligence, the mind 
that “surrounds” it on all sides. We can think here beyond Frans de Waal’s valuable question, 
“Are we smart enough to know how smart animals are?” Are we intelligent enough to recognize 
how much intelligence surrounds us? We don’t know very much about what intelligence is and 
how it operates—or else we wouldn’t have put the conditions of life at risk, wouldn’t have 
degraded our own surrounding intelligence as we have. The problem seems to relate to a 
localized epistemology that doesn’t get at the interwovenness of things—a way of knowing, a 
way of doing things reflected in and perpetuated by our manner of thinking, speaking, and 
moving. 
 
Again, if you look at me, you think I show up “outside” of you. You point to me and say, “You 
are over there.” But I actually show up for you “in there,” “in” “you”. And there is no “me” 
showing up “in here,” inside of what I might call “me,” otherwise there would be an “object” 
“here” where there is only a luminous and knowing spaciousness, a spaciousness that always has 
room for you to appear, along with the forest, the sky, the moon, the stars. The whole World 
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shows up HERE, and it need not do so with or as the habit, the practice-realization of a reified 
subject-object duality. I show up for the trees, and the trees show up for me, intimately and 
immediately, in an altogetherness and interwovenness, we know each other, even if what I call 
my conscious mind lacks access to this knowing. The trees show up in my lungs, in my bones 
and flesh. I open my eyes, and: “Tree!” I don’t have to “do” anything. Tree shows up, verifying 
the Self I really am when I have forgotten (not merely lost) the self I think I know, and simply let 
Tree appear. Tree shows up HERE, NOW, though, from one perspective, seeming to be “over 
there”. If I walk over to touch the tree, once I get there, only part of the tree appears—speaking 
quite relatively. By the time I touch the tree, even though I touch the whole Cosmos, relatively 
speaking I touch a part. The whole tree shows up, filling the Cosmos, but I touch only part of it if 
I forget this, remembering the self instead. 
 
Tree exists in a state of grace, never trying to be what it isn’t. But we try to be what we are not: 
Something localized, something with a face other than the Face of the Divine, the Face of the 
Mystery. That’s probably too poetic for some of us, but, then, what are we trying to be at 
moments when the poetic or the mystical sound too poetic or mystical? 
 
Nondual knowing stops trying to “know the world,” because, so to speak, first we must know 
ourselves. We go around trying to “know” the world, but we don’t know the knower. When we 
begin to find “problems” in the world, we must STOP. Evidently what we do creates problems. 
Is that because we show up for the World as a problem? The World has no “conscious purposes,” 
and so it never intends to show up for us as a problem. Only when we practice the knowing and 
doing that go together with conscious purposes do we find problems.  
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Let us just once more consider this strange possibility: Could each of us point at the Earth (as 
opposed to “the organism,” or our body, our head, or some other part) and say, “That’s me! 
That’s us!” Could we say that of the World, of the Cosmos? 
 
When Black Elk shared his vision, he described a series of ascensions, and a view of the Hoop of 
the Nation (what we might call the Sacred Circle of Beings). At one point he even becomes an 
eagle. Then he is riding a horse again: 
And a Voice said: “All over the universe they have finished a day of 
happiness.” And looking down I saw that the whole wide circle of the day was 
beautiful and green, with all fruits growing and all things kind and happy. 
Then a Voice said: Behold this day, for it is yours to make. Now you shall 
stand upon the center of the earth to see, for there they are taking you.” 
I was still on my bay horse, and once more I felt the riders of the west, the 
north, the east, the south, behind me in formation, as before, and we were going 
east. I looked ahead and saw the mountains there with rocks and forests on them, 
and from the mountains flashed all colors upward to the heavens. Then I was 
standing on the highest mountain of them all, and round about beneath me was the 
whole hoop of the world. And while I stood there I saw more than I can tell and I 
understood more than I saw; for I was seeing in a sacred manner the shapes of all  
things in the spirit, and the shape of all shapes as they must live together like one 
being. And I saw that the sacred hoop of my people was one of many hoops that 
made one circle, wide as daylight and as starlight, and in the center grew one 
mighty flowering tree to shelter all the children of one mother and one father. And 
I saw that it was holy. (33) 
 
Oddly enough, something vaguely similar can happen in the case of space travel—perhaps the 
closest thing a “scientific” culture, a conquest consciousness, can get to a Shamanic Journey or 
Vision Quest. The journey to space, the home leaving, the rupture out of ordinary context, seems 
to be extreme enough to shake one at least a little out of the habits of fragmentation, distance, 
reason, and analysis. Our epistemology could be characterized as an epistemology of 
transcendence, or self-transcendence. Perhaps it should not surprise us then that an experience of 
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self-transcendence precipitated by space flight could trigger a shift out of conquest 
consciousness. Yaden et al. (2016) wrote a study of self-transcendent experiences in space flight, 
noting that, “Viewing the Earth from space has often prompted astronauts to report 
overwhelming emotion and feelings of identification with humankind and the planet as a whole” 
(1). This is the experience we tried to consider earlier, the notion that someone could point, not 
to our “body” or to us as “an organism,” but could point to the Earth, and we might experience 
that as “me”—perhaps with the ordinary sense of me-ness, the habit of ego, dropped away. The 
authors write, 
The overview effect, as the experience is called, refers to a profound reaction to 
viewing the earth from outside its atmosphere White (1987). A number of 
astronauts have attributed deep feelings of awe and even self-transcendence to 
this experience (e.g., Linenger, 2000; Mitchell &Williams, 1996; White, 1987). 
Astronaut Edgar Mitchell described it as an “explosion of awareness” (White, 
1987, p. 38) and an “overwhelming sense of oneness and connectedness . . . 
accompanied by an ecstasy . . . an epiphany” (Hunt, 2015, p. 73). White 
contends that the overview effect refers more generally to the experience of 
viewing common landscapes from far above, such as from a mountaintop, though 
the view of Earth from space provides the quintessential version of this 
experience (White, 1987, p. 1).  
Astronauts attribute short- and long-term emotional benefits to these 
experiences (White, 1987; Stuster, 2010), but the scientific community has only 
recently begun to take a serious interest in these effects. (2) 
 
They offer a sampling of astronaut experiences: 
 
It’s hard to explain how amazing and magical this experience is. First of all, 
there’s the astounding beauty and diversity of the planet itself, scrolling across 
your view at what appears to be a smooth, stately pace . . . 
 
I’m happy to report that no amount of prior study or training can fully prepare 
anybody for the awe and wonder this inspires. (NASA Astronaut Kathryn D., as 
cited in Robinson et al., 2013, p. 81) 
 
I had another feeling, that the earth is like a vibrant living thing. The vessels 
we’ve clearly seen on it looked like the blood and veins of human beings. I said to 
myself: this is the place we live, it’s really magical. (Chinese Space Program 
Astronaut Yang Liu, as cited in Chen, 2012, p. 288) 
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If somebody’d said before the flight, “Are you going to get carried away looking 
at the earth from the moon?” I would have say [sic], “No, no way.” But yet when 
I first looked back at the earth, standing on the moon, I cried. (NASA Astronaut 
Alan Shepard, as cited in Nardo, 2014, p. 46) 
 
You . . . say to yourself, ‘That’s humanity, love, feeling, and thought.’ You don’t 
see the barriers of color and religion and politics that divide this world.” (NASA 
Astronaut Gene Cernan, as cited in White, 1987, p. 37) 
 
You identify with Houston and then you identify with Los Angeles and Phoenix 
and New Orleans . . . and that whole process of what it is you identify with begins 
to shift when you go around the Earth . . . you look down and see the surface of 
that globe you’ve lived on all this time, and you know all those people down there 
and they are like you, they are you—and somehow you represent them. You are 
up there as the sensing element, that point out on the end . . . you recognize that 
you’re a piece of this total life. (NASA Astronaut Rusty Schweikart, as cited in 
White, 1987, p. 12) 
 
Before I flew I was already aware how small and vulnerable our planet is; but 
only when I saw it from space, in all its ineffable beauty and fragility, did I 
realize that humankind’s most urgent task is to cherish and preserve it for future 
generations. (German Cosmonaut Sigmund Jahn, as cited in Hassard & Weisberg, 
1999, p. 40) 
 
The feeling of unity is not simply an observation. With it comes a strong sense of 
compassion and concern for the state of our planet and the effect humans are 
having on it. It isn’t important in which sea or lake you observe a slick of 
pollution or in the forests of which country a fire breaks out, or on which 
continent a hurricane arises. You are standing guard over the whole of our Earth. 
(Russian Cosmonaut Yuri Artyushkin, as cited in Jaffe, 2011, p. 9) 
 
From space I saw Earth—indescribably beautiful with the scars of national 
boundaries gone. (Syrian Astro naut Muhammad Ahmad Faris, as cited in 
Hassard & Weisberg, 1999, p. 1) 
 
You’ve seen pictures and you’ve heard people talk about it. But nothing can 
prepare you for what it actually looks like. The Earth is dramatically beautiful 
when you see it from orbit, more beautiful than any picture you’ve ever seen. It’s 
an emotional experience because you’re removed from the Earth but at the same 
time you feel this incredible connection to the Earth like nothing I’d ever felt 
before. (NASA Astronaut Sam Durrance, as cited in Redfern, 1996, p. 1) 
 
During a space flight, the psyche of each astronaut is re-shaped; having seen the 
sun, the stars and our planet, you become more full of life, softer. You begin to 
look at all living things with greater trepidation and you begin to be more kind 
and patient with the people around you. (3-4, 6) 
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These passages should bring to mind Rumi’s, “This is certainly not like we thought it was!” I 
think it can be all-too-easy to read this as “merely poetic” musings after a really cool experience. 
We should at the very least hold tenderly, in ongoing re-membering, such phrases as, “no amount 
of prior study or training can fully prepare anybody for the awe and wonder this inspires,” “you 
feel this incredible connection to the Earth like nothing I’d ever felt before,” “During a space 
flight, the psyche of each astronaut is re-shaped,” “the earth is like a vibrant living thing,” and, 
perhaps most of all, “The feeling of unity is not simply an observation.” Not simply an 
observation, but something that can shift one’s way of life, and even prompt a search for other 
ways of knowing, as in the case of Edgar Mitchell, who, though scientifically trained, founded 
the Institute of Noetic Sciences (IONS), which has done important and rigorous work to 
document so-called “para-normal” phenomena, other ways of knowing. Publications done at 
IONS have appeared in peer-reviewed academic journals—research which I think a good number 
of philosophers would find dubious, but which they also likely know little about—and thus do 
not realize that it exceeds the standards of most published science. 
 
Again, I think that we have a tendency to dismiss these sorts of experiences, in part because of 
the kinds of fallacies Dewey, James, Nietzsche, and other philosophers tried to get us to face. 
James certainly comes to mind, because of his cogent critique of what he termed “medical 
materialism”: 
Perhaps the commonest expression of this assumption that spiritual value 
is undone if lowly origin be asserted is seen in those comments which 
unsentimental people so often pass on their more sentimental acquaintances. 
Alfred believes in immortality so strongly because his temperament is so 
emotional. Fanny’s extraordinary conscientiousness is merely a matter of over-
instigated nerves. William’s melancholy about the universe is due to bad digestion 
— probably his liver is torpid. Eliza’s delight in her church is a symptom of her 
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hysterical constitution. Peter would be less troubled about his soul if he would 
take more exercise in the open air, etc. 
A more fully developed example of the same kind of reasoning is the 
fashion, quite common nowadays among certain writers, of criticising the 
religious emotions by showing a connection between them and the sexual life. 
Conversion is a crisis of puberty and adolescence. The macerations of saints, and 
the devotion of missionaries, are only instances of the parental instinct of self-
sacrifice gone astray. For the hysterical nun, starving for natural life, Christ is but 
an imaginary substitute for a more earthly object of affection. And the like.  
We are surely all familiar in a general way with this method of 
discrediting states of mind for which we have an antipathy. We all use it to some 
degree in criticizing persons whose states of mind we regard as overstrained. But 
when other people criticise our own more exalted soul-flights by calling them 
‘nothing but’ expressions of our organic disposition, we feel outraged and hurt, 
for we know that, whatever be our organism’s peculiarities, our mental states have 
their substantive value as revelations of the living truth; and we wish that all this 
medical materialism could be made to hold its tongue. 
Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple-
minded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism 
finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging 
lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out Saint Teresa as 
an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George Fox’s 
discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats 
as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle’s organ-tones of misery it accounts 
for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-tensions, it says, are, when 
you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications 
most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology 
will yet discover. 
And medical materialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such 
personages is successfully undermined. 
Let us ourselves look at the matter in the largest possible way. Modern 
psychology, finding definite psycho-physical connections to hold good, assumes 
as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental states upon bodily 
conditions must be thorough-going and complete. If we adopt the assumption, 
then of course what medical materialism insists on must be true in a general way, 
if not in every detail: Saint Paul certainly had once an epileptoid, if not an 
epileptic seizure; George Fox was an hereditary degenerate; Carlyle was 
undoubtedly auto-intoxicated by some organ or other, no matter which, — and the 
rest. But now, I ask you, how can such an existential account of facts of mental 
history decide in one way or another upon their spiritual significance? According 
to the general postulate of psychology just referred to, there is not a single one of 
our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic 
process as its condition. 
Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious 
emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately enough, we should 
doubtless see ‘the liver’ determining the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as 
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it does those of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it 
alters in one way the blood that percolates it, we get the Methodist, when in 
another way, we get the atheist form of mind. So of all our raptures, and our 
drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs. They are equally 
organically founded, be they of religious or of non-religious content. 
To plead the organic causation of a religious state of mind, then, in 
refutation of its claim to possess superior spiritual value, is quite illogical and 
arbitrary, unless one have already worked out in advance some psycho-physical 
theory connecting spiritual values in general with determinate sorts of 
physiological change. Otherwise none of our thoughts and feelings, not even our 
scientific doctrines, not even our dis-beliefs, could retain any value as revelations 
of the truth, for every one of them without exception flows from the state of their 
possessor’s body at the time. 
It is needless to say that medical materialism draws in point of fact no 
such sweeping skeptical conclusion. It is sure, just as every simple man is sure, 
that some states of mind are inwardly superior to others, and reveal to us more 
truth, and in this it simply makes use of an ordinary spiritual judgment. It has no 
physiological theory of the production of these its favorite states, by which it may 
accredit them; and its attempt to discredit the states which it dislikes, by vaguely 
associating them with nerves and liver, and connecting them with names 
connoting bodily affliction, is altogether illogical and inconsistent. 
Let us play fair in this whole matter, and be quite candid with ourselves 
and with the facts. When we think certain states of mind superior to others, is it 
ever because of what we know concerning their organic antecedents? No! it is 
always for two entirely different reasons. It is either because we take an 
immediate delight in them; or else it is because we believe them to bring us good 
consequential fruits for life. 
When we speak disparagingly of ‘feverish fancies,’ surely the fever-rocess 
as such is not the ground of our disesteem — for aught we know to the contrary, 
103 degrees or 104 degrees Fahrenheit might be a much more favorable 
temperature for truths to germinate and sprout in, than the more ordinary blood-
heat of 97 or 98 degrees. It is either the disagreeableness itself of the fancies, or 
their inability to bear the criticisms of the convalescent hour. 
When we praise the thoughts which health brings, health’s peculiar 
chemical metabolisms have nothing to do with determining our judgment. We 
know in fact almost nothing about these metabolisms. It is the character of inner 
happiness in the thoughts which stamps them as good, or else their consistency 
with our other opinions and their serviceability for our needs, which make them 
pass for true in our esteem. 
Now the more intrinsic and the more remote of these criteria do not 
always hang together. Inner happiness and serviceability do not always agree. 
What immediately feels most ‘good’ is not always most ‘true,’ when measured by 
the verdict of the rest of experience. The difference between Philip drunk and 
Philip sober is the classic instance in corroboration. If merely ‘feeling good’ could 
decide, drunkenness would be the supremely valid human experience. But its 
revelations, however acutely satisfying at the moment, are inserted into an 
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environment which refuses to bear them out for any length of time. The 
consequence of this discrepancy of the two criteria is the uncertainty which still 
prevails over so many of our spiritual judgments. There are moments of 
sentimental and mystical experience — we shall hereafter hear much of them — 
that carry an enormous sense of inner authority and illumination with them when 
they come. But they come seldom, and they do not come to every one; and the 
rest of life makes either no connection with them, or tends to contradict them 
more than it confirms them. Some persons follow more the voice of the moment 
in these cases, some prefer to be guided by the average results. Hence the sad 
discordancy of so many of the spiritual judgments of human beings; a discordancy 
which will be brought home to us acutely enough before these lectures end. (23-5) 
 
Because of our whole way of life and our style of thinking—and because of the demands of an 
epistemology of practice-realization—we cannot help keeping certain data at a distance. We hear 
about visions, conversions, ecstasies, and so on that we cannot help thinking about as 
neurological events that don’t correspond to any clearer, truer, and/or more subtle reality, despite 
the fact that the so-called noetic quality of these experiences gives them a feeling of greater 
reality than the one the medical materialist (usually an atheist) takes as real—another fact the 
materialist readily attempts to dismiss. Nevertheless, as one group of researchers summarized 
their findings: 
Religious, spiritual, and mystical experiences (RSMEs) are often described as 
having a noetic quality, or the compelling sense that the experience feels “real.” 
In this exploratory, multimethod study, 701 participants completed questions 
about the subjective qualities of their RMSEs, reported the impact of their RSMEs 
on various life domains, and provided written descriptions of their experiences for 
quantitative linguistic analysis. The majority of participants (69%) reported that 
their RSMEs felt “more real than their usual sense of reality.” This quality of 
realness was associated with positive self-reported impacts on family life (r = 
.16), health (r = .22), sense of purpose (r = .29), spirituality (r = .30), and 
reduced fear of death (r = .24). Participants who reported experiences as feeling 
more real used more language referring to connection, a greater whole, and 
certainty (“love,” “all,” “and,” “everything”) and fewer first-person pronouns, 
cognitive processes, and tentativeness (“I,” “me,” “think,” “probably”). (Yaden et 
al. 2017: 54) 
 
We can suggest here again that maybe our style of consciousness and our way of knowing is a 
symptom, and that we would better call that style of consciousness the thing that needs healing, 
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as evidenced by its effects in the world. While we might think of “mystical experiences” as 
“beyond the limit” in philosophy, perhaps we should consider at least some of them as the 
necessary medicine for the kind of philosophizing we ordinarily do in the academy and in our 
everyday lives when we live under the influence of a conquest style of consciousness. Perhaps 
some kinds of knowing only come from, not fevers or “drugs,” but rather from practices of 
Nature-Culture, such as meditation and simply spending time in Nature, developing an intimate 
relationship with Nature, one we cannot get from books or lectures. They may also come from 
certain kinds of traditional Shamanic practices, including the use of holotropic medicines 
(sometimes referred to as “psychedelics”). 
 
Let us consider an artefact from Strassman’s careful scientific inquiry into DMT experience, 
keeping in mind that a brain flooded with DMT may be, as James put it, “much more favorable 
for truths to germinate and sprout in” than our habitually practiced-and-realized brain. Strassman 
describes one non-white participant, called Carlos, as expressing skepticism that the “white 
man’s medicine” would offer much (which actually makes sense: even though DMT is integral 
to Indigenous Medicine, a laboratory setting turns it into “white man’s medicine”). However, 
Carlos had a rather intense experience at the high dose of .4mg/kg. After this dose, in the course 
of recording the experience, Strassman said to Carlos, “One of our volunteers likes to say ‘You 
can still be an atheist until 0.4.’” To which Carlos replied, “This is true” (230). What is our 
atheism if it gets overturned by a little DMT? And what is our atheism if we try and hold onto it, 
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either by avoiding certain experiences or by clinging to it despite evidence of other kinds of 
reality?104 
 
The fuller documentation of his experience is worth considering. After this higher dose, Carlos 
refers to himself in the third-person as he describes what happened, thus indicating a powerful 
decentralization of the ego. The shift from geo-centric to helio-centric is less profound than the 
shift from ego-centric to holo-centric (almost anagrams in both cases, a re-ordering, a New 
Cosmos). The degree of realization we see here cannot be determined, because one would have 
to see it in living practice, in ongoing practice-realization, but I have added emphasis where a 
different way of knowing is directly mentioned: 
At 12 minutes he said, 
Please remove my eyeshades. 
Laura did so. 
It was really quite special. I wasn’t human for about three and a half minutes. 
This dose creates a level of stress that’s unparalleled in the annals of Carlos’s 
history. 
He cleared his throat and said, 
I met myself as the Creator. 
“Creator of . . . ?” 
The Creator of all. I’ve had that realization before, but not at this level. 
“One of our volunteers likes to say ‘You can still be an atheist until 0.4.’” 
This is true. 
Carlos took a deep breath and began telling us what had happened. It was difficult 
to keep up with his rate of sharing his incredible story. 
There was the sound of the entire universe, more like a hum. It was pervasive, 
overwhelming. I thought, “Holy moly, how did I get into this?” Things weren’t 
right and were getting more wrong all the time. Then my ability to perceive as a 
                                                 
104 More recently, Griffiths et al. (2019) examined a large group of people who had undergone a 
mystical experience: n = 809 Non-Drug, 1184 psilocybin, 1251 lysergic acid diethylamide 
(LSD), 435 ayahuasca, and 606 N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT). They found that, whether the 
experience was spontaneous or facilitated by a plant teacher, “More than two thirds of those who 
identified as atheist before the experience no longer identified as atheist afterwards. These 
experiences were rated as among the most personally meaningful and spiritually significant 
lifetime experiences, with moderate to strong persisting positive changes in life satisfaction, 
purpose, and meaning attributed to these experiences.” 
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human being winked out. There were no more emotions, because emotions work 
only up to a certain point. 
I saw a man lying in a hospital room. He was naked with a person on 
either side of him, one female and one male. At first they didn’t look like anybody 
I knew. They were perfect generic human beings. I recognized, in context, that 
they were me, you, and Laura. The way of knowing was totally different from 
this reality. I didn’t know I was in a study of any kind. 
There was something wrong with him. He was there to get better. The 
hospital was a healing center. What was wrong with him was death. The naked 
person was dead. What killed the person was the stress from the DMT. None of 
my guardians or protectors made an appearance. They were out of the loop. 
He was healed, more than healed. He was reborn. He got cured from 
death, healed from death. And then he became the creator of a whole universe. 
I gradually became more and more solid and moved toward my everyday 
presence. I watched the universe’s creation down from fundamental mental 
energy to a vibratory rate to material things. I realized I was recreating the 
hospital and the room. As the world jelled more and more, I wanted to see it and 
asked to have the eyeshades taken off. I became fascinated with my fingers, like a 
newborn. 
I’ve taught classes on how the universe is a construct of your own mind. 
And here it was happening. My attitude was different when I knew you were my 
creations. I felt as close to you as to my own son and daughter. 
I would have to say my experience was a classical death/rebirth 
experience. I had done it before, but never in the same way as with DMT. It was 
spectacular in imagery, texture, and atmosphere and had incredible lighting and 
effects. Boil it down and it’s very, very classic. 
The 0.2 was harrowing—this was way beyond. I knew the boundary 
beyond life existed. I never thought I'd be there, though, at such an early age. It’s 
one of those things that old men talk about, like “once I got there.” It’s just the 
wrong place and time. I expect these sorts of things in the mountains with my 
friends in a more ceremonial setting. (230-1) 
 
The lack of ceremonial setting puts a demand on the soul to supply missing context—which it 
always has the capacity to do, however in general this will have a more limited value in terms of 
depth and persistence of realization. But, again, the question here has to do with what we think 
happened, and what we habitually hold onto that experiences like this might get us to let go of. 
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In an interview, Aldous Huxley was asked about the value of psychedelics and the heightened 
perception they facilitate. The interviewer asked if “imaginative writers” would benefit from it. 
Huxley replied: 
Well I think the people who would benefit most of all are professors. I think it 
would be extremely good for almost anybody with fixed ideas and with a great 
certainty about what’s what to take this thing and to realize that the world he has 
constructed is by no means the only world, that there are these extraordinary other 
types of universe which we may inhabit and which we should be very grateful for 
inhabiting I think.105 
 
 Other types of worlds, accessible only by means of other ways of knowing. This should give us 
pause.  
 
Another of Strassman’s participants had this exchange with him: 
“How do you feel about the third dose?” 
You should patent it. I guess it’s too late for that. If I could only hold onto this 
feeling. If everybody did this every day the world would be a much better place. 
Life would be a lot better. The potential for good is so great. Feeling good within 
yourself. I guess meditation is supposed to get you to the same place. 
“I’m not sure that’s possible.” 
Me neither. 
Ten minutes into her third dose, Cassandra started smiling. Just then, there also 
was a horrible coughing out in the hall. 
I can still feel it. I hold all this stuff, the shit, in the left side of my abdomen. I got 
the message this time to let go of all that. lean still feel the relaxation. It’s warm 
and tingly. 
This seemed like an opening. If she retreated or attacked in response to my next 
few comments, I’d leave well enough alone. However, she seemed to be asking 
for some help. 
“What do you hold on to?” 
The pain. 
“What pain?” 
I guess all the pain. 
She began crying. 
I guess all the pain I ever felt. 
“There’s a lot there?” 
Yeah. 
                                                 
105 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6xp0XxVvOk 
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She began crying more heavily. 
“It’s okay to feel it, and cry, and to let it go, too.” 
That’s the good part, to let go of it. 
At 15 minutes she sighed, 
I feel like I have a new body. It’s so much more aware. 
“It is yours.” 
She laughed dryly, then began crying more deeply. 
These aren’t sad tears, they are tears of enlightenment. 
“It doesn’t matter.” 
I felt her bristle as she said, 
Yes it does. 
Reflecting back to her even more closely, I offered, “I guess they are a cleansing 
sort of tears.” 
Yes. I’ll be a guru after this morning. You know how everyone’s quest is to find 
the meaning or the purpose of life? Well, it’s to feel this way. Life doesn’t cut it 
normally. 
“What do you mean?” 
Everything about life. It’s not very empowering. You aren’t taught to focus on 
yourself. To realize the strength you have in yourself. Life throws you into the 
victim role. I know that’s a trite expression, but I think it’s true. Things do happen 
when you’re out of control with your life. These DMT experiences are like the 
height of meditation, accessing inner power and inner strength. You know that 
question in your rating scale about “higher power or God”? Well, I’m 
uncomfortable with that idea because it implies outside, but I do contact 
something deeper and more inside. This session was more combined, in terms of 
the presences joining me and me being the focus of it more. The first trip was just 
me, and the second trip was more the presences; this was a combination. 
“How do you feel about the fourth dose coming up?” 
It’ll be the best, it’ll be even better. I am going deeper and deeper through these 
layers. 
Immediately after giving Cassandra her last dose, people began talking loudly 
outside the door. At 6 minutes we heard a huge crash. Five minutes later she said, 
I feel very loved. 
“That’s a nice feeling.” 
Yes, warm. 
She looked sad and tapped the fingers of her right hand against the bed. 
I’m feeling a lot. 
There was a horrible sound outside the door, someone drilling in screws. I thought 
about how incredible it was that our volunteers could disregard all the chaos of a 
hospital ward and still have such profound experiences. Cassandra lifted the 
eyeshades but kept her eyes closed. Then she opened her eyes half-mast, gazing 
straight ahead. She looked up at the ceiling and began crying again. 
“What are you feeling?” 
Everything will be okay. I don’t need to worry about all my doubts. Things like 
“Where will I go? What will I do?” It’s reassuring. 
“An optimistic feeling?” 
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Yes, it’s very refreshing. It feels like there are thousands and thousands of 
separate parts of me and this drug brings them all together. It feels very 
complete. 
“You said you felt loved.” 
It was a feeling in my chest. It was warm. My whole chest felt inflated. It was a 
really good feeling. I was loved by the entities or whatever they are. It was very 
pleasant and comforting. 
Cassandra and I spoke a few weeks later by phone. 
She said, “There have been profound physical changes, very beneficial 
ones. It feels as if I got my stomach back. Now for the first time in years I’m able 
to breathe deep into my stomach. I’m more optimistic. That’s worn off a little bit 
by now, but not extremely. I can remember the optimism in meditation. It’s like 
having the deepest possible tissue massage. On the third trip I was really able to 
let go. I guess I was hurt in there when I was raped. That’s where I hide things 
and protect myself, constantly clenching them. Years of keeping those feelings 
tightly kept in my abdomen. I feel a lot freer. 
“DMT is far better than any therapy ever was for me. All therapy reminds 
me of is how bad things were and are. On DMT I saw and felt myself as a good 
person, as loved by the DMT elves.” 
I asked, “Elves?” 
“There was a sense of many visitors. They were jovial, and they had a 
great time giving me the experience of being loved. With each dose there was 
more and more of a fulfilling safe and comfortable familiar feeling. 
“It would be great to do DMT maybe once a year to put a perspective on 
things and see where I’m at and heal me. The freedom in my abdomen is still 
there. The clenching is back again a little bit, but on a more consistent basis I can 
remember that I was able to really clear it out. (171-3) 
 
These “elves” seem to be a common factor in many DMT experiences. Philosophically, this 
seems almost astonishing. Why would people take a holotropic medicine and have similar 
experiences—of “elves”? 
 
The profundity (even what we might call the improbability) of the DMT experience was perhaps 
best captured by Terrence McKenna, who said: “why this is not four-inch headlines on every 
newspaper on the planet, I cannot understand because, I don’t know what news you were waiting 
for, but this is the news that I was waiting for.” His fuller description is worthy of careful 
reflection: 
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I’ve been at this fairly steadily since 1964, and have tried to do everything with a 
certain level of attention and reverence . . . . 
 
In the course of sorting out as many peculiar and bizarre possibilities as life could 
offer me in many places my attitude was always critical. My attitude was always a 
“show me” attitude. I don’t believe in faith. I don’t believe in belief. My favorite 
gospel story is the story of the apostle Thomas, who was not present when Christ 
came the first time after the resurrection to the upper room. And then later 
Thomas came to the apostles and they said, “The master has been here,” and he 
said, “You guys have been smoking too much of that red leb.”  . . . Thomas said, 
“Unless I put my hand into the wound, I will not believe it.” And then time 
passed, and then Christ came again to the upper room. And he said, “Thomas, 
come forward, put your hand into the wound.”  
 
 . . . My conclusion about this story is that alone among all humanity and all times 
and places, only one person every touched the incorporeal body of God. Thomas 
the doubter touched because he doubted. It was not necessary that the believers 
should be vouchsafed such a boon, but the doubter was awarded the supreme 
enlightenment.  
 
Ok, so much for that. So my thing has always been—whether you present me with 
a diet, a social arrangement, a sexual conundrum, a work of art—my criterion is, 
“Is it shit, or is it Shinola?” I’m happy to give you the benefit of my personal 
life’s experience preceding along those lines. I want to talk about what to my 
mind is the quintessential hallucinogen, and consequently the quintessential 
spiritual and magical tool of this dimension. And that is DMT, 
dimelhyltryplamine, a compound that occurs in the human nervous system. It 
occurs in many many plants. It is the commonest hallucinogen in all of nature. 
And I don’t know how you got to where you are this afternoon, but the way I got 
here is by testing and by hoping and by pursuing a magical—if that’s the word—a 
miraculous, transcendental ideal that, over the course of life, experience strips 
from you. You know, you have to get a job, your first love is not your last love, 
slowly this pristine shining belief in perfectibility is eroded by the slings and 
arrows of outrageous fortune, you know, the dark oxen that turn the millstones of 
the world.  
 
But I am here to tell you that it is real. There is a doorway into another dimension. 
Aladdin’s lamp is real. Fairyland is real. Magic is real—in the most real sense, in 
the same sense that what we call reality is real. And I learned this through this 
compound. And one of the great puzzles about this compound is why more people 
don’t know about it. . . . 
 
So, DMT, like all things in this world, has a physical body, a presence and a 
presentation. In this case it looks rather like earwax. It is orange. It is crystalline. 
It smells vaguely of moth balls. And, for my money, it is the lapis, the 
quintessence—the universal panacea at the end of time has sent a reflection back 
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through the temporal labyrinth, and wherever this touches, wherever this 
concresses, the mystery is fully present.  
 
So what is it, then? Well, it’s an experience, and I maintain it’s the most intense 
experience you can have this side of the yawning grave—without doubt. I mean, 
people say, “Is it dangerous?” Well, the answer is, “Only if you fear death by 
astonishment.” Yes, that’s a joke here. It’s not a joke there, because you find 
yourself literally holding your heart to verify that you have not, in fact, had a 
coronary thrombosis induced by wonder, terror, reverence, and astonishment. . . . 
 
You’re at the center of a mountain or something. And you’re in a room which 
aficionados call ‘the dome’ and people will ask each other ‘did you see the dome? 
Were you there?’ It’s softly lit, indirectly lit, and the walls - if such they be - are 
crawling with geometric hallucinations: very brightly colored, very iridescent 
with deep sheens and very high reflective surfaces. Everything is machine-like 
and polished and throbbing with energy.  
 
But that is not what immediately arrests my attention. What arrests my attention  
is the fact that this space is inhabited - that the immediate impression as you  
break into it, is there is a cheer. The gnomes have learned a new way to say  
“Hooooo-----raaaaay!” You break in to this space and are immediately swarmed 
by squeaking, self-transforming elf-machines, these things which are made of 
light, and grammar, and sound that come chirping, and squealing, and tumbling  
toward you. And they say “Hooray! Welcome! You’re here!”  . . . and my 
immediate impression, no matter how many times I do this—and I’ve done it 
maybe 30 or 40 times which isn’t a lot in a lifetime of worshipping it—my 
immediate impression is that they are welcoming. There is something going on 
which I over the years come to call LUV— L, U, V. Not “light utility vehicle,” 
but LUV that is not like Eros, or not like sexual attraction. I don’t know what it’s 
like exactly. It’s almost like a physical thing. It’s like a glue that pours out into 
this space. And my immediate impression in there is, I’m appalled. I’m appalled 
at how far I’ve come.  
 
And one of the strange things about DMT is that it does not affect your mind in  
an ordinary sense, in that, you know, drugs they make you giggly, they frighten  
you, they stimulate you, they depress you. DMT does none of this. You go to that  
place with all your groceries. You’re there, and you’re there thinking, “Jesus H.  
fucking Christ, what is this? What is it?” And you’re thinking, “I must be dead, 
I’ve done it this time.” The psychedelic mantra: “I’ve done it this time. I must be  
dead.”  
 
And meanwhile these things are literally in your face. And what they do is they  
jump into your chest and then they jump out again, and what they’re doing—and  
this is the point I think—what they’re doing is they are singing, chanting,  
speaking, in some kind of language that is very bizarre to hear. But what is far  
more important is that you can see it. They speak in a language which you see.  
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And this is completely confounding, because syntax is not something you 
ordinarily reach out and touch. And in this space that’s what happening. And so 
like jeweled self-dribbling basketballs, these things come running forward. And 
what they are doing with this visible language that they create, is they’re making 
gifts—they’re making gifts for you. And they will say [imitates alien language] 
which condenses as something which looks like a cross between a Sopwith 
Camel, a Havana cigar, a piece of abalone, an opal, and nookie, and they offer it 
to you.  
 
And you’re looking at this thing, and as you look at it, it also transforms, changes, 
speaks, sings, undergoes metastasis, undergoes metamorphosis. And these things 
are just accumulating. And each elf-machine creature elbows others aside, says, 
“Look at this, look at this, take this, choose me!” And as you direct your attention 
into these things, you have the overwhelming conviction that if you could bring a 
single one of these objects back to this world, that somehow you wouldn’t have to 
say anything. You would just walk up to people and say, “Friend,” and people 
would say, “Oh my god! You got a piece of the action, the real action!”  
 
This state of ecstatic frenzy—and it’s like a bugs bunny cartoon running 
backwards in cyberspace or something—this state of incredible frenzy goes on for 
about three minutes, and all the time the elves are saying, “Don’t give way to 
wonder. Do not abandon yourself to amazement. Pay attention! Pay attention! 
Look at what we’re doing. Look - at - what - we’re - doing, and then do it! Do it!”  
 
And it’s this thing where then everything stops and they wait, and you feel like a 
torch, a spark, lit in your belly that begins to move up your esophagus. And 
eventually when it reaches your mouth, your mouth just flies open and this 
language-like stuff comes out. Acoustically, it’s [imitates alien language] But 
what you’re – you’re not hearing it. The startled friends who sent you to this place 
are putting up with this. What you’re experiencing is a visual modality  
where these tones are surfaces, shading, colors, insets, jewels—you are making 
something. You know, erase, move forward, add cerulean, put in stippling—it’s 
that sort of thing.  
 
. . . . and often it’s very erotic, although I’m not sure that’s the word. But it’s 
something, it’s almost like sex is the surface of something of which this is the 
volume. And I’m a great fan of sex. I don’t mean to denigrate it. I mean to raise 
DMT to a very high status. But it’s astonishing. . . . 
 
So, this is an experience which in some form—I mean it will be different for each 
one of you—but in some form at least what will be similar to my description is 
how dramatic it will be. It will hit you as hard as it hit me, if you do it right. This, 
to me, this experience is of a fundamentally different order than any other 
experience this side of the yawning grave. And why religions have not been built 
around it? Why empires have not risen and fallen around the control of its  
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sources? Why theology has not enshrined it as its central exhibit for the presence 
of the other in the human world? I don’t know. I can tell the secret. As you notice, 
nothing shuts me up. But why this is not four-inch headlines on every newspaper 
on the planet, I cannot understand because, I don’t know what news you were 
waiting for, but this is the news that I was waiting for. 
 
It’s an incredible challenge to human understanding to try and make sense of  
this. . . . the DMT thing is—it’s like an avalanche of orgasmic beauty, but a 
certain kind of beauty. The only words that I can find for the kind of beauty that it 
is, is bizarre, alien, outlandish, outré, freaky, and at the very edge of what the 
human mind seems to be able to hold. Well, where is this coming from? And what 
is happening?  
 
 . . . . This has to be taken seriously. In other words, the “it’s only a hallucination” 
thing—that horse shit is just passe.106 
 
We see in this experience a dimension McKenna refers to as LUV, something beyond the sexual 
(apparently, startling so), something that might be an even more intense presencing of what 
Sorenson called hypersensuality. Just as Sorenson felt this hypersensuality functioned as a glue 
that held the Culture together, perhaps we could intimately know a dimension of Love that holds 
all of Nature-Culture together, holds the whole Cosmos together. In this sense, McKenna’s 
description actually resonates with the experiences and teachings (doctrines) of a wide variety of 
traditions. Reading the Avatamsaka Sutra feels like an invitation to touch something every bit as 
intimate and inconceivable as what McKenna describes, and the Buddhist traditions (like many 
traditions around the world) have practices that, though they take much more time to master than 
DMT (which even McKenna characterizes elsewhere as requiring art and practice), can take us 
to the same place. McKenna himself managed to verify some cross-cultural resonance when he 
asked a Tibetan yogi to try DMT: 
So how can it be then that a compound which each of us carries—right here—
right in the pineal gland, right in the Ajna chakra—the Philosopher’s Stone is no  
further away than that—how can this be secret from us? How can we be trapped  
in a dimension of such limitation and such mundanencss when our own nervous  
                                                 
106 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adDRsqEj4PU 
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systems, and the ecology around us, and our own history over the past half  
million years argues that this is what we were born and bred for? This is where  
we belong. This is what “at play in the fields of the Goddess” must mean. And  
somehow history has made us dysfunctional, buried the mystery . . . . 
 
. . . . some of you may have seen, years and years ago, this B movie about a guy 
who has a big ranch in Mexico, and one of the campesinos comes rushing back 
from having encountered a brontosaur in the forest, and he can only point 
inarticulately at the woods and say “Something, something, something, 
something!!” And that’s what I am: I’m a monkey, and I’ve come back to the 
troop, and I’m telling you there’s something over the next hill that is off the scale, 
off the scale. And I have made it my business to, you know, delve, I’m a delver, 
I’m a noetic archaeologist—obscure heresies and strange rites and all of this stuff: 
been there, done that; it’s all pale soup compared to this. And so, I hype it to you 
simply to try and inspire you to explore it. We are, at the present state, in the 
position of explorers of the new world fifty years after Columbus. We have 
notebook entries. We have partial maps. But we don’t have a complete map of 
what this thing is. It’s another dimension. It is literally another dimension.  
 
I took DMT to a Lama of great accomplishment—not one of the grab-ass can of 
Budweiser welded to the good right hand Lamas, but a real Lama. This guy was 
over 90 when he smoked DMT, and since his wheel has turned. And he said to 
me, he said, “It’s the lesser lights,” he said, “You can’t go further into the Bardo 
and return.” And so I think that we stand at the brink of an enormous frontier. . . . 
 
Here the Lama explicitly mentions the Bardo, the Liminal, the Threshold. In some sense, DMT is 
the meditation experience, and it requires a spiritual ecology to render its finest fruits. We could 
cultivate that ecology. Though I have not tried this form of DMT myself, as a philosopher 
standing on the near side of sagehood, I would welcome the experience, and trust the practice of 
philosophy as I have so far engaged it to provide the proper context for working with it.   
 
We may find it interesting that McKenna talks about this as reclaiming our own minds, our own 
birthright. This resonates both with what people like Paul Shepard and (as we shall see) C.L. 
Martin say about our paleolithic inheritance, but also with what so many sages teach about our 
spiritual inheritance. Meditation in particular, and spiritual practice in general (from rites and 
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rituals to ceremonies and celebrations, and everything in between), is about reclaiming our mind, 
our body, our World, our Cosmos, our birthright, what cannot ever be taken once we really 
remember it, reclaim it, renew it in the Now. Here is McKenna inviting our own experience 
along these lines:, inviting the rupture of barriers that keep us out of the Bardo—barriers that are 
nothing but habits, ways of practicing, ways of living, a style of consciousness characterized by 
fear, craving, self-doubt, boredom, weariness, anxiousness, and so on: 
I didn’t get into this business by being an airhead, or a screwball. My attitude was 
always: If it’s real it can take the pressure. You know, you don’t have to 
pussyfoot around the real thing. 
  
I studied yoga, I wandered around in the east, I was fast shuffled by beady-eyed 
little men in doties. I know the whole spiritual supermarket and rigmarole, and I 
find nothing there to interest me on the level of 5 grams of psilocybin mushrooms 
in silent darkness. I mean that is where the pedal hits the metal, that is where the 
rubber meets the road.  
  
And the inspiration for me to get up and talk to an audience like this simply 
comes from the fact that I cannot believe that this could be kept under wraps the 
way it has. I mean I kidded with you earlier that they would make sex illegal if 
they could. Well, they can’t, so it isn’t. But, the psychedelic experience is as 
central to understand your humanness as having sex, or having a child, or having 
responsibilities, or having hopes and dreams—and yet it is illegal. We are 
somehow told—we are infantilized—we’re told, “You can wander around within 
the sanctioned playpen of ordinary consciousness, and we have some intoxicants 
over here if you want to mess yourself up, we’ve got some scotch here, and some 
tobacco, and red meat, some sugar and a little TV so forth . . .” 
 
But these boundary dissolving hallucinogens that give you a sense of unity with 
your fellow man and nature are somehow forbidden. This is an outrage. It’s a sign 
of cultural immaturity and the fact that we tolerate it is a sign that we are living in 
a society as oppressed as any society in the past.   
  
My thing is not about my opinion, or what I saw in Africa, or anything like that. 
This is—get it straight—this is about an experience. Not my experience. Your 
experience. It’s about an experience which you have . . . you must do the 
experience. . . .This is an art, it is something that you coax into existence . . . 
anything worth doing is an art, that is acquired. This is part of our birthright, 
perhaps the most important part of our birthright. These substances will deliver, it 
is the confoundment of psychology and science generally, and that’s why it is so 
touchy for cultural institutions. . . . 
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The way I think of these psychedelics or a different way is that they are catalysts 
for the imagination, catalysts to say what has never been said, to see what has 
never been seen, to draw, paint, sing, sculpt, dance and act what has never before 
been done. To push the envelope of creativity and language—and, what’s really 
important is, I call it the felt presence of direct experience, which is a fancy term 
which just simply means we have to stop consuming our culture, we have to 
create culture, don’t watch TV, don’t read magazines, don’t even listen to NPR, 
create your own road show.  
 
The nexus of space and time where you are now is the most immediate sector of 
your universe. And if you’re worrying about Michael Jackson, or Bill Clinton, or 
somebody else, then, you are disempowered. You’re giving it all away to icons, 
icons which are maintained by an electronic media so that you want to dress like 
X or have lips like Y, or something. This is shit brained, this kind of thinking. 
That is all cultural diversion . . . . 
 
 . . . you want to reclaim your mind, and get it out of the hands of the cultural 
engineers who want to turn you into a half-baked moron consuming all this trash 
that’s being manufactured out of the bones of a dying world.107 
 
We are seeing something of a resurgence of serious interest in holotropic or psychedelic 
medicines. We may go so far as to call it a renaissance, and to think of Husserl’s comments 
about the other Renaissance. Can the model be philosophy again? Not without philosophers who 
do the hard work of helping to heal our way of knowing and living. However, without genuine, 
vitalizing philosophy, the new explorers will be left only or mainly with guidance from what 
passes as philosophy in our culture. I do not mean just the academic stuff, which no one will 
bother reading anyway. What I mean is that a “visionary” in this culture is Elon Musk, and a 
“soul doctor” is Dr. Phil. Without serious philosophy/spirituality/religion to guide them, people 
will be left in a spiritual supermarket, in which they may want lots of spiritual chocolate 
pudding, and will do everything they can to avoid spiritual arugula, spiritual rutabaga, and wild 
spiritual berries. We need the roots and fruits of serious traditions.  
                                                 
107 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIG25NdOWIs 
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This renaissance has seen research supported by no less than the Veterans Administration. Some 
of these medicines can do more for soldiers with PTSD than years and years of conventional 
“therapy”. The work of Roland Griffiths, Michael and Annie Mithoefer, James Fadiman, and 
others has documented, even within the current scientific paradigm, the remarkable potentials 
these medicines offer, including healing maladies of the soul like depression and opening up 
creativity and more skillful styles of thinking.  
 
Walter Pahnke, who had an MD and a PhD from Harvard, wrote about a variety of psychedelic 
experiences, including what he called the “cognitive psychedelic experience,” 
characterized by astonishingly lucid thought. Problems can be seen from a novel 
perspective, and the inner relationships of many levels or dimensions can be seen 
all at once. The creative experience may have something in common with this 
kind of psychedelic experience, but such a possibility must await the results of 
future investigation. (1969: 6) 
 
Though it may seem that philosophers should take a sincere interest in a natural substance with a 
documented potential to increase lucidity of thinking, they might also find it interesting to 
consider the fifth type of experience described by Pahnke: 
The fifth and last type of psychedelic experience may ultimately prove to be the 
most valuable and is the focus in regard to treatment of the dying patient. This 
experience has been called by various names: psychedelic-peak, cosmic, 
transcendental, or mystical. Nine universal psychological characteristics were 
derived from a study of the literature of spontaneous mystical experience reported 
throughout world history from almost all cultures and religions. When subjected 
to a scientific experiment, these characteristics proved to be identical for 
spontaneous and psychedelic mystical experiences. (6-7) 
 
Like McKenna, Pahnke and his co-author for another article saw a frontier in these medicines: 
With these drugs, science stands on an awesome threshold. Some religious leaders 
would undoubtedly consider it improper for man to tread upon the holy ground of 
the unconscious, protesting against the exploration of “inner space” as they have 
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campaigned against the exploration of outer space. But man’s apparent destiny to 
seek an ever greater comprehension of the nature of reality cannot be thwarted or 
suppressed. The importance of research proceeding in harmony with the highest 
known ethical principles, however, is dear. (Pahnke and Richards 1966: 206) 
 
“An awesome threshold.” The threshold of Threshold Awareness, the liminal of Liminality. The 
authors titled the article most wonderfully: “Implications of LSD and Experimental Mysticism.” 
The experimental spirit, rooted in the ethical, should win the day. Given the view of philosophy 
we have explored, we could retitle the piece: Implications of Holotropic Medicines and 
Experimental LoveWisdom. 
 
Because of his age and his status in the culture, Michael Pollan’s book on holotropic medicines 
should be of great interest to philosophers. As a way to conclude these particular considerations, 
let us consider a substantial selection of his thoughts about these medicines, based on his own 
experience and that of others: 
even a moment’s reflection tells you that attributing the content of the psychedelic 
experience to “drugs” explains virtually nothing about it. The images and the 
narratives and the insights don’t come from nowhere, and they certainly don’t 
come from a chemical. They come from inside our minds, and at the very least 
have something to tell us about that. If dreams and fantasies and free associations 
are worth interpreting, then surely so is the more vivid and detailed material with 
which the psychedelic journey presents us. It opens a new door on one’s mind. 
And about that my psychedelic journeys have taught me a great many interesting 
things. Many of these were the kinds of things one might learn in the course of 
psychotherapy: insights into important relationships; the outlines of fears and 
desires ordinarily kept out of view; repressed memories and emotions; and, 
perhaps most interesting and useful, a new perspective on how one’s mind works. 
This, I think, is the great value of exploring non-ordinary states of 
consciousness: the light they reflect back on the ordinary ones, which no longer 
seem quite so transparent or so ordinary. To realize, as William James concluded, 
that normal waking consciousness is but one of many potential forms of 
consciousness—ways of perceiving or constructing the world—separated from it 
by merely “the filmiest of screens,” is to recognize that our account of reality, 
whether inward or outward, is incomplete at best. Normal waking consciousness 
might seem to offer a faithful map to the territory of reality, and it is good for 
many things, but it is only a map—and not the only map. As to why these other 
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modes of consciousness exist, we can only speculate. Most of the time, it is 
normal waking consciousness that best serves the interests of survival—and is 
most adaptive. But there are moments in the life of an individual or a community 
when the imaginative novelties proposed by altered states of consciousness 
introduce exactly the sort of variation that can send a life, or a culture, down a 
new path. 
For me, the moment I recognized the tenuousness and relativity of my 
own default consciousness came that afternoon on Fritz’s mountaintop, when he 
taught me how to enter a trance state by means of nothing more than a pattern of 
rapid breathing and the sounds of rhythmic drumming. Where in the world has 
that been all my life? This is nothing Freud or any number of psychologists and 
behavioral economists haven’t told us, but the idea that “normal” consciousness is 
but the tip of a large and largely uncharted psychic iceberg is now for me 
something more than a theory; the hidden vastness of the mind is a felt reality. 
(408-9) 
 
It feels important to linger with this, especially the, “Where in the world has that been all my 
life?” My students tell me this all the time when I teach them basic compassion meditation and 
other forms of philosophical practice. Here Pollan lauds a practice—a simple practice of 
breathing, which so many philosophers could easily engage with, experiment with, and come-to-
know something about their own heart, mind, body, World, and even Cosmos. Consider the 
difference this seems to make: We all can spout theories about the mind. What of the felt reality? 
Why would we ever—ever—forgo reality, forgo lived experience for the pale substitute of 
abstractions we can analyze and argue over? It’s as if much of philosophy is based on a kind of 
category error, an error in thinking wisdom, love, or beauty will be found in propositions, as if 
we really could get what we need by constructing and analyzing texts. Of course, it cannot be 
found in a narrow “quest for experience” either. 
 
Pollan touches on what many people touch on: The need for context, which includes ongoing 
practice-realization. These experiences are just experiences. They are fleeting. They may reshape 
one’s entire life, but their potential for good will always depend on practice-realization, on the 
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fullness of our intention, on the quality of our ethical lifestyle, on the way we apply effort, 
attention, and awarness. Nevertheless, the experiences seem tremendously important for shaking 
us out of the habitual ways of knowing that keep us caged. A profound experience can allow us 
to throw them off, and only our practice will determine the extent to which habit and ignorance 
can reclaim us. Pollan knows that he only tasted something—but even one taste of something 
profound (Sophia as Sapienza) would outweigh most everything a typical student gets from a 
typical philosophy class (or four years or six years of them) in today’s academy: 
I don’t mean to suggest I have achieved this state of ego-transcending 
awareness, only tasted it. These experiences don’t last, or at least they didn’t for 
me. After each of my psychedelic sessions came a period of several weeks in 
which I felt noticeably different—more present to the moment, much less inclined 
to dwell on what’s next. I was also notably more emotional and surprised myself 
on several occasions by how little it took to make me tear up or smile. I found 
myself thinking about things like death and time and infinity, but less in angst 
than in wonder. (I spent an unreasonable amount of time reflecting on how 
improbable and fortunate it is to be living here and now at the frontier of two 
eternities of nonexistence.) All at once and unexpectedly, waves of compassion or 
wonder or pity would wash over me. 
This was a way of being I treasured, but, alas, every time it eventually 
faded. It’s difficult not to slip back into the familiar grooves of mental habit; they 
are so well worn; the tidal pull of what the Buddhists call our “habit energies” is 
difficult to withstand. Add to this the expectations of other people, which subtly 
enforce a certain way of being yourself, no matter how much you might want to 
attempt another. After a month or so, it was pretty much back to baseline. 
But not quite, not completely. For much like the depressed patients I 
interviewed in London, who described being nourished and even inspired by their 
furloughs from the cage of depression, the experience of some other way of being 
in the world survives in memory, as a possibility and a destination. 
For me, the psychedelic experience opened a door to a specific mode of 
consciousness that I can now occasionally recapture in meditation. I’m speaking 
of a certain cognitive space that opens up late in a trip or in the midst of a mild 
one, a space where you can entertain all sorts of thoughts and scenarios without 
reaching for any kind of resolution. It somewhat resembles hypnagogic 
consciousness, that liminal state perched on the edge of sleep when all kinds of 
images and scraps of story briefly surface before floating away. But this is 
sustained, and what comes up can be clearly recalled. And though the images and 
ideas that appear are not under your direct control, but rather seem to be arriving 
and departing of their own accord, you can launch a topic or change it, like a 
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channel. The ego is not entirely absent—you haven’t been blasted into particles, 
or have returned from that particular state—but the stream of consciousness is 
taking its own desultory course, and you are bobbing and drifting along with it, 
looking neither forward nor back, immersed in the currents of being rather than 
doing. And yet a certain kind of mental work is getting done, and occasionally I 
have emerged from the state with usable ideas, images, or metaphors. (409-10) 
 
Here he mentions the liminal space, which, McKenna would remind us, requires skill and art 
to navigate. Thinking as this spaciousness, Liminal or Original Thinking, does not happen 
just because of a bag of tricks. These medicines will become “medical” “science” rather than 
Medicinal Wisdom if we don’t work with them skillfully (we shall have more to say about 
this distinction later). That holds for every Art of Awareness we might consider, from 
meditation to mandalas to working with Yijing (the ancient Chinese field guide of relational 
knowing). But, it matters that Pollan entered this space, and that he could easily understand, 
even wonderstand its basic goodness and usefulness in the best sense of the term. We can all 
enter this space, because we are this space.  
 
A genuinely healthy Nature-Culture helps us to understand what we are, and helps us to live 
in, through, as this spaciousness. That is how it supports our peace and joy and overall well-
being, making our well-being, our good mind and good heart, integral to the well-being, the 
good mind and good heart, of all ecologies. We enter the practice-realization of the health, 
healing, holiness, and wholeness of the World and the Cosmos. Pollan saw—even with what 
seems to be a more limited philosophical life, that is, in comparison to the much more richly 
contextualized ways of life manifested in living traditions which one finds almost always in 
at least partially degraded forms these days—even with a more bare-bones spiritual 
orientation, Pollan saw how he could become intimate with the landscape of his own soul.  
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Spiritual practices, Arts of Awareness, Arts of Knowing have to do with becoming familiar 
with our own souls, our own minds, our own heart-mind-body-World-Cosmos—in ways that 
cultivate the conditions of life, love, and liberation. What else do we think philosophy 
should be about? And what do we have to say if it seems we need to know better, know 
radically differently in order to realize such a sacred intention? Pollan continues: 
My psychedelic adventures familiarized me with this mental territory, and, 
sometimes, not always, I find I can return to it during my daily meditation. I don’t 
know if this is exactly where I’m supposed to be when I’m meditating, but I’m 
always happy to find myself floating in this particular mental stream. I would 
never have found it if not for psychedelics. This strikes me as one of the great 
gifts of the experience they afford: the expansion of one’s repertoire of conscious 
states.  
Just because the psychedelic journey takes place entirely in one’s mind 
doesn’t mean it isn’t real. It is an experience and, for some of us, one of the most 
profound a person can have. As such, it takes its place as a feature in the 
landscape of a life. It can serve as a reference point, a guidepost, a wellspring, 
and, for some, a kind of spiritual sign or shrine. (410) 
 
Here, Pollan does not, technically, get things philosophically out of whack. He rather 
experiences the difficulty of taking experience seriously, and becoming familiar with the 
nondualistic, nonlocal epistemology that intimate experience seems to invite, in many if not all 
traditions (sometimes only in certain branches of a tradition, but it seems to live everywhere). If 
we just say, “It’s all in the mind,” we may emphasize dualities that don’t really have a leg to 
stand on: mind-body, mind-nature, self-other, mind-heart, spiritual-scientific, profane-sacred, 
and other dualisms break down, and they break us down if we cling to them, since they don’t 
seem to help us practice and realize a healthy world, and in fact seem to contradict something in 
reality. In an interview, Jung tried to get at this in terms of the general tendencies of introversion 
and extroversion that show up in both individuals and cultures. It perhaps helps to read his 
comments in light of his collaboration with the great physicist Wolfgang Pauli to develop a 
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nondual theory of mind-matter, the so-called Synchronicity Hypothesis, or the Pauli-Jung 
Conjecture: 
psychic events are facts, are realities, and when you observe the stream of images 
within, you observe an aspect of the world, of the world within. Because the 
psyche, if you understand it as a phenomenon occurring in living bodies, is a 
quality of matter, just as our body consists of matter. We discover that this matter 
has another aspect, namely a psychic aspect. It is simply the world seen from 
within. It is just as though you were seeing into another aspect of matter. This is 
an idea that is not my invention. Old Democritus talked of the spiritus insertus 
atomis, the spirit inserted in atoms. That means the psyche is a quality which 
appears in matter. It doesn't matter whether we understand it or not, but that is the 
conclusion we come to if we draw conclusions 
without prejudices.  
And so, you see, the man who goes by the influence of the external 
world—say society or sense perceptions—thinks he is more valid because this is 
valid, this is real, and the man who goes by the subjective factor is not valid 
because the subjective factor is nothing. No, that man is just as well based, 
because he bases himself on the world from within. So he is quite all right even if 
he says, “Oh, it is nothing but my fantasy.” Of course that is the introvert, and as 
the introvert is always afraid of the external world, he will be apologetic about it 
when you ask him. He will say, “Yes, of course, I know those are my fantasies,” 
and he has always a resentment. And as the world in general, particularly 
America, is extraverted as hell, the introvert has no place, because he doesn’t 
know that he beholds the world from within. And that gives him dignity, that 
gives him certainty, because, nowadays particularly, the world hangs by a thin 
thread, and that thread is the psyche of man. Suppose certain fellows in Moscow 
lose their nerve or their common sense for a bit, then the whole world is in fire 
and flames.  
Nowadays we are not threatened by elemental catastrophes [well, now we 
have made those too—n.k.]. There is no such thing in nature as an H-bomb—that 
is all man’s doing [plastic too, and all the rest—n.k.]. We are the great danger. 
The psyche is the great danger . . . And so it is demonstrated in our day what the 
power of the psyche is, how important it is to know something about it. But we 
know nothing about it. Nobody would give credit to the idea that the psychic 
processes of the ordinary man have any importance whatever. One thinks, “Oh, he 
is just what he has in his head. He is all from his surroundings.” He is taught such 
and such a thing, believes such and such a thing, and particularly if he is well 
housed and well fed, then he has no ideas at all. And that’s the great mistake, 
because he is just what he is born as, and he is not born as a tabula rasa but as a 
reality. (JS: 303-4) 
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It may prove helpful just now to pause just for a moment to contemplate Jung’s work with Pauli. 
In particular, let us consider a passage from Gieser’s fascinating study of the collaboration and 
relationship between these two fascinating figures. Here, Gieser emphasizes Pauli’s views, and 
that serves as a good balance for our many considerations of Jung’s views. In reading this, we 
can hold McKenna’s “dancing in the fields of the Goddess” in mind, as well as his and 
Sorenson’s reflections on LUV, Eros, and hypersensuality, and also the notion of a supraliminal 
vs. a liminal kind of knowing: 
What began to happen around the turn of the [20th] century must according 
to Pauli be interpreted as the return of the feminine principle. Einstein’s theory of 
relativity showed that neither time nor space are absolute categories but that they 
are intertwined. Man, the observer, immediately returns to the world of science 
when Einstein states that space has to be defined from the position of the observer 
in a movable system of reference. The universe can no longer be defined as an 
intrinsically dormant mechanistic system, but has to take into account the 
conditions under which reality is observed. This tendency was further 
strengthened by the advent of quantum physics: both Werner Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty relation and Niels Bohr’s complementary principle place the observer 
and the process of observation in the centre of the laws of physics and deal a 
sharp blow to the law of causality. Instead every observation is now seen as a 
unique creative act, where it is necessary to choose perspective on reality. It is in 
the meeting of subject and object that reality is created. 
From Pauli’s perspective this means the beginning of the return of the 
feminine principle to the Western worldview. Eros shows how things are 
interrelated, linked to each other. But anima is also linked with the deepest 
mysteries of existence – the rhythm of life and death and the creation of the 
unique. Pauli’s dreams increasingly often contained a dancing woman with 
oriental features, whom he called the Chinese woman. This anima personified 
psychophysical mystery, in other words the connection between body and soul, 
matter and psyche. In this way she represented the direct opposite of the 
prevailing scientific viewpoint, where psyche and matter are still entirely separate. 
She embodied the psychophysical secrets, including sexuality and the 
‘parapsychological phenomena’. With her dance she stood for a dynamic 
asymmetrical principle, in contrast to the static and mechanical principle of 
classical science. She also represented a new unified form of contemplation where 
feeling, emotional interest, intuition and ethical questions receive as much room 
as the intellect in scientific work. In contrast to meaningless chance, she 
represented meaningful coincidences. Time, which in classical science constitutes 
only a mechanistic, linear progress of hands on a clock, is from the Chinese 
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woman’s perspective a succession of unique instants with a distinctive quality of 
their own, which unite the now of outer reality with that of inner reality. 
Western science has created a sharp distinction between man and matter. 
Matter is treated as a dead object which is at man’s disposal. Therefore Pauli felt 
guilt on behalf of his science to the great mother, which demands restitution. Just 
like the old alchemists, Pauli considered that modern man has to realize that every 
manipulation of matter also has repercussions on man himself and reflects his 
own inner state. He believed that science could only develop in the right direction 
if it was realized that physical reality is connected with man’s mental reality. The 
feminine perspective implies a focusing on the totality and searches for the unity 
which bridges the division of the world into exclusive opposing pairs. Classical 
physics from Galileo-Kepler-Newton to Einstein represents, to Pauli, a largely 
patriarchal thinking. Physics has not yet recognized that the mental state of the 
observer may be able to influence the observed natural process. The mental 
element, observation as a psychological process, is as yet an unconsidered fact in 
the self-understanding of science. Pauli felt that his Chinese woman symbolized a 
subterranean wisdom, nature’s own intrinsic knowledge. Western man needs the 
wisdom of the dark mother goddess as a counterweight to the products of the 
masculine intellect. In physics as a discipline, this would imply an increased 
cross-scientific activity: one must climb down from the abstract, causal and 
mathematical models to the source and roots of life, in other words move nearer to 
biology, psychology and parapsychology. . . . 
 . . . . Pauli sought a transcendental reality, in other words a reality which 
goes beyond the opposing pairs, but which nevertheless is able to include them in 
a symmetrical manner within a greater whole. He did not seek a transcendence in 
the ‘supersensory’ sense. To him it was of the greatest importance for matter to be 
given as large a place in the worldview as the non-material. . . . 
  . . . Pauli believed in the possibility of a unified science – an additional 
inheritance from his godfather Ernst Mach – which could unite psychology, 
physics and biology in a general science of life. Unlike the positivists, on the 
other hand, he did not see the unifying factor in the possibility of reducing these 
disciplines to sensory impressions or to general laws of physics – he sought 
instead a common deep structure for all disciplines. 
One of the insights reached by both depth psychology and quantum 
physics is that one must reckon with at least two levels of reality. One is the 
naively perceived everyday world which is controlled by consciousness, a world 
of culturally specific categories and images. This is the world of classical physics 
and everyday perception. Then we have the non-visual – or unconscious – level, 
at which our classical laws and rational images no longer apply. To understand 
this deep level both physics and psychology have been compelled to work with 
symbols, probability and ‘underlying structures’. It is at this deeper level that 
Pauli believes that objective reality is to be found. Pauli had hopes for a future 
research into these deep levels of the human psyche, i.e. scientific studies of 
cognitive functions, creativity and the process of dreaming that has not at all been 
realized by today’s psychology. Instead depth psychology has become the big 
business of therapy that he feared. Scientific psychology on the other hand is still 
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locked in its nineteenth-century mechanistic view of the mind, with its ‘modern’ 
metaphor of the computer. (342-4) 
 
As a philosopher, I feel overjoyed at the appearance of Sophia in Pauli’s dreams. Pauli also had 
dreams that he sensed as carrying an alchemical import. In a letter to Jung he wrote: 
I would just like to say a brief word of thanks for sending me your treatise on 
alchemy. It was bound to be of great interest to me, both as a scientist and also in 
the light of my personal dream experiences. These have shown me that even the 
most modern physics also lends itself to the symbolic representation of psychic 
processes, even down to the last detail. Of course, nothing is further from the 
thoughts of modern man than the idea of penetrating the secrets of matter in this 
way, for he would actually rather use these symbols to penetrate the secrets of the 
soul, since it seems to him that, relatively speaking, less research has been done 
on the soul, and it is less familiar than matter. (from Gieser: 200) 
 
Pauli thought that his vivid dreams about physical processes, including atomic and sub-atomic 
processes, should be understood in light of alchemy. Why? Because, in a certain sense, he may 
have—by the Grace of Sophia—touched the need for scientists to embrace alchemy, to see 
themselves as the alchemists did: as children of Sophia. The work of science is not “outer work” 
done on “external” “matter,” but always a spiritual task, in service to life, in service to Sophia. 
Losing that vision, we make the same mistake some alchemists did: We get hooked by conscious 
purposes and conquest styles of thinking, and we start spreading suffering rather than healing. 
Gieser does a pretty nice job of getting at this: 
Pauli took the example of the radioactive nucleus, which so often occurred in his 
dreams. There the nucleus  was presented as something incredibly charged and 
numinous, which caused Pauli to assume that it represented a modern symbol of 
the Self, like the philosopher’s stone with the alchemists. He thought that this 
symbol might have a collective significance, not merely a personal significance 
for himself. 
 
But perhaps there is a lesson to be learned from alchemy’s mistake 
of attributing to the lapis the ability to help in the manufacture of 
genuine gold. For it seems to me important for us, too, not to attach 
any particular expectations of external, material success to the 
occurrence of the central symbol. This appears to be very closely 
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connected with the ‘epilogue’ of your treatise, where you touch on 
the questions of ascribing psychic contents to the ego and the risk 
of the inflation of consciousness. Maybe the alchemists’ idea that 
they could really make gold by using the lapis can be seen as an 
expression of such an inflation of consciousness. [letter from Pauli 
to Jung] 
 
Pauli thought that we have something to learn from the mistakes of the 
alchemists – those who believed that gold could be created with the philosopher’s 
stone. The mistake lies in attaching material hopes to what should instead 
symbolize man’s striving for an inner value. As Pauli regarded the radioactive 
nucleus as a modern parallel to the lapis of the alchemists, one may wonder how 
he viewed contemporary research into the atomic nucleus. He says that one can 
see the alchemists’ hopes of creating gold as an inflation of consciousness, in 
other words as a sign of human arrogance. 
If one were to develop further this parallel drawn by Pauli, one might ask 
whether perhaps many modern physicists have unconsciously attached high 
expectations to the radioactive atomic nucleus. Could they have been driven 
by something which goes far beyond the concrete nucleus, by something like the 
lapis of the alchemists – i. e. by the dream of a substance which can give a never-
failing force and a possibility of transforming everything into whatever one 
wants? In modern times, when physics has become totally separated from a 
contemplative consideration of the cosmos, one might be able to draw the parallel 
with the period when alchemy began to degenerate into gold-making and to lose 
its function as a route to individuation. The vulgar alchemists, with their hopes of 
creating gold with the aid of the philosopher’s stone, are the counterpart to the 
physicists of modern times, with excessive hopes pinned on the radioactive 
nucleus. It would solve everything, just like lapis: give access to inexhaustible 
energy, create material prosperity and peace on earth. These exaggerated hopes 
again express a seeking for the Self in a concrete and vulgarized form. This is a 
sign, then as now, of the hubris of consciousness and it can finish only as foretold 
in the myth of Icarus – with Icarus’ fatal dive into the sea. (202-3) 
 
We must take care to appreciate the incredible value of this sort of thinking. It precisely tries to 
avoid a bag of tricks approach in which the physicist, for instance, might try to “use” dreams or 
“use” LSD to “come up with ideas,” or “solve problems in physics,” or even “fix” our 
“neuroses”. We lure ourselves into this sort of error all the time, for instance every time we try to 
speak about the value of dreams by reciting Kekule’s discovery of the structure of benzene in a 
dream, or Singer’s development of the sewing machine. This is all essentially a kind of sin 
against Sophia—obviously not of same variety as dreaming up nuclear bombs (which our atomic 
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physicists of course did), or of dreaming up the horrifying application and proliferation of 
nuclear bombs, but we do benefit from seeing how this all comes out of a style of thinking, and 
that by means of liberating ourselves out of that style of thinking, and into deeper intimacy with 
ourselves, our World, and the knowing made possible in that liberating activity, we can begin to 
return to Sophia, return to the work of healing and the cultivation of more vitalizing ecologies. 
We have to handle all arts of awareness the way we would handle a poisonous snake, and we 
have to handle them in the context of philosophies, ways of life, that we likewise handle like 
poisonous snakes. This should not create anything other than an attitude of love, an attitude of 
wisdom-love-beauty, an attitude of joyful appreciation, and not some sort of dryness. 
 
With respect to Pauli’s vision, it feels important to emphasize the notion of a unity of the 
disciplines, and to view it through our meta-analysis, for our sense here has to do with touching a 
deeper level of knowing, one that transcends the ego and makes possible all the partial insights 
we have so far claimed as knowledge. The unification Pauli sought could be seen as a kind of 
alchemical transmutation that would allow us to stop treating the lead of partial insights as gold, 
and to instead pursue the deeper work of actually bringing abundance into the World—because 
the Nature of the World is abundance. 
 
In relation to these passages, the one by Jung and the others by and about Pauli, we can see the 
great need to both value the psyche—to see psyche/soul/mind as sacred—but also to see how 
what happens “in the mind” happens “in a living ecology, in the World, in the Cosmos”—for 
otherwise the noetic quality of Cosmic meaningfulness suddenly becomes senseless. We fail to 
practice-realize the great interwovenness of things, and so we end up sucked back into ignorance. 
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This too speaks to our need for philosophical/spiritual/religious traditions—traditions of practice. 
For we must become familiar with the landscape of the soul, the inner-outer ecologies of soul, as 
part of a practice of cultivating these living, loving landscapes. To enter these spaces means 
something to the land—to the soil as much as the soul—or we have limited it, and perpetuated a 
pattern of insanity. But all of this was contemplation with Pollan. Let us continue with Pollan’s 
reflections: 
For me, the experiences have become landmarks to circle around and 
interrogate for meaning—meanings about myself, obviously, but also about the 
world. Several of the images that appeared in the course of my trips I think about 
all the time, hoping to unwrap what feels like a gift of meaning—from where or 
what or whom, I cannot say. There was that steel pylon hovering over the 
landscape of self. Or the image of my grandfather’s skull staring back at me in 
Mary’s mirror. The majestic but now hollowed-out trees in which my parents 
appeared to me, liable to topple in the next windstorm. Or the inky well of Yo-Yo 
Ma’s cello, resonating with Bach’s warm embrace of death. But there is one other 
image I haven’t shared that I keep thinking must contain some important teaching, 
even as it continues to mystify me. 
My last psychedelic journey was on ayahuasca. I was invited to join a 
circle of women who gather every three or four months to work with a legendary 
guide, a woman in her eighties who had trained under Leo Zeff. (She in turn had 
trained Mary, the woman who guided my psilocybin journey.) This journey was 
different from the others in that it took place in the company of a dozen other 
travelers, all of them strangers to me.  
Befitting this particular psychedelic, which is a tea brewed from two 
Amazonian plants (one a vine, the other a leaf), there was a considerable amount 
of ceremony in the shamanic mode: the singing of traditional icaros, prayers and 
invocations to “the grandmother” (a.k.a. the “plant teacher” or ayahuasca), bells 
and rattles and shakapas, and the blowing on us of various scents and smokes. All 
of which contributed to a mood of deep mystery and a suspension of disbelief that 
was especially welcome, inasmuch as we were in a yoga studio a long way from 
any jungle. 
 
The mention here of a “plant teacher” should strike the average academic philosopher as strange. 
We can note that in this case the teacher has a feminine energy—an aspect of Sophia—and we 
may recall Pauli’s dreams here as well. Perhaps we should also recall Diotima, the teacher of 
Socrates, the one who initiated him into the mysteries of LoveWisdom.  
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Pollan will have to work in order to receive the doctrines and doctoring of this plant teacher. A 
few western anthropologists have written about the phenomena of plant teachers. Jeremy Narby 
spent time with the Ashaninka. He writes: 
The main enigma I encountered during my research on Ashaninca ecology 
was that these extremely practical and frank people, living almost autonomously 
in the Amazonian forest, insisted that their extensive botanical knowledge came 
from plant-induced hallucinations. How could this be true?  
The enigma was all the more intriguing because the botanical knowledge 
of indigenous Amazonians has long astonished scientists. The chemical 
composition of ayahuasca is a case in point. Amazonian shamans have been 
preparing ayahuasca for millennia. The brew is a necessary combination of two 
plants, which must be boiled together for hours. The first contains a 
hallucinogenic substance, dimethyltryptamine, which also seems to be secreted by 
the human brain; but this hallucinogen has no effect when swallowed, because a 
stomach enzyme called monoamine oxidase blocks it. The second plant, however, 
contains several substances that inactivate this precise stomach enzyme, allowing 
the hallucinogen to reach the brain. The sophistication of this recipe has prompted 
Richard Evans Schultes, the most renowned ethnobotanist of the twentieth 
century, to comment: “One wonders how peoples in primitive societies, with no 
knowledge of chemistry or physiology, ever hit upon a solution to the activation 
of an alkaloid by a monoamine oxidase inhibitor. Pure experimentation? Perhaps 
not. The examples are too numerous and may become even more numerous with 
future research.”  
So here are people without electron microscopes who choose, among 
some 80,000 Amazonian plant species, the leaves of a bush containing a 
hallucinogenic brain hormone, which they combine with a vine containing 
substances that inactivate an enzyme of the digestive tract, which would otherwise 
block the hallucinogenic effect. And they do this to modify their consciousness.  
It is as if they knew about the molecular properties of plants and the art of 
combining them, and when one asks them how they know these things, they say 
their knowledge comes directly from hallucinogenic plants. 
Not many anthropologists have looked into this enigma—but the failure of 
academics to consider this kind of mystery is not limited to the Amazon. Over the 
course of the twentieth century, anthropologists have examined shamanic 
practices around the world without fully grasping them.  
A brief history of anthropology reveals a blind spot in its studies of 
shamanism. (1999: 10) 
 
Like Pollan, Narby tried ayahuasca. His experience involved a humbling of the rational mind—
we can recall Jung’s mention of the “demolition of rational understanding,” and take it as a kind 
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of prerequisite for any significant paradigm shift. It just comes with the territory, the frontier, the 
Bardo. Narby writes, 
Deep hallucinations submerged me. I suddenly found myself surrounded by two 
gigantic boa constrictors that seemed fifty feet long. I was terrified. These 
enormous snakes are there, my eyes are closed and I see a spectacular world of 
brilliant lights, and in the middle of these hazy thoughts, the snakes start talking to 
me without words. They explain that 1 am just a human being. I feel my mind 
crack, and in the fissures, I see the bottomless arrogance of my presuppositions. It 
is profoundly true that I am just a human being, and, most of the time, I have the 
impression of understanding everything, whereas here I find myself in a more 
powerful reality that 1 do not understand at all and that, in my arrogance, I did not 
even suspect existed. I feel like crying in view of the enormity of these 
revelations. Then it dawns on me that this self-pity is a part of my arrogance. I 
feel so ashamed that 1 no longer dare feel ashamed. Nevertheless, I have to throw 
up again. 
I stood up feeling totally lost, stepped over the fluorescent snakes like a 
drunken tightrope walker, and, begging their forgiveness, headed toward a tree 
next to the house.  
I relate this experience with words on paper. But at the time, language 
itself seemed inadequate. I tried to name what I was seeing, but mostly the words 
would not stick to the images. This was distressing, as if my last link to “reality” 
had been severed. Reality itself seemed to be no more than a distant and one-
dimensional memory. I managed nonetheless to understand my feelings, such as 
“poor little human being who has lost his language and feels sorry for himself.” I 
have never felt so completely humble as I did at that moment. (6-7) 
 
The humility stands out. It’s rather remarkable how arrogant we can be when it comes to what 
we know. Humus, humility, humaneness . . . And notice how language failed, the habitual use of 
language showed its hollowness, where hallowness became evident as essential. 
 
Monica Gagliano, an evolutionary ecologist, has run experiments demonstrating the capacity of 
plants to learn. This is nothing short of astonishing from the standpoint of localized 
epistemologies and brain-as-computer metaphors, since it demonstrates extra-neuronal cognition. 
Of course, if mind is non-local, the findings are simply a delightful part of life. Extra-neuronal 
memory was also demonstrated—famously or infamously—by James McConnel, who trained 
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flatworms, then cut them in half, letting them grow back again. The half that could not have 
possibly retained memory (because it had no neurons to do so) still remembered. Very loosely 
speaking, this would be like taking some stem cells from your liver and growing a new you who 
had at least some of your memories. McConnel also did this by grinding up the worms who 
learned and feeding them to naïve worms. This would be like . . . well, you get the idea. Memory 
transfer was later demonstrated in rats, and has been replicated more recently—a shocking result 
that challenges current theories (see Bédécarrats et al. 2018). Karl Pribram’s theory that the mind 
functions like a hologram would account for the findings, but scientists will likely pursue other 
explanations. In any case, we consider Gagliano here because she not only showed that plants 
can learn, but she too experienced their apparent capacity to teach, which she documents in her 
book, Thus Spoke the Plant (seemingly a reference to Zarathustra, but I find no mention of 
Nietzsche in her book). Let’s return to Pollan’s experience: 
As has been the case with all of my journeys, the night before had been 
sleepless, as part of me worked to convince the rest of me not to do this crazy 
thing. That part was of course my ego, which before every trip has fought the 
threat to its integrity with ferocity and ingenuity, planting doubts and scenarios of 
disaster I had trouble batting away. What about your heart, pal? You could die! 
What if you lose your lunch or, even worse, your shit?! And what if “the 
grandmother” dredges up some childhood trauma? Do you really want to lose it 
among these strangers? These women? (Part of the power of the ego flows from 
its command of one’s rational faculties.) By the time I arrived for the circle, I was 
a nervous wreck, assailed by second and third thoughts as to the wisdom of what I 
was about to do. 
 
Pollan gifts us with a precious thing: He confesses his fears, and he indirectly admits the need for 
fairly significant spiritual context in order to arrive at a ceremony like this with a good mind, a 
good spirit. One of the downsides of these sorts of ceremonies is that people arrive at them the 
way people arrive at an intensive spiritual retreat: More or less crazy and in a state of mind not 
conducive to insight. I would be willing to bet that few if any Zen masters, for instance, see even 
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the faintest hint of insight in the first 2-3 days of a retreat, unless the student has somehow 
managed to increase or maintain their practice beforehand in a very deep way. Thankfully, a 
medicine like Ayahuasca can open us to insight in spite of ourselves—at least in some cases. But 
the whole process, and the whole World, would benefit from a prior engagement with philosophy 
as a way of life. The fear that comes up, though, is significant, and we will return to it.  
 
At the end of the day, can we suggest that fear is the biggest factor in keeping philosophers from 
exploring alternative ways of knowing? I often imagine that Plato handled his Apology rather 
like a poisonous snake. I think he must have used it at a point at which a student had had begun 
to see the value of philosophy and had then to decide if they were going to seriously pursue a 
philosophical life. The dialogue seems to say: “You could get killed for this, for really wanting to 
know who you are and what this world is. Are you ready for that?” I imagine he would follow 
that up with lessons on how much we need to give up, how we need to let go of what we think 
we know, and how we need to enter into a different way of knowing, one that apparently delivers 
insights that cannot simply be told. Pollan, and the people he interviewed for the book, 
experienced an ineffability with holotropic medicines that perhaps resonates with the ineffability 
of LoveWisdom that Socrates expresses in the Republic.  
 
In any case, the ego doesn’t have much of a chance against a sufficient dose of medicine like 
Ayahuasca, and, once the medicine begins to work, the ego can no longer stand in the way of 
insights it ordinarily obstructs: 
But, as has happened every time, as soon as I swallowed the medicine and 
slipped past the point of no return, the voice of doubt went quiet and I surrendered 
to whatever was in store. Which was not unlike my other psychedelic experiences, 
with a couple of notable exceptions. Perhaps because the tea, which was viscous 
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and acrid and unexpectedly sweet, makes its alien presence felt in your stomach 
and intestines, ayahuasca is a more bodily experience than some other 
psychedelics. I did not get sick, but I was very much aware of the thick brew 
moving through me and, as the effect of the DMT (ayahuasca’s active ingredient) 
came on, imagined it as a vine winding its way through the curls and convolutions 
of my intestines, occupying my body before slowly working its snakelike way up 
to and into my head. 
There followed a great many memories and images, some horrifying, 
others magnificent, but I want to describe one in particular because, although I 
don’t completely understand it, it captures something that psychedelics have 
taught me, something important. Because there was still some light in the room 
when the ceremony began, we were all wearing eye masks, and mine felt a little 
tight around my head. Early in the journey, I became aware of the black straps 
circling my skull, and these morphed into bars. My head was caged in steel. The 
bars then began to multiply, moving down from my head to encircle my torso and 
then my legs. I was now trapped head to toe in a black steel cage. I pressed 
against the bars, but they were unyielding. There was no way out. Panic was 
building when I noticed the green tip of a vine at the base of the cage. It was 
growing steadily upward and then turning, sinuously, to slip out between two of 
the bars, freeing itself and at the same time reaching toward the light. “A plant 
can’t be caged,” I heard myself thinking. “Only an animal can be caged.” 
I can’t tell you what this means, if anything. Was the plant showing me a 
way out? Perhaps, but it’s not as if I could actually follow it; I am an animal, after 
all. Yet it seemed the plant was trying to teach me something, that it was 
proposing a kind of visual koan for me to unpack, and I have been turning it over 
in my mind ever since. Maybe it was a lesson about the folly of approaching an 
obstacle head-on, that sometimes the answer is not the application of force but 
rather changing the terms of the problem in such a way that it loses its dominion 
without actually crumbling. It felt like some kind of jujitsu. Because the vine 
wasn’t just escaping the confines of the cage, it was using the structure to improve 
its situation, climbing higher to gather more light for itself. 
 
The reference to a koan is strained, since koan (a term from Zen Buddhist philosophy) should be 
considered one of the Arts of Awareness that can help liberate us into a better way of knowing, 
but Pollan gives no sense of understanding what koan are or how one would actually work with a 
koan. However, he does seem to use the term effectively enough here. It’s worth noting that one 
of the people Pollan interviewed for his book found their experience with holotropic medicines 
inspiring for their spiritual practice—in Zen philosophy. Pollan visited Johns Hopkins, where 
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some of the most interesting recent work with psilocybin was done, by Roland Griffiths and 
other researchers. As Pollan describes it: 
To listen to these people describe the changes in their lives inspired by 
their psilocybin journeys is to wonder if the Hopkins session room isn’t a kind of 
“human transformation factory,” as Mary Cosimano, the guide who has probably 
spent more time there than anyone else, described it to me. “From now on,” one 
volunteer told me, “I think of my life as before and after psilocybin.” Soon after 
his psilocybin experience, Brian Turner, the physicist, quit his job with the 
military contractor and moved to Colorado to study Zen. He had had a meditation 
practice before psilocybin, but “now I had the motivation, because I had tasted the 
destination”; he was willing to do the hard work of Zen now that he had gotten a 
preview of the new modes of consciousness it could make available to him. 
Turner is now an ordained Zen monk, yet he is also still a physicist, 
working for a company that makes helium neon lasers. I asked him if he felt any 
tension between his science and his spiritual practice. “I don’t feel there’s a 
contradiction. Yet what happened at Hopkins has influenced my physics. I realize 
there are just some domains that science will not penetrate. Science can bring you 
to the big bang, but it can’t take you beyond it. You need a different kind of 
apparatus to peer into that.” (73-4) 
 
For his part, Roland Griffiths’s own encounters with the volunteers in the 
2006 study reignited his passion for science, but they also left him with a deeper 
respect for all that science does not know—for what he is content to call “the 
mysteries.” 
“For me the data [from those first sessions] were . . . I don’t want to use 
the word mind-blowing, but it was unprecedented the kinds of things we were 
seeing there, in terms of the deep meaning and lasting spiritual significance of 
these effects. I’ve given lots of drugs to lots of people, and what you get are drug 
experiences. What’s unique about the psychedelics is the meaning that comes out 
of the experience.” (75) 
 
The prospect of “unprecedented” results should seem attractive to philosophers—especially 
given how Griffiths contrasts it with “drug experiences”—but it seems particularly valuable that 
these sorts of experiences can become synergetic with a holistic philosophical way of life.  
 
However, we still seem to stand at a threshold here. It seems the scientific training of most 
westerners keeps them somehow at a distance from an even more radical shift. We may be 
approaching it though. Our inquiry seeks to orient us toward it. It would be as ineffable as any of 
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these experiences—at least in some sense. But clearly we would all be able to get along, to 
communicate, to cultivate life onward. We would not be stuck in a liminal space that prevents 
contact, communication, or compassionate activity in the living, loving World. We are trying 
through our inquiry to find out how to become more effective at taking care of the World. The 
whole point of considering this sort of material “beyond the limit” has to do with the 
commitment we must have to take care of wisdom wherever we find it, and to cross any ethically 
available threshold, no matter how fearful we feel, if the threshold seems to offer potentially 
empowering, healing insights.  
 
Continuing with Pollan’s final reflections on Ayahuasca and his overall experience with these 
medicines: 
Or maybe the lesson was more universal, something about plants 
themselves and how we underestimate them. My plant teacher, as I began to think 
of the vine, was trying to tell me something about itself and the green kingdom it 
represents, a kingdom that has always figured largely in my work and my 
imagination. That plants are intelligent I have believed for a long time—not 
necessarily in the way we think of intelligence, but in a way appropriate to 
themselves. We can do many things plants can’t, yet they can do all sorts of 
things we can’t—escaping from steel cages, for example, or eating sunlight. If 
you define intelligence as the ability to solve the novel problems reality throws at 
the living, plants surely have it. 
They also possess agency, an awareness of their environment, and a kind 
of subjectivity—a set of interests they pursue and so a point of view. But though 
these are all ideas I have long believed and am happy to defend, never before have 
I felt them to be true, to be as deeply rooted as I did after my psychedelic 
journeys. 
The un-cageable vine reminded me of that first psilocybin trip, when I 
felt the leaves and plants in the garden returning my gaze. One of the gifts of 
psychedelics is the way they reanimate the world, as if they were distributing the 
blessings of consciousness more widely and evenly over the landscape, in the 
process breaking the human monopoly on subjectivity that we moderns take as a 
given. To us, we are the world’s only conscious subjects, with the rest of creation 
made up of objects; to the more egotistical among us, even other people count as 
objects. 
Psychedelic consciousness overturns that view, by granting us a wider, 
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more generous lens through which we can glimpse the subject-hood—the 
spirit!—of everything, animal, vegetable, even mineral, all of it now somehow 
returning our gaze. Spirits, it seems, are everywhere. New rays of relation appear 
between us and all the world’s Others. 
Even in the case of the minerals, modern physics (forget psychedelics!) 
gives us reason to wonder if perhaps some form of consciousness might not figure 
in the construction of reality. Quantum mechanics holds that matter may not be as 
innocent of mind as the materialist would have us believe. For example, a 
subatomic particle can exist simultaneously in multiple locations, is pure 
possibility, until it is measured—that is, perceived by a mind. Only then and not a 
moment sooner does it drop into reality as we know it: acquire fixed coordinates 
in time and space.  
The implication here is that matter might not exist as such in the absence 
of a perceiving subject. Needless to say, this raises some tricky questions for a 
materialist understanding of consciousness. The ground underfoot may be much 
less solid than we think. 
This is the view of quantum physics, not some psychonaut—though it is a 
very psychedelic theory. I mention it only because it lends some of the authority 
of science to speculations that would otherwise sound utterly lunatic. I still tend to 
think that consciousness must be confined to brains, but I am less certain of this 
belief now than I was before I embarked on this journey. Maybe it too has slipped 
out from between the bars of that cage. Mysteries abide. But this I can say with 
certainty: the mind is vaster, and the world ever so much more alive, than I knew 
when I began. (410-14) 
 
These suggestions related to holotropic medicines, like the suggestions above from Heavy Head, 
Little Bear, and Peat, invite us to think more deeply about the Liminal Mind, what makes it 
possible (and what it makes possible), and how it might collapse (and what subsequently become 
more possible or less possible in its relative, even near-total absence). This Liminal Mind seems 
like a proper expression of what I would call Original Mind, by which I mean the source of what 
we tend to call “original thinking,” but which the dominant paradigm co-opts into its own pattern 
of insanity, such that most original thinking amounts to more of the same. Part of what we want 
to contemplate relates to the relative instability of Original Mind, the relative ease with which 
insanity can overwrite it. We can easily presence insanity and a kind of incoherence, so much so 
that we cannot fathom coherence and a truly healthy Mind. They seem like “myths” or “woo-
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woo”. We love to shout, “Woo! That’s just woo!” Can we not entertain serious possibilities, 
perhaps threatening possibilities, regarding our own insensitivity and incoherence? 
 
We are talking about a revolution in our sense of Health, Healing, and Holiness. We saw this 
with the work of Berry and Shepard, and also in Jung, Nietzsche, and others. Recall the case of 
Semmelweis. Vyner draws a similar parallel: 
 . . . the mortality rate after amputations at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary from 
1864 to 1866, when Joseph Lister first began to do surgery there, was forty-five 
percent. It was fifty percent in Edinburgh and thirty-nine percent at the best 
hospitals in Paris. 
The problem was that medicine had not yet come to understand the little 
animals we now call bacteria. At that time nobody knew that these little animals 
could cause disease. It was thus routine, even at the greatest of hospitals, for a 
surgeon to leave his dissecting laboratory and come do surgery on a patient in 
blood stained clothing without even washing his hands. 
This all changed when Lister read Pasteur’s work. Lister immediately 
understood the implications of Pasteur’s discovery of microorganisms for the 
practice of surgery, and he initiated the practice of operating under antiseptic 
conditions. At his instigation, his surgical ward at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary 
began to use carbolic acid to cleanse their instruments, wash their hands, cleanse a 
patient’s wound or incision and to cleanse the wards in which the patients stayed. 
A mere year later, the mortality rate on Lister’s surgical ward had fallen to three 
percent! 
Now imagine for a moment, that we are in the midst of a similar bout of 
ignorance in which we have, as a species, misunderstood the nature of the healthy 
mind for at least several millennia now, if not longer. That just as surgeons knew 
nothing of the pathogenicity of bacteria as recently as the mid-nineteenth century 
in Europe, that our species has not yet recognized that the egocentric mind is 
actually a pathogen, and that as a result, generations of children have been 
unwittingly and unintentionally brought up to have a fundamentally unhealthy 
mind. 
Imagine further that this unhealthy state of mind is actually the 
psychological cause of several of humanity’s most troublesome and intractable 
problems; that the ego is the cause of the moods, inner conflict and inauthenticity 
that make the average human being uneasy and unhappy. That the ego is also the 
psychological foundation of war, religious intolerance, racism and the caustic 
belief that there is only one truth and one good way to live. 
If science were to unequivocally establish that all of this is true, and that 
the egocentric mind that we all have is actually an unhealthy mind, what would 
we do about it? Would we not, like Lister, take matters in hand and find a way to 
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stop propagating the egocentric mind from one generation to the next? Would we 
not also set out to find out if there is another type of mind that is a healthy 
mind?108 
 
In part, we want to inquire into the connections of knowing and true well-being, wholeness, 
healthiness, holiness, and healing. And we want to look at how a joie de vivre, along with a sense 
of the sacredness of our ecologies, may vanish with the advent of conquest consciousness. 
Sorenson wrote some fascinating field notes on his experience of watching a seemingly healthy 
Mind-Nature-Culture fall apart: 
I’m out, back from the Andaman where I’ve just been through an experience I’ll 
not soon forget. Only by pure chance did I happen to be there when their 
extraordinary intuitive mentality gave up the ghost right in front of me, in an 
inconceivable overwhelming week. I’m almost wrecked myself, in a strange 
anomie from having gone through that at too close a range, and from staying up 
all night too many times to try to understand just what was going on . . . 
 
There really was no way to have predicted that, just after I arrived, the acute 
phase of their ancient culture’s death would start. To speak abstractly of the death 
of a way-of-life is a simple thing to do. To experience it is quite another thing. 
I’ve seen nothing in the lore of anthropology that might prepare one for the speed 
by which it can occur, or for the overwhelming psychic onslaughts it throws out. 
Nor does my profession forewarn of those communicable paroxysms that hover in 
the air which, without warning, strike down with overwhelming force, when a 
culture’s mind gives way. 
 
Yet this is just what happened when the traditional rapport of those islands was 
undone, when the subtle sensibility of each to one another was abruptly seared 
away in a sudden unpredicted, unprecedented, uncognated whirlwind. In a single 
crucial week a spirit that all the world would want, not just for themselves but for 
all others, was lost, one that had taken millennia to create. It was suddenly just 
gone. 
 
Epidemic sleeplessness, frenzied dance throughout the night, reddening burned-
out eyes getting narrower and more vacant as the days and nights wore on, 
dysphasias of various sorts, sudden mini-epidemics of spontaneous estrangement, 
lacunae in perception, hyperkinesis, loss of sensuality, collapse of love, 
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impotence, bewildered frantic looks like those on buffalo in India just as they’re 
clubbed to death; 14 year olds (and others) collapsing on the beach, under houses, 
on the pier, in beached boats as well as those tied up at the dock, here and there, 
into wee hours of the morn, even on through dawn, in acute inebriation or 
exhaustion. Such was the general scene that week, a week that no imagination 
could have forewarned, the week in which the subtle sociosensual glue of the 
island’s traditional way-of-life became unstuck. 
 
To pass through the disintegrating social enclaves was to undergo a rain of 
psychic blows, a pelting shower of harrowing awarenesses that raised goose flesh 
of unexpected types on different epidermal sites along with other kinds of 
crawlings of flesh and skin. There were sudden rushes, both cold and hot, down 
the head and chest and across the neck, even in the legs and feet. And deep inside, 
often near the solar plexus, or around heart, or in the head or throat, new 
indescribable sensations would spontaneously arise, leave one at a loss or deeply 
disconcerted. 
 
 . . . . Eventually I retreated, mentally exhausted, cognitively benumbed, 
emotionally wrung out. I tried to thwart that siege (when I finally recognized it for 
what it really was) by getting key people out. A useless foolish gambit; for no one 
would leave the spot, as if they were welded to it, as if it held some precious thing 
they very greatly loved, which they neither would nor could abandon. 
 
When the mental death had run its course, when what had been was gone, the 
people (physically still quite alive) no longer had their memory of the intuitive 
rapport that held them rapturously together just the week before, could no longer 
link along those subtle mental pathways. What had filled their lives had vanished. 
The teensters started playing at (and then adopting) the rude, antagonistic, ego-
grasping styles of the encroaching modern world, modeled after films and then 
TV. Oldsters retreated into houses, lost their affinity to youngsters, who then 
turned more to one another, sometimes squabbling (which did not occur before). 
 
It seems astonishing that the inner energy of such passings is so undetectable to 
minds not some way linked to the inner harmonies and ardors of the place. 
Research-distance yields abstractions like ‘going amok’, which could have been 
easily applied that week, or ‘revitalizing movement’, which also could have been 
(in a perverse kind of way). It seems that only by some mental coalescence with 
the local lifeway can one access its deeper psychic passions, not just those of 
adolescence, but graver ones like those which for a time were released in 
inconceivable profusion, when the collective subtle mind of the islands, built up 
over eons, was snuffed out. 
 
Similar processes, perhaps not always so dramatic, seem to occur when any 
domineering or abstractly focused alien culture (whether Western, Sinic, Indic, or 
Islamic) impacts on a preconquest people. To the degree that the in-depth 
readjustment requires new relationships between the awareness and manipulation 
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centers in the cerebral cortex and the centers of emotion in the mid and lower 
brains, they represent physiological as well as psychological change and therefore 
raise important questions about the promise and condition of the state of 
humankind.109 
 
Having watched such a collapse, and having seen the pre-conquest consciousness in action, 
Sorenson sketches a history of the rise of conquest consciousness, a thumb-nail sketch of how 
“an integrative human mental evolutionary development was destroyed by the emergence of an 
adversarial one.” Sorenson claims that “all four major civilization developments of the world 
(Western, Sinic, Indic, and Islamic) have conquistadorial features,” but he sketches the western 
one to make his point. Let us consider a few of the broad strokes he makes: 
It is common knowledge that agriculture enables larger populations. We also 
know that larger populations sometimes outstrip the natural resources they depend 
upon (much like what happened with sweet potato in New Guinea). In primeval 
Mediterranea agricultural innovation would have come on come on spottily at 
first, here and there, not everywhere at once; in some places it started a 
millennium later. Where regions became congested, and new land resources 
scarce, the free-range requirement of preconquest life disappeared--slowly at first 
since surrounding virgin lands would for quite some time be able to absorb 
pressed peoples. Eventually, however, there would be confinement, confrontation, 
and conflict. At that point in the evolution, a psychological transformation 
commenced, one that focused with growing intensity on emergent cognitive 
abstractions and symbols by which to anchor claims to property. As these took 
hold, possessiveness evolved as a basic human trait. 
 
. . . . As this civilizational process continued, in the pattern of its onset, 
philosophies of governance emerged. They were first a means to anchor conquest, 
then to manage seized property and wealth according to the wishes of the 
conquerors. Formal ideologies to conjoin governed peoples emerged. Loyalty to 
an abstract idea of nation began grasping hearts and minds. Since states that 
managed resources rationally became stronger, reasoned argument became a 
power tool. While truth in conquered territories could be arbitrarily imposed, in 
keeping with the nature of conquest, states that managed resources rationally 
became stronger. Reasoned argument developed. Such refinements as the zetetic, 
elenctic, and meiotic modes of dialectic reasoning emerged and were eventually 
formalized in the dialectic systems of Socrates and Aristotle. Since a conquest 
ethos lay at their root, it should not be surprising that the dialectic form was 
conquistadorial as well. It enabled one to dip into the kaleidoscopic maelstrom of 
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direct sentient experience, drag out chunks, and make latent mental entities of 
them--as if by such capture, as if by such conquest of the senses, a higher reality 
was bestowed. It produced a means by which the elements of the sentient world 
could be materialized, conquered, and controlled according to the interests and 
desires of established rulers. 
 
It seems worthwhile for scholars, scientists, and ordinary people to contemplate this entwinement 
of abstraction, extraction, property, and control. And we should perhaps contemplate it in light of 
the Flynn effect, the finding that average I.Q. scores have gone up rather dramatically over the 
past century. If we were to look at the average I.Q. of the people of 1900, and compare them to 
our own, they would score about 70, which marks the edge of so-called mental retardation. 
Conversely, if the most average of us could go back to 1900 and take an I.Q. test, we would 
likely rate as a genius.110 But we haven’t become a culture of geniuses. If we consider the 
altogetherness of time, language, abstraction, distance, conquest, and aggression, and the 
altogetherness of timelessness, communion, concreteness, intimacy, cooperation, mutuality, co-
discovery-creation, and the basic nature of PracticeRealization, we may wonder if we have not 
become a culture of sophisticated fools who have gotten very good at teaching stupidity that 
looks like intelligence, cleverness lacking Wisdom, conquest in place of coherence (all of it 
rationalized in one way or another—though the incoherences mean that rationalizations almost 
never appear in a universal form, and each group finds their rationalizations superior, but all 
rationalizations facilitate the same thing: the degradation of the conditions of life). Sadly, we 
have only concepts here to provoke us into experience and experimentation. But words and their 
wind can move us. 
 
                                                 
110 Watch James Flynn himself summarize some of the issues at play: 
https://www.ted.com/talks/james_flynn_why_our_iq_levels_are_higher_than_our_grandparents?
language=en 
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Jeanette Armstrong offers some further reflections that may help just now: 
[Western civilization is] grounded in the belief that the Grandmother [Nature] is 
wild and needs taming and that Indigenous Peoples are wild and need taming. 
 
First they tamed Grandmother to make things. Taking things, easy to take without 
giving back. Taming the land. Agriculture was a way first to increase human 
advantage to sustenance. However, it also increased populations that now needed 
more and more and so more land was taken from other living things. 
 
Agriculture needed easier tools in order to produce more and more. Then it 
created a need of tools for war in order to keep the tamed lands and tools to take 
more land from more peoples. Then it was necessary to make more war tools so 
taking was easier. 
 
It was necessary to make more tools and to teach people to run the new tools to 
feed their families. It was necessary to make them believe that they could be 
wealthy and thus happy. It creates junk-ease. 
 
Tools were made to reach into every house with that in mind. To keep people 
believing in making more tools to make life easy, and to rush to use new tools and 
thus to believe they need such tools. And so it is necessary to tame more and 
more—necessary to make junk easier and easier and they might be happier. 
 
We have junk-ease, arising from our junk-knowledge. The Keurig coffee machine typifies this 
sort of junk-ease: It’s junk, and it supposedly makes life easier. Indeed, a recent news story 
quotes a woman as saying about her single-use coffee machine, “That thing is my life.” She also 
said, “But I know that tossing the empty little cups in the garbage after I use them isn’t the most 
environmentally friendly thing to do.”111 Rather astonishing—to try and live with that sort of 
incoherence and incongruence. Armstrong might say the woman senses “nature’s economic 
requirements of us as humans in the way we are,” but her relationship with time, her relationship 
with work, her entanglement in a thousand abstract agendas reinforces that “ever increasing . . . 
insulation from nature’s economic requirements.” The same news story reports that in 2015, the 
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last year for which data were available, Keurig alone produced 10.5 billion of those little plastic 
cups, and other companies also produce them. Indeed, market share of single-serve machines has 
reached 41% of U.S. consumers!  
 
This has led some people to consider banning the single serve cups. Of course, the pattern of 
insanity holds, and plenty of people will step in to tell us we needn’t worry, as in the case of 
Adam Minter, writing in the Chicago Tribune.112 Mr. Minter reasoned, using the figure of 8.5 
billion plastic cups made in 2013, that this would come to a mere 25,500 metric tons of plastic, 
which amounts to .01 percent of the solid waste generated in the U.S. each year. He notes that we 
throw out 860,000 tons of books each year. He fails to note that plastic cups do not biodegrade 
(though, some elements in books might not either). But the insanity comes to the suggestion that 
25,500 metric tons of plastic is okay (860,000 tons of books is no small symptom either). 
 
A similar line of thinking arrived in our midst courtesy of the U.S. government, run as it is by so 
many people who want to keep us hooked on junk-ease, people who want us controlled, people 
who want to keep the mind of conquest going. From a recent National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration Report: 
Using the IPCC estimated carbon budget, as of 2011, approximately 51 percent, 
or 515 Gt C (1,890 Gt CO2), of this budget had already been emitted, leaving a 
remaining budget of 485 Gt C (1,780 Gt CO2) (IPCC 2013b). From 2011 to 2015, 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement production, and land-use change totaled 
approximately 50 Gt C (183 Gt CO2), leaving a remaining budget from 2016 
onwards of 435 Gt C (1595 Gt CO2) (CDIAC 2016). Under the No Action 
Alternative, U.S. passenger cars and trucks are projected to emit 23 Gt C (83 Gt 
CO2) from 2016 to 2100, or 5.2 percent of the remaining global carbon budget. 
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Under Alternative 1, this projection increases to 25 Gt C (91 Gt CO2) or 5.7 
percent of the remaining budget.   
 
The emissions reductions necessary to keep global emissions within this carbon 
budget could not be achieved solely with drastic reductions in emissions from the 
U.S. passenger car and light truck vehicle fleet but would also require drastic 
reductions in all U.S. sectors and from the rest of the developed and developing 
world. In addition, achieving GHG reductions from the passenger car and light 
truck vehicle fleet to the same degree that emissions reductions will be needed 
globally to avoid using all of the carbon budget would require substantial 
increases in technology innovation and adoption compared to today’s levels and 
would require the economy and the vehicle fleet to substantially move away from 
the use of fossil fuels, which is not currently technologically feasible or 
economically practicable.113 
 
This makes for exceptionally logical thinking, and we should receive it as an astonishing artifact. 
Since improving emissions on U.S. cars won’t, by itself, save the climate from collapse, we 
shouldn’t bother doing it. We have our agendas. We can forget attunement with our home (or its 
Creator). 
 
Armstrong’s discussion of junk-ease brings to mind the experience of Helena Norberg-Hodge, 
who, again, spent many years in Ladakh, witnessing its pre- and post-conquest state: 
In the traditional economy, time was plentiful and limited only by the course of 
the seasons. However much work there was to be done, life was lived at a human 
pace and everyone could afford to be patient. By contrast, the modern economy 
turns time into a commodity— something that can be bought and sold—and 
suddenly it is quantified and divided into the tiniest fragments. Time becomes 
something costly, and as people acquire new “time-saving” technologies the pace 
of life only gets faster. The Ladakhis now have less time for each other and for 
themselves. As a result, they are losing their once-acute sensitivity to the nuances 
of the world around them—the ability, for instance, to detect the slightest 
variations in the weather, or in the movement of the stars. A friend from the 
Markha Valley summed it up for me: “I can’t understand it. My sister in the 
capital, she now has all these things that do the work faster. She just buys her 
clothes in a shop, she has a jeep, a telephone, a gas cooker. All of these things 
save so much time, and yet when I go to visit her, she doesn’t have time to talk to 
me.” One of the most striking lessons that changing Ladakh has taught me is that 
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while the tools and machines of the modern world in themselves save time, the 
new way of life as a whole has the effect of taking time away. (1992:106) 
 
Junk-ease, junk-time, junk-life with junk-coffee, junk-food, junk-knowledge, junk-philosophy. 
The “development” of conquest consciousness, conquest experience, the conquest world, brings 
a strange kind of impoverishment, an impoverishment of the soul, an impoverishment of 
connection, an impoverishment of intimacy, an impoverishment of true ease. The 
impoverishment includes not only the relatively spiritual realm, but the material one as well, as 
both the number of stupid “jobs” increases along with inequality. Consider this reflection from 
Norberg-Hodge: 
In 1975, I was shown around the remote village of Hemis Shukpachan by a young 
Ladakhi named Tsewang. It seemed to me that all the houses we saw were 
especially large and beautiful. I asked Tsewang to show me the houses where the 
poor people lived. Tsewang looked perplexed a moment, then responded, ‘We 
don’t have any poor people here.’Eight years later I overheard Tsewang talking to 
some tourists. ‘If you could only help us Ladakhis,’ he was saying, ‘we’re so 
poor.’ (Norberg-Hodge et al. 1995: 93) 
 
Let us return to Liminal Awareness, the vision of it, the possibility of the impossible it could 
inspire us to practice-and-realize. Perhaps with inconceivable things, we need some degree of via 
negativa, a “not this” sort of conversation. The mind needs some sort of contrast in order to 
sense, some “news of a difference,” some “News of the Cosmos”. Sorenson reflects on the news 
of the Cosmos that non-conquest consciousness heralds: 
For several years after I began contacting preconquest peoples like those 
described above, I considered their type of consciousness an oddity, a kind of 
naive primitive emotionality, one perhaps suitable only for small, isolated groups, 
but certainly for no one else. It took a long time for me to realize that they had 
evolved their own sophisticated type of cognition that was simply different from 
what I (or anyone I knew) was used to. And I came to realize that such mentality 
could not be considered primitively ignorant if only because it was so sensitively 
intelligent and beneficially responsive. It moved more facilely, more 
harmoniously, and more constructively than do the mentalities associated with 
today’s postconquest world. Furthermore, it provided for an astonishingly 
rewarding and zestful life. 
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This sophisticated development of human mentality may be realizable only in 
preconquest settings . . . It would be unreasonable to assume that human mentality 
evolved the same way everywhere during prehistoric times. Less altruistic types 
also evolved. It appears that at least one such combative type in Mediterranea 
progressively demolished its earlier preconquest type of life. 
 
 . . . Under such conditions the logical sense-of-truth of our Western ‘Age of 
Reason’ simply remains outside their realm of reason. Instead of applying rules 
logically sorted out (to know just where they stand or how they must fit in) . . . 
preconquest infants boldly thrust their sentient interests and awarenesses into an 
empathetic experiential maelstrom. The boundary-resistant, fluctuating pulses of 
cognition they experience there leave logic at a loss, therefore undeveloped. This 
may seem primitive, even a madhouse to those whose sense-of-reason is built on 
clear concepts logically examined. Yet a remarkably harmonious, on-the-mark 
intuitive rapport was the lot of these preconquest peoples. Such nonlogical rapport 
presents serious problems both for epistemologists and anthropologists, as it does 
for modern ‘common folk’. For many years, my logical mind considered such 
cognitive separations insurmountable. Now I think that they only are when 
inquiry is held too rigorously within a single culture’s ethos and system of beliefs. 
 
Questions going far beyond the quandary stated at the beginning of this chapter 
are raised. As fascinating as we may find the impact of conquering cultures on 
preconquest groups, it pales before the challenge to epistemology posed by the 
existence of a system of cognition not based on symbolic logic. We of Western 
training may find it virtually impossible to see how truth can be demonstrated 
without recourse to symbols that are logically controlled. When I first came face-
to-face with these experientially-based modes of cognition wherein logic was 
irrelevant, they slid right past me. I did not even see them. Even when I did begin 
to catch on, I tended to doubt such perceptions once I was again within the 
confines of Western culture . . . eventually . . . I began to question whether 
symbolic logic was actually the only means to get at truth. Now I rather think that 
alternative routes to truth may exist within the immediacy of a type of experiential 
awareness that perhaps moves in extra-sentient directions not yet brought into the 
realm of our modern sense-of-truth. My slowness in this matter leads me to 
believe it may take modern humankind some time to identify and make use of 
these perhaps more rarefied mental capabilities. 
 
If such capabilities could indeed be realized, what practical significance might 
they have on the world as it has currently evolved? Integrative (as opposed to 
adversarial) approaches to truth might benefit a population that is becoming 
increasingly congested in its planetary home. Freeing epistemology from the so-
called ‘Age of Reason’ might even bring scholarly benefits, such as opening areas 
of inquiry notoriously resistant to logical investigation, e.g., the visionary quests 
of sorcerers, the meditational insights of lamas, or just those evanescent 
understandings people sometimes grasp in that never-never land between sleep 
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and waking. It might also help us understand those awareness flows that can occur 
across seemingly impenetrable cultural and cognitive barriers, as, for example, 
when liking is astir. Inquiry into such matters has long resisted both syntax and 
logic as well as the crucial pillars underlying them: e.g., quantification, 
measurement, and classification. A new way of looking would seem required. 
 
Finally, in the ultimate analysis, we do not yet have a way to know if the 
postconquest type of consciousness that dominates the world today represents a 
positive or negative shift in the evolution of mentality. This question of 
fundamental values bears on all of humankind and on the future of humanity. 
Thus, of all the questions raised, it is the one that most demands an answer. 
 
We might indulge the suggestion that Sorenson has played it coy here. The evidence of harms 
arising from conquest consciousness abounds. Perhaps the more challenging question comes to 
how we preserve the positive aspects of western and other conquest cultures while engaging in a 
practice-realization of re-Indigenizing ourselves.  
 
Sorenson does pinpoint value as a root issue. In 1985, the UN established the Global Forum of 
Spiritual and Parliamentary Leaders on Human Survival. The group included His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama, Mother Theresa, and Chief Oren Lyons of the Haudenosaunee of the Native Peoples 
of Turtle Island (a.k.a. North America). This group met at various locations around the world 
over the course of 6 years. In 1991, while meeting in Tokyo, they agreed to summarize their 
work. They agreed on a single statement to capture the essence of their understanding: Value 
Change For Survival.114 Our culture needs guidance right now on how to begin shifting its 
values as an intelligent response to current conditions, as well as a more Wise, Loving, and 
Beautiful expression of our own ideals. LoveWisdom must offer that guidance, including 
LoveWisdom practiced-and-realized in Indigenous traditions.  
 
                                                 
114 See for instance http://www.indigenousvalues.org/newsletters/showarticle.php?article=111 
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Love itself has much to teach us, as Sorenson realized: 
Possessing a protean character, love lies more fluidly within the human frame 
than language. Following its own inner protocols, love seems able to evade the 
stable kinds of labeling required for logical inquiry. In exotic cultures it is hard to 
see at all. In the eastern Andaman, its workings were initially invisible to Western 
eyes. It was necessary to firm up subliminal awarenesses before the workings out 
of eros could even be detected there. Though difficult to deal with scientifically, 
love plays such a profound role in the affairs of humankind that it begs 
experimental types of scrutiny. (1995:1) 
 
The poet e.e. cummings comes to mind: 
since feeling is first 
who pays any attention 
to the syntax of things 
will never wholly kiss you; 
 
This one too: 
 
when God decided to invent 
everything he took one 
breath bigger than a circustent 
and everything began 
 
when man determined to destroy 
himself he picked the was 
of shall and finding only why 
smashed it into because 
 
 
And Wallace Stevens: 
 
Rationalists, wearing square hats, 
Think, in square rooms, 
Looking at the floor, 
Looking at the ceiling. 
They confine themselves 
To right-angled triangles. 
If they tried rhomboids, 
Cones, waving lines, ellipses — 
As, for example, the ellipse of the half-moon — 
Rationalists would wear sombreros. 
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Too many of our philosophers, scientists, and other academics wear the square hats of the 
modern conquistador, picking the was of shall and smashing why into because, following along 
with the culture of clinging, rather than following along with the Way, with the sacred (which 
they do not perceive, and thus do not perceive as important). Intentionally or even ironically, 
many of us in academia end up perpetuating the culture’s pattern of insanity, rather than living 
forth as its conscience. As Nietzsche put it, we seem to long for a “world of truth,” one that “can 
be mastered completely and forever with the aid of our square little reason” (GS 373). But this is 
nothing more than conquest consciousness at work: We want to master the World, not attune 
with it. We want square tomatoes to fit with along the edge of our bottom line. In our culture, the 
conversation with Love goes worse than this: 
 
Philosophy: ˹(x)(y) [x  love  y  ⊃  (Σ w) w is a representation such that . . . . . . . ))))]˺  
Love:  ♥ How I do dote upon thee . . . . ♥115 
 
Why does philosophy speak like this? In the west, according to Sorenson we experienced, 
 
A fracturing of love into Bacchanalian and Sublime occurred during the early 
Greek foundations of Western culture. Out of that schism Western ethos grew. 
The ethos molded the Western type of consciousness. In the eastern Andaman, 
eros was not cleaved at all. It shaped a type of psyche not countenanced by the 
West since its prehistory. (1995: 1) 
 
Sorenson suggests that, 
 
Western consciousness thus developed along quite different paths. Reared and 
schooled didactically, we of the West learn principally through verbalized 
instruction. Throughout our education we are required to behave per stated rules, 
and to assume standards, duties and responsibilities imposed by others. At formal 
education’s end, we seek wealth and power to express our ego needs and inner 
cravings. We yen to remake surroundings in accordance. With so many ego-
driven people being produced this way, we have a society where many different 
egos vie, where conflict and competition become norms. Peace must then be 
                                                 
115 Arthur C. Danto, from the foreword to The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love, ed. by Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen 
M. Higgins, University Press of Kansas, 1991, p. xii. 
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maintained by codes of conduct, laws and regulations. These must be didactically 
conveyed. When adolescent erotism surges, it makes people in the system ill at 
ease. It even frightens them. They pretend it isn’t really there, stamp on it when 
pretense becomes untenable. Adolescence in the West becomes a time to 
dissimulate and pretend.  
On Epuul’s island there were no laws and regulations, nor were they 
needed. Likewise for pretense. Consciousnesses emerged instinctively in harmony 
with others. I had to suppress my inbred contentious instincts before I could even 
see this (1995: 11) 
 
In these sentiments, he seems to play the following passage from Laozi in reverse: 
 
I let go of the law, 
and people become honest. 
I let go of economics, 
and people become prosperous. 
I let go of religion, 
and people become serene. 
I let go of all desire for the common good, 
and the good becomes common as grass. (Ch. 57) 
 
Once the common good gets lost, we begin to desire it. As we lose true serenity, we need 
“religion” and “spirituality” to mediate. Once we lose prosperity—recall that Perlman and others 
argue that this is can be seen as the default state when we are possessed of being, possessed by 
Nature, possessed in relational openness—we have to develop economics. As economics 
encourages the collapse of honesty, we need all sorts of laws—and we arrive at a point at which 
we cannot effectively imagine “letting go” of the law. Laozi invites us to sense, invites us to 
verify that, attuned with the Way, attuned with Nature, attuned with the Sacred, “the law would 
be written in our hearts” (32). Though we may find it hard to imagine for ourselves, Sorenson 
found this to hold in the cultures he witnessed, and we could perhaps practice and realize it for 
ourselves. 
 
But realizing it for ourselves presents us with the challenges we have tried to bring out. Let us 
say that we would like to access a better way of knowing. What will we do? For instance, we 
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might like to consider dreams as a way to know better. But then we need to ask: Can we even 
dream anymore? There are all sorts of things that we would have to consider, and all sorts of 
practices we would have to experiment with in order to know by means of dreams. But, Can we 
even dream? We must include in this question the context: A degraded situation in which we not 
only suffer from sleep deprivation, but we also suffer from what Naiman (2017) calls “the silent 
epidemic of REM sleep loss.” I am not sure if we can see how spiritually significant this is, since 
we require a revolution in concept-constellations in order to fully sense it, constellations like 
“health,” “philosophy,” “knowing,” “dream,” “sacred,” “ecology”. If we don’t see dreaming as 
essential to the health of and our knowing of soul and soil, of self and world, mind and body, 
Nature and Culture, then we don’t see what a serious spiritual-philosophical-psychological-
biological-ecological epidemic Naiman warns us about. Ninety readers out of one hundred might 
not take the lack of dream life as a spiritual emergency, but in relation to all we have considered 
and will consider, this falling apart of dream life seems to go together with a collapse of 
knowing, a collapse of a style of consciousness, a collapse of Nature-Culture, a collapse of Mind 
and Wisdom. 
 
Let us try and get at what dreaming could mean. We first need a little sketching from a distance, 
a return to some of the considerations we have already engaged, but from a different angle, so to 
speak.  
 
Essential to a way of knowing is vision, worldview, a style of consciousness, a pattern of 
thinking, a feel for Nature and reality, a way of speaking and moving. We have to face the 
pressures of language, but also the pressures of reason, and the nihilism that reason may have 
458 
 
sired. How do we participate in reality if so many aspects of our culture precisely inhibit a 
vitalizing feel for Nature-Culture and Mind-Nature? What does it even mean to “participate in 
reality,” and why should we care? The way we ask this question itself seems symptomatic of our 
crisis. Some of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of that crisis may help. 
 
Strong (1974) offers a compelling summary of Nietzsche’s views on the interwovenness of 
language, thought, and reality, and it seems to me that Nietzsche has more to offer us regarding a 
diagnosis of this interwovenness in the western case (again, speaking about a style of 
consciousness). Strong convincingly responds to some of the things one might like to say about 
Nietzsche’s views in order to undermine them, and Strong specifically places his comments in 
relation to Habermas, a giant of a figure, Kantian in his commitment to reason, and surely eager 
to find ways to free us from having to face the more extreme demands that Nietzsche makes on 
our soul.  
 
Maybe that sounds a bit histrionic. And yet, aren’t we dealing with the effects of nihilism? Is 
there any compelling interpretation for the collapse of the conditions of life as an event that 
might surprise Nietzsche, if we told him only about the advancement of technology, the growth 
of population, and the fact that we had not yet resolved the problem of nihilism? Maybe the 
explosion of technology and population in fact go together with the problem of nihilism—
technology especially if we recall Dewey’s efforts to show the fallacy of thinking of “science” 
and “technology” as separate.  
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In any case, Strong reads Nietzsche as making at least three major claims: First that language 
constitutes our knowledge of reality and reality itself (more conservatively, we could say it has a 
strong impact on these, or that it significantly shapes or in-forms them—but we should recall that 
our more radical suggestions here are as revolutionary as Whorf’s while avoiding his basic 
errors), secondly that language binds our thinking and all our activity and keeps it within the 
reality it has constituted, and finally, perhaps most disturbingly, that language itself makes an 
epistemology of nihilism necessary. Strong asks, near the end of his inquiry, “What then is the 
epistemology of nihilism?” He answers, based on his understanding of Nietzsche: “The hidden 
linguistic imperatives of the categories which men now live under force them towards 
nothingness” (259). 
 
We can suggest here that Nietzsche needn’t sound as naïvely Whorfian as might at first seem. 
The main diagnosis has to do with things like the interwovenness of reason, agency, morality, 
truth, science, philosophy, psychology, and—finally—language, which perhaps only bears a 
deeper guilt in relation to how it encourages us to remain stuck in a certain style of 
consciousness, such that a feedback loop develops, and the errors of bad philosophy, errors of 
unskillful Nature-Culture interbeing, become solidified and amplified over time. But we can 
reasonably consider the possibility that some Cultures had more skillful and realistic 
relationships with Nature, practices of attunement that allowed the development of language to 
go along in a basically healthier way, all things considered. 
 
In any case, Strong brings out the emphasis Nietzsche lays on morality and control as aspects of 
his critique of language, thought, and reality, and it always seems to me that this really hits 
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home, because if we overthrow our certainty about things like subjects and agency, then we 
undermine the notion of “the sovereign individual,” and we appear to invite total chaos. We need 
to be able to hold people responsible it seems—but of course that is an assumption of our way of 
life, not a metaphysical verity.  
 
Strong points out three epistemological prejudices that our language seduces us into: The 
subject-object distinction, the notion of agency (the supposition of a “doer” and that doer’s “free 
will”), and linear or narrow-minded or mechanical causality (basic cause-effect sequencing). We 
might see the first as an interesting challenge to Descartes, and the latter two as an interesting 
challenge to Kant: What Descartes and Kant arrive at as a kind of certainty, Nietzsche 
undermines as a function of grammar. The cogito of Descartes and the transcendental deduction 
of Kant (one of the tools of the philosopher’s toolkit, and one that does not rest “at the limit”—a 
turn of phrase that has new meaning in light of “liminal awareness”) have shown us first and 
foremost that language can seduce us. We might go a little further and say that language 
embodies, and gets us to embody, a certain form of life. But the language and the form of life, 
which go altogether, are not necessarily skillful and realistic. They are not necessarily wise or 
true. They are not somehow beautiful in and of themselves, but can only have a beauty, a 
wisdom, a grace, and compassionate effectiveness in relation to everything else. 
 
Among other things, Strong helps us appreciate Nietzsche’s insight that the subject-object 
distinction itself creates or goes altogether with a certain kind of consciousness, one that in the 
western case in particular gets seduced into a-historical fantasies. I think this is very much in line 
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with what Dewey would later describe as the philosophical fallacy, and the delusion of the 
western “quest for certainty”.  
 
Turning to Nietzsche himself, consider one of his key “Conclusions”: “The faith in the categories 
of reason is the cause of nihilism.” That deserves a full stop, even though he adds, “We have 
measured the value of the world according to categories that refer to a purely fictitious world.” 
(WP I, B) Not just faith in the categories of reason, but faith (and rationalization) coupled with a 
ceaseless application of them creates a fictitious world, one in which we have “daylight savings 
time,” “Earth Overshoot Day,” “bread” and other “food,” industrial “agriculture” that has left us 
with 60 harvests or less in some places, “development,” “democracy,” “criminals,” 
“philosophers,” “science”. These are fictions—all arrived at by rational processes.  
 
Even Dewey seems caught up in some of the devotion and faith we have in things like science—
which we can charitably take as evidence of their seductive power (we fall in love with reason, 
rationality, efficiency, technology, textual analysis). Dewey of course appears to go scandalously 
wrong in many places, including a passage in which he suggests the aim of human civilization 
“is to subordinate the materials and forces of the natural environment so that they shall be 
rendered tributary to life functions” (1909: 178). This could be charitably received, but it does 
seem at times that Dewey gets hung up on the relationship between “knowledge” and “control”. 
We are almost certainly not here to “control” the energies of life and “subordinate” them, to 
make them bear tribute to human agendas. Rather, if we had to say something, we might say we 
are here to co-discover-create in, through, with, as the energies of life, the “sacred powers” and 
“inconceivable causes”. Again, notions of control seem like signs of the seductiveness of 
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conquest consciousness, such that even otherwise sensitive and visionary philosophers cannot 
see fully enough into a more Nondualistic Way of Life. 
 
As early as Human, All-too-Human, Nietzsche began to try and confront the interwovenness of 
language, thought, and reality: 
Language as an alleged science. The importance of language for the 
development of culture lies in the fact that, in language, man juxtaposed to the 
one world another world of his own, a place which he thought so sturdy that from 
it he could move the rest of the world from its foundations and make himself lord 
over it. To the extent that he believed over long periods of time in the concepts 
and names of things as if they were aeternae veritates, man has acquired that 
pride by which he has raised himself above the animals: he really did believe that 
in language he had knowledge of the world. The shaper of language was not so 
modest as to think that he was only giving things labels; rather, he imagined that 
he was expressing the highest knowledge of things with words; and in fact, 
language is the first stage of scientific effort. Here, too, it is the belief in found 
truth from which the mightiest sources of strength have flowed. Very belatedly 
(only now) is it dawning on men that in their belief in language they have 
propagated a monstrous error. Fortunately, it is too late to be able to revoke the 
development of reason, which rests on that belief. 
Logic, too, rests on assumptions that do not correspond to anything in the 
real world, e.g., on the assumption of the equality of things, the identity of the 
same thing at different points of time; but this science arose from the opposite 
belief (that there were indeed such things in the real world). So it is with 
mathematics, which would certainly not have originated if it had been known 
from the beginning that there is no exactly straight line in nature, no real circle, no  
absolute measure. (HH I, 11) 
 
What he doesn’t consider is that some cultures may have been running a reasonably successful 
version of the experiment he himself suggests in Gay Science, an experiment to incorporate 
truth. That this might naturally appear in the languages of those cultures would not surprise him. 
Those cultures might have a different set of values, and we might not find a very precise analog 
for what we call and value in “reason” (think “Value Change For Survival”). In relation to this 
we should also consider Nietzsche’s suggestion that, 
This ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness has the 
very useful consequence that it prevents an all too fast development of 
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consciousness. Believing that they possess consciousness, men have not exerted 
themselves very much to acquire it; and things haven’t changed much in this 
respect. To this day the task of incorporating knowledge and making it instinctive 
is only beginning to dawn on the human eye and is not yet clearly discernible; it is 
a task that is seen only by those who have comprehended that so far we have 
incorporated only our errors and that all our consciousness relates to errors. (GS 
44) 
 
Nietzsche doesn’t seem to understand that, aside from a sort of Darwinian pessimism that we 
needn’t get caught up in, spiritual and philosophical traditions have in some sense long sought to 
accomplish this incorporation. At times they have phrased it as getting back to an original 
goodness, but that doesn’t mean the original goodness doesn’t need its own process of 
incorporation, which includes a freeing of oneself of error, a kind of pruning away or 
unincorporating of error which happens with a simultaneous incorporation of wisdom, love, and 
beauty which manifests precisely in spontaneity. Spiritual traditions like Buddhism and Daoism 
make spontaneity a hallmark of spiritual achievement for the two-fold reason that spontaneity is 
seen as something like an essential quality of our original mind, and also a sign that wisdom, 
love, and beauty have become so thoroughgoing, so fully embodied that one doesn’t have to 
“think” about them in the ordinary manner of thinking. Another way to put it, harkening back to 
the very earliest passage from Bateson, is that, if we are truly wise and compassionate, our 
thinking already presences these. A wise and compassionate response is as intimate and 
immediate as turning our head when someone calls our name, not the function of abstract 
calculation. As Bateson said: 
We face a paradox in that I cannot tell you how to educate the young, or 
yourselves, in terms of the epistemology which I have offered you except you first 
embrace that epistemology. The answers must already be in your head and in your 
rules of perception. You must know the answer to your question before I can give 
it to you. (Steps, 310) 
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The sort of intimacy and spontaneity that we should read into this runs through many spiritual 
and philosophical traditions, and the curious reader may like to consult Edward Slingerland’s 
work that reads the ancient Chinese traditions in relation to contemporary dual process theory, 
which Nietzsche, too, seems to be getting at in this passage. The conscious process differs from 
the instinctive process. Kahneman famously referred to it as “thinking, fast and slow.” The slow 
process is conscious, the fast one instinctive. Slingerland’s work can help us see how the ancient 
sages of China tried to recommend a union of these, a synergy, a harmony. By consciously 
training ourselves, we either attune the instinctive layer or, rupture and then realign the conscious 
layer (or maybe we do both). In either case, we rely on spiritual or philosophical practices, on 
Arts of Awareness. 
 
In a culture devoid of proper Mythology (as a science of living, as an expression of 
LoveWisdom), what do we actually practice? We practice and get very good at certain patterns 
of thought, speech, and action, and these become embedded (so to speak) in our flesh and 
bones—our bones speak, our language emanates from our blood and guts—as well as appearing 
outside of us, manifested as our ecologies. We are lived by our reactivities, our freak-outs, our 
predilections, our consumption, our strangely designed buildings, the relationship we have with 
non-human beings and Nature in general, our intellectual fascinations, our manner or reading, 
our way of doing science, our way of getting through each day. We are lived by our 
philosophies—by the rationalizations of powers we pretend to understand. When we get out of 
attunement with life, nihilism can become our basic instinct. We become lived by nihilism, and it 
spills out of our thought, speech, and action. 
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Nietzsche seems so perceptive and insightful as he uncovers the problem of nihilism. Consider 
his reflections in the preface to Will to Power: 
Final Conclusion: All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render 
the world estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and 
therefore devaluated the world—all these values are, psychologically considered, 
the results of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase 
human constructs of domination—and they have been falsely projected into the 
essence of things. What we find here is still the hyperbolic naïveté of man: 
positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things. 
 
This drives the rationalization. We want the world a certain way. We try to make 
it comfortable, and we don’t want to have to owe the world anything. 
 
For why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the values we 
have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents 
the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals . . .  
 
Again it seems worth emphasizing the relationship between morality, truth, subjects, agency, 
reason, nature. He brings this out in the Genealogy, including in this final passage: 
We can no longer conceal from ourselves what is expressed by all that willing 
which has taken its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the human, and 
even more of the animal, and more still of the material, this horror of the senses, 
of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from 
all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself—all this 
means—let us dare to grasp it—a will to nothingness, an aversion1 to life, a 
rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and 
remains a will! … And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the beginning: man 
would rather will nothingness than not will.116 
 
Strong summarizes Nietzsche’s critique and some of its implications this way: 
 
Thus for Nietzsche, the desire to found knowledge on truth, itself made necessary 
and encouraged by the epistemological categories of our language, results in a 
gradual undermining of that which might serve as the basis for truth.  
 
The will to truth carries a perverse necrophilia. If life is in fact appearance, and 
there is no “truth” to be ultimately reached, the defense of the will to truth is the 
                                                 
116 Translation by Kaufmann. The last line reads: Lieber will noch der Mensch das Nichts 
wollen, als nicht wollen. 
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assertion of the ultimate validity of a man made perspective, without there being 
in fact any reason why “truth” should be sought or preferred. To affirm truth as an 
ultimate standard is to tie oneself to exhaustion and indeed Nietzsche is led to 
speculate, as Freud was also later to, if there did not lie in the will to truth a 
“concealed will to death”. . . . 
 
Nietzsche seems then to leave an irresoluble dilemma. The search for liberation 
from the oppressions and chains of bourgeois society, itself but the latest 
manifestation of the genealogy of the West, forces a recognition that as an 
individual one cannot escape society, for that which structures society also 
structures the self. In fact, everything that one might do in such an attempt at 
liberation is itself imbued with that from which one is seeking to escape. So the 
attempt to free oneself results merely in a reinforcement of one's fetters. Our way 
of being in the world makes us seek freedom, the search binds us all the more to 
that which we would escape and we find both that we cannot achieve freedom nor 
desist from searching. . . . 
 
 . . . in Nietzsche’s discovery of our anthropology by the proceeding from our 
language, Nietzsche’s enterprise presages that of Wittgenstein. Contrary to 
Wittgenstein though, Nietzsche thinks that the compulsions of our language 
reveal radical and uncurable sickness in Western humans. Wittgenstein had hoped 
for a physician to cure the “sicknesses of our understanding”; 
Nietzsche ultimately requires “transfiguration.” (258-60) 
 
The emphasis on transfiguration has in part to do with the unconscious dimensions at work. We 
cannot change our beliefs, as if it were a matter of getting the right “propositions” in our heads. 
That seems to be a sort of basic error of institutionalized education and philosophy, even though 
so many educators and philosophers criticize the notion vehemently and insist they want “critical 
thinkers,” that they see some sort of intimacy in communication that goes beyond the model of 
sender-receiver, and so on. Nevertheless, speaking generally, we approach the matter of 
education in a way that does not get at “transfiguration,” in part because we lack a better vision, 
a better worldview than the one Nietzsche critiques, in part because we lack practices for doing 
anything more skillful, and in part because, altogether with the other two issues, our 
epistemology lacks rigor, and leaves us unable to truly know better when it comes to teaching, 
learning, and living (the three go together, so how, given the state of the world, could we 
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proclaim the skillfulness of our approach to teaching anything?). Bateson has some reflections 
that puts this in the framework as a problem of logical typing: 
It is interesting to consider the nature of such a concept as “crime.” We act 
as if crime could be extinguished by punishing parts of what we regard as 
criminal actions, as if “crime” were the name of a sort of action or of part of a sort 
of action. More correctly “crime,” like “exploration,” is the name of a way of 
organizing actions. It is therefore unlikely that punishing the act will extinguish 
the crime. In several thousand years, the so-called science of criminology has not 
escaped from a simple blunder in logical typing. 
Be that as it may, there is a very profound difference between a serious 
attempt to change the characterological state of an organism and trying to change 
that organism’s particular actions. The latter is relatively easy; the former, 
profoundly difficult. Paradigmatic change is as difficult as—indeed is of the same 
nature as—change in epistemology. (For an elaborate study of what seems to be 
necessary to make characterological changes in human criminals, the reader is 
referred to a recent book, Sane Asylum, by Charles Hampden-Turner.) It would 
seem to be almost a first requirement of such deep training that the particular act 
for which the convict was being punished when in jail should not be the main 
focus of the training. (MN 124) 
 
Paradigmatic change is difficult. We seem to have evidence that we need it, and yet we seem to 
focus on particular actions and parts of actions—almost against our better judgment in some 
cases, but also because we don’t know how to go deeper. In the university, we don’t try to 
change the struggling student’s character, but we instead give them worksheets or assignment to 
help them “find and analyze arguments” and then to “critically respond.” We do all sorts of 
things that amount to actions and parts of actions. We may as well keep shouting, “Stand up 
straight!” 
 
With respect to Nietzsche’s suggestions, as summarized by Strong above, it seems important to 
emphasize again the dimension of incorporation, and to do so while keeping an ecological vision, 
an ecological sensitivity. Nietzsche in some sense offers an epistemology that includes practice-
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and-realization, and he even seems to verge into systems thinking now and then. In Gay Science 
he writes: 
But among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this, one eventually 
turned against morality, discovered its teleology, its prejudiced (interessiert) 
perspective, and now the recognition of this long incarnate (eingefleischt) 
mendacity that one despairs getting rid of, becomes a stimulant. Now we discover 
in ourselves needs implanted by a long understanding of morality—which now 
appear to us as needs for untruth; on the other hand, these needs are those on 
which the values for which we endure life seem to hang. This antagonism—not to 
esteem what we know and not to be allowed any longer to value those lies we 
would tell ourselves—results in a process of dissolution. (GS 344, translation by 
Strong) 
 
This notion of incarnation matters. Interestingly, a resonance arises here with both Jung and the 
physicist Wolfgang Pauli. In a letter to Jung, Pauli wrote: 
I should like to thank you once again for the pleasant evening I spent with you. 
I shall give a lot of thought to many of the things you said, so that I can digest 
them properly. What made the deepest impression upon me was the central role 
played in your thinking by the concept of ‘incarnation’ as a scientific working 
hypothesis. This concept is of particular interest to me, first of all because it is 
supraconfessional (‘Avatara’ in India) and also because it expresses a 
psychophysical unity. More and more I see the psycho-physical problem as the 
key to the overall spiritual situation of our age, and the gradual discovery of a new 
(‘neutral’) psycho-physical language of unity, whose function is symbolically to 
describe an invisible, potential form of reality that is only indirectly inferable 
through its effects, also seems to me an indispensable prerequisite for the 
emergence of the new ιερoς gγαμoς [sacred marriage, holy marriage, or 
alchemical/spiritual union of opposites—n.k.] or predicted by you. I have also 
clearly seen how you have linked the concept of incarnation with ethics, which, 
moreover, just like Schopenhauer (in his work on the basis of morality), you have 
based on the identity of self and neighbor at deeper psychic levels (‘what one does 
to others, one also does to oneself’ etc.). Is it possible to define your point of view 
as incarnatio continua? (248) 
 
Gieser offers the following helpful commentary: 
The idea of incarnation is closely connected with Jung’s view of the unconscious 
as the primeval rock of consciousness, which also contains the possible future 
lines of development of consciousness. Incarnation is tied up with the realization 
of a potentially existing reality and is therefore also linked with his concept of 
individuation, that is, the individual’s realization of his own potential. The 
concept of incarnation is also related to the unique moment of creation and the 
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advent of something new, especially a new or changed level of consciousness. 
Inspiration, creative impulses and sudden insights have their origins in the 
unconscious. But without consciousness, the products of the unconscious are 
amoral. A discerning consciousness, an ethical decision, is required in order to 
transform the products of the unconscious into cultural products. Similarly Jung 
sees the statements of interaction between God and man as symbolic expressions 
of an urge originating in the unconscious to be made conscious. ‘. . . since man 
knows himself only as an ego, and the self, as a totality, is indescribable and 
indistinguishable from a God-image, self-realization – to put it in religious or 
metaphysical terms – amounts to God’s incarnation’. (248) 
 
The heart-mind-body-world-cosmos is flexible, and it can incarnate a variety of possibilities. Our 
job has to involve something like what Nietzsche demands: Running an ethical-ontological-
aesthetic experiment, which means a living spiritual practice, philosophy as a way of life.  
 
Whatever Sorenson and Wolff witnessed, for example, most westerners cannot typically 
incarnate—but they remain possibilities even for those of us raised in western culture, and both 
Sorenson and Wolff discovered. The issue Whorf uncovered is not that one simply cannot 
“think” in ways that transcend the habits reflected in and encouraged by language, but that it is 
not common or easy, given a certain cultural-linguistic context to do so, and that one may find it 
quite challenging to encourage and maintain any vitalizing shift in understanding and awareness 
in certain culture-nature contexts (which contexts include the languages spoken).  
 
For instance, we encountered Sorenson’s experience of synchronicity with Nature, which seemed 
to go together with insights into other ways of knowing. But it required submersion in a non-
conquest Nature-Culture context, and perhaps it required the energy of the storm, and the 
synchronistic energy in Sorenson’s psyche (to speak analytically). Wolff’s experience involved 
studying with Ahmeed, the Shaman. We will turn to it in a moment. But, while Nietzsche’s 
criticisms of reason and truth remain fresh in our minds, let’s look at the experience of Daniel 
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Everett, the linguist who lived among the Amazonian Pirahã—and we should note that he went 
among them as a missionary, even though he is also a linguist: 
The Pirahãs made me question concepts of truth that I had long adhered to 
and lived by. The questioning of my faith in God, coupled with life among the 
Pirahãs, led me to question what is perhaps an even more fundamental component 
of modern thought, the concept of truth itself. Indeed, I decided that I lived under 
a delusion —the delusion of truth. God and truth are two sides of the same coin. 
Life and mental well-being are hindered by both, at least if the Pirahãs are right. 
And their quality of inner life, their happiness and contentment, strongly supports 
their values.  
From the time we are born we try to simplify the world around us. For it is 
too complicated for us to navigate; there are too many sounds, too many sights, 
too many stimuli for us to take even a single step unless we can decide what to 
pay attention to and what to ignore. In specific intellectual domains we call our 
attempts at simplification “hypotheses” and “theories.” Scientists invest their 
careers and energies in certain attempts at simplification. They request money 
from funding organizations to travel to or to build some new environment in 
which to test their simplifying scheme.  
But this type of “elegance theorizing” (getting results that are “pretty” 
rather than particularly useful) began to satisfy me less and less. People who 
contribute to such programs usually see themselves as working toward a closer 
relationship to truth. But as the American pragmatist philosopher and 
psychologist William James reminded us, we shouldn’t take ourselves too 
seriously. We are no more nor less than evolved primates. It is rather ridiculous to 
think that the universe is a virgin saving herself for us. We are all too often the 
three blind men describing an elephant; or the man who looks on the wrong side 
of the road for his keys, simply because the light is better there. (272) 
 
This seems like an artefact Nietzsche would savor, and it feels quite resonant in our inquiry just 
now. Here we have a former Christian missionary (and current academic) noting experientially 
the very thing Nietzsche invites us all to notice, and which we get a feel for in the passages from 
Husserl and Dewey we considered much earlier in our inquiry. Reason and truth function, in 
practical terms, not much differently than “God”—for the meaning of these terms has to do with 
how we live, how we practice, what we can bring to realization, not as a matter of whim or 
intellectual intention, but in the interwovenness of all things, altogether with, through, as a 
sacred-creative-ordering-in-mutuality. It is a co-discovery-creation, not anything we can force on 
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the basis of faith—either faith in “Reason” that inclines us toward “elegance theorizing” (a 
variety of junk-ease and junk-knowledge perhaps), or faith in “God” that inclines us toward 
“elegance preaching” and missionary work, all in the midst of a culture characterized by 
conquest consciousness.  
 
We have to take great care here, because this all can sound like a post-modern tirade against 
“reason” and “western culture”. We are interested in something far more subtle, and far more 
practical—loving, intimate, joyful, healthful, healing, and eminently sane in a holistic sense.  
 
We could suggest that we see in this passage from Everett the beginnings of a conversion, but, 
lacking a broader sense of philosophy and spirituality, he only seems to experience it as a de-
conversion, one that shook his life apart, but for which he seems to feel deeply grateful. He 
quotes Jim Elliot, as we all can, especially those of us in academia caught up in a paradigm that 
seems to be in crisis: “He is no fool who gives what he cannot keep to gain what he cannot lose.” 
Everett says, of his “de-conversion”: 
When I reached the place where I was finally prepared to take the consequences 
and let someone else know about my “deconversion,” some two decades had 
elapsed since my initial doubts. And, as I expected, when I finally announced my 
change of belief, it had severe consequences for me personally. It’s a difficult 
decision for anyone to tell his closest friends and family that he no longer shares 
their foundational beliefs—the beliefs that make them who they are. It must be  
something like coming out as gay to unsuspecting close friends and family.  
In the end, my loss of religion and the epistemological crisis that 
accompanied it led to the breakup of my family—what I most wanted to avoid. 
(271) 
 
Maybe we in academia will need to let go of what we cannot keep, in order to gain what we 
cannot lose—the Self, the Soul, reality, Sophia. Socrates embodies this sort of renunciation in the 
most positive sense of the term. Among the reasons for his refusal to escape prison and death: He 
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thereby presenced for us his incorporation of something no one could take away from him—the 
very pinnacle of all philosophical PracticeRealization. Perhaps we can say that every genuine 
philosophical and spiritual tradition wants this for us, wants us to realize what no one can ever 
take from us. However, what Everett refers to as “religion” (as he seems to use the term) means 
any aspect of any tradition that has lost sight of this, lost touch with the need to make it real, by 
means of concrete practice-realization. As we shall see, the Pirahãs, perhaps in some ways 
instinctively, accept things that seem unscientific to us—but they accept them on the basis of 
experience, not faith. Everett does not seem to ask what even Christianity might have allowed 
him to experience, if only it had taught him more skillful and realistic practices, more rigorous 
ways of knowing sacredness and making it real. 
 
In any case, it seems important to emphasize how Everett’s insight applied simultaneously to 
“truth” and “God”. There is something resonant here in the thoughts of Stuart Kauffman, who, in 
his capacity as a scientist (perhaps not as a philosopher), has participated in what may yet turn 
out to be a revolution in science: 
Perhaps the most astonishing aspect of Investigations, both as process and the 
resulting book, was my puzzled realization that the way Newton, Einstein, and 
Bohr taught us to do science may be incomplete. You see, in following their 
cornerstone examples of physics, we are taught to prestate the particles, forces, 
laws and initial and boundary conditions, then compute the consequences. In this 
enterprise, we are able to state ahead of time what the full space of possibilities is, 
that is, we can finitely prestate the configuration space of possibilities of the 
system in question. This capacity to prestate the configuration space, for example, 
is the central conceptual presupposition of the classical statistical mechanics of a 
liter of gas in its 6N-dimensional phase space of all possible positions and 
momenta of the N particles of gas. But I was, to my deep surprise, led to doubt 
that we can ever prestate the configuration space of a biosphere. (2000: x) 
 
It may seem like a different issue, but somehow the sense that we could prestate the 
configurations of the universe or of life may arise from the delusions Nietzsche sought to 
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criticize. It appears to come from a desire for a transcendent perspective. The Pirahã Culture, like 
many other Cultures we have included in our inquiry, might fascinate Nietzsche precisely in the 
manner in which they incorporated a commitment to themselves and to life, rejecting 
commitments to “truth” in the sense Nietzsche found it practiced in western culture. As Everett 
puts it: 
They have no craving for truth as a transcendental reality. Indeed, the 
concept has no place in their values. Truth to the Pirahãs is catching a fish, rowing 
a canoe, laughing with your children, loving your brother, dying of malaria. Does 
this make them more primitive? Many anthropologists have suggested so, which 
is why they are so concerned about finding out the Pirahãs’ notions about God, 
the world, and creation.  
But there is an interesting alternative way to think about things. Perhaps it 
is the presence of these concerns that makes a culture more primitive, and their 
absence that renders a culture more sophisticated. If that is true, the Pirahãs are a 
very sophisticated people. Does this sound far-fetched? Lets ask ourselves if it is 
more sophisticated to look at the universe with worry, concern, and a belief that 
we can understand it all, or to enjoy life as it comes, recognizing the likely futility 
of looking for truth or God?  
The Pirahãs have built their culture around what is useful to their survival. 
They don’t worry about what they don’t know, nor do they think they can or do 
know it all. Likewise, they do not crave the products of others’ knowledge or 
solutions. Their views, not so much as I summarize them dryly here, but as they 
are lived out in the Pirahãs’ daily lives, have been extremely helpful to me and 
persuasive as I have looked at my own life and the beliefs that I held, many of 
them without warrant. Much of what I am today, including my nontheistic view of  
the world, I owe at least in part to the Pirahãs. (273) 
 
As we shall see, the Pirahãs may have also fascinated Dewey for their commitment to the 
immediacy of experience. They practiced-and-realized a way of life that resonates with his 
principle of immediate empiricism. But let us turn to Wolff, who not only had many of his 
western ideas challenged, but who enjoyed the great privilege of practicing-and-realizing some 
of the deeper insight of the Culture he encountered. 
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Wolff’s training with the Shaman involved wandering around in the forest, the jungle. Wolff 
spent many hours in a western mindset. He didn’t know how to sense, how to relate with the 
jungle in an active-receptive-participatory way. Finally, he says,  
I decided instead to really open my ears, my eyes, my nose, my skin to whatever I 
could pick up in the jungle around us. I stopped abruptly. The jungle was 
suddenly dense with sounds, smells, little puffs of air here and there. I became 
aware of things I had largely ignored before. It was as if all this time I had been 
walking with dirty eyeglasses—and then someone washed them for me; or as if I 
were watching a blurry home movie—and then someone turned the focusing 
knob. But it was more than that—much more. I could smell things I had no name 
for. I heard little sounds that could be anything at all. I saw a leaf shivering. I saw 
a line of insects crawling up a tree. (155-6) 
 
Something began to shift. The Shaman took notice: 
 
Ahmeed noticed that I had been walking slower and slower while paying 
intense attention to the world around me. He too stood still.  
“Sit?” he asked.  
“Well, no . . . not really . . . perhaps . . . I don’t know,” I stammered.  
“Drink?” he asked.  
Afterward I realized that he had spoken very softly, so as not to intrude on 
what was going on inside me, and he had used simple, single words: Sit? Drink? 
Yes, I was very thirsty. I looked at him, thinking he would find a water vine. He 
was the person who knew the jungle, after all. He looked back at me with a 
perfectly blank expression. He was not helping. He was not talking.  
Suddenly, a new thought burst in on me: maybe I could sense water. In my 
mind I made a sort of list: seeing water, hearing water, smelling water. I might 
smell water, or even hear it if it was dripping on a leaf perhaps. I looked around.  
“Do not talk,” Ahmeed said—I knew he meant “Do not think.” “Water 
inside heart,” he said next, with a gesture of his hand on his heart. I knew he 
meant I should sense inside—not with my mind, but from the inside.  
It is sad to have to use so many words to say something so simple. As 
soon as I stopped thinking, planning, deciding, analyzing—using my mind, in 
short—I felt as if I was pushed in a certain direction. I walked a few steps and 
immediately saw a big leaf with perhaps half a cup of water in it.  
 
I must have stood there for a full minute, in awe. Not in awe of anything in 
particular, simply in awe. When I leaned over to drink from the leaf, I saw water 
with feathery ripples, I saw a few mosquito larvae wriggling on the surface, I saw 
the veins of the leaf through the water, some bubbles, a little piece of dirt. 
Reaching out, I put a finger in the water, then saw that one of the wriggling 
mosquito larvae had been trapped in a tiny bubble on my finger. How beautiful, 
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how perfect. I did not put the finger with the water droplet in my mouth, but 
looked back at the leaf.  
My perception opened further. I no longer saw water—what I felt with my 
whole being was a leaf-with-water-in-it, attached to a plant that grew in soil 
surrounded by uncounted other plants, all part of the same blanket of living things 
covering the soil, which was also part of a larger living skin around the earth. And 
nothing was separate; all was one, the same thing: water—leaf—plant—trees—
soil—animals—earth—air—sunlight and little wisps of wind. The all-ness was 
everywhere, and I was part of it.  
I cannot explain what went on inside me, but I knew that I had learned 
something unbelievably wonderful. I felt more alive than I had ever felt before. 
All of me was filled with being.  
 
What this other sense is, I do not know. For me it is very real. I think of it as a 
sense of knowing. It probably is a quality we all have to a greater or lesser degree. 
For me it works when I can get out of my mind, when I can experience without 
having to understand, or name, or position, or judge, or categorize.  
It is a quality that has to be used or it fades away; just as one has to 
exercise muscles, so too knowing must be exercised.  
I am saying this after the fact, trying to describe something that does not 
fit into our Western concepts, and therefore there are no words. At the time I did 
not think anything. I was learning how to put my mind aside and use some other 
sense to know.  
Standing over a leaf with a little water in it, somewhere in the jungles of 
Malaysia, I did not think in words. I did not think. I bathed in that overwhelming 
sense of oneness. I felt as if a light was lit deep inside me. I knew I was radiating 
something—love, perhaps—for this incredible world, this rich, varied, and totally 
interconnected world of creations that, at the same time, gave love to me. And 
with the love, I also felt a very deep sense of belonging.  
 
After a while, I slowly woke up. I came to, so to speak, and was in my body 
again. I looked around. Ahmeed was not where I thought he was. In fact, he was 
not anywhere in sight. He must have walked on, I thought. And as soon as I 
thought, I panicked. I realized that I was alone, that Ahmeed had left me in a 
strange place. I had no idea where I was, or how to get back to Three or to find 
Ahmeed. My first reaction was to shout, to yell, to call him. But the sense of 
being part of this wonderful whole was so strong that I could not raise my voice. I 
opened my mouth and tried to make a sound, but no sound would pass my throat. 
I could not possibly disturb this oneness by yelling, by feeling panicked. I could 
not be afraid—after all, I was part of this all-ness.  
 
My life changed in that moment.  
 
And then I knew I need not shout for help, I need not run after Ahmeed. I knew 
with a great certainty that all I had to do was put my mind aside and know where 
he was. Almost immediately I knew: He was not too far away. I had an impression 
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of him walking leisurely in that direction. He sauntered as if he were deep in 
thought, or perhaps he was thinking of me. In my mindless [i.e. habitual mind 
dropped off, forgotten—n.k.] state of being I sent him a voiceless hello, and it was 
easy to imagine receiving his slight smile that barely stretched the corners of his 
mouth.  
Part of me wanted to join Ahmeed, go back to Three [the village] to eat 
and drink. But another part wanted to stay here and know this new world more 
intimately. I stayed.  
I was certain I would find my way back to Ahmeed and the village later, 
when it grew dark perhaps. I have no idea how long I stayed—there is no time in 
that mindless state—but it was quite dark when I finally returned to the 
settlement.  
When it was time to leave the place where I had discovered the leaf with 
water (I never drank any, by the way; I was not thirsty anymore), I extended my 
knowing to sense where the settlement was. There, my knowing told me 
immediately.  
With my new and now extended knowing I became aware of a soft sound, 
some distance away. At first I did not recognize the sound. It seemed familiar, but 
I had no name for it and in that state I avoided naming, understanding, and 
recognizing. But this sound wanted to be acknowledged. It intruded on my being, 
almost as if introducing itself: I am Tiger. It was that sound between purring and 
growling that tigers make when they are not sleeping and not hunting. I think of it 
as an announcement: I am here. (156-60) 
 
I like that Tiger appears here, not as something to get freaked out about, but as one of The Others 
who make us what we are. “I am here, I Am That I Am, and this place is holy.” It also seems 
important to savor, “My life changed in that moment.” Such vitalizing life-changing moments 
are integral to all genuine practices of LoveWisdom. 
 
In light of this sort of experience, we can suggest that, Nietzsche gets something right and 
something wrong when he writes: 
Ultimate solution.—We believe in reason: this, however, is the philosophy of gray 
concepts. Language depends on the most naïve prejudices. 
Now We read disharmonies and problems into things because we think 
only in the form of language-and thus believe in the “eternal truth” of “reason” 
(e.g., subject, attribute, etc.) 
We cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraint of 
language; we barely reach the doubt that sees this limitation as a limitation.  
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Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot 
throw off. (WP III 522) 
 
He gets something very right: We have dressed ourselves in drab grey garments of reason, the 
robes of a new religion (“science”), robes we cannot throw off. And yet—we can; perhaps we 
must. But what is it we throw off, and what kind of nakedness do we seek? The nakedness of 
“the primitive”?  
 
We don’t know what this so-called “primitive” is. We have suspicions, perhaps misguided ones, 
perhaps nothing more than prejudice and limiting thinking. Calvin Luther Martin (1993) engages 
with some of them: 
Many will respond with that oft heard reply, But we cannot go back! To which I 
respond, But we never left―never left our true, real context, that is. Homo is still 
here on this planet earth, abiding in our most fundamental and necessary nature by 
its fundamental and necessary terms. We left all of that only, really, in our fevered 
imagination. It all began as an act of imagination, an illusory image―most 
fundamentally, an image of fear―and so the corrective process must likewise 
begin with an image. Let us re-learn, as hunter-gatherers knew to the core of their 
being, that this place and its processes (even in our death) always takes care of 
us―that Homo’s citizenship, and errand, rest not with any creed or state, but with 
‘that star’s substance from which he had arisen.’” (130) 
 
This in turn resonates with L.L. Martin et al. (2014) who ask, “What would the world look like if 
mindfulness were the rule rather than the exception?” They give a preliminary answer: 
In some ways, we already know the answer to that question. Research has shown 
that when people behave mindfully, they are more creative (Langer & Eisenkraft, 
2009), healthier (Langer, 2009), and more liked by their interaction partners 
(Langer, Cohen, & Djikic, 2012). They learn better (Langer, Hatem,&Howell, 
1989), exhibit less stereotyping (Djikic, Langer, & Stapleton, 2008), display 
greater self-acceptance (Carson & Langer, 2006), and even live longer 
(Alexander, Langer, Newman, Chandler, & Davies, 1989). (290) 
 
They go on to lay out their version of the hunter-gather style of mind, and claim that mindfulness 
would basically put us back in touch with it. They describe resonance between how brushes with 
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death change people’s lives positively by turning them toward the present moment, and how both 
mindfulness and the hunter-gatherer lifestyle do the same. They describe many wonders of all 
three of these, and then conclude as follows: 
Does the picture we have painted seem too good to be true? Could 
widespread mindfulness really give rise to a world in which people were more 
creative, coped better, and experienced greater happiness? We believe it could. 
Keep in mind that there is evidence for most of our conclusions, and when 
we did speculate, we did not deviate far from that evidence. Remember also that 
the immediate-return lifestyle [let’s say, a lifestyle free from Captain Clock] is 
one that served our species well for the first 95% of its existence. It may very well 
be the lifestyle with which our biology is most compatible. 
In fact, we consider it to be our birthright. It comes naturally to us once 
the constraints of our delayed-return societies are removed. If this conjecture is 
true, the real marvel is not that mindfulness can lead people to experience the 
world in the ways we have described. “The real marvel seems to be that the world 
isn’t experienced like this by everyone all the time, since this is, quite simply, the 
way things are” (Wren-Lewis, 1994, p. 110). 
So, what would the world look like if people were more mindful? In many 
ways, it would look like the world of 100,000 years ago. That does not mean we 
would be living in the forest and foraging for food. It means we would be paying 
attention, seeing more options in the ways we could interpret the world, adjusting 
our behavior in response to subtle changes in the environment, and behaving 
authentically rather than through fixed cultural knowledge we may have 
introjected mindlessly. And the good news is that we don’t have to undergo 
anything as dramatic as a close brush with death to develop an immediate-return 
orientation. It can come naturally to us if we let it. Wren-Lewis (1994) captured 
this sentiment well, when he said: 
 
What I suspect we need is not any kind of path or discipline, but a 
collection of tricks or devices for catching the Dark at the corner of 
the eye, as it were, and learning how to spot its just-waiting-to-be-
seen presence, combined with strategies for stopping the 
hyperactive survival-programs from immediately explaining the 
perception away. (p. 114) 
 
Perhaps with the help of a few mindfulness exercises (Langer & Piper, 1987), we 
could all learn to let go and look at the world and say, “It is good.” 
 
Though the authors deserve much praise for their work, this is in some ways the kind of 
approach we may, quite explicitly, need to get beyond, and it seems another instance of the old 
epistemology’s deeply-rooted presence in science.  
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Among other things, the authors draw from the work of Langer, whose orientation to 
“mindfulness” differs too significantly from traditional philosophical practices to be taken 
seriously as a general recommendation for practice. It is far too anemic—and I say that with deep 
respect for Langer, who is a brilliantly creative and courageous researcher and a skillful thinker. 
But Langer’s orientation to “mindfulness,” though it contrasts favorably to the basic 
mindlessness of the dominant culture, would in turn contrast in almost the same way (i.e. would 
seem at least a bit, and maybe significantly mindless) when considered in the context of much 
older and broader understandings of “mindfulness”. Langer’s more limited approach fits well 
with the authors’ recommendation of a bag of tricks to fix our ills. The bag of tricks approach is 
a prominent form of our addiction to “technology,” junk-ease, and junk-knowledge (“Just give 
me a few exercises to do . . . ”), for we cannot practice without some basic vision of the cosmos, 
and without basic ethical commitments, a basic style of thinking and living, and a basic sense of 
what it means to practice in the first place, and a basic attunement of aesthetic and spiritual 
sensibilities, a vitalizing mythology. Bateson offers a helpful criticism of the “bag of tricks” 
approach, rooted in something we consider quite rigorous, namely the “science” of “medicine”: 
Consider the state of medicine today. It’s called medical science. What 
happens is that doctors think it would be nice to get rid of polio, or typhoid, or 
cancer. So they devote re-search money and effort to focusing on these 
“problems,” or purposes. At a certain point Dr. Salk and others “solve” the 
problem of polio. They discover a solution of bugs which you can give to children 
so that they don’t get polio. This is the solution to the problem of polio. At this 
point, they stop putting large quantities of effort and money into the problem of 
polio and go on to the problem of cancer, or whatever it may be. 
Medicine ends up, therefore, as a total science, whose structure is 
essentially that of a bag of tricks. Within this science there is extraordinarily little 
knowledge of the sort of things I’m talking about; that is, of the body as a 
systemically cybernetically organized self-corrective system. Its internal 
interdependencies are minimally understood. What has happened is that purpose 
has determined what will come under the inspection or consciousness of medical 
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science. If you allow purpose to organize that which comes under your conscious 
inspection, what you will get is a bag of tricks—some of them very valuable 
tricks. It is an extraordinary achievement that these tricks have been discovered; 
all that I don’t argue. But still we do not know two-penn’orth, really, about the 
total network system.  
Cannon wrote a book on The Wisdom of the Body, but nobody has written 
a book on the wisdom of medical science, because wisdom is precisely the thing 
which it lacks. Wisdom I take to be the knowledge of the larger interactive 
system—that system which, if disturbed, is likely to generate exponential curves 
of change. 
Consciousness operates in the same way as medicine in its sampling of the 
events and processes of the body and of what goes on in the total mind. It is 
organized in terms of purpose. It is a shortcut device to enable you to get quickly 
at what you want; not to act with maximum wisdom in order to live, but to follow 
the shortest logical or causal path to get what you next want, which may be 
dinner; it may be a Beethoven sonata; it may be sex. Above all, it may be money 
or power. . . .  
On the one hand, we have the systemic nature of the individual human 
being, the systemic nature of the culture in which he lives, and the systemic nature 
of the biological, ecological system around him; and, on the other hand, the 
curious twist in the systemic nature of the individual man whereby consciousness 
is, almost of necessity, blinded to the systemic nature of the man himself. 
Purposive consciousness pulls out, from the total mind, sequences which do not 
have the loop structure which is characteristic of the whole systemic structure. If 
you follow the “common-sense” dictates of consciousness you become, 
effectively, greedy and unwise—again I use “wisdom” as a word for recognition 
of and guidance by a knowledge of the total systemic creature. 
Lack of systemic wisdom is always punished. We may say that the 
biological systems-the individual, the culture, and the ecology are partly living 
sustainers of their component cells or organisms. But the systems are nonetheless 
punishing of any species unwise enough to quarrel with its ecology. Call the 
systemic forces “God” if you will (Steps 440-2). 
 
Let us first note that, on this account of life, we cannot seriously maintain an interest in 
“science,” because that will put us in a fundamental disconnect with life, which seems to demand 
wisdom and not a bag of tricks or a collection of facts. What can we possibly mean by 
knowledge if what we call knowledge doesn’t help us to further the conditions of life? Would 
any of us, for instance, rather choose a physician who seemed both to know how to heal and to 
have some reputation for wisdom? Why would we ever think it helpful to separate these, thinking 
in an ecological sense? 
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Let us also note that the suggestion that we might “call it ‘God’” is not as nonchalant as it may 
appear. There is something essential in a genuine spiritual/philosophical orientation—and by 
“philosophical” here we cannot mean something aside from philosophy as a way of life.  
 
For instance, even western philosophers have noticed that, if we attend with care in the moment, 
we do not find our ego. The ego seems to become the center of our activity by means of a 
process of abstraction. We live in a culture that encourages the elaboration of the ego. The 
culture is, so to speak, deliberately, even connivingly ego-centric, and its language and science 
(including technology) encourage ego-centrism in practice. This causes problems for us, because 
the more we get taken out of being-moment, the more we worry about the self, obsess about gain 
and loss, pleasure and pain, praise and blame, fame and ill-repute, and we start engaging in 
conscious purposes that reflect this ego-centrism. But, consider the world of difference between 
Hume’s (or Dan Dennett’s) alleged inability to locate the ego and Buddha’s.  
 
It merits special emphasis that Buddha does not give the impression of wanting to found a 
religion per se. He sounds like a philosopher—but by no means a professor. Rather, he is so 
oriented toward philosophy as a way of life that the life he recommends is the practice-
realization of the atopos, and thus his students are properly called monks, for they must 
accomplish the rupture Hadot refers to, and in the early days the challenges of the rupture were 
confronted primarily through the marginalization of what we would call lay-practice, or the 
practice of a home-dweller. It can be so challenging to practice philosophy in the midst of a 
pattern of insanity that many people have found it much more practical, skillful, and realistic to 
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turn to a monastic setting (which needn’t actually mean living in a monastery—living alone on a 
mountain, for instance, functions as a monastic ecology, depending on one’s practice). But at this 
point we cannot seem to escape the acknowledgement that this may imply a demand that we 
transform our notion of “civilization,” because, if “civilization” has any systemic lack of 
wisdom, and if a lack of wisdom does not go unpunished by, “God,” then we will soon have hell 
to pay—and we may already be making payments on the interest we currently owe—to rely on 
an apt economic metaphor. 
 
I have heard Robert Thurman talk about his brief time as a Buddhist monk as a specifically 
philosophical gesture, and not a religious one. He insists that he did not seek a religion, but 
sought a philosophy. He read Wittgenstein and other western philosophers with great zeal, but he 
did not find a proper living philosophy, a proper philosophy as a way of life until he encountered 
Buddhist philosophy. Leonard Cohen practiced Zen Buddhism for many years, and even lived 
full-time in an austere monastery on Mt. Baldy for five years, but he made it clear that he already 
had a religion, namely Judaism, and that Zen practice had no conflict with that religion. 
 
Why, then, do we think of Buddhism as religious? For a variety of complex reasons, not least of 
which that it liberates us into what Bateson said we could call “God”. There is something almost 
inescapably sacred about the World (the central cleverness of the west lies in its capacity to 
facilitate this seemingly impossible escape), and this sacredness has been so closely associated 
with what we call “religion” that it seems to me almost unavoidable that Buddhism would 
become “religious”—especially given its philosophical commitments to upaya (skillful means). 
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Even Martin Luther King touched on the overlap we approach in our inquiry. In his “An 
Experiment in Love” (a title that resonates with Sorenson’s work, as well as with Dewey’s, 
Nietzsche’s and other themes in our inquiry), King suggests that agape is, “a willingness to go to 
any length to restore community.” We must see that this implicitly means any ethical length, or 
else the suggestion involves nonsense. King outlines an experiment in love, not violence. And he 
famously suggests that: “Whether we call it an unconscious process, an impersonal Brahman, or 
a Personal Being of matchless power of infinite love, there is a creative force in this universe that 
works to bring the disconnected aspects of reality into a harmonious whole” (from Testament of 
Hope, 20). 
 
Though we call Buddhism a religion, we can also see the Buddhist traditions as continuing the 
cultivation of philosophy as a way of life in a manner largely unreplicated in the west, in terms 
of diversity and continuity. They found many ways for lay-practitioners to realize profound, 
transformative insights. Liberation became available to larger and larger numbers of people. 
However, we have suggested here that a tension remains, fundamentally, between what 
civilization has become and what “God” demands, what Sophia demands—and recall again 
Bateson’s warning that Sophia will not tolerate a lack of wisdom. 
 
Bateson serves as a useful touchstone for approaching the sacredness we may find if we let go of 
what we cannot keep and begin to practice-and-realize what we cannot lose. In reflecting on her 
collaboration with her father, Mary Catherine Bateson wrote: 
Gregory used to quote Kipling’s lines, “There are nine and sixty ways of 
constructing tribal lays, And—every—single—one—of—them—is—right.” 
(Kipling 2002). That is, I think, a fairly interesting way of talking about religion: 
to say that there is something that human religions are trying to get at that matters. 
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And they get at some of it in many different ways which include vast amounts of 
nonsense, much of it dangerous, but we perhaps do not yet have a better way of 
getting at it, whatever it is. . . . 
. . . . Gregory grew up in a family that sturdily insisted that orthodox 
religion was nonsense, and at the same time he was stimulated by exposure to 
religious images, metaphors and poetry that demanded a different kind of 
understanding. 
Gregory planned the book that became Angels Fear to discuss religion and 
aesthetics as ways of knowing that might prove to be indispensable to human 
survival and to that recognition of the larger interactive system of the biosphere 
he called wisdom (M. C. Bateson 2004:39–40). “The sacred (whatever that 
means) is surely related (somehow) to the beautiful (whatever that means)” (1979: 
213). For him, as a scientist, to begin to talk about religion and aesthetics was to 
step onto dangerous ground – Where Angels Fear to Tread – places he felt it was 
essential to venture, but where he was going to get into trouble with his 
colleagues, and he knew it. Yet the exclusion of certain ideas – the Cartesian 
partition of ways of knowing – seemed to him damaging. 
 . . . . it strikes me today that he is saying [in his book Mind and Nature] 
that of course there is something that looks like intelligent design in evolution, 
because the mind-like properties of systems are unfolding. In this sense one can 
see mind at work in the structure of the eye, or in the structure of the cell and 
what have you. But in this understanding the mind is not external. Mind is a 
characteristic of the unfolding organization and process, immanent and emergent.  
 . . . . he was proposing yet another aspect of the pattern which connects all 
living things, recognizing in our own mental processes of thought and learning a 
pattern which connects us to the biosphere rather than an argument for separation. 
This recognition is inhibited by the dualistic assumption that what happens in the 
natural world is mechanical. It is inhibited in a deep way by the Cartesian body–
mind distinction, as if the natural world were purely material instead of being 
shaped by process and organization. Having over simplified our description of the 
natural world, we open the door to a compensatory leap from the recognition of 
the complexity around us to the insistence on a mind external to it – a deity – 
shaping it. “Miracles,” said Gregory, “are dreams and imaginings whereby 
materialists hope to escape from their materialism.” (1987:51) (in Hoffmeyer 
2008: 20-1) 
 
Among other things, our inquiry seeks to bring out how the wisdom and sacredness Bateson 
wanted to inquire into are available to us by means of philosophical/spiritual practices, 
inseparable from an ethical way of life which thus liberates us into the larger loops of mind that 
are the wisdom we need in order to live in harmony with, in attunement with . . . call it Sophia, 
God, Brahman, the unconscious, the Self, or an infinite Wisdom-Love-Beauty. 
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We may find it rather interesting, perhaps even inspiring (in the sense of taking in a breath of 
wonder) to consider how James McNeley describes the relationship between Navajo philosophy 
(based on his research and field interviews while living in the Navajo Nation) and Bateson’s 
thinking about Mind-and-Nature and its relationship to “religion”: 
There are some interesting commonalities, which I wish to examine here, 
between the traditional Navajo conception of deity dwelling within and giving 
unity to the natural world, and the conception of Mind-in-nature proposed by 
Gregory Bateson. Angels Fear examines the similarities between such traditional 
religions and Bateson’s cybernetics-based model of the workings of Creatura (the 
biological and social realms of the world). Tackling the “epistemology of the 
sacred,” Angels Fear addresses the question, “What features of human religions, 
ancient and modern, become intelligible in the light of cybernetic theory and 
similar advances in epistemology?” (page 142) Mary Catherine Bateson observes 
in the Introduction that Gregory had become aware “that the unity of nature he 
had affirmed in Mind and Nature might only be comprehensible through the kind 
of metaphors familiar from religion; that, in fact, he was approaching that 
integrative dimension of experience he called the sacred.” (page 2) 
 . . . . Religions are mental models of systems (Angels Fear, page 195). 
Thinking about the world through such models may help in understanding the 
way the “real” system (whatever that is) works. The Batesons’ argument runs 
something like this: If it is characteristic of religions that they contain ideas which 
are unquestioned and unquestionable—in short, sacred—the “real” systems they 
model contain absolute verities, too. If certain religious concepts are not 
communicated freely, being held “too sacred” to be freely shared, we should 
consider that the noncommunication of some information is found in the working 
of all living systems, and that this may be necessary for sustaining the integrity of 
the whole (pages 80-81 and 135). If religions require a leap of faith, there are 
similar gaps in our perception of the world where, indeed, faith is required for the 
continued existence of our being, and religion helps to protect that faith (pages 
95-96). If religion attempts to unify experience, providing in fact a “pattern which 
connects” the elements of experience, then there is, in the cybernetic 
understanding of the world, a unity and a communicative web which is not 
discerned by classical science (page 196). If religions characteristically imply an 
ethics and an aesthetic, then there is (in the Batesons’ theory of Creatura) an 
implied injunction not to violate the communicative web, and there is aesthetic 
satisfaction in holistic perception and recognition of system integration (page 
199). There exists, in sum, formal similarity between the structure of Batesonian 
holistic science and the structure of traditional religions. They are both good to 
think with (in some respects), and they both help us to think about the world in 
much the same way. 
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If this be so, how “good” is, for example, Navajo religion to think with, if 
we use the Batesons’ holistic model of the world as a sort of standard? Would it 
seem to serve the Navajo people well in understanding the world the way “post-
Cartesians” understand it? 
. . . . The Navajo world is one in which, throughout mythological times, its 
inhabitants have become progressively able to establish connections with different 
aspects of the supernatural—with different holy people residing within the various 
phenomena of nature. The goal of life is to live in a condition of balance and 
harmony with the powers and other inhabitants of the world. This is not easy! It 
requires following prescriptive teachings, correcting errors through ritual means, 
and always recognizing that one is a part of a communicative fabric which unites 
all elements of the living world. To arrive at the ideal condition of harmony, to 
arrive at the good, to arrive at the beautiful is to achieve identification with an 
abstract and enigmatic being referred to as sa’ah anagram bik’eh hozho. But this 
being is not a localized god or power, rather it in itself symbolizes a state of 
balance between the great male and female principles which underlie and  give 
life to the entire world which was created on earth’s surface. The seeking for 
identification expressed in the prayer, “I am sa’ah anagram bik’eh hozho . . .” is 
nothing less than an identification with the whole system in a state of harmony 
and balance. 
In looking for similarities between this Navajo construction of the world 
and that of the Batesons, we first find an illustration of Gregory Bateson’s claim 
that religion consists of “vast aggregates of organization having immanent mental 
characteristics” (Angels Fear, page 142)—much as does his own cybernetic 
model of the world. Additionally, the Navajo ideal of harmony is conceived to be 
achieved through, in essence, reopening channels of communication to those holy 
ones who have it within their power to reestablish balance and remove 
pathology—very analogous to the self-corrective circuitry found in Holistic 
Science. Other features of Navajo and of Batesonian views about thought and 
mind become evident in a comparison of the two; I see these commonalities:  
Both hold that thought or mind is immanent in nature. Both hold that 
human mind and thought is not equal to—let alone superior to—that which exists 
elsewhere; the greater intelligence lies in nature. Both hold that there is a flow of 
ideas, of messages, throughout the world, and that this flow of information is 
critical to the maintenance of balance or homeostasis—and they even agree that 
such a balanced unity may have the aesthetic quality of beauty (Bateson, 1979, 
page 19). 
Both hold that, in the interactions between human and non-human thought, 
distortions in human thinking may lead to disruptions in the larger world, and that 
human thinking must be corrected if balance, harmony, or homeostasis is to be 
reestablished in the world.  
In the most general terms, I think that the most significant bridge between 
the two views is a common recognition that human life and thought are contingent 
upon the thought relationships established with other elements of the natural 
world—elements which are more pregnant with knowledge than is the limited 
mind of man or woman. (1987: 5-6) 
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We may find ourselves in strange territory here, stranger than we may feel comfortable with. 
And thus we must resist the urge to co-opt or dismiss—the two poles of what we may refer to as 
desacralized (and now industrialized) science and philosophy in its encounter with anything 
vitalizing.  
 
On the one hand, it seems useful to note a resonance here with Dewey. Let’s consider it in a 
roundabout way first, based on an article Dewey wrote in which he engages an interlocutor who 
insists on maintaining a dualism between “is” and “ought”: 
After contrasting in the blankest manner the world of fact and of morals, he goes 
on to suggest that moral forces are not only rightfully supreme over the actual 
forces in the world at any time, but “are so interwoven with the order of things 
that nothing out of harmony with them can long stand” (p. 117). This would 
imply that moral forces are, and that they do not exist nobody knows where 
outside the actual world, but are themselves supremely actual. With this view I 
find myself, as I remarked, in large sympathy . . . . If it means that “justice” and 
“love” are . . . the actual forces of reality, taken at a certain angle and scope of 
working, it conveys intelligibly to me.  
But limiting the question as best I can, I should say (first) that the 
“ought” always rises from and falls back into the “is,” and (secondly) that the 
“ought” is itself an “is,”—the “is” of action.  
The “ought” is never its own justification. We ought to do so and so 
simply because of the existing practical situation; because of the relationships in 
which we find ourselves. We may, by an abstraction, which is justifiable enough 
as a means of analysis, distinguish between what is and what should be; but this 
is far from meaning that there is any such separation in reality . . . . a man’s duty 
is never to obey certain rules; his duty is always to respond to the nature of the 
actual demands which he finds made upon him,—demands which do not 
proceed from abstract rules, nor from ideals, however awe-inspiring and exalted, 
but from the concrete relations to men and things in which he finds himself. The 
rule, at worst and at best, is but an aid towards discriminating what the nature of 
these relations and demands. (1891: 198-200) 
 
Here we see Dewey talking about love and justice as “the actual forces of reality,” a rather 
astonishing sort of claim, which he potentially tones down (on one way of reading, he definitely 
tones down) by qualifying it with the words that follow.  
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This more general framing gets concentrated in Art as Experience, where Dewey tells us that, 
“the closer man is brought to the physical world, the clearer it becomes that his impulsions and 
ideas are enacted by nature within him” (AE 339). This brings him quite close to a Jungian view, 
which itself either gets limited as some kind of “mere psychologism,” or liberates us into a 
spiritual experience of life that will not tolerate any intolerance of the mystical and the religious. 
We may also note here that this enactment of Nature “within” us makes our own heart-mind-
body-world-cosmos the ultimate laboratory. Practicing, so to speak, “with/in the body,” “with/in 
the heart,” “with/in the mind,” allows us to come to insights, not simply in the manner of the 
Gedankenexperiments of Einstein, but heretofore (in the west at least) very minimally practiced-
and-realized collaborations between artists, scientists, and philosophers. 
 
Dewey also tells us in Art as Experience that, “Philosophy like art moves in the medium of 
imaginative mind” (AE 297). At times, even Dewey seems to lack imagination, and we need 
more imaginative philosophy right now. For instance, consider what Dewey says in A Common 
Faith: 
There exist concretely and experimentally goods—the values of art in all its 
forms, of knowledge, of effort and of rest after striving, of education and 
fellowship, of friendship and love, of growth in mind and body. These goods are 
there and yet they are relatively embryonic. Many persons are shut out from 
generous participation in them; there are forces at work that threaten and sap 
existent goods as well as prevent their expansion. A clear and intense conception 
of a union of ideal ends with actual conditions is capable of arousing steady 
emotion. It may be fed by every experience, no matter what its material. 
In a distracted age, the need for such an idea is urgent. It can unify 
interests and energies now dispersed; it can direct action and generate the heat of 
emotion and the light of intelligence. Whether one gives the name “God” to this 
union, operative in thought and action, is a matter for individual decision. But the 
function of such a working union of the ideal and actual seems to me to be 
identical with the force that has in fact been attached to the conception of God in 
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all the religions that have a spiritual content; and a clear idea of that function 
seems to me urgently needed at the present time. 
The sense of this union may, with some persons, be furthered by mystical 
experiences, using the term “mystical” in its broadest sense. That result depends 
largely upon temperament. But there is a marked difference between the union 
associated with mysticism and the union which I had in mind. There is nothing 
mystical about the latter; it is natural and moral. Nor is there anything mystical 
about the perception or consciousness of such union. Imagination of ideal ends 
pertinent to actual conditions represents the fruition of a disciplined mind. There 
is, indeed, even danger that resort to mystical experiences will be an escape, and 
that its result will be the passive feeling that the union of actual and ideal is 
already accomplished. But in fact this union is active and practical; it is a uniting, 
not something given.  
One reason why personally I think it fitting to use the word “God” to 
denote that uniting of the ideal and actual which has been spoken of, lies in the 
fact that aggressive atheism seems to me to have something in common with 
traditional supernaturalism. I do not mean merely that the former is mainly so 
negative that it fails to give positive direction to thought, though that fact is 
pertinent. What I have in mind especially is the exclusive preoccupation of both 
militant atheism and supernaturalism with man in isolation. For in spite of 
supernaturalism’s reference to something beyond nature, it conceives of this earth 
as the moral centre of the universe and of man as the apex of the whole scheme of 
things. It regards the drama of sin and redemption enacted within the isolated and 
lonely soul of man as the one thing of ultimate importance. Apart from man, 
nature is held either accursed or negligible. Militant atheism is also affected by 
lack of natural piety. The ties binding man to nature that poets have always 
celebrated are passed over lightly. The attitude taken is often that of man living in 
an indifferent and hostile world and issuing blasts of defiance. A religious 
attitude, however, needs the sense of a connection of man, in the way of both 
dependence and, support, with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is a 
universe. Use of the words “God” or “divine” to convey the union of actual with 
ideal may protect man from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or 
defiance. (LW9: 34-5) 
 
We can deeply appreciate even today (maybe especially today) Dewey’s comparison of militant 
atheism with militant theism. But he seems to get hoist on his own petard. We can clarify this in 
a moment, but let us note that Dewey’s invocation of the poetic would be endorsed by many 
religious thinkers. And the fact that he specifically refers to the “ties binding” humans to nature 
feels explicitly religious when we think of the significance of the term “religion”: It has to do 
with binding and connection, and with reestablishing and rejuvenating those ties by means of 
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practice-and-realization that allow us entrance to and embodiment of the knowledge the spiritual 
traditions claim we can verify. In this sense, I would call myself a religious person. But, why the 
exclusion of “the mystical” on Dewey’s part? I would call myself a mystic with even more 
enthusiasm than I would call myself religious, given the cultural confusions around “religion”. 
But, there are perhaps just as many confusions around “mysticism”. Either way, we may detect 
in Dewey and in ourselves a lack of imagination with regard to religion and mysticism—by 
which we must mean something to do with practice-realization, and thus something integral to 
epistemology and Knowing in the full sense we intend in our inquiry. Consider this other passage 
from the same text: 
The difference, however, between mystic experience and the theory about it that 
is offered to us must be noted. The experience is a fact to be inquired into. The 
theory, like any, theory, is an interpretation of the fact. The idea that by its very 
nature the experience is a veridical realization of the direct presence of God does 
not rest so much upon examination of the facts as it does upon importing into 
their interpretation a conception that is formed outside them. In its dependence 
upon a prior conception of the supernatural, which is the thing to be proved, it 
begs the question. (26) 
 
Aside from any deeper critique we might make of Dewey’s suggestion here, we could take it at 
face value and point out that the same description applies to what we call “science”. Religion in 
the spiritual sense offers us experimentation, a way of life and a means of practice which allows 
us to verify the claims of the tradition. We would naturally want to go further and speak about 
the deeply poetic, symbolic, and nonconceptual aspects of this, which ultimately carry us into 
transcendence of all the “theory” of the tradition—just as the mysteries of Nature and the 
unknown always leave scientific theory as tentative in a key sense.  
 
We could suggest the same lack of imagination ultimately stifles the profound transformation 
Everett seems to have experienced as he lived with the Pirahãs: 
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All the doctrines and faith I had held dear were a glaring irrelevancy in 
this culture. They were superstition to the Pirahãs. And they began to seem more 
and more like superstition to me. I began to seriously question the nature of faith, 
the act of believing in something unseen. Religious books like the Bible and the 
Koran glorified this kind of faith in the nonobjective and counterintuitive—life 
after death, virgin birth, angels, miracles, and so on.  
The Pirahãs’ values of immediacy of experience and demand for evidence 
made all of this seem deeply dubious. Their own beliefs were not in the fantastic 
and miraculous but in spirits that were in fact creatures of their environment, 
creatures that did normal kinds of things (whether or not I thought they were real). 
There was no sense of sin among the Pirahãs, no need to “fix” mankind or even 
themselves. There was acceptance for things the way they are, by and large. No 
fear of death. Their faith was in themselves. (270-1) 
 
The Pirahãs had faith in themselves—but such faith clearly maintains itself in nonduality with 
knowing, with verification. What does one verify? There is no such thing as practice-realization 
in a vacuum, in some pure form without context. The Pirahãs indeed have doctrines. Everett uses 
the word in its pejorative sense only, and not as he describes the doctrines of the Pirahãs. 
“Doctrine” does not equate to “dogma” except in the case of spiritual disease. In the case of 
spiritual health, doctrine means “teaching,” and a “doctor” is a teacher. The philosopher as soul 
doctor, as physician of the psyche, plays the role of a teacher, one who facilitates the self-
realization of the student—for the teacher in this case explicitly avoids trying to “give” anything 
to the student in the ordinary sense. The Pirahãs have a core doctrine, expressed in their language 
and culture, that took Everett some time to discover and begin to understand: 
The word xibipíío seemed to be related to a cultural concept or value that had no 
clear English equivalent. Of course, any English speaker can say, “John 
disappeared,” or “Billy appeared just now,” but this is not the same. First, we use 
different words, hence different concepts, for appearing and disappearing. More 
important, we English speakers are mainly focused on the identity of the person 
coming or going, not the fact that he or she has just left or come into our 
perception.  
Eventually, I realized that this term referred to what I call experiential 
liminality, the act of just entering or leaving perception, that is, a being on the 
boundaries of experience. A flickering flame is a flame that repeatedly comes and 
goes out of experience or perception.  
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This translation “worked”—it successfully explained to me when it was 
appropriate to use the word xibipíío (and a useful working translation is the best a 
researcher can hope for in this type of monolingual situation).  
The word xibipíío therefore reinforced and gave a positive face to the 
pervasive Pirahã value I had been working on independently. That value seemed 
to be to limit most talk to what you had seen or heard from an eyewitness. 
If my hypothesis was correct, then knowledge about bigí, beings in other 
layers, spirits, and so on, must come from information supplied by living 
eyewitnesses. As counterintuitive as it might sound initially, there are purported 
eyewitnesses to the layered universe. The layers themselves are visible to the 
naked eye—the earth and the sky. And the inhabitants of the layers are also seen, 
because these other beings traverse the upper boundary, that is, come down from 
the sky and walk about our jungle. The Pirahãs see their tracks from time to time. 
The Pirahãs even see the beings themselves, lurking as ghostly shadows in the 
jungle darkness, according to the eyewitness accounts.  
 And the Pirahãs can traverse a bigí in their dreams. To the Pirahãs, dreams 
are a continuation of real and immediate experience. Perhaps these other beings 
travel in their dreams too. In any case, they do traverse the boundaries. Pirahãs 
have seen them. (129-30) 
 
The doctrine—the Nature-Culture teaching and practice-realization—of xibipíío thus carries us 
back to Dewey’s notion of immediate empiricism, but crucially, in a manner of profound 
spiritual resonance, it carries us also to Liminal Awareness, as discussed by Sorenson, and 
implied by other sources of doctrine we have considered. Recall that shifting into this Liminal 
Awareness is not a matter of snapping one’s fingers and hoping for it. To say, “Be Liminally 
Aware!” is probably worse than saying, “Stand up straight!” Recall the experience Wolff had, in 
which his supraliminal mind kept trying to assert itself. The Shaman told Wolff not to go outside 
of the heart—the ultimate laboratory, in its altogetherness with the Cosmos. It seems the Pirahãs 
demanded the same thing, at least in spirit, from Everett: 
I said that our up-high father had made my life better. Once, I said, I used to drink 
like the Pirahãs. I had many women (exaggerating somewhat here), and I was 
unhappy. Then the up-high father came into my heart and made me happy and 
made my life better. I gave no thought to whether all these new concepts, 
metaphors, and names that I was inventing on the fly were actually intelligible to 
the Pirahãs. They made sense to me. This night, I decided to tell them something 
very personal about myself—something that I thought would make them 
understand how important God can be in our lives. So I told the Pirahãs how my 
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stepmother committed suicide and how this led me to Jesus and how my life got 
better after I stopped drinking and doing drugs and accepted Jesus. I told this as a 
very serious story.  
When I concluded, the Pirahãs burst into laughter. This was unexpected, to 
put it mildly. I was used to reactions like “Praise God!” with my audience 
genuinely impressed by the great hardships I had been through and how God had 
pulled me out of them.  
“Why are you laughing?” I asked.  
“She killed herself? Ha ha ha. How stupid. Pirahãs don’t kill themselves,” 
they answered.  
They were utterly unimpressed. It was clear to them that the fact that 
someone I had loved had committed suicide was no reason at all for the Pirahãs to 
believe in my God. Indeed, it had the opposite effect, highlighting our differences. 
This was a setback for my missionary objectives. Days went by after this in which 
I thought long and hard about my purpose among the Pirahãs.  
Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I 
communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. 
The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and 
that he wanted others to do what he told them.  
The Pirahã men then asked, “Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he 
dark like us or light like you?”  
I said, “Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. 
But I do have his words.”  
“Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or 
seen him?”  
They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in 
any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren’t interested in any stories I had 
to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only 
what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told 
them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. 
(265-6) 
 
I cannot presume to properly evaluate the situation, but it doesn’t seem surprising that Everett 
never thought to personally witness the divine for himself, perhaps by means of dreams. Such 
practices are not available in the west, and Everett is left with evaluating his religion, not in 
terms of the traditions it may offer for going beyond what one has been told, but in terms of the 
black-and-white dictates of “reason”. He tells us plainly that the Pirahãs believe in spirits, they 
believe in things Everett himself may not be able to see without practice. He says, “the Pirahãs 
can traverse a bigí in their dreams. To the Pirahãs, dreams are a continuation of real and 
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immediate experience. Perhaps these other beings travel in their dreams too. In any case, they do 
traverse the boundaries. Pirahãs have seen them” (130). But Everett would likely have had no 
way to “traverse the boundaries” (cross the thresholds) that keep many religious people separated 
from the divine (excluded from Liminal Awareness), and he would have had no way to teach the 
Pirahãs how to encounter Jesus—though someone like Theresa of Avilla, Hildegard of Bingen, 
or Meister Eckart might have been able to do so. Of course, the Pirahãs had no need for outside 
doctrines. Everett could see how healthy their own doctrines (doctors, teachings, practices, way 
of life) kept them. A similar phenomenon has surely been seen in almost every serious religious 
tradition to appear in the Earth. 
 
We may have drawn near to a need for returning to where we began, and we have drawn near 
again to a threshold. Something a little disturbing to the contemporary mind lurks precisely here. 
So integral to our inquiry, we have sensed its presence many times, drawn near to it and probably 
dismissed it, but let us try to ask a little more about why it seems to strange to us. Jung touches 
on it a little: 
Whether primitive or not, mankind always stands on the brink of actions it 
performs itself but does not control. The whole world wants peace and the whole 
world prepares for war, to take but one example. Mankind is powerless against 
mankind, and the gods, as ever, show it the ways of fate. Today we call the gods 
“factors,” which comes from facere, ‘to make.’ The makers stand behind the 
wings of the world-theatre. It is so in great things as in small. In the realm of 
consciousness we are our own masters; we seem to be the ‘factors’ themselves.  
But if we step through the door of the shadow we discover with terror that we are 
the objects of unseen factors.  To know this is decidedly unpleasant, for nothing is 
more disillusioning than the discovery of our own inadequacy.  It can even give 
rise to primitive panic, because, instead of being believed in, the anxiously-
guarded supremacy of consciousness—which is in truth one of the secrets of 
human success—is questioned in the most dangerous way.  (CW 9i: 49) 
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It may not at first seem scary to seriously contemplate the powers that live themselves through 
us. But those who have experienced such things often experience fear. In large part, in our 
context, this occurs because we lack a way of life that can contextualize experiences that we 
would currently, culturally label as anomalous. We tend to write them off, explain them away, 
and so on. Elizabeth Lloyd Mayer details a wide range of anomalous data in her book, 
Extraordinary Knowing. She herself experienced extraordinary knowing on at least two 
occasions—I mean as “the knower,” for she also had first-hand experiences of Extraordinary 
Knowing arising in others. In one case, she felt herself being walked (as if by a power she might 
pretend to understand) to a lost object which she should not have been able to locate:  
My youngest sister was living with my husband and me, finishing her last 
year of high school. My husband’s aunt had given him an extremely showy gold 
watch, one he’d never wear. In a burst of generosity, he’d given it to my sister. 
My sister wore it every day. But she was seventeen and careless. She’d 
leave it lying around in the kitchen, in the car, in the laundry room. One afternoon 
I was working in my bedroom when she burst in: “I can’t find that watch!” We 
retraced where she’d been and when she’d last had it. No luck. My husband was 
due home in two hours. My sister was panicked; she was sure he’d be quick to 
notice that she wasn’t wearing the watch and ask where it was. We circled back 
over all the places we’d already looked. We were about to give up. 
And at that point something happened that was unlike anything I’d ever 
experienced. I was standing in our upstairs hall, near the door of my husband’s 
study. I walked into his study: deliberately, intentionally, but with no awareness 
of volition on my part. It was as though I was watching myself in a slow-motion 
film. I walked straight to a closet in the far corner of the room, a closet I’d entered 
maybe twice—if that— over the course of our entire marriage. As I walked, I 
wasn’t aware of thinking, of deciding, of choosing to do any of the things I was 
doing or about to do. I was just doing them. I bent down—again, it felt absolutely 
deliberate—and reached deep into the closet, behind a row of shoes, then behind 
some boxes behind the shoes. My hand went directly to a small leather case in the 
very back corner. I lifted out the case, stood up, and opened it. Inside was the 
watch. 
Weirdly, I felt neither surprise nor excitement; I simply expected it. I 
walked out of my husband’s study, called for my sister, and showed her the 
watch. “Where was it?” she demanded. 
I tried to tell my sister what happened, but it was hard to find the words. 
She looked disbelieving. I hazarded a guess as to how the watch got into my 
husband’s closet. Perhaps, annoyed at rescuing the watch from my careless sister 
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one too many times, he’d taken it and hidden it away. My sister was skeptical, but 
couldn’t come up with a more compelling suggestion. 
I decided I’d save face for everyone. I put the watch back in the closet, 
and when my husband got home, I told him what a panic my sister had been in 
and how she’d spent all afternoon looking for it. 
My husband was calm and casual in his reply. “I was wondering when 
she’d miss it,” he said. “She left it in the bathroom after you’d gone to work this 
morning. You weren’t here, so I thought I’d try teaching her a lesson. I put it 
away in my closet.” 
He went and got it, then handed it over to me. “Tell her to be more careful 
with it from now on.” (58-9) 
 
Somehow, Mayer had no conscious problem processing this experience—even though deep 
reflection into such an experience might lead us to question agency, subjectivity, the nature of 
the ethical, and the nature of knowing. But in the course of writing her book, she had another 
experience that did provoke more of this sort of reflection, because it somehow touched a deeper 
layer of ego, or at least shook the ego loose enough that she could consciously register the shock 
(we can recall here Jung’s notion of a required “demolition of rational understanding”). 
 
Mayer had heard from various people that instances of Extraordinary Knowing and other 
anomalous phenomena often arise when we become liberated from the little box of the ego (as 
depicted in our “artistic” image of mind presented some time ago). If we can turn down the noise 
of ego, so to speak, something else can come through, as we self-liberate into larger ecologies of 
mind. Mayer had the opportunity to try a ganzfeld experiment, which works on this principle. 
The ganzfeld (literally “complete field”) involves the production of a monotone experience that 
perhaps cancels out the noise of the ego, in a manner perhaps loosely analogous to noise-
cancelling headphones. Typically, the visual field is made monotone by covering the eyes with 
special goggles—easily replicated at home by cutting a ping-pong ball in half or repurposing ski 
goggles or other goggles that can be painted white to make a monotone visual field—and 
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headphones that play a uniform sound or even white noise. In a typical experiment a computer 
randomly assigns one of 6 images for a person to try and “send” to another person completely 
isolated and put in a ganzfeld experience. This goes on for perhaps 15 minutes. The person in the 
ganzfeld is then brought out and asked to put a group of 6 images in order, with the first-ranked 
image the one they think most likely to have been the one the sender was attempting to send (of 
course, we describe this using an obsolete model of language, for convenience). The ranking 
system is required, since the receiver’s first reaction may be that that have no idea which image 
is the one the sender was trying to get through. No one but the sender and the computer that 
randomly picked the image know this.  
 
After her time in the ganzfeld, Mayer found herself unable to recognize any of the images she 
saw. We could say the conscious mind knew nothing—knowing as we know it knew nothing. 
But the graduate student assisting with the research asked her to rank the images anyway, even if 
it seemed random. Mayer ranked the images—apparently at random—and the grad student left 
the room. He returned with a sealed envelope, containing the image being sent to her 
“psychically”. Mayer opened it. It was the same image she had ranked as her top choice, even 
though she had no conscious “knowledge” of receiving it. Mayer describes her reaction: 
And at that moment the world turned weird. I felt the tiniest instant of 
overwhelming fear. It was gone in a flash but it was stunningly real. It was unlike 
any fear I’ve ever felt. My mind split. I realized that I knew something I was 
simultaneously certain I didn’t know. And I got it. This is what my patients meant 
when they said, “My mind’s not my own.” Or “I’m losing my mind.” The feeling 
was terrifying. My mind had slipped out from under me and the world felt out of 
control. 
I recovered quickly and launched in on logical explanations. First and 
most compelling, it must have been pure coincidence. The odds I’d picked the 
right card were, after all, one in six. And that uncanny feeling—I knew perfectly 
well that coincidence does that to people. We all want to feel magical and 
omnipotent and we’ll grasp for that feeling wherever we can. Uncanny feelings 
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are one result and psychologists ever since Freud have been coming up with 
reasons why. 
But I knew it wasn’t that simple and my arguments with myself didn’t 
carry the day. Once again, I was remembering my sister’s watch. Walking straight 
to that box in back of my husband’s closet had taught me a feeling, a full-bodied, 
single-minded, wholehearted feeling I’d described as being “walked by the 
experience.” It was as if the experience knew me. It brought a thoroughly 
unaccustomed sensation to the surface, a feeling that was categorically unlike 
ordinary knowing. The fraction of a second that had me landing on the red 
sunset—so brief and so ephemeral it barely registered—was an echo of the 
sensation I’d had when I’d walked straight to my sister’s watch. This time I’d 
walked not across a room but across my mind, walked straight out of my ordinary 
knowing into an inchoate, uncertain mental state that—maybe—deserves to be 
called knowing, too. It took the graduate student jolting me into the realization 
that I’d picked the correct card for me to consider—maybe—letting it in. After I 
left the lab, I realized that I’d gotten what I’d come for: some feeling for a quality 
of knowing that gave me that hook for believing. I wondered if I’d see the 
ganzfeld experiments differently, in the sense that I’d now see that there was 
something there worth seeing. Part of me still insisted that picking the red sunset 
was merely coincidence, no more than a lucky guess and nothing to do with the 
ganzfeld state or tuning down the noise. (207-7) 
 
As a child, I used to always wonder why depictions of people experiencing “paranormal” events 
would show them experiencing fear. Why wouldn’t someone feel joyful and excited to discover 
they had the capacity to “read minds” or to encounter something truly mysterious in the World? 
And yet, these may be the most typical sorts of reactions—explaining in part why we keep these 
experiences at bay, at least in a context so lacking in its capacity to empower us to receive and 
work with them. Given our degraded cultural context, people may experience fear and confusion 
in the presence of Extraordinary Knowing and other anomalous events, and that fear may extend 
into a fear of ridicule, because so much habit energy has gone into the dominant paradigms. This 
explains why some of the arts of awareness necessary for a better way of knowing cannot simply 
be taken up as a bag of tricks. Too much meditation, for instance, can send someone to the psych 
ward with a case of psychosis or other mental breakdown—something that also might have once 
puzzled me (“Don’t they want to experience reality?” I would likely wonder). Pollan’s 
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experience of restlessness and fear before trying some of the holotropic medicines comes to mind 
here, as do the many direct and indirect suggestions in his book about the need for a proper 
context—a challenge greater than most of us seem to recognize. 
 
Shifting our way of knowing in the manner we seem to be getting at in our inquiry cannot 
happen in a healthy way without a healthy context, and at this point we seem to have to both aim 
at large-scale transformations of a tragically degraded context while simultaneously doing the 
best we can with the degraded context we have. An epistemology of the sacred is an 
epistemology of health. This comes both from the demands of ecology (ultimately the demands 
of philosophy) and the meaning of “sacred,” which originally carries a sense of activity, namely 
the activity of making holy. It is not simply “this place is sacred,” but that it has been made 
sacred, is being made sacred, and as we participate in reality we too make it sacred and receive 
its sacredness in an altogether activity of mutuality. But making holy is just making whole, 
making healthy, making healing. Our better way of knowing is in one sense a way of healing, a 
way of entering the ongoing self-healing activity of life. Bateson wrote: “the Creatura, the world 
of mental process, is both tautological and ecological. I mean that it is a slowly self-healing 
tautology” (MN: 206). However, recall Bateson’s warning about divine punishment for lack of 
wisdom: Though we can choose to participate in this self-healing tautology, attune ourselves 
with it, we may also resist it, or even actively misknow it, attuning instead to our own agendas. 
In such a case, things may become quite intense as the healing response seeks to rebalance 
things: 
Left to itself, any large piece of Creatura will tend to settle toward tautology, that 
is, toward internal consistency of ideas and processes. But every now and then, 
the consistency gets torn; the tautology breaks up like the surface of a pond when 
a stone is thrown into it. Then the tautology slowly but immediately starts to heal. 
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And the healing may be ruthless. Whole species may be exterminated in the 
process. (MN: 206) 
 
We will come back to the notion of participating in this tautology, as part of a better way of 
knowing. But let’s circle back to some of the other issues Mayer raises in the passage above. 
Mayer speaks of a fear, and of a sense of an unthought known (perhaps not far from the sense in 
which Bollas used that term)—something she apparently knew, but could not consciously think 
or touch. There is a known, and a threshold, a Liminal Space which we somehow may cross over 
into or receive from. We might live it, we might thrive in, through, as this Liminal Space or 
Awareness, which is “the world of mental process”—once we leave behind, or drop off, or let go 
of, or liberate ourselves from the narrow sense of mental process, and the narrow sense of self, 
we so consistently practice and realize. 
 
In some sense, we find ourselves still coming to terms with the discovery of the fullness of the 
psyche, and that fullness has immense epistemological implications, as we have already 
suggested. As Jung puts it, here referring to this fullness as “the unconscious”: 
The hypothesis of the unconscious puts a large question-mark after the 
idea of the psyche. The soul, as hitherto postulated by the philosophical intellect 
and equipped with all the necessary faculties, threatened to emerge from its 
chrysalis as something with unexpected and uninvestigated properties. It no 
longer represented anything immediately known, about which nothing more 
remained to be discovered except a few more or less satisfying definitions. Rather 
it now appeared in strangely double guise, as both known and unknown. In 
consequence, the old psychology was thoroughly unseated and as much 
revolutionized as classical physics had been by the discovery of radioactivity. 
These first experimental psychologists were in the same predicament as the 
mythical discoverer of the numerical sequence, who strung peas together in a row 
and simply went on adding another unit to those already present. When he 
contemplated the result, it looked as if there were nothing but a hundred identical 
units; but the numbers he had thought of only as names unexpectedly turned out 
to be peculiar entities with irreducible properties. For instance, there were even, 
uneven, and primary numbers; positive, negative, irrational, and imaginary 
numbers, etc. So it is with psychology: if the soul is really only an idea, this idea 
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has an alarming air of unpredictability about it—something with qualities no one 
would ever have imagined. One can go on asserting that the psyche is 
consciousness and its contents, but that does not prevent, in fact it hastens, the 
discovery of a background not previously suspected, a true matrix of all conscious 
phenomena, a preconsciousness and a postconsciousness, a superconsciousness 
and a subconsciousness. The moment one forms an idea of a thing and 
successfully catches one of its aspects, one invariably succumbs to the illusion of 
having caught the whole. One never considers that a total apprehension is right 
out of the question. Not even an idea posited as total is total, for it is still an entity 
on its own with unpredictable qualities. This self-deception certainly promotes 
peace of mind: the unknown is named, the far has been brought near, so that one 
can lay one’s finger on it. One has taken possession of it, and it has become an 
inalienable piece of property, like a slain creature of the wild that can no longer 
run away. It is a magical procedure such as the primitive practices upon objects 
and the psychologist upon the psyche. He is no longer at its mercy, but he never 
suspects that the very fact of grasping the object conceptually gives it a golden 
opportunity to display all those qualities which would never have made their 
appearance had it not been imprisoned in a concept (remember the numbers!). 
The attempts that have been made, during the last three hundred years, to 
grasp the psyche are all part and parcel of that tremendous expansion of 
knowledge which has brought the universe nearer to us in a way that staggers the 
imagination. The thousandfold magnifications made possible by the electron-
microscope vie with the five hundred million light-year distances which the 
telescope travels. Psychology is still a long way from a development similar to 
that which the other natural sciences have undergone; also, as we have seen, it has 
been much less able to shake off the trammels of philosophy. All the same, every 
science is a function of the psyche, and all knowledge is rooted in it. The psyche 
is the greatest of all cosmic wonders and the sine qua non of the world as an 
object. It is in the highest degree odd that Western man, with but very few—and 
ever fewer—exceptions, apparently pays so little regard to this fact. Swamped by 
the knowledge of external objects, the subject of all knowledge has been 
temporarily eclipsed to the point of seeming non-existence. 
The soul was a tacit assumption that seemed to be known in every detail. 
With the discovery of a possible unconscious psychic realm, man had the 
opportunity to embark upon a great adventure of the spirit, and one might have 
expected that a passionate interest would be turned in this direction. Not only was 
this not the case at all, but there arose on all sides an outcry against such an 
hypothesis. Nobody drew the conclusion that if the subject of knowledge, the 
psyche, were in fact a veiled form of existence not immediately accessible to 
consciousness, then all our knowledge must be incomplete, and moreover to a 
degree that we cannot determine. The validity of conscious knowledge was 
questioned in an altogether different and more menacing way than it had ever 
been by the critical procedures of epistemology. . . . 
 . . . If, as certain modern points of view, too, would have it, the psychic 
system coincides and is identical with our conscious mind, then, in principle, we 
are in a position to know everything that is capable of being known, i.e., 
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everything that lies within the limits of the theory of knowledge. In that case there 
is no cause for disquiet, beyond that felt by anatomists and physiologists when 
contemplating the function of the eye or the organ of hearing. But should it turn 
out that the psyche does not coincide with consciousness, and, what is more, that 
it functions unconsciously in a way similar to, or different from, the conscious 
portion of it, then our disquiet must rise to the point of agitation. For it is then no 
longer a question of general epistemological limits, but of a flimsy threshold that 
separates us from the unconscious contents of the psyche. The hypothesis of the 
threshold and of the unconscious means that the indispensable raw material of all 
knowledge—namely psychic reactions—and perhaps even unconscious 
“thoughts” and “insights” lie close beside, above, or below consciousness, 
separated from us by the merest “threshold” and yet apparently unattainable. We 
have no knowledge of how this unconscious functions, but since it is conjectured 
to be a psychic system it may possibly have everything that consciousness has, 
including perception, apperception, memory, imagination, will, affectivity, 
feeling, reflection, judgment, etc., all in subliminal form. (CW8: para. 356-8, 362) 
 
These suggestions create challenges that go altogether. The challenges they present for 
epistemology go altogether with the challenges they present for ethics, aesthetics, politics, and 
Nature-Culture in general. The challenges of knowledge and agency go together with the 
“making-responsible” that Nietzsche critiques in Beyond Good and Evil, Genealogy of Morals, 
and other works. If we are not “the sovereign individual” of our hopes and fears, what are we? 
All of this goes together with justification and justified true belief. We need justifications when 
we cannot properly attune ourselves to the powers we pretend to understand. Even Jung, who 
made a career and a practice of opening to these mysteries, had surprises waiting for him at every 
turn, including the very “end”. In a letter dated December, 1960, which Kate Hillman wrote to 
her then-husband James Hillman, while he was in the U.S. raising money for the C.G. Jung 
Institute, she describes how Jung experienced insight through the dying process: 
It seems Jung almost died in September, then to his own surprise came back to 
life, in order to experience something new once more. He lives now in an ‘in 
between’ state somehow. Most often he lets himself drop off into awake 
nondirective states, leaving the ego and the mind out. He says he experiences 
truth as light, that is not with the consciousness he has preached all these years but 
another kind of awareness, on a very deep level . . . Jung says he does not trust 
consciousness in the usual sense anymore . . . Liliane [Frey] says it means giving 
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up a great deal to enter into this state where truth so to say lingers on a different 
level, that Jung has always known about it but not until now really taking it on as 
a change in himself.  (from Russell 2013) 
 
Jung entered the Bardo, the Between, which, again, as Trungpa put it, “is the meditation 
experience.” He entered “nondirective states,” which, as far as they were meditative, involve a 
choiceless awareness, a shift into Liminal Awareness that does not involve agency, subjectivity, 
time, and other elements as they typically appear in relation with conquest consciousness. Jung 
experiences a kind of deeper revolution, even greater perhaps than the revolution he invited us to 
see as implicit in the discovery of the unconscious. Here, he finds consciousness even more 
limited than he might have thought in light of all his experience with the unconscious (thus 
putting the earlier passage in a new light, the one in which he refers to, “the anxiously-guarded 
supremacy of consciousness—which is in truth one of the secrets of human success” (CW 9i: 
49)). Does it not seem strange? What did he learn? Shouldn’t all of us philosophers wonder 
about it—the true philosopher in each and everyone of us? Because, it is not just Jung here, but 
vast spiritual traditions, including the Tibetan traditions that explicitly teach about the Bardo of 
death and dying, and which explicitly offer the doctrine, the teaching, the soul medicine of a 
primordial awareness that is itself the foundation upon which what we call consciousness 
depends. The Mind Science, the Nature Science of many Buddhist traditions invites us to verify 
this awareness for ourselves, and to allow it to change our way of knowing—our way of living, 
loving, and liberating. Indeed, we can only truly know it in, through, as a better way of 
knowing.117 
                                                 
117 We can also think here of the apotheosis of Thomas Aquinas, which rendered all his written 
philosophical works, from his new perspective, as not worthy of receiving the sacred droppings 
of the donkeys in the stable. Here too, we could think of those decisive experiences of Rumi, 
Dogen, Tsongkhapa, and others.  
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As we make our final steps in this dimension or this expression of our inquiry, let us linger a bit 
on the problem of “knowledge,” by which we should mean the way what we know becomes an 
obstacle. Knowing should liberate—liberating possibilities in ourselves, in others, in the World. 
Knowing means the evolution of ecologies, the ongoing thriving of life, the activity of 
incarnation and re-incarnation. But “knowledge” as we tend to mean it in the dominant culture 
often becomes an obstacle to these vitalizing functions. 
 
We have touched on the question of dreaming again and again, and we can consider it in relation 
to this problem of “knowledge”. Dreaming was once a sacred activity, even in the west. We no 
longer live in such a context. We do not go to a temple after fasting and praying, as the Greeks 
did, and then lay down to sleep with the open-hearted intention to receive a dream, a healing 
dream, a dream that will help us achieve wholeness, practice and realize holiness. Illness of the 
body can go altogether with illness in the soul, and that which can balance the soul may also 
balance the body—which means intertwining ecologies. 
 
WEH Stanner offers the following Australian Aboriginal verse: 
White man got no dreaming, 
Him go ’nother way. 
White man, him go different. 
Him got road belong himself. 
 
Stanner comments: “Although, as I have said, The Dreaming conjures up the notion of a sacred, 
heroic time of the indefinitely remote past, such a time is also, in a sense, still part of the present. 
One cannot ‘fix’ The Dreaming in time: it was, and is, everywhen” (24). It never ceases to amaze 
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the westernized part of my mind when we challenge time, threaten mutiny against Captain 
Clock. Every time it comes up, I smile in wonder at how we have lived, how I have lived.  
 
 
Why bother Entering DreamTime? Why bother dreaming—as a philosophical practice, as an 
altogether way of life. Dreams have no impact on reality, right? (Aside from the bag of tricks 
approach, of course.) We “know” that dreams are “just dreams”. But do we know how to dream? 
Can we even dream anymore, in this context, really attend to dreaming, take care of dreaming as 
altogether with taking care of the World, when we must fit our lives into a schedule? We go to 
bed too tired, and we must wake up and immediately fall in line with an agenda. How does one 
maintain the dream? What if we need to lay back down and enter the dream again, because we 
did not finish our work? What if Sophia needs to speak to us, perhaps to offer a truth we cannot 
yet think, but which we could dream? 
 
We must keep in mind that large-scale manipulation depends on abstractions and 
standardization. A symbol system co-opts the power, the empowerment of living-loving symbol, 
living-loving image, living-loving sense, and turns it into an instrument of control. The symbolic 
power of the clock exercises great control over us.  
 
Jung has a delightful passage, showing the power of conquest consciousness to squash our 
dreamlife, reducing us to seeing the discovery of some chemical or engineering structure as a 
great prize for our dream life: 
When I went to East Africa, I went to a small tribe in Mount Elgon and I asked 
the medicine-man about dreams. He said, “I know what you mean; my father still 
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had dreams.” I said, “You have no dreams?” And then he wept and answered, 
“No, I have no dreams anymore.” I asked, “Why?” He answered, “Since the 
British came into the country.” “Now, how is that?” He said, “The District 
Commissioner knows when there shall be war; he knows when there are diseases; 
he knows where we must live—he does not allow us to move.” The political 
guidance is now represented by the D.C., by the superior intelligence of the white 
man; therefore, why should they need dreams? Dreams were the original guidance 
of man in the great darkness. Read that book of Rasmussen’s about the Polar 
Eskimos. There he describes how a medicine-man became the leader of his tribe 
on account of a vision. When a man is in the wilderness, the darkness brings the 
dreams—somnia a Deo missa—that guide him. It has always been so. (CW 18, 
para. 674) 
 
We can see something similar at work in an anecdote Gary Snyder relates in his exquisite essay, 
“The Etiquette of Freedom”: 
Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca became unaccountably deepened after losing his 
way and spending several winter nights sleeping naked in a pit in the Texas desert 
under a north wind. He truly had reached the point where he had nothing. (“To 
have nothing, you must have nothing!” Lord Buckley says of this moment.) After 
that he found himself able to heal sick native people he met on his way westward. 
His fame spread ahead of him. Once he had made his way back to Mexico and 
was again a civilized Spaniard he found he had lost his power of healing—not just 
the ability to heal, but the will to heal, which is the will to be whole: for as he 
said, there were “real doctors” in the city, and he began to doubt his powers. To 
resolve the dichotomy of the civilized and the wild, we must first resolve to be 
whole. (27) 
 
Why bother dreaming, when the academics, scientists, and technicians can tell us everything we 
need to know? Why bother healing, why seek medicine, when we could seek medication, 
treatments, “cures”? We would have to accomplish a renunciation. We would have to admit, “I 
have lost my way.” We might have to be left with nothing—which is the most positive reading of 
our acceleration of climate collapse: The soul will drive us to lose everything we cannot keep, so 
that we may realize what we cannot lose. I have seen this sort of thing work itself out very 
painfully in the lives of individuals. It would be tragic to see it on a global scale, even if it did 
return us to the sacred in a decisive way. 
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On the other hand, we may have to face a much more uncomfortable possibility—perhaps 
altogether with the more positive prospect. Jung captures it this way: “The unconscious has a 
thousand ways of snuffing out a meaningless existence with surprising swiftness.” But a much 
fuller quotation is in order, because of the way Jung weaves this problem into the larger vision of 
spiritual/philosophical/religious practice-realization as manifested in Alchemy. We must re-
member here (always Sati, remembering, mindfully aware), and handle with great care the fact 
that the alchemists were children of Sophia and sought the Philosopher’s Stone. They sought 
Wisdom, Love, and Beauty. We can then read this fuller description by Jung while remembering 
this, and also remembering Pauli’s reflections about alchemy. Moreover, we must keep the 
present particular suggestion in mind: That we look here into avoiding the suicidal impulse our 
species seems driven by just now. Conquest consciousness and a materialistic, nihilistic 
sensibility has eclipsed the Sun, the Cosmos, the Sacred. Freud inquired into melancholia and 
found that it functioned as if the shadow of an object had fallen over the ego: 
An object choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person, had at one 
time existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from this 
loved person, the relationship was shattered. The result was not the normal one of 
a withdrawal of the libido from this object and a displacement of it on to a new 
one, but something different, for whose coming about various conditions seem to 
be necessary. The object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and 
was brought to an end. But the free libido was not displaced on to another object; 
it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not employed in any 
unspecified way, but served to establish an identification of the ego with the 
abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter 
could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the 
forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and 
the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the 
critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification.118 
 
                                                 
118 www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~schopra/FREUD/MOURNING%20AND%20MELANCHOLIA.doc 
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But this sense of a shadow falling over us could apply to mourning as well, for the main 
difference has to do with a lack of “disturbance in self-regard” in mourning. In depression, we 
hate ourselves—because we cannot have our object of love. In mourning, we cannot have the 
object of our love, but we can accept the loss as not having to do with our lack of self-worth. 
Obviously cases of overlap exist: “If I hadn’t been so selfish, she wouldn’t have gone out that 
night by herself . . . I never deserved her love . . .” Maybe we find ourselves in something like an 
overlapping case with respect to Sophia, with respect to Nature, with respect to an intimately 
meaningful Cosmos, an intimately meaningful Love Affair. Consider some of Freud’s other 
comments in light of our relationship with a sense of sacredness, our loss of positive 
psychoterratic feedback loop Albrecht speaks about, our loss of pre-conquest consciousness, our 
loss of an intimate connection to place and landscape (what eco-psychologists refer to as 
topophilia), our degradation of the world and the damage this does to our biophilia. In short, read 
this passage not through the lens of mere ego-psychology, but through the lens of Eco-
Psychology, and the nonduality of the human soul and the soul of the World, the intimate love 
we might naturally want to express and experience for Sophia as Gaia: 
The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly 
painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to 
love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a 
degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in 
a delusional expectation of punishment. This picture becomes a little more 
intelligible when we consider that, with one exception, the same traits are met 
with in mourning. The disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; but 
otherwise the features are the same. Profound mourning, the reaction to the loss of 
someone who is loved, contains the same painful frame of mind, the same loss of 
interest in the outside world - in so far as it does not recall him - the same loss of 
capacity to adopt any new object of love (which would mean replacing him) and 
the same turning away from any activity that is not connected with thoughts of 
him. It is easy to see that this inhibition and circumscription of the ego is the 
expression of an exclusive devotion to mourning which leaves nothing over for 
other purposes or other interests. It is really only because we know so well how to 
explain it that this attitude does not seem to us pathological. 
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We should regard it as an appropriate comparison, too, to call the mood of 
mourning a ‘painful’ one. We shall probably see the justification for this when we 
are in a position to give a characterization of the economics of pain. 
In what, now, does the work which mourning performs consist? I do not 
think there is anything far-fetched in presenting it in the following way. Reality-
testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to 
demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object. This 
demand arouses understandable opposition - it is a matter of general observation 
that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a 
substitute is already beckoning to them. This opposition can be so intense that a 
turning away from reality takes place and a clinging to the object through the 
medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis.¹ Normally, respect for reality gains 
the day. Nevertheless its orders cannot be obeyed at once. They are carried out bit 
by bit, at great expense of time and cathectic energy, and in the meantime the 
existence of the lost object is psychically prolonged. Each single one of the 
memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought 
up and hypercathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of 
it. Why this compromise by which the command of reality is carried out 
piecemeal should be so extraordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain in terms 
of economics. It is remarkable that this painful unpleasure is taken as a matter of 
course by us. The fact is, however, that when the work of mourning is completed 
the ego becomes free and uninhibited again. 
Let us now apply to melancholia what we have learnt about mourning. In 
one set of cases it is evident that melancholia too may be the reaction to the loss 
of a loved object. Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that 
there is a loss of a more ideal kind. The object has not perhaps actually died, but 
has been lost as an object of love (e.g. in the case of a betrothed girl who has been 
jilted). In yet other cases one feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss of 
this kind has occurred, but one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost, and 
it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously 
perceive what he has lost either. This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is 
aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense 
that he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him. This would 
suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is 
withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is 
nothing about the loss that is unconscious. 
In mourning we found that the inhibition and loss of interest are fully 
accounted for by the work of mourning in which the ego is absorbed. In 
melancholia, the unknown loss will result in a similar internal work and will 
therefore be responsible for the melancholic inhibition. The difference is that the 
inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we cannot see what it 
is that is absorbing him so entirely. The melancholic displays something else 
besides which is lacking in mourning - an extraordinary diminution in his self-
regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world 
which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself. The patient 
represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally 
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despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and 
punished. He abases himself before everyone and commiserates with his own 
relatives for being connected with anyone so unworthy. He is not of the opinion 
that a change has taken place in him, but extends his self-criticism back over the 
past; he declares that he was never any better. This picture of a delusion of 
(mainly moral) inferiority is completed by sleeplessness and refusal to take 
nourishment, and - what is psychologically very remarkable - by an overcoming 
of the instinct which compels every living thing to cling to life. 
 
In the face of our degradation of the planet, we may start to become increasingly restless, 
sleepless, and inclined to put our lives at risk. Why? Because we did not merely “cathect” some 
“object” and then lose the “object”. Rather, the whole possibility of meaning became degraded, 
corrupted, extracted, consumed, co-opted into an ego-centric pattern of insanity. Caught in the 
delusions of subject-object relations, we collapsed the conditions of life that make all 
relationality possible. We wallow in chains, in the shadow of lost meaning, in the shadow of a 
sacred world that we destroyed—that ego-centrism and conscious purpose destroyed, and thus 
the ego hates itself, however unconsciously.  
 
We can shift from a Freudian to a Jungian register and think of this shadow not as the eclipse of 
meaning, but as the shadow side of “science,” “reason,” “technology.” We can thus think of the 
shadow as the loss of an essential illumination, obscured by a nihilism we could heal, or we can 
think of it as the dark side of what could be illuminating the World if only we could heal it. 
There are other ways to think of it as well. But, however we think of our situation, we may want 
to admit that we might be mourning the loss of species, and we might feel melancholia because 
we do blame ourselves. We may feel quite unworthy and ineffectual in the face of the ongoing 
loss. We may do anything we can to medicate ourselves, but the weight of this incredible loss, 
and our culpability in it, may incline us to increase the pace of destruction, rather than doing the 
much more difficult work of healing what we have broken, torn, burned, fragmented, killed. This 
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melancholia differs from the one Freud considers, because we really have manifested, from a 
certain perspective, as worthy of rebuke. It would be like someone who felt melancholy for 
betraying their own mother or their dearest beloved. There is a deep mourning, then, for being 
the perpetrators of such a catastrophe, and for coming into the world cut off from the Earth, with 
no vitalizing Nature-Culture, with no sense of how to find a purpose that matters. 
 
And it matters that we cannot seem to kill without justification, even though the human species 
may be sadly, among mammals, the most likely by far to kill others of its own species . . . Isn’t 
that striking? We spend so much time trying to differentiate ourselves from other species, 
because of our ego-centrism . . . We tried to be the only animal who uses tools, then the only 
animal who makes tools, then the only animal capable of transitive inference, and on and on. We 
cannot find something that sets us apart—except for the fact that we seem to be the being most 
likely to kill others of its own species. And perhaps we are the being most inventive in the hunt. 
Yet, we cannot do this without justification. Once upon a time we painted The Others on sacred 
cavern walls, because we had to know how they participated in the life-death cycle with us, had 
to receive their sacred Yes in order to willfully take their lives. But now we go to the 
supermarket and get meat packed in Styrofoam and saranwrap—desacralization at its finest and 
most convenient. We are cut off, and yet we know the destruction the unfolds in our name, we 
know the degradation and debasement of life that goes altogether with the degradation of 
sacredness, and we know the incredible suffering that comes with it. We need to justify it, with 
nihilism or with rationalizations—or both. As Nietzsche suggested: We would rather will 
nothing than have nothing to will. 
 
512 
 
We should attend more to this issue of our suffering and our possible collective suicide attempt. 
There are a few dimensions to consider, and a variety of perspectives will help. On a basic level, 
Thich Nhat Hanh gets at something quite significant when he writes, 
The main affliction of our modern civilization is that we don’t know how to 
handle the suffering inside us and we try to cover it up with all kinds of 
consumption. Retailers peddle a plethora of devices to help us cover up the 
suffering inside. But unless and until we’re able to face our suffering, we can’t be 
present and available to life, and happiness will continue to elude us.119 
 
We don’t know how to handle suffering—or joy.  We don’t know what we are, and don’t seem 
to know how to work with whatever is arising in the moment. Even though Hanh applies the 
skillful means of all the philosophers in his tradition, it may behoove us to take care with the 
phrase, “the suffering inside us.” Though we experience suffering, so to speak, “within” our own 
basic mind stream, it is essential for us to recognize that the suffering we are not handling well is 
not merely our own personal suffering. When we see other beings suffering, we typically 
experience an empathic response, and this can lead to empathy distress. We will discuss this a 
little more later, but the basic problem here is that we can begin to numb, avoid, tune out, or 
otherwise fail to skillfully handle suffering in ourselves and in others—perhaps most especially 
so if we suspect our way of life goes together with the suffering we perceive. This is part of what 
almost seems like a double-bind in the ecological crisis: We have to change our whole way of 
life—and we want to, and we don’t want to, and we are scared to, and yet we sense we must, we 
know things can’t go on like this, but we want our fair share, but we sense it’s all out of balance . 
. . 
 
                                                 
119 https://www.lionsroar.com/5-practices-for-nurturing-happiness/ 
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It’s not always easy to put our finger on what is going on, in our own psyche and in the 
collective psyche, and a variety of psychodynamic perspectives seem quite useful when it comes 
to a full acknowledgement of the ecological crisis and the various issues bound up with it. For 
instance, Searles (1972) offers some provocative reflections, including some courageous 
confessions. The basic hypothesis Searles offers is that “man is hampered in his meeting of this 
environmental crisis by a severe and pervasive apathy which is based largely upon feelings and 
attitudes of which he is unconscious” (361). If it is unconscious, to say it again, this means we 
are not conscious of it. Of course, some of us may be conscious of certain aspects of what drives 
us in this crisis, but somehow elements of it remain unconscious, and we must do what we can to 
wake up. 
 
Searles mentions some of the more Freudian dynamics that we might find odd, but which seem 
worthy of reflection: 
First, it is apparent in how moralistic a spirit most communications about this 
subject are conveyed; the speaker or writer tells us, from a morally superior and 
therefore safe position, projecting his own Oedipal guilt upon us, that we have 
raped mother earth and now we are being duly strangled or poisoned, as by a 
vengeful Jehovah, for our sin. Second, we are given to feel that the ecologists are 
calling upon us to relinquish our hard-won genital primacy, symbolized by our 
proudly cherished but ecologically offensive automobile, and return to a state of 
childhood, when genital mastery was something longed for but not yet achieved; 
our apathy includes an unconscious defiant refusal to do this. Third, our fear, 
envy, and hatred of formidable Oedipal rivals makes us view with large-scale 
apathy their becoming polluted into extinction. (364) 
 
It is not clear whether the first part of this passage is meant to be how some unconscious 
dimension of our psyche receives the news of climate catastrophe. We certainly don’t hear a lot 
of “wrath of god” talk, and the moral superiority often seems directed at the worst offenders, the 
climate deniers and the corporate evil-doers. But any aspect of the conversation could be 
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received with these more stark connotations because of the fact that we are all at fault here, and 
most of us live our lives completely out of alignment with the nature of our situation. It’s an 
incredible double-bind, and could surely provoke a bit of insanity. Aside from threats to our 
sovereignty and our sense of guilt (and our possible ambivalence to children—not to be 
underestimated), Searles mentions the suicidal melancholia we considered with Freud: 
Mankind is collectively reacting to the real and urgent danger from environmental 
pollution much as does the psychotically depressed patient bent upon suicide by 
self-neglect—the patient who, oblivious to any urgent physical hunger, is letting 
himself starve to death or walks uncaring into the racing automobile traffic of a 
busy street. One day recently as I was driving on the Washington beltway, 
observing the general custom of traveling a few miles above the speed limit, it 
suddenly struck me that I was essentially hurrying to get off it—to get its 
murderously threatening, bleak, lonely, crowdedness over with. I wondered if the 
same were true of most of the other drivers also, perhaps without their realizing it. 
I wondered, is this not a fair sample of how we all feel not only about the beltway 
but about our whole current life as it is? Is not the general apathy in the face of 
pollution a statement that there is something so unfulfilling about the quality of 
human life that we react, essentially, as though our lives are not worth fighting to 
save? (365-6) 
 
I am not sure we register fully, at a conscious level, how ugly we have made the world, including 
how treacherous roads are, as artifacts of insanity, as places where we not only cut through 
Nature once, but cut through it in an ongoing way, cut ourselves off from Nature and from our 
own souls in an ongoing way. Highway and road systems mark off the human. The Others come 
into these places at their peril, and they often die for it, which I think upsets almost all of us 
when we see it, because it seems so obviously wasteful, sacrilegious. We have no good ethical, 
ontological, or aesthetic justification for so many roads and cars, so many profane and useless 
jobs. We could operate a Culture without these jobs and roads—even a Culture with significant 
technological development and total employment (for everyone has a place, a purpose, and it 
makes us sick when we cannot realize our purpose). We could just as easily have an intelligent 
mass transit system and wisely, compassionately, beautifully arranged work lives—work with 
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clear purpose, not the fake purposes of being a “team player” in a “work hard, play hard” 
corporate culture that does nothing more than perpetuate the pattern of insanity. The story teller 
or poet in us needs to do more than come up with slogans and sit-coms, the artist in us needs to 
do more than design logos and labels, the psychologist in us needs to do more than deal with 
customer complaints or close deals on used cars, the caretaker in us needs to do more than mop 
floors in a soulless office building or wait tables at a restaurant that serves mass-produced veal.  
 
Even at a modern university there are so many stupidities, so much designed ugliness, that it can 
feel depressing or even degrading to participate. As faculty watch the continued corporatization 
and growth of administration, as they see their work-life balance out of whack, as they struggle 
to get research done while overloaded with teaching and committee work, as they see their 
students stressed, overworked, living in crowded dorms and apartments, barely getting by 
financially, it can be hard to feel truly peaceful and joyful. If we wanted to serve the demands of 
education and the demands of sanity, we could probably double the number of faculty in most 
departments (with tenure for everyone). Currently, only about 25% of academic positions are 
tenure track, leaving the vast majority working as part of the precariat.120  Adjuncts and others in 
academia contend with a VUCA121 lifestyle that intertwines with and reflects in countless ways 
the lives of their students, their universities, and their world. According to a recent documentary 
                                                 
120 The figure comes from the AAUP: http://www.aaup.org/issues/contingency/background-facts   
Also see, Osborne, Bethany J, et al, “Introduction from the Special Issue Editors: Preparing 
Graduate Students for a Changing World of Work,” Canadian Journal of Higher Education, 
suppl. Preparing Graduate Students for a Changing World of Work 44.3 (2014).  
121 Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. This string of words, signified by the 
acronym VUCA, has been used in the U.S. military and elsewhere to characterize our 
contemporary global context. See, for instance, Euchner, James, “Navigating the VUCA World: 
An Interview with Bob Johansen.” Research Technology Management 56.1 (Jan/Feb 2013): 10-
15. DOI: 10.5437/08956308X5601003 
516 
 
on adjuncts, 31% of them live at or near the poverty line, 60% of part-time faculty have to work 
other jobs, and 1 in 4 part-time faculty receive public assistance.122 A report in the Chronicle of 
Higher Education indicates that roughly 360,000 people with graduate degrees applied for food 
stamps in 2010, including 33,655 people with PhD’s.123 Note also that if we value education, and 
if we see education like Socrates did (perhaps for different reasons), as one of the most crucial 
factors for securing the health of a society and the conditions of life that support it, we should 
also contemplate what it means that the average CEO makes 829 times more than the average 
adjunct professor.124  Adding to the problem, we find a shocking dearth of deep solidarity 
amongst faculty, graduate students, undergraduate students, staff, and administrators. In too 
many cases, the relationships within and between these groups is essentially lacking in active 
mutual support, at times adversarial, and in general lacking the power of functioning as a 
coordinated and compassionate community. In a basic way, things are not essentially better in 
other industries, and we all face the same ecological issues, the same designed ugliness, the same 
issues of nihilism, and so on. But it seems interesting to think about how dysfunctional education 
is. 
 
The VUCA lifestyle, the designed ugliness, the pervasive stupidities, and more come together 
with ecological degradation to produce a profound sense of loss, a traumatizing that we may not 
fully recognize, a grief we may try to avoid even acknowledging: 
Any reading of the ecological literature makes clear that ours is a time of 
significant ecological loss. Evidence accrues that the sixth mass extinction is well 
under way, that global eco-system productivity is in steep decline, and that the 
                                                 
122 http://www.alternet.org/education/brave-new-films-college-and-university-greed-driving-
adjunct-professors-poverty-across 
123 https://www.chronicle.com/article/From-Graduate-School-to/131795/ 
124 http://www.alternet.org/economy/bad-you-think-inequality-its-worse 
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biosphere as a whole is becoming irreparably damaged by human actions. In 
addition to being the subject of intense scientific scrutiny, global environmental 
change and regional ecological decline are increasingly embedded within 
everyday experience, evoking strong mental and emotional responses.  
In response, the mental health implications of global environ-mental 
change are gaining increasing research attention. This is particularly the case over 
the last decade, which has seen growing efforts to understand the mental health 
implications of climate change. Climate-related weather events and environmental 
changes, for example, have been linked to a wide variety of acute and chronic 
mental health experiences, including: strong emotional responses, such as 
sadness, distress, despair, anger, fear, helplessness, hopeless-ness and stress; 
elevated rates of mood disorders, such as depression, anxiety, and pre- and post-
traumatic stress; increased drug and alcohol usage; increased suicide ideation, 
attempts and death by suicide; threats and disruptions to sense of place and place 
attachment; and loss of personal or cultural identity and ways of knowing. 
An important concept emerging from peoples’ lived experiences of 
climate change directly related to mental health, but not well rep-resented in the 
current literature, is what we term ecological grief — the grief felt in relation to 
experienced or anticipated ecological losses, including the loss of species, 
ecosystems and meaningful landscapes due to acute or chronic environmental 
change. We contend that ecological grief is a natural response to ecological 
losses, particularly for people who retain close living, working and cultural 
relationships to the natural environment, and one that has the potential to be felt 
more strongly and by a growing number of people as we move deeper into the 
Anthropocene.  
To date, very little research has considered ecological grief an area of 
formal scientific inquiry, although the terms ‘grief’ and ‘mourning’ are finding 
increased application in the description of people’s lived experiences and personal 
responses to environmental change. In this Perspective, we argue that ecological 
grief is an important emergent area for psychological and geographical inquiry 
that has potential to shed light on personal and collective responses to ecological 
loss. Further, a better understanding of eco-logical grief has the potential to 
enhance understanding of the emotional and psychological dimensions of climate 
change impacts; to aid identification of what climate-related losses matter to 
people; and to identify opportunities to cope with or heal ecological grief and 
human suffering due to these ecological losses. We begin by examining the 
application of ecological grief within scientific research exploring the mental 
health implications of cli-mate change. We draw primarily (though not 
exclusively) upon our own multi-year research programmes around climate 
change-driven mental, emotional and grief responses in Northern Canada (by A. 
Cunsolo) and the Australian Wheatbelt (by N. Ellis) (see also Table 1). Building 
on this research, as well as a synthesis of avail-able relevant literature, we then 
offer a broad research agenda for ecological grief that calls for an expansion of 
the geographic and cultural application of ecological grief concepts, deep 
engagement with place and land, and engagement with the emerging policy 
domain of climate change loss and damage. Throughout, we note that under-
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standing the multitude of triggers for ecological grief, and the myriad ways in 
which people experience and express this grief, requires a pluralistic and 
interdisciplinary approach, bringing together at times differing and at times 
complementary research methods, disciplinary perspectives and lived 
experiences. We conclude by reflecting upon what ecological grief means for how 
we think about individual and collective mental well-being in the Anthropocene 
era, and for supporting the resourcefulness of individuals and communities 
increasingly at risk from climate change impacts.  
Grief is a natural human response to loss. To grieve the loss of a loved one 
is a common human experience, and one that all of us will encounter throughout 
the course of our lifetimes. From a develop-mental perspective, grief is the 
internal physiological and emotional responses to loss, and mourning is the period 
of mental, emotional and personal transition as people learn to live again in the 
context of loss. The processes of grieving and mourning can take many forms, 
differ across cultures, vary greatly among individuals, and even be experienced 
differently by the same individual each time a different loss is encountered. 
Although processes of grief and mourning are well understood in the 
psychological literature in response to the loss of a loved person, rarely are these 
concepts extended to losses encountered in the natural world20.We consider 
ecological grief to be a form of “disenfranchised grief” or a grief that isn’t 
publicly or openly acknowledged. Indeed, ecological grief, and the associated 
work of mourning, experienced in response to ecological losses are often left 
unconsidered, or entirely absent, in climate change narratives, policy and 
research. Yet, acknowledging hitherto unacknowledged forms of grief brings to 
light values and objects that are often considered outside the scope of human care 
and, by association, ethical responsibility. As discussed by Butler, for example, 
experiences of grief and mourning illuminate our relational ties and fundamental 
dependency upon complex ecological communities and, in turn, our ethical and 
political responsibilities to these systems. For Butler, and oth-ers28–30, grief and 
mourning have ‘we-creating’ capacities, exposing our known, unknown and 
unacknowledged connections to others, and allowing for opportunities to reach 
across differences to connect with others. In this light, grief and mourning can 
also question fundamental assumptions about what we choose to value — and 
what we choose to grieve and mourn — including climate change-induced 
ecological loss and degradation. (Cunsolo and Ellis 2018: 275-6) 
 
When we lose our essential connection with Nature, with the land, with the Others, we disrupt 
ecologies of mind that result in a loss of meaning altogether with a loss of knowing. Knowing 
and meaning go together. Our loss becomes unspeakable in a culture based on conquest 
consciousness—unspeakable because of its depth, and because we cannot fully acknowledge it. 
We cannot face it, and instead we avoid it. This may seduce us into suicidal activity, in part 
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because we are so out of our minds that we cannot think properly about our situation, and also 
because the suicidal tendencies come as a medication for our suffering. We feel a breakdown of 
meaning and mind with the breakdown of ecologies, we experience the suffering in ourselves 
and others, and we turn toward medications that themselves depend on the further breakdown of 
ecologies, mind, and meaning, medications like travel, shopping, consuming media, reading 
books, working at universities, doing scientific research, drinking, watching sports, and so on. 
 
Imagine something in you that wants to speak, wants to say to you, “We have experienced a 
profound loss. Beings are dying. The World has been raided, and as material has been extracted, 
meaning has withered. We have to face this loss. We have to grieve and then make things right. 
Things have to change. We cannot go on like this.” Who knows what the voice might say? But 
we simply experience an out-of-kilter feeling, vague or intense. We think our discomfort has to 
do with stress at work, busyness, bills, family troubles, anxiety, depression. What if the anxiety 
comes from not listening to ourselves? What if the busyness comes from not listening, and not 
wanting to listen? As the work of Francis Weller and Martἱn Prechtel suggests, we are not very 
good at grief in this culture, and maybe conquest consciousness has particular trouble with grief 
arising as a consequence of conquest consciousness.125 As we degrade our own soul by refusing 
to listen, refusing to accept what the World itself communicates in, through, as our soul, we 
endure a kind of slow suicide, and we enact that in the degradation of the World, however 
indirectly we may think it happens. In such a state of grief and suicidality, in such a state of loss, 
                                                 
125 See Weller’s, The Wild Edge of Sorrow: Rituals of Renewal and the Sacred Work of Grief, 
and Prechtel’s The Smell of Rain on Dust: Grief and Praise for some reflections on grief. Their 
work in light of the work on ecological grief indicates we have a lot of grieving to do, and we 
need productive ways to face it, or else we will continue to avoid it in the most unhelpful and 
destructive ways. 
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how can we think our thinking will be reliable? How can we trust a way of knowing that seems 
to go together with self-inflicted harm—again, however indirect we may think it is? 
 
Searles courageously confesses his own suicidal energies: 
 
For several years I have spent a long day each month working as a consultant at 
the New York State Psychiatric Institute in New York City. One evening a year or 
so ago, as I was returning by cab on the Triboro Bridge, on the way to LaGuardia 
to catch the shuttle plane back to Washington, I was seized by an urge to leap 
from the cab and hurl myself off the bridge. Such urges are no stranger to me, a 
sufferer since childhood from a phobia of heights. But the urge this time was 
particularly powerful, and the determinant I was able to glimpse, this time, of this 
tenacious, multirooted symptom was particularly memorable, humbling, and 
useful to me. I felt I had to destroy myself because I simply could not face 
returning to my usual life in Washington, and the reason I found it intolerable to 
face was that I felt so shamefully and desperately unable “simply” to face the 
living out of my life, the growing old and dying, the commonest, most everyday 
thing, so my panicky thoughts went, that nearly all people do—all, that is, with 
the exception of those who commit suicide or take refuge in chronic psychosis.  
However unique to my own individual life history must be the pattern of 
determinants that give rise to my particular omnipotent urge to destroy my life 
rather than surrender to the eventual losing of it through living and aging and 
dying, I insist that my urge is not entirely irrelevant to what transpires in my 
fellow human beings in general: I am convinced that each of us in his or her own 
particular way must cope with some such irrationally omnipotent reaction to 
inevitable loss.  
I postulate that an ecologically healthy relatedness to our nonhuman 
environment is essential to the development and maintenance of our sense of 
being human and that such a relatedness has become so undermined, disrupted, 
and distorted, concomitant with the ecological deterioration, that it is inordinately 
difficult for us to integrate the feeling experiences, including the losses, 
inescapable to any full-fledged human living. Over recent decades we have come 
from dwelling in an outer world in which the living works of nature either 
predominated or were near at hand, to dwelling in an environment dominated by a 
technology which is wondrously powerful and yet nonetheless dead, inanimate. I 
suggest that in the process we have come from being subjectively differentiated 
from, and in meaningful kinship with, the outer world, to finding this technology-
dominated world so alien, so complex, so awesome, and so overwhelming that we 
have been able to cope with it only by regressing, in our unconscious experience 
of it, largely to a degraded state of nondifferentiation from it. I suggest, that is, 
that this “outer” reality is psychologically as much a part of us as its poisonous 
waste products are part of our physical selves.  
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The proliferation of technology, with its marvelously complex integration 
and its seemingly omnipotent dominion over nature, provides us with an 
increasingly alluring object upon which to project our “nonhuman” unconscious 
strivings for omnipotence; hence we tend increasingly to identify, unconsciously, 
with this. Concomitantly, the more “simply human,” animal-nature-based 
components of our selves become increasingly impoverished (by reason of such 
factors as the overpopulation; the impersonal, driven turmoil of living in a 
technology-dominated society; the emphasis upon consuming material products; 
and so on), less and less capable of integrating our “nonhuman” components. 
More comprehensively, we become increasingly unable to consciously experience 
as an inner emotional conflict the war between the “human” and the “nonhuman” 
(autistic, omnipotence based) aspects of our self; hence we project this conflict 
upon, and thus unconsciously foster, the war in external reality between the 
beleaguered remnants of ecologically balanced nature and man's technology 
which is ravaging them.  
Many aspects of the ecologically deteriorating world in which we live 
foster in us, at a largely unconscious level, the mode of experience seen in an 
openly crystalized form in paranoid schizophrenia and postulated as 
characterizing the most threatened moments of normal infancy before the 
establishment of a durable sense of individuality. The pervasively and 
increasingly polluted world in which we live, where as one concerned individual 
was hardly overstating it when he said, “Everything we breathe, eat, and drink is 
going to kill us,” is reacted to as being our all-permeating enemy. This tends to 
paralyze us into terrorized inactivity, all the more so because in this deeply 
regressed mode of experience we are not at all well differentiated from the 
environment, hence we have no clearly separate self with which to wage a 
struggle with the “outer” threat. (367-9) 
 
The more Freudian interpretations may seem odd at first, but it can prove useful to sense how our 
situation might resonate with suicidal depression and even psychosis. The breakdown of 
meaning comes altogether with suffering of all kinds. We could say that it turns the whole world 
into a kind of new territory, a new culture we could call Sorrowville. Sorrowville came with a 
dream, especially in “America,” the global capital of Sorrowville. But the so-called “American 
Dream” has begun to fall apart. This is because our vision of life doesn’t function. In general, 
what we call capitalism involves deluded visions arising from beings who lack vision. Western 
leaders, both political and economic, have no real vision. They only know how to do more of the 
same: More samsara thinking, more “growth,” more of the same policies, tactics, strategies, and 
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styles of thought, speech, and action that are destroying the conditions of life. People are not 
really fooled by this, but we are not always sure what to do instead, and our not-being-fooled 
often remains unconscious.  
 
We have a kind of entangled hope for the “American Dream,” a hope that we can just work hard 
and be able to be happy and fulfilled. This is a special kind of samsara thinking, the thinking of 
the pattern of insanity that holds us. It creates Sorrowville in the extreme, because we cannot 
ever arrive at true happiness and fulfillment by working hard on behalf of a destructive and 
deluded system. In fact, the harder we work in a corrupt system, the more unhappy and 
unfulfilled we and those around us will feel. Eventually it will destroy us. Somehow, we all seem 
to sense that we want our energy to go into cultivating life and cultivating our own soul, at the 
same time. But the dominant culture can only pretend to facilitate this—and pretend it does, and 
the level of deceit required, including a manufactured self-deception for all its citizens, is 
remarkable. 
 
We may be able to fool ourselves a bit, and we may see some examples of people who appear 
happy and fulfilled by means of their success in the various games of Sorrowville, but deep 
down most of us know that things are not right, even if the self-deception mechanisms keep that 
sense of things repressed, or directed only at system-sanctioned enemies (“the terrorists,” the 
“bad actors” in domestic and foreign governments, “the immigrants,” and so on). Perhaps almost 
everyone feels it rather directly, and it creates a difficult situation: People feel spiritually 
bankrupt, and since they cannot imagine an alternative, they double down on Sorrowville. They 
buy a second house in Sorrowville, they cultivate more and more ties to Sorrowville, they run for 
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mayor of Sorrowville (metaphorically or literally), they deepen their debt in Sorrowville, they 
invest more time and energy into Sorrowville, they give more blood and sweat, they give more 
tears and cheers, they do everything they can to promote Sorrowville, trying to get themselves to 
believe in it, trying to tie themselves to hope, or even acting out a deranged kind of aggression 
against the world, a kind of dark nihilism that says, “Nothing matters! I can’t get what I really 
want, so I’m going to wreck this place. I hate this place!” They begin to hate life itself, or at least 
behave as if they do, as if they detest Nature and refuse to see anything sacred here.  
 
Sorrowville leads to trying to love ourselves by hating others and hating life itself, seeking 
fulfillment by being disconnected from ourselves and others and life. It can’t ever work. But we 
try awfully hard to make it work, because we are tired, frustrated, scared, hopeful, hungry . . . we 
can’t even name our deeper hunger or the object of our hope—not really. We don’t have the best 
resources for facing the situation. We just have a set of limited concepts in our samsaric 
thinking: Us and them, individual and collective, gain and loss, pain and pleasure, fame or lack 
of fame, praise and blame, haves and have-nots. This may seem overly simplistic, but we are in 
an important sense not very sophisticated in our thinking when we get stranded in Sorrowville 
(stranded like travelers who wanted to go to Shangri-La, but had to make a forced landing in 
some nightmarish town we never, ever wanted to visit, or, travelers who think they have indeed 
arrived in Shangri-La but actually wound up at a very bad carnival in the middle of nowhere). 
Stranded in Sorrowville, our thinking can sometimes be complicated, but it’s not particularly 
sophisticated, nuanced, and elegant. We’re a little too angry, fearful, confused, doubtful, 
deprived, and desperate for anything but rather simplistic kinds of thinking. Things may seem 
different in academia, but the thinking there is sometimes complicated rather than complex 
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(perhaps more often than feels easy to admit), and even in the most sophisticated cases it may not 
involve itself in anything like the rebellion against the dominant culture that seems needed right 
now. Sophia thinking, the thinking of a better way of knowing, takes more patience (or 
inclusiveness) and generosity than we allow ourselves to have, more wholesomeness and 
concentration, and more joyful perseverance and wisdom, and many of these qualities are 
lacking in academic ecologies. Sophia thinking demands love, and we don’t get taught how to 
really unleash our capacity for love—which in turn demands real wisdom, real discernment, or 
else it is not true love. 
 
So, even though the diagnosis might seem different between academic ecologies and other 
ecologies, there is more in common than we might at first think. In fact, the diagnosis applies to 
all those in education, including parents. Whether we are “liberal” or “conservative,” whether we 
are highly “educated” or not, we can sometimes think of ourselves as above the messes in the 
world. We think the problem rather obviously lies with “those liberals,” or some other “bad 
actors” or “backward thinkers” who lack our reasonable and informed perspective on life. 
Sometimes an advanced education, or even membership in a particular religion or political party, 
can give us the feeling of being beyond the kind of consciousness, beyond the evil and ignorance 
that has created the unprecedented disaster we all find ourselves in, but we in education, at all 
levels (though, in some sense maybe more so at the university level), must look at the ways in 
which we collude with forces that harm the conditions of life, and begin to come together to 
consider ways of actively recognizing and resisting these forces.  
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Altogether with the breakdown of the conditions of life comes the breakdown of meaning, 
including the meaning of education, the meaning of our work and careers, and the meaning of 
life itself.126 We begin to feel bereft. The conditions of life, the wisdom and wildness within and 
without, are our source of meaning, and they are collapsing.127  
 
Realizing the meaning of life is intimately interwoven with the realization of our function in life 
(what we could poetically refer to as our soul purpose), and neither of these can be derived from 
or entangled with something like “capitalism,” “business,” “money,” “economic growth,” or any 
kind of materialistic consumption. Our soul purpose cannot even be tied to a “career” or “job” in 
any ordinary sense. We do need to make a living, and we needn’t feel that a medium of exchange 
is inherently “dirty” or “beneath” us. However, making a living has to mean making the 
conditions of life thrive, and when we can sense (even unconsciously) that the way we make a 
living either degrades life or does little to further it, we have to talk ourselves into the 
meaningfulness of it (which fails even if it succeeds, because the success involves denial, 
repression, and an inner conflict). Without life, no meaning is possible (and vice versa), so we 
                                                 
126 The breakdown of relative meaning comes as a consequence of losing touch with the 
immediate meaningfulness of life. The meaning of anything arises in relationship with our 
contact with, our intimacy with the meaningfulness of life. The meaningfulness of life is not a 
pre-given idea or concept, but the ground of all possible meaning. Evolution, for instance, 
depends on meaningfulness. We can try to convince ourselves of the randomness and mechanical 
nature of evolution, but this is a matter of magical thinking, in the pejorative sense. We don’t live 
in a vast machine with “meanings” sprayed on the surface like pointless graffiti. The Cosmos is 
alive and alove, with meaningfulness “all the way down”. 
127 Among other things, we now have research into solastalgia, nature deficit disorder, ecology, 
and ecopsychology that confirms how the degradation of the conditions of life degrades our 
psychological, spiritual, and physical health. “Solastalgia” is a term coined by the philosopher 
Glenn Albrecht to indicate the suffering caused by the loss of the solace which healthy ecologies 
provide—not just psychological “comfort” really . . . healthy ecologies are the well-spring of 
well-being for us.   
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must therefore enter into a real relationship with life—which is what philosophy as a way of life 
is about, what the arts of awareness facilitate, what a vitalizing Nature-Culture practices and 
realizes. It’s not easy in the absence of good philosophy, and as we become more and more 
afraid and full of self-doubt, and when the dominant culture attempts to keep itself going by 
means of perpetuating fear, craving, hatred, doubt, and ignorance—and a lot of destruction. 
 
When we get scared, we can accentuate our ignorance. Our ignorance amounts to attempting to 
defy reality. It’s both tragic and comic that we can live our lives in a way that attempts to defy 
reality, and yet this is the core of “American culture,” which of course is not easy to define. The 
most healthy kind of Culture would focus its resources on helping every one of its members to 
attune with reality. That is not the case in U.S. culture, where “reality” is a brand of 
entertainment, and the health of the collective soul can be measured by the fact that the dominant 
culture elected a “reality television” “star” as its political “leader”. Such an evaluation is not 
itself political. We are not here debating whether, in that election, we elected the candidate with 
the right political ideas. Neither establishment candidate seemed the right choice if we wanted to 
get ourselves back in touch with reality and avert the catastrophes we are currently heading 
toward. 
 
The point is that “reality” now has nothing to do with a profound, transformative engagement 
with life or the divine, with how things are, with our soul purpose, and with our basic capacity 
for wisdom, love, and beauty. But this is not a new thing, something that happened when Trump 
got elected, or some cultural artifact. Reality has been gone in academia for some time, we could 
say, if reality has to do with the kinds of things spiritual traditions and their arts of awareness put 
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us in touch with. Failing to verify spiritual realities, we in academia have helped to verify a post-
truth landscape. This is our practice too.  
 
Verification of wisdom, love, peace, and so on, in the laboratory of the heart, the heart-mind-
body-world-cosmos, is not really an option in the modern university, and though some 
academics (and non-academics too) will marvel at the election of a reality television star and 
think it has to do with those “other” people who elected him, they may not see their own 
contribution to the crisis we all face. One will be hard pressed to find university courses on how 
to live, how to love, how to die, the importance of dream and how to work with dream, how to 
find one’s soul purpose, or how to know Self and World. A university course called “How to 
Know Reality” would be rather anomalous in the dominant culture. One could make a long list 
of courses that almost certainly don’t exist at all (perhaps there are a handful of such course in 
the whole of the U.S.) but which might be standard offerings in a more healthy culture.  
 
Shifting our epistemology goes altogether with seeing how badly we know ourselves and the 
World, how unrealistically our political, economic, and educational systems function. The 
altogetherness matters, and today’s philosopher should likely see themselves as symbolically 
living out the life of Socrates. That is not a good thing. It means we have come to a crisis, and 
our prophesies for the culture should be foreboding. The “American dream” is quite a nightmare 
for many—it has infected all the beings of the planet—and indeed, as in a nightmare, many of us 
don’t feel we have any influence over events.  
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It is strange that our inquiry pushes us towards an epistemology that gives up control, but one 
which also must empower us. We make a duality between “control” and “no control”. Neither 
functions. But, in our way of knowing the political reality of the dominant culture, the vast 
majority of people must feel a sense that they do not control their own fate, and that injustice is 
systemic. We may feel skeptical about this, but we must recall again that ecologies of mind 
beyond the merely conscious can know things before the conscious mind does. It does seem that 
people have irrational conscious views, but those may arise from unconscious conflicts, or 
unconscious knowings the ego must repress.  
 
In any case, recent research demonstrates that the political system is not truly democratic, and 
that can have a psychological impact on anyone who disagrees with those who actually control 
the society, especially if they also realize they are likely in a majority. It’s like we are being gas 
lighted on a mass scale, and that too could drive a psychotic and/or suicidal reaction, thus 
intensifying the pattern of insanity and impelling us to drive the conditions of life to collapse. 
Politics has become a theater of nihilism, and this could provoke or further any melancholy, 
mourning, and even suicidal feelings we have. Wrecking the planet might even give us the only 
form of control we think we might have, for we can sense how we have precious little control 
over the organization of society, even if we are supposed to have some semblance of democratic 
spirit in the republic.  
 
If we have no control, and if politicians and corporations nevertheless speak as if they are doing 
right by us, doesn’t that seem like a kind of crazy-making? If there were any doubt about our 
lack of influence, Gilens and Page (2014) found that “economic elites and organized groups 
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representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, 
while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence” 
(564). They in fact go further. At the time their work was published, no previous study had been 
able to apply a single statistical model to test theories of how politics actually functions in the 
U.S., and so we could perhaps repress our intuitions and the apparent evidence and think 
optimistically. But Gilens and Page found a way to do such an analysis, and they uncovered 
something disappointing but unsurprising: 
What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute 
troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments 
to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In 
the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in 
the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of 
citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally 
lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political 
system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they 
generally do not get it. (576) 
 
So, “liberals” don’t control the political “reality,” nor do unions, or “conservatives,” or 
immigrants, or any other group we love to blame (Jewish people, Arabs, Mexicans, whatever). 
Rather, a small band of economic elites control things, and they are not on the side of the average 
person, who is essentially disenfranchised. Ordinary citizens have little control—at least, 
ordinary citizens as they currently practice and realize their lives, their World. Ordinary citizens 
do have tremendous potential power, especially if they root themselves in wisdom, love, and 
beauty. As Hume pointed out:  
Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with a 
philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the 
few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and 
passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is 
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effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the 
governors have nothing to support them but opinion.128 
 
Somehow or other, we have—all of us together—gotten opinions “in our heads” that function 
very well for the structures of power and domination that keep us in Sorrowville.  
 
And it’s not just “us”. A recent Gallup poll which surveyed people from all over the world found 
that the U.S. is viewed as “the greatest threat to peace in the world” by a large margin (the 
biggest threat is not Iran, which barely registers). This too can promote crazy-making, or at least 
animosity, as we try to embrace the image of the U.S. as a peace-promoting society, while we 
sense otherwise, from our own soul and even from other people, who must then become enemies 
of some measure if they express a view that perceives the U.S. as less than wonderful. The 
survey also found that a third of those polled thought the world would be better off if there were 
more female politicians.129 I strongly agree. But this is a minority opinion, and, again, our 
general opinions are somehow conducive to the less better off world we have, the world of 
Sorrowville. 
 
For some reason, many of us hold on to the opinion or the notion that we are living in a 
“democracy”. I am not sure how we should define that term. The philosopher Lewis Mumford 
gave a definition that helps get at something important about democracy: 
“Democracy” is a term now confused and sophisticated by indiscriminate use, and 
often treated with patronizing contempt. Can we agree, no matter how far we 
might diverge at a later point, that the spinal principle of democracy is to place 
                                                 
128 Available online: http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL4.html  Hume is 
here, I think, essentially taking up the concerns that Socrates voices in dialogues such as Meno 
and Republic. The dangers of human opinion and belief can hardly be overstated, and we cannot 
root a culture in opinions, even “correct” ones. 
129 http://www.wingia.com/en/services/about_the_end_of_year_survey/global_results/7/33/ 
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what is common to all men above that which any organization, institution, or 
group may claim for itself?130 
 
An important thing there seems to be a more realistic view about how we relate to each other and 
the conditions of life. Some things should not belong to anyone—including “individuals,” which 
Mumford does not specifically mention in this passage. The things we hold in common transcend 
organizations, institutions, and groups. They also transcend each of us as individuals. This 
principle actually protects us as individuals, allowing us to realize ourselves, to realize our 
potentials and our purpose. And it makes for common sense: If you see a hundred people peeing 
just upstream from where you are standing, you will not drink from the river; if you actually 
need the river for your survival, you will not feel ethically satisfied if those hundred people (or, a 
single wealthy individual) were to claim they “own” the river and can do as they please with it. 
Yet we allow some people or groups (including, perhaps principally, corporations) to dump 
toxins in our rivers and streams. We allow many corporations to do whatever they want with the 
land and other things we hold in common (“hold” in a caring way, things we care for altogether, 
that which we all hold in our heart-mind-body-World-Cosmos).  
 
The Sauk chief Black Hawk said, “My reason teaches me that land cannot be sold. The Great 
Spirit gave it to his children to live upon, and cultivate as far as is necessary for their 
subsistence” (from Philip 2005: 31). Similarly, Crowfoot of the Blackfeet said, 
Our land is more valuable than your money . . . We cannot sell the lives of men 
and animals. It was put here by the Great Spirit and we cannot sell it because it 
does not belong to us. You can count your money and burn it within the nod of a 
buffalo’s head, but only the Great Spirit can count the grains of sand and the 
blades of grass on the plains. As a present to you, we will give you anything we 
have that you can take with you; but the land, never. (from Philip 2005: 31-2) 
 
                                                 
130 Available at http://www.primitivism.com/mumford.htm 
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This same thought has occurred to people in western culture as well. For instance, consider this 
famous passage from Rousseau: 
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of 
saying, “This is mine,” and found people simple enough to believe him, was the 
real founder of civil society.131 From how many crimes, wars and murders, from 
how many horrors and misfortunes might not anyone have saved mankind, by 
pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, “Beware of 
listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the 
earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.”132 
 
Think about how this resonates with Sorenson’s findings regarding liminal awareness: 
 
Any form of subjugation, even those barriers to freedom imposed by private 
property, are the kiss of death to this type of life. Though durable and self-
repairing in isolation, the unconditional open trust this way of life requires 
shrivels with alarming speed when faced with harsh emotions or coercion. Deceit, 
hostility, and selﬁshness when only episodic temporarily benumb intuitive 
rapport. When such conditions come to stay and no escape is possible, intuitive 
rapport disintegrates within a brutally disorienting period of existential trauma 
and anomie.133 
 
The Culture Sorenson studied remains inconceivable to us. It involves a nonduality of the 
individual and the community, and in the dominant culture we have tremendous fears around this 
duality. Those fears might best be healed through the practice-and-realization of nonduality, but 
                                                 
131 One is tempted to read “evil society” here, not because society itself is inherently evil, but 
because our notion, our vision, our practice of “civilization” has so far not manifested a 
profoundly ethical orientation, and the consequences of that have led to significant evil. We have 
not rooted “civilization” in WisdomLoveBeauty. A true Culture needs to cultivate Wisdom, 
Love, and Beauty. Culture that does not cultivate mutual nourishment, mutual rejuvenation, 
mutual healing, mutual illumination, and mutual liberation is not Culture but mere “evil society,” 
which we refer to as “civilization” or conquest consciousness. Tragically, such societies may be 
filled with many lovely people who sincerely wish to do good, and whose core values have 
nothing to do with anything evil. The trouble is that “civil society” can co-opt the values of its 
citizens, and this is what makes them complicit in the evils that society does. Our situation may 
seem daunting, but somehow or other we have to call forth a transformation, in ourselves and in 
the culture. 
132 From his Discourse on Inequality, available online: 
https://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/cvsp/Documents/DiscourseonInequality.pdf879500092.pdf 
133 http://ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html 
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it may prove challenging. We should at least note that what Sorenson and Rousseau are talking 
about does not mean we can have no peace and privacy. We can practice and realize a right to 
dwell peacefully someplace, feeling secure, feeling genuinely at home, able to have confidence 
in our privacy and safety. It is to say that we can only truly have this, and share it with all, if it 
grows out of a realistic view of the whole. The main point is that a genuine sense of being 
peaceful and at home in the world is a matter of philosophical practice-realization, not a matter 
of laws, and conflict between the individual and the collective can only arise if those have been 
dualized. Sorenson did not notice any such conflict with respect to pre-conquest consciousness. 
 
Somehow or other, we (the dominant culture in particular) bought into the idea that the Earth can 
belong to individuals. This got bound up with capitalism and conquest in an altogether way, just 
as science and technology got bound up with capitalism and conquest. Science and technology 
arises already from conquest consciousness, and this goes altogether with the epistemic failures 
we can find in them. We might suggest that part of the motivation for holding onto science as we 
do, for fighting against any reasonable remembrance and rejuvenation of the roots of philosophy, 
spirituality, and religion has to do with what we have sacrificed, what we have degraded for the 
sake of science-and-technology (it helps to see them in their non-duality). 
 
At some point, “the American Dream” emerged as a special variety of delusion to keep us all 
going along with the structures of power and domination that rule the nation and largely shape 
the world. The United States was, as the historian Gordon Wood points out, founded in such a 
way as to control any democratic inspirations that were emerging at the time—and that control 
continues. Wood shows that the Constitution itself was “intrinsically an aristocratic document 
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designed to check the democratic tendencies of the period” in order to “restore and prolong the 
traditional kind of elitist influence in politics that social developments, especially since the 
Revolution, were undermining” (1998: 513).  
 
Wood grants that the deep division over the Constitution during the time of the Constitutional 
Convention is not easy to analyze, since, for instance, there were wealthy men on both sides of a 
political divide. Nevertheless, looking carefully, he finds that the debate was largely “a social 
one,” and that, even though there were wealthy men on both sides of the debate, one side seemed 
more interested in the general welfare, such that the debate was “fundamentally one between 
aristocracy and democracy” (484-5). Wood quotes one Antifederalist (those opposing the 
Constitution) who wrote that the Federalists were trying to essentially nullify the Revolution, in 
order to “lord it over the rest of their fellow citizens, to trample the poorer part of the people 
under their feet, that they may be rendered servants and slaves” (488).  
 
Wood notes that the Antifederalists had a very tough time making their case, in part because “out 
of a hundred or more newspapers printed in the late eighties only a dozen supported the 
Antifederalists” (486). The Antifederalists also keenly perceived the influence of men of wealth 
and fame. Wood points out that, “Although to a European, American society may have appeared 
remarkably egalitarian, to many Americans, especially to those who aspired to places of 
consequence but were made to feel their inferiority in innumerable, often subtle ways, American 
society was distinguished by its inequality” (488). There were a host of economic, social, and 
political factors at work that served to mark off a de facto aristocracy whose influence was 
impossible for the Antifederalists to resist, because, as Wood puts it, “to the continual annoyance 
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of the Antifederalists, the great body of the people willingly submitted to it” (489). We are back 
to Hume, and also Socrates.  
 
This is in fact the main point of our discussion here. We are trying to think spiritually and 
philosophically, and all of this is not meant as a history lesson in the typical sense. History can 
be very important—depending on how we handle it (usually not very well)—but in all our 
history lessons, we rarely focus on the spiritual dimension. We tend to get hung up on delusions 
of progress. The sins of “history” as an invention, if we reflect on them, reveal the genius of 
Mythology as a superior approach to organizing a Culture, a Nature-Culture, and synchronizing 
souls to the sacredness of life. The individual soul is interwoven with the collective soul, and this 
in turn is interwoven with the soul of the World. Our own liberation thus goes together with the 
liberation of all our fellow citizens and all our fellow beings. These things a Mythology helps to 
reveal. But we are stuck with “history”. Even in history, though, we can sense that we are all in 
this together, whether we have “conservative” or “liberal” political views. And history can also 
teach us that many of our views are not really ours to begin with, and that they in one way or 
another function quite well for the small portion of the population who actually control most of 
the wealth and power in our society. 
 
Spiritually speaking we have many interesting lessons to learn from our “history” and our 
present. For instance, we think our ideas and opinions belong to us. I see this in my students all 
the time. They speak with tremendous sincerity, as if they are voicing their own ideas and 
opinions. A student tells me something I have heard a hundred times before, something that fits 
perfectly into the logic of Sorrowville, and they say it as if they were the first to think this 
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thought, as if they arrived at this thought by careful reasoning, and as if the thought will lead to 
liberation. In sharing this, I am not playing the part of the jaded teacher. The issue is that I know 
my students can indeed arrive at skillful thinking. They are fully capable of Sophia thinking or 
Original Thinking (thinking that arises from our self-liberation into larger ecologies of mind), but 
they are not going to do much of it in a culture that would be deeply threatened by Original Mind 
and its wisest, most loving and beautiful manifestations.  
 
In general, we think our ideas and opinions belong to us, but in fact we belong to these ideas and 
opinions—and they will always limit us. LoveWisdom means getting beyond ideas and opinions, 
touching the unlimited dimension of our being, while keeping an eye on the ways we are lived by 
powers we pretend to understand. We have to liberate ourselves from our own opinions, even 
from our own sense of what is reasonable and rational—but without thereby becoming 
unreasonable or irrational. 
 
We may have to liberate ourselves from many of the principles and notions that shaped the 
development of the dominant culture. For instance, we seem to take it as a given that we need a 
separation of church and state, but it is not clear that we know how that may require 
differentiation from the impossibility of separating spirituality and culture—i.e. that politics 
cannot be fully separated from religion, from sacredness, holiness, health, healing, and all 
matters of soul that philosophical/spiritual/religious traditions have always attended to. “Secular” 
can only mean inclusive, not a-religious, non-religious, or atheistic.  
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Consider, for instance, one of Locke’s expressions of his view of the separation of the secular 
and the religious, a view we can sense at work as a rationalization in the dominant culture: 
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil 
government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the 
one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies 
that will be always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on 
the one side, a concernment for the interest of men's souls, and, on the other side, 
a care of the commonwealth. 
 
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the 
procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. 
 
Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession 
of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.134  
 
There are at least two troubling issues here: Politics becomes focused on “materiality” and 
“possession” on the one hand, and the health of the soul is cut off from political life on the other. 
This may not be the best way of characterizing the problem with Locke’s expression, but it gets 
us close. Locke is one of the icons of the very epistemology our inquiry suggests we need to 
overcome, and given his influence on the development of the dominant culture, this stands out. 
We have a basic issue of epistemology, but also an issue of the nature of philosophy/spirituality. 
Locke’s view here does not seem to be other than a challenge to the Socratic view, which holds 
that the resonance between individual soul and collective soul, and the life-and-death importance 
of the care of our soul, demand that our political life make a central place for the soul, and thus a 
central place for LoveWisdom, which for Socrates surely seems to have a religious or spiritual 
character. Socrates seems to recommend justice on the basis of righteousness and a direct 
experience of the sacredness of all things (sacred, for instance, in terms of their participation in 
                                                 
134 http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1651-1700/john-locke-letter-concerning-toleration-
1689.php 
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the Good). A healthy society depends on a healthy soul, and there seems to be no way to evade 
that, and the hard work comes to finding a way for that to function inclusively.  
 
On balance we could respectfully suggest that Socrates might find Locke a “person of no 
account”—a major problem given Locke’s influence on the reasoning and rationalization of the 
dominant culture. I don’t think Locke can give an account that will stand up to scrutiny, for this 
dualism between the sacred and the profane seems untenable, as our inquiry continues to 
suggest—though, this is not a study of Locke, and we examine a few Lockean artefacts merely as 
representative symptoms, as part of our overall inquiry, which invites us to see the altogetherness 
of what we call epistemology, politics, ethics, and what we might call spirituality. 
 
We need not say that the only alternative to this sort of Lockean view is the unification of church 
and state. Any particular church and any particular religion cannot rule in a diverse, inclusive and 
democratic society. But it seems urgent to notice the negative side-effects that seem to come out 
of a few of Locke’s basic views, not least of which the fact that, in the dominant culture, we raise 
managers, CEO’s, politicians. We do not raise spiritual/philosophical Elders and 
philosophically/spiritually mature leaders (which would mean psychologically healthy and 
mature human beings). Put another way, as Sheldon Wolin demonstrates in his magisterial 
Politics and Vision, a political order comes with a vision, a vision of what a human being is and 
is for, what the World is and is for, what a society is and is for. Our inquiry suggests that this is 
always a philosophical matter, but philosophy as we mean it here is inherently spiritual, 
inherently embracing of the religious impulse. There is no way to get the spiritual out the World, 
the soul, the society without making all of us sick. If we like, we can be a stiff-lipped atheist 
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about it and just mark this up to the sheer number of religious people in the World (even though 
our inquiry suggests it’s a matter of interwovenness, not mere opinion that these things go 
together). As Nasr points out: 
Obviously, for those for whom religion is still a reality, it is much easier to appeal 
to religion and the religious view of nature to discover the means through which a 
solution would be found for the [ecological] crisis from which we all suffer.  
 
We often forget that the vast majority of people in the world still live by religion. 
And yet most Western intellectuals think about environmental issues as if 
everyone were an agnostic following a secular philosophy cultivated at Oxford, 
Cambridge, or Harvard, and so they seek to develop a rationalist, environmental 
ethics based on agnosticism, as if this would have any major effect whatsoever 
upon the environmental crisis. It is important to consider in a real way the world 
in which we live. If we do so then we must realize why in fact religion is so 
significant both in the understanding and in the solution of the environmental 
crisis. Let us not forget, I repeat, that the vast majority of people in the world live 
according to religion. The statistic that is often given, saying that only half of 
humanity does so, is totally false because it is claimed that in addition to the West 
one billion two hundred million Chinese are atheists or non-religious. This is not 
at all the case. Confucianism is not a philosophy, but a religion based upon 
ritual—I shall come back to that in a few moments. There are at most a few 
hundred million agnostics and atheists spread mostly in the Western world, with 
extensions into a few big cities in Asia and Africa. But this group forms a small 
minority of the people of the world. Those who live on the other continents, as 
well as many people in Europe and America, still live essentially in a religious 
world. Although in the West the religious view of nature has been lost, even here 
it is still religion to which most ordinary people listen, while the number is much 
greater in other parts of the globe. That is why any secularist ideology that tries to 
replace religion always tries also to play the role of religion itself. This has 
happened with the ideology of modern science in the West, which for many 
people is now accepted as a “religion.” That is why the people who try to sell you 
many kinds of goods on television do so as “scientists”—as agents of 
“authority”—and always wear a white robe, not a black robe of traditional priests. 
They are trying to look like members of the new “priesthood.” They function as 
the priesthood of a pseudo-religion. Their whole enterprise is made to appear not 
as simply ordinary science but as something that replaces religion. For people 
who accept this thesis it would be feasible to accept a rationalistic ethics related to 
science, but the vast majority of people in the world still heed authentic religion. 
Consequently, for them, no ethics would have efficacy unless it was religious 
ethics. . . .  
The fact remains that the vast majority of people in the world do not 
accept any ethics which does not have a religious foundation. This means in 
practical terms that if a religious figure, let us say, a mulla or a brahmin in India 
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or Pakistan, goes to a village and tells the villagers that from the point of view of 
the Sharī’ah (Islamic law) or the Law of Manu (Hindu law) they are forbidden to 
cut this tree, many people would accept. But if some graduate from the University 
of Delhi or Karachi, who is a government official, comes and says, for rational 
reasons, philosophical and scientific reasons, that it is better not to cut this tree, 
few would heed his advice. So from a practical point of view the only ethics 
which can be acceptable to the vast majority, at the present moment in the history 
of the world, is still a religious ethics. The very strong prejudice against religious 
ethics in certain circles in the West which have now become concerned with the 
environmental crisis is itself one of the greatest impediments to the solution 
of the environmental crisis itself. (1989: 29-31) 
 
More current demographics are not easy to determine, but I have not seen any indication that 
atheists and agnostics exceed roughly 7% of global population. With possibly 93% or more of 
our global human family rooted in something they can call religion or a religious sensibility, it is 
not clear how we can keep religious/spiritual concepts or a religious/spiritual attitude out of our 
conversation about the most serious problems we face. It’s just that we have to find ways to do 
this inclusively. Moreover, we can make good use of the arts of awareness and the 
epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic values that all religious/spiritual/philosophical traditions 
share. There is a common ground of wisdom, love, and beauty that can function as the common 
ground of an inclusive and pluralistic society that doesn’t have to try and ignore the sacred, and 
thus put us at odds with Nature. 
 
There are at least a few key dynamics at work in these contemplations. For one thing, we are 
getting at the epistemological error Bateson pointed out. Recall Bateson’s suggestion that “our 
loss of the sense of aesthetic unity was, quite simply, an epistemological mistake,” and he invites 
us to see how “that mistake may be more serious that all the minor insanities that characterize 
those older epistemologies which agreed upon the fundamental unity” (MN:18). Nasr gets at the 
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same sense of aesthetic unity, which in philosophical/spiritual terms we can refer to as the 
sacred: 
The unifying vision which related knowledge to love and faith, religion to 
science, and theology to all the departments of intellectual concern is finally 
completely lost, leaving a world of compartmentalization where there is no 
wholeness because holiness has ceased to be of central concern, or is at best 
reduced to sentimentality. In such a world those with spiritual and intellectual 
perspicacity sought, outside of the confines of this ambience, to rediscover their 
traditional roots and the total functioning of the intelligence which would once 
again bestow upon knowledge its sacramental function and enable men to 
reintegrate their lives upon the basis of this unifying principle, which is 
inseparable from both love and faith. For others, for whom such a criticism of the 
modern world and rediscovery of the sacred was not possible but who, at the same 
time, could not be lulled to sleep before the impoverished intellectual and spiritual 
landscape which was presented to them as modern life, there was only lament and 
despair which, in fact, characterizes so much of modern literature and which the 
gifted Welsh poet Dylan Thomas was to epitomize in the poem that was also to 
become his elegy: 
 
Too proud to die, broken and blind he died 
The darkest way, and did not turn away, 
A cold kind man brave in his narrow pride 
Being innocent, he dreaded that he died 
Hating his God, but what he was was plain. 
An old kind man brave in his burning pride. 
 
But because God is both merciful and just, the light of the Intellect could not be 
completely eclipsed nor could this despair be the final hymn of contemporary 
man. (1989: 39) 
 
Later in the same lecture series, Nasr tells us that, 
 
Knowledge of the sacred leads to freedom and deliverance from all bondage and 
limitation because the Sacred is none other than the limitless Infinite and the 
Eternal, while all bondage results from the ignorance which attributes final and 
irreducible reality to that which is devoid of reality in itself, reality in its ultimate 
sense belonging to none other than the Real as such. That is why the sapiential 
perspective envisages the role of knowledge as the means of deliverance and 
freedom, of what Hinduism calls mokśa. To know is to be delivered. Traditional 
knowledge is in fact always in quest of the rediscovery of that which has been 
always known but forgotten, not that which is to be discovered, for the Logos 
which was in the beginning possesses the principles of all knowledge and this 
treasury of knowledge lies hidden within the soul of man to be recovered through 
recollection. The unknown is not out there beyond the present boundary of 
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knowledge but at the center of man’s being here and now where it has always 
been. And it is unknown only because of our forgetfulness of its presence. It is a 
sun which has not ceased to shine simply because our blindness has made us 
impervious to its light. 
The traditional concept of knowledge is concerned with freedom and 
deliverance precisely because it relates principial knowledge to the Intellect, not 
merely to reason, and sees sacred knowledge in rapport with an ever-present 
Reality which is at once Being and Knowledge, not with a process of 
accumulation of facts and concepts through time and based on gradual growth and 
development. Without denying this latter type of knowledge which in fact has 
existed in all traditional civilizations, tradition emphasizes that central knowledge 
of the sacred and sacred knowledge which is the royal path toward deliverance 
from the bondage of all limitation and ignorance, from the bondage of the outside 
world which limits us physically and the human psyche which imprisons the 
immortal soul within us. (267-8) 
 
We contemplate a suggestion some will find challenging: That a vitalizing epistemology 
includes, rather than excludes, at least some of what we have written off as “religious”. Bateson 
tried to suggest that religions contain in their doctrines and practices valid and viable ways of 
liberating ourselves into larger ecologies of mind, and thus enabling us to take action in the 
world on the basis of wisdom, love, and beauty, rather than mere conscious purpose, however 
well rationalized on the basis of “science,” “politics,” “economics,” or “philosophy”. Religions 
have to do with getting us beyond our ego, and putting us in touch with . . . call it “God” if you 
like, or Sophia, or Brahman, or the unconscious, or the Self. If we disagree too much on what 
“it” says, we have either tried to commit the intellectualist fallacy, or we have made some other 
error—for we remain fallible beings. In any case, we can suggest here that we both require 
religion for what it offers in terms of liberating us into wisdom, love, and beauty, and for the 
sake of meeting our responsibility to the World, for it seems, increasingly so to me, that we 
somehow seem to need to practice and realize the sacredness of the World (and this means 
something in the basic spirit of “religion,’ properly construed), and there are in any case too 
many religious people for any rigorous epistemology to simply exclude them—and that has 
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political implications. Excluding the religious from our epistemology is just another version of 
the intellectualist fallacy, one that ignores how real human beings must practice and realize in 
order to know. One way or another, epistemology has both a religious and a political dimension, 
even if we can see no further than playing the role of Confucius and trying to convince political 
(and religious) leaders that the society would function much better if they practiced and realized 
a better way of knowing, we must still try and work more holistically. 
 
We can sense here another challenging suggestion: That any philosophically wise, loving, and 
beautiful notion of “liberty” and “liberation” cannot be restricted in the manner Locke seems to 
endorse. Indeed, Locke’s recommendations may end up backfiring—an unsurprising thing given 
the way a lack of wisdom never goes unpunished. Because the governments of the dominant 
culture applied Locke’s (and similar) rationalizations for following conscious purposes (and 
unconscious drives), we are suffering needless side-effects. The kind of “liberty” Locke 
recommends is incoherent, in spite of whatever conscious purposes he had. Similarly, “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (to whatever degree that was inspired by Locke, and 
perhaps a misunderstanding of Epicurus) is also incoherent without a proper philosophical, that 
is Nature-Culture, context, and while no one should force a religious dogma into that context, 
one cannot stray far from the spiritual, and thus cannot cut off liberty from the soul by somehow 
orienting it to “the material”. Even Jefferson, despite his many sins, seems to have sensed this in 
some way, given that his first draft of the Declaration of Independence reads, “We hold these 
truths to be sacred & undeniable . . .”135 Whatever Jefferson thought about how humans would 
                                                 
135 https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/jefferson%E2%80%99s-
%E2%80%9Coriginal-rough-draught%E2%80%9D-declaration-independence 
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most skillfully practice and realize life, liberty and happiness, we have arrived at a culture that 
practices the pursuit of happiness in a materialistic way. Nasr touches on this in his own way—
and we should recall that he wrote this in 1999: 
 . . . even if we are not personally concerned with the metaphysical, spiritual, and 
cosmological roots of the environmental crisis, we are nonetheless aware of the 
fact, that outwardly (I do not say inwardly) this crisis is driven by the modern 
economic system appealing to human passions, especially the passion of greed 
intensified by the creation of false needs, which are not really needs but wants. 
This is in opposition to the view which religions have espoused over the 
millennia, that is, the practice of the virtue of contentment, of being content with 
what one has. The modern outlook is based on fanning the fire of greed and 
covetousness, on trying to do everything possible to attach the soul more and 
more to the world and on making a vice out of what for religion has always been a 
virtue, that is, to keep a certain distance and detachment from the world; in other 
words, a certain amount of asceticism. There is a famous German proverb, “There 
is no culture without asceticism”; and this is true of every civilization.  
We are living in the first period in human history in the West in which, 
except for a few small islands here and there of Orthodox or Catholic or Anglican 
monasticism and a few people who try to practice austerity, asceticism is 
considered to be a vice, not a virtue. It is not taught in our schools as a virtue; it is 
taught as a vice, preventing us from realizing ourselves, as if our “selves” were 
simply the extension of our physicality. This idea of self-realization is, of course, 
central to Oriental and certain Occidental traditions. But it has become debased in 
the worst way possible and transformed into the basis for modern consumerism, 
which can be seen in its most virulent form in America—now fast conquering 
Europe, and doing a good job of reaching India, China, Indonesia, etc. (within the 
next decade we will have several billion new consumers in such countries 
thirsting for artificial things which they have lived without for the last few 
thousand years). And what this will do to the earth God alone knows. It is beyond 
belief and conjecture what will happen if present trends continue. So what is it 
that can rein in the passions, either gradually or suddenly? Nothing but religion 
for the vast majority of people who, believing in God and the afterlife, still fear 
the consequences of their evil actions in their lives in this world. If it were to be 
told to them that pollution and destruction of the environment is a sin in the 
theological sense of the term they would think twice before indulging in it. For 
the ordinary believer the wrath of God and fear of punishment in the afterlife is 
the most powerful force against the negative tendencies of the passionate soul. 
For nearly all people on the earth who continue to pollute the air and the water, 
and whose lifestyle entails the destruction of the natural environment, what is it 
that is going to act as a break against the ever-growing power of the passions 
except religion? The religions have had thousands of years to deal with the 
slaying of the passionate ego, this inner dragon, to use the symbol mentioned in so 
many traditions. St. Michael’s slaying of the dragon with his lance has many 
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meanings, one of which is, of course, that the lance of the Spirit alone is able to 
kill that dragon; or what in Sufism is called nafs, that is the passionate soul, the 
lower soul within us. We rarely think of that issue today. But where is St. Michael 
with his lance? How are we going to stop people from wanting more and more if 
not through the power of the Spirit made accessible through religion? And once 
you have opened up the Pandora’s box of the appetites, how are you going to put 
the genie back into the box? How are you going to be able, with no more than 
rational arguments, to tell people to use less, to be less covetous, not to be greedy, 
and so forth? No force in the world today, except religion, has the power to do 
that unless it be sheer physical coercion. 
For the vast majority of people there is no other way to control the great 
passions within us which have now been fanned by, first of all, the weakening of 
religion and, secondly, the substitution of another set of values derived from a 
kind of pseudo-religion whose new gods are such idols as “development” and 
“progress.” But such notions do not have the power to help us control our 
passions. On the contrary they only fan the fire of those passions. We have been 
witness during the last generation alone to the ever greater debunking of the 
traditional religious attitudes towards the world, especially what we call in Arabic 
riḍā, that is contentment with our state of being, a virtue which is the very 
opposite of the sin of covetousness. Of course, the Muslims have been criticized 
by the West for a long time for simply being fatalistic in the face of events, of 
being too content with their lot. This same debunking has also been directed 
towards similar Christian values. But that is because of a deep misunderstanding. 
Where, in the current educational system in the West, is attention being paid to 
these traditional virtues? Even from a purely empirical, scientific point of view, 
these virtues must be seen as being of great value, seeing that they have made it 
possible for human beings to live for thousands of years in the world without 
destroying the natural environment as we are currently doing. These traditional 
virtues that allowed countless generations to live in equilibrium with the world 
around them were at the same time conceived as ways of perfecting the soul, as 
steps in the perfection of human existence. These virtues provided the means for 
living at peace with the environment. They also allowed man to experience what 
it means to be human and to fulfill his destiny here on earth, which is always 
bound to try to inculcate such virtues within oneself. (31-2) 
 
This may sound strange to a non-religious person. Let’s be clear about a few things. For one, we 
are in no way—in no way—suggesting we need to set up a theocracy. The issue has to do with 
how to make sacredness part of epistemology and, thus, politics too. Over and above any thought 
of “fear and trembling,” we can come to sense the importance of an experience of sacredness. 
Nasr speaks in part to include the full spectrum of moral development, any stage of which might 
benefit from a religious sensibility. We can at least provisionally accept the validity of a variety 
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of findings in this regard, from Kohlberg and Gilligan to more exotic theories from Jean Gebser 
or Clare Graves, but we can also embrace here the many philosophical/spiritual traditions of the 
World which seem to agree: We are capable of cultivation, of practice and realization that allows 
us to respond not merely on the basis of fear and trembling, but on the basis of wisdom, love, 
beauty, compassion, peace, joy, and wonder, and a religious sensibility may prove as helpful to 
facilitating insights based on, for instance, a mature ethic of care or universal moral principles as 
it does in the more preliminary developmental thinking that can only manage, “If I do this I’ll get 
in cosmic trouble.” Indeed, that level of moral development may go with a level of intellectual 
development that itself can broaden so profoundly that it boggles the mind that militant atheists 
would restrict “god” to the notions they seem to have had as children, and which they have not 
practiced into anything more mature but rather abandoned in an ontogenetically crippled state. In 
any case, we are talking here also about a view, and we can suggest it is never a “world” “view” 
that we mean when we speak of a worldview, but rather a Cosmic Vision, a feel for the whole, 
properly called a mythology, because it has a mythopoetic quality, an integration of wisdom-
love-beauty. Philosophy does not really function unless it functions as mythology does. We will 
have to save a fuller discussion of that for another time, and here we need only reflect on the 
central issues: That most humans identify as religious, that religions endorse values antithetical 
to consumerism and to the “liberty” our secular philosophy has helped us to practice and realize, 
and that, most of all, religions and spiritual traditions have images, visions, doctrines, teachings, 
and practices for helping us to self-liberate out of ego-centric action (including consumption) 
and into larger ecologies of wisdom-love-beauty. If there is anything right about religions, we 
might say that their rightness predicts our unwellness, given the current context, and that they 
each have some variety of medicine that may help all of us to heal.  
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Among those practices are what we may call rites, rituals, ceremonies, and celebrations. These 
are not always easy to distinguish. Nasr offers us a few reflections that we can think of in general 
terms: 
Another cardinal and central role of religion in the solution of the 
environmental crisis, one that goes to its very root, is much more difficult to 
understand within the context of the modern mind-set. This role is related to the 
significance of religious rituals as a means of establishing cosmic harmony. Now, 
this idea is meaningless in the context of modern thought, where ritual seems to 
have no relation or correspondence with the nature of physical reality. In the 
modern world view, rituals are at best personal, individual, subjective elements 
that create happiness in the individual or establish a relationship between him or 
her and God. That much at least some modern people accept. But how could rites 
establish cosmic harmony? From the modern scientific point of view such an 
assertion seems to make no sense at all. But it is not nonsense; it is a very subtle 
truth that has to be brought out and emphasized. From both the spiritual and the 
religious perspective, the physical world is related to God by levels of reality 
which transcend the physical world itself and which constitute the various stages 
of the cosmic hierarchy. It is impossible to have harmony in nature, or harmony of 
man with nature, without this vertical harmony with the higher states of being. 
Once nature is conceived as being purely material, even if we accept that it was 
created by God conceived as a clockmaker, this cosmic relationship can no longer 
even be conceived much less realized. Once we cut nature off from the immediate 
principles of nature—which are the psychic and spiritual or angelic levels of 
reality—then nature has already lost its balance as far as our relation to it is 
concerned.  
Now rituals, from the point of view of religion, are God-made. I am not 
using the term ritual as seen from the secular point of view, as if one were putting 
on one’s gown and going to some commencement exercise or some other 
humanly created action, often called a “ritual” in everyday discourse today. I am 
using it in the religious sense. According to all traditional religions, rituals 
descend from Heaven. A ritual is an enactment, or rather re-enactment, here on 
earth of a divine prototype. In the Abrahamic world, that means that rituals have 
been revealed to the prophets by God and taught by them to man. The “repetition” 
of the Last Supper of Christ in the Eucharist, or the daily prayers of Muslims—
where do they come from? According to the followers of those religions, they all 
come from Heaven. In Hinduism and Buddhism one observes the same reality. 
The differences are of context and world view, but the fundamentals are the same. 
There is no Hindu rite which was invented by someone walking along the Ganges 
who suddenly thought it up. For the Hindus they are of divine origin. The Muslim 
daily prayers, which we have all seen in pictures, were given by the Prophet to 
Muslims on the basis of instructions received from God. Even the Prophet did not 
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invent them. The Eucharist “re-enacts” the Last Supper which, as the central rite 
of Christianity, was first celebrated by Christ himself.  
Now, these rites, by virtue of their re-enactment on earth, link the earth 
with the higher levels of reality. A rite always links us with the vertical axis of 
existence, and by virtue of that, links us also with the principles of nature. This 
truth holds not only for the primal religions, where certain acts are carried out in 
nature itself—let us say the African religions or the Aboriginal religion of 
Australia, or the religions of the Native American Indians—but also in the 
Abrahamic world, in the Hindu world, and in the Iranian religions. Whether one is 
using particular natural forms such as a tree or a rock or a cave or something like 
that, or man-made objects of sacred and liturgical art related to rites carried out 
inside a church, synagogue, mosque, or Hindu temple, it does not make any 
difference. The same truth is to be found in all these cases. From a metaphysical 
point of view a ritual always re-establishes balance with the cosmic order.  
In the deepest mystical sense, nature is hungry for our prayers, in the sense 
that we are like a window of the house of nature through which the light and air of 
the spiritual world penetrate into the natural world. Once that window becomes 
opaque, the house of nature becomes dark. That is exactly what we are 
experiencing today. Once we have shut our hearts to God, darkness spreads over 
the whole of the world. This, of course, is something very difficult to explain to 
an agnostic mentality. But from a practical, expedient point of view at least, it 
should be taken into consideration even by those who do not take rites seriously, 
seeing what has happened to nature at the hands of those sectors of humanity who 
no longer perform traditional rites.  
All religious people who believe in the efficacy of rites and perform them 
have a way of looking at the natural world and their place in it which is very 
different from the secularist way that has itself led us to the environmental crisis. 
You have all read or heard about examples of various religious rituals and their 
relation to nature, even in lesser known religions. Perhaps the best known, as far 
as displaying the direct relation between rituals and the natural world is 
concerned, is the rain-dance of the Native Americans, about which skeptics make 
jokes. But some people take it very seriously and go to Native American medicine 
men, the shamans, to try to get help from them to bring rain. Of course, such a 
thing is laughed at by official science, but that does not matter, for such a science 
neglects the sympathaeia which exists between man and cosmic realities. (34-5) 
 
Here we get at issues of Synchronicity and mystical participation for which we may remain 
unprepared. In any case, it seems that a participatory relationship with reality, with Nature, is of 
paramount importance, and a better way of knowing seems rooted in mystical participation—in a 
rigorous sense, not in any pejorative sense of obscurantism, primitivism, superstition, or other 
dismissive denotations and connotations. We thus touch on yet another indication that we need a 
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paradigm shift. That seems to come altogether with needing a better way of knowing. We have to 
remind ourselves again and again that we cannot make much sense of how what we might 
narrowly refer to as a “religious” way of knowing can go together with what we narrowly refer 
to as a “scientific” way of knowing—and we have an easy way of understanding at least that 
much, for all it means is that our current science and our basic way of knowing are somehow 
incomplete, and partially incoherent. That is the least strange suggestion in our whole inquiry, 
but because of the ultimately radical nature of such a suggestion, the possible implications can 
seem strange, and we must of course take care not to lurch into desperate metaphysical 
speculations. 
 
Nasr notes that this hunger for spirituality goes together with a hunger for a holistic science, and 
we might say a hunger for holistic culture. It seems reasonable to suggest that, all things 
considered, it’s more enjoyable to live in a sacred World. This seems to be true because of the 
altogetherness of wisdom, love, and beauty. Even an atheist like Bateson could sense this. Nasr 
offers the following contemplation regarding the need to think science and religion together, to 
practice the thinking-together of a sacred science and a science of sacredness, and the problems 
we face when we fail to practice and realize along these lines: 
Now, one does not need to look very far to see what has happened in the 
modern world. Gradually, from the seventeenth century onwards, first in the 
West, then spreading in recent decades to other parts of the world, the legitimacy 
of the religious knowledge of nature has been rejected. Most people who study the 
views of an Erigena or a St. Thomas Aquinas on nature do so as historians. But 
their views are not accepted by the mainstream of modern Western society as 
legitimate knowledge of the world. What has been lost is a way of studying nature 
religiously, not simply as “poetry,” as this term is used today in a trivializing 
sense and not of course in a positive one. True poetry possesses a great message 
as far as nature is concerned, a message which itself is usually religious. In any 
case modern society has disassociated knowledge of nature from religion as well 
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as sapiential poetry itself, and relegates the religious attitude and knowledge of 
nature to sentiment or “simply” to poetic sensibility.  
We have wonderful examples of nature poetry in the great poetry 
produced in the nineteenth century in England. The Romantic poets produced 
beautiful poetry about nature. But what effect did it have on the physics 
departments of the universities? Absolutely none, precisely because the science 
that developed in the seventeenth century, through very complicated processes 
which I cannot go into now, began to exclude from its world view the possibility 
of a religious or metaphysical form of knowledge of nature. This science even 
excluded the poetic view of nature in so far as it claimed any intellectual 
legitimacy and sought to be more than what some would call “mere poetry.” 
Modern science has clung to that monopoly very hard, even in this pluralistic age 
of ours, in which everything other than science is relativized. Post-modernists 
usually deconstruct everything except modern science because, if this were to be 
done, the whole world view of modernism along with post-modernism would 
collapse. So you have a kind of scientific exclusivity and monopoly which has 
been created and accepted by most although not all people in the modern world. 
Goethe, the supreme German poet as well as a scientist, rebelled very strongly 
against this monopolistic claim of modern science. There were also certain 
scientists, such as Oswald, who was a reputable chemist, who rejected scientific 
mechanism; and one can name others. But these are exceptions to the rule. The 
rule became that there is no other knowledge of nature except what is called 
scientific knowledge. And if someone claims that there is a religious knowledge 
of nature, then it is usually claimed that it is based on sentiment, on emotions, or, 
in other words, on subjective factors. If, for example, you see a dove flying and 
you think of the Holy Spirit, that is simply a subjective correlation between your 
perception of the dove and your own sentiments. There is no objectivity accorded 
to the reality of nature as perceived through religious knowledge. That is why 
even symbolism has become subjectivized—it is claimed to be “merely” 
psychological, à la Jung. The symbols which traditional man saw in the world of 
nature as being objective and as being part of the ontological reality of nature 
have been all cast aside by this type of mentality which no longer takes the 
religious knowledge of nature seriously.  
During the last thirty years, when the thirst for a more holistic approach to 
nature made itself felt, something even worse occurred because neither 
mainstream religion nor modern science showed any interest whatsoever in the 
religious and symbolic knowledge of nature and the holistic approach to it. The 
water sought for in this thirst seeped under the structures of Western culture and 
came out in the form of New Age movements, nearly all of which are very much 
interested in the science of the cosmos. But what they claim as science is really a 
New Age pseudo-science of the cosmos. It is not an authentic traditional science, 
because a traditional science of the cosmos always has to be related to a 
traditional religious structure. In this New Age climate the word “cosmic” has 
gained a great deal of currency precisely because of the dearth of an authentic 
religious knowledge of the cosmos in the present-day world. Somehow the thirst 
had to be satisfied. So we have had both excavation of the earlier Western esoteric 
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teachings about nature—usually presented in distorted fashion—or borrowings 
from Oriental religions and their teachings about nature, often distorted. Even the 
famous and influential book of Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics, does not really 
speak of Hindu cosmology or Chinese physics, but only mentions certain 
comparisons between modern physics and Hindu and Taoist metaphysical ideas.  
To be sure there are many profound correlations and concordances to be 
found between certain aspects of biology, astronomy, and quantum mechanics on 
the one hand and Oriental doctrines of nature, of the cosmos, on the other. I would 
be the last person to doubt that truth. But what has occurred for the most part is 
not the kind of profound comparison we have in mind, but its parody, a kind of 
popularized version of a religious knowledge of nature, usually involving some 
kind of occultism or even some kind of an existing cult. The great interest shown 
today in Shamanism in America, in the whole phenomenon of the Native 
American tradition (which is one of the great and beautiful primal traditions that 
still survives to some extent), with weekend Shamanic sessions, is precisely 
because such teachings appeal to a kind of mentality that seeks some sort of 
knowledge of nature of a spiritual and holistic character other than what modern 
science provides. This phenomenon is one of the paradoxes of our day and has not 
helped the environmental crisis in any appreciable way. Indeed, it has created a 
certain confusion in the domain of religion and created a breach between the 
mainstream religious organizations which still survive in the West—whether they 
be Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox—and these pseudo-movements and the New 
Age phenomenon, which they rightly oppose. The fact that these pseudo-religious 
movements are very pro-environment, yet in an ineffectual manner, has caused 
many people in the mainstream to take a stand against the very positions which 
they should be defending. So we have the paradoxical situation in America today 
where the most conservative Christian groups are those which are least interested 
in the environment. This phenomenon was not originally caused by the rise of the 
New Age religions but is certainly related to it and strengthened by it. (37-9) 
 
Scholarship on the so-called New Age spiritualities seems to give them a warm measure of 
redemption (see the work of Paul Heelas, for instance). There is much to be critical about, but 
more often than not the critics seem to neglect the main issue: Spiritual materialism. That we can 
all fall prey to this matters much more than the fact that “new agers” often do. As something of a 
radical traditionalist, it seems to me we should be cautious about any form of self-styled spiritual 
practice, but I would add that the major criticism of anything new agey falls upon today’s 
philosophers, and not anyone in the new age movements. If philosophy departments would 
satisfy the spiritual hunger of the culture, we would not see so much foolishness in new age and 
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even mainstream religious and spiritual practice. If people come to philosophy and we do no 
better than teach them Locke, Descartes, and Kant—and do it in the manner we do—then they 
will naturally go elsewhere to satisfy the basic imperatives of the soul—or, they will medicate (in 
all the ways the pattern of insanity encourages), or, usually and dangerously, they will do both. 
And this too goes altogether with politics. It may be that, in various ways and in various times 
(and further varying according to the individual and context), philosophers have actively evaded 
the political. This may be an especially pronounced issue in the dominant culture. Capps (2003) 
describes some aspects of this: 
In The Metaphysical Club (2001) Louis Menand cites the Cold War as a decisive 
factor in pragmatism's declining fortunes. Menand argues that pragmatism was 
originally designed to ensure that our principles were not taken too seriously - or 
at least not so seriously that violence might result. However, because the Cold 
War “was a war over principles” (p. 441) pragmatism began to appear “naive, and 
even a little dangerous” (p. 439). Menand thus concludes that pragmatism was 
unsuited to a time when people felt compelled to stake their lives for their beliefs. 
John McCumber argues that pragmatism's decline can be traced to McCarthyist 
political intimidation. In Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the 
McCarthy Era (2001) McCumber suggests that pragmatism (as well as other non-
analytic philosophical approaches) was well suited for addressing the political and 
philosophical issues posed by the Cold War - so well suited, in fact, that it invited 
a reactionary backlash. Thus, in contrast to Menand, McCumber concludes that 
the eclipse of pragmatism and other non-analytic philosophical approaches was 
the result of political pressure. Philosophers learned all too well that academics 
should be dispassionate and apolitical. The dominance of analytic philosophy can 
be traced to the requirement that philosophy be dry, narrow, and far removed 
from the concerns of everyday life. Both explanations are compelling. On both 
accounts pragmatism fell into disfavor not due to philosophical or inspirational 
shortcomings but rather as a result of an increasingly hostile political 
environment. If true, these theories would explain pragmatism’s eclipse less in 
terms of factors internal to professional philosophy and more in terms of external 
cultural factors. (61-2) 
 
McCumber wrote an eponymous article prior to trying to make the fuller case in a book. The title 
alludes to Thales, who famously demonstrated the mindlessness philosophers can fall into when 
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he literally fell into a well (“ditch” sounds better) while walking along, observing the heavens. 
McCumber writes, 
Thales has not been the only philosopher to lose his footing so badly that 
his for truth was impeded or even ended. Most of the time, the footing involved is 
political. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Kant, and Hegel, to name a few, all at 
one time or another fell afoul of the social and political powers in their respective 
societies. Moreover, as work of Foucault will suggest, the effects of politics on 
philosophy may not always limited to interference with individual philosophers; 
politics may go on to influence nature of philosophy itself. In Germany after 
1830, for example, reactionary forces purged the Young Hegelians—including 
such able thinkers as Feuerbach, Marx, Max Stirner, and David Strauss—from 
academic positions, consigning the country’s universities generation and more of 
the kind of egoistic charlatanry described by Lewis White  
 
 . . . men entered and left the [neo-Kantian] movement as if it were 
a church or political party; members of one school blocked the 
appointments and promotions of members of the others; eminent 
Kant scholars and philosophers who did not found their own 
schools or accommodate themselves to one of the established 
schools tended to be neglected as outsiders and contemned as 
amateurs.  
 
Political interference with philosophers did not end with the nineteenth 
century, of Many Anglo-American philosophers, if they thought about it at all, 
would say that the debacle of 1968 in France called forth irrationalism in the 
thought of Derrida and Foucault, while the rise of the Nazis in Germany allowed 
Heidegger to claw his way to the top of the philosophical heap. England's 
Thatcher, apparently unwilling to tolerate philosophy at all, instigated the greatest 
academic exodus since Hitler. But such things—we Americans like to tell 
ourselves—do not happen around here. Though politics may influence philosophy 
in the Old World, American philosophy is an autonomous, indeed 
overwhelmingly tenured, discipline in the freest country on earth. The only 
important force shaping it has, it appears, been reason itself: the ongoing process 
of argument and evaluation in which American philosophers excel.  
This exemption from politics may, however, be more spurious than real; 
certainly it cannot be taken for granted. The United States, the first country to be 
founded on a philosophy, has (perhaps for that reason) never been friendly to 
philosophers. Bertrand Russell ran up against American intolerance for the 
intellect and its life in 1940, when his attempt to teach in the US was pronounced 
by a judge to be dangerous to the “public health, safety, and morals” [Edwards 7: 
235, 238]. World War II made a cold climate harsher, and five years later Brand 
Blanshard could write: “mathematics, physics, engineering, medicine-all the 
sciences, theoretic and applied, that have to do with the art of war are riding high; 
the humanities, including philosophy, have gone into temporary eclipse” [8]. The 
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Cold War, extending militaristic practices into peacetime, made the “temporary” 
in Blanshard'’s judgment sound naively optimistic. When, as an undergraduate in 
the sixties, I took a course in journalism, "philosopher" was on the list of 
pejorative terms. By then, of course, the Cold War had already wreaked most of 
its havoc on American intellectual life. For just a decade earlier, little more than a 
generation ago now, the United States had undertaken what was perhaps the 
greatest intellectual purge in the history of Western democracy.  
According to its most responsible spokesmen, this purge, which hit 
academia around 1949 and did not fully subside until about 1960, aimed at 
removing Communists from teaching positions. That, in itself, was an assault on 
both intellectual and personal freedom, because it elevated association into guilt. 
But the movement had a much broader base than just the House Un-American 
Affairs Committee (HUAC) and related govern- mental bodies, and its targets 
were correspondingly diverse. As one writer put it in 1955,  
 
It soon became clear that, whatever the ostensible goal of the early 
stages of this restrictive movement, its later intent was the 
achievement of a settled, conservative orthodoxy in the political, 
economic, and general social opinion of America. The evidence for 
this conclusion is overwhelming.... What we face is a general 
reaction... against the more humane, idealistic, and 
internationalistic tendencies of the past few decades. [Moore 623-
24; also see Lazarsfeld and Thielens 55-58]  
 
Such “general reaction” is, of course, on the rise again. HUAC, for 
example, has found eager successors among those whom Robert Hughes calls 
“the young velociraptors in Congress” [62]. Moreover, as we will see, 
contemporary attacks on government support of the arts and humanities explicitly 
echo the McCarthy Era's generalized, anti- intellectual convulsion-a convulsion in 
which, as Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., write, “what was really under 
attack was the quality of American education” [166]. (1996: 33-4) 
 
It is perhaps more important than we might have thought, when we considered the matter earlier, 
how well contemplation of “heaps” (discussed by Rorty) fits in with structures of power, and it 
seems worthwhile for philosophers to think about the ways a natural reaction of fear may have 
contributed to the apparent “strength” of an analytical approach to philosophy, and how fear may 
continue to influence what we do in the academy. These reflections also cast new light on Walter 
Kaufmann’s suggestion that philosophers don’t want to stick their necks out, and that few of 
them would be so bold as to write something visionary and genuinely (not technically) 
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challenging. We must all handle philosophy in the manner of handling poisonous snakes—and 
attempts to defang the snakes (whether conscious or not, whether well-argued or not) will only 
transfer the fangs elsewhere, and they may thus prove far more dangerous. Leave the snake-
handling to empowered and empowering philosophers and their empowered and empowering 
students. 
 
Even in light of such considerations, the reader may think we are being too hard on Locke, but in 
fact we have no interest in picking on Locke in particular. We merely consider representative 
artifacts from his work, and some of his apparent nonsense goes together in an important way 
with Freud’s. Recall that Freud claimed “the principal task of civilization, its actual raison 
d’ȇtre, is to defend us against nature.” This is an extraordinary claim, a symptom of basic 
unwellness. But it is not far from Locke’s narrow-minded sense of Nature. Locke views Nature 
as something humans walk around in, as if humans can function separately from Nature, just as if 
we can have a non-spiritual political life. He seems to have a fundamentally confused view, and 
this view leads to serious errors in our relationship with Nature and with each other, which gets 
exacerbated to the extent that Locke influenced certain aspects of the vision of the dominant 
culture. In truth, these things go together. Locke both expresses the disorder of the western soul, 
and also perpetuates it, develops it, and is not alone responsible for it (especially since he wrote 
many good things as well, especially when evaluated on the basis of his context). Functionally, 
Locke’s views reflect and encourage a devaluing of Nature, such that human labor is what 
ultimately gives Nature value (perhaps only in relation to politics, but that would leave a terrible 
duality in place), and thus he justifies the notion of private property in the limited and limiting 
economic sense—a sense lacking wisdom, which will not go unpunished. The devaluation of 
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Nature goes along with the development of capitalism and of what we call civilization. Here is a 
passage from Locke’s Second Treatise on Government: 
40. For it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing; and let 
any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with 
tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in 
common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement 
of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very 
modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of 
man, nine-tenths are the effects of labour. Nay, if we will rightly estimate things 
as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about  them—what  in  
them  is  purely  owing  to  Nature  and  what  to labour—we shall find that in 
most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of 
labour. 
 
41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several nations of 
the Americans are of this, who are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life; 
whom Nature, having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials 
of plenty—i.e., a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance what might serve for 
food, raiment, and delight; yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not one 
hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy, and a king of a large and fruitful 
territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day labourer in England.  
 
Locke seems to have a rather low estimate of Nature and of Indigenous Peoples, even though he 
probably spent little time in wild Nature and had no reasonable way to evaluate either Nature or 
an Indigenous way of life. As far as Nature goes, he shows no deep gratitude for the ways Nature 
labors to keep us alive. The trees labor to give us air and to hold the land in place. All beings 
labor like this, to maintain our altogether World. How do we mark off human labor as “special” 
without creating problems? As far as Locke’s comments about Indigenous People, we need only 
recall the many accounts of pre-conquest consciousness we have encountered to find his 
suggestions suspicious and misguided at best. We can see shadow elements in the western 
psyche lurking here. Another place this sort of error shows itself is earlier in the text. We should 
preface the reading with an acknowledgment of the challenges he faced and the good intentions 
he certainly did have in addition to some misguided notions . . . these passages have less to do 
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with picking on Locke than in recognizing problems in conquest consciousness that predate 
Locke, but which he suffered from and then perpetuated in the sense that his philosophy seems to 
have influenced a significant number of relatively significant people. Locke writes: 
Sec. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them 
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, 
and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. 
And tho’ all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind 
in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body 
has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of 
them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, 
there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before 
they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or 
venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a 
tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no 
longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his 
life. 
 
Sec. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet 
every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but 
himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from 
the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something 
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being 
the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to 
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in 
common for others. 
 
Sec. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the 
apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to 
himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they 
begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when 
he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first 
gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction 
between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the 
common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will 
any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, 
because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery 
thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as 
that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given 
him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any 
part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which 
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begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of 
this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. 
Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have 
digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become 
my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that was 
mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my 
property in them. 
 
Sec. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any 
one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or 
servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for 
them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the 
water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who can doubt, but that in the 
pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of 
nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath 
thereby appropriated it to himself. 
 
Sec. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath killed it; it 
is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it 
was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the 
civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to 
determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in 
what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any 
one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or 
what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that 
common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. 
And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues 
her during the chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no 
man's private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of 
that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of 
nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property. 
 
Sec. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other 
fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much 
as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature, that does by this 
means give us property, does also bound that property too. God has given us all 
things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But 
how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any 
advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: 
whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing 
was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. 
 
From the perspective of someone suffering a lack of religious tolerance and suffering from 
political justifications based on spiritual materialism, it can make sense to argue for a separation 
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of church and state that ends up sounding like a separation of sacredness and state. Perhaps, as a 
devout Christian of whatever variety, Locke just couldn’t get a sense of his world’s loss of 
sacredness, or how much more lost sacredness could get. Or perhaps he lived a profound sense of 
sacredness and could not imagine anyone’s doing otherwise. Of this we cannot be sure, but it 
does not seem so, based on his context and based on artifacts like this one.  
 
On a positive note, Locke seems to have felt it quite natural to make arguments about 
government on the basis of religious doctrine. But how then did he think a duality of the sacred 
and the profane would end up? Scholars of Locke’s thought surely have answers, but we are 
looking here at a style of consciousness at work, not engaging in the endless debates of weary 
intellectualism. If, as Bateson suggests, relations aren’t the kind of thing we can possess, what 
are we to make of the notions of possession Locke seems to accept? And what are we to make of 
this notion of labor as a process of separation from Nature? Why isn’t labor the activity of 
cultivating Nature, participating in Nature? The divisions between human and Nature, mind and 
Nature, sacred and profane, even sacred and Nature get expressed and then perpetuated in the 
“history” of the dominant culture. It is a history not of progress but of separation and degradation 
(including the activities of analysis, philosophical and scientific).  
 
Reading Locke’s words in light of Bateson’s myth of the tree of knowledge also helps bring 
clarity to the problems of conquest consciousness. Clearly Locke acknowledges that we are not 
to spoil, destroy, or take more than we need from Nature, but he gives no relational account of 
this. It is an injunction, from God, and he does not see the inherent problem in using conscious 
purposes to govern the use of what God has gifted to us. In any case, a separation of church and 
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state does not make it easy for Locke’s injunction against spoilage and destruction to become a 
matter of law. On what basis can it become law (assuming we are in such bad shape that we need 
laws)? Will we not demand, on the basis of liberty, that we can do whatever we want? Whatever 
the debates in ecological ethics (and they are legion, and they are typically academic in so many 
cases, often stuck in the old epistemology, often too boring and/or technical for the general 
public to care), we would need a sense of relationality to truly dispel the problems the old 
epistemology engenders.  
 
In contemplating these passages from Locke, we can admit the great challenge involved in 
broadening our vision sufficiently to sense with intimacy that nourishment does not “belong” to 
us, that our labor does not “belong” to us, and that we always live by the consent of all, and also 
by the participation and gift of all. The consent is not explicit, in the manner of asking 
permission to borrow a pen. We can help ourselves by, for instance, thinking very scientifically, 
and asking how to point at the mind that found the acorns (in Locke’s example), or where to 
point at the mind that made the acorns, or to find the mind that decided its own labor matters 
more than the oak tree’s labor. We can ask where exactly the human begins and the so-called 
environment ends. Locke hides behind the relative barrier of the skin, and the relative activity of 
a “doer,” but our modern science easily reveals the skin as less of a bunker, and the “doer” more 
of an illusion than we have implicitly hoped in the “history” of the west. We need to be able to 
live together, but the line of argument here evidences an outdated epistemology. 
 
These things arise together, and thus capitalism, eco-illiteracy and eco-illogic, loss of wonder, 
loss of meaning, loss of spirituality, loss of ecosensual or liminal awareness all go together. As 
561 
 
the Sng’oi and many other Indigenous People realized, and as a relational, nonlocal, ecologically 
rooted epistemology must emphasize, we belong with the land, arise in, through, as the living 
Land, the living World, and the notion of “owning” the land makes no sense, and could only 
function as a relative concept if we handled it like handling a poisonous snake. We can work 
with relative boundaries, and we can grant each other respect, including the respect of personal 
space. In some Cultures, “personal space” has far more to do with the quality of mind and heart 
than we would ever imagine here in the dominant culture. But owning land doesn’t make sense 
in at least some mature Cultures. Topophilia and biophilia, on the other hand, are de rigor. We 
can feel deeply rooted, feel a deep sense of belonging, a pervading Beauty, and Love, and 
Wisdom, so that Cultivation of land and soul are not two things (the former does not mean 
“agriculture” but the activity of cultivating life forward). This orientation reveals our dominant 
notions of “development” and “cultivation” for what they are: degradation, exploitation, and 
delusion.  
 
In looking at other societies, or considering what a wise Culture might look like, we can 
reexamine our notion of “progress”. What is progress? Consciously or not, we seem to see 
“history” as a march of “progress,” and we look at the past as pathways of “progress”. We could, 
on the other hand, look at pathways of potential development, ways of attunement that seem 
either more or less skillful. Re-Indigenizing does not mean recovering an “old” “way of living,” 
but recovering a verified Way forward—and verifying it for ourselves. We can only attune with 
life and cultivate it onward, in as healthy a manner as possible. What will we practice? Can we 
look at what has been repressed so that the dominant culture could ascend? This question alone 
makes all the difference. What did we repress to make our way of life possible? What did we 
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make unknowable, because of an implicit epistemic conquest and occupation, including ongoing 
epistemic policing? How can we see through, cut through our delusions and understand what we 
repressed? What was forced into the shadows may be needed for us to thrive. We can’t keep 
avoiding the work we need to do to look at our collective shadow, to examine what we repressed 
in the name of progress, so that we can mature, and so that we can uncover vitalizing 
possibilities for moving forward, some of them in the shadow, including ones we have called 
“religious” or “superstitious”. 
 
Our pattern of insanity can be interrupted, and we cannot afford to do what humans usually do: 
Wait until suffering builds to such a degree that we cannot escape it. Everyone’s “bottom of the 
barrel” differs. For some of us, it takes painful lesson after painful lesson before we can give up 
something unskillful (even to the point of its being unethical, for we are excellent at rationalizing 
and can even chose to do something quite immoral once we have gotten far enough in our 
practice of insane and unwholesome ways of being). But we can raise the bottom of our barrel. 
We can decide: This is enough! No more! It is like Hannah Arendt’s notion that the difference 
between evil on the one hand and good on the other comes to this: “I shouldn’t” (but I do it 
anyway) versus “I cannot!” When we say, “No. I cannot do something like that,” we may save 
the World. We certainly save our own soul, and our soul is not-two with the souls of others and 
the soul of the World. Our “noble nay” makes more of a difference than we will ever understand. 
 
Education, we might say, requires a shift from imparting knowledge to opening pathways to 
liberation, gateways to Wisdom, Love, and Beauty. At this particular moment, education seems 
to need to empower citizens to rebel, to make ethical use of the power they have, and to show 
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them how to know better the proper way to use that power. The need for rebellion will perhaps 
become a little clearer. We in fact have scientific arguments for rebellion. We will get to those a 
bit later. At the moment, we are just reflecting on how epistemology goes altogether with ethics 
and aesthetics, and politics, economics, and all the rest. To overcome the limited and limiting 
ideas and opinions that have been planted in the ecology of mind, we need better ways of 
knowing, and practices that can break apart the manufactured consent that has gotten us all to 
consent to catastrophe. We are lived by powers. Our opinions have been manufactured, but we 
think of them as truths.  
 
Hume pointed out that those in power have nothing to support them but the opinion of the 
governed. Wood’s study shows that when the elitist document we call the Constitution was being 
framed, those wanting to challenge it in order to establish a more truly egalitarian society could 
not win against the public’s trust in the wealthy and the famous, and many feared to speak 
against those wealthy and famous people. The majority of the newspapers sided with the wealthy 
and famous for that reason, as did most smaller merchants. No one wanted to be put out of 
business for saying the wrong things about the wrong people. 
 
Things are no different today. We complain about the “liberal media,” and yet 90% of all 
media—everything, from movies and television to newspapers and radio—90% of all news and 
media is controlled by just 6 major corporations.136 Corporations are not bastions of “liberal” 
                                                 
136 http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-america-
2012-6 
http://billmoyers.com/story/twenty-years-of-media-consolidation-has-not-been-good-for-our-
democracy/ 
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thought. Newspapers are a business, and they are run to make money, not to foster democracy, 
inform the public, enrich the culture, contribute to healing, foster a sense of sacredness, help 
keep us rooted in wisdom, love, and beauty. We seem to hold the magical belief that a “news” 
corporation could aim at providing the best “news” (whatever that is), and by means of an 
invisible hand, it could become most profitable as it did the best job fulfilling that aim. But this 
has not proven so. Thus, at the current level of corporate ownership, we are as likely to get 
serious critique of the structures of power as people were during the time of the framing of the 
Constitution—probably less so. And, just as back then, we have many wealthy and famous 
people to tell us what to think (some of them get elected to office), and a vast ecology of 
sophisticated propaganda that gets us to think certain thoughts as our own, thoughts that are very 
helpful to the structures of power but which we see as our “salvation,” or at least as something 
like political or economic “wisdom”. 
 
This control extends beyond media. It turns out that just 10 corporations manipulate the majority 
of our consumption.137 Again, these are not progressive institutions, not institutions of wisdom, 
love, care, and compassion, not institutions dedicated to a beautiful World. They are instead 
dedicated to profit—not well-being, not wisdom, not peace, not benevolence, not cooperation, 
not anything any serious religious, spiritual, or philosophical tradition has taught us to value. 
Many of the largest corporations in fact profit directly from ill-being, from ignorance, from 
clinging and craving, from fear and self-doubt, from war and aggression. Some of the most 
                                                 
137 http://www.businessinsider.com/these-10-corporations-control-almost-everything-you-buy-
2012-4 
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powerful institutions in the world, in all of history, have a vested interest in the perpetuation of 
ignorance and war. 
 
The top 10 corporations have a combined revenue that exceeds that of 180 nations. Of the 100 
largest economic entities on the planet, 69 are corporations, and of the 200 largest economic 
entities on the planet, 153 are corporations.138 It’s worth stating the obvious fact that “economic 
entities” are not sentient beings, and the planet did not evolve (or was not created) to support 
such a false construct. These economic entities are leading the way in terms of the degradation of 
air, soil, and water. That’s not a matter of “liberal thinking,” but simply a reasonable assessment. 
We need clean air and water. No way around it. So our “economics” must be rooted in that. It is 
perhaps not surprising that “economics” and “nemesis” share the same etymology. 
 
Let us remember again why we want to consider these things in our inquiry. The collapse of the 
conditions of life can be seen as anomalous data in relationship to our current way of knowing. 
The same holds for the political, economic, and social factors. Our way of knowing is a way of 
living. We also need to understand the unconscious factors that might drive us toward collective 
suicide. We further need to understand philosophy’s current and potential role, in offering ways 
of knowing that could better our situation.  
 
What else do we call the problems we face but problems of wisdom, love, and beauty? The 
collapse of the conditions of life is not a matter of science, technology, politics, or economics, in 
                                                 
138 http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2016/09/12/10-biggest-corporations-make-more-
money-most-countries-world-combined 
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the ways that we have separated those disciplines from philosophy. It is not a problem of 
knowledge in the manner we typically relate to knowledge. Yes, there are many kinds of 
knowledge, but for the most part what we mean by knowledge and what we mean by wisdom, 
love, and beauty should be seen as wrongly separated in practice. In practice, knowledge has to 
do with facts, propositions, statistics, and so on, and it can be gathered rather mindlessly, 
unethically, and by means of “tools” that have almost nothing to do with life or sacredness. 
 
Maybe another way to get at the matter comes to this: Philosophers in general do not go around 
telling first year college students things like this: “You should major in philosophy because the 
world is falling apart. You are going to get a meaningless job and contribute to the degradation 
of the world. You do not live in a democracy. You will need to learn wisdom, love, and beauty to 
work with your life well, to help the world, and realize your purpose. You will need to learn how 
to dream, how to dance, how to think, speak, and move in skillful and realistic ways. This is 
what we teach. Come and learn about yourself and your world.” That philosophers do not do this 
is a problem—a symptom that both reflects and feeds into the disease. 
 
It is like saying philosophers are not sensitive to the suffering of their students. But it also has to 
do with our natural reaction to empathy distress. If we do not have a solid compassion practice, 
we must necessarily limit our exposure to suffering, or we will burn out—which itself tunes us 
out. Thich Nhat Hanh’s point about suffering comes back again and again: We seem to need 
significant training on how to work with suffering, our own and that of others. 
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Living in the dominant culture, living in Sorrowville, comes with a lot of suffering, and the 
contemporary U.S. has become a remarkable ecology of pain and suffering, not only for 
ourselves, but also for many others, both human and non-human. This forms the context of our 
thinking and knowing: the pain, the causes of the pain, the treatment of the pain, and the side-
effects of that treatment. This is all part of how we know ourselves and our world. If we didn’t 
know ourselves, for instance, in a way that allows or facilitates the production of Amazon.com 
warehouses and the painful kind of work that comes with them, we wouldn’t need so many pain-
relieving drugs (it’s a telling symptom that the name of the company started by the world’s 
richest capitalist, and a major engineer of ecological degradation, comes from the name of the 
rainforest). The same goes for all sorts of other jobs and also recreations, for our leisure time 
amounts to an industry of extraction, medication, and desperate attempts to make meaning, to 
deal with the lack of happenings in the culture by means of forced happenings that often create 
suffering for ourselves and others. Just “going on vacation” tends to involve a more significant 
intervention into ecologies than we care to admit. Every time we fly, beings must suffer for it. 
Do we really sense that? It extends to driving, and for most of us it extends to eating and 
maintaining our bodies, our homes, our jobs, our relationships. Our way of knowing how to live 
comes with gratuitous suffering. 
 
However we look at it, it takes a process of knowing to create the kinds of pain we see in our 
society. We may say we know how to build airplanes, how to harness nuclear energy, how to get 
a rocket on the moon, but a more honest assessment would say, first, that we know how to 
degrade ecologies, and that includes a knowledge of how to make addictions, both to further the 
degradation of ecologies and to medicate ourselves as part of doing so. The leading edge of the 
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dominant culture naturally leads in degradation and the addictions that go with it. A 2008 study 
by Manchikanti and Singh found that, although the U.S. accounts for less than 5% of the global 
population, we account for 80% of global opioid consumption and 99% of hydrocodone 
consumption. Some of this opioid use happens because of physical pain. Many people cannot get 
through their workday without pain relievers—clearly an unnatural situation, and another 
symptom of our current crisis. Opioid use also happens because of emotional and spiritual pain, 
because the soul needs something, and we are not looking for it in the right place.  
 
This “not looking in the right place” or in the right Way (not only the manner of looking, but the 
way of life, the spirituality) ends up imprisoning us. It may seem odd to suggest, but we’ve put 
ourselves in a kind of invisible symbolic prison that functions surprisingly well—it really does 
keep the soul in chains, the heart, mind, and body in bondage. Everyone is in it, so we had to 
build lots and lots of physical prisons to help keep up the illusion that those not inside them are 
“free”—at “liberty” to “pursue happiness”. There again, with less than 5% of the world 
population, we have almost 25% of the world’s prison population, and far more prisoners than 
China—which has triple the population, and is hardly an icon of “freedom”.139 That’s an 
interesting joke: Why are there so many prisons in the U.S.? To convince everyone outside of 
them that they are free. Similarly, we need Disneyland and other fantasy theme parks to convince 
us that the world we live in, the world of our practice and realization, is “real”. 
 
It may seem paradoxical to say that all (or most) of the people outside of prisons are not really 
free, but things are even more insidious than that: We are in a kind of bondage, and we ourselves 
                                                 
139 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm 
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keep things that way, without really seeing it. The U.S. functions to facilitate this bondage. This 
is the context of our thinking and philosophizing: The context of facilitating bondage and 
degradation.  
 
In writing about the Antifederalists, Wood cites one who presciently suggested that the people 
would be made into “the instruments of their own subjugation,” and this Antifederalist therefore 
saw the task of the Antifederalist movement as preventing people from becoming “a groveling, 
distinct species, uninterested in the general welfare” (490). This shows a fairly sophisticated 
feeling for human psychology. Modern research helps us to understand that there is something in 
us, something like a switch, that can be turned away from an orientation to connect and shifted 
into an orientation focused on ourselves—and not in reasonable ways. In order to connect, we 
have to reach beyond the narrow self, and the soul always demands that we reach beyond the self 
we think we are. When we fail to do this, in any way (and there are thousands of ways to miss 
the mark), we become a “distinct species,” that is to say, an atomized being, a separated being, a 
being cut off from life and love. And we suffer. Indeed, that is suffering: Feeling cut off from life 
and love. 
 
The thing is, we know very well in our hearts, and now scientifically too, that we are not a 
species of atomized beings. We are a species of interbeing, just like the rest of life, with our own 
special set of “individual” and “collective” blessings and gifts to realize that interbeing. The 
myth of the “self-interested” human being is a great example of bad mythology—bad 
philosophy. As a philosophical/economic/scientific hypothesis, we have overturned it with good 
evidence. Nevertheless, we keep plugging along with it—in part because we haven’t really, 
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really seen the full scope of our situation. If we did, maybe the comedian Chris Rock is correct 
about what our response would be, collectively: 
Chris Rock: It’s hard for me to figure out people voting against their own self-
interests. At some point you go, Okay: Is that what they want? 
 
Frank Rich: Is it possible that they’re just angry, whether it’s anger at Obama or 
Washington in general, and they just want to lash out? If you’re angry, you don’t 
rationally consider what’s in your self-interest. 
 
Chris Rock: Maybe. But we had Bush for eight years. They saw what that was. 
Apparently a lot of people want to go back to that. A lot of people think rich 
people are smart.140 
 
Frank Rich: For all the current conversation about income inequality, class is still 
sort of the elephant in the room. 
 
Chris Rock: Oh, people don’t even know. If poor people knew how rich rich 
people are, there would be riots in the streets.141 
 
Do we not even know? We have data suggesting we actually don’t. Two social scientists asked 
5000 U.S. citizens about their perception of income inequality and what they thought would be 
more ideal. The difference between the average perception of how things are and the average 
ideal people have in mind is perhaps as surprising as the difference between our perception of 
inequality and its brutal reality: 
 
                                                 
140 Note the resonance both with Hume and the situation the Antifederalists faced. 
141 http://www.vulture.com/2014/11/chris-rock-frank-rich-in-conversation.html 
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from Norton and Ariely (2011: 11) 
 
People estimated that the top 20% of society (economically speaking) control just under 60% of 
the nation’s wealth. In fact, the top 20% control 84% of the nation’s wealth—and the top 1% 
control about 42% (and things have gotten worse since that study was conducted). That’s a very 
small group of people with a vast amount of wealth. And it turns out that 92% of respondents 
thought that the more equitable “ideal” version (which, unbeknownst to the participants in the 
study, the scientists modeled on an existing “socialist” economy, namely Sweden) was the best 
way to go. How might it feel, what might be going on in our unconscious if deep down in there 
we suspect things are so far out of whack with what we think is fair? And what if, deep down in 
there, what we think is fair is even more radical than what we express consciously? How might 
we feel? Would we feel a need to rebel? Would we feel suicidal if we thought we had no 
control? Would we feel angry if the whole system seemed rigged? 
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A similar finding about fairness holds with income. The U.S. is incredibly “wealthy,”142 and also 
has the most inequitable distribution of wealth among “developed” nations.143 But wealth is not 
the same as income, since wealth is the total net positive value of all one’s assets, and thus 
includes such things as stocks and real estate, and takes into account one’s debt. Income 
inequality is a related and telling feature of our society. A recent study regarding pay inequality 
was done in 40 countries. The authors found that the U.S. showed a “particularly pronounced” 
underestimation of the wage gap between CEO’s and the average worker. People guessed on 
average that CEO’s make 30 times more than their typical worker. In fact, CEO’s make 354 
times what their average worker makes. Again, the ideal people have in mind was something 
very “un-American” if we take what we actually have as the “American dream”: people thought 
that a 7 to 1 gap would be fair.  
 
Further questions about how rich the rich are, and what that says about the dominant culture and 
how we might transform it, have arisen in the context of the recent college bribery scandal, in 
which wealthy people paid as much as $6.5 million to guarantee their child a slot at elite 
universities. Presumably, these children could not have gotten in otherwise, and so we may 
conclude they had less than elite academic achievements. Journalist Anand Giridharadas, author 
of Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World, commented on the scandal as 
follows: “The college bribery scam is not a college bribery scam. It is a master class in how 
America—governed by a cheater, ruled by rule breakers, managed by a class that confuses its 
                                                 
142 Recall the U.S. is the leading WEIRD society: “Western,” “Educated,” Industrialized, “Rich,” 
and “Democratic”—all terms in the acronym needing quotes other than Industrialized, because 
all of the other terms are much more significantly relative.  
143https://www.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianz_com/migration/media/eco
nomic_research/publications/specials/en/Allianz_Global_Wealth_Report_2018_e.pdf 
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privilege for merit—functions.”144 In an interview with Democracy Now, Giridharadas offered 
some insights into the nature of inequality as a pattern of insanity, which among other things 
means that attempts to “change” the pattern will tend to reflect the pattern itself, and thus 
perpetuate it. Let us consider some of his comments at length: 
 . . . when a scandal like this breaks, it’s really important for us to understand that 
we’ve gone from seeing 0 percent of a system to 0.003 percent of a system, right? 
There’s so much more here. This is a little biopsy of a world that we happen to 
get. 
 
And what we learned is, as you cover on this show, America is, in many ways, 
rigged for the wealthy and powerful. And we know that. We have a tax code that 
is rigged for the wealthy and powerful. We have anti-trust enforcement that’s 
rigged for the wealthy and powerful. We fund public education according to 
property taxes, so the nicer mommy or daddy’s house, the better the school you 
get. America is already rigged for rich people. 
 
The problem is, for some rich people, all that rigging that I just described is 
shared equally among rich people . . . You have the same first-class seat on the 
commercial jet that everybody—all the other rich people have. And what we 
found in this case was, some rich people are not satisfied with the generalized 
rigging that they have to share with everybody else. They want special, private, 
bespoke, bottle-service rigging over and above the standard rigging that rich 
people receive. 
 
 . . . this [the college bribery scandal] is a phenomenal glimpse, because what—as 
someone who’s been writing about this plutocracy for a few years, what these 
folks say when they hear critics like me is, “Don’t be negative. Don’t be zero-
sum. We can empower the least among us. We can fight for the poor. And we can 
benefit and get rich. Right? It’s not zero-sum.” And you know what really is 
actually zero-sum? When there is one college seat, and a hard-working kid from a 
poor neighborhood, whose family has never sent anybody to college, but now 
they have a shot at that seat—they’ve worked hard, their parents took many buses 
to many jobs, they might be eligible for that seat—and they don’t get that seat, 
because someone like Bill McGlashan, private equity baron, impact investing 
impresario, who had a $2 billion impact fund with Bono, has locked up that seat 
for his son. 
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https://www.democracynow.org/2019/3/15/anand_giridharadas_college_bribery_scandal_highlig
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 . . . . And what was so—and that makes this story so much more powerful, 
because you have a guy who’s had a $2 billion fund, called The Rise Fund, that 
was about empowering people around the world, from Appalachia to Africa, who 
hadn’t had opportunity. And what we now know is this guy was working to rig 
the system, when we weren’t looking, to make sure that those people he was 
supposedly empowering with his fund would never actually be able to compete 
with his son. 
 
. . . . So, there are two things here your viewers really need to understand, because 
this is why this matters to all of us. First of all, at a more general level, this case is 
not a one-off, in the fact that the mechanism by which rich people were exerting 
wealth, influence and rigging things was charity. If you look at the Koch brothers, 
many others, the mechanism by which a lot of this stuff is done, and the kind of 
conquest of power is done, is through charity and philanthropy. So it’s very 
notable, but also very telling, rather than exceptional, that the mechanism here 
was charity.145 
 
These are some of the basic details. We do need to correct one very unfortunate turn of phrase: 
“a world that we happen to get.” Rather, we live in a world we intentionally make—even if we 
do so by misunderstanding the nature of intention and action, even if we do so on the basis of 
misunderstanding time and space, even if we do so on the basis of misunderstanding self and 
world. Indeed, Giridharadas would likely agree with this correction based on what he says later 
in the interview, and we need to inquire into those further considerations to see the pattern of 
insanity more clearly: 
the uncomfortable fact is that when you actually look at any of the data—these 
people claim to love data—the data is that the very same people who are giving 
and doing philanthropy, and doing social this and impact that, are actually also the 
great hoarders of opportunity in our time. . . . Their share of the world’s wealth 
increases, not decreases, every year. They’re grabbing more of the pie every year, 
even as they help. Their share of the nation’s income has doubled since the 
middle of the 20th century, the 1 percent’s has. And, you know, you know all the 
things you’ve covered in the show. Half of this country, the bottom half of this 
country, has not basically seen a pay rise since 1979. You’ve had a tremendous 
age of innovation that has failed to translate into progress, if progress means most 
people’s lives getting better. 
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And the unmistakable fact that I learned through my reporting—I started the 
reporting with a question: What’s the relationship between the two halves of this 
paradox? On the one hand, you got all these generous rich people; on the other 
hand, you have the fact that it’s a age of inequality, an age of anger. America feels 
rigged to people. The American dream is elusive. What’s the relationship? Is it 
just that this charity, this philanthropy, this do-gooding is not working? It’s not 
working fast enough? Or is it actually that this charity and philanthropy and elite 
do-gooding is part of how they maintain the system that allows them to keep 
taking all? 
 
And what I found through my reporting was that when these elites get involved in 
social change, what they do is they change change. They take leadership of 
change. They Columbus social change. They declare themselves now the people, 
the CEO of Change Inc. And they edit out, in their capacity as board members, 
trustees, leaders of organizations, donors to causes—they edit out forms of change 
they don’t want to—they don’t really like. And they encourage forms of change 
they believe in. So, on any issue—you take the empowerment of women. You 
know what they don’t like? Maternity leave. You know why? Because it’s 
expensive. Costs money—right?—for companies, for the taxpayer, particularly 
wealthy taxpayers. So what do they like? Lean in. You know why? Because lean 
in is free. All you got to do is tell women that patriarchy is actually a posture 
problem: If you just lean at a slightly different angle of recline, patriarchy gone. 
Well, that’s very cheap. Rich people love lean in. 
 
. . . . “Lean in” means telling women to raise their hands more and be a little more 
assertive in meetings, to fight patriarchy . . . Which is, I don’t know, like telling 
the slaves to be nicer? I mean, like the answer to systems of oppression is not to 
tell people to be more pleasing to their bosses. But this is—but this is the advice 
from, you know, a billionaire corporate feminist, Sheryl Sandberg, who, while she 
was telling women to lean in, was also selling women out so that they would live 
under Donald Trump, because Facebook was so, you know, unwilling to deal with 
the cyberwar issue and the abuse-of-privacy issue and Cambridge Analytica, etc.  
 
. . . . You know, on basic finances, a lot of rich people who get involved in this 
kind of change making, they love apps. Let’s have an app to help workers with 
precarious income smooth their income, or let’s have an app, a fintech app, to 
help women save more for the future. Win-win, easy. Doesn’t hurt them at all. 
Right? You know what they don’t like? You know, how about an initiative to 
actually rat out the trillions of dollars hiding in tax havens around the world? How 
come you don’t really have many of the big billionaires funding philanthropic 
efforts to expose the tax havens? It’s a serious question. I mean, if they’re really 
about making the world a better place, that seems like a pretty good cause. It’s 
revealing that they’re not interested in that cause. Why? Because they’re never—
the people who have the most to lose from change can’t be placed in charge of 
reforming the status quo. But all of us have actually allowed that to happen. All of 
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us have participated in a culture that actually does sort of see Mark Zuckerberg as 
a change agent, that actually does see Silicon Valley as change agents, that 
actually does sort of buy it when ExxonMobil tries to rebrand itself as the 
renewable company. And so we all need to wake up and stop believing the phony 
story that the people with the most to lose from change can lead change. 
 
[there is a] kind of thought leader circuit—right?—Aspen, Davos, TED—these 
places where rich and powerful people go to kind of take in ideas like gelato and 
kind of want to hear ideas that don’t threaten them, and the way that that has 
incentivized thinkers to kind of clip the wings of their diagnoses of the society 
and be more palatable to billionaires . . . 
 
[and there are] young people, 21-, 22-year-olds on campuses, trying to decide 
what to do with their life, [and] their idealism has been understood and managed 
and coopted by JPMorgan, McKinsey, Goldman Sachs and others to convince 
these most talented young people we have that if you really want to change the 
world, you’ve got to spend a couple years at Goldman; otherwise, how will you 
know how to make change? 
 
 . . . [in the book] I wanted to take together this kind of complex of people and 
institutions that is defined by a common religion of doing well by doing good, 
that the best way to empower others is to also benefit yourself. Win-win. You can 
fight for social justice, and you can get rich.146 
 
We live in a culture of conquest, and the modern-day conquistadors—whom we politely label, or 
rebrand, as CEO’s, “captains of industry,” “thought leaders,” “change makers,” and so on, 
referring to their epistemic policing with words like “visionary thinking”—the modern-day 
conquerors have invaded and conquered the processes that might challenge their domination and 
control, including politics, education, and a vast array of charitable and non-governmental 
organizations that should function as facilitators of empowerment. This includes environmental 
organizations of all kinds, even Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, and it certainly affects 
philosophical education at all levels. It includes all manner of campaigns to “lift up” the people 
of exploited and degraded lands and cultures. Again and again, we try to cure our alcoholism 
with more drinking, or drinking brandy and Champaign instead of beer and vodka. We don’t 
                                                 
146 https://www.democracynow.org/2019/3/15/winners_take_all_anand_giridharadas_on 
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want dangerous ideas. Our “thought leaders” and conquistadors would do everything they could 
to marginalize, ridicule, and even get rid of a modern-day Socrates if one would appear. Don’t 
we each need to appear as such a figure, such an archetype? We all can sense this insanity, and 
begin to question it in the very ways that would make the conquistadors uncomfortable.147 
 
But waking up from this insanity does not seem so easy, because the invaders have invaded the 
mind so thoroughly. The strange thing that Chris Rock tried to point out is that people seem to 
vote as if they wanted to demand inequality, as if they wanted to say, with their vote, “Above all, 
let there be the very wealthy; let wealth be concentrated in such a way that it would be obscene if 
I really could see how rich the rich really are. Facilitate the capacity of wealth to go to very few. 
This is my political will.” This seems to be how people vote, and yet if you ask them on 
reflection how they think the society actually is or should be, they give a rather different answer 
                                                 
147 The apex predators in our current, highly degraded ecology seem to be corporations. While it 
does not seem helpful to single out individuals, we do need to recognize that human beings keep 
these corporations running (human beings also run the NGO’s that have gotten infected with a 
corporate mentality, something like a zombie-ant fungus taking over the body and mind of an 
ant). In various ways, these human beings will begin to express a psychology that keeps the 
larger ecology going. For instance, David M. Mayer wrote, “My 20 years of research in moral 
psychology suggests many reasons why people behave in an unethical manner. When it comes to 
the wealthy, research shows that they will go to great lengths to maintain their higher status. A 
sense of entitlement plays a role.” He further notes that, “Wealthy individuals who are 
considered as “upper class” based on their income have been found to lie, steal and cheat more to 
get what they desire. They have also been found to be less generous. They are more likely to 
break the law when driving, give less help to strangers in need, and generally give others less 
attention.” The general problem has to do with an insane solution to insanity: Use the mindset 
that creates suffering to solve the suffering. But, we should see how what we call human 
psychology plays a role. A particular mindset goes into perpetuating the pattern of insanity, and 
it always involves a view of self, world, time, space, and so on. Mayer’s reflections can be found 
here: https://www.alternet.org/2019/03/science-explains-wh-rich-parents-are-more-likely-to-be-
unethical/ 
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from their vote. Moreover, if the practices of education did not fail people so miserably, they 
might support political goals radically at odds with their voting record. 
 
There are a variety of factors that might explain these phenomena, including factors sketched by 
Giridharadas, and the general notion that the dominant culture indoctrinates its citizens to keep 
them in line, to make certain things off limits to thought, unknowable even if experienced by 
accident. There is also the deliberate nature of the control. We have an industrialized circus to go 
with our industrialized bread, and that circus includes an industrialized politics. 
 
Calling it industrialized has a double meaning. On the one hand it means we have manufactured 
it, treated it as another commodity, in a process in which the consumer is ultimately consumed. 
On the other hand, it also means that the captains of industry have taken over. They are the 
overseers of the managers who manage the factory in which consent gets manufactured. Sheldon 
Wolin has written about this “inverted totalitarianism,” which differs from the classical 
totalitarian regimes by having the consent of the people managed by means other than brute 
force (though, not in its total absence) and by separating the state from the corporations in such a 
way that we cannot claim to have a state-run economy in the classical sense. In such an ecology, 
the corporation seems to be the apex predator, though we must see that predator itself as an 
ecology. Just as each human being is an ecology energy flows, “organs,” bacteria, fungi, and so 
on, a corporation has symbionts who direct its activities. It is a social-material ecology, driven by 
delusions and abstractions. But the activity of the symbionts (the CEO’s, board members, and 
other parasites who benefit from its action in the world) drives it as a social-material ecology that 
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has traumatic effects in the world. It is an organism always feverish, always hungry. Wolin notes 
that this predator fights dirty, and depends on a larger ecology of corruption to survive: 
Over the centuries politicians and political theorists—starting with Plato’s 
Republic—have emphasized disinterestedness, not personal advantage, as the 
fundamental virtue required of those entrusted with state power. In recognition of 
the temptations of power and self-interest a variety of constraints—legal, 
religious, customary, and moral—were invoked or appealed to in the hope of 
limiting rulers or at least inhibiting them from doing harmful or evil acts. At the 
same time rulers were exhorted to protect and promote the common good of 
society and the well-being of all of their subjects. With the emergence of 
democratic ideas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it fell to the 
citizen to assume responsibility for taking care of political and social 
arrangements, not only operating institutions but “cultivating” them, caring for 
them, improving them, and, ultimately, defending them. Democracy presumed the 
presence of a “popular culture,” not in the contemporary sense of packaged 
pleasures for a perpetually adolescent consumer, but culture in its original 
meaning: from the Latin cultus = tilling, cultivating, tending. The ideal of a 
democratic political culture was about cooperating in the care of common 
arrangements, of practices in which, potentially, all could share in deciding the 
uses of power while bearing responsibility for their consequences. The 
assumption was that if decision-making institutions of a community were left 
untended, all or most might suffer. A medieval aphorism summed up the 
traditional idea of the political, “that which touches all should be approved by 
all.” 
In contrast, the ethos of the twenty-first-century corporation is an 
antipolitical culture of competition rather than cooperation, of aggrandizement, of 
besting rivals, and of leaving behind disrupted careers and damaged communities. 
It is a culture for increase that cannot rest (= “stagnation”) but must continuously 
innovate and expand. It accepts as axiomatic that top executives have to be, first 
and foremost, competition-oriented and profit-driven: the profitability of the 
corporate entity is more important than any commonality with the larger society. 
“The competitor is our friend,” according to an Archer Daniels Midland internal 
memo, “and the customer is our enemy.” Enron had “visions and values” cubes 
on display; its chief financial officer’s cube read, “When Enron says it will rip 
your face off, it will rip your face off.” 
Perhaps the most striking embodiment of the aggrandizing culture of the 
corporation is Wal-Mart, the consumer’s low-cost paradise and the perfect 
economic complement to Superpower. In its own way it is an invasive, totalizing 
power, continuously establishing footholds in local communities, destroying small 
businesses that are unable to compete, forcing low wages, harsh working 
conditions, and poor health care on its employees, discouraging unionization. It is 
inverted totalitarianism in a corporate, imperial mode. 
As the scandals about Enron and WorldCom demonstrated, the self-
interest of the corporate executive takes precedence over the interests of the 
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institution. During the last decade corporate crimes and abuses involving the 
highest executive levels have been commonplace: cheating, lying, deceptive 
practices, extraordinary bonuses despite corporate failure, ruthless conduct, and so 
forth. Recall that in the Reagan presidency, corporate managers rather than public 
service–oriented officials dominated the upper levels of government, bringing 
with them a corporate ethos. Not surprisingly, “conflicts of interest” flourished. 
Equally unsurprising, the reverse did not occur; no corporate executive stood 
accused of sacrificing private interest to the common good. The effect of 
persistent, pervasive corporate misconduct is to promote public distrust of power-
holders in general. From Superpower’s vantage point public cynicism, far from 
being deplorable, is one more element contributing to political demoralization and 
languor. 
Although the doctrine of the “preemptive strike” is a controversial topic in 
discussions of foreign policy, there is less political controversy about its 
economic counterpart. Corporate competition has its preemptive strike in hostile 
takeovers, poison pills, and the like. These tactics of corporate power politics 
form a complement to Superpower politics.  The corporate ethos is not one that 
favors conciliation and fairness or worries over collateral damage. 
The broad question is whether democracy is possible when the dominant 
ethos in the economy fosters antipolitical and antidemocratic behavior and values; 
when the corporate world is both the principal supplier of political leadership and 
the main source of political corruption; and when small investors occupy a 
position of powerlessness comparable to that of the average voter. “Shareholder 
democracy” belongs on the same list of oxymorons as “Superpower democracy.” 
At stake are the conditions that serve forms of power antithetical to 
democracy. The citizenry is reduced to an electorate whose potency consists of 
choosing among congressional candidates who, prior to campaigning, have 
demonstrated their “seriousness” by successfully soliciting a million dollars or 
more from wealthy donors. This rite of passage ensures that the candidate is 
beholden to corporate power before taking office. Not surprisingly, the candidate 
who raises the most money will likely be the winner. The vote count becomes the 
expression of the contributor. 
“Managed democracy” is the application of managerial skills to the basic 
democratic political institution of popular elections. An election, as distinguished 
from the simple act of voting, has been reshaped into a complex production. Like 
all productive operations, it is ongoing and requires continuous supervision rather 
than continuing popular participation. Unmanaged elections would epitomize 
contingency: the managerial nightmare of control freaks. One method of assuring 
control is to make electioneering continuous, year-round, saturated with party 
propaganda, punctuated with the wisdom of kept pundits, bringing a result boring 
rather than energizing, the kind of civic lassitude on which a managed democracy 
thrives. A large campaign contribution represents the kind of surplus power a 
dynamic capitalist economy makes available. 
It begins as the production of an ordinary commodity, say a computer 
chip, which eventually turns a profit that is then “invested” in a candidate or party 
or a lobbyist in order to purchase “access” to those who are authorized to make 
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policies or decisions. A law or regulation favorable to the donor mysteriously 
emerges—an immaculate deception or “earmark” with no apparent “father.” No 
one wants to acknowledge paternity or reveal the consensual act that produced it. 
At issue is more than crude bribery. Campaign contributions are a vital 
tool of political management. They create a pecking order that calibrates, in 
strictly quantitative and objective terms, whose interests have priority. The 
amount of corruption that regularly takes place before elections means that 
corruption is not an anomaly but an essential element in the functioning of 
managed democracy. The entrenched system of bribery and corruption involves 
no physical violence, no brown-shirted storm troopers, no coercion of the political 
opposition. While the tactics are not those of the Nazis, the end result is the 
inverted equivalent. Opposition has not been liquidated but rendered feckless. 
(2017: 138-41) 
 
It’s startling to think about how much violence is actually institutionalized, and how the apex 
predator sees the rest of us not only as prey, but as an enemy prey, perhaps an enemy prey whose 
face it will rip off. These are “civilized” and, relatively speaking, sophisticated forms of practice 
that bring to realization widespread ecologies of fear, anger, aggression, mistrust, fragmentation, 
degradation, extraction. This is all fundamental to our way of knowing ourselves, each other, and 
the world.  
 
In thinking things through, we have to keep our eye on the spiritual lessons, which will always 
go against forces of oppression and domination. Among those is that we have a basic sense of 
justice, which is why we have to be managed and controlled. Socrates had to be put to death 
because he could not be controlled. He was wildness in the midst of the city, and he practiced the 
wildness of justice, the justice of wildness. Justice, as Cornel West likes to say, is “what love 
looks like in public,” and people like Socrates, Gandhi, King, Malala Yousefzai, and even Greta 
Thunberg live their love in a public way. It is like a drive toward ecosensuality, the nonduality of 
“individual” and “collective,” “organism” and “environment”.  
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It is significant that Socrates inspired King. There appears to be a deep resonance in the 
ecologies of black culture that have persisted in spite of the dominant ecologies of oppression. 
Wolin thus provides a very good added layer of explanation for the way industrialized “justice” 
operates in the dominant culture: 
Inverted totalitarianism has learned how to exploit what appear to be 
formidable political and legal constraints, using them in ways that defeat their 
original purpose but without dismantling or overtly attacking them. . . . 
Our totalizing system, nonetheless, has evolved its own methods and 
strategies. Its genius lies in wielding total power without appearing to, without 
establishing concentration camps, or enforcing ideological uniformity, or forcibly 
suppressing dissident elements so long as they remain ineffectual. However, the 
parallel lines of classic totalitarianism and inverted totalitarianism occasionally 
intersect. It is true that aliens, and even some citizens, who are suspected of 
having “links” to terrorists have been hauled away, kept incommunicado, and 
even transported abroad to countries with more cost-effective, less tender methods 
of interrogation, yet such practices are meant more as object lessons than as 
standard procedures. In the same vein the United States has established only a few 
extrajudicial courts (e.g., so-called military tribunals) and does not have 
concentration camps, only some “detention centers” and “brigs” where, under 
harsh conditions, prisoners may be held without being charged with a specific 
crime. The point is to preserve an economy of fear and not to saturate the 
“market.” For what is most revealing of totalitarian tendencies in our inverted 
regime are not the publicized denials of due process to enemy nationals or to 
misguided “freedom fighters.” The more important consideration is ensuring 
domestic tranquility. But, specifically, against whom? 
The United States has the highest rate of incarceration of any country in 
the world, a prison system with brutalizing conditions, and one that has been 
significantly privatized. Equally striking, a disproportionately high percentage of 
the imprisoned are African Americans. Assuming that most of the imprisoned 
African Americans have committed some crime, their incarceration would appear 
to contrast with the Nazi policies that herded millions of Jews, Gypsies, 
homosexuals, political opponents, and Slavs into slave labor camps for no other 
reason than to satisfy irrational ideological beliefs (“racial purity”) and obtain 
“free” labor. Or do the high incarceration rates among blacks reflect not only old-
fashioned racism but inverted totalitarianism’s fear of political dissidence? 
The significance of the African American prison population is political. 
What is notable about the African American population generally is that it is 
highly sophisticated politically and by far the one group that throughout the 
twentieth century kept alive a spirit of resistance and 
rebelliousness. In that context, criminal justice is as much a strategy of political 
neutralization as it is a channel of instinctive racism. 
583 
 
Our government need not pursue a policy of stamping out dissidence—the 
uniformity imposed on opinion by the “private” media conglomerates performs 
that job efficiently. This apparent “restraint” points to a crucial difference 
between classical and inverted totalitarianism: in the former economics was 
subordinate to politics. Under inverted totalitarianism the reverse is true: 
economics dominates politics—and with that domination come different forms of 
ruthlessness. It is possible for the government to punish by withholding 
appropriated funds, failing to honor entitlements, or purposely allowing 
regulations (e.g., environmental safeguards, minimum wage standards) to remain 
unenforced or waived. What seem like reductions in state power are actually 
increases. Withholding appropriated money is an expression of power that is not 
lost on those adversely affected; waiving minimum wage standards is an act of 
power not lost on those who benefit and those who suffer. Such strategies play a 
major role in the incorporation of state and corporate power. Incorporation need 
not always require, for example, that corporate representatives sit on review 
committees that judge new drugs or gather in the office of the vice president to 
consult on energy policies. Power is typically exercised in a context where the 
participants know their cues. Recently a major television network withdrew a 
program dealing with Ronald Reagan after the Republican National Committee 
protested a scene where the former president was portrayed as less than inclusive 
about homosexuals. This surrender occurred at the precise moment when the 
Republican-dominated Federal Communications Commission was promoting 
greater concentration of media ownership and, in the process, ignoring an 
unprecedented outcry from thousands of citizens. (2017: 57-8) 
 
We can note that “incorporation” here has a strange resonance with Nietzsche’s experiment to 
incorporate truth. In the dominant culture, we incorporate corporations. We know ourselves in an 
ecology defined by their presence, and they function like an apex predator, but one living like an 
invasive vine, with roots and shoots in every possible niche. We are entangled with this predator, 
and it has lodged itself in our bodies and minds.  
 
Wolin suggests that part of the structural energy driving the way we know how to run a society, 
the way we know how to do things, the way we know ourselves, each other, and the world, has 
to do with the suppression of a source of energy, inquiry, and spiritual/philosophical challenge 
from a particular set of ecologies within the larger ecology—namely the ecologies of Black 
culture. But there may be other such suppressions, many occurring without the need for force or 
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even the threat of force. Plato is never taught dangerously even though Gandhi’s translation of 
the Apology was thought dangerous enough to structures of power that it was banned. Who’s 
going to ban Plato? Which philosophy professors will be tried for the secular equivalent of 
impiety and the corruption of youth? 
 
If Wolin is correct that the structures of power need to fear the revolutionary potentials, then 
philosophers have yet another reason to ask themselves whether or not it is ethical, in this 
context, to fail to teach Gandhi and King when they teach Plato—from day one, from the 
introductory courses that try to do too much intellectual work and not enough practice of 
wisdom, love, and beauty, such that we could realize, in mutuality, new ways of knowing 
ourselves, each other, and the world. 
 
Cornel West refers to this vein in Black culture as the Black prophetic tradition. In the 
introduction to his book, Black Prophetic Fire (co-written with Christa Buschendorf) West 
writes: 
Are we witnessing the death of Black prophetic fire in our time? Are we 
experiencing the demise of the Black prophetic tradition in present-day America? 
Do the great prophetic figures and social movements no longer resonate in the 
depth of our souls? Have we forgotten how beautiful it is to be on fire for justice? 
These are some of the questions I wrestle with in this book. 
Since the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., it is clear that something 
has died in Black America. The last great efforts for Black collective triumph 
were inspired by the massive rebellions in response to Dr. King’s murder. Yet 
these gallant actions were met with increasing repression and clever strategies of 
co-optation by the powers that be. The funda mental shift from a we-
consciousness to an I-consciousness reflected not only a growing sense of Black 
collective defeat but also a Black embrace of the seductive myth of individualism 
in American culture. Black people once put a premium on serving the community, 
lifting others, and finding joy in empowering others. Today, most Black people 
have succumbed to individualistic projects in pursuit of wealth, health, and status. 
Black people once had a strong prophetic tradition of lifting every voice. Today, 
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most Black people engage in the petty practice of chasing dollars. American 
society is ruled by big money, and American culture is a way of life obsessed with 
money. This is true for capitalist societies and cultures around the world. The 
Black prophetic tradition—along with the prophetic traditions of other groups—is 
a strong counter-force to these tendencies of our times. Integrity cannot be 
reduced to cupidity, decency cannot be reduced to chicanery, and justice cannot 
be reduced to market price. The fundamental motivation for this book is to 
resurrect Black prophetic fire in our day—especially among the younger 
generation. I want to reinvigorate the Black prophetic tradition and to keep alive 
the memory of Black prophetic figures and movements. I consider the Black 
prophetic tradition one of the greatest treasures in the modern world. It has been 
the leaven in the American democratic loaf. Without the Black prophetic 
tradition, much of the best of America would be lost and some of the best of the 
modern world would be forgotten. 
All the great figures in this book courageously raised their voices in order 
to bear witness to people’s suffering. These Black prophetic figures are connected 
to collective efforts to overcome injustice and make the world a better place for 
everyone. Even as distinct individuals, they are driven by a we-consciousness that 
is concerned with the needs of others. More importantly, they are willing to 
renounce petty pleasures and accept awesome burdens. Tremendous sacrifice and 
painful loneliness sit at the center of who they are and what they do. Yet we are 
deeply indebted to who they were and what they did. 
Unfortunately, their mainstream reception is shaped according to the 
cultural icon of the self-made man or the individual charismatic leader. This is 
especially true for the male figures. This is not to say that they did not fulfill the 
function of leaders and speakers of their organizations. But I want to point out 
that any conception of the charismatic leader severed from social movements is 
false. I consider leaders and movements to be inseparable. There is no Frederick 
Douglass without the Abolitionist movement. There is no W. E. B. Du Bois 
without the Pan-Africanist, international workers’, and Black freedom 
movements. There is no Martin Luther King Jr. without the anti-imperialist, 
workers’, and civil rights movements. There is no Ella Baker without the anti-US-
apartheid and Puerto Rican independence movements. There is no Malcolm X 
without the Black Nationalist and human rights movements. And there is no Ida 
B. Wells without the anti-US-terrorist and Black women’s movements.  
 
We face the threat that all the energy and materiality invested into the inverted totalitarian 
system will triumph, and philosophy departments don’t seem to be helping. Yet, West is 
optimistic that we can get in touch with the Prophetic of the Black tradition and other traditions. 
Prophecy is one of the madnesses Plato mentions in the Phaedrus, and in our inquiry we would 
interpret these madnesses as ways of knowing, ways of entering the epistemic space of 
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liberation, ways of self-liberating into larger ecologies of mind. We can, at this point, sense 
rather well the repressed interwovenness of wisdom and compassion, epistemology and ethics, 
knowing and loving—and this goes together with a duality between “individual” and 
“collective,” “organism” and “environment,” “civilized” and “wild” that our inquiry suggests we 
need to challenge. West challenges some of this as well, when he clearly declares the 
interwovenness of the great figures he will discuss and their ecologies of liberation. These are 
ecologies of practice-and-realization, ecologies of knowing. And this knowing demands a 
selflessness, the presencing of “forgetting the self,” which can at times appear as a sacred 
madness. Of the divine or sacred madnesses, Plato has Socrates say, 
. . . in fact the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift 
of the god. 
The prophetess of Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona are out of their 
minds when they perform that fine work of theirs for all of Greece, either for an 
individual person or for a whole city, but they accomplish little or nothing when 
they are in control of themselves. We will not mention the Sybil or the others who 
foretell many things by means of god-inspired prophetic trances and give sound 
guidance to many people—that would take too much time for a point that’s 
obvious to everyone. But here’s some evidence worth adding to our case: The 
people who designed our language in the old days never thought of madness as 
something to be ashamed of or worthy of blame; otherwise they would not have 
used the word ‘manic’ for the finest experts of all—the ones who tell the future—
thereby weaving insanity into prophecy. They thought it was wonderful when it 
came as a gift of the god, and that’s why they gave its name to prophecy; but 
nowadays people don’t know the fine points, so they stick in a ‘t’ and call it 
‘mantic.’ Similarly, the clear-headed study of the future, which uses birds and 
other signs, was originally called oionoïstic, since it uses reasoning to bring 
intelligence (nous) and learning (historia) into human thought; but now modern 
speakers call it oiōnistic, putting on airs with their long ‘ō’. d 
To the extent, then, that prophecy, mantic, is more perfect and more admirable 
than sign-based prediction, oiōnistic, in both name and achievement, madness 
(mania) from a god is finer than self-control of human origin, according to the 
testimony of the ancient language givers. 
Next, madness can provide relief from the greatest plagues of trouble that 
beset certain families because of their guilt for ancient crimes: it turns up among 
those who need a way out; it gives prophecies and takes refuge in prayers to the 
gods and in worship, discovering mystic rites and purifications that bring the man 
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it touches through to safety for this and all time to come. So it is that the right sort 
of madness finds relief from present hardships for a man it has possessed. 
Third comes the kind of madness that is possession by the Muses, which 
takes a tender virgin soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry 
that glorifies the achievements of the past and teaches them to future generations. 
If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet by 
acquiring expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses’ madness, he will 
fail, and his self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have 
been driven out of their minds. 
There you have some of the fine achievements—and I could tell you even 
more—that are due to god-sent madness. We must not have any fear on this 
particular point, then, and we must not let anyone disturb us or frighten us with 
the claim that you should prefer a friend who is in control of himself to one who 
is disturbed. (244a-245b, translation by Cooper) 
 
The reader will surely notice the slight strangeness of a passage like this in the midst of 
contemplations related to politics, addiction, economics, justice. Our labyrinth walking has 
possibly begun to give a sense of why it belongs here (as well as anywhere), why we come back 
to not only Plato’s Phaedrus, but why we should have the Republic in mind too, including its 
suggestion that we must, in some sense, look “outside” ourselves to fully realize the soul. 
Receiving these words from Plato in light of Cornel West’s reflections, and in light of our whole 
inquiry thus far, we can sense how knowing goes together with the social, the ethical, the living 
context, the ecology of thinking, and how only sacred madness can heal what is broken in the 
World and in the dominant culture.  
 
Because of the inconceivability of the larger ecologies, because the ego remains trapped in its 
little box, we must liberate ourselves into the larger ecologies, and this can look like madness. 
We must note that, it is not just any madness, but a sacred madness that will give us the best 
things we have, and that Prophecy so inspired would be . . .  well, prophecy—a sensing “ahead” 
by means we are not at all used to in our ego-based functioning. The Black prophetic tradition 
and other prophetic traditions, involve this sacred madness that is a sacred sanity. And it 
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depends, crucially, on the interwovenness of knowing and loving—thus deepening our 
understanding of why hatred is the near-enemy of knowledge, and why political (or any) 
aggression is a variety of ignorance, healed by LoveWisdom.  
 
We thus have increasingly sophisticated philosophical reasons for experimenting with practices 
that properly decenter of the ego. Even from the standpoint of evolutionary psychology, we 
could side with Darwin and an ecological view, and suggest that we basically feel a calling to 
take care of each other, and to establish a healthy ecology, an ecology rooted in wisdom, love, 
and beauty.  
 
But we can get distracted—and we live in an ecology of deliberate distraction and control. From 
the perspective of LoveWisdom, we willingly engage in an astonishing array of distractions, and 
swallow a remarkable measure of rationalizations handed to us from the very forces that control 
us. Since the dominant culture’s ecology has to do with materialism, one of our main sources of 
distraction, and the major arena of rationalization, has to do with materiality. As beings of soul, 
as ensouled adventurers, we can only feel deeply fulfilled by means of a spiritual satisfaction—
one which transcends the duality between mind-body, spirit-soul, heaven-earth, and so on. But, 
we get hooked into seeking spiritual satisfaction in material things, and the culture encourages 
this with verve, seducing us into thinking we can solve both the material and spiritual problems 
we face by material means, by the same means that actively create material inequalities and 
spiritual/emotional/physical unwellness. We get indoctrinated to think that wealth can solve the 
problems of wealth and the problems of illth that go altogether with the problems of wealth. In 
the activity of dualistic consciousness, there is no such thing as wealth, but only wealth-illth, 
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which, as we work to control it, and control the world on its basis, is the very activity of 
suffering. Nothing aside from transcendence of the dualistic way of knowing ourselves, each 
other, and our World will allow us to fully realize a World of fundamental abundance. 
Meanwhile, we live as if always in privation; we practice and realize ecologies of suffering. 
 
When we experience suffering, we naturally want to feel better. If we can perceive any material 
object as a viable way to feel better, we will certainly try it, again and again, which means we 
can easily become inclined to know ourselves and our world in certain limited and limiting ways. 
And thus one thing that has happened over the past couple hundred years in particular is a kind 
of material bribe: We willingly distract ourselves away from the soul (which means putting up 
with increasing inequality and various forms of injustice, including ecological degradation) in 
exchange for material consumption, which is offered (encouraged) to us (by means of powerful 
seductions and clever manipulations) as a substitute for our spiritual hunger, a process facilitated 
by the kind of duality Locke encouraged. Lewis Mumford captures this bribe rather well: 
The bargain we are being asked to ratify takes the form of a magnificent bribe. 
Under the democratic-authoritarian social contract, each member of the 
community may claim every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional 
stimulus he may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted 
minority: food, housing, swift transportation, instantaneous communication, 
medical care, entertainment, education. But on one condition: that one must not 
merely ask for nothing that the system does not provide, but likewise agree to take 
everything offered, duly processed and fabricated, homogenized and equalized, in 
the precise quantities that the system, rather than the person, requires. Once one 
opts for the system no further choice remains. In a word, if one surrenders one’s 
life at source, authoritarian technics will give back as much of it as can be 
mechanically graded, quantitatively multiplied, collectively manipulated and 
magnified.148 
 
                                                 
148 Available at http://www.primitivism.com/mumford.htm 
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“Magnificent bribe” is a perfect phrase, and also an imperfect phrase. It’s a magnificent swindle 
and a magnificent coup—and more than anything else, a magnificent domination of the soul. But 
the soul cannot really be dominated or controlled. There are always consequences for going 
against our own Soul and going against Life. We now face some of the more severe of those 
consequences, and we must do all we can to minimize the appearance of further, still more 
intense consequences, which are inevitable if we keep going as we are. We need LoveWisdom 
more than ever just to be able to navigate the consequences we already have coming and cannot 
escape, and even more than that to avoid something worse. 
 
Mumford says “we are being asked to ratify” this bribe because we have to constantly ratify it. 
Recall Hume’s observation that the real power is on the side of the governed. We must 
continually assent, in a kind of “inverted totalitarianism,” to use Wolin’s term.  
 
Of necessity, we ratify this swindle by forfeiting our freedom—by which we must mean 
something beyond our ordinary sense of being an “autonomous individual” or a “sovereign 
individual,” instead meaning something along the lines of what most of the great spiritual, 
religious, and philosophical traditions have promised us regarding our potential. The liberation 
into which these traditions invite us differs from the “liberty” of the dominant culture, and thus 
stands in tension with Locke’s notion in the sense that this spiritual liberty has no dependence on 
property and possession, and it comes with an abiding peace and joy. In our secular, desacralized 
world, we tend to chase comfort and “happiness” in place of peace, love, joy, and true 
liberation—in part because liberation in the sense intended by these traditions seems so daunting 
at first glance (daunting to the ego), and so we get hooked by the swindle Mumford discusses. In 
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his delightful book, Without Guilt and Justice: From Decidophobia to Autonomy (1973), the 
philosopher Walter Kaufmann writes about the swindle this way: 
Cloudless contentment is not open to man, and if he trades his freedom and 
integrity for it, the time will come when he feels cheated. This does not mean that 
he will openly regret the bargain. Most people have failed to cultivate their critical 
perception of their own present position and of the alternatives they might have 
chosen; precisely this is the trade they made; this is what they gave up for comfort 
and contentment. Now they feel cheated without knowing how and when and 
why. What they feel is a diffuse and free-floating resentment in search of an 
object. Having given up autonomy for happiness, they have missed out on both. 
(213)  
The very philosophical writer Kurt Vonnegut framed the swindle much more humorously, in a 
graduation speech that everyone in the dominant culture should read in full: 
I look back on all the taboos that I was taught, that everybody was taught, and I 
see now that they were parts of a great swindle. Their purpose was to make 
Americans afraid to get close to one another—to organize. 
 
It was even taboo to discuss the American economic system and its bizarre 
methods of distributing wealth. I learned that at my mother’s knee. God rest her 
soul. God rest her knee. She taught me never to say anything impolite about the 
neighborhood millionaire. She didn’t even want me to wonder out loud how the 
hell he ever got to control that much wealth.149 
 
Vonnegut, who was perhaps as affected by Nietzsche as Walter Kaufmann was, does one better 
than the venerable Princeton professor: He intimates that the swindle must compromise intimacy, 
thus pointing the same way as those beautiful traditions of liberation, which always seem to 
invite us to verify the interwovenness of liberation and intimacy. 
 
Ultimately, the assent to this swindle happens by means of a drugging or even a poisoning of the 
soul (cutting ourselves off from intimacy and interwovenness is the poisoning of the soul, and 
                                                 
149 The full speech is available online: 
https://www.truthdig.com/articles/kurt-vonneguts-call-to-save-the-planet-is-just-as-timely-now-
as-it-was-four-decades-ago/ 
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since we must include Nature in this intimacy and interwovenness, we must see all philosophies 
as toxic which endorse a duality between human and Nature). In one way or another the soul 
must be controlled by structures of power, or else it will overthrow them. We may consider in 
this regard a painful description of how elephants are controlled by humans who have lost touch 
with their own soul: 
Circus elephants—walking in single file down a stress. Why don’t they run away? 
It’s simple. It’s because they’re dead. They are dead souls in circuses and zoos. 
The only way to get elephants who are so powerful to do what a human wants 
with just a flick of their hand, is to beat the soul out of them. I saw it in Peach, 
when I beat her, I saw her soul leave. (Bradshaw 2009: 213) 
 
Those are the words of Ray Ryan, a former zookeeper. The keepers of our human zoo cannot use 
too much force (at least within their borders) if they want to appear “civilized”. So our souls are 
degraded and our assent is manufactured in other ways (the loss of intimacy means a loss of our 
true power). Mumford’s analysis misses some key details of that. 
 
For instance, we do not have “every material advantage.” Some of us have far more material 
advantage than others—a fact that (according to the studies above) we may not really see, or may 
not want to see. Even basic things like clean air and clean water are becoming luxuries (again, 
we may not see this, or may not want to see it). There is also a huge gap between the 
accessibility of quality food for the rich and for the poor. We have “food deserts” throughout the 
U.S., usually in poor neighborhoods. In such places, one is hard pressed to find an organic 
vegetable, but junk-food (and junk-ease) abounds—as do junk ways of knowing oneself and the 
world, even though all the people living in these areas have as much potential for wisdom, love, 
and beauty as anyone else. And we can note that ongoing lack of total health and vigor works in 
favor of our current structures of power. From the standpoint of current structures of power and 
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domination, the weaker we are, the more unhappy, docile, overworked, overloaded, and so on, 
the better. Physical strength must be confined to sports and sanctioned forms of violence, and 
must not be allowed to show up as the sheer physical capacity to non-violently rebel against 
power, inequality, and degradation. 
 
Mumford, in the formulation above, also leaves out the way fear and misery function to keep us 
going. Fear and misery (misery of all kinds, including self-doubt, self-hatred, doubt of others, 
hatred of others) keep us deeply rooted in Sorrowville, hooked on its hopes and dreams, its 
delusions and pathologies. As we experience fear and pain, two things happen, both of which 
arising from a habit of reacting to pain by focusing on ourselves, becoming, in one way or 
another, more self-centered: We attempt to escape the situation (which can include blocking our 
perception of the facts), and to the degree we cannot escape we will medicate.  
 
To medicate is not to heal. Medication is not Medicine. We use things like junk-food, junk-ease, 
alcohol, cigarettes, sex, violence, gambling, fantasies of wealth and success, and of course all 
those opioids to medicate ourselves so that we can keep the engines of “progress” moving along. 
It is like a great wheel. The engine of Sorrowville, the engine of samsara thinking, is a wheel, a 
merry-go-round of insanity we get trapped on, and right now it’s spinning faster and faster. The 
sheer pace of it encourages further medicating and unplugging. But we are not unplugging from 
the wheel itself, and we are not healing anything. 
 
Since food is essential, medicating and unplugging by means of food happens pervasively. A 
tremendous amount of the processed insanity we call “food,” the rationally formulated poison 
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referred to as “food,” functions largely as a mechanism of distraction and profit: We are 
distracted from the real ills we experience, and in exchange we increase the wealth of 
corporations and a very small portion of the population. Research shows that when we are in 
pain or exposed to things that get us to see life as harsh and fearful, we eat more junk food, even 
if we don’t particularly like it or want to eat it (see Laran et al. 2011, Laran and Salerno 2013, 
Swaffield and Roberts 2015).150  
 
We are all familiar with the insane offerings of the food-as-medication approach. The presence 
of extreme eating competitions is a strange symptom of our culture, as is the fact that we deep 
fry sticks of butter, eat pizza with cheese-stuffed crust, and try to put bacon in and on everything. 
It is widely known that processed foods come out of a scientific production process that seeks to 
achieve a “bliss point” of flavor that maximizes the addicting quality of the food, usually by 
optimizing the hit of fat, sugar, and salt we take in with each bite—using ingredients that are 
typically produced via the wheel of suffering that makes us seek food-as-medication in the first 
place—samsara is incredibly well-put-together. The ingredients tend to be unhealthy for humans 
and for large-scale ecologies, and both the production of the ingredients as well as the 
consequences of using and consuming them create tremendous suffering—which leads us to 
crave more medication, including food-as-medication. 
 
                                                 
150 That much of our food is garbage is both widely known and widely denied. Many people in, 
say, little mining towns in Appalachia might become angry at the suggestion that they shouldn’t 
eat fast food. The propaganda machine that keeps Sorrowville going has an uncanny 
effectiveness when it comes to distorting reality. 
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Our politicians constantly try to scare us and keep us scared, thus keeping us in a state of craving 
for medication and unplugging of all kinds. The U.S. is quite a fearful society, even though, in 
terms of hard facts and statistics, we are relatively safe, and even though many of us (perhaps 
most) do not experience any ongoing threat of overt violence from the state or even from 
criminal activity (although, significant portions of the population do have to deal with this, both 
within the dominant culture and, especially, outside its borders, where it carries on, orchestrates, 
or otherwise supports violence, domination, aggression, atrocities).  
 
Yet the propaganda machine constantly tells us “the Muslims” are out to get us (various plots are 
even engineered by law enforcement to entrap would-be terrorists), that “Mexicans” are taking 
our jobs and engaging in criminal violence, that “blacks” and “immigrants” are dangerous, and 
so on. And we are a society of the gun, in which we see significant levels of weaponized 
violence. In various ways, fear is provoked in us, and this sense of fear in turn provokes us to 
think less wisely, compassionately, and beautifully. We get materialistic and greedy, and 
increasingly self-obsessed. We have to stuff our faces because the world might end, and we have 
to get ours before others get theirs, because there isn’t enough to go around. This is not a 
conscious thought. It’s a matter of seeing destruction around us and feeling like something has to 
be done. Not knowing what to do, we focus on ourselves, and deep intelligences in us react as if 
there might be starvation around the corner, so they command us to feed—particularly on high 
calorie foods, even if they aren’t nourishing. Eating or even binging (including binge-watching, 
which is “poor eating for the mind,” a variety of junk-food for the soul) distracts us from our 
suffering, and gives us a feeling that we have done something. We get some temporary relief.  
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We are in pain, fearful, anxious, weary from working long hours and lacking proper practices of 
rejuvenation. We need a cigarette—or a pack, or more—to get through the day. We need alcohol 
and pills to wind down at night. We need pain killers and other medications because the whole 
organization of society is unwise and unhealthy. This “civilization” depends on ill-being, and 
health may look like wildness, madness to those who have been “civilized”. We have learned 
how to know living this way, learned how to live knowing this way.  
 
But, we cannot really evade knowing that this knowing is stupidity. Thus we can say the bargain 
Mumford speaks of has changed. Though we might have agreed to play along, it has begun to 
break down, and the epistemic errors have caught up with us. We seem to sense it, know it in our 
bones even if the ego will not allow a full confrontation with it. It may be part of why we seem to 
be pushing so hard to collapse the conditions of life. But it is a general crisis of meaning, because 
we don’t know the meaning of the game anymore, and the game has stolen deeper sources of 
meaning from us, because meaning tied to the soul and the sacred, meaning rooted in living 
ecologies and loving virtues will always oppose the false meanings of the bribe Mumford refers 
to, the “nothing but” life Jung described. But, we remain under the thrall of centuries, even 
millennia of error. Wolin veers directly into Bateson’s ecological thinking when he describes the 
error as arising from lack of skill with large-scale patterns: 
Unlike the classic forms of totalitarianism, which openly boasted of their 
intentions to force their societies into a preconceived totality, inverted 
totalitarianism is not expressly conceptualized as an ideology or objectified in 
public policy. Typically it is furthered by power-holders and citizens who often 
seem unaware of the deeper consequences of their actions or inactions. There is a 
certain heedlessness, an inability to take seriously the extent to which a pattern of 
consequences may take shape without having been preconceived. 
The fundamental reason for this deep-seated carelessness is related to the 
well-known American zest for change and, equally remarkable, the good fortune 
of Americans in having at their disposal a vast continent rich in natural resources, 
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inviting exploitation. Although it is a cliché that the history of American society 
has been one of unceasing change, the consequences of today’s increased tempos 
are, less obvious. 
Change works to displace existing beliefs, practices, and expectations. 
Although societies throughout history have experienced change, it is only over the 
past four centuries that promoting innovation became a major focus of public 
policy. Today, thanks to the highly organized pursuit of technological innovation 
and the culture it encourages, change is more rapid, more encompassing, more 
welcomed than ever before—which means that institutions, values, and 
expectations share with technology a limited shelf life. We are experiencing the 
triumph of contemporaneity and of its accomplice, forgetting or collective 
amnesia. Stated somewhat differently, in early modern times change displaced 
traditions; today change succeeds change. 
The effect of unending change is to undercut consolidation. Consider, for 
example, that more than a century after the Civil War the consequences of slavery 
still linger; that close to a century after women won the vote, their equality 
remains contested; or that after nearly two centuries during which public schools 
became a reality, education is now being increasingly privatized. In order to gain 
a handle on the problem of change we might recall that among political and 
intellectual circles, beginning in the last half of the seventeenth century and 
especially during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, there was a growing 
conviction that, for the first time in recorded history, it was possible for human 
beings to deliberately shape their future. Thanks to advances in science and 
invention it was possible to conceive change as “progress,” an advancement 
benefiting all members of society. Progress stood for change that was 
constructive, that would bring something new into the world and to the advantage 
of all. The champions of progress believed that while change might result in the 
disappearance or destruction of established beliefs, customs, and interests, the 
vast majority of these deserved to go because they mostly served the Few while 
keeping the Many in ignorance, poverty, and sickness. 
An important element in this early modern conception of progress was that 
change was crucially a matter for political determination by those who could be 
held accountable for their decisions. That understanding of change was pretty 
much overwhelmed by the emergence of concentrations of economic power that 
took place during the latter half the nineteenth century. Change became a private 
enterprise inseparable from exploitation and opportunism, thereby constituting a 
major, if not the major, element in the dynamic of capitalism. Opportunism 
involved an unceasing search for what might be exploitable, and soon that meant 
virtually anything, from religion, to politics, to human wellbeing. Very little, if 
anything, was taboo, as before long change became the object of premeditated 
strategies for maximizing profits. 
It is often noted that today change is more rapid, more encompassing than 
ever before. In later pages I shall suggest that American democracy has never 
been truly consolidated. Some of its key elements remain unrealized or 
vulnerable; others have been exploited for antidemocratic ends. Political 
institutions have typically been described as the means by which a society tries to 
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order change. The assumption was that political institutions would themselves 
remain stable, as exemplified in the ideal of a constitution as a relatively 
unchanging structure for defining the uses and limits of public power and the 
accountability of officeholders. 
Today, however, some of the political changes are revolutionary; others 
are counterrevolutionary. Some chart new directions for the nation and introduce 
new techniques for extending American power, both internally (surveillance of 
citizens) and externally (seven hundred bases abroad), beyond any point even 
imagined by previous administrations. Other changes are counterrevolutionary in 
the sense of reversing social policies originally aimed at improving the lot of the 
middle and poorer classes. 
How to persuade the reader that the actual direction of contemporary 
politics is toward a political system the very opposite of what the political 
leadership, the mass media, and think tank oracles claim that it is, the world’s 
foremost exemplar of democracy? (2017: x-xii) 
 
We can sense here the way the aesthetic (beauty), ethical (love), and in general a dimension of 
wisdom come together. In balance, in a mode of health, these dimensions work together to 
empower our experience of sacredness. Sacredness is a making sacred (not mere projection, but 
participatory activity, a co-discovery-creation), and when our epistemology becomes 
compromised by a loss of certain aesthetic and ethical factors (again, Bateson’s sense that the 
“loss of the sense of aesthetic unity was, quite simply, an epistemological mistake” (MN:18)), 
when we cannot find skillful, spiritual ways of liberating into the larger ecologies of mind that 
allow us to know ourselves and our World in healthy, healing, holistic, and holy ways, and thus 
arrive at insights, arrive at an Original Thinking that can cultivate life forward, then instead we 
will desacralize the world and perpetuate a process, a pattern of degradation.  
 
Wolin properly relates our inability to think ecologically or systemically with an abundance of 
Nature to absorb the burden of our stupidity. Nevertheless, as Bateson points out, the lack of 
wisdom and the concomitant employment of magical thinking (in the form of science and 
technology) never goes “unpunished,” which simply means it comes with karma or negative 
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side-effects which we carry with us like Jacob Marley’s chains. All of this then give rise to a 
need for ongoing entertainment, because we have forsaken meaningful activity. Things stop 
happening in a sense meaningful enough to help us transcend our suffering, and we get sucked 
into limited thinking. Let us recall a little bit of how Jung put it, 
Everything is banal; everything is “nothing but,” and that is the reason why 
people are neurotic. They are simply sick of the whole thing, sick of that banal 
life, and therefore they want sensation. They even want a war; they all want a 
war; they are all glad when there is a war; they say, “Thank heaven, now 
something is going to happen—something bigger than ourselves!” (CW 18, para. 
628) 
 
“Something bigger than ourselves” means a decentering of the ego, on one level or another 
something spiritual, and something ethical, a we-consciousness. We precisely lack this. To put it 
more clearly, the culture encourages the opposite of meaningfulness, sacredness, wisdom, love, 
beauty. It encourages an impossibility: To find meaning in “individualism” or “individuality,” in 
fragmentation, competition, materiality, property, distraction, degradation, medication, nihilism. 
Patriotism and religious dogmatism become medications, synthetic substitutions offered to 
placate the soul’s need for sacredness (in the case of the atheist, scientific materialism holds the 
place of religious dogma, and patriotism becomes defense of the territory of reason—for reason 
is the encumbered “strict father”—against the ignorance and magical thinking of the masses).  
 
In such a situation, work becomes a rather intense symptom, since the soul hungers for 
meaningful work, work connected with life and with love. We cannot have deeply meaningful 
work in the ecologies of suffering cultivated by the dominant culture—and, as Wolin puts it, the 
“inability to take seriously the extent to which a pattern of consequences may take shape without 
having been preconceived” locks us into a pattern of insanity that can only be healed by 
madness. Our ability to sense this pattern of insanity, or at least our sense of the loss of the 
600 
 
meaningfulness of our work (if not the larger consequences of that loss of meaning—i.e. its 
intimate relation to the living World), explains why roughly 70% of workers are not engaged 
with their work, including over 17% who are “actively disengaged”.151  
 
The psychological/spiritual need for meaningful work—and how to establish meaningful work—
has been little discussed in most of our university philosophy courses. We really don’t 
understand it, don’t understand how to talk to our students about the need to establish meaningful 
work, and what that would entail given our understanding of ecology and spirituality, and this 
ignorance fuels a great deal of violence and confusion. For instance, it fuels a perpetuation of 
poverty, in part because the propaganda of the dominant culture has taught us not to trust poor 
people or out-of-work people. They will take advantage of us all if we help them! Cultivation of 
compassion must be avoided at every opportunity in a culture that depends on ill-being, 
fragmentation, a denial of the interwovenness of things, an encouragement of mistrust, 
misknowing, and an obsession with pain and pleasure, material gain and loss, praise and blame, 
and celebrity and social invisibility. 
 
As a general rule, in this kind of culture, we must lack truly meaningful work (and what 
meaningful work we find may come with significant rationalizations, because the culture as a 
whole is so out of congruence with the conditions of life), and our repression of this, our refusal 
to confront the anger, depression, and despair over how meaningless our jobs are, or how once 
meaningful jobs or potentially meaningful jobs have become compromised and degraded . . . all 
                                                 
151 http://www.gallup.com/poll/181289/majority-employees-not-engaged-despite-gains-
2014.aspx 
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of this makes us unwell—and we look in all the wrong places for a cure. As James Hillman puts 
it: 
The thing that therapy pushes is relationship, yet work may matter just as much as 
relationship. You think you’re going to die if you’re not in a good relationship. 
You feel that not being in a significant, long-lasting, deep relationship is going to 
cripple you or that you’re crazy or neurotic or something. You feel intense bouts 
of longing and loneliness. But those feelings are not only due to poor relationship; 
they come also because you’re not in any kind of political community that makes 
sense, that matters. Therapy pushes the relationship issues, but what intensifies 
those issues is that (a) we don’t have satisfactory work, or (b) . . . we don’t have a 
satisfactory political community. 
 
You just can’t make up for the loss of passion and purpose in your daily work by 
intensifying your personal relationships. I think we talk so much about inner 
growth and development because we are so boxed in to petty, private concerns on 
our jobs. (Hillman and Ventura 1993: 13) 
 
This disengagement, this being trapped in petty, meaningless, and terribly authoritarian activity, 
along with our general level of pain and suffering—and the general collapse of meaning that 
goes altogether with the rise of nihilism and the degradation of ecologies that forms the context 
(and ironically the aim) of all our thinking—drives us into addictive behaviors—including, as we 
have suggested, the addiction to abstractions, intellectualism, knowledge, control, writing, 
analyzing, and all the other means of escape we try—even if it takes a confrontation with our 
own spiritual materialism to see this, to be able to honestly admit it. 
 
We can say there is always going to be a cycle or set of cycles in life. But what does the cycle 
reinforce? What powers will live us in any given cycle? Because we have become so 
materialistic and deluded, disconnected, fragmented, our cycles reinforce suffering, to a degree 
that has become basically traumatizing—and, oddly perhaps, because we have tended to 
reinforce suffering in general, for a long time now we have become increasingly materialistic, or 
at least increasingly prone to seek a kind of material escape through numbing medication and 
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degrading consumption (rather than healing medicine and vitalizing consummation). The main 
thing to realize about our materialism, particularly with respect to the magnificent bribe, is that 
materialism of any variety cannot make us happy. It is an attempt to eat shadows. It is not that 
we are “immaterial” beings, but that we aren’t “material” beings. 
 
The work of Tim Kasser is particularly interesting in terms of the scientific establishment of the 
ills of materialism (the illth that comes hand-in-hand with “wealth”). Kasser’s 2002 book, The 
High Price of Materialism, summarizes some of the key findings. His work indicates that the 
actual pursuit of materialism leads to ill-being (i.e. the pursuit of “happiness” and “property” in 
this context), and, perhaps surprisingly to some, even the aspiration to materialism does so. The 
ill-being we are speaking of is not just unhappiness, but also more physical pain and possibly 
more physical illness. His work shows that materialism seems to cause unhappiness, and that 
unhappiness itself can drive materialism, thus showing the well-put-togetherness of our 
suffering, and the feedback loop that it entails. These are findings that most spiritual traditions 
have reasoned through in some detail, and some spiritual traditions have already done a scientific 
verification of the unhealthiness of materialism by means of a science of mind. By carefully 
observing the effects of materialistic thoughts, aspirations, and actions, some traditions have 
made an empirical, experimental case for the total unworkability of a materialistic orientation to 
life.  
 
This contrast may be a little confusing. If we say that a spiritual life is the only realistic chance 
we have for true fulfillment, and a materialistic life leads inevitably to ill-being (for ourselves 
and others), what are we saying? Some people, in the west especially, tend to think of the 
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contrast between the material and the spiritual as something like a contrast between “reality” and 
something airy-fairy (we sometime make this contrast through the dualities of science and 
spirituality, or the natural and the supernatural, or the rational and the mystical). But the sense of 
spirituality we have touched upon in our inquiry makes it clear that we should have something 
else in mind—indeed, close to the “opposite” in mind. The basic idea goes something like this: 
Spirituality refers to a commitment to bring something to realization for oneself and all beings 
(not merely to “believe” or to “know,” but to taste—Sophia as Sapienza), and to participate in 
life, to participate something meaningful that transcends the ego (a forgetting or decentering of 
the “self” as ego). 
 
The transcendence we need demands a better way of knowing—a more skillful way of life. 
Spirituality fundamentally involves insight and intimacy—the presencing of wisdom, love, and 
beauty—and these are not “physical” “things”. They are not objects and are not material in any 
reasonable sense. Moreover, we have no indication that anything material can provide these 
experiences.152 Thus, to think of the world in material terms, to pursue material objects or 
material gain, to exploit material resources, to do objective and materialist science, all of this will 
lead us into difficulty, because these gestures lead us away from our basic spiritual hunger, the 
                                                 
152 It is also worth noting that, from the standpoint of a real commitment to not merely believe, 
the assumption that the Cosmos is made only of something called “matter” is nothing more than 
a belief, and in any case we are still not sure what that “matter” is. It was only a split-second ago, 
so to speak, that we discovered everything we can see in the visible universe is but 5% of the 
“stuff” that exists. We still don’t know what that other 95% is, and we do not know the full story 
of the 5%—or if indeed the new 100% is itself not merely another fraction of a still larger whole 
(in other words, the 5% “visible matter” plus the 95% “dark matter and dark energy” might not 
add up to 100% of what exists, but that “100%” might itself be a mere 2% or 10% or 50% of 
another Whole that western science has not even vaguely scried). Moreover, we have never 
found some “thing” that itself, for certain, does not break down when the right kinds of energy 
and analysis are applied to it. 
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hunger to know ourselves, to know the nature of reality, and to enjoy true peace and happiness, 
to enjoy wisdom, love, and beauty, and to practice-realize a meaningful existence. This basic 
hunger should make philosophy courses the most popular courses at any modern university, and 
make philosophy among the most common majors. What we have now should stand out as 
symptomatic of a most serious illness, a conditions-of-life-threatening illness. 
 
We do not seem to have any way of making ourselves happy and healthy with a materialistic 
approach to life. But the basic dynamics of our culture rely on a materialistic approach to 
everything, and so we are encouraged into materialism and away from anything spiritual—and, 
to help the bondage function, the “spiritual” is placed at odds with the material, the scientific, the 
economic. The scientist and the engineer must feel like sell-outs if they pursue anything that 
sounds like “woo,” or like superstition, faith, weakness, some kind of affront to reason and 
rationality. The result is a spectrum of trauma and addiction from which all of us suffer, even if 
we are lucky enough to be at the less intense end of that spectrum. The addiction researcher 
Bruce Alexander sums up the situation rather nicely: 
Global society is drowning in addiction to drug use and a thousand other habits. 
This is because people around the world, rich and poor alike, are being torn from 
the close ties to family, culture, and traditional spirituality that constituted the 
normal fabric of life in pre-modern times. This kind of global society subjects 
people to unrelenting pressures towards individualism and competition, 
dislocating them from social life.153 
 
People adapt to this dislocation by concocting the best substitutes that they can for 
a sustaining social, cultural and spiritual wholeness, and addiction provides this 
substitute for more and more of us. 
 
                                                 
153 Recall the Antifederalist prediction that U.S. culture would cultivate “a groveling, distinct 
species, uninterested in the general welfare.” 
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History shows that addiction can be rare in a society for many centuries, but can 
become nearly universal when circumstances change—for example, when a 
cohesive tribal culture is crushed or an advanced civilisation collapses.154 
 
Alexander is famous for his work on Rat Park.155 As a young researcher, it suddenly dawned on 
him that the addiction research done with rats had them living alone in bare metal cages. That’s 
not a life for any being. In these terrible conditions, in which the rats were sometimes starved for 
24 hours so that they would perform experiments in exchange for “food pellets,” they were also 
rigged up for addiction research. This involved surgically implanting a needle that would inject a 
drug into the rat every time they pressed a little lever. The rats quickly developed strong 
symptoms of addiction, and many concluded that drugs like heroin and cocaine are so addictive 
that, if we take them, we automatically want more. Alexander wondered if there might be more 
to the story.  
 
Alexander and his team built “Rat Park” for the rats to live together in. They had plenty of rat 
friends to play with, as well as some toys and other sources of stimulation and exercise. It was 
not as exciting as life outside the lab, but it was way better than the standard setup. When the 
researchers made drugs available in the park, they found far lower levels of addiction than in the 
standard studies. Eventually, they came to the realization that human beings are more likely to 
take drugs and become addicted to them when they are, at one level or another, experiencing a 
“caged life”. Recall here what Ayahuasca offered Michael Pollan as a koan: Only an animal can 
be caged. He realized he had to sit with that, not to grasp after an “answer”. We do too. Our 
                                                 
154 http://www.brucekalexander.com/ 
155 http://www.brucekalexander.com/articles-speeches/rat-park/148-addiction-the-view-from-rat-
park 
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trauma, anxiety, and addiction are Ecological problems in a very broad sense, not issues of 
“individual” “psychology” or even “social” or “economic” maladies. 
 
It’s important to see the ways in which our society isolates us and essentially creates a caged life 
for us all—a bare and barren Ecology, a degraded Landscape of the Soul that arises altogether 
with a degraded Landscape of the World.  
 
In this culture of fear, stress, and trauma, we are taught to be suspicious of and competitive with 
each other—in other words, we are inducted into conquest consciousness. Writing about the 
troubling rise of loneliness (a disease of those who have made themselves “a distinct species,” 
those who lack a Nature-Culture that helps them practice-realize a sociosensual and hypersensual 
or ecosensual awareness, a Liminal Awareness engaged in intimate relationality), George 
Monbiot notes that, 
Ebola is unlikely ever to kill as many people as this disease strikes down. Social 
isolation is as potent a cause of early death as smoking 15 cigarettes a day; 
loneliness, research suggests, is twice as deadly as obesity. Dementia, high blood 
pressure, alcoholism and accidents – all these, like depression, paranoia, anxiety 
and suicide, become more prevalent when connections are cut. We cannot cope 
alone. 
 
Yes, factories have closed, people travel by car instead of buses, use YouTube 
rather than the cinema. But these shifts alone fail to explain the speed of our 
social collapse. These structural changes have been accompanied by a life-
denying ideology, which enforces and celebrates our social isolation. The war of 
every man against every man – competition and individualism, in other words – is 
the religion of our time, justified by a mythology of lone rangers, sole traders, 
self-starters, self-made men and women, going it alone. For the most social of 
creatures, who cannot prosper without love, there is no such thing as society, only 
heroic individualism. What counts is to win. The rest is collateral damage.156 
 
                                                 
156 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/14/age-of-loneliness-killing-us 
607 
 
When “social” creatures (creatures of Interbeing) are isolated, they cannot function at their best, 
which means they cannot as easily see into the ills of their society and envision alternatives. Nor 
are they enmeshed in loving connection with one another. We long for love and connection 
(from the core of what we call our biology and psychology, and also from a spiritual center), but 
a materialistic approach must drive us apart—apart from ourselves, apart from each other, apart 
from other sentient beings (including countless Wild beings and the Wildness of Nature), apart 
from Landscape and Nature, apart from Heaven and Earth, apart from Wisdom, Love, and 
Beauty—lest we discover that we have no abiding interest in material things. 
 
Perhaps the finest example of the atomization of society comes in the form of the slot machine. 
In her study of machine gambling, Natasha Dow Schüll points out that the vast majority of 
gambling addictions relate to machine gambling (2012: 14). We have roughly twice the number 
of slot machines as we do ATMs.157 The slot machines are designed to put us in a kind of 
trance.158 When Schüll was reading posting sites on gambling addiction, she came across a post 
by a woman who was astounded by the way the machine had hypnotized her so deeply that she 
“didn’t even have the strength to go to the bathroom” (103). Many respondents to the post had 
similar experiences. Caught in samsara, caught in the cycle of fear, stress, trauma, and confusion, 
it is this trance that people seek, even though they may do so as an attempt to seek happiness (it 
makes the gambler exactly like the rest of us).  
 
                                                 
157 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/slot-machines-the-big-gamble-07-01-2011/ 
158 The role of trance in the dominant culture and in samsara thinking in general can hardly be 
overstated. We will have to save a fuller discussion of it for the third book in this series, an 
Inquiry into Beauty and Wakefulness. 
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That may seem odd. We may imagine that people gamble because they want to win. But the 
craving for a gambling win is just a trance of hope, a samsaric trance in which we try to fulfill 
the hunger of the soul by eating shadows instead of real food. Caught in samsara, what we want 
is always more trance. It’s important to recall here that Socrates claimed that his fellow 
Athenians wanted to execute him because they were asleep in their own lives, and they hated his 
attempts to awaken them. They wanted to remain in their trance, just as so many of us do today, 
from the broken-bodied warehouse worker to the greedy investor who becomes careless about 
risk. 
 
Perhaps we can understand the psyche of the gambler, and our own psyche too, if we consider 
their experience with care. One of the people Schüll interviewed said the following: 
Most people define gambling as pure chance, where you don’t know the outcome. 
But at the machines I do know: either I’m going to win, or I’m going to lose. I 
don’t care if it takes coins, or pays coins: the contract is that when I put a new 
coin in, get five new cards, and press those buttons, I am allowed to continue.  
 
So it isn’t really a gamble at all—in fact, it’s one of the few places I’m certain 
about anything. If I had ever believed that it was about chance, about variables 
that could make anything go in any given way at any time, then I would’ve been 
scared to death to gamble. If you can’t rely on the machine, then you might as well 
be in the human world where you have no predictability either. (12) 
 
Another gambling addict said this: 
 
The thing people never understand is that I’m not playing to win . . . . [I play to] 
keep playing—to stay in that machine zone where nothing else matters . . . It’s 
like being in the eye of a storm, is how I’d describe it. Your vision is clear on the 
machine in front of you but the whole world is spinning around you, and you 
can’t really hear anything. You aren’t really there—you’re with the machine and 
that’s all you’re with. (2) 
 
It seems we are not quite sure that we can work with our lives. This is what would ordinarily 
draw someone to philosophy or religion in a society that had begun to lose a vitalizing Nature-
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Culture, a society manifesting conquest consciousness to some degree, a consciousness hungry 
for “control,” a consciousness dependent on mindlessness, distraction, fragmentation. People 
would line up for philosophy courses if those courses taught them the wholeness, holiness, and 
fundamental workability of life, and the practices for bringing that wholeness, holiness, and 
workability to fruitful, mutually nourishing, mutually illuminating realization.  
 
We hunger for vision, and have no idea how to release it in ourselves, so we’ll take the clear 
vision of a gambling screen, the clear vision of sports statistics, the clear vision of writing code 
or designing psychotic buildings, the clear vision of writing academic articles, the clear vision of 
a figure dressed in leather, the clear vision of anything at all that will keep us in a trance, keep us 
feeling like we’re in control, in the eye of the storm, allowing us to forget our pain (while, 
ironically, creating more for ourselves with each moment). Since we don’t live in a culture 
rooted in Wisdom, Love, and Beauty, we are not educated to truly know ourselves and our 
capacity to work with whatever arises, to skillfully handle suffering, to gracefully realize reality. 
Moreover, it is particularly interesting that we are seeking a kind of wondrous and blissful 
tranquility of mind and a genuine joyfulness and health, and there too our culture fails us.  
 
Also significant is how the culture misdirects us about our true needs. We are told that we want 
to win and that what we want to win is something worldly, like money, fame, property, time. But 
in fact we seek a kind of contentment and connectedness. We want connection we can rely on. If 
the only version of connection we can get is the tragically limited connection with a gambling 
machine, cell phone, book, or research project then we can actually become addicted to the 
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machines and the technical research. We don’t have to find a slot machine to get this addictive 
substitute for real connection. 
 
Tristan Harris, a former employee at Google, refers to his smartphone as “a slot machine in my 
pocket.”159 From his experience being trained in the psychology of tech development, and his 
experience actually working in the industry, he came to sense that tech design involves a practice 
of “exposing people’s psychological vulnerabilities.” It was a journey into the desert that helped 
Harris to enter into an experience of “waking up and questioning [his] own beliefs.” He ended up 
preparing a slide presentation (144 slides) called, “A Call to Minimize Distraction & Respect 
Users’ Attention.” Sadly, he reports that, “It was one of those things where there’s a lot of head 
nods, and then people go back to work.” He notes that, “All of us are jacked into this system. All 
of our minds can be hijacked. Our choices are not as free as we think they are.”160 
 
How much do our pocket slot machines really distract us? How unfree are we? How highjacked 
are we? I ask these questions having been startled by the way some academics have clearly been 
captured by their phone. I have watched people check their phones during colloquia and other 
contexts in which it stands out as philosophically uncouth. But the question about cell phone 
addiction is just an exemplar of the broader question: How unfree are we? And we cannot so 
easily answer such a question. We face a general issue that few of us will admit that “external” 
and “internal” forces might manipulate us on an ongoing basis. We think that other people are 
obviously susceptible to manipulation, but we see ourselves as a little too wise, a little too sharp 
                                                 
159 https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/the-binge-breaker/501122/ 
160 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/05/smartphone-addiction-silicon-valley-
dystopia 
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to fall for such manipulation in any significant way. And how strange would we feel if we were 
to say, “I think I am a victim of large-scale, sophisticated manipulation”? Would we think 
ourselves crazy? Would it feel crazy? What if insanity were the norm? We might guess, for a 
variety of reasons, that a majority of people will think themselves beyond manipulation. I would 
bet a good number of academics think themselves beyond these sorts of manipulation—maybe 
even the ones I see checking their cell phones during colloquia (they surely have good reason to 
feel bored). 
 
Even in the seemingly more simple case of cell phone usage (more simple than the large-scale 
manipulation we might not feel ready to face), the majority of people think they check their 
phone (and likely Facebook and so on too) less often than others.161 Depending on which studies 
we consult, we will find that Americans check their phone up to 150 times a day on average.162 
More than half of us check our phones a few times an hour,163 and one lower-end survey result 
puts us at 47 checks per day—a collective 9 billion phone checks per day in the U.S.164 We touch 
our phones 2,617 times a day.165 
 
Do we collectively check in with Sophia 9 billion times a day? That is to say: Do we check in 
with Wisdom, Love, and Beauty, do we check in with the sacred, do we check in with our 
                                                 
161 http://www.gallup.com/poll/184046/smartphone-owners-check-phone-least-hourly.aspx 
162 http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2013/05/cellphone-users-check-phones-150xday-
and-other-internet-fun-facts/ 
163 http://www.gallup.com/poll/184046/smartphone-owners-check-phone-least-hourly.aspx 
164 https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-media-
telecommunications/us-global-mobile-consumer-survey-2016-executive-summary.pdf 
165 http://www.networkworld.com/article/3092446/smartphones/we-touch-our-phones-2617-
times-a-day-says-study.html 
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highest intentions 9 billion times a day? Do we caress our loved ones 2600 times a day? Do we 
ourselves receive 2600 loving touches each day? Perhaps that’s too much touching. But is it still 
fair to say that many of us may be starved for loving touch and genuine connection? Is it fair to 
say we remember to check our phone more often than we remember to check our soul? Vonnegut 
comes to mind here too: 
We must learn to deal with one another more frankly and openly, even 
humorously. But, more important than that, we must learn to touch. If we are to 
become a strong and decent people, we must become cousins now—eccentric 
cousins maybe, but cousins all the same. Blood is thicker than water. Let us learn 
from the Mafia. It is time, incidentally, that the white people in this country 
acknowledged that the so-called black people are actually blood relatives of 
theirs. This is easily proved. 
 
But this is no time to marvel and cackle over family trees. This is a time for us to 
become excited about being members of the family of man. 
 
Does anyone have nerve enough to touch a stranger near him or her now? Even an 
old person? Ambulances are waiting outside. First aid stations have been set up in 
white nylon tents, in case you need oxygen or want to want to wash your hands in 
Lysol. 
 
If an American people is to be born during the tragedy of the war in Vietnam, it is 
going to have to be a personal, visceral adventure. 
 
I do not apologize for making this suggestion. 
 
We must become a family in order to take care of one another the way families 
do. Now, nearly 200 years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 
written by a man who owned human slaves, I think we understand that our 
politicians and millionaires can do very little for us, except to take our money. 
There are sound reasons for this, I’m sure. I mean to study economics some day. 
Meanwhile, we must love one another and care for one another as best we can, 
and we must organize. You, our new generation of adults, must organize us. 
And if our government persists in being as wrong-headed as it is today, you must 
threaten it with the only effective weapon the Earthlings have against the 
Plutonians, which is a general strike.166 
 
                                                 
166 https://www.truthdig.com/articles/kurt-vonneguts-call-to-save-the-planet-is-just-as-timely-
now-as-it-was-four-decades-ago/ 
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The reference to Plutonians is the “big news” in Vonnegut’s speech. He reveals to his audience 
that, “flying saucer creatures from Pluto have invaded us.” He says,  
Pluto is a suspicious and prideful and secretive and warlike planet, with a 
technology far in advance of our own. My guess is that Plutonians began to arrive 
and reproduce and hold jobs in our government just as the Second World War was 
ending. Our last three presidents may have been Plutonians. Most of them, 
however, are in the Pentagon. We would perhaps welcome them, if it weren’t for 
their humorlessness and pitilessness, and their blather about national honor—and 
for their love of war. 
 
The Plutonians seem like an image of conquest consciousness (a kind of archetypal image). A 
general strike, a general refusal to perpetuate this consciousness is in order. How else do we 
break the cycle of trauma-stress-addiction? George Monbiot recently penned (well, probably 
typed and emailed out) a piece called, “Only rebellion will prevent an ecological apocalypse”: 
Had we put as much effort into preventing environmental catastrophe as 
we’ve spent on making excuses for inaction, we would have solved it by now. 
Everywhere I look, I see people engaged in furious attempts to fend off the moral 
challenge it presents. . . . 
The political class, as anyone who has followed its progress over the past 
three years can surely now see, is chaotic, unwilling and, in isolation, strategically 
incapable of addressing even short-term crises, let alone a vast existential 
predicament. Yet a widespread and willful naivety prevails: the belief that voting 
is the only political action required to change a system. Unless it is accompanied 
by the concentrated power of protest – articulating precise demands and creating 
space in which new political factions can grow – voting, while essential, remains 
a blunt and feeble instrument. 
The media, with a few exceptions, is actively hostile. Even when 
broadcasters cover these issues, they carefully avoid any mention of power. . . . 
 Those who govern the nation and shape public discourse cannot be trusted 
with the preservation of life on Earth. There is no benign authority preserving us 
from harm. No one is coming to save us. None of us can justifiably avoid the call 
to come together to save ourselves. 
I see despair as another variety of disavowal. By throwing up our hands 
about the calamities that could one day afflict us, we disguise and distance them, 
converting concrete choices into indecipherable dread. We might relieve 
ourselves of moral agency by claiming that it’s already too late to act, but in doing 
so we condemn others to destitution or death. Catastrophe afflicts people now 
and, unlike those in the rich world who can still afford to wallow in despair, they 
are forced to respond in practical ways. In Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi, 
devastated by Cyclone Idai, in Syria, Libya and Yemen, where climate chaos has 
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contributed to civil war, in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, where crop 
failure, drought and the collapse of fisheries have driven people from their homes, 
despair is not an option. Our inaction has forced them into action, as they respond 
to terrifying circumstances caused primarily by the rich world’s consumption. The 
Christians are right: despair is a sin. . . . 
Every nonlinear transformation in history has taken people by surprise. As 
Alexei Yurchak explains in his book about the collapse of the Soviet Union – 
Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More – systems look immutable until 
they suddenly disintegrate. As soon as they do, the disintegration retrospectively 
looks inevitable. Our system – characterised by perpetual economic growth on a 
planet that is not growing – will inevitably implode. The only question is whether 
the transformation is planned or unplanned. . . . 
This is less daunting than we might imagine. As Erica Chenoweth’s 
historical research reveals, for a peaceful mass movement to succeed, a maximum 
of 3.5% of the population needs to mobilise. Humans are ultra-social mammals, 
constantly if subliminally aware of shifting social currents. Once we perceive that 
the status quo has changed, we flip suddenly from support for one state of being 
to support for another. When a committed and vocal 3.5% unites behind the 
demand for a new system, the social avalanche that follows becomes irresistible. 
Giving up before we have reached this threshold is worse than despair: it is 
defeatism. . . . 
The success of this mobilisation depends on us. It will reach the critical 
threshold only if enough of us cast aside denial and despair, and join this 
exuberant, proliferating movement. The time for excuses is over. The struggle to 
overthrow our life-denying system has begun.167 
 
It’s strange how common this sort of language is: a “life-denying system”. How is it that 
philosophers do not turn this into a chorus, or maybe a verse, as they sing forth a call to 
liberation? And Monbiot makes a good point: It takes a lot of energy to maintain inactivity in the 
face of this level of degradation, especially given the intentional nature of a good measure of that 
degradation. 
 
It can feel shocking to realize how much of the suffering in our world is intentional, and among 
the high-tech conquistadors, Harris is not the only one to admit it, or to feel ethical compunction 
                                                 
167 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/15/rebellion-prevent-ecological-
apocalypse-civil-disobedience 
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about it. The founding president of Facebook, Sean Parker, had this to say about the mind-
hacking approach of Facebook: 
It literally changes your relationship with society, with each other. It probably 
interferes with productivity in weird ways. God only knows what it’s doing to our 
children’s brains . . . 
 . . . the thought process that went into building these applications, 
Facebook being the first of them . . . was all about, “How do we consume as much 
of your time and conscious attention as possible?”168  
 
We should linger over that question for a moment. Shouldn’t that shock us? One of the most 
powerful, pervasive, and wealthy corporations on the planet, a hungry and violent apex predator, 
meditated on, focused on, obsessed over how to consume our time and our consciousness, our 
time and our attention. We are not the consumer; we are the consumed. Forgive the bold type, 
but these thoughts send shivers into the soul, and the repercussions of this kind of large-scale 
activity send shockwaves into the soul of the World. Why would we let ourselves be eaten up—
physically even, and certainly spiritually, psychically. 
 
Our souls are being mined for the ore of attention, sucked dry by vampires who seek the 
lifeblood of the heart, eaten up by zombies who hunger for the magic of our minds. What is 
attention? In all traditions of LoveWisdom, attention means care, attending to the soul, attending 
to the sacred, attending to wisdom, love, and beauty. We are here to attend to life, not to likes on 
Facebook. Pulling us away from our soul purpose involves turning us into zombies roaming the 
degraded landscape of Sorrowville (starving for the lost magic of mind), self-domesticated, self-
dominated slaves to a system of greed, addicts in a trance, hungry for the next hit, the next fake 
happening. I think my colleagues in the university get frustrated when they see the effects of all 
                                                 
168 https://www.axios.com/sean-parker-facebook-exploits-a-vulnerability-in-humans-
2507917325.html 
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of this in their students, but they tend to seek a bag of tricks to deal with it: How to craft better 
learning outcomes, how to get students to seek outside support, how to make lectures more 
interesting, how to increase online engagement, and a long list of useless interventions that turn 
education into “educational science,” where we instead need wisdom, love, and beauty. 
 
Since all of this happens in such a high-tech way—in the culture at large as well as in the 
university—since it’s all very sophisticated and appears quite civilized, the violence goes 
unnoticed, and the victims of any of the harsher forms or consequences of this violence tend to 
be marginalized. In other words, much of the violence is slow and at some level soft, in physical 
terms (for instance, we often don’t feel the risk of cancer going up, or the tumor beginning to 
grow). In spiritual terms, the logic of this violence is the same as the more overt kind with which 
we are familiar, just as the logic of “inverted totalitarianism” still leads to the same conclusion: 
subjugation. We want to buy into it this logic. We seem to be getting all sorts of benefits. 
Technology makes life better—doesn’t it? Corporations are working for us—aren’t they? Unless 
they are the apex predator in our ecology, and, as seems rather obvious, we are their prey—we in 
the university too. Again, we are not the consumer, but the consumed; not the educated, but the 
indoctrinated; not the educators, but the colluders. We have an inverted consumerism to go with 
our inverted totalitarianism. We are taught, and thus know how to know, that corporatized 
medical care is the best way to go, along with corporatized justice, corporatized education, 
corporatized entertainment, corporatized technology (and thus science), corporatized government 
staffed all the way to the top with former and future corporate executives. 
 
Let’s return to the quote from above: 
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. . . the thought process that went into building these applications, Facebook being 
the first of them . . . was all about, “How do we consume as much of your time 
and conscious attention as possible?” And that means that we need to sort of give 
you a little dopamine hit every once in a while, because someone liked or 
commented on a photo or a post or whatever. And that’s going to get you to 
contribute more content, and that’s going to get you . . . more likes and comments. 
It’s a social-validation feedback loop . . . it’s exactly the kind of thing that 
a hacker like myself would come up with, because you’re exploiting a 
vulnerability in human psychology . . . the inventors, creators—it’s me, it’s Mark 
[Zuckerberg], it’s Kevin Systrom on Instagram, it’s all of these people—
understood this consciously. And we did it anyway.169 
 
They did it anyway because it fulfills the logic of the system: To prey on, to consume the 
consumer—and whether we use Facebook or not, this is our ecology of mind. Former Facebook 
executive Chamath Palihapitiya made similar comments, including this one: “The short-term, 
dopamine-driven feedback loops we’ve created are destroying how society works.” But this gets 
things wrong, because what they do is reveal how badly the society of the dominant culture 
functions. The dominant culture is a culture of conquest consciousness, and this already carries 
with it the conquest of consciousness itself. The part somehow occludes the whole. With no 
possibility for decentering the ego, for transcendence into sociosensual or ecosensual awareness 
and interbeing, we remain stuck in the ego, we practice and realize fragmentation, and it is only a 
matter of time before Nature reveals our epistemological errors. Palihapitiya claims to feel a lot 
of guilt for developing the platform that helped reveal our stupidity, and he won’t allow his own 
children to use it. He notes the large-scale social implications of social media: “No civil 
discourse, no cooperation; misinformation, mistruth . . . This is a global problem.”170  
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The misinformation is a problem we have all become familiar with. We refer to the “post-truth 
landscape,” an incredibly degraded ecology that we let loose on ourselves . . . why? In a recent 
piece on Wired, Paris Martineau wrote, 
A couple of hours after the Christchurch massacre, I was on the phone 
with Whitney Phillips, a Syracuse professor whose research focuses on online 
extremists and media manipulators. Toward the end of the call, our conversation 
took an unexpected turn. 
Phillips said she was exhausted and distressed, and that she felt 
overwhelmed by the nature of her work. She described a “soul sucking” feeling 
stemming in part from an ethical conundrum tied to researching the ills of online 
extremism and amplification. 
In a connected, searchable world, it’s hard to share information about 
extremists and their tactics without also sharing their toxic views. Too often, 
actions intended to stem the spread of false and dangerous ideologies only make 
things worse. 
Other researchers in the field describe similar experiences. Feelings of 
helplessness and symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder—like 
anxiety, guilt, and anhedonia—are on the rise, they said, as warnings go unheeded 
and their hopes for constructive change are dashed time and time again. 
“We are in a time where a lot of things feel futile,” says Alice Marwick, a 
media and technology researcher and professor at the University of North 
Carolina Chapel Hill. “We’re up against a set of bad things that just keep getting 
worse.” Marwick co-authored Data & Society’s 2017 flagship report, Media 
Manipulation and Disinformation Online with researcher Rebecca Lewis. 
In a way, their angst reflects that of the tech world at large. Many 
researchers in the field cut their teeth as techno-optimists, studying the positive 
aspects of the internet—like bringing people together to enhance creativity or 
further democratic protest, á la the Arab Spring—says Marwick. But it didn’t last. 
The past decade has been an exercise in dystopian comeuppance to the 
utopian discourse of the ‘90s and ‘00s. Consider Gamergate, the Internet Research 
Agency, fake news, the internet-fueled rise of the so-called alt-right, Pizzagate, 
QAnon, Elsagate and the ongoing horrors of kids YouTube, Facebook’s role in 
fanning the flames of genocide, Cambridge Analytica, and so much more. 
“In many ways, I think it [the malaise] is a bit about us being let down by 
something that many of us really truly believed in,” says Marwick. Even those 
who were more realistic about tech—and foresaw its misuse—are stunned by the 
extent of the problem, she says. “You have to come to terms with the fact that not 
only were you wrong, but even the bad consequences that many of us did foretell 
were nowhere near as bad as the actual consequences that either happened or are 
going to happen.” 
Worst of all, there don’t appear to be any solutions. The spread of 
disinformation and rise of online extremism stem from a complex mix of many 
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factors. And the most common suggestions seem to underestimate the scope of 
the problem, researchers said. . . . 
“It’s not that one of our systems is broken; it’s not even that all of our 
systems are broken,” says Phillips. “It’s that all of our systems are working ... 
toward the spread of polluted information and the undermining of democratic 
participation.”171 
 
We don’t understand living ecologies, and we thought it would turn out alright if we unleashed 
artificial ones. The magical thinking seems evident in a variety of ways. But, at least we were 
clever enough to invent a system that works—to further the degradation of the soul, yes, but it 
works, thus verifying what we “know”.  
 
We have said it again and again: The dominant culture functions as a culture of distraction (an 
anti-Culture), a culture that does everything it can to point away from the soul, because the soul 
wants nothing to do with the basic activities of the culture.172 We repeat it because it takes awhile 
to register that our not wanting to participate in the culture goes together with a  longing to 
participate in Nature and Cosmos (and thus in a healthy, healing, holy Culture), and this sets us 
up for unwellness. It is not as if we can note that there is a lot of distraction in the culture and 
simply move on. The whole thing is set up, mostly inadvertently, as a system of suffering. We 
can see the tragic aspects of this not only in overt forms of violence, but in the equally tragic 
manifestations that appear simultaneously comical.  
 
                                                 
171 https://www.wired.com/story/existential-crisis-plaguing-online-extremism-researchers/ 
172 An anti-Culture functions like a parallel to an anti-Christ: It is evil, and seeks the destruction 
of the Soul. The dominant culture is an anti-Culture, and it survives only by means of a vast 
array of violence within and outside of its borders. It is essential to realize that distraction is 
Sorrowville. If we never, ever got distracted, we would not suffer. There would be pain, but there 
would be no suffering. LoveWisdom simply means an end to distraction, an end to self-
deception.  
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One of the funnier tragic symptoms to me is the number of amusement parks that have grown in 
the soil of the dominant culture. I feel a certain sensitivity to this because I lived near one—
which, as a monument to our dysfunction, is situated on a beach. It is comic and heartbreaking to 
sense how we are not supposed to realize, that we must be kept from, cut off from the realization 
that the beach itself—that the ocean itself, and the beauty of the natural world, and the beauty of 
our connections, our connectedness and interwovenness with Nature and each other—we are not 
supposed to practice-realize these relationships as exactly what the soul needs for basic 
nourishment, not supposed to practice-realize the truth that we can touch joy immediately, 
intimately as we touch these relationships and make them real. The amusement park I lived close 
to even had a very large video arcade and casino, so that people would go to the beach in order to 
go inside a large building and be distracted and entranced. Again, our cleverness functions, our 
delusion of control creates evidence for its success. But though we know how to build 
amusement parks on the beach, we lack the wisdom to have never thought of such a thing to 
begin with. 
 
We can read “amusement” as “a/musement”. The Muses are the sources of inspiration in us and 
in the World. The prefix “a-” often signals “not” or “away,” as in the word atypical. So, an 
amusement park is a place we go to be away from the Muses, away from true inspiration, away 
from sacred madness. We have 400 amusement parks in the U.S. In Europe there are 300, but 
Europe has twice the population of the U.S.173 The U.S. appears to be the capital of amusement. 
 
                                                 
173 http://www.iaapa.org/resources/by-park-type/amusement-parks-and-attractions/industry-
statistics 
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In a letter to William Wilson, founder of the famous 12-step program, Alcoholics Anonymous, 
Jung offered suggestions about alcohol that apply to our general crisis of attention, our seduction 
away from care, attending, and spiritual practice, and into amusement, medication, and 
distraction: 
His craving for alcohol was the equivalent, on a low level, of the spiritual thirst of 
our being for wholeness, expressed in medieval language: the union with God. 
 
How could one formulate such an insight in a language that is not misunderstood 
in our days? 
 
The only right and legitimate way to such an experience is that it happens to you 
in reality and it can only happen to you when you walk on a path which leads you 
to higher understanding. You might be led to that goal by an act of grace or 
through a personal and honest contact with friends, or through a higher education 
of the mind beyond the confines of mere rationalism . . . 
 
I am strongly convinced that the evil principle prevailing in this world leads the 
unrecognized spiritual need into perdition, if it is not counteracted either by real 
religious insight or by the protective wall of human community. An ordinary man, 
not protected by an action from above and isolated in society, cannot resist the 
power of evil, which is called very aptly the Devil. But the use of such words 
arouses so many mistakes that one can only keep aloof from them as much as 
possible. 
 
 . . . . You see, “alcohol” in Latin is “spiritus” and you use the same word for the 
highest religious experience as well as for the most depraving poison. The helpful 
formula therefore is: spiritus contra spiritum. (1976: 623-5) 
 
We all know that our cell phones distract us. But we don’t seem to fully appreciate the situation. 
And many of us know that we have various forms of addiction other than our phones. Whether 
it’s music, movies, fast food, alcohol, shopping, or even an addiction to being right, to reading 
books and making arguments, we don’t live our lives with as much skill and poise as we could. 
Instead of medicalizing this basic, widespread problem of addiction (and the widespread trauma 
that goes along with it), it may prove far more helpful to contemplate the spiritual nature of these 
issues. This would not even be to “spiritualize” them (as opposed to “medicalizing” them), but to 
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sense their fuller reality and to work with it in a more skillful Way (Dao, path of life, holistic 
philosophy/spirituality). 
 
But let us make no mistake here: The corporations, the apex predators who prey on our energy 
and attention, feed on our suffering, biting and sucking the soul dry—both our human soul and 
the soul of the World—they want every last drop from us, and resisting addiction and distraction 
(perhaps one and the same thing), resisting manipulation and control (being controlled and 
giving in to the mindset of control)—resisting being put together, being lived by energies of fear 
and craving, self-doubt and general nihilism—such resistance does not come easy in a culture of 
addiction and distraction, a culture of craving, a culture of magical thinking (including our 
scientific and technological thinking), a culture of degradation and fragmentation. To suggest we 
are the consumed in this consumer anti-Culture means our energy, creativity, intelligence, and 
physical health all get eaten up. For instance, companies like Netflix have encouraged us to 
binge-watch, and their business model admittedly sees our good night’s sleep as an enemy—an 
enemy to profit and plunder, an enemy to conquest consciousness itself, and its ways of knowing 
self and world.174 It seems we need to think about that, to sit with it: Our rest, our time (as 
moment, as being-time, as life-rhythm), goes against the dictates of capitalism—as does our 
liberation, our education, and in general our well-being, in the broadest and most meaningful 
sense.  
 
                                                 
174 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/watching-netflix-at-night-why-you-might-be-sleeping-
with-the-enemy-2017-04-18 
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If we look with care, we can see Netflix continuing the violence of colonialism and conquest—
but in its slow and more “civilized” guise (the slowness is relative . . . there is plenty of high-
speed violence). And it works on a schedule, on a calendar, with agendas. We can’t wait for the 
next series, the next episode. The calendar of entertainment goes together with the calendar of 
work. Philosophers may not watch Netflix, but they of necessity participate in these calendars, 
and they deal with the energy flows thus created and tapped in the hearts, minds, bodies, worlds 
of their students.  
 
Netflix, with its corporate “vision”—and let us recall that vision has a cosmic dimension, having 
to do with a basic sense of what humans are and are for, what sentient beings are and are for, 
what the World is and is for—Netflix looks around the world and does not see human beings as 
spiritual traditions see them, but rather untapped profits, untapped hearts, minds, bodies, 
ecologies. For instance, craving to begin draining the minds of Brazilians, the company sent a 
scout who reported back that the internet infrastructure in Brazil needed significant development 
before the company would have a chance to lock onto people’s minds as they do in more 
“developed” ecologies. So Netflix donated internet servers.175 This seems like a nice thing if we 
listen only to the propaganda about how the internet will give us information and opportunity 
(we just read about the existential crises of former techno-optimists). When we get more realistic 
and honest about the forces dominating the internet, we see that companies like Netflix know 
very well that education and opportunity are not the main functions of the internet. The internet 
is about distraction, addiction, isolation, extraction. To control how we attend, what we attend to, 
                                                 
175 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-01-12/netflix-wants-the-world-to-binge-
watch 
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and why we attend amounts to takeover of the Soul. The Soul itself is awareness, and the 
constriction and control of our attention and awareness constrains and controls the whole of our 
Psyche. The Psyche is both the greatest goldmine for, and the greatest threat to, capitalist 
enterprise. 
 
Raiding that goldmine has two dimensions: The sheer consumption of time, energy, and 
attention, and then, on top of that, a process of turning that consumption into data about how the 
mind works—for the purposes of further manipulation and control. When Time-Warner took 
over HBO, John Stankey (the new person in charge of HBO as a result of that merger) made it 
clear that the company wants every last drop of our attention: “We need hours a day. It’s not 
hours a week, and it’s not hours a month. We need hours a day. You are competing with devices 
that sit in people’s hands that capture their attention every 15 minutes.” Stankey also made it 
clear why:  
I want more hours of engagement. Why are more hours of engagement important? 
Because you get more data and information about a customer that then allows you 
to do things like monetize through alternate models of advertising as well as 
subscriptions, which I think is very important to play in tomorrow’s world.176 
 
Here we see a more overt statement of “surveillance capitalism,” a force we all need to recon 
with. This form of capitalism emerges as a highly sophisticated process of consuming the 
consumer and perpetuating an inverted totalitarianism—with a great deal of economic inequality.  
 
As consumers, we have our agendas, we have our conscious purposes, and to whatever degree 
we see them as our own, not as manipulated into existence by a pattern of insanity. We have an 
                                                 
176 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/media/hbo-att-
merger.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur 
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agenda, and we have limited time. We go to Amazon and we think we are just buying books, we 
go to Google and think we are just searching for information, we go to Facebook and think we 
are just connecting with people, we go to Netflix and think we are just entertaining ourselves, we 
use an app on our phone an think we are just saving some time and getting this or that benefit. In 
reality, by means of these activities we collude in our own consumption, we participate in the 
processes that drain our heart, our mind, our soul, our body, our World. Why? Not only do these 
companies dominate our attention, but they also record every keystroke on a timeline, thus 
learning more and more about how to manipulate the mind of Sorrowville, how to deepen 
Sorrowville and keep us trapped in it, and even how to develop better and better artificial 
“intelligence” that would further amplify the bondage of Sorrowville. Sorrowville is just 
conquest consciousness under the guise of cities, civilization, a polis. It is in such a 
consciousness that “information” becomes so important. “Information” replaces true inspiration, 
and “knowledge” replaces wisdom.  
 
Amazon.com recently received hundreds of millions of dollars in government contracts, for 
things like the development of rockets and spy satellites (while they compete for a coveted $10 
billion dollar Pentagon contract for cloud services). Thus, we not only pay them to surveil and 
manipulate us as we make purchases, but through our taxes we will fund their research and 
development of better ways to do so, better schemes for knowing us, for “developing” us. Of 
course, part of the logic of Sorrowville leads us to a state of affairs in which Amazon.com itself, 
while making $11 billion in profit in 2018, paid 0 taxes. In fact, they received a rebate of $129 
million (they had a rebate in 2017 as well, and from 2009-2018 they had a effective tax rate of 
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just 3%).177 Meanwhile, “Google is using machine learning to find more oil reserves both above 
and below the seas, its data services are streamlining and automating extant oilfield operations, 
and it is helping oil companies find ways to trim costs and compete with clean energy 
upstarts.”178 Google helps oil companies extract more oil and compete with renewable energy—
at a historical moment when we must do everything we can to keep oil (and many other 
“resources”) in the ground. Amazon.com has an oil and gas division too, which has the same 
aims, the same conscious purposes.  
 
When we search for things on Google (or search and purchase on Amazon.com, from academic 
books to herbal remedies to fair-trade goods), not only do they monetize that search process by 
surveilling us—so goes our way of knowing—but they use the information they gather about us 
to develop AI that will more efficiently wreck the planet. We thus collude in our own 
degradation on multiple levels. Google could focus its resources, which includes a vast reservoir 
of human creativity and intelligence, on resolving the problems of the world. So could we. 
Instead, we all engage in a pattern of insanity that becomes increasingly sophisticated. And the 
insanity comes home very clearly in such incoherences as Google’s dropping “don’t be evil” 
from its code of conduct,179 to the schizophrenia of Bill Gate’s heading up a $1billion climate 
action fund while Microsoft took up “Empowering Oil & Gas with AI” as their 2018 theme for 
one of the largest oil and gas events in the world.180  
                                                 
177 On Amazon’s taxes, see https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/02/16/amazon-paid-no-federal-taxes-
billion-profits-last-year/?utm_term=.8e8578a83c8e  
On surveillance capitalism, see Zuboff 2015 and 2018. On Amazon’s government contracts and some commentary 
on the surveillance state, see: 
https://www.democracynow.org/2019/2/11/glenn_greenwald_as_bezos_protests_invasion 
178 https://gizmodo.com/how-google-microsoft-and-big-tech-are-automating-the-1832790799 
179 https://gizmodo.com/google-removes-nearly-all-mentions-of-dont-be-evil-from-1826153393 
180 https://gizmodo.com/how-google-microsoft-and-big-tech-are-automating-the-1832790799 
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Let us keep in mind: All of the above is quite rational, all of it a matter of acquiring and applying 
knowledge, engaging in typical ways of knowing, and behaving in a logical manner given the 
premises active in our context. Everyone working in the oil and gas divisions at Microsoft, 
Google, and Amazon.com would likely ace a course in logic or critical thinking, as would the 
executives and engineers at Facebook, Netflix, the corporations that run casinos, and so on.  
 
Let us also keep in mind the fact that we all participate in this pattern of insanity. I do too. 
Perhaps certain advanced beings do nothing but work to dispel it, but somehow it seems most of 
us perpetuate it to at least some degree (in academia that includes every moment of teaching that 
maintains the current model of the university . . . at the very least, we would either have to 
revolutionize our syllabi or teach maybe an hour of non-traditional content, perhaps outside the 
university context, for every half hour of standard content). As part of the pattern, corporations 
have colonized our minds, our hearts, our bodies, our souls, our World—including institutions of 
higher education. We cannot become well, we cannot fulfill our potential, we cannot enter 
WisdomLoveBeauty until we decolonize, decolonialize, and enter a time of healing—a healing 
time, a healing rhythm not confined to clocks and calendars, a cycle of renewal and rejuvenation. 
But, we do need to understand a little more about our spiritual sickness. If we cannot recognize 
the signs and symptoms, we may fail to make a proper diagnosis. We may not even recognize the 
ways in which we have become so unwell. 
 
 We have again and again gestured toward spirituality, toward WisdomLoveBeauty as the only 
realistic way to dispel our illness. Spirituality to dispel the “spirits,” daemon (eudaemonia) to 
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dispel the demons. We encounter with genuine spirituality the most realistic possibility for 
psychological health and healing. We can see recent attempts at a “positive psychology” that 
seeks to offer us information, data about psychological health, but it remains nascent, and it 
needs deeper spiritual roots.  
 
The great psychologist Abraham Maslow understood that a spiritual psychology, a genuinely 
scientific psychology, would have to confront transcendence. He said, “I am Freudian and I am 
behavioristic and I am humanistic, and as a matter of fact I am developing what might be called a 
fourth psychology of transcendence as well” (1993: 4). We could take up our own fourth way, or 
a fifth way, or a boundless Way, and call it a philosophical or spiritual psychology, a philosophy 
of transcendence, an epistemology of the sacred that demands a revolution in all sciences (at the 
very least because all science arises as mind—no scientist practices science except by means of 
their soul, their psyche, and hence all science is psychological in a significant sense—including 
the strange sense revealed by quantum science: that what we call “mind” and what we call 
“matter” seem in some way to co-arise). As Maslow put it: “In the light of such facts [as 
spontaneity and self-regulation] can we seriously continue to define the goals of science as 
prediction and control? Almost one could say the exact opposite—at any rate for human beings. 
Do we ourselves want to be predicted and predictable? Controlled and controllable?” (12) 
 
We draw close to a subtle point. Maslow asks, “What if the organism is seen as having 
“biological wisdom”?” (14) He asks this about human beings, just as he does in the previous 
quote. But, he gives no justification for such a narrowing and limited view. He seems to stumble 
in the presence of the greater challenge.  
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Let us pause a moment. We do not want to live irrationally, living as unreliable, flakey children 
upon whom life could not rely, and for whom life could not be relied upon. We need to 
acknowledge our total dependence, on each other, on all beings, on life, on the sacred, on the 
mystery that we cannot control. We cannot control it, and in a basic sense it does not control us 
either. How do we walk the middle way between living in an out-of-control manner on the one 
hand, and living in a manipulated and controlled manner on the other?  
 
Our inquiry suggests that structures of power and domination do indeed manipulate and control 
us. We cannot simply wish that away, or stomp our foot like tempestuous children and “rebel”. 
We will merely make, as Maslow puts it, “stupid. ineffective clumsy gropings toward health” 
(15). How can we make wise movements? How can we make graceful movements that our 
cerebellum and other aspects of the larger ecology of mind will view with enjoyment, appreciate 
as artistic and poised? How can we begin to dance a better world? How can we know better? 
 
Maslow’s question matters here: “What if the organism is seen as having “biological wisdom”?” 
But it needs reframing. In the first iteration: What if we ourselves “have” wisdom? But, wisdom 
is not an object, and if someone asked, “Do human beings really have wisdom?” or, “Do dogs 
really have wisdom?” to either question we might skillfully reply, “No!” Instead, we can better 
ask Maslow’s question this way: What if we ourselves already are WisdomLoveBeauty? What if 
all of sentient being is WisdomLoveBeauty? We orient there toward the larger ecologies of mind 
in which Bateson locates wisdom. We don’t need the fragmentation of “the organism” (as 
Dewey tried to show us), and we don’t need the caveat of “biological wisdom”. Just Wisdom, 
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presenced in, through, as life, presenced in, through, as each of us in, through, as our activity of 
interwovenness.  
 
We can then consider what Maslow says about the limited case he tried to present and make it 
real without the fragmentation and borders. We need only make one small change: We can read 
the following passage as if the “it” he refers to means life, Sophia, sacredness, and not “the 
organism,” and we can capitalize that word to make it easier: 
If we learn to give It greater trust as autonomous, self-governing, and self-
choosing, then clearly we as scientists, not to mention physicians, teachers, or 
even parents, must shift our image over to a more Taoistic one. This is the one 
word that I can think of that summarizes succinctly the many elements of the 
image of the more humanistic scientist. Taoistic means asking rather than telling. 
It means nonintruding, noncontrolling . . . It is like saying that if you want to learn 
about ducks, then you had better ask the ducks instead of telling them. (14) 
 
The meaning of all of this demands extensive contemplation. We may receive this as one way of 
expressing the nature of a sacred epistemology, a more rigorous practice of LoveWisdom. How 
can we learn to ask the ducks?  
 
On the one hand, we can suggest the following: A nondualistic, nonlocal epistemology, an 
epistemology of the sacred, a more rigorous and scientific epistemology must somehow 
transcend the ego-centrism and anthropocentrism of thinking “knowledge” can be evaluated 
from a human perspective alone. In one way or another, humans often appear self-congratulatory 
about what they think they know. Again, we may think we know how to make microwave ovens, 
lasers, fast cars, rockets that fly to the moon. But all these knowledge claims, and most of the 
skepticism about them, tend to remain confined to the human realm. We never seem to ask, 
“What would the ducks say we know? What would the mountains say we know? How do we 
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presence ourselves for all the other beings here?” Consider what The Others of the San Francisco 
Bay Area might say about us, based on the following artefact: 
Modern residents would hardly recognize the Bay Area as it was in the 
days of the Ohlones. Tall, sometimes shoulder-high stands of native bunchgrasses 
(now almost entirely replaced by the shorter European annuals) covered the vast 
meadowlands and the tree-dotted savannahs. Marshes that spread out for 
thousands of acres fringed the shores of the Bay. Thick oakbay forests and 
redwood forests covered much of the hills. 
The intermingling of grasslands, savannahs, salt- and freshwater marshes, 
and forests created wildlife habitats of almost unimaginable richness and variety. 
The early explorers and adventurers, no matter how well-travelled in other parts 
of the globe, were invariably struck by the plentiful animal life here. “There is not 
any country in the world which more abounds in fish and game of every 
description,” noted the French sea captain la Perouse. Flocks of geese, ducks, and 
seabirds were so enormous that when alarmed by a rifle shot they were said to rise 
“in a dense cloud with a noise like that of a hurricane.” Herds of elk—“monsters 
with tremendous horns,” as one of the early missionaries described them—grazed 
the meadowlands in such numbers that they were often compared with great herds 
of cattle. Pronghorn antelopes, in herds of one or two hundred, or even more, 
dotted the grassy slopes. 
Packs of wolves hunted the elk, antelope, deer, rabbits, and other game. 
Bald eagles and giant condors glided through the air. Mountain lions, bobcats, 
and coyotes—now seen only rarely—were a common sight. And of course there 
was the grizzly bear. “He was horrible, fierce, large, and fat,” wrote Father Pedro 
Font, an early missionary, and a most apt description it was. Trse enormous bears 
were everywhere, feeding on berries, lumbering along the beaches, congregating 
beneath oak trees during the acorn season, and stationed along nearly every 
stream and creek during the annual runs of salmon and steelhead. 
It is impossible to estimate how many thousands of bears might have lived 
in the Bay Area at the time of the Ohlones. Early Spanish settlers captured them 
readily for their famous bear-and-bull fights, ranchers shot them by the dozen to 
protect their herds of cattle and sheep, and the early Californians chose the grizzly 
as the emblem for their flag and their statehood. The histories of many California 
townships tell how bears collected in troops around the slaughterhouses and 
sometimes wandered out onto the main streets of towns to terrorize the 
inhabitants. To the Ohlones the grizzly bear must have been omnipresent, yet 
today there is not a single wild grizzly bear left in all of California. 
Life in the ocean and in the unspoiled bays of San Francisco and Monterey 
was likewise plentiful beyond modern conception. There were mussels, clams, 
oysters, abalones, seabirds, and sea otters in profusion. Sea lions blackened the 
rocks at the entrance to San Francisco Bay and in Monterey Bay they were so 
abundant that to one missionary they seemed to cover the entire surface of the 
water “like a pavement.” 
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Long, wavering lines of pelicans threaded the air. Clouds of gulls, 
cormorants, and other shore birds rose, wheeled, and screeched at the approach of 
a human. Rocky islands like Alcatraz (which means pelican in Spanish) were 
white from the droppings of great colonies of birds. 
In the days before the nineteenth-century whaling fleets, whales were 
commonly sighted within the bays and along the ocean coast. An early visitor to 
Monterey Bay wrote: “It is impossible to conceive of the number of whales with 
which we were surrounded, or their familiarity; they every half minute spouted 
within half a pistol shot of the ships and made a prodigious stench in the air.” 
Along the bays and ocean beaches whales were often seen washed up on shore, 
with grizzly bears in “countless troops”—or in many cases Indians—streaming 
down the beach to feast on their remains. 
Nowadays, especially during the summer months, we consider most of the 
Bay Area to be a semi-arid country. But from the diaries of the early explorers the 
picture we get is of a moist, even swampy land. In the days of the Ohlones the 
water table was much closer to the surface, and indeed the first settlers who dug 
wells here regularly struck clear, fresh water within a few feet. 
Water was virtually everywhere, especially where the land was flat. The 
explorers suffered far more from mosquitoes, spongy earth, and hardto-ford rivers 
than they did from thirst—even in the heat of summer. Places that are now dry 
were then described as having springs, brooks, ponds—even fairly large lakes. In 
the days before channelizations, all the major rivers—the Carmel, Salinas, Pajaro, 
Coyote Creek, and Alameda Creek—as well as many minor streams, spread out 
each winter and spring to form wide, marshy valleys. 
The San Francisco Bay, in the days before landfill, was much larger than it 
is today. Rivers and streams emptying into it often fanned out into estuaries which 
supported extensive tule marshes. The low, salty margins of the Bay held vast 
pickleweed and cordgrass swamps. Cordgrass provided what many biologists now 
consider to be the richest wildlife habitat in all North America. 
Today only Suisun Marsh and a few other smaller areas give a hint of the 
extraordinary bird and animal life that the fresh- and saltwater swamps of the Bay 
Area once supported. Ducks were so thick that an early European hunter told how 
“several were frequently killed with one shot.” Channels crisscrossed the 
Bayshore swamps—channels so labyrinthian that the 
Russian explorer Otto von Kotzebue got lost in them and longed for a 
good pilot to help him thread his way through. The channels were alive with 
beavers and river otters in fresh water, sea otters in salt water. And everywhere 
there were thousands and thousands of herons, curlews, sandpipers, dowitchers, 
and other shore birds. 
The geese that wintered in the Bay Area were “uncountable,” according to 
Father Juan Crespi. An English visitor claimed that their numbers “would hardly 
be credited by anyone who had not seen them covering whole acres of ground, or 
rising in myriads with a clang that may be heard a considerable distance.” 
The environment of the Bay Area has changed drastically in the last 200 
years. Some of the birds and animals are no longer to be found here, and many 
others have vastly diminished in number. Even those that have survived have 
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(surprisingly enough) altered their habits and characters. The animals of today do 
not behave the same way they did two centuries ago; for when the Europeans first 
arrived they found, much to their amazement, that the animals of the Bay Area 
were relatively unafraid of people. 
Foxes, which are now very secretive, were virtually underfoot. Mountain 
lions and bobcats were prominent and visible. Sea otters, which now spend almost 
their entire lives in the water, were then readily captured on land. The coyote, 
according to one visitor, was “so daring and dexterous, that it makes no scruple of 
entering human habitation in the night, and rarely fails to appropriate whatever 
happens to suit it.” 
“Animals seem to have lost their fear and become familiar with man,” 
noted Captain Beechey. As one reads the old journals and diaries, one finds the 
same observation repeated by one visitor after another. Quail, said Beechey, were 
“so tame that they would often not start from a stone directed at them.” Rabbits 
“can sometimes be caught with the hand,” claimed a Spanish ship captain. Geese, 
according to another visitor, were “so impudent that they can scarcely be 
frightened away by firing upon them.” 
Likewise, Otto von Kotzebue, an avid hunter, found that “geese, ducks, 
and snipes were so tame that we might have killed great numbers with our sticks.” 
When he and his men acquired horses from the missionaries they chased “herds of 
small stags, so fearless that they suffered us to ride into the midst of them.” 
Von Kotzebue delighted in what he called the “superfluity of game.” But 
one of his hunting expeditions nearly ended in disaster. He had brought with him 
a crew of Aleutian Eskimos to help hunt sea otters for the fur trade. “They had 
never seen game in such abundance,” he wrote, “and being passionately fond of 
the chase they fired away without ceasing.” Then one man made the mistake of 
hurling a javelin at a pelican. “The rest of the flock took this so ill, that they 
attacked the murderer and beat him severely with their wings before other hunters 
could come to his assistance.” 
It is obvious from these early reports that in the days of the Ohlones the 
animal world must have been a far more immediate presence than it is today. But 
this closeness was not without drawbacks. Grizzly bears, for example, who in our 
own time have learned to keep their distance from humans, were a serious threat 
to a people armed only with bows and arrows. During his short stay in California 
in 1792, Jose Longinos Martinez saw the bodies of two men who had been killed 
by bears. Father Font also noticed several Indians on both sides of the San 
Francisco Bay who were “badly scarred by the bites and scratches of these 
animals.” 
Suddenly everything changed. Into this land of plenty, this land of 
“inexpressible fertility” as Captain la Perouse called it, arrived the European and 
the rifle. For a few years the hunting was easy—so easy (in the words of 
Frederick Beechey) “as soon to lessen the desire of pursuit.” But the advantages 
of the gun were short-lived. Within a few generations some birds and animals had 
been totally exterminated, while others survived by greatly increasing the distance 
between themselves and people. 
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Today we are the heirs of that distance, and we take it entirely for granted 
that animals are naturally secretive and afraid of our presence. But for the Indians 
who lived here before us this was simply not the case. Animals and humans 
inhabited the very same world, and the distance between them was not very great. 
The Ohlones depended upon animals for food and skins. As hunters they 
had an intense interest in animals and an intimate knowledge of their behavior. A 
large part of a man's life was spent learning the ways of animals. 
But their intimate knowledge of animals did not lead to conquest, nor did 
their familiarity breed contempt. The Ohlones lived in a world where people were 
few and animals were many, where the bow and arrow were the height of 
technology, where a deer who was not approached in the proper manner could 
easily escape and a bear might conceivably attack—indeed, they lived in a world 
where the animal kingdom had not yet fallen under the domination of the human 
race and where (how difficult it is for us to fully grasp the implications of this!) 
people did not yet see themselves as the undisputed lords of all creation. The 
Ohlones, like hunting people everywhere, worshipped animal spirits as gods, 
imitated animal motions in their dances, sought animal powers in their dreams, 
and even saw themselves as belonging to clans with animals as their ancestors. 
The powerful, graceful animal life of the Bay Area not only filled their world, but 
filled their minds as well. (Margolin 1978: 7-12) 
 
Among other things, this passage touches on some of the insights Paul Shepard tried to invite us 
to sense and make sense of. We find much to contemplate. One of course senses a resonance 
with Levi-Strauss, and that infamous passage from Totemism: 
Radcliffe-Brown’s demonstration ends decisively the dilemma in which the 
adversaries as well as the proponents of totemism have been trapped because they 
could assign only two roles to living species, viz., that of a natural stimulus or that 
of an arbitrary pretext. The animals in totemism cease to be solely or principally 
creatures which are feared, admired, or envied: their perceptible reality permits 
the embodiment of ideas and relations conceived by speculative thought on the 
basis of empirical observations. We can understand, too, that natural species are 
chosen not because they are “good to eat” but because they are “good to think.” 
(1971: 89) 
 
Not “good to think with,” in the manner of a “tool,” but “good to think,” in the manner of a 
power that lives us, a factor in the soul that makes the mind what it is—mind of ecology and 
ecology of mind. We can think Redwood, think Raven, think Wolf—and thereby let them think 
us, empowering our thinking and liberating us into larger ecologies of thought, speech, and 
action. We think them into being, and let them think us into being, in mutual illumination, 
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mutual nourishment, mutual care and responsiveness. We can properly call this mystical 
participation, an epistemology of the sacred.  
 
Shepard invites us to see that Raven, Wolf, and all The Others taught us how to think, speak, 
move. The awakeness we find in the Natural world is the awakeness that we ourselves are, and 
we thus lived entwined with The Others, interwoven in, through, as Nature. But interwovenness 
was perhaps always an achievement, a consummatory experience—one that even arose in some 
cultures by means of consumption of a very different kind than ours. Consuming Buffalo, in the 
altogether way of a Nature-Culture, may have facilitated Consummatory Insight. The Others 
participated with us in the life-death-life activity of the World. We did not merely eat them. We 
lived with them, through them. We dreamed them, and they dreamed us. When we dream today, 
if that dreaming will heal us and the World, we will need to dream again like this. The Others, 
these interwoven ecologies, are good to live, good to dream, and they require our dreaming for 
their vitalized being. 
 
Though Levi-Strauss does write, “good to think,” we should not cut this off from thinking with. 
We need only understand, practice, and realize “good to think” as always in mutuality. But, we 
also lost participation as we lost diversity of ecologies. We substituted “knowing” for “being,” 
for “being together,” for “thinking together,” which means co-discovery-creation, the living 
activity of WisdomLoveBeauty in, through, as interwovenness, relational openness. Let us 
consider the following artefact from C.L. Martin: 
Words. I have grown suspicious of them. The irony is that I am paid 
handsomely to use them. And use them I do, mostly in delivering windy lectures 
to hundreds of university students every year, trying to convey an understanding 
of the history of the North American continent both before and after the European 
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arrival. I have been holding forth on the subject for years and am growing 
increasingly distrustful of what I myself have been saying. Partly because I use 
the language of the Anglo-American; they are the words of a Western-trained, 
Western-oriented intellect as it seeks to wrap itself around this place, this 
landscape, and to convey what has transpired here in the affairs of humankind. 
Yet all the while I am mocked by the knowledge that my words are not the words 
of the people whom my European ancestors encountered on this continent. Those 
earlier residents pronounced the place, and described the affairs of people, very 
differently from the way I do now or my Maryland forebears did centuries ago. 
Our differing sets of words have yielded profoundly variant stories. One of them I 
flatter myself I know well. The other, the aboriginal, is the problem. The people 
native to North America spoke (and many still speak) of a world, a place, and a 
way of living and being, all alien to my Western cast of mind. And yet both 
stories seek to describe and communicate the inherent truths of the same place 
and man and woman’s role in all of that. 
Words reflect the way our minds touch the world about us. In this sense 
they are a kind of sonar: they orient us. Among the Navajo, the Diné, femaleness 
is referred to in terms of certain cardinal points (south and west), specific colors 
(blue and yellow), times of day (daylight and twilight) and life (maturation and 
old age), seasons (summer and fall), and a precise, highly complex state of being, 
the closest word for it being active. Maleness invokes a different, complementary, 
and seemingly opposed constellation of references. Navajos define themselves 
through a language that makes connections between what seem to me curiously 
arranged categories of perception and knowledge. So, too, are other beings—
animal beings, plant beings—inserted into this wheeling landscape of potentiality, 
where the “I” knows how essential it is to “become part of it”—all of the 
dimensions and categories of place. l Thus do these people plug themselves into 
the powers of place: through carefully chosen words and speech. 
We, too, are forever being admonished to choose our words carefully. But what 
do we have to choose from? Scan the dictionary in your brain, or take down such 
a volume from the shelf and realize that our speech is loaded; the words resonate 
with a distinctive imagination of the world—an observation one might of course 
make for any culture, past or present. (What is the fundamental imagination of my 
language for the earth, I ask myself—afraid of the answer. Hence my anxiety with 
words.) “As soon as mankind ceases to ‘reverberate’ to the world, the sickness 
penetrates language.” Language becomes “the victim of illusions produced by 
words. 
Words, says Scott Momaday, are names. Yes, possibly. I like to think of 
them more as forces that mold the space around me, into which I then pour my 
sense of reality and my energies, after the fashion of the amoeba. As the engineer 
of space, language does more than establish the terms of discourse between 
people; it may also do much the same thing between people and the myriad other 
life forms about us. The idea is aboriginal, not mine, and I readily admit I am 
perplexed by it. Yet it seems to be there when I try to read between the lines as 
native peoples so matter-of-factly tell Europeans what went wrong: “With the 
coming of the whites and Christianity the demons of the bush have been pushed 
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back to the north where there is no Christianity. And the conjuror does not exist 
any more with us, for there is no need of one. Nor is there need for the drum.” 
Another: “Since prayer has come into our cabins, our former customs are no 
longer of any service; . . . our dreams and our prophecies are no longer true,—
prayer has spoiled everything for us.” And a third: “The spirits do not come to 
help us now. The white men have driven them away.” Behold the strange, 
incantatory powers of a speech that can silence the elemental powers around it. 
How can anyone who wields such words ever hope to become “a part of it?” 
(1993: 1-2) 
 
That is a good question, and it relates to our question our earlier question: What do The Others 
think about what humans seem to know, The Others with whom we no longer live-and-know? 
Putting any romantic notions aside, we can certainly say that millions of people lived on Turtle 
Island before conquest consciousness arrived. However we tell the story, the ecological diversity 
here seems astonishing—including the human ecological diversity, consisting of possibly 
hundreds of unique languages to go with hundreds of unique nations, unique Nature-Cultures. 
Given the state of things prior to the arrival of conquest consciousness and what we find today, 
would the redwoods, ravens, bears, wolves, whales be wrong to say that what humans in the 
dominant culture know all too well is how to degrade, how to exterminate, how to spread fear 
and fragmentation?  
 
It seems that a proper epistemology should always invite us to evaluate our claims to knowledge 
from a decentered perspective, but not merely a decentering of the ego (even that we largely fail 
to understand). We should evaluate our claims to knowledge from the perspective of the more-
than-human. And this is part of why we need arts of awareness that allow us to self-liberate into 
larger ecologies of mind, ecologies that would include Oak, Salmon, Eagle, and Bear. 
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We must therefore keep in mind that we ourselves are the ducks in question when we consider 
Maslow’s invitation to “ask the ducks”. What we think of as ourselves, the ego, has to learn to 
ask the rest of the ecology, to ask the birds and butterflies of the soul, “What do you know?” 
Imagine doing that with yourself, sitting quietly and asking, “What knowing is there, here, that 
this consciousness, this ego does not yet understand?” And we would have to sense this, practice 
it and realize it, not merely as something “internal,” but as liberation into larger ecologies. We 
would have to inquire with great care, attention, reverence, and humility into such a relationship 
with life—and with ourselves and all our relations—ducks and dolphins and mountains and 
rivers included. Some of the issues involved come out in Maslow’s suggestion that we have a 
preliminary model for relating to people in the way he suggests above:  
In point of fact. we already have such a model in the good psychotherapist. This is 
about the way he functions. His conscious effort is not to impose his will upon the 
patient, but rather to help the patient—inarticulate, unconscious, semiconscious—
to discover what is inside him, the patient. The psychotherapist helps him to 
discover what he himself wants what is good for him. the patient, rather than what 
is good for the therapist. This is the opposite of controlling, propagandizing, 
molding, teaching in the old sense. (14-15) 
 
The psychology of transcendence, the soul study of transcendence, the spiritual approach to life 
and love demands this revolution, a revolution in which we all become philosophers, which 
means therapists, attendants of the soul, most especially, we might say, the Soul of the World, in 
its nonduality with our own soul. We are here to care and attend, not to impose our will. Our life 
is, in some important sense, not “about” us. “My life” is not “about” “me,” and “your life” is not 
“about” “you”. That would narrow us so very much. Somehow, our life is about the World, about 
the Sacred, about the Mystery. Even more: Your life, my life, all life is the very presencing of the 
mystery. This may help us to clarify the meaning of spirituality: Intimate participation, mystical 
participation in what transcends the ego (a pleonasm, but maybe it’s necessary). 
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This participation is care, caring, careful. It means attending. Spirituality means attending to life.  
 
We need to get at a subtle interwovenness of suffering here, and some of it will only become 
clear after more practice. Nevertheless, we can say now that we want to inquire into our being 
domesticated, manipulated, controlled, swindled, hooked (in the sense of addiction, and also in 
the sense of shenpa, the Tibetan Buddhist notion that relates to the way the energy of ignorance 
captures us), and how that pulls us out of healing, health, wholeness, holiness, and the spiritual 
inspiration of the soul.  
 
Again, we can return to the model Maslow offers: A psychotherapist, which means one who 
attends the soul, cares for the soul. In a spiritual path, a spiritual practice, we serve and attend. 
Our patient, right now, is the World; and our patient is also our own Soul. Seeing the 
interwovenness of these may prove challenging. James Hillman offers some helpful preliminary 
suggestions, which bear on our general contemplations on thinking and knowing. If our context 
of knowing is a world we have known as and by means of suffering, bondage, control, and 
degradation, what do we think this implies about our way of knowing? What does it say about 
what we need to do in order to practice-and-realize a better way of knowing? What does our 
practice of LoveWisdom tell us when we throw out everything we think we know and listen—
with the most painful humility? 
My practice tells me I can no longer distinguish clearly between neurosis 
of self and neurosis of world, psychopathology of self and psychopathology of 
world. Moreover, it tells me that to place neurosis and psychopathology solely in 
personal reality is a delusional repression of what is actually, realistically, being 
experienced. This further implies that my theories of neurosis and categories of 
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psychopathology must be radically extended if they are not to foster the very 
pathologies my job is to ameliorate. 
Not so long ago the patient’s complaint was inside the patient. A 
psychological problem was considered to be intrasubjective; therapy consisted in 
readjusting inner psychodynamics. Complexes, functions, structures, memories, 
emotions- the interior person needed realigning, releasing, developing. Then, 
more recently, owing to group and family therapies, the patient’s complaint was 
located in the patient’s social relations. A psychological problem was considered 
to be intersubjective; therapy consisted in readjusting interpersonal 
psychodynamics within relationships, between partners, among members of 
families. In both modes psychic reality was confined to the subjective. In both 
modes the world remained external, material, and dead, merely a backdrop in and 
around which subjectivity appeared. The world was therefore not the province of 
therapeutic focus. Therapists who did focus there were of a lower, more 
superficial order: social workers, counselors, advisors. The deep work was inside 
the person’s subjectivity. 
 Of course, social psychiatry, whether behaviorist Marxist, or more broadly 
conceived, strongly emphasizes external realities and locates the origins of 
psychopathology in objective determinants. The “out there” largely determines 
the “in here,” according to this view This was especially the American dream, an 
immigrant’s dream: change the world and you change the subject. However, these 
societal determinants remain external conditions, economic, cultural, or social; 
they are not themselves psychic or subjective. The external may cause suffering, 
but it does not itself suffer. For all its concern with the outer world, social 
psychiatry too works within the idea of the external world passed to us by 
Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, and Kant. 
 Precisely this external, nonsubjective view of the world now needs to be 
reworked. 
Before we can proceed with it, we have first to recollect the idea of reality 
that generally operates throughout depth psychology. Psychological dictionaries 
and schools of all orientations agree that reality is of two kinds. First, the word 
means the totality of existing material objects or the sum of conditions of the 
external world. Reality is public, objective, social, and usually physical. Second, 
there is a psychic reality, not extended in space, the realm of private experience 
that is interior, wishful, imaginational. Having divided psychic reality from hard 
or external reality, psychology elaborates various theories to connect the two 
orders together, since the division is worrisome indeed. It means that psychic 
reality is conceived to be neither public, objective, nor physical, while external 
reality, the sum of existing material objects and conditions, is conceived to be 
utterly devoid of soul. As the soul is without world, so the world is without soul. 
 Therefore, when something goes wrong in a life, depth psychology still 
looks to intra- and intersubjectivity for the cause and the therapy. The public, 
objective, physical world of things—buildings and bureaucratic forms, mattresses 
and road signs, milk cartons and buses—is by definition excluded from 
psychological etiology and therapy. Things lie outside the soul. 
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Psychotherapy has been working successfully within its province of 
psychic reality conceived as subjectivity, but it has not revisioned the notion of 
subjectivity itself. And now, even its success there comes in question as the 
patients’ complaints bespeak problems that are no longer merely subjective in the 
former sense. For all the while that psychotherapy has succeeded in raising the 
consciousness of human subjectivity, the world in which all subjectivities are set 
has fallen apart. Breakdown is in a new place—Vietnam and Watergate, bank 
scandals with government collusion, pollution and street crime, the loss of literacy 
and the growth of junk, deceit, and show. We now encounter pathology in the 
psyche of politics and medicine, in language and design, in the food we eat. 
Sickness is now “out there.” 
 The contemporary use of the word “breakdown” shows what I mean. 
Nuclear power plants like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl provide vivid 
examples of possibly incurable, chronic breakdowns. The traffic system, the 
school systems, the courts and criminal justice system, giant industries, municipal 
governments, finance and banking-all undergo crises, suffer breakdowns, or must 
be shored up against the threat of collapse. The terms “collapse,” “functional 
disorder,” “stagnation,” “lowered productivity” “depression,” and “breakdown” 
are equally valid for human persons and for objective public systems and the 
things within the systems. Breakdown extends to every component of civic life 
because civic life is now a constructed life: we no longer live in a biological 
world where decay, fermentation, metamorphosis, catabolism are equivalents for 
the dysfunction of constructed things. Robert Sardello, my colleague and friend in 
Dallas, writes: 
 
The individual presented himself in the therapy room of the 
nineteenth century, and during the twentieth the patient suffering 
breakdown is the world itself... The new symptoms are 
fragmentation, specialization, expertise, depression, inflation, loss 
of energy, jargoneze, and violence. Our buildings are anorexic, our 
business paranoid, our technology manic. 
 
Wherever the language of psychopathology occurs (crisis, breakdown, collapse), 
the psyche is speaking of itself in pathologized terms, attesting to itself as subject 
of the pathos. As breakdown appears in all these symptoms of Sardello’s list, so 
then does psyche or psychic reality. The world, because of its breakdown, is 
entering a new moment of consciousness: by drawing attention to itself by means 
of its symptoms, it is becoming aware of itself as a psychic reality. The world is 
now the subject of immense suffering, exhibiting acute and crass symptoms by 
means of which it defends itself against collapse. So it becomes the task of 
psychotherapy and its practitioners to take up that line initiated first by Freud: the 
examination of culture with a pathological eye. At the conclusion to Civilization 
and Its Discontents Freud wrote: 
 
. . .  there is one question I can hardly evade. If the development of 
civilization has such . . . similarity to the development of the 
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individual... may we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that . 
. . some epochs of civilizations—possibly the whole of mankind 
have become neurotic? An analytic dissection of such neuroses 
might lead to therapeutic recommendations that could lay claim to 
great practical interest. 
 
Let us carry Freud’s notion of neurosis and the therapeutic analysis of it beyond 
the community of individuals to the communal environment. 
This examination, as well as the therapeutic eros that draws the 
practitioner into the world as patient, has been vitiated at the very start by tracing 
dysfunction in the world back to individual subjectivity. Depth psychology has 
argued that architecture, politics, or medicine cannot change until architects, 
politicians, and doctors go into analysis. Depth psychology has insisted that the 
pathology of the world out there results simply from the pathology of the world in 
here. The world’s disorders are man-made, enactments and projections of human 
subjectivity. 
Is this view not depth psychology’s denial of things as they are so as to 
maintain its view of the world? Cannot psychology itself be unconscious of its 
own ego-defenses? If depth psychology is wrong on this count, then another of its 
defenses also needs reversing. Not only my pathology is projected onto the world; 
the world is inundating me with its unalleviated suffering. After one hundred 
years of the solitude of psychoanalysis, I am more conscious of what I project 
outward than what is projected onto me by the unconsciousness of the world. 
(Hillman 1998: 62-5) 
 
Hillman elaborates some of these ideas in his conversation with Michael Ventura. The 
conversation seems particularly apt for our inquiry since we have tried to ask why—after 2500 
years of philosophizing in the west—why have things gotten worse in so many crucial ways? 
Many of those most responsible for the collapse of the conditions of life had exposure to 
philosophy in some of the finest institutions of higher education in the most “advanced” societies 
in the world. How did we get ourselves into such a mess? Hillman brings out the same problem 
Dewey and Bentley tried to bring out: We keep hiding behind our own skin, and we have 
practiced dualities that arise from a very basic epistemological mistake, the error of a localized, 
dualistic epistemology. Hillman gets at the fact that this has to do with a whole way of life, and 
cannot be fixed by merely “going inside,” the way philosophers do or the way most people in 
therapy do. 
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Hillman: We’ve had a hundred years of analysis, and people are getting more and 
more sensitive, and the world is getting worse and worse. Maybe it’s time to look 
at that. We still locate the psyche inside the skin. You go inside to locate the 
psyche, you examine your feelings and your dreams, they belong to you. Or it’s 
interrrelations, interpsyche, between your psyche and mine. That’s been extended 
a little bit into family systems and office groups — but the psyche, the soul, is still 
only within and between people. We’re working on our relationships constantly, 
and our feelings and reflections, but look what’s left out of that. 
 
Hillman makes a wide gesture that includes the oil tanker on the horizon, the 
gang graffiti on a park sign, and the fat homeless woman with swollen ankles and 
cracked skin asleep on the grass about fifteen yards away. 
 
What’s left out is a deteriorating world. 
So why hasn’t therapy noticed that? Because psychotherapy is only working on 
that “inside” soul. By removing the soul from the world and not recognizing that 
the soul is also in the world, psychotherapy can’t do its job anymore. The 
buildings are sick, the institutions are sick, the banking system’s sick, the schools, 
the streets — the sickness is out there. 
You know, the soul is always being rediscovered through pathology. In 
the nineteenth century people didn’t talk about psyche, until Freud came along 
and discovered psychopathology. Now we’re beginning to say, “The furniture has 
stuff in it that’s poisoning us, the microwave gives off dangerous rays.” The 
world has become toxic. 
 
Both men, watching the sun flash on the sea, seem to be thinking the same 
thing. 
 
Michael Ventura: That sea out there is diseased. We can’t eat the fish. 
Hillman: The world has become full of symptoms. Isn’t that the beginning of 
recognizing what used to be called animism? The world’s alive—my god! It’s 
having effects on us. “I’ve got to get rid of those fluorocarbon cans.” “I’ve got to 
get rid of the furniture because underneath it’s formaldehyde.” “I’ve got to watch 
out for this and that and that.” So there’s pathology in the world, and through that 
we’re beginning to treat the world with more respect. 
Ventura: As though having denied the spirit in things, the spirit—offended—
comes back as a threat. Having denied the soul in things, having said to things, 
with Descartes, “You don’t have souls,” things have turned around and said, “Just 
you watch what kind of a soul I have, muthafucka.” 
Hillman: “Just watch what I can do, man! You’re gonna have that ugly lamp in 
your room, that lamp is going to make you suffer every single day you look at it. 
It’s going to produce fluorescent light, and it’s going to drive you slowly crazy 
sitting in your office. And then you’re going to see a psychotherapist, and you’re 
going to try to work it out in your relationships, but you don’t know I’m really the 
one that’s got you. It’s that fluorescent tube over your head all day long, coming 
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right down on your skull like a KGB man putting a light on you, straight down on 
you—shadowless, ruthless, cruel.” 
Ventura: And yet we sense this in all we do and say now, all of us, but we’re 
caught in a double bind: on the one hand this is “progress,” a value that’s been 
ingrained in us—and if you think it’s not ingrained in you, take a drive down to 
Mexico and see if even poor Americans would want to live the way most of those 
people have to live (the life of the American poor seems rich to them, that’s why 
they keep coming); but on the other hand, we know that the things of our lives are 
increasingly harmful, but we haven’t got Idea One about what to do. Our sense of 
politics has atrophied into the sort of nonsense that goes on in presidential 
elections. (Hillman and Ventura: 4-5) 
 
This sense of animism . . . Hillman takes it very seriously, and he relates it to the anima mundi, 
the World Soul: 
In place of the familiar notion of psychic reality based on a system of 
private experiencing subjects and dead public objects, I want to advance a view 
prevalent in many cultures (called primitive and animistic by Western cultural 
anthropologists), which also returned for a short while in ours at its glory through 
Florence and Marsilio Ficino. I am referring to the world soul of Platonism, which 
means nothing less than the world ensouled. 
Let us imagine the anima mundi neither above the world encircling it as a 
divine and remote emanation of spirit, a world of powers, archetypes, and 
principles transcendent to things, nor within the material world as its unifying 
panpsychic life principle. Rather let us imagine the amma mundi as that particular 
soul spark, that seminal image, which offers itself through each thing in its visible 
form. Then amma mundi indicates the animated possibilities presented by each 
event as it is, its sensuous presentation as a face bespeaking its interior image—in 
short, its availability to imagination, its presence as a psychic reality. Not only 
animals and plants ensouled as in the Romantic vision, but soul given with each 
thing, God-given things of nature and manmade things of the street. 
The world comes with shapes, colors, atmospheres, textures - a display of 
self-presenting forms. All things show faces, the world not only a coded signature 
to be read for meaning but a physiognomy to be faced. As expressive forms, 
things speak; they show the shape they are in. They announce themselves, bear 
witness to their presence: “Look, here we are.” They regard us beyond how we 
may regard them, our perspectives, what intend with them, and how we dispose of 
them. This imaginative claim on attention bespeaks a world ensouled. More our 
imaginative recognition, the childlike act of imagining the world, animates the 
world and returns it to soul. 
Then we realize that what psychology has had to call “projection” is 
simply animation, as this thing or that spontaneously comes alive, arrests our 
attention, draws us to it. This sudden illumination of the thing does not, depend on 
its formal, aesthetic proportion that makes it “beautiful”; it depends rather upon 
the movements of the anima mundi animating her images and affecting our 
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imagination. The soul of the thing corresponds or coalesces with ours. This 
insight that psychic reality appears in the expressive form or physiognomic 
quality of images allows psychology to escape from its entrapment in 
“experience.” Ficino releases psychology from the self-enclosures of Augustine, 
Descartes, and Kant, and their successors, often Freud and sometimes Jung. For 
centuries we have identified interiority with reflexive experience. Of course, 
things are dead, said the old psychology, because they do not experience 
(feelings, memories, intentions). They may be animated by our projections, but to 
imagine their projecting upon us and each other their ideas and demands, to 
regard them as storing memories or presenting their feeling characters in their 
sensate qualities—this is magical thinking. Because things do not experience, they 
have no subjectivity, no interiority, no depth. Depth psychology could go only to 
the intra- and inter- in search of the interiority of soul.  
Not only does this view kill things by viewing them as dead; it imprisons 
us in that tight little cell of ego. When psychic reality is equated with experience, 
then ego becomes necessary to psychological logic. We have to invent an interior 
witness, an experiencer at the center of subjectivity—and we cannot imagine 
otherwise.  
With things returned again to soul, their psychic reality given with the 
anima mundi, then their interiority and depth—and depth psychology too—
depend not on their experiencing themselves or on their self-motivation but upon 
self-witness of another sort. An object bears witness to itself in the image it offers, 
and its depth lies in the complexities of this image. Its intentionality is 
substantive, given with its psychic reality, claiming but not requiring our witness. 
Each particular event, including individual humans with our invisible thoughts, 
feelings, and intentions, reveals a soul in its imaginative display. Our human 
subjectivity too appears in our display. Subjectivity here is freed from 
literalization in reflexive experience and its fictive subject, the ego. Instead, each 
object is a subject, and its self-reflection is its self-display, its radiance. 
Interiority, subjectivity, psychic depth—all out there, and so, too, 
psychopathology. (Hillman: 67-8) 
 
An epistemology of the sacred is an epistemology of the World Soul, an epistemology of the 
World Ensouled. It would not surprise anyone to suggest such an orientation will feel 
exceedingly strange in the contemporary academy. We are back to, “Stand up straight!” Worse 
yet, the imperative here is, “Experience the sacredness of the World!” And yet, somehow, it 
seems to me at least (and maybe the reader senses it too), our inquiry suggests we have to do 
this. Every “going inward” will only enact the Cartesian, conquest style of consciousness, if we 
don’t dispel that form of consciousness by means of practice. And the dispelment of, the 
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disenchantment from that consciousness is itself a re-enchantment with the World, and an 
entrance into a kind of mystical participation. We would exchange mechanism for Magic—not 
the “magical thinking” of some sort of “primitive” worldview (or, the much less wise magical 
thinking of our techno-fantasy life), but the skillful and realistic Magic proper to the World. We 
confront inconceivability here. We of course want all of this explained, but that is like trying to 
talk Sleeping Beauty into waking up. She remains asleep, and in her sleep she cannot understand 
what we say. Waking up is what she needs.  
 
Hillman gets at this difficulty of re-enacting conquest consciousness every time we try to 
“reflect” on our problems, and it’s interesting how Eros makes an appearance here, in light of 
Sorenson’s suggestion that Eros gets cut off or ontogenetically crippled in the development of 
conquest consciousness: 
Hillman: Put this in italics so that nobody can just pass over it: This is not to deny 
that you do need to go inside—but we have to see what we’re doing when we do 
that. By going inside we’re maintaining the Cartesian view that the world out 
there is dead matter and the world inside is living. 
Ventura: A therapist told me that my grief at seeing a homeless man my age was 
really a feeling of sorrow for myself. 
Hillman: And dealing with it means going home and working on it in reflection. 
That’s what dealing with it has come to mean. And by that time you’ve walked 
past the homeless man in the street. 
Ventura: It’s also, in part, a way to cut off what you would call Eros, the part of 
my heart that seeks to touch others. Theoretically this is something therapy tries to 
liberate, but here’s a person on the street that I’m feeling for and I’m supposed to 
deal with that feeling as though it has nothing to do with another person. 
Hillman: Could the thing that we all believe in most—that psychology is the one 
good thing left in a hypocritical world—be not true? Psychology, working with 
yourself, could that be part of the disease, not part of the cure? I think therapy has 
made a philosophical mistake, which is that cognition precedes conation—that 
knowing precedes doing or action. I don’t think that’s the case. I think reflection 
has always been after the event. (12) 
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It is no small thing that Hillman arrives at Dewey’s insight, by means of contemplating the way 
psychology has functioned in practice, as a therapy for the soul. Recall Dewey’s words:  
Only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know 
what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea 
required for proper execution. The act must come before the thought, and a habit 
before an ability to evoke the thought at will. Ordinary psychology reverses the 
actual state of affairs. 
 
This seems a wondrous resonance in insight. And it says something about us that in practice we 
try to think first as part of controlling ourselves and the environment in order to realize our 
agendas. Our very style of thinking thus enacts the duality between organism and environment. 
Each thought, each instance of speaking, each activity in which we engage reinforces a style of 
consciousness, a habit of conscious purposes. This makes everything an ecological problem, 
including our intimate relationships: 
Hillman: Descartes makes our love for the world into a perversion: it’s 
necrophilia because the world is just a dead body. 
Ventura: To love the world, the planet, is necrophilia—because to the Cartesian 
and scientific way of thinking anything not human is dead. This helps explain the 
real disgust some people on the far right have for ecologists and ecological 
issues—they’re disgusted by our love of the planet because unconsciously they 
feel it’s necrophilia! 
Hillman: And what about this? Romantic love keeps the world dead. It insists, 
“Only you, only you, only you—you are my heart’s desire. Forsaking all others.” 
And here the “others” doesn’t mean just other people, it means all others. No 
significant others can be had anywhere. Your car is out. 
Ventura: If romantic love keeps the world dead, then romantic love is an ecology 
problem? 
Hillman: Right. It never asks, “What are the people saying?”—and by “the 
people” I don’t mean just the tribe, I mean the banana tree and your Chevy and 
the sea. They will get jealous, and you know you can die from jealousy. Jealousy 
plots revenge. The world is taking revenge. Or maybe the world is dying from 
jealousy, jealous that humans with their huge heart capacity for love and their 
genital juices only give this to each other. How insanely selfish. 
Ventura: And what about this? Technological man treats the earth kind of like a 
wife beater or rapist treats women: his Eros is so twisted that the only physical 
relationship he can have with the planet is violence. That would go a long way 
toward explaining his insistence on violating the planet. But you were about to 
say— 
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Hillman: If romantic love is an ecology problem, it’s also a political problem. It’s 
antisocial. It doesn’t let my love into the community. 
Ventura: Are we now promoting free love, like the communes of the sixties or 
the old free sects and religions? 
Hillman: No, I’m not setting out rules for a new practice. I’m not saying, “Let’s 
construct a new society based on loving old cars and banana trees. Follow your 
fetish!” 
Ventura: I don’t know—in the context of all this, “Follow your fetish” might not 
be the worst thing in the world to say. 
Hillman: I’m still being a psychologist, I’m still saying, “Look at your personal 
love feelings, your romantic hang-up, your obsessive desire, not as something 
particularly wrong with you—or as something right with you either that shows 
what a powerful child of Eros you are—but look at it as a function of a Cartesian 
society. There will never be a solution to your pangs by just setting up a commune 
or preaching free love. The only solution can come when the world is reanimated, 
when we recognize how alive everything is, and how desirable.” Maybe that’s 
what consumerism and advertising are really all about, unconsciously, 
compulsively: a way to rekindle our desire for the world. (183-4) 
 
To say our relationships are ecological means that when we go on dates, for instance, we use up 
resources, in an act of taking without the traditional gifting in mutuality that characterizes 
healthy Nature-Culture. Consider the enormous ecological impact of romances and weddings. 
Let me preface this by saying I feel like a terribly romantic person, and I would like to be able to 
express the passion of romance without degrading ecologies. Why is it so hard for us to co-
discover-create an elegant yet simple, graceful, passionate way of relating to each other? What 
we do now seems gratuitous, as if we have to consume in excess to convince ourselves that love 
is happening. Since nothing happens in the dominant culture, we have to put on a great show, a 
great distraction, to mimic the feeling of real happening. We cannot simply be with each other, 
and we have no time for a community to truly come together and make a celebration. So we 
industrialize it, and we manufacture our romance. People will spend tens of thousands of dollars 
on a wedding, and have dozens or even hundreds of guests fly thousands of miles to attend. We 
should perhaps feel incredible shame for consuming the scale of resources we do in the name of 
“love”.  
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An altogether thinking arises as we pursue the conscious purpose, the ego-centric purpose of 
“being together”. We are already in the activity, lived by it, lived by archetypes that we pretend 
to understand, however we may reflect on it after the fact with rational and rationalizing notions. 
Our conquest consciousness arrives in our relationships before we do, and all we can manage in 
many cases is rationalization. The ecological dimension of romance is not merely a matter of 
extraction, consumption, and degradation in the name of “love,” but the practice-realization of a 
way of knowing and living, a pattern of thinking, a style of awareness that involves 
mindlessness—it is a way of knowing ourselves, our beloved, and our world, a way not rooted in 
wisdom, love, and beauty, but always trying to grasp after them. In an increasingly desperate 
attempt to feel good, to restore wholeness, we go further and further into the pattern of insanity, 
such that if we aren’t consuming more resources than we need to, something feels off, and we 
think we need to “go out” more, “go on vacation together,” and so on—anything but revolt 
against the system that keeps us tired, fragmented, lonely in the midst of others, too distracted to 
be truly together except in fleeting moments. This seems to have a positive feedback loop in it: 
The more we degrade ecologies, the more we need to degrade ecologies.  
 
And we must keep in mind that this holds for what we call science too. In the name of 
“knowledge” or “love of knowledge” or even “love of wisdom” we degrade ecologies. Our 
science is a function of a way of life, a style of consciousness. It may seem to arrive at insights 
(perhaps in spite of itself), just as we may arrive at seeming happiness (often in spite of 
ourselves) when we fall in love. But, since all of this activity takes place “in the Matrix,” so to 
speak, in the cave of conquest consciousness, or however we want to designate our delusion, 
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then everything we see becomes part of the practice-realization of delusion, with degrading 
effects on ecologies that manifest as suffering in countless sentient beings. Our bad epistemology 
carries a tremendous moral burden. 
 
How could we change things? This question comes up again and again, because only by means 
of a new way of knowing can we get anywhere. The demand for “answers” comes altogether 
with the disease, with the pattern of insanity. It is an insane demand.  
 
Hillman gets at the need to shift our way of life: 
Hillman: Part of the treatment of these difficulties is to look at a person’s 
schedule, his notebook, her calendar. Because your schedule is one of your 
biggest defenses. 
Ventura: Treat my schedule? 
Hillman: Treat your schedule. And I’ll tell you, I have had more resistance in 
trying to treat people’s schedules and change their schedules than you can ever 
imagine. 
Ventura: You’d get a shitload of resistance out of me. 
Hillman: Do you ever ask your soul questions when you make your schedule? 
Ventura: [Groans.] My soul just went, He fucking-a doesn’t! 
Hillman: The job then becomes how the soul finds accommodations within your 
day. Regarding dreams, regarding persons, regarding time off. Because the manic 
defense against depression is to keep extremely busy — and to be very irritated 
when interrupted. That’s part of the sign of the manic condition. 
Ventura: Me and many of the people I know are often too busy to be anything 
but busy. Yes, it’s manic, and we sort of know that. You’re saying it’s a defense 
against depression. If we go back to what we were talking about before and 
assume that the source of our depression is in the present rather than twenty or 
thirty years ago, then the question is: What chronic depression are we — as 
individuals, as a city, as a culture — trying to avoid by being so chronically 
manic? 
Hillman: The depression we’re all trying to avoid could very well be a prolonged 
chronic reaction to what we’ve been doing to the world, a mourning and grieving 
for what we’re doing to nature and to cities and to whole peoples — the 
destruction of a lot of our world. We may be depressed partly because this is the 
soul’s reaction to the mourning and grieving that we’re not consciously doing. 
The grief over neighborhoods destroyed where I grew up, the loss of agricultural 
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land that I knew as a kid . . . all those things that are lost and gone. Because that’s 
what depression feels like. 
We paint our national history rosy and white and paint our personal 
history gray. We’re so willing to admit that we’re trapped in our personal history, 
but we never hear that said of our national history. . . . 
I think we’ve also lost shame. We talk about our parents’ having shamed 
us when we were little, but we’ve lost our shame in relation to the world and to 
the oppressed, the shame of being wrong, of messing up the world. We’ve 
mutated this shame into personal guilt. Perhaps the way to begin the revolution is 
to stand up for your depression. (44-5) 
 
In other words, we would have to listen—to that wisdom “within” us, the wisdom already in the 
World. We would have to feel. It’s not easy, because what we must hear may seem strange—
perhaps even irrational at first. And, of course, we would have to face the shame and humiliation 
we might be repressing or avoiding—the melancholia and mourning that our busyness keeps us 
from touching. 
 
We need to return to these considerations, but first, in light of them, let us return to Jung’s 
discussion of alchemy, for among the strange things we may want to seriously consider is this 
one: We may yet need to become alchemists—professional philosophers and scientists most of 
all—but maybe the philosopher/scientist in everyone of us needs to take inspiration from those 
Servants of Sophia who sought the mysterious Philosopher’s Stone and its miraculous powers of 
healing. And we must avoid their error. We must not think some miraculous piece of technology 
will save us, when the real work is spiritual. We stand in the same relation to ourselves and our 
world that the alchemists did, and our delusion of “real gold” from the lead of our ignorance is 
the delusion of technology. Science today seeks to “produce” technology the way alchemy 
sought to “produce” gold. Can we face the possibility that the insanity has become even worse in 
our case? Can we inspire ourselves to turn toward the care of the soul that Socrates, the original 
Servant of Sophia in the west, implored us to give ourselves to? 
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The arcanum of alchemy is one of these archetypal ideas that fills a gap in 
the Christian view of the world, namely, the un-bridged gulf between the 
opposites, in particular between good and evil. Only logic knows a tertium non 
datur; nature consists entirely of such “thirds,” since she is represented by effects 
which resolve an opposition—just as a waterfall mediates between “above” and 
“below.” The alchemists sought for that effect which would heal not only 
the disharmonies of the physical world but the inner psychic conflict as well, the 
“affliction of the soul”; and they called this effect the Lapis Philosophorum 
[Philosopher’s Stone]. In order to obtain it, they had to loosen the age-old 
attachment of the soul to the body and thus make conscious the conflict between 
the purely natural and the spiritual man. In so doing they rediscovered the old 
truth that every operation of this kind is a figurative death—which explains the 
violent aversion everybody feels when he has to see through his projections and 
recognize the nature of his anima. It requires indeed an unusual degree of self-
abnegation to question the fictitious picture of one’s own personality. This, 
nevertheless, is the requirement of any psychotherapy that goes at all deep, and 
one realizes how oversimplified its procedures are only when the analyst has to 
try out his own medicine on himself. One can, as experience has often shown, 
relieve oneself of the difficult act of self-knowledge by shutting out the moral 
criterion with so-called scientific objectivity or unvarnished cynicism. But this 
simply means buying a certain amount of insight at the cost of artificially 
repressing an ethical value. The result of this deception is that the insight is 
robbed of its efficacy, since the moral reaction is missing. Thus the foundations 
for a neurotic dissociation are laid, and this in no way corresponds to the 
psychotherapist’s intention. The goal of the procedure is the unio mentalis, the 
attainment of full knowledge of the heights and depths of one’s own character. 
If the demand for self-knowledge is willed by fate and is refused, this 
negative attitude may end in real death. The demand would not have come to this 
person had he still been able to strike out on some promising by-path. But he is 
caught in a blind alley from which only self-knowledge can extricate him. If he 
refuses this then no other way is open to him. Usually he is not conscious of his 
situation, either, and the more unconscious he is the more he is at the mercy of 
unforeseen dangers: he cannot get out of the way of a car quickly enough, in 
climbing a mountain he misses his foothold somewhere, out skiing he thinks he 
can just negotiate a tricky slope, and in an illness he suddenly loses the courage to 
live. The unconscious has a thousand ways of snuffing out a meaningless 
existence with surprising swiftness. The connection of the unio mentalis with the 
death-motif is therefore obvious, even when death consists only in the cessation 
of spiritual progress. 
 The alchemists rightly regarded “mental union in the overcoming of the 
body” as only the first stage of conjunction or individuation, in the same way that 
Khunrath understood Christ as the “Saviour of the Microcosm” but not of the 
Macrocosm, whose saviour was the lapis. In general, the alchemists strove for a 
total union of opposites in symbolic form, and this they regarded as the 
indispensable condition for the healing of all ills. Hence they sought to find ways 
and means to produce that substance in which all opposites were united. It had to 
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be material as well as spiritual, living as well as inert, masculine as well as 
feminine, old as well as young, and—presumably—morally neutral. It had to be 
created by man, and at the same time, since it was an “increatum,” by God 
himself, the Deus terrestris. 
The second step on the way to the production of this substance was the 
reunion of the spirit with the body. For this procedure there were many symbols. 
One of the most important was the chymical marriage, which took place in the 
retort. The older alchemists were still so unconscious of the psychological 
implications of the opus that they understood their own symbols as mere 
allegories or—semiotically—as secret names for chemical combinations, thus 
stripping  mythology, of which they made such copious use, of its true meaning 
and using only its terminology. Later this was to change, and already in the 
fourteenth century it began to dawn on them that the lapis was more than a 
chemical compound. This realization expressed itself mainly in the Christ-
parallel. Dorn [Gerhard Dorn, Belgian philosopher of the 16th century—n.k.] was 
probably the first to recognize the psychological implications for what they were, 
so far as this was intellectually possible for a man of that age. Proof of this is his 
demand that the pupil must have a good physical and, more particularly, a good 
moral constitution. A religious attitude was essential. For in the individual was 
hidden that “substance of celestial nature known to very few,” the “incorrupt 
medicament” which “can be freed from its fetters, not by its contrary but by its 
like.” The “spagyric medicine” [alchemical medicine] whereby it is freed must be 
“conformable to this substance.” The medicine “prepares” the body so that the 
separation can be undertaken. For, when the body is “prepared,” it can be 
separated more easily from “the other parts.” 
Like all alchemists, Dorn naturally did not reveal what the spagyric 
medicine was. One can only suppose that it was thought of as physical, more or 
less. At the same time he says that a certain asceticism is desirable, and this may 
be a reference to the moral nature of the mysterious panacea. At any rate he 
hastens to add that the “assiduous reader” will thenceforth advance from the 
meditative philosophy to the spagyric and thence to the true and perfect wisdom. 
It sounds as if the assiduous reader had been engaged at the outset in reading and 
meditating, and as if the medicine and the preparation of the body consisted 
precisely in that. Just as for Paracelsus the right “theōria” was part of the panacea, 
so for the alchemists was the symbol, which expresses the unconscious 
projections. Indeed, it is these that make the substance magically effective, and 
for this reason they cannot be separated from the alchemical procedure whose 
integral components they are. 
The second stage of conjunction, the re-uniting of the unio mentalis with 
the body, is particularly important, as only from here can the complete 
conjunction be attained—union with the unus mundus. The reuniting of the 
spiritual position with the body obviously means that the insights gained should 
be made real. An insight might just as well remain in abeyance if it is simply not 
used. The second stage of conjunction therefore consists in making a reality of the 
man who has acquired some knowledge of his paradoxical wholeness. 
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The great difficulty here, however, is that no one knows how the 
paradoxical wholeness of man can ever be realized. That is the crux of 
individuation, though it becomes a problem only when the loophole of “scientific” 
or other kinds of cynicism is not used. Because the realization of the wholeness 
that has been made conscious is an apparently insoluble task and faces the 
psychologist with questions which he can answer only with hesitation and 
uncertainty, it is of the greatest interest to see how the more unencumbered 
symbolical thinking of a medieval “philosopher” tackled this problem. The texts 
that have come down to us do not encourage the supposition that Dorn was 
conscious of the full range of his undertaking. Although in general he had a clear 
grasp of the role the adept played in the alchemical process, the problem did not 
present itself to him in all its acuteness, because only a part of it was enacted in 
the moral and psychological sphere, while for the rest it was hypostatized in the 
form of certain magical properties of the living body, or as a magical substance 
hidden within it. This projection spread over the problem a kind of mist which 
obscured its sharp edges. The alchemists still believed that metaphysical 
assertions could be proved (even today we have still not entirely freed ourselves 
from this somewhat childish assumption), and they could therefore entrench 
themselves behind seemingly secure positions in the Beyond, which they were 
confident would not be shaken by any doubts. In this way they were able to 
procure for themselves considerable alleviations. One has only to think what it 
means if in the misery and incertitude of a moral or philosophical dilemma one 
has a quinta essentia, a lapis or a panacea so to say in one’s pocket! We can 
understand this deus ex machina the more easily when we remember with what 
passion people today believe that psychological complications can be made 
magically to disappear by means of hormones, narcotics, insulin shocks, and 
convulsion therapy. The alchemists were as little able to perceive the symbolical 
nature of their ideas of the arcanum as we to recognize that the belief in hormones 
and shocks is a symbol. We would indignantly dismiss such an interpretation as a 
nonsensical suggestion. (CW14: para. 674-80) 
 
By the end of the passage, Jung seems to miss something, for all true traditions of LoveWisdom 
tell us very precisely that, in the midst of our most painful poverty, we have a jewel of 
incomparable value sewn into our shirt, placed there by a loving Sophia. Jung surely knows this, 
but he forgets to note the problem of spiritual materialism: Knowing there is nothing for us to 
“do,” we remain in denial regarding right or skillful effort, and we long for junk-ease, easy-
medicine, medication in place of healing.  
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We can hardly process the distance that separates us from the alchemists, and most philosophers 
today do not think of them as part of a renaissance that took philosophy as a way of life for its 
icon, rather than the kind of philosophy that became the archetype for the so-called age of 
enlightenment and the science we have today. The union of opposites they sought (or its spiritual 
equivalent) does not even appear on the menu in most philosophy courses (perhaps it appears in 
none), and it seems that our culture has only gone further into darkness since the age of 
enlightenment began. Consider Gieser’s discussion of Pauli’s sentiments regarding the western 
relationship to matter: 
For such a symmetrical union of opposites to be achievable, according to Jung, an 
elevation of the feminine principle was required – and on this Pauli could only 
agree. 
 
However I am, like Jung, of the opinion that the production 
of balance between the spirit and physical matter necessitates an 
elevation of the feminine principle or symbol and that this at the 
same time has to correct the one-sidedness of a purely patriarchal 
age. This seems to be the mood of our time (of which it may 
perhaps also be said that it has no chivalry). 
Insofar as science is a product of masculine consciousness, 
the ‘eternal feminine’ in terms of natural philosophy means the 
consciousness-transcending unity beyond the opposing pair. [–––]. 
Classical science from Galileo-Kepler-Newton right down to 
Einstein stands on the other hand for the trinitarian-patriarchal 
view. Only modern physics has again recognized that in this world 
actual phenomena of necessity form and remain complementary 
opposing pairs and that they at the same time allow the observer 
freedom. It has not yet been officially admitted that the psychic 
state of an involved observer may also have an influence on the 
natural process. 
I should like to attempt here to make a comparison with the 
ancient Chinese way of thinking (communicated to me by R. 
Wilhelm), in order to express what I cannot yet grasp in exact 
concepts: the two signs of the I Ching, Yang (male) and Yin 
(female), originally signify a mountain in the sun (south side) and a 
mountain in the shade (north side).We must learn to realize in our 
occidental manner and with the aid of our mathematics (which the 
ancient Chinese did not know) that there is only one X (one 
‘mountain’, one ‘content’, one ‘real’, one ‘essence’, or whatever 
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one may call the element of a still unknown and invisible reality) 
that according to the ‘illumination’ for us mortals i.e. according to 
how it appears in our human consciousness (this divides and 
distinguishes), appears either spiritual or material. 
 
On behalf of his profession Pauli felt guilt towards the great mother, mater, 
mother earth. She demands rehabilitation. He writes: “Suddenly I had a 
remarkable feeling experience. The ›observation‹ of microphysics appeared to me 
to be a kind of black mass and I felt remorse. Remorse with regard to matter, 
which appeared to me to be a maltreated living thing. (Biological implication.) – 
The practice of this black ›mass of measuring‹ in the external world transforms 
only its condition, not that of the observer.” Pauli saw here the alchemical 
position as the ideal and symmetrical one; the transmutation of matter is a process 
which must include the transformation of man – if he remains outside and only 
uses matter the whole thing will turn into a black mass. Western man has created 
a razor-sharp demarcation between himself and matter. Matter is treated as an 
inanimate object which lies at his disposal for exploitation. The attitude of the 
alchemist is more humble. He knows that every manipulation of matter reflects 
and has repercussions on his own condition. The transformation of matter stands 
in direct relation to his own transformation and redemption. (Gieser: 323-4) 
 
Aren’t things even worse than this, in that we treat living beings as disposable, as simply 
available for exploitation? We do this not only through industrialized agriculture and 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, but in every aspect of the culture. Consider the fights 
over something as stupid as getting cruise ships to slow down enough so that wildlife can get out 
of their way. A certain number of whales will be murdered by humans every year simply because 
we have to keep our leisure agendas. Why do we even have cruise ships? Think of the wonder of 
this symptom: To go out in the ocean, eat and drink ourselves to extremes, and fill the ocean with 
our waste. It’s astonishing. So many aspects of the dominant culture come to using the world as 
meaningless and exploitable—everything submitted to our agendas. Even the above discussion 
of “the transformation of matter” runs aground, because we might think we can still do whatever 
we want, but snap our fingers in a gesture of magical thinking and say, “This affects us too.” On 
the contrary, it demands a revolution in science and technology, a transformation in our very 
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understanding of the “transformation of matter”. We must learn from the alchemists that our 
primary function is spiritual, not “scientific” in the sense we now have of “science”. 
 
We should note that the alchemists too may have felt guilt at how they treated Nature, how they 
treated Sophia. They faced the same problems of spiritual materialism we all face, the very ones 
we could say have become the dominant ideology of our time. We may find this aptly expressed 
in an old alchemical illustration that shows Sophia in a tree, with an alchemist before her, one 
who seems to have come out of his closed up study. 
 
However the original artist may have intended the image, we can read it as a warning to the 
philosopher: While the philosopher locks themselves up in a room with the books of abstract 
philosophy and the toys of science, Sophia awaits in Nature, in the Tree of Life, and She will 
begin to feel scorned—something we provoke at our peril, not Hers. As Dewey suggests, “The 
so-called separation of theory and practice means in fact the separation of two kinds of practice, 
one taking place in the outdoor world, the other in the study” (1922: 71). But such a duality will 
not hold, as we clearly see in its consequences—we live in a one-practice World, where the 
nonduality of unity and diversity allows for many versions of “one-practice,” as long as they 
each remain attuned to Nature.  
 
However we describe it, the shift from a passion for Wisdom to a fevered pursuit of 
“knowledge” marks the fall of humanity, and it goes altogether with the development of western 
culture. Nasr remarks that this fall of the west may help us to understand the strangeness of 
western culture: 
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it was here [in the west] that a rebellion took place against traditional philosophy, 
which had remained inalienably linked to religion everywhere and in all stages of 
premodern history save for a brief period in Greco-Roman antiquity. This 
rebellion resulted in a new chapter in the history of Western philosophy wherein 
much of philosophy set itself against the very principles of religion and even 
wisdom. Only in the West did a philosophy develop that was not only no longer 
the love of wisdom but went so far as to deny the very category of wisdom as a 
legitimate form of knowledge. The result was a hatred of wisdom that should 
more appropriately be called “misosophy” (literally hatred of sophia, wisdom) 
rather than philosophy. (Nasr 1996: 80) 
 
That seems to invite a full stop. In the image above, one could imagine Sophia accusing the 
philosopher of neglecting Her—of behaving, for all intents and purposes, as if he hates Her. Nasr 
continues: 
In both Greek antiquity and the European Middle Ages, Western philosophy 
possessed schools that could be compared with the great intellectual traditions of 
China and India, not to speak of the Islamic world, which shared much of the 
heritage of antiquity with the West. It is only in the post-medieval period that the 
mainstream of Western philosophy turned against both revelation and noesis or 
intellection as sources of knowledge, and limited itself to empiricism or 
rationalism, with results that were catastrophic for the unity of Western 
civilization as far as the relation between faith and reason was concerned. Other 
religions, whose views concerning the order of nature were discussed in the 
previous chapter, created civilizations in which schools of philosophy were 
cultivated in the traditional sense of the term; however, none of them paralleled 
the development of post-medieval Western philosophy, at least not until the 
nineteenth century. That is why a number of scholars with some justification have 
refused to apply the very term “philosophy” to Oriental doctrines because one 
cannot call, let us say, the Samkhya [the philosophical traditions of India that 
include what we now, perhaps somewhat tragically, refer to as “yoga”] and 
Kantianism, philosophy unless philosophy is taken to possess a distinct meaning 
in each of the cases in question. However, one could quite legitimately call 
Pythagoreanism and ishraqi doctrines or neo-Confucianism philosophy and have 
a clear understanding, based upon principles, of what is meant by philosophy, 
which must, nevertheless, be endowed with a definition universal enough to 
embrace expressions of traditional philosophy as different as 
Pythagoreanism and neo-Confucianism. (80-1) 
 
Nasr suggests that “The full grasp of the current religious and also antireligious understanding of 
the order of nature and its consequences for the environmental crisis . . . cannot be achieved 
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without dealing, in addition to religion, with both Western philosophy and science,” and that 
understanding that requires us to  
examine how Western philosophy from its inception in Greece to its 
transformation during the Renaissance and finally up to the contemporary period 
has dealt with the order of nature and how changes came about in the 
philosophical understanding of that order, which were both affected by the 
religious understanding of the natural order and later combatted, opposed, and 
influenced that understanding. (81)  
 
Nasr does this by means of a scholarly historical study, and his insights are valuable. They have 
not sunk into the larger culture. We have tried here to illuminate certain aspects of the problems 
Nasr examines by means of a different kind of inquiry. A change in style of inquiry—indeed to 
demand that inquiry can no longer be restricted to textual practices—arises in part from sheer 
astonishment of how much worse things have gotten since Nasr began writing about them—as 
early as the late 1960’s—and how much worse they have gotten even in the past decade, or the 
past half-decade. We have tried to touch on a variety of things scholars like Nasr don’t always 
touch on. Nevertheless, again and again, we seem to come back to the need for things scholars 
like Nasr note we have forsaken and need to recover, like the power of dreams, revelations, 
intuitions, initiations—really, the Sacred Madnesses that Plato taught us about. In some sense, 
perhaps we really do need to make our way back to Madness and Magic, a process obstructed by 
our addiction to rationality and its illusions of control and ease: It’s easy to read a book, easy to 
turn on an air conditioner or a microwave, and these things give us a feeling of control and 
sovereignty, but we thereby give up dignity and true empowerment for this delusion of 
sovereignty, just as we give up wisdom and love for the delusions of knowledge and civilization. 
It seems that we intellectuals in particular, and also the broader society, have no idea what we 
lost when we lost philosophy as a way of life, including a sense of the religious life that would 
appear less like dogma and more like skillful doctrine, skillful teachings, healings, doctorings for 
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the care of the soul and the World, for the cultivation of vitalizing Nature-Culture. Our ancestors 
might have echoed the sentiments of the Pueblo Elder Jung quoted, the one who said that he and 
his people help the Sun to rise, for the sake of all humanity. Indeed, our ancestors seem to have 
thought something very much like this. Consider this passage from the great philologist Károly 
Kerényi: 
A later witness very clearly expresses the knowledge, bordering on 
certainty, of the Greeks that their own existence was bound up inseparably with 
the Eleusinian Mysteries. He was not himself a Greek, but he was a devout 
worshipper of the gods; he was initiated at Eleusis and even held the rank of a 
hierophant, though not of Eleusis. His name was Vettius Agorius Praetextatus. 
His religious offices—as well as his high political honors—are recorded in an 
inscription in Rome. In the year A.D. 364 the Catholic Emperor Valentinian 
prohibited all nocturnal celebrations with a view to abolishing, among other rites, 
the Mysteries of Eleusis. . . . “But” [according to the report of the Greek historian 
Zosimos], “after Praetextatus, who held the office of proconsul in Greece,  
declared that this law would make the life of the Greeks unlivable, if they were 
prevented from properly observing the most sacred Mysteries, which hold the 
whole human race together, he permitted the entire rite to be performed in the 
manner inherited from the ancestors as if the edict were not valid.”  
 This late testimony throws a highly significant light on the meaning of the 
Mysteries of Eleusis. They were thought to “hold the entire human race together” 
[we may suggest, they held the whole World together—n.k.], not only because 
people continued, no doubt, to come from every corner of the earth to be initiated, 
as they had in the days of the Emperor Hadrian, but also because the Mysteries 
touched on something that was common to all men. They were connected not only 
with the Athenian and Greek existence but with human existence in general. And 
Praetextatus clearly stated just this: bios, life, he declared, would become 
“unlivable” (abiotos) for the Greeks if the celebration were to cease. (Kerényi 
1991: 11-12) 
 
We can sense into this with an ecological vision, not constrained by either ordinary time or the 
literalness of pure rationality. Symbolically speaking, life became unlivable. The world becomes 
unlivable. The Greek world died. Our world may die. The Sun no longer comes up as it used to, 
because conquest consciousness did so much to interrupt the rites, rituals, ceremonies, 
celebrations, and sacraments of genuine Nature-Culture. We must see the non-“symbolic” aspect 
of symbolism, the more-than-merely-“psychological” dimension of archetype. The whole point 
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of Synchronicity comes to the dispelment, the rupture of barriers, including the barriers that tell 
us that participation in mysteries, that mystical participation in life does not affect the World—
even when we may sense in our bones that the World is a constellation of participatory activity, 
interwoven in nonlinear “causality”. Synchronicity offers us a moment of touching this. 
Sacrament refers to Synchronicity in relation to Sacredness, to the Making Sacred of the World. 
 
The Eleusinian Mysteries were themselves likely degraded, maybe even by the time of Plato, but 
they could still offer passage to barrier-rupturing insight, an opening to the sacred. Perhaps part 
of Plato’s vision for philosophy included a sense of rejuvenating the initiatory tradition—a sense 
of the deep need for rupture and revolution—because Socrates had predicted the fall of his 
culture, because the Ancient Greeks were already deeply entangled in the pernicious effects of 
“civilization”. Any philosophy of civilization, any philosophy of Culture must be handled not 
like a poisonous snake, but like a dozen of them. So, we would need to do much better than Plato 
did, and we would have to have something that worked better than the Eleusinian Mysteries in 
their likely degraded form. No simple “return” to dreaming, to mysteries, to plant teachers, to 
Sacred Madness of any kind will really do what we need it to do. We should make no mistake 
here: Spiritual practice can be healing for individuals, families, whole communities. Somehow, 
we have everything we need, already, and it makes sense to recommend things like meditation 
and even Ayahuasca as part of the healing process. But we run foolish risks when we fail to see 
how these practices must arise as part of an altogether practice-realization of a 
philosophical/spiritual/religious way of life.  
 
Perhaps a more “sober” diagnosis from Bateson will help here: 
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Let me offer you a myth. 
There was once a Garden. It contained many hundreds of species —
probably in the subtropics—living in great fertility and balance, with plenty of 
humus, and so on. In that garden, there were two anthropoids who were more 
intelligent than the other animals. 
On one of the trees there was a fruit, very high up, which the two apes 
were unable to reach. So they began to think. That was the mistake. They began to 
think purposively. 
By and by, the he ape, whose name was Adam, went and got an empty box 
and put it under the tree and stepped on it, but he found he still couldn’t reach the 
fruit. So he got another box and put it on top of the first. Then he climbed up on 
the two boxes and finally he got that apple. 
Adam and Eve then became almost drunk with excitement. This was the 
way to do things. Make a plan, ABC and you get D. 
They then began to specialize in doing things the planned way. In effect, 
they cast out from the Garden the concept of their own total systemic nature and 
of its total systemic nature. 
After they had cast God out of the Garden, they really went to work on 
this purposive business, and pretty soon the topsoil disappeared. After that, 
several species of plants became “weeds” and some of the animals became 
“pests”; and Adam found that gardening was much harder work. He had to get his 
bread by the sweat of his brow and he said, “It’s a vengeful God. I should never 
have eaten that apple.”  
Moreover, there occurred a qualitative change in the relationship between 
Adam and Eve, after they had discarded God from the Garden. . . . .  
The biblical version of this story, from which I have borrowed 
extensively, does not explain the extraordinary perversion of values, whereby the 
woman’s capacity for love comes to seem a curse inflicted by the deity.  
Be that as it may. Adam went on pursuing his purposes and finally 
invented the free-enterprise system. Eve was not, for a long time, allowed to 
participate in this because she was a woman. . . .  
A parable, of course, is not data about human behavior. It is only an 
explanatory device. But I have built into it a phenomenon which seems to be 
almost universal when man commits the error of purposive thinking and 
disregards the systemic nature of the world with which he must deal. This 
phenomenon is called by the psychologists “projection.” The man, after all, has 
acted according to what he thought was common sense and now he finds himself 
in a mess. He does not quite know what caused the mess and he feels that what 
has happened is somehow unfair. He still does not see himself as part of the 
system in which the mess exists, and he either blames the rest of the system or he 
blames himself. In my parable Adam combines two sorts of nonsense: the notion 
“I have sinned” and the notion “God is vengeful.” 
If you look at the real situations in our world where the systemic nature of 
the world has been ignored in favor of purpose or common sense, you will find a 
rather similar reaction. (Steps: 442-4) 
 
663 
 
Here he lays out the problem rather plainly. We have considered it from many angles. Let us put 
it in an apparent tension with Jung’s reading of the myth: 
Problems thus draw us into an orphaned and isolated state where we are 
abandoned by nature and are driven to consciousness. There is no other way open 
to us; we are forced to resort to conscious decisions and solutions where formerly 
we trusted ourselves to natural happenings. Every problem, therefore, brings the 
possibility of a widening of consciousness, but also the necessity of saying 
goodbye to childlike unconsciousness and trust in nature. This necessity is a 
psychic fact of such importance that it constitutes one of the most essential 
symbolic teachings of the Christian religion. It is the sacrifice of the merely 
natural man, of the unconscious, ingenuous being whose tragic career began with 
the eating of the apple in Paradise. The biblical fall of man presents the dawn of 
consciousness as a curse. And as a matter of fact it is in this light that we first 
look upon every problem that forces us to greater consciousness and separates us 
even further from the paradise of unconscious childhood. Every one of us gladly 
turns away from his problems; if possible, they must not be mentioned, or, better 
still, their existence is denied. We wish to make our lives simple, certain, and 
smooth, and for that reason problems are taboo. We want to have certainties and 
no doubts—results and no experiments—without even seeing that certainties can 
arise only through doubt and results only through experiment. The artful denial of 
a problem will not produce conviction; on the contrary, a wider and higher 
consciousness is required to give us the certainty and clarity we need. (CW8: 
para. 751)  
 
It seems exceedingly wise to read this in light of Kate Hillman’s letter. Jung began to think of 
this “consciousness” very differently. He seems to be trying to say we can expand the little box 
of ego, but instead we could say we self-liberate beyond the ego, beyond the “consciousness” 
that seems stuck with not trusting Nature—though we may think of the ongoing practice of this 
as an opening of awareness, a waking up that is like becoming conscious though in some way 
transcending ego-centric “consciousness”. Naïve trust in Nature is not the same as the sage’s 
trust in Nature (a consummatory experience, an ongoing practice-realization), though there is a 
reason why Sophia has a childlike dimension, the beginner’s mind, timeless wisdom, embodied 
for instance in the image of Manjushri, the youth who wields the life-giving Sword of Wisdom—
it cuts through delusion.  
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This feeling orphaned that Jung mentions means a lot. We may, consciously or not, hate Nature 
the way we would hate a “bad mother.” It relates to what Bateson mentioned, and we benefit 
from understanding that Sophia (the Divine, the Sacred)  may appear “vengeful” if we behave 
ignorantly, and we can skillfully “look inward” for ways we have fallen off the razor’s edge, and 
begin to engage in practices (or renew practices) that will put us back in attunement.  
 
What about that? What about atoning (for something reasonably seen as sin—the exploitation 
and abuse of the sacred, and of countless sentient beings) and attuning (becoming resonant again 
with that sacredness and those beings)? What about resolution for the problem Bateson outlines? 
Vain is the word of the philosopher that heals no suffering. What will begin to heal the suffering 
of this mistake of common sense? Bateson’s own answer does not really function. It’s a bit . . . 
too sketchy, and in some ways we might respectfully suggest that he reveals the limits of his 
vision: 
But we are met here not only for diagnosis of some of the world’s ills but also to 
think about remedies. . . . The problem is systemic and the solution must surely 
depend upon realizing this fact. 
First, there is humility, and I propose this not as a moral principle, 
distasteful to a large number of people, but simply as an item of a scientific 
philosophy. In the period of the Industrial  
Revolution, perhaps the most important disaster was the enormous increase of 
scientific arrogance. We had discovered how to make trains and other machines. 
We knew how to put one box on top of the other to get that apple, and Occidental 
man saw himself as an autocrat with complete power over a universe which was 
made of physics and chemistry. And the biological phenomena were in the end to 
be controlled like processes in a test tube. Evolution was the history of how 
organisms learned more tricks for controlling the environment; and man had 
better tricks than any other creature. 
But that arrogant scientific philosophy is now obsolete, and in its place 
there is the discovery that man is only a part of larger systems and that the part 
can never control the whole. . . .  
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 Even within the individual human being, control is limited. We can in 
some degree set ourselves to learn even such abstract characteristics as arrogance 
or humility, but we are not by any means the captains of our souls. 
It is, however, possible that the remedy for ills of conscious purpose lies 
with the individual. There is what Freud called the royal road to the unconscious. 
He was referring to dreams, but I think we should lump together dreams and the 
creativity of art, or the perception of art, and poetry and such things. And I would 
include with these the best of religion. These are all activities in which the whole 
individual is involved. The artist may have a conscious purpose to sell his picture, 
even perhaps a conscious purpose to make it. But in the making he must 
necessarily relax that arrogance in favor of a creative experience in which his 
conscious mind plays only a small part. 
We might say that in creative art man must experience himself—his total 
self—as a cybernetic model. 
It is characteristic of the 1960s that a large number of people are looking 
to the psychedelic drugs for some sort of wisdom or some sort of enlargement of 
consciousness, and I think this symptom of our epoch probably arises as an 
attempt to compensate for our excessive purposiveness. But I am not sure that 
wisdom can be got that way. What is required is not simply a relaxation of 
consciousness to let the unconscious material gush out. To do this is merely to 
exchange one partial view of the self for the other partial view. I suspect that what 
is needed is the synthesis of the two views and this is more difficult. 
My own slight experience of LSD led me to believe that Prospero was 
wrong when he said, “We are such stuff as dreams are made on.” It seemed to me 
that pure dream was, like pure purpose, rather trivial. It was not the stuff of which 
we are made, but only bits and pieces of that stuff. Our conscious purposes, 
similarly, are only bits and pieces. 
The systemic view is something else again. (Steps 444-6)   
 
We consider in particular these comments about LSD for how they contrast with the other 
passages we have considered about holotropic medicines. We could cite a large literature on the 
healing power of these medicines, and Stan Grof is among the Elders in psychology to consult in 
these matters. One of the things I will always remember about meeting Grof is the frankness of 
his view on these medicines: Given his experience with them (including guiding many patients in 
working with them), and given the state of the world, he found it hard to believe we could 
effectively heal our situation without them—that is to say, if we want to heal things in a manner 
that will spare a great number of sentient beings (human and non-human) who are currently 
headed for gratuitous suffering because of our failure to take skillful and realistic action.  
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Given a forced choice between what we call art and experiences inspired by these medicines, one 
would be tempted to side with the plant teachers—because the plants are our Elders, and in the 
best case art is done by a spiritual teacher. Outside of a fuller spiritual life, the artist can only 
hope for inspiration from the divine (or perhaps has developed limited practices for access, an 
artistic bag of tricks), but with these medicines we open ourselves to speak directly with the 
divine, which is the heart of LoveWisdom, the purpose of a spiritual life. Given a hundred people 
engaged with art in the typical manner, and a hundred people properly taking plant medicines, 
we would expect a more intense and potentially useful experience constellating wisdom, love, 
and beauty in the case of the holotropic medicines. I would be willing to bet that few aesthetic 
experiences can so combine these three, and that far fewer aesthetic experiences bring healing of 
the soul, of HeartMindBodyWorldCosmos with the consistency of these medicines. Nothing is a 
panacea, and everything, including art, including these medicines, depends on practice and a 
holistic way of life. But art at its best does not exceed these medicines at their best—and we can 
admit that, ultimately (once we truly understand the aesthetic), the reverse holds true as well. 
 
Bateson, we may suggest, lacked the proper context to practice with LSD—lacked the art 
McKenna warned us these medicines demand. It seems that a great many people lack that 
context, lack genuine art in their practice, and that they achieve seemingly beneficial results in 
spite of themselves. Without LoveWisdom as an ethical-ontological-aesthetic-epistemological 
context, we not only limit these Arts of Awareness—meditation and the creative arts included—
but we can turn them into powerful forces of spiritual materialism. Bateson does not seem to 
address this. The suggestion that, “in creative art man must experience himself—his total self—
as a cybernetic model” feels true yet insufficient, almost empty in some ways. Generally 
667 
 
speaking, especially in the dominant culture, this simply cannot happen except by accident, an 
accident that will always remain limited until it self-liberates. In the case of psychedelic 
experiences, they seem to increase the likelihood of the accident, and they often lead to mystical 
experiences that are rare in our engagement with art. Again, we should emphasize that spiritual 
context is the best way to take full advantage of this potential in the medicines. The medicine 
makes the experience likely, even though Bateson himself did not seem to take enough of the 
medicine, or take it in the right way, to realize this potential for himself. 
 
Mystical experiences tend to give us precisely the corrective for the epistemological error 
Bateson himself identifies: A loss of the sense of the aesthetic unity of the World (and the 
experience of art is not always an experience of the aesthetic unity of the World). We can recall 
again Bateson’s words: “I hold to the presupposition that our loss of the sense of aesthetic unity 
was, quite simply, an epistemological mistake. I believe that that mistake may be more serious 
that all the minor insanities that characterize those older epistemologies which agreed upon the 
fundamental unity” (MN:18). In light of this suggestion, let us recall that Griffiths et al. studied 
4285 cases of mystical experience, with 3476 of those facilitated by holotropic medicines. They 
found that more than two thirds of those who had identified as atheists prior to their experience 
gave up that label afterward. This seems surprising. What is it about an atheistic attitude that it 
cannot handle the rupture facilitated by these medicines? It is as if liberation into a larger 
ecology of mind decenters an essentially ego-centric attitude. That might be hard to sense. 
Maybe we could put it this way: An atheistic attitude cannot participate in a Cosmos that is 
meaningful all the way down, but liberation into a larger ecology of mind puts us in touch with 
meaningfulness all the way down, and this dispels whatever it is that maintains the atheistic 
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stance. Atheism is just a variety of keeping intimacy at bay, and even the theist can get caught up 
in it. Such a theist is nearly what the atheist thinks of them: Someone who wants to believe. But 
a theist who allows the self-liberation, the forgetting of self that at least momentarily dispels the 
illusion of ego, no longer needs “belief,” for they have verified something. I find these 
suggestions strange, for I do not consider myself a theist per se, and I used to think of myself as 
an atheist. Now, however, after years of practicing philosophy, and with no dependence upon 
holotropic medicines, I can comfortably say that atheism seems a more limited and limiting view 
than any healthy theism, and once we let sacredness in or acknowledge it (in whatever form), 
things unthinkable from a typical atheistic perspective suddenly become possible. It is as if 
atheism tries to keep a tight rein on reality, but the Windhorse of the Soul will never be 
bridled.181  
 
Let us set these suggestions aside for a moment and consider some of the overall results 
uncovered by Griffiths et al., which seem rather astonishing. The vast majority of people 
received these consummatory experiences as among the most meaningful and significant of their 
                                                 
181 We could perhaps distinguish between a non-theistic religious impulse and a more theistic 
one. The former remains religious or spiritual, but does not, let us say, imagine “actual” 
“deities”. But Buddhist philosophy, perhaps from the beginning, accepted the existence of 
deities. One might consider it non-theistic in the sense that it does not see deities as in control of 
the Cosmos, or as the highest realization of awareness. The sage actually ranks above the deity, 
so to speak, and the deities go to the sages to receive teachings. It is difficult to know how to 
think about deities who appear in other Cultures, since we in the west have been so influenced by 
the dominant views of the most dominant religions here. At the other end of the spectrum, one 
can perhaps imagine a sort of highly spiritual atheism that does endorse or encourage the 
experience of genuine sacredness. But then it is not clear how it still maintains the impossibility 
of anything theistic, for the sacredness of the Cosmos might be what the theist means by “God”. 
After all, I read somewhere about a Buddhist monk who, when asked by a Christian monk why 
he did not believe in God, explained to the Christian monk the basic teaching of sunyata, or 
openness. The Christian monk replied, “How do you know that is not what I mean by ‘God’?” 
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lives. Among “spontaneous” experiencers, 74% rated it among the top five most significant 
experiences of their lives, and 28% rated it as number one—the most important experience of 
their lives. Among the medicinally facilitated group, 78% ranked the experience in the top five 
of a lifetime, and 27% thought it was the single most significant experience. These experiences 
frequently involved communication with an intelligence—a benevolent, knowing, and sacred 
presence—and this yielded, in the case of psychedelic-facilitated experiences, psychological 
insights that 67% of people found among the top five most significant of their lives, and 27% 
found the single most significant. How remarkable, from a philosophical standpoint: A medicine 
with a high degree of reliability for bringing us to one of the most important experiences of 
“Know thyself” of our lives.  
 
We might dare go so far as to tease that perhaps 1 in 4 philosophers are missing out on the most 
significant experience of their lives, and perhaps 3 in 4 are missing out on one of the most 
significant experiences—one that might grant them valuable insight into Self and World. Of 
course we have caveats: Perhaps philosophers are a special crowd (perhaps all their best insights 
come from reading texts, and maybe few philosophers would find holotropic medicines helpful 
in bringing insight, healing, wholeness, a sense of aesthetic unity, etc.), and perhaps those who 
are open to taking such medicines are somehow foolish, likely to accept rather silly things as 
matters of great insight, but all of that seems like intellectual hopefulness, and it goes against too 
much evidence and reasonableness. Even if 1 in 10 philosophers might be missing out on one of 
the most significant experiences of “Know thyself” of their lives, the matter becomes worthy of 
serious contemplation. It’s essential to note that such experiences and insights need not come 
from holotropic medicines, but the dictum to “Know Thyself” does lead one to wonder about the 
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ethical obligation of taking up some form of practice that might invite such consummatory 
experiences by means of entrance into a Bardo, the crossing of the threshold of the gateless gate.  
 
This “Know thyself” happens by means of the rupture Hadot mentions and involves the 
ineffability Socrates tells us about in Republic: 73% of the participants said the experience 
transcended space and time (what we have called the rupture of space and time, a rupture of the 
habitual, a rupture of conquest consciousness, a taste of the atopos), and 85% called the 
experience ineffable. Furthermore, 69% claimed that what they encountered existed, as least in 
part, in some “other dimension” or “other reality,” as if they had to leave they cave of delusion, 
as if they had to enter a Bardo to experience it. And 76% of the psychedelic-assisted 
experiencers found the experience more real than “everyday normal consciousness.”  
 
If today’s university student enrolls in a philosophy course to know themselves and the nature of 
reality, they might be better off taking an 8-week course in compassion practice and then 
attending an Ayahuasca ceremony. And given that Forstmann and Sagioglou (2017) found, in a 
fairly large-scale general population study (1487 participants), a positive correlation between 
experience with “classic” holotropic medicines (e.g. LSD, psilocybin, mescaline), and both 
nature relatedness and ethical ecological behavior (e.g. conserving resources, recycling), we 
might suspect the World would be better off as well. We might, in light of our suggestions about 
nonlocal epistemology, suggest that the World would recommend it, that the ducks, geese, lakes, 
rivers, fishes would recommend that we try to know better by taking up some sort of practice 
(with or without the integration of holotropic medicines) that might begin to liberate us out of 
ego-centric ways of knowing.  
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Lyons and Carhart-Harris (2018) gave psilocybin to patients with treatment resistant depression. 
Prior to treatment, these patients tested higher than the control group in authoritarian views. 
After treatment, nature relatedness increased and authoritarian viewpoint decreased. One might 
contemplate that with care, given the suggestions that we are experiencing some level of mass 
melancholia and mourning, and that authoritarian threats seem on the rise, perhaps because our 
egos are desperate for simple solutions.   
 
As for Forstmann and Sagioglou (2017), the authors report that, 
Using structural equation modeling we found that experience with classic 
psychedelics uniquely predicted self-reported engagement in pro-environmental 
behaviors, and that this relationship was statistically explained by people’s degree 
of self-identification with nature. Our model controlled for experiences with other 
classes of psychoactive substances (cannabis, dissociatives, empathogens, popular 
legal drugs) as well as common personality traits that usually predict drug 
consumption and/or nature relatedness (openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, conservatism). Although correlational in nature, results suggest 
that lifetime experience with psychedelics in particular may indeed contribute to 
people’s pro-environmental behavior by changing their self-construal in terms of 
an incorporation of the natural world, regardless of core personality traits or 
general propensity to consume mind-altering substances. Thereby, the present 
research adds to the contemporary literature on the beneficial effects of 
psychedelic substance use on mental wellbeing, hinting at a novel area for future 
research investigating their potentially positive effects on a societal level. (957) 
 
Again we see the central role of “forgetting the self,” which means forgetting that part of us we 
identify with, the part we call “consciousness” but should call “ego”. As Bateson argues, 
“consciousness is, almost of necessity, blinded to the systemic nature of the man himself. 
Purposive consciousness pulls out, from the total mind, sequences which do not have the loop 
structure which is characteristic of the whole systemic structure. If you follow the ‘common-
sense’ dictates of consciousness you become, effectively, greedy and unwise” (Steps, 442). He is 
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talking about this “less real” ordinary, everyday consciousness. Philosophy means liberation into 
the larger loops, the fuller ecologies, the more real dimensions of Mind. The Arts of Awareness 
are the means by which we make that liberation real, practice and bring it to fruition, and thus 
accomplish true understanding. Prior to this, we cannot be said to know, but only to believe, 
perhaps on the basis of decent lines of reasoning, common sense, and scientific evidence. 
 
That art, the range of fine arts, offers no better access to wisdom than any other art of 
awareness—at least on its own—seems obvious, otherwise we would be putting artists in brain 
scanners because we wanted to understand how they got so wise and compassionate, how they 
developed peace and true joy, how they arrived at healing insights that changed their whole lives 
for the better. Such points merit repetition and extension, because one sees so much spiritual 
materialism around the arts, and so many attempts by young artists to satisfy themselves with an 
artistic life ungrounded in a broader and deeper spiritual life. We may examine artists because 
we want to understand artistic creativity, but creativity is not limited to the arts, and we cannot 
simply paint our way to wisdom. It takes context, and the art of Hakuin, Rumi, Ikkyu, Milarepa, 
Rengetsu, and Hildegard differs in deeply significant ways from the art produced by artists 
lacking the kind of way of life they engaged. We should see holotropic medicines the same way. 
These medicines seem to consistently bring insights and healing, and they seem to work in a 
manner that allows for an integrated experience of wisdom, love, and beauty, but they too 
demand context, and there is a tremendous amount of spiritual materialism with them. Still, they 
carry a significance that almost demands the attention of a greater number of philosophers and 
academics—indeed, a greater level of care and attention in the whole culture, as part of the 
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process of healing conquest consciousness and its karmic wounds. I would propose Ayahuasca 
circles and other medicine circles that include a mix of academics and non-academics. 
 
Because it is a complex topic, we can consider here only a little of the technical side of how 
these medicines might work, from a “scientific” perspective, such that we can perhaps 
understand how arts of awareness in general might work—for, though there will be differences 
of course, there may be shared features, and these may be key or core dimensions of the relevant 
experiences. A few caveats are in order though. First, our overall inquiry critiques “science”. 
What we in the dominant culture call science arises altogether with the degradation of Nature. It 
comes out of conquest consciousness. It goes altogether with the marginalization of philosophy 
as a way of life. Moreover, science as we know it includes findings that the mainstream currents 
of that science reject, or seem hostile to or uncomfortable with—either way, they are not easily 
explained. All of these things go together to make for a feeling that paradigm change seems in 
order. That paradigm shift may include some of the tools of complexity theory. Any shift will 
have to explain the results of complexity research, but we cannot be sure whether or not even this 
newer, non-linear mathematics will become foundational to a new science. All that we can be 
sure of is that this new science—if it will be rigorous, sustainable, and philosophically 
coherent—will have to be in service to the conditions of life, and that may mean a difference we 
cannot yet imagine in practice, especially if the world becomes catastrophically degraded, or if 
we simply wise up and decide that the degradation of the world that happens in the name of 
science must stop. In either case (the World’s choice in one way or another), we may see a very 
different kind of science emerge. 
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Complexity theory offers us ways of understanding why we get caught up in stupidity, and what 
wisdom in Bateson’s sense might mean. If we think of wisdom as self-liberation into larger loops 
or ecologies of mind, how does that happen, and what usually prevents it? A general answer 
based on a variety of neuroscientific research might be this: Wisdom, love, and beauty depend on 
decentering the ego and walking a razor’s edge between chaos and order, something like the 
razor’s edge that combines a beginner’s mind and an experienced mind, wildness and gentleness, 
Nature-Culture; usually our ego imposes an order on experience and on the World (an agenda), 
and this habitual use of ourselves and the World tends to involve a self-organizing stability, a 
resistance to perturbation, but it results in access to a relatively narrow repertoire of states, 
insights, activities, perceptions, and it seems to involve fragmentation and duality; certain 
practices can facilitate a letting go of the ego-centric default mode of the heart-mind-body-world 
complex (including the brain, of course, which is so often the focus of research), and this goes 
together with increased criticality in the system, which means a capacity to stay open, not 
foreclosing on any states (think of settling habitually into opinions, conclusions, ways of 
thinking), but allowing a fuller available repertoire of states to become possible (a wilding of 
mind, in which an increase, relatively speaking, in chaos or even madness emerges), and 
remaining open as various relative stabilities manifest (as insight, for instance); repeated 
exposure to such states of increased criticality result in long-term development of vertical and 
horizontal integration (in the brain, but also in the heart-mind-body-World-Cosmos). In other 
words, the research does seem to indicate that practices such as meditation or proper work with 
holotropic medicines lets us out of the little box of the ego and into larger ecologies of mind 
which the activity we call ego usually keeps us cut off from. Such ecologies have a wildness, but 
they bring us peace, and their joyful functioning in, through, as us arises as wisdom, love, and 
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beauty. We access them, or let them access us (or let them become us, manifest as us) in just the 
way Dogen and countless other philosophers suggested: By forgetting the self, and allowing 
these ecologies to verify us as we verify them. 
 
A fuller meta-analysis would explore this in more detail than we can offer here. But let us at least 
consider a few small artefacts. Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) report the following summary of their 
work inquiring into “a theory of conscious states” facilitated by complexity theory and the 
holotropic medicine psilocybin: 
Entropy is a dimensionless quantity that is used for measuring uncertainty about 
the state of a system but it can also imply physical qualities, where high entropy is 
synonymous with high disorder. Entropy is applied here in the context of states of 
consciousness and their associated neurodynamics, with a particular focus on the 
psychedelic state. The psychedelic state is considered an exemplar of a primitive 
or primary state of consciousness that preceded the development of modern, adult, 
human, normal waking consciousness. Based on neuroimaging data with 
psilocybin, a classic psychedelic drug, it is argued that the defining feature of 
“primary states” is elevated entropy in certain aspects of brain function, such as 
the repertoire of functional connectivity motifs that form and fragment across 
time. Indeed, since there is a greater repertoire of connectivity motifs in the 
psychedelic state than in normal waking consciousness, this implies that primary 
states may exhibit “criticality,” i.e., the property of being poised at a “critical” 
point in a transition zone between order and disorder where certain phenomena 
such as power-law scaling appear. Moreover, if primary states are critical, then 
this suggests that entropy is suppressed in normal waking consciousness, meaning 
that the brain operates just below criticality. It is argued that this entropy 
suppression furnishes normal waking consciousness with a constrained quality 
and associated metacognitive functions, including reality-testing and self-
awareness. It is also proposed that entry into primary states depends on a collapse 
of the normally highly organized activity within the default-mode network 
(DMN) and a decoupling between the DMN and the medial temporal lobes 
(which are normally significantly coupled). (1) 
 
The characterization of “primitivity” does not really help. We now have research indicating that 
so-called higher-order functions of mind depend on so-called primitive brain structures. We will 
likely see more research of this kind. But, as one example, Marek et al. 2018 found that the 
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cerebellum, a “primitive” brain structure, is involved in an intimate relationship with higher 
thought. Conventionally, the cerebellum has to do with the basic task of movement, and damage 
to the cerebellum results in movement that lacks smoothness. But the researchers found that only 
about 20% of the cerebellum deals with movement in the literal sense, while 80% of its activity 
relates to the movement of thought. Here we find a kind of proprioception of thinking, for the 
cerebellum has both a 2-fold overrepresentation of higher-order networks (the language of 
representation is limiting), but it demonstrates a consistent temporal appearance—it’s one of the 
final stops of a wave or dance of thinking, one that may evaluate the thinking for smoothness: 
Does this thinking seem to move skillfully? Here we find even more sense in Nietzsche’s 
suggestion in Twilight of the Idols that, “thinking wants to be learned like dancing, as a kind of 
dancing” (“What the Germans Lack,” 7). And, in light of the relation of skillfully danced 
thinking and criticality, as discussed by Carhart-Harris et al., we may come to make more sense 
of Zarathustra’s statement, “Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now a 
god dances through me,” (I.5), as well as his statement, “I say unto you: one must still have 
chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in 
yourselves” (I.7, translations by Kaufmann). We are lived by powers we pretend to understand; 
we can choose whether the powers that live us lurch or dance, whether they move with  profanity 
or sacredness, whether they make the world dimmer or bring luminosity, presencing the 
luminous-and-knowing?182 We can be lived by a kind of divine madness, a sacred sanity that 
dances on the razor’s edge of chaos. 
                                                 
182 We might recall Dewey here: “a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is offered 
us: Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences 
and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our 
dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary 
experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in “reality” even 
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These findings resonate with Pauli’s understanding of the Synchronicity phenomenon. As Gieser 
explains, Pauli thought that Synchronicity, or “the Σ phenomena” (again, Σ is used as 
abbreviation for synchronicity), 
often arises in conjunction with a transition from an unstable state of 
consciousness into a new stable state, when consciousness has expanded and an 
equilibrium with the unconscious has been established. During the unstable state, 
i.e. during the transition, it seems as if the new insight has to be reinforced by the 
appearance of physical marginal phenomena. When the new conscious position is 
attained and has stabilized, the marginal phenomena disappear. Pauli took this 
from his personal experience. He emphasized that with him the synchronistic 
phenomena always occurred in connection with certain states of consciousness 
and in relation to certain stages in life, especially when the ‘opposites keep in 
balance as much as possible’. On one occasion he even states that the 
synchronistic phenomena disappear when consciousness cannot ‘keep pace’ with 
the ‘required’ development of consciousness. It seems like an effect from a 
‘higher’ plane: something that demands widening of consciousness. This 
‘something higher’ corresponds to Jung’s concept of the Self, which is the self-
organizing principle of the psyche. There is therefore a direct relationship 
between the state of consciousness of the subject and the Σ phenomena. (284) 
 
The chaos of a dancing star is not mere chaos, but comes altogether with a union of opposites. It 
is a dance of criticality, a dance of openness, a dance of liminality in which we touch something 
that transcends the ego. 
 
In an unwise culture, we practice a habitual mind that suppresses the relative chaos in us that 
could arise altogether as a dancing star, as the sacred-creative-cosmic-patterning that is the 
                                                 
the significance they had previously seemed to have?” (LW1: 18) We might add: The union of 
past and future with the present manifest in every awareness of meanings is a mystery only when 
consciousness is gratuitously divided from nature, and when nature is denied temporal and 
historic quality. When consciousness is  
connected with nature, the mystery becomes a luminous revelation of the operative 
interpenetration in nature of  
the efficient and the fulfilling” (LW1: 265).  
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nonduality of what we ordinarily refer to as “chaos” and “order”. But we have access to it. It’s 
still there. We can enter the Bardo of star dancing, participate in the dance of life by means of the 
Arts of Awareness, including meditation and holotropic medicines. When we take these 
medicines, we increase criticality altogether with increasing global connectivity—i.e. a rupture 
of barriers between ecologies of mind. Tagliazucchi et al. (2014) found that, “The psilocybin 
state is also characterized by a larger repertoire of states: i.e. novel motifs that are exclusive to 
the psychedelic state . . . These motifs are among the most interconnected states possible” 
(5450). In language that evokes the sense of the Liminal, the Bardo, the authors note that, 
A key feature of spontaneous brain activity is its dynamical nature. In analogy to 
other self‐organized systems in nature, the brain has been described as a system 
residing in (or at least near to) a critical point or transition zone between states of 
order and disorder [Chialvo, 2010; Haimovici et al., 2013; Tagliazucchi and 
Chialvo, 2011; Tagliazucchi et al., 2012a]. In this critical zone, it is hypothesized 
that the brain can explore a maximal repertoire of its possible dynamical states, a 
feature which could confer obvious evolutionary advantages in terms of cognitive 
and behavioral flexibility. It has even been proposed that this cognitive flexibility 
and range may be a key property of adult human consciousness itself [Tononi, 
2012]. An interesting research question therefore is whether changes in 
spontaneous brain activity produced by psilocybin are consistent with a 
displacement from this critical point—perhaps towards a more entropic or super‐
critical state (i.e. one closer to the extreme of disorder than normal waking 
consciousness) [Carhart‐Harris et al., 2014]. (5444) 
 
Our ordinary thinking, our habitual mindlessness, keeps us away from the Threshold, keeps us 
out of the Bardo of insight and inspiration that comes with forgetting the self and giving up 
ordinary notions of control and conscious purpose. We obviously enjoy relative insights all the 
time, and our inquiry suggests that these come, in some sense, in spite of ourselves, and that 
perhaps only unthreatening insights can arise in most cases, even when we may find ourselves in 
serious need of just those kinds of insights. The authors conclude as follows: 
It has long been claimed that the psychedelic (translated “mind-revealing” 
[Huxley et al., 1977]) state is an expanded state of consciousness in which latent 
psycho-logical material can emerge into consciousness [Cohen,1967] and novel 
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associations can form. Indeed, this was the original rationale for the use of LSD in 
psychotherapy [Busch and Johnson, 1950]. It has also been claimed that 
psychedelics may be able to assist the creative process, for example, by promoting 
divergent thinking and remote association [Fadiman, 2011]. Thus, the increased 
repertoire of metastable states observed here with psilocybin may be a mechanism 
by which these phenomena occur [see also Carhart-Harris et al., 2014]. It was also 
interesting that under psilocybin, more inter-hemispheric dynamical correlations 
were detected in the hippocampal/ACC network (Fig. 5C). Recent 
electrophysiological work in mice has shown that layer five pyramidal neurons 
(the primary cellular units implicated in the action of psychedelic drugs 
[Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013]) that are sensitive to serotonin 2A receptor 
mediated excitation (the primary pharmacological process implicated in the action 
of psychedelics [Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013]) are disproportionately those 
pyramidal neurons that project interhemispherically [Avesar and Gulledge, 2012]. 
Thus, altered interhemispheric communication may be an important component of 
the mechanism of action of psychedelics. Concerning the low frequency 
fluctuations results, these were consistent with our earlier work with MEG in 
which we observed decreased oscillatory power in neural fields in high-level 
cortical regions in the 1 to 100 Hz frequency range [Muthukumaraswamy et al., 
2013]. In the present analysis, decreased low frequency power in the 0.01 to 
0.1Hz range was found and again, these effects were localized to consistent high-
level cortical regions. Low frequency fluctuations in BOLD are known to 
correlate with neuronal parameters such as fluctuating gamma power and 
infraslow fluctuations in local field potentials [Pan et al., 2013]. The slower beta 
band also shows positive correlations with fMRI fluctuations in key DMN regions 
[Laufs et al., 2003], whereas both alpha and beta apparently inhibit large-scale 
cortical BOLD coherence [Tagliazucchi et al., 2012b]. Thus, it seems that a 
primary action of psilocybin, and likely other psychedelics [Riba et al., 2002], is 
to cause a generalized desynchrony and loss of oscillatory power in higher level 
cortical regions—likely via serotonin 2A receptor mediated excitation of deep-
layer pyramidal neurons in these regions [Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013]. 
However, the high amplitude activity detected in the hippocampi and ACC (Fig. 
1) suggests that this desynchronizing effect does not generalize to these deeper 
structures. The frequency domain result was further examined by a separate 
analysis of the point-process rate and interval distributions (see Fig. 3). The RSNs 
which exhibited the most significant changes correspond to higher brain systems 
such as the DMN, executive control and attention net-works and not primary 
sensory and motor networks. This outcome is consistent with the regional 
distribution of serotonin 2A receptors [Erritzoe et al., 2009], the receptors 
implicated in psilocybin’s psychedelic action [Vollen-weider et al., 1998]. These 
receptors are concentrated in higher level cortical regions (e.g. the highest 
distribution in humans is in the PCC [Carhart-Harris et al., 2013; Errit-zoe et al., 
2009] and are relatively less prevalent in the sensori-motor cortex. That the 
default mode network has consistently been implicated in the action of psilocybin 
is also intriguing given its association with self-reflection [Gusnard et al., 2001] 
and selfhood more generally [Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010]. It is likely to be 
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relevant therefore that one of the most commonly reported features of an intense 
psychedelic experience is a compromised sense of selfhood typically described as 
“ego dissolution” or “ego disintegration” [Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; Klee,1963; 
Savage, 1955]. (5454) 
 
These findings in turn relate to later work by Tagliazucchi et al. (2016), which the authors 
summarize as follows: 
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is a non-selective serotonin-receptor agonist 
that was first synthesized in 1938 and identified as (potently) psychoactive in 
1943. Psychedelics have been used by indigenous cultures for millennia [1]; 
however, because of LSD’s unique potency and the timing of its discovery 
(coinciding with a period of major discovery in psychopharmacology), it is 
generally regarded as the quintessential contemporary psychedelic [2]. LSD has 
profound modulatory effects on consciousness and was used extensively in 
psychological research and psychiatric practice in the 1950s and 1960s [3]. In 
spite of this, however, there have been no modern human imaging studies of its 
acute effects on the brain. Here we studied the effects of LSD on intrinsic 
functional connectivity within the human brain using fMRI. High-level 
association cortices (partially overlapping with the default-mode, salience, and 
frontoparietal attention networks) and the thalamus showed increased global 
connectivity under the drug. The cortical areas showing increased global 
connectivity overlapped significantly with a map of serotonin 2A (5-HT2A) 
receptor densities (the key site of action of psychedelic drugs [4]). LSD also 
increased global integration by inflating the level of communication between 
normally distinct brain networks. The increase in global connectivity observed 
under LSD correlated with subjective reports of “ego dissolution.” The present 
results provide the first evidence that LSD selectively expands global connectivity 
in the brain, compromising the brain’s modular and “rich-club” organization and, 
simultaneously, the perceptual boundaries between the self and the environment. 
 
Carhart-Harris et al. (2016a) found a similar breakdown of the default mode network (DMN), the 
little box of the ego: 
The present data also inform on another fundamental question; namely, 
how do psychedelics alter brain function to (so profoundly) alter consciousness? 
Interestingly, although the effects of LSD on the visual system were pronounced, 
they did not significantly correlate with its more fundamental effects on 
consciousness. Instead, a specific relationship was found between DMN 
disintegration and ego-dissolution, supporting prior findings with psilocybin (17). 
Also consistent with previous psilocybin research (9), a significant relationship 
was found between decreased PCC alpha power and ego-dissolution. Moreover, 
an especially strong relationship was found between PH-RSC decoupling and 
ego-dissolution (see also ref. 10). Thus, in the same way the neurobiology of 
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psychedelic-induced visual hallucinations can inform on the neurobiology of 
visual processing, so the neurobiology of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution 
can inform on the neurobiology of the “self” or “ego” (37), and the present results 
extend our understanding in this regard, implying that the preservation of DMN 
integrity, PH-RSC communication, and regular oscillatory rhythms within the 
PCC may be important for the maintenance of one’s sense of self or ego. 
Linking these results to pathology, an especially strong relationship was 
found between PH-RSC decoupling and the “altered meaning” factor on the ASC. 
Interestingly, altered activity within the PH-RSC circuit under psilocybin has 
previously been found to correlate with the spiritual experience and insightfulness 
dimensions of the 11-factor ASC (10), and altered RSC/PCC activity has been 
found to correlate with ego-dissolution (9), suggesting modulation of this 
particular circuit may be an important feature of especially profound psychedelic 
experiences. The altered meaning factor of the ASC is composed of items such as 
“some unimportant things acquired a special meaning” and “things in my 
surroundings had a new or alien meaning” that are phenomenologically resonant 
with the notion of “aberrant salience” in schizophrenia research (38). Impaired 
reality testing as a corollary of impaired ego functioning may explain an 
association between ego-dissolution and altered meaning. Similarities between 
aspects of psychosis and the psychedelic state have long been debated, and one of 
the most influential hypotheses on the neurobiology of schizophrenia proposes a 
functional disconnect between certain brain structures in the disorder (39). In this 
context, it is intriguing to consider whether the PH-RSC circuit is involved in 
certain psychosis-related experiences (e.g., refs. 40 and 41). More specifically, it 
would be interesting to examine the integrity of the PHRSC 
connection in cases of endogenous psychoses in which phenomena such as altered 
meaning, ego-dissolution, and/or impaired reality-testing are observed. To our 
knowledge, these specific phenomena have never been formally investigated in 
imaging studies involving patients exhibiting endogenous psychoses, but studies 
on early psychosis and the at-risk mental state may be informative in this regard 
(e.g., ref. 40). 
When the present results are considered in relation to previous human 
neuroimaging studies with psychedelics, some general principles emerge. It seems 
increasingly evident that psychedelics reduce the stability and integrity of well-
established brain networks (e.g., ref. 16) and simultaneously reduce the degree of 
separateness or segregation between them (e.g., ref. 42); that is, they induce 
network disintegration and desegregation. Importantly, these effects are consistent 
with the more general principle that cortical brain activity becomes more 
“entropic” under psychedelics (17). Furthermore, with the benefit of the present 
study’s multimodal imaging design, we can extend on these generic insights to 
postulate some more specific physiological properties of the psychedelic state and 
how these relate to some of its key psychological properties; namely, expanded 
V1 RSFC relates to the magnitude of visual hallucinations and decoupling of the 
PH-RSC circuit relates to the level of ego-dissolution, and perhaps also the 
profundity of a psychedelic experience more generally (also see refs. 9 and 10 in 
this regard). (4857)  
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This team, like Tagliazucchi et al. (2014), found that a certain rhythm keeps the ego-centric mind 
in place, and that dispelling that rhythm allows for liberation into larger ecologies of mind and 
meaning, for the habitual meanings inhibit our access to broader and deeper meanings, meanings 
more in attunement with wisdom, love, beauty. In another study, Carhart-Harris et al. (2016b) 
found that this activity does indeed look like madness in a certain sense, giving a quasi-scientific 
“validation” to Plato’s suggestions in Phaedrus: 
LSD produced robust psychological effects; including heightened mood but also 
high scores on the PSI, an index of psychosis-like symptoms. Increased optimism 
and trait openness were observed 2 weeks after LSD (and not placebo) and there 
were no changes in delusional thinking . . . The present findings reinforce the 
view that psychedelics elicit psychosis-like symptoms acutely yet improve 
psychological wellbeing in the mid to long term. It is proposed that acute 
alterations in mood are secondary to a more fundamental modulation in the 
quality of cognition, and that increased cognitive flexibility subsequent to 
serotonin 2A receptor (5-HT2AR) stimulation promotes emotional lability during 
intoxication and leaves a residue of ‘loosened cognition’ in the mid to long term 
that is conducive to improved psychological wellbeing. (1) 
 
Thus a healthy experience of madness—not insanity, but a sacred madness—can loosen the 
bondage of thought. The authors found a basic openness and positivity that came as 
concessionary or consummatory with the holotropic or psychedelic experience: 
The findings that optimism and openness are increased 2 weeks after LSD are 
consistent with previous findings (Griffiths et al. 2006, 2008; MacLean et al. 
2011), suggesting that improved psychological wellbeing and increased openness 
are relatively reliable mid- to long-term effects of psychedelics. That there were 
no increases in psychotic symptomatology at the 2 week end point is also 
consistent with reports of preserved or even improved mental health among 
populations of people that have used psychedelic drugs (Bouso et al. 2012; Krebs 
& Johansen, 2013; Hendricks et al. 2015). These results are also consistent with 
previous findings that psychedelics can be useful in treating certain psychiatric 
disorders (Moreno et al. 2006; Grob et al. 2011; Gasser et al. 2014; Johnson et al. 
2014; Bogenschutz et al. 2015) as well as the notion that they may have 
therapeutic potential in the treatment of mood disorders such as depression 
(Carhart-Harris et al. 2014b). High dispositional optimism is associated with a 
range of positive health and socio-economic outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 2014); 
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thus, the increases in optimism observed here may be treated as further evidence 
of the therapeutic potential of psychedelic drugs. (7) 
 
In speaking to the press about the findings of Carhart-Harris (2016a), David Nutt, one of the 
study’s co-authors, said, “This is to neuroscience what the Higgs boson was to particle 
physics.”183 He seems to want to convey the relatively long time people have been waiting for 
findings like this to come out, and how much energy and technological investment had to go into 
it, and thus the analogy. But, could there be something especially “profound” in these findings? 
In a sense, though they are preliminary and do not answer all our questions, they are more 
momentous than the Higgs boson, and carry a more radical import, because the findings we have 
discussed support a view that encourages us to sense the vital importance of dispelling the 
enchantment of ego, of rupturing our ego-centrism and self-liberating into larger ecologies of 
mind, characterized by openness and a kind of wildness. These findings support the suggestion 
that a more skillful way of knowing places forgetting the self (but not losing it) at the center of 
its practice. We will increasingly come to sense how this means compassion, nonlocality, and 
nonduality are central to a skillful way of knowing. We see here an intimate link between 
wisdom, love, and beauty. The epistemological depends inextricably on the ethical, and on the 
aesthetic. That basic insight needs much more cultivation, and in the end it becomes a life of 
practice, but our inquiry has at least brought it to our attention in a number of ways, of varying 
cogency depending on each reader’s own history of practice. We can return to some of these 
considerations later. 
 
                                                 
183 https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/apr/11/lsd-impact-brain-revealed-
groundbreaking-images 
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For now, let us note that the evidence for positive effects of holotropic medicines seems quite 
compelling, especially when we include case studies and various records of experience. But, 
since we have it available, we can incorporate the kinds of technical study and analysis we see 
above into our understanding of how these practices could become part of a new epistemology. 
One of the greatest dangers, though, remains the need to cultivate these practices altogether with 
the cultivation of healthy ecologies.  
 
Art, as much as holotropic medicines or any other Art of Awareness, can lure us into all sorts of 
spiritual materialisms that will only perpetuate the pattern of insanity (in various ways, including 
by direct co-opting, as in the case of the use of meditation and psychedelics in tech and other 
industrial contexts), or will at least become highly limited in their potentially therapeutic effects. 
Among other things, we must confront our tendency to seek junk-ease and to avoid the demands 
of spiritual work. We may specifically engage our practice of life in ways that allow us to bypass 
real contact with philosophical/spiritual/religious work and insights that seem to troublesome 
(demanding) and/or threatening.  
 
Consider, for instance, the difference between the art of tragedy on the one hand and the art of a 
full-blown ceremony on the other. We can all acknowledge the power of art. Art can be medicine 
for the soul. But why did Plato criticize the arts? Among other reasons, he did so because they 
can lull us into thinking we know something we don’t, perhaps after a couple hours at the theater 
or a few minutes of reading a poem. Here is Kerényi on the differences between tragedy and the 
Mysteries: 
Aristotle investigated both what happened in the minds of the audience at a 
tragedy and the experience offered by the annually recurring venture of Eleusis. 
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The spectator at the tragedy had no need to build up a state of concentration by 
ritual preparations; he had no need to fast, to drink the kykeon [what we might call 
the communion drink] and to march in a procession. He did not attain a state of 
epopteia, of “having seen” by his own inner resources. The poet, the chorus, the 
actors created a vision, the theama [the spectacle or mise en scene], for him at the 
place designed for it, the teatron [theater]. Without effort on his part, the spectator 
was transported into what he saw. What he saw and heard was made easy for him 
and became irresistibly his. He came to believe in it, but this belief was very 
different from that aroused by the epopteia [the vision inspired by the Mysteries]. 
He [the spectator at the theater] entered into other people’s sufferings, forgot 
himself [we should better say, forgot themselves] and—as Aristotle stressed— 
was purified. In in the Mysteries, a purification—katharmos—had to take effect 
long before the epopteia. (113) 
 
Aristotle seems to have thought the audience at a theater can achieve a kind of purification, a 
catharsis by means of pity and terror. Now, these are not the proper emotions of philosophy, and 
we see here how off-the-mark Aristotle gets us from the outset. The proper emotions of 
LoveWisdom here would be Compassion and Wonder, especially if we understand by these the 
definitions Joyce gave for “pity” and “terror” in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: 
Aristotle has not defined pity and terror. I have. I say . . . —  
Lynch halted and said bluntly: 
— Stop! I won’t listen! I am sick. I was out last night on a yellow drunk with 
Horan and Goggins.   
Stephen went on: 
— Pity is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is 
grave and constant in human sufferings and unites it with the human sufferer. 
Terror is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is grave 
and constant in human sufferings and unites it with the secret cause. 
 
Cocky little Joyce, eh? He goes beyond Aristotle. But his definitions are not so bad. And they get 
at this limitation in Aristotle’s notions. We would do better to say something vaguely along the 
lines of this: Compassion is the activity of the sacred powers and inconceivable causes of the 
World, activity which, if we practice-and-realize it, arrests the habitual mind in the presence of 
whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and presences the mystery of not-two-not-
one in relation with the one who sufferers (not “united” but not “fragmented” or at a distance—a 
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not-two-not-one); Wonder is the feeling of Bliss and the ongoing not-knowing (openness) of 
Wisdom which arises when the habitual mind is dropped away in the presence of the luminous-
and-knowing constant in all experience, that in, through, as which the sacred powers and 
inconceivable causes take action in, through, as Self and World. 
 
But let us go back to Aristotle. Isn’t it easier to go to the theater than it is to practice philosophy? 
An Ayahuasca ceremony, for instance, might involve several weeks of rather dedicated spiritual 
practice, with changes in diet, possible fasting, an increased awareness of heart-mind-body-
world-cosmos, increased attention to activity and experience, then a potentially multi-day 
experience of the ceremony “itself,” involving spiritual work fully engaged “with the medicine” 
for perhaps 6 or more hours each day, and then days and weeks of integration and further 
contemplation carried back into the daily practice of one’s life. All of this seems more 
demanding that just going to see a play, and even if we incorporated philosophy as a way of life 
into the process of preparing for and then viewing a play at the theater, the overt happening of 
the play compared to the initiatory ordeal of the ceremony could still leave many a theater 
experience feeling lacking. And things seem much worse when we compare theater today with 
theater of millennia past. In Ancient Greece, for instance, one might loosely say everyone went 
to see the latest play by Sophocles, and one perhaps knew a large number of people with whom 
one experienced the tragedy, and one could process the art and what it brought up with a 
relatively extensive community of people who had shared the experience of seeing the play. In 
one way or another, it might have felt far more intimate than the theater experiences of today. 
Not being numbed by an overload of stimulation, one could go to the theater fresh in mind, and 
highly sensitive to what might appear, quite open and able to feel, with time to contemplate for 
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days afterward since another “blockbuster” was not already being released. Today, we may have 
no idea who most of the people are in the theater, and, more than likely, we don’t bother going to 
the theater anyway. Instead, we binge-watch at home after a long or full day of busyness, having 
suffered a barrage of stimuli that would likely throw our ancient ancestors into shock if they 
suddenly had to face them. We can barely think straight, and what we want from entertainment is 
in part relative quiet. By binge-watching we get all the medication we can from it, and even less 
experience of possible opening to wisdom. The fact that most of the media of our time is 
produced in such a degraded context, including degraded philosophical education at all levels, 
only makes things worse. 
 
Plato saw the contrast developing between art and rigorous spirituality as problematic. Going to 
the Academy and going to the theater were certainly different. We can imagine the Academy as 
far more demanding than the theater. But a poet could nevertheless write things that might 
enthrall the public, without teaching them how to work with the experiences that unfolded, to 
teaching them to what degree the art was potentially misleading.  
 
Art, like anything, must be handled as we would handle a poisonous snake. Plato perhaps felt 
that a philosopher bears the responsibility to teach people how to handle poisonous snakes. If we 
don’t know how to work with our compassion, we will experience empathic distress and begin to 
turn away—and we will soon turn away pre-emptively, as we now do with respect to the collapse 
of the conditions of life. A tragic play does not teach us how to work with compassion or what 
compassion even is. It may evoke empathy in us, but that actually becomes unhelpful in more 
cases than we might imagine. Empathy is our basic capacity for resonance, upon which the 
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theater relies. If someone yawns, others around them may yawn, without any practice-realization 
of wisdom. Compassion, on the other hand, is like skillful and realistic resonance—the 
realization of Wisdom. We could loosely think of it as the difference between the basic capacity 
to move our body that infants display versus the capacity for movement cultivated by an 
experienced dancer. Few people realize the difference between empathy and compassion, and 
few realize that compassion requires training. Certainly the dominant culture never teaches that 
we should cultivate compassion before attending the theater (instead, because of the 
revolutionary power and import of compassion, we give trigger warnings, and people self-select 
out of experiences that threaten their ego and worldview, as well as allowing the ego and the 
culture to co-opt anything too revolutionary). The dominant culture has no mainstream tools for 
the cultivation of compassion, and so any advice about doing so is largely platitudinous. The 
Buddhist philosophical traditions, on the other hand, have worked with this training for over two 
millennia, and now even contemporary science has verified the findings. But the most important 
verification arises in our own experience of the practice-realization of compassion.184 
 
We engaged in these reflections to both agree and disagree with Bateson’s suggestions about 
holotropic medicine based on his limited experience with one of them, while simultaneously 
clarifying what it would mean to think, speak, and act more wisely by the standards of wisdom 
Bateson himself endorses. In looking for ways we might practice and realize more wisdom, 
Bateson does well to recommend the Royal Road of Dreams—seeing that healing begins 
                                                 
184 Thupten Jinpa’s Fearless Heart is a good place to begin learning about compassion practice. A 
variety of work has been done on compassion and similar forms of mind training. The reader is 
advised to consult research by Tania Singer, Richard Davidson, Kristen Neff, Joan Halifax, 
Zoran Josipovic, Barbara Fredrickson, and others. The reader will find an appendix on 
compassion training in the present text. 
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“within,” while we must keep an eye on the larger ecologies as well. In other words, the “within” 
is the “without,” and we touch the World “right here,” in the Heart.  
 
We can see Bateson as cautioning that everything of Dream, from the “ordinary” dreams of an 
“ordinary” night to the potentially more powerful dreams of the enriched context of, say, an 
Ayahuasca ceremony, remains in “pieces”: 
My own slight experience of LSD led me to believe that Prospero was 
wrong when he said, “We are such stuff as dreams are made on.” It seemed to me 
that pure dream was, like pure purpose, rather trivial. It was not the stuff of which 
we are made, but only bits and pieces of that stuff. Our conscious purposes, 
similarly, are only bits and pieces. 
The systemic view is something else again. (Steps 446)   
 
Somehow we have to get in touch with the wholeness of our activity. But dreams can in fact put 
us in touch with it. We err in treating our “ordinary” dreams as merely ordinary, just as we err in 
making too much of holotropic medicines, trying to turn them into junk-ease or some other 
variety of spiritual materialism. This too is a matter of context, shifting the context of thinking-
dreaming-being into something more holistic. Contrary to Bateson’s suggestion, with proper 
practice (or by shear luck), holotropic medicines can indeed provide an experience of system, of 
relationship, of interwovenness. Indeed, both these medicines and our dream work can become 
integrated into a proper science and a spiritual way of life. 
 
Interestingly, Wolfgang Pauli had many dreams that shaped his waking life and inspired both his 
scientific inquiry and his spiritual growth. All of us have had dreams we may remember years 
and years afterward. Some dreams become touchstones for our lives. But every single night’s 
dreaming could serve as a guide for every single day’s activity—if we could begin to work with 
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them, which itself may entail mutiny against Captain Clock. We can sense the catch-22 here, and 
the pattern of insanity holds us fast.  
Pauli relates in a letter to Jung that a dream at the end of October 1946 had such a 
strong effect on him that he had to turn to Kepler again. Here we again find the 
central motifs of rotation and cosmic rays. In the first dream of October 25, he 
receives a casket through the post. Inside there is an apparatus for the 
experimental investigation of cosmic rays. Next to it stands a tall, blond man of 
between 30 and 40. He says that Pauli must force the water up higher than the 
houses in the city so that the city dwellers will believe him. Behind the apparatus 
in the box he then sees a bunch of keys, eight in all, arranged in a circle with the 
key bits pointing downwards. As a comment on the dream he remarks that he has 
had earlier dreams where a dark, male figure – called the ‘Persian’ – occurs who 
is not accepted as a student at the ETH. Pauli interprets him as a contrast to the 
prevailing scientific collective attitude .He thinks that ‘the blond’ and ‘the 
Persian’ may be two aspects of one and the same figure, like the Mercurius 
duplex of the alchemists. They both have an extremely ‘psychopompos’ character, 
i.e. that of a spiritual guide. He calls this figure ‘the stranger’.  
The next dream, of October 28, reads: 
 
The ‘Blond’ is standing next to me. In an ancient book I am 
reading about the Inquisition trials of the disciples of the teachings 
of Copernicus (Galileo, Giordano Bruno) as well as about Kepler’s 
image of the Trinity. Then the Blond says: ‘The men whose wives 
have objectified rotation are being tried.’ These words upset me 
greatly: The Blond disappears and to my consternation the book 
also becomes a dream image: I find myself in a courtroom with the 
other accused men. I want to send my wife a message and I write a 
note: ‘Come at once, I am on trial.’ It is getting dark, and for a long 
time I cannot find anyone to give the note to. But finally a Negro 
comes along and says in a friendly way that he will deliver the note 
to my wife. Soon after the Negro has left with the note, my wife 
turns up in fact and says to me: ‘You forgot to say good night to 
me.’ Now it starts to get lighter, and the situation is as it was at the 
beginning (except that my wife is now present, too): The ‘Blond’ is 
standing next to me once more, and I am reading the ancient book 
again. Then the Blond says to me sadly (apparently referring to the 
book): ‘The judges do not know what rotation or revolution is, and 
that is why they cannot understand the men.’ With the insistent 
voice of a teacher, he goes on to say: ‘But you know what rotation 
is!’ ‘Of course’ is my immediate reply, ‘The revolution and the 
circulation of light – all that is part of the basic rudiments.’ (This 
seemed to be a reference to psychology, but the word is never 
mentioned.) Where upon the Blond says: ‘Now you understand the 
men whose wives have objectified their rotation for them.’ Then I 
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kiss my wife and say to her: ‘Good night! It is terrible what these 
poor people who have been charged are going through!’ I grow 
very sad and start crying. But the Blond says with a smile: ‘Now 
you’ve got the first key in your hand.’ At this point I woke up and 
was quite shaken. The dream was an experience of a numinous 
character and has deeply influenced my conscious attitude. 
 
Pauli connects this dream with the anima problem, not only his own but the one in 
sciences in general. In the seventeenth century something decisive happens in the 
transition from the hermetic to the classical, mechanical worldview. It concerns 
the exclusion of the feminine and the soul from matter. Rotation is a typical 
symbol of the mandala: it is associated with the centring processes that lead to 
wholeness. To understand ‘rotation’ means to understand the function of the soul 
(anima) in science. In the seventeenth century the mandala ceases to belong to the 
inner world, where its function was to integrate the different aspects of existence 
(body, soul, God and Cosmos). Now the mandala with its ‘rotation’ is instead 
projected into outer space in Kepler’s vision of the solar system. The soul has 
begun its exodus from nature, which is doomed to turn into dead matter. The soul 
is cast into the shackles of subjectivity and the scientist becomes unaware of her 
(the soul being seen as feminine) function in the cognitive process. When Pauli 
cries compassionately for the accused he receives the first key. Feeling is the first 
key to the new understanding of nature and science. (180-1) 
 
We include this dream in our inquiry for a variety of reasons. First of all, it touches upon the 
mandala principle, and, as our inquiry comes to a close, it is worth emphasizing that a fuller 
version of it would go into the mandala principle at length. It is one of the most important ways 
or practices for beginning to enter a better way of knowing.  
 
But it also matters a great deal that Pauli here somehow comes to the importance of compassion 
and feeling. We can take note of two things in particular. First of all, this revelation of feeling 
shatters that barrier between science and religion. We have several times noted how Pauli comes 
to such insights, as for instance the basic insight that how we are with matter will either liberate 
or bind our very souls. In a general way, as Gieser summarizes it, 
Pauli was convinced, this time wholly in agreement with the alchemists, that the 
‘knowledge of salvation’ of modern times must presuppose work which leads to 
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knowledge and thus to deliverance. This applies to work with both matter and 
psyche. Work with matter has the aim both of gaining knowledge and of 
improving man’s concrete living conditions. In the same way psychology gives 
man knowledge of himself, which is a precondition of achieving a meaningful 
life. What is important to recognize is that religious search and the scientific quest 
for knowledge have the same incentive. (258) 
 
We only need to keep some clarity about what this “knowledge” is, and what this “improving” of 
conditions is. As Laozi says, 
Do you want to improve the world? 
I don’t think it can be done. The world is sacred. 
It can’t be improved. 
If you tamper with it, you’ll ruin it. 
If you treat it like an object, you’ll lose it. There is a time for being ahead, 
a time for being behind; 
a time for being in motion, 
a time for being at rest; 
a time for being vigorous, 
a time for being exhausted; 
a time for being safe, 
a time for being in danger. The Master sees things as they are, 
without trying to control them. 
She lets them go their own way, 
and resides at the center of the circle. (Ch. 29) 
 
This controlling . . . it seems to arise on the basis of epistemological error. Recall Dewey’s sense 
of an aspect of that error: “Plato may have erred. But at least for well over a millennium of years 
Europe trod the path he marked out. A corrupt and fallen world could be organized and ruled 
only by principles drawn from a supernatural realm of Being” (UPMP 43). Don’t we try to 
“organize and rule” this “corrupt and fallen world,” by means of the supernatural principles of 
science? Don’t we use the runes of mathematics and the enchantments of physics and chemistry 
to command and “improve” the world? Aren’t scientists and engineers the clerics of the cult of 
reason and control? If we saw the World as perfect, what would it look like? If the World is 
perfect, why move millions of people to desert areas, diverting rivers, running air conditioners, 
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burning fossil fuels? Similarly, if we are so open-minded, why do the default networks of ego 
control our experience so thoroughly? 
 
It seems to me that Dewey never quite overcame this fundamental problem of control. For 
instance, in his introduction to a book by F.M. Alexander (the “friend” who “remarked” to 
Dewey “that there was one superstition current among even cultivated persons. They suppose 
that if one is told what to do, if the right end is pointed to them, all that is required in order to 
bring about the right act is will or wish on the part of the one who is to act,” and who provided 
the provided the example of standing up straight), Dewey writes, “It is a commonplace that 
scientific technique has for its consequence control of the energies to which it refers.” This is not 
a strange thing to suggest—90 readers out of 100, if they exhibit the signs and symptoms of 
conquest consciousness, will not skip a beat on reading such a sentence, and those who do will 
not likely question it in a way that liberates the mind in the manner our inquiry invites us to 
attempt.  
 
Though we might reject “control” as a measure of epistemic success, there is much else to 
recommend itself in Dewey’s introduction to this book, and I would include Alexander’s work, 
when properly approached, near the top of the list of recommended arts of awareness that might 
help us know in better ways: 
In writing some introductory words to Mr. Alexander’s previous book, 
Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual, I stated that his procedure and 
conclusions meet all the requirements of the strictest scientific method, and that 
he had applied the method in a field in which it had never been used before—that 
of our judgments and beliefs concerning ourselves and our activities. In so doing, 
he has, I said in effect, rounded out the results of the sciences in the physical field, 
accomplishing this end in such a way that they become capable of use for human 
benefit. It is a commonplace that scientific technique has for its consequence 
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control of the energies to which it refers. Physical science has for its fruit an 
astounding degree of new physical energies. Yet we are faced with a situation 
which is serious, perhaps tragically so. There is everywhere increasing doubt as to 
whether this physical mastery of physical energies is going to further human 
welfare, or whether human happiness is going to be wrecked by it. Ultimately 
there is but one sure way of answering this question in the hopeful and 
constructive sense. If there can be developed a technique which will enable 
individuals really to secure the right use of themselves, then the factor upon which 
depends the final use of all other forms of energy will be brought under control. 
Mr. Alexander has evolved this technique.  
In repeating these statements, I do so fully aware of their sweeping nature. 
Were not our eyes and ears so accustomed to irresponsible statements that we 
cease to ask for either meaning or proof, they might well raise a question as to the 
complete intellectual responsibility and competency of the author. In repeating 
them after the lapse of intervening years, I appeal to the account which Mr. 
Alexander has given of the origin of his discovery of the principle of central and 
conscious control. Those who do not identify science with a parade of technical 
vocabulary will find in this account the essentials of scientific method in any field 
of inquiry. They will find a record of long continued, patient, unwearied 
experimentation and observation in which every inference is extended, tested, 
corrected by more further searching experiments; they will find a series of such 
observations in which the mind is carried from observation of comparatively 
coarse, gross, superficial connections of causes and effect to those causal 
conditions which are fundamental and central in the use which we make of 
ourselves. 
Personally, I cannot speak with too much admiration—in the original 
sense of wonder as well as the sense of respect—of the persistence and 
thoroughness with which these extremely difficult observations and experiments 
were carried out. In consequence, Mr. Alexander created what may be truly called 
a physiology of the living organism. His observations and experiments have to do 
with the actual functioning of the body, with the organism in operation, and in 
operation under the ordinary conditions of living—rising, sitting, walking, 
standing, using arms, hands, voice, tools, instruments of all kinds. The contrast 
between sustained and accurate observations of the living and the usual activities 
of man and those made upon dead things under unusual and artificial conditions 
marks the difference between true and pseudo-science. And yet so used have we 
become to associating “science” with the latter sort of thing that its contrast with 
the genuinely scientific character of Mr. Alexander’s observations has been one 
great reason for the failure of many to appreciate his technique and conclusions. 
As might be anticipated, the conclusions of Mr. Alexander’s experimental 
inquiries are in harmony with what physiologists know about the muscular and 
nervous structure. But they give a new significance to that knowledge; indeed, 
they make evident what knowledge itself really is. The anatomist may “know” the 
exact function of each muscle, and conversely know what muscles come into play 
in the execution of any specific act. But if he is himself unable to co-ordinate all 
the muscular structures involved in, say, sitting down or rising from a sitting 
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position in a way which achieves the optimum and efficient performance of that 
act; if, in other words, he misuses himself in what he does, how can he be said to 
know in the full and vital sense of that word? Magnus proved by means of what 
may be called external evidence the existence of the central control in the 
organism. But Mr. Alexander’s technique gave a direct and intimate confirmation 
in personal experience of the fact of central control long before Magnus carried 
on his investigations. And one who has had experience of the technique knows it 
through the series of experiences which he himself has. The genuinely scientific 
character of Mr. Alexander’s teaching and discoveries can be safely rested upon 
this fact alone. 
The vitality of a scientific discovery is revealed and tested in its power to 
project and direct new further operations which not only harmonize with prior 
results but which lead on to new observed materials, suggesting in turn further 
experimentally controlled acts, and so on in a continued series of new 
developments. Speaking as a pupil, it was because of this fact as demonstrated in 
personal experience that I first became convinced of the scientific quality of Mr. 
Alexander’s work. Each lesson is a laboratory experimental demonstration. 
Statements made in advance of consequences to follow and the means by which 
they would be reached were met with implicit skepticism—a fact which is 
practically inevitable, since, as Mr. Alexander points out, one uses the very 
conditions that need re-education as one’s standard for judgment. Each lesson 
carries the process somewhat further and confirms in the most intimate and 
convincing fashion the claims that are made. As one goes on, new areas are 
opened, new possibilities are seen and then realized; one finds himself continually 
growing, and realizes that there is an endless process of growth initiated. 
From one standpoint, I had an unusual opportunity for making an 
intellectual study of the technique and its results. I was, from the practical 
standpoint, an inept, awkward slow pupil. There were no speedy and seemingly 
miraculous changes to evoke gratitude emotionally, while they misled me 
intellectually. I was forced to observe carefully at every step of the process, and to 
interest myself in the theory of the operations. I did this partly from my previous 
interest in psychology and philosophy, and partly as a compensation for my 
practical backwardness. In bringing to bear whatever knowledge I already 
possessed—or thought I did—and whatever powers of discipline in mental 
application I had acquired in the pursuit of these studies, I had the most 
humiliating experience of my life, intellectually speaking. For to find that one is 
unable to execute directions, including inhibitory ones, in doing such a seemingly 
simple act as to sit down, when one is using all the mental capacity which one 
prides himself upon possessing, is not an experience congenial to one’s vanity. 
But it may be conducive to analytic study of causal conditions, obstructive and 
positive. And so I verified in personal experience all that Mr. Alexander says 
about the unity of the physical and psychical in the psycho-physical; about our 
habitually wrong use of ourselves and the part this wrong use plays in generating 
all kinds of unnecessary tensions and wastes of energy, about vitiation of our 
sensory appreciations which form the material of our judgments of ourselves; 
about the unconditional necessity of inhibition of customary acts, and the 
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tremendous difficulty found in not “doing” something as soon as an habitual act is 
suggested, together with the great change in moral and mental attitude that takes 
place as proper coordinations are established. In re-affirming my conviction as to 
the scientific character of Mr. Alexander’s discoveries and technique, I do so then 
not as one who has experienced a “cure” but as one who has brought whatever 
intellectual capacity he has to the study of a problem. In the study, I found the 
things I had “known”—in the sense of theoretical belief—in philosophy and 
psychology, changed into vital experiences which gave a new meaning to 
knowledge of them.  
In the present state of the world, it is evident that the control we have 
gained of physical energies, heat, light, electricity, etc., without having first 
secured control of our use of ourselves is a perilous affair. Without the control of 
our use of ourselves, our use of other things is blind; it may lead to anything. 
Moreover, if our habitual judgments of ourselves are warped because they 
are based on vitiated sense material—as they must be if our habits of managing 
ourselves are already wrong—then the more complex the social conditions under 
which we live, the more disastrous must be the outcome. Every additional 
complication of outward instrumentalities is likely to be a step nearer destruction: 
a fact which the present state of the world tragically exemplifies. 
The school of Pavlov has made current the idea of conditioned reflexes. 
Mr. Alexander’s work extends and corrects the idea. It proves that there are 
certain basic, central organic habits and attitudes which condition every act we 
perform, every use we make of ourselves. Hence a conditioned reflex is not just a 
matter of an arbitrarily established connection, such as that between the sound of 
a bell and the eating-reaction in a dog, but goes back to central conditions within 
the organism itself. This discovery corrects the ordinary conception of the 
conditioned reflex. The latter as usually understood renders an individual a 
passive puppet to be played upon by external manipulations. The discovery of a 
central control which conditions all other reactions brings the conditioning factor 
under conscious direction and enables the individual through his own co-
ordinated activities to take possession of his own potentialities. It converts the fact 
of conditioned reflexes from a principle of external enslavement into a means of 
vital freedom. 
Education is the only sure method which mankind possesses for directing 
its own course. But we have been involved in a vicious circle. Without knowledge 
of what constitutes a truly normal and healthy psychophysical life, our professed 
education is likely to be mis-education. Every serious student of the formation of 
disposition and character which takes place in the family and school knows—
speaking without the slightest exaggeration—how often and how deplorably this 
possibility is realized. The technique of Mr. Alexander gives to the educator a 
standard of psycho-physical health—in which what we call morality is included. 
It supplies also the “means whereby” this standard may be progressively and 
endlessly achieved, becoming a conscious possession of the one educated. It 
provides therefore the conditions for the central direction of all special 
educational processes. It bears the same relationship to education that education 
itself bears to all other human activities. 
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I cannot therefore state too strongly the hopes that are aroused in me by 
the information contained in the Appendix that Mr. Alexander has, with his 
coadjutors, opened a training class, nor my sense of the importance that this work 
secures adequate support. It contains in my judgement the promise and 
potentiality of the new direction that is needed in all education. (from Alexander 
1955: xvii-xxi) 
 
It’s nice to hear about the humiliation of a great philosopher—not because of schadenfreude, but 
because it indicates a movement from the “known” to something much more interesting. Reading 
this passage, one may understand why a philosopher could find it tempting to enroll in such a 
training course, as I did. The training is something like getting a master’s degree: Three years on 
roughly a semester system, with 20 hours per week in class, and as much study and practice 
outside of class as one can manage. Then comes many years of cultivation, for one cannot do this 
sort of work with skill except by means of ceaseless practice.  
 
Having succeeded only modestly, I can at least say that the emphasis on “control” one sees both 
in Dewey and Alexander does make a certain amount of sense. But it seems to also get people 
confused about what they really need to practice and realize in order to function skillfully and 
realistically. The more rational procedures Alexander could successfully capture in language do 
not suffice. In Alexander’s preface to the same book (in a spirit that could serve as a preface to 
our inquiry here), he warns that the reader should not be surprised 
if they find that they are unsuccessful in learning to apply my technique, 
particularly since in attempting to change and improve the use of themselves they 
are called upon to work to a new principle, and, further, that in this process they 
must inevitably come into contact with hitherto unknown experiences, because 
the carrying-out of the necessary procedures calls for a manner of use of the self 
that is new and unfamiliar, and when first experienced “feels wrong.” In any 
attempt therefore to apply my technique to changing and improving the use of the 
self, it is courting failure to continue to depend on the “feeling” which has been 
the familiar guide in the old habitual “doing” which “felt right,” but which was 
obviously wrong since it led us into error. 
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May it not be that some of those who have complained of difficulty in 
trying to teach themselves may have overlooked this point, and to that extent be 
responsible for their own failure? And here I would like to add a word of warning 
to those I am trying to help, for a study of the letters in which the writers tell of 
experiencing difficulty in understanding shows signs of having been written after 
a quick reading rather than a close and careful study of the subject-matter. I read 
recently an article suggesting that people should practise reading quickly, 
although the habit of too-quick reading in which understanding becomes 
dominated by speed—that royal road to the physical and mental derangement of 
mankind—is an only too common failing to-day. This is only one example of the 
habit of too-quick reaction to stimuli in general, and to its prevalence may be 
traced most of the misunderstandings, misconception, and misdirection of effort 
manifested by the great majority of people to-day in conducting matters relating 
to the body politic. 
Again, those who have written asking for help in teaching themselves are 
obviously almost wholly occupied with the idea of learning “to do it right.” In 
reply I would refer them to the first chapter of this book, where I put down as 
exactly as possible what I did and (what was still more important in the end) what 
I did NOT do in teaching myself. If they will look at page seven, they will see that 
at the beginning of my experimentation I found that I must not concern myself 
primarily with “doing,” as I then understood “doing,” but with preventing myself 
from doing—preventing myself, that is, from giving consent to gaining an end by 
means of that habitual “doing” which resulted in my repeating the wrong use of 
myself that I wished to change. My record shows that the farther I progressed in 
my search for a way to free myself from the slavery to habitual reaction in 
“doing” (which I had created for myself by trusting to the guidance of my 
unreliable sense of feeling), the more clearly I was forced to see that my only 
chance of freeing myself was, as a primary step, to refuse to give consent to my 
ordinary doing” in carrying out any procedure. (vii-viii) 
 
Thus one needs to enter some semblance of nondoing, which gives entrance to nonlocalized 
knowing, thinking, speaking, moving. It does not feel like “control,” and we can return to Plato’s 
suggestion, when he wrote of madness and its many “fine achievements,” that, “We must not 
have any fear on this particular point, then, and we must not let anyone disturb us or frighten us 
with the claim that you should prefer a friend who is in control of himself to one who is 
disturbed” (245b). 
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Perhaps ironically, cybernetics, the science Bateson helped develop, was in part about control (as 
its name suggests). How can a missile control itself? How can a machine, computer, or robot 
control itself? How does an organism control itself? Loosely speaking, these are some of the 
questions that inspired the cybernetic revolution. Bateson’s skepticism about conscious purposes 
is effectively skepticism about conscious control—or skepticism about control as we understand 
it. 
 
How does spider do what she does? How does fly do what he does? 
 
Is there a control center? Is there a controller in your skull? Is what we call the “self,” is what we 
refer to as I-me-mine the controller of our life? 
 
We cannot locate a controller. We only find interwovenness. Ultimately we find the 
interwovenness of our soul and the Cosmic soul (people still freak out at the sight of “Cosmic 
soul,” but such people often live as if they can control their lives). At least some people 
influenced by cybernetics began to see that “control” is not strictly speaking a localizable 
process. We live in a nonlocal World, a nonlocal Cosmos, embedded in nonlocal Ecologies 
(ecologies of practice-realization). Such an insight is perhaps the origin of Bateson’s concerns 
about “conscious human purposes”. He saw that we do not “control” our lives, and that (all the 
more so, in some sense) we cannot possibly control “the world,” cannot “improve” the World.  
 
When we try to live in a mode of control, a mindset of control—part of the style of conquest 
consciousness—we create negative side-effects. Under the right circumstances, those negative 
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side-effects become deadly, catastrophic, even at a planetary scale. For Bateson, the nuclear arms 
race stood out as an excellent symptom of this disorder of the Soul (though, it is not hard to find 
countless excellent examples, and Bateson discusses others, such as “ecological” harms created 
by the western way of living). 
 
It is important to understand the scientific basis of this insight that ordinary “control” is a 
delusion. After all, we not only have the original finding from Libet et al. (1985) of a delay of a 
few hundred milliseconds between our experience of conscious choice on the one hand, and a 
prior, unconscious spike in neural potential on the other. Most people have heard of this: A few 
hundred milliseconds before we think we make a decision, “something” apparently already 
decided. However, Soon et al. (2008) used more refined methods to go far beyond milliseconds 
to establish a ten second delay. In other words, Soon et al. could look at what was going on in a 
participant’s brain, and the reliably predict ten seconds before the participant claimed to make a 
conscious choice that they would make a conscious choice. Imagine that. Imagine that I ask you 
to make a choice, to choose for yourself under your own control of when the choosing would 
happen, and at the moment you decide, “Now,” ten seconds have passed since I said to someone 
observing with me in another room, “The choice has been made, and shortly this little ego will 
try and take credit for it. Watch as the little ego says, ‘Now.’” Ten seconds later, ‘you’ say, 
“Now.”185 
 
                                                 
185 To clarify, our fMRI machines cannot operate in real time like this, so the researchers had to 
look at a recording of the brain activity and then predict on the basis of that recording when the 
also recorded choice would come. They could predict it, and if we had equipment that could 
display real-time activity with sufficient resolution, we could make the prediction in real time. 
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But even this sort of work makes the error of looking for the choice “inside” of the “organism,” 
and we lack the sophistication in our technical science to see, perhaps hours or days in advance, 
perhaps weeks or months in advance, how a choice of the larger ecology will emerge apparently 
in relation to a localized part of it, for instance in a “choice” a human person makes in relation to 
other humans—and we would poke fun at anyone who claimed to have access to such larger 
patterns, especially if they, for instance, called that access “astrology,” “tarot card reading,” 
“Yijing reading,” “remote viewing,” or any of a number of other names. Yet this doesn’t mean 
anything more than saying, “Do you see the difference between Libet et al. (1985) and Soon et 
al. (2008)? Well, an even greater leap can be made, and we have access to the larger patterning 
in which choices always participate, because we ourselves participate in them already. We are 
these larger patternings, and they come to awareness in various ways.”  
 
Any “choice” will always be relational, and the larger ecologies will always contextualize and 
constitute that “choice”. Standing far from the Earth and pointing at “where” “my” decision was 
made, we would say, “There.” We thus come to Eliot’s, “I can only say, there we have been: but 
I cannot say where.” Indeed, Eliot invites us into the Moment, into the Bardo: 
At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless; 
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, 
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards, 
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point, 
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance. 
I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where. 
And I cannot say, how long, for that is to place it in time. 
The inner freedom from the practical desire, 
The release from action and suffering, release from the inner 
And the outer compulsion, yet surrounded 
By a grace of sense, a white light still and moving, 
Erhebung without motion, concentration 
Without elimination, both a new world 
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And the old made explicit, understood 
In the completion of its partial ecstasy, 
The resolution of its partial horror. (1968: 15-16) 
 
Here we see the paradoxes of the Bardo, and the paradoxes of doing. We cannot “do,” and so we 
cannot “control”. Here too we can keep in mind how both Nietzsche and Jung challenged our 
ordinary notions of “control”. In the case of Jung, it shows up, for instance, in his insights into 
the powers and factors in the soul that live in, through, and as us, and also his insights into 
Synchronicity and the boundlessness of the soul—the rupture of space and time, and thus Eliot’s 
refusal to place The Dance in space and time, just as the mystic refuses to place Sophia or the 
Divine in space and time, even though they also manifest in, through, as what we call space and 
time. In the case of Nietzsche it shows up, for instance, in his critique of the “sovereign 
individual,” his deep question about whether we can truly embody reality, and his insight that 
western culture, including its politics and morality, would be gravely threatened by what the 
embodiment of reality might entail—and thus western culture is organized to keep us oriented 
away from reality while we nevertheless take our experience as reality.  
 
Again in a more “scientific” mode of speaking, if we study tuna separate from water, we cannot 
explain the swimming of tuna. The “body” of a tuna fish does not explain how it can swim so 
fast, for that body cannot produce enough “force” to swim as fast as tuna fish do in fact swim. 
We need to study fluid dynamics and the interplay (we might say InterPlay, or interrelationship 
and interwovenness) of tuna and water in order to explain the swimming of a tuna fish. The 
water directed the discovery-creation of tuna, and the water directs the swimming of tuna (see 
Barrett 2012). Of course, this is all a process of mutuality. We must see tuna-ocean-grey whale-
kelp-krill-orca-otter  - - - - - - - all in mutuality. 
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This is the irony of trying to control Sophia: We become controlled, controllable, manipulated, 
hooked, possessed by karma, lived by powers of delusion we pretend to understand, rather than 
being lived by powers of liberation. Liberation means an end to controller and controlled, and 
only such a way of life can be called a way of knowing, a way of wisdom, that earns those 
names. Self-liberating into the patterning of things self-liberates us into wisdom, love, and 
beauty. This activity is the activity of love and compassion. The feeling of this activity is beauty, 
wonder, bliss.  
 
Compassion for the accused, the condemned, the damned . . . Can we manage it? Pauli’s dream 
seems to invite us to feel again, to feel for the ignorance of the accused as well as their accusers. 
Feeling is very much an issue here. A thread of suffering runs through our inquiry, suffering 
brought about by how we have known ourselves and our world, how we have known how to do 
science and technology, how we have known how to love and hate, how we have known how to 
live. Wrong living is suffering. Thus, Buddha said to his students,  
Now it is for one who feels that I proclaim: ‘This is suffering,’ and ‘This is the 
origin of suffering,’ and ‘This is the cessation of suffering,’ and ‘This is the way 
leading to the cessation of suffering.’ (Numerical Discourses, Book of Threes, II. 
(Great Chapter), Sutta 61, translation in Bodhi 2012: 269) 
 
A highly regarded Thai philosopher Luangpor Teean wrote a text inspired by these words. In the 
preface he writes, 
This book is not concerned with words, but with the practice at yourself: the fruit 
that is received, you receive it at yourself. This method is therefore the most direct 
and easiest. It is to watch the mind at the moment it thinks, to know the deception 
in the actual moment, and to resolve it there. It isn’t that knowing the thought we 
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evaluate it, because doing so is delusion (anger and greed as well). When we can 
cut here, there is sati-samadhi-panna complete at this moment.186 
 
This sati-samadhi-panna is in one sense Wisdom (panna)-Love-and Beauty (sati-samadhi). More 
literally, panna is wisdom. Samadhi indicates the well-put-togetherness of life, and in particular 
the achievement of a well-put-togetherness in our own experience. Sati indicates re-membering, 
a remembering in, through, as which we embody and presence what we conventionally refer to 
as mindfulness. All of this depends on love, on an ethic of care and compassion, an ethic of 
virtue and skillful thinking.  
 
In our lack of wisdom, love, and beauty, we seek after fruit, as in Bateson’s myth. This style of 
mind, this graspiness, is the essence of conquest consciousness.  
 
In terms of graspiness and grasping, we must recognize that we grasp after concepts for 
satisfaction as much as we grasp after chocolate and even ordinary objects. We can speak of 
“grasped-grasping,” which means that we do not grasp something outside of our own grasping. 
When we reach for the cup, we don’t reach for the cup, and we never get hold of the cup. We 
instead grasp our own grasping. It’s part of the Cosmic Joke. Hilarity ensues—though often in 
the form of suffering that sometimes takes tragic turns. It’s when we can get free of it that we can 
laugh, even at the parts that seem really awful when we are caught in the midst of them. 
 
When we look at an action carefully, we may see the following: We think a lot, and then we 
suddenly find ourselves taking action. William James noticed this. The idea is that action does 
                                                 
186 http://www.mahasati.org/oneWhoFeels.html 
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not happen due to “conscious choice,” but at moments of lapsed consciousness. Why? Because 
we cannot consciously control our mind, body, heart, world. There is no place to stand, no way 
to get leverage. It’s comical to think otherwise, and yet we do. One can try this. Sit in a chair. 
Just sit with a loose intention to stand. Notice how a lapse in awareness usually occurs in the 
process. 
 
We can instead do the following: We can watch with great clarity and natural stability as things 
happen all by themselves. This is the proper function of what we call consciousness. It is only a 
facet of what we can call a primordial awareness which already does just this, as the womb of all 
action. Everything arises in, through, and as this primordial awareness. If we begin to just look at 
our action, we can get in touch with this deeper and broader awareness, cutting through our 
dualistic mind. The dualistic mind cannot “do” things, and this is why choice is experienced as a 
lapse of mind when we look at it carefully. Then, looking at it fluidly, we can allow action to 
arise. 
 
Nietzsche gets at some of the important issues here. He notes, as we often have along with him, 
that will and “justice” get bound up completely in weird culture. Free will means freedom to 
judge and to punish. An obsession with will is the hallmark of a culture that wants its egos on 
steroids. He also notes the importance of our inconceivability: That we cannot say anything 
about ourselves really, because that would be to say something about the whole of life, the whole 
Cosmos, the multiverse. One cannot do such a thing. To see this inconceivable beauty is 
paramount. Of course, where one gets started with this vision will vary. Anything I might write 
is not necessarily the best place to begin practicing for any given reader. This is why there are so 
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many “secret teachings” in Buddhist traditions. Such a way of working with things is most 
honest: In interbeing there is no teaching without a teacher and a student, and any given bucket 
of words is as likely to drown someone as to quench their thirst. 
 
We also need to practice some awareness of the interbeing of what we call willing with other 
things. Freeman’s idea that will crucially involves the limbic system is just about on the nose (ha 
ha—he did work on the olfactory system) with the Buddhist philosopher Hui-neng’s notion that 
“the passions themselves are enlightenment.” Freeman tries to summarize the altogetherness this 
way: 
Our intentional actions continually flow into the world, changing the world and 
the relations of our bodies to it. This dynamic system is the self in each of us, it is 
the agency in charge, not our awareness, which is constantly trying to keep up 
with what we do. (2000: 139). 
 
He seems to still miss a deeper awareness. He means here the ego, not the awareness Jung 
entered in the dying process, the nondualistic awareness.187 Once we transform habitual action 
and intention, transform the heart-mind-body-world-cosmos, letting go of all our doing, then 
immediately the passions themselves function in their profoundest aspect, and nothing can stop 
the flow of love and compassion. It is gnosis as know-how, wisdom as skill, compassion as 
creativity. 
 
                                                 
187 Study of this nondual consciousness is far more recent and exceptionally limited in 
comparison to the study of “consciousness,” which itself is a relatively new area of scientific 
research. The work of Zoran Josepovic is a good place to start, though other researchers are 
definitely in the game, such as Richard Davidson and company, John Dunne, Adam Hanley, and 
others. 
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The nonlinearity of free will is also inconceivable. We think we live in a universe of straight 
lines and right angles, paved over, shingled, covered in plastic. The Cosmos is more interesting 
than that. What we call will emerges in an altogether way. For there to be will in the way we 
narrowly conceive of it, there would have to be a willer, one who could stand outside of things, 
stopping the sun in the sky. These things have been noted in fragmented form by countless 
scientists and philosophers. Nevertheless, there is skillful effort, compassionate intention, 
realistic renunciation. We can say Yes and we can say No, beyond the “picking and choosing” 
grasping of conquest consciousness. It is so important to see why “the Great Way” means giving 
up picking and choosing without giving up life, without collapsing into nihilism or shallow self-
effacement. As Trungpa put it: 
In the ordinary sense, renunciation is often connected with asceticism. You give 
up the sense pleasures of the world and embrace an austere spiritual life in order 
to understand the higher meaning of existence. In the Shambhala [spiritual] 
context, renunciation is quite different. What the [spiritual] warrior renounces is 
anything in his experience that is a barrier between himself and others. Any 
hesitation about opening yourself to others is removed . . . The idea of 
renunciation arises when you begin to feel that basic goodness belongs to you. Of 
course, you cannot make a possession out of basic goodness . . . It is a greater 
vision, much greater than your personal territory or schemes. (2003: 59) 
 
We should return here to Dogen as well:  
 
When you realize [the teaching of the Buddha], you do not think, ‘This is 
realization just as I expected it.’ Even if you think so, realization inevitably differs 
from your expectation. Realization is not like your conception of it. Accordingly, 
realization cannot take place as previously conceived . . .  Reflect on this: What 
you think one way or another before realization is not a help for realization. 
(Tanahashi, 876, with slight modification) 
 
Further on Dogen tells us, “Understand now that there is only a single buddha’s eye, which is 
itself the entire earth . . . . Also, learn that the entire earth is itself the dharma body” (879). And 
then he makes clear an ecological vision, a nonlocal vision, a nonlocal epistemology: 
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To seek to know the self is always the wish of living beings. However, those who 
see the true self are rare. Only buddhas know the true self. People outside the way 
regard what is not the self as the self. On the other hand, what buddhas call the 
self is the entire earth. (879) 
 
The interwovenness of these things is easy to underestimate, as is the strangeness they may invite 
us into from the standpoint of practicing-and-realizing a better way of knowing, a better way of 
living. If we don’t bring to fruition a better way of living, we are left with platitudes. “What the 
buddhas call the self is the entire earth” amounts to another load of junk, and meanwhile that 
Earth continues to degrade as we continue to “regard what is not the self as the self.” 
 
We are talking about an end to grasping, including the grasping after answers to our problems. 
We do need insight. We need Wisdom, Love, and Beauty. We need to rejuvenate our ecologies. 
And we cannot wait until all our grasping is gone, because that might only happen when the 
conditions of life, which allow any grasping at all to exist, shift catastrophically. Nevertheless, if 
we want to find out to what degree truth can endure incorporation, if we want to run the 
experiment as Nietzsche invited, we have to open up to much more than our current forms of 
discourse and ways of life tend to allow. I know how hard this may seem, or how strange, 
because much of it still seems strange and challenging to me.  
 
It seems important to keep emphasizing the need for something revolutionary. We have touched 
on this in many ways. We are getting to the point at which we have little choice but to start 
mobilizing. We have gotten to the point at which we should, if we want to keep a clear 
conscience, make sure our students understand the insanity of our situation, and help them 
understand the divine madness that may help them transform it. We considered George 
Monbiot’s view, and it comes from years of writing about climate issues. It has struck me 
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personally as quite remarkable that we have arrived at a point at which we have no serious, 
vocal, and consistent philosophical calls for revolution—but we do have scientific ones.  
 
We have by now contemplated enough artefacts to sense an image. But I still see a few obstacles 
to sensing that image. Perhaps they all boil down to something like this: I am not sure how to get 
a typical intellectual to genuinely receive the suggestions I think we need to receive. There are 
two aspects of this—we might call it two kinds of anomalous data that indicate our culture is an 
in-the-cave culture, a society of Platonic troglodytes who think themselves highly sophisticated. 
Our delusion has put us into a tragic-catastrophic situation. At times I am not even sure if enough 
of my colleagues in academia realize the apparent gravity of our situation. That gravity prompts 
people like George Monbiot to write the words we considered above—he has made ecological 
issues a central part of his career as a responsible journalist, just as I think any responsible 
philosopher must do the same. The situation has prompted Chris Hedges to write words I have 
never heard in a philosophy course: 
We must sever ourselves from reliance on corporations in order to build 
independent, sustainable communities and alternative forms of power. The less 
we need corporations the freer we will become. This will be true in every aspect 
of our lives, including food production, education, journalism, artistic expression 
and work . . . 
The longer we pretend [a] dystopian world is not imminent, the more 
unprepared and disempowered we will be. The ruling elite’s goal is to keep us 
entertained, frightened and passive while they build draconian structures of 
oppression grounded in this dark reality . . . Even if we cannot alter the larger 
culture, we can at least create self-sustaining enclaves where we can approximate 
freedom. We can keep alive the burning embers of a world based on mutual aid 
rather than mutual exploitation. And this, given what lies in front of us, will be a 
victory.188 
 
                                                 
188 https://www.truthdig.com/articles/the-world-to-come/ 
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In reflecting on the quote above, we may see some rather positive things in what Chris Hedges 
has to say. No matter how on or off track we find his suggestions, we may need to see that we 
need something else, something that will allow us to realize a way out of this mess. Hedges’ 
suggestions, at least in this brief passage, won’t really do that. I think he’s right that we must 
sever our reliance on corporations, and we must also see what we can actually rely on. Where is 
our true refuge? Philosophy has always sought to put us in touch with our true refuge. We need 
this now more than ever. Where are the philosophers who will help?  
 
Writing this book has involved an ongoing witnessing of destruction and degradation. News 
about the state of our ecologies has gotten worse and worse. Hedges has witnessed the same 
unravelling as he has done his best to challenge the structures of power responsible for it, and 
rally the rest of us into much needed revolution. Not long after writing the passage above, he 
wrote this one: 
There is one desperate chance left to thwart the impending ecocide and extinction 
of the human species. We must, in wave after wave, carry out nonviolent acts of 
civil disobedience to shut down the capitals of the major industrial countries, 
crippling commerce and transportation, until the ruling elites are forced to 
publicly state the truth about climate catastrophe, implement radical measures to 
halt carbon emissions by 2025 and empower an independent citizens committee to 
oversee the termination of our 150-year binge on fossil fuels. If we do not do this, 
we will face mass death.189 
 
Even over the past few years, an incredibly thin slice of geological time, the future has become 
grimmer in prospect—which really says something. Already in December of 2012, at a 
conference of the American Geophysical Union, Brad Werner, of the Complex Systems Lab at 
UC San Diego, delivered a paper titled, “Is Earth F**ked?” Such language does not occur often 
                                                 
189 https://www.truthdig.com/articles/extinction-rebellion/ 
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in science—not only the expletive, but also the urgency it conveys. Consider the full title of his 
paper: “Is Earth F**ked? Dynamical Futility of Global Environmental Management and 
Possibilities for Sustainability via Direct Action Activism.”190 In other words, Dr. Werner 
attempted to argue, by means of dynamical systems theory, that the time has come for revolt. We 
could therefore characterized his paper as a scientific argument for political/ecological 
revolution, based on the simple premise that we might like to avoid the situation in which our 
planet is “f**ked,” as well as the evidence of how things stand right now, and how well we seem 
to be doing at resolving the matter within the political, economic, and philosophical frameworks 
currently dominating the discourse around climate collapse. 
 
Lest we imagine this kind of thinking an isolated case, let’s consider a blog post from 2013 by 
Kevin Anderson, professor of energy and climate change and Deputy Director of the UK’s 
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change. In this post, Anderson argues that a price on carbon cannot 
keep us within the 2 degrees centigrade target which some scientists put forth as the (possibly 
dangerous) upper bound for relatively manageable climate shift. He writes the following: 
Our ongoing and collective carbon profligacy has squandered any opportunity for 
the ‘evolutionary change’ afforded by our earlier (and larger) 2°C carbon budget. 
Today, after two decades of bluff and lies, the remaining 2°C budget demands 
revolutionary change to the political and economic hegemony. And if that’s too 
challenging to countenance we should be honest and reject 2°C as either too 
onerous an endeavour, or acknowledge that we lack the courage to try.191 
 
Such apparently science-based arguments (whether we accept them or not) hint at why we might 
want to characterize this as a crisis in philosophy. We might suggest that for at least three 
reasons: Philosophers need to address the situation (and it is a crisis situation), philosophers must 
                                                 
190 Abstract available at http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2012AGUFMEP32B..04W 
191 Available at: http://kevinanderson.info/blog/why-carbon-prices-cant-deliver-the-2c-target/ 
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see the ways in which the discipline has contributed to it (a crisis in the way philosophy has been 
practiced), and philosophers must wake up to the new context, a context that has never existed 
before. The latter issue has appeared in various ways in our inquiry, and it has to do with an 
almost invisible crisis of the context of philosophy. 
 
To say it another way, in speaking of a crisis in philosophy we speak about nothing fancy, 
intellectual, or abstract. We have a crisis in our way of life, a crisis in how-we-do-things. It 
seems hardly radical to suggest that a healthy culture dedicated to nurturing healthy souls would 
look very different from the dominant culture, would do things very differently, would see 
things, would sense the World differently. For instance, we would spend much, much more time 
in Nature, and that Nature would still have a lot of wildness in it. That means, among other 
things, we would see the stars radiant in the dark of night, a night filled with the music of 
nocturnal beings. We would walk in forests and swim in rivers, lakes, oceans. We would think a 
living thinking, thinking with Raven and Wren, with Horse and Whale, with Mountains and 
Rivers. We would live in a context of dream, listening to dreams and treating them not only as a 
personal possession, but relating to them socially, as if your dream has something to offer the 
World, guidance and insight for me and others, and my dream has something to offer you in 
return, in mutuality. We would live in a context of ceremony and celebration, a context of gift 
and gratitude, a context of circle gatherings, a culture of the campfire, a culture of conversation, 
a salon culture in the finest sense. It would be the context of our living bodies and the Body of 
the Earth, the living hearts, minds, bodies, and worlds that constitute our precious ecological 
niche of the Cosmos. It would be the context of rich diversity, which means ecological diversity 
in the broadest sense, and ecological health and resilience in the broadest sense. It would be the 
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context of a nonlocal, nonlinear Cosmos, alive and alove, and brimming with meaningfulness, 
open, holding us all in place, in purpose. As the philosopher Erazim Kohák (1984) notes, this is 
not our context. Rather our context looks degraded, because of its “development”: 
In the global city of our civilization, girded by the high tension of our power lines, 
we have abolished the night. There glare of electric light extends the unforgiving 
day far into a night restless with the eerie glow of neon. We walk on asphalt, not 
on the good earth; we look up at neon, not at the marvel of the starry heavens. 
Seldom do we have a chance to see virgin darkness, unmarred by electric light, 
seldom can we recall the ageless rhythm of nature and of the moral law which our 
bodies and spirits yet echo beneath the heavy laughter of forgetting. The world of 
artifacts and constructs with which we have surrounded ourselves knows neither a 
law nor a rhythm: in its context, even rising and resting come to seem arbitrary. 
We ourselves have constructed that world for our dwelling place, replacing rude 
nature with the artifices of techne, yet increasingly we confess ourselves 
bewildered strangers within it, ‘alienated,’ ‘contingently thrown’ into its 
anonymous machinery, and tempted to abolish the conflict between our 
meaningful humanity and our mechanical life-world by convincing ourselves, 
with Descartes, that we, too, are but machines. (ix-x) 
 
Perhaps because of the age of this book, the passage understates the situation. Almost no one will 
experience night as our ancient ancestors did, or even our ancestors of just a few hundred years 
ago. Gone from our context: the awesome sight of the Milky Way, the planets, the constellations 
and stars glowing as they did when the Mind of our current (perhaps barely hanging on) potential 
gazed up at them, related with them, so many millennia ago. Gone that profound impact, the 
mysterious in-forming and transforming of Cosmic darkness and light. That thinking has been, to 
some degree, abolished—and now damned. 
 
To have abolished night . . . to have poisoned entire ecosystems . . . to have constructed a world 
of bewildered strangers, atomized nihilists, alientated sleepwalkers living in landscapes empty of 
the exuberance of wild bird song and the flying symbolism they carry to us—gift to us—and thus 
missing the meaningfulness that once filled the air (gifting inspiration), filled all things (gifting 
714 
 
the palpability of sacredness), and now a world of “nothing but,” a universe of nothing but 
matter, nothing but consumption and trash . . . What a context! It seems impossible. Our 
ancestors of just a few hundred years ago would have thought it impossible that human beings 
could, for instance, decimate thousands of species, drive our oceans to near collapse of life that 
has sustained us for so many millennia, or cut down or indirectly kill 3 trillion Trees. Thomas 
Huxley famously declared the supply of cod inexhaustible, and yet we have lost perhaps 90 
percent of the cod population, as we simultaneously wreck the coral reefs of the World and keep 
a dizzying record of ocean species going and gone. 
 
Kohák wrote his delightful book while living in a relatively wild and secluded place—an 
admirable attempt to return to Wisdom, Love, and Beauty, to return to Sophia and Her Wildness, 
and to learn from Her, to let Her transform his soul. Though someone like Charles Fisher might 
chide Kohák for living too civilized a life, Kohák could nevertheless still write, “A mile beyond 
the powerline, the night still comes to restore the soul, the deep virgin darkness between the 
embers of the dying fire and the star-scattered vastness of the sky” (30). We could pause a 
moment here, between the Embers and the Stars, in the darkness that no longer exists in our 
artificial world. What is LoveWisdom beyond the power line? How can we arrive at it? Why is it 
important? Is it important? Have we really transcended all our old context, such that we can 
presence wisdom, love, and beauty without a healthy relationship to Nature, to Natural 
ecologies? 
 
Our ego has its own immune system, its own defense mechanisms (in more “scientific” terms, 
the ego is a dynamic system, a self-stabilizing process or event . . . it is no more a “thing” than 
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anything else we label with a noun, but it has the apparent “persistence” in “time” that we 
associate with that which we label with nouns). We don’t really see the ego, and, in a way more 
significant, we do not see the unconscious and we do not see the sacred powers and 
inconceivable causes that live themselves in, through, as us.  
 
One of the things we have been asking in this inquiry goes like this: Is the state of the world 
enough for us to really put aside our preconceived notions (including the ones we repress) with 
enough skill and poise that we could think differently? I am not sure what we are waiting for. It 
seems as though we have this story that “some people” are behaving irrationally, but we have 
entertained suggestions in this inquiry that the problem is not well-put that way, because we all 
participate, because all of this comes from a style of consciousness we share, and that it all 
proceeds quite rationally given premises philosophy has done little to vigorously challenge and 
offer alternatives for. We must mean by “vigorously challenge” an effective activity, for most of 
the world does not read academic philosophy, and most of the world does not think in the dry, 
non-religious, technical manner. Even our notion of validity strikes me as anemic and cut off 
from the fuller activity of thinking we have tried to draw close to in our inquiry. But perhaps we 
can only open to it after facing the anomalous data and its potential implications. 
 
Let’s return to that first level of data again, the ecological. Not long ago, Paul Ehrlich of the 
Department of Biology at Stanford, and John Harte at the Energy and Resources Group at UC 
Berkeley, published a paper called, “Food security requires a new revolution.”  They headline 
the paper as follows:  
A central responsibility of societies should be supplying adequate nourishment to 
all. For roughly a third of the global human population, that goal is not met today. 
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More ominously, that population is projected to increase some 30% by 2050 A 
central responsibility of societies should be supplying adequate nourishment to 
all. For roughly a third of the global human population, that goal is not met today. 
More ominously, that population is projected to increase some 30% by 2050. The 
intertwined natural and social systems, that must meet the challenge of producing 
and equitably distributing much more food without wrecking humanity’s life-
support systems, face a daunting array of challenges and uncertainties. These have 
roots in the agricultural revolution that transformed our species and created 
civilization. Profound and multifaceted changes, revising closely-held cultural 
traditions and penetrating most of civilization will be required, if an 
unprecedented famine is to be avoided. 
 
And they encourage a Revolutionary Spirit: 
 
But events like the civil rights revolution in the United States in the 1950s and 
1960s and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 show that, when the time is ripe, 
sudden change is possible even when seemingly very unlikely [73]. You can be 
sure complex adaptive systems will produce emergent properties, and they are not 
necessarily all bad. What is obvious to us is, however, that if humanity is to avoid 
a calamitous loss of food security, a fast, society-pervading sea change as 
dramatic as the first agricultural revolution will be required – and one where the 
consequences will be carefully considered. Will change be sufficiently great not 
just in food getting, but in human demographics, consumption patterns, especially 
in the energy sector, and in norms? For the new revolution to succeed the changes 
will both require, and help promote synergistically, new forms of governance 
and of economic relationships. And only then might the resulting nutritional 
bounty be equitably shared over the planet.192 
 
In spite of the call for “new forms of governance and of economic relationships,” we may think 
the crux of this challenge relates more to the global south than to those of us in the seemingly 
comfortable north. But Nature’s necessities may force us to think again. Jason E. Smerdon of the 
Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, co-author of a recent paper on upcoming droughts in the 
U.S. Central Plains and Southwest, had this to say about the work done in producing that 
paper: “Even when selecting for the worst megadrought-dominated period [of the past], the 21st 
century projections make [those] megadroughts seem like quaint walks through the Garden of 
                                                 
192 Ehrlich, Paul R. and Harte, John, “Food security requires a new revolution,” International 
Journal of Environmental Studies, 29 Jul 2015, DOI: 10.1080/00207233.2015.1067468 
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Eden.”193 Quaint walks through the Garden of Eden. Startling language. And we must add to this 
the fact that what water we do have to drink has become dangerous. Allaire, Wu, and Lall (2018) 
found that millions of people in the U.S. drink unsafe water each year, with the range of threat 
verging up to 28% of the population in any given year. But, this marks a conservative estimate of 
danger, because we have not regulated all the chemicals that make their way into our water and 
into our bodies, our HeartMindBodyWorldCosmos. Nor have we determined the interwoven 
activity of these chemicals—perhaps on our capacity to think and know with skill, to dream, to 
conjure forth viable solutions to our problems. The Environmental Working Group found that the 
water in 42 states contains 141 unregulated chemicals and another 119 regulated chemicals.194 
Even if the glass of water you drink violates no established safety standard, that may only be due 
to the fact that what’s in the glass has no established standard, and furthermore that, while the 
many chemicals in your glass might be at a level declared safe by this or that standard, we have 
no idea how all of them together will affect you, today and over the course of many years. A 
more recent report by the Environmental Integrity Group and Earthjustice (with data available 
only after the range of the study by Allaire, Wu, and Lall) found that ground water in 39 states 
contains unsafe levels of toxins from the burning of coal. The study found that 91% of coal-fired 
power plants have made the drinking water in their environs toxic.195 Isn’t this a kind of 
violence, injustice, immorality that our culture inflicts on us and on all sentient beings? It seems 
like a cultural and structural violence, and it often unfolds in such a way that we cannot sense the 
pattern of insanity very easily. 
 
                                                 
193 http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/3232 
194 https://www.ewg.org/agmag/2005/12/national-tap-water-quality-database 
195 https://www.environmentalintegrity.org/reports/coals-poisonous-legacy/ 
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Things look equally challenging if not more so with respect to food. Currently, food availability 
remains chronically uncertain in many parts of the world, affecting billions of people, and 
drought will persist and intensify in areas of the U.S., the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere for 
the foreseeable future. A recent scientific model puts us at a permanent disjunction between 
supply and demand for food by 2040, which does not take into account possible tipping points 
we might cross, or ones might have already, unwittingly crossed. To quote Dr. Aled Jones, 
Director of the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University, where the model was 
developed: 
We ran the model forward to the year 2040, along a business-as-usual trajectory . 
. . The results show that based on plausible climate trends . . . the global food 
supply system would face catastrophic losses, and an unprecedented epidemic of 
food riots. In this scenario, global society essentially collapses as food production 
falls permanently short of consumption.196 
 
In a committee meeting Jones was quoted as saying, “The financial and economic system is 
exposed to catastrophic short-term risks that the system cannot address in its current form.”197 
Are we really preparing our students to deal with this, philosophically speaking? 
 
A paper by James Hansen and others should intensify our concerns. Our global conversation 
about climate collapse has typically taken 2 degrees centigrade as an upper bound, long disputed 
as a dangerous one. We are currently on track for 5 or 6, which has been called a “science 
fiction” scenario in terms of its dystopian effects. Even getting to 2 degrees will take critical 
insights and seemingly impossible action.198 Thus the title of Hansen’s paper gives a clear 
                                                 
196 http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article42191.htm   
197 Ibid. 
198 See, for instance, Bill McKibben’s, “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” Rolling 
Stone, July 19, 2012. It is McKibben who rightly calls 5 degrees a “science fiction” scenario. 
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indication of the seriousness of our situation: “Ice melt, sea level rise and superstorms: evidence 
from paleoclimate data, climate modeling, and modern observations that 2 degrees C global 
warming is highly dangerous.”199 In light of all this data, we can understand why the British 
economist Nicholas Stern titled a recent article, “The Next Two Decades Will Make or Break 
Humanity—Why Are We Waiting to Fight Climate Change?”200 Stern has said that, “Whatever 
way we look at it, the action we need to take is immense.”201 And we should note again that we 
are not talking about avoiding far-off events. The World Bank, not known as a bastion of radical 
or alarmist suggestions, recently released a report projecting that, on our present course, we will 
see 100 million people thrust into “extreme poverty” in just 15 years (Hallegatte et al. 2015).202 It 
behooves us to take that figure as conservative. Even setting aside everything else we know, 
consider the ethical implications of allowing such a thing to happen, and consider the political 
ramifications when that number of people decide they will not go gently. Indeed, we should pay 
attention to the findings indicating that we can link 40% of all deaths to pollution and 
environmental degradation.203    
 
These contextual elements constitute an altered state of philosophy. No one has ever 
philosophized under these circumstances. Let’s not mistake that for the trivial notion that no one 
                                                 
199 Atmos. Chem. Phys. Discuss., 15, 20059–20179, 2015, DOI:10.5194/acpd-15-20059-2015  
The recent COP21 in Paris produced a document acknowledging 1.5 degrees Celsius as a critical 
target, but it contains no binding and actionable plan for making this happen—and, again, we are 
on track for well more than 2 degrees at this point. 
200 http://www.alternet.org/books/next-two-decades-will-make-or-break-humanity-why-are-we-
waiting-fight-climate-change 
201 http://climatenewsnetwork.net/stern-warns-that-humanity-is-at-climate-crossroads/ 
202 https://openknowledge-worldbank-
org.oca.ucsc.edu/bitstream/handle/10986/22787/9781464806735.pdf?sequence=13 
203 Pimentel et al. (2007). Ecology of Increasing Diseases: Population Growth and 
Environmental Degradation. Human Ecology. DOI 10.1007/s 10745-007-9128-3 
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has ever philosophized under “precisely” these circumstances, or that no one ever philosophized 
in conditions of crisis.204 Instead, we come upon the more disturbing perception that no one has 
philosophized with scientific evidence that the collapse of the conditions of life on the planet 
could occur before their very eyes—and because of their actions, including the failure to 
navigate the crisis with greater Wisdom, Love, and Beauty. We can reasonably see this as an 
indictment of our way of knowing ourselves, each other, and the World. We may think here of 
Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago:  
If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously 
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest 
of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart 
of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart? 
 
During the life of any heart this line keeps changing place; sometimes it is 
squeezed one way by exuberant evil and sometimes it shifts to allow enough 
space for good to flourish. One and the same human being is, at various ages, 
under various circumstances, a totally different human being. At times he is close 
to being a devil, at times to sainthood. But his name doesn’t change, and to that 
name we ascribe the whole lot, good and evil. 
 
Socrates taught us: Know thyself! 
 
Confronted by the pit into which we are about to toss those who have done us 
harm, we halt, stricken dumb: it is after all only because of the way things worked 
out that they were the executioners and we weren’t. If Malyuta Skuratov had 
summoned us, we, too, probably would have done our work well! 
 
From good to evil is one quaver, says the proverb. 
And correspondingly, from evil to good. (2007: 168) 
 
                                                 
204 As environmental philosopher Dale Jamieson put it: “The core problem is that this is a 
completely unprecedented problem.”  (http://www.climatecentral.org/news/fifty-years-after-
warning-climate-talks-19637) It does not seem that philosophers in the academy have grappled 
or wrangled or turned to face this with any degree of sufficiency. Though some may do so, we 
need a mass movement of LoveWisdom . . . professors of philosophy must come together to 
become Philosophers—and we need each other for this. 
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We may also think of this powerful line from the same work: “Every man always has handy a 
dozen glib little reasons why he is right not to sacrifice himself.” 
 
As a note to fellow professional philosophers, let me say that, it seems to me—and I am 
continually willing and almost hoping205 to be wrong about this—but it seems to me that we as a 
discipline need to recognize and genuinely confront the apparent fact that we are, according to 
the latest science, in the midst of a serious if not a mass extinction and a potentially dreadful and 
catastrophic shift of the conditions of life as we have known them.206 The last mass extinction 
took an asteroid to accomplish. We are accomplishing this one—whether a true “mass 
extinction” or just an incredible and morally horrific less-than-mass extinction—just by living 
our lives, which includes virtually every aspect of how we philosophize: The way we think, the 
way we teach and research, the coffee we drink, the cars we drive, the books we purchase and 
publish, the food we eat, the phones we use, the many trips we take, the sheets we sleep in, and 
on, and on, and on. We are all seized by a life-threatening case of soul scurvy, and a principal 
symptom seems to be our incredible incompetence at educating our students about this crisis. 
They need revolutionary suggestions—not desperate suggestions, but suggestions that may go so 
far outside the bounds of comfort for many people in many philosophy departments that I harbor 
significant doubts anything sufficient will appear in them.  
 
                                                 
205 I wouldn’t go so far as to “hope,” since philosophy begins at the end of hope, and at the end 
of fear. 
206 Ceballos et al., “Accelerated modern human–induced species losses: Entering the sixth mass 
extinction.” Sci. Adv. 2015; DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.1400253 
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If I thought the way we teach LoveWisdom could heal the soul, heal the World, then I would 
endorse it whole-heartedly. As things stand, we seem to need a radical transformation in our way 
of knowing, including our way of knowing what LoveWisdom is. We have a few as 60 harvests 
left. 60. And it takes 1000 years to cultivate an inch of topsoil.207 We face a collapse of the insect 
populations—and these are some of the most successful species ever to appear, so let us think 
how this might bode for humanity.208 Horseshoe crabs, part of the miraculous 5% of beings who 
survived the traumatic end-Permian mass extinction, have seen a 90% population collapse.209 A 
recent U.N. report (and these reports tend to be conservative in the wrong direction) gives us, 
gives the world, a 12-year ultimatum.210 We have just over a decade to avert catastrophe, but 
actually to still leave ourselves with serious consequences from our long history of incoherence, 
unskillfulness, and ignorance—our long history of not embodying our own highest values. An 
even more recent report informs us that one million animal and plant species are threatened with 
extinction.211 I am not sure we have any idea what that really means, as the scale boggles the 
mind and the heart, such that we can take it in neither with compassion nor with wisdom unless 
                                                 
207 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/only-60-years-of-farming-left-if-soil-degradation-
continues/  
and https://www.monbiot.com/2015/03/25/3703/   But the reader may like to do some further 
research. We have a Soil Crisis altogether with our Soul Crisis. And 60 harvests might be 
generous. 
208 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/feb/10/plummeting-insect-numbers-
threaten-collapse-of-nature  
and https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/20/insectageddon-farming-
catastrophe-climate-breakdown-insect-populations  In the latter piece, Monbiot characterizes 
farming and fishing as more dangerous than “global warming” and general pollution. Our way of 
knowing farming is fully infected with our soul scurvy. 
209 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/03/horseshoe-crab-population-at-risk-
blood-big-pharma 
210 https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ 
211 https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-decline-unprecedented-
report/ 
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we give ourselves to it whole-heartedly. Tipping points and nonlinear dynamics make mass 
extinction a process that, once triggered, will likely move with unstoppable and traumatizing 
force. We could be in the midst of one, or maybe it’s just a horrific, immoral non-mass-
extinction event. Even if we aren’t in the early stages of a genuine mass extinction, the current 
level of “biological annihilation” (see Ceballos et al. 2017) is still wreaking havoc on the hearts, 
minds, bodies, souls of those undergoing it—including those individuals and species who may 
survive. Even if human beings are not among the species going extinct, human beings will feel 
that loss, not only psychologically, but physically too. We will suffer greatly for it. 
 
It can feel both heartbreaking and morally horrific to condemn so much of the human and more-
than-human world to painful and irrevocable destruction. Consequently, it can feel impossible to 
philosophize without acknowledging the level of suffering in the human and more-than-human 
world arising as a result of our current way of life, our current “forms of life and forms of 
discourse.” Moreover, it seems we should see ourselves realistically as just another species. We 
have some wonderful technology, and we have proven relatively adaptable and innovative. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the day, we must see ourselves as a very recent (youthfully ignorant), 
soft-bellied, hard-headed creature who may not fare any better than the millions of other species 
we eliminate. Even if that seems too strange to contemplate, we can easily understand, based on 
the science we have, that millions of people already suffer needlessly because of climate 
collapse, and that we will likely see hundreds of millions or even billions more people suffering, 
many even dying, in the lifetime of almost anyone reading these words. 
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We might agree to see this as a serious moral issue, worthy of the consideration of our ethicists. 
Or, we may think this discussion has verged into “politics” or something philosophically 
inappropriate. But one of the most important questions we can consider together is whether such 
assessments hold in the altered states of philosophy we now face, and those we may face in the 
future.212 In any case, we find ourselves back with Socrates. A recent report from the World 
Economic Forum asks, “Is the world sleepwalking into a crisis? Global risks are intensifying but 
the collective will to tackle them appears to be lacking. Instead, divisions are hardening” (9). 
Sleepwalking was the problem Socrates identified. The report is titled, “2019 Global Risks Out 
of Control,” and it claims that, “Of all risks, it is in relation to the environment that the world is 
most clearly sleepwalking into catastrophe” (15).213 
 
In this altered state of philosophizing, in the incredible situation we face today in which many 
philosophers are sleepwalking into catastrophe (and, we might say, sleepwalking their students 
into catastrophe), our political, economic, and basic philosophical views may need serious 
reconsideration. In some sense, political parties and economic theories no longer matter, and our 
“scientific” metaphysics and epistemology are up for grabs. What we “know” must become 
doubted. We now face, a “sacred duty to rebel in order to protect our homes, our future, and the 
future of all life on Earth.”214 Any genuinely viable and vitalizing way forward will only come 
from Original Thinking, and this thinking we do not wonderstand. As things continue to fall 
                                                 
212 “Altered state” indicates that the context of philosophy has altered or changed significantly, 
and it carries the same connotation in our present context to say, “We are philosophizing in an 
altered state” as it would to say that when we had gotten drunk or taken a strong dose of sleeping 
pills.  
213 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf 
214 https://www.brightest.io/cause/extinction-rebellion/activity/international-rebellion-for-
climate-justice-global/ 
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apart, we may join our fellow citizens in thinking, perhaps to our own chagrin, that a certain 
intellectual tradition had some valid points which we should have incorporated into the way we 
have organized society, nothing in neoliberalism, Marxism, or other political or economic views 
will save us for two reasons.  
 
First of all, to say it again, the nature and scale of the crises we face are unprecedented. No 
already-existing intellectual tradition has a ready-made answer—and “science” alone cannot 
manufacture one. We find ourselves in uncharted waters. Most of us experience the daunting 
nature of this, how it all feels unfixable, how we need to just keep living from day to day, and 
how we secretly hope that, surely, someone will figure something out. 
 
But who will figure it out? On what basis? On what will they rely? Anyone trying to solve the 
problems we face will very likely do so on the basis of the same kind of thinking that got us into 
them. Instead of joining our fellow citizens in thinking someone will figure things out, we should 
perhaps just begin to join our fellow citizens—in thinking, thinking-in-activity. As Hedges puts 
it: 
If we do not shake off our lethargy, our anomie, and resist, our misery, 
despondency and feelings of helplessness will mount. We will become paralyzed. 
Resistance, especially given the bleakness before us, is about more than winning. 
It is about a life of meaning. It is about empowerment. It is a public declaration 
that we will no longer live according to the dominant lie. It is a message to the 
elites: YOU DO NOT OWN US. It is about defending our dignity, agency and 
self-respect. The more we free ourselves from the bondage of fear to throw up 
barriers along the forced march toward ecocide the more we will be enveloped by 
a strange kind of euphoria, one I often felt as a war correspondent documenting 
horrific suffering and atrocities to shame the killers. We obliterate despair in our 
acts of defiance, even if our victories are Pyrrhic. We reach out to those around 
us. Courage is contagious. It is the spark that ignites mass revolt. And we should, 
even if we fail, at least choose how we will die. Resistance is the only action left 
that will allow us to remain psychologically whole. And it is the only action left 
726 
 
that has any hope of halting the wholesale extinction of the human race, not to 
mention most other species.215 
 
Even though we may agree with much of what Hedges invites us to consider, we should keep our 
mind of LoveWisdom, our heart of WisdomLoveBeauty, and move with great care, so that we do 
not allow the old thinking to perpetuate itself. That is the second problem: Any gesture we make 
right now will be shaped by the style of consciousness we have practiced and realized.  
 
This is the second level of frustration for me. I have been vexed and saddened by the ongoing 
collapse of the conditions of life as I have pursued this work. But I have also felt keen frustration 
with the deeper dimensions of how we seem to have gotten into this mess and what we may need 
to do to get out of it. It has seemed strange to find out how many people have inquired carefully 
into the space our epistemology seeks to delineate. It’s there, and yet it remains at the margins, 
with many aspects of it dismissed.  
 
We could have approached our inquiry in many ways, and could have emphasized quite different 
border territories of this Bardo Awareness. For instance, there is a large literature on the other 
kind of anomalous data, relating to we call the “supernatural” or “paranormal”. Why do we write 
it off? Why does it not even show up as salient? We use the phrase, “Not on my radar.” Why 
not? We have suggested that the collapse of the conditions of life should be considered as 
evidence that our way of knowing, our way of living requires a paradigm shift. The scientists 
making a scientific case for revolution should thus consider making a scientific case for a new 
way of knowing, not just a new political-economic system. What do we really expect from 
                                                 
215 https://www.truthdig.com/articles/extinction-rebellion/ 
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conquest consciousness? Its style of relating manifests in its politics, its economics, its ecologies, 
and its sciences. Similarly, the development of science depends on the development of scientists, 
and we can see that the philosophical context of that development is suspect. So why don’t we all 
feel more open to other ways of knowing? 
 
I have felt deep gratitude, for instance, that Sophia brought to me my first taste of the ufology 
literature—a major literature of anomalous data—and I felt equal gratitude for the people 
engaged with these matters. Admittedly, some of it does seem “airy-fairy,” but that is the worst 
possible reason for writing something off, because that is just another face of the general 
problem of spiritual materialism that affects academia as much as it affects so-called “new age” 
thought and literature.  
 
 What I personally experience when I read this, or even peer-reviewed scientific literature on the 
anomalous data available to us, is a mix of astonishment tinged with distress. I find it incredible 
that we seem so unable to open ourselves and do the work necessary to meet this data. We seem 
unable to sense the Superness of Nature, but just this kind of rejuvenated sense of things marks 
the essence of a better way of knowing. It’s as if we need—above all else—a new attitude of 
knowing in order to know better, and that attitude involves a living loving sense of sacredness 
and magic that our style of consciousness has removed from the world—made unknowable, 
whether or not it can actually exist. If something is not allowed in our ontology, it is not 
knowable, and must be explained on the basis of what we will allow (in our great wisdom, our 
great insight into the nature of reality), and this amounts to metaphysical policing, which is part 
of how conquest consciousness maintains its conquered territory. 
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We think ourselves very sophisticated, very rational when we insist on “naturalistic” 
explanations. These explanations only allow “naturalistic” phenomena. This sounds reasonable, 
but it reveals the intensity of entanglement in dualistic thinking: We do not see how this kind of 
dualistic thinking creates problems and limits our capacity to be responsive to ourselves, each 
other, and the World. There is an analogy here in van Fraassen’s (2002) critique of 
“empiricism”: We decide we are going to live in a box (“the empirical”) and we must wait to 
find out what is allowed in the box (whatever “science” allows). We decide ahead of time, with 
great confidence, that we cannot experience anything that doesn’t belong in the box. If someone 
claims to have experienced something that doesn’t belong in the box, they have mis-seen or 
misunderstood—or they want to deceive us. 
 
We do need to discern the difference between illusion and perception, and at the same time we 
must not reify that discernment, or we then fail to sense how we imagine the World forth—not in 
an airy-fairy way, but in the concrete way we all engage, as our way of life, our practice-and-
realization, our way of knowing (the one we must stop “doing,” and start nondoing). Our 
dualizing obscures this, and it obscures ourselves, obscures reality. Instead of leaping into 
aliveness and aloveness, we decide we will live in a box (or a cage), and we cannot experience 
what doesn’t belong in that box. If someone claims to have experienced such a thing, they must 
somehow be deluded or deceitful. How do we let go of this duality? 
 
We could turn, for instance, to Strieber and Kripal (2016)—not for an answer, but to further 
enter the inquiry, to wander further into the darkness. Kripal is a serious scholar, and this shines 
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through with his opening words for the book he co-wrote with Strieber, a book called The Super 
Natural: “I am afraid of this book.” Why? Because it seems to evoke a bit of fear and trembling 
to turn toward the possibility that the world is already a Super Natural World. To call it 
“supernatural” merely repeats the duality of our limiting thinking: We put the “natural” on one 
side, and “supernatural” on the other; the “rational” on one side, the “irrational” on the other. But 
Nature is already wonderous, exceeding all our concepts. The Cosmos can become intelligible 
without being conceivable. I think of Yeats here. In a letter he wrote to Elizabeth Pelham in 
1939, he says,  
When I try to put all into a phrase I say, ‘Man can embody truth but he cannot 
know it.’ I must embody it in the completion of my life. The abstract is not life 
and everywhere draws out its contradictions. You can refute Hegel but not the 
Saint or the Song of Sixpence. (from Ellman 1999: 289) 
 
It’s as if he accepted Nietzsche’s challenge, Nietzsche’s experiment of incorporation. By means 
of intimate experience, we can wonderstand the living Cosmos without “knowing” it, in the 
manner of ordinary understanding. This wonderstanding is knowing as gnosis, by which term I 
mean to stipulate that it is not a dualistic “knowing”. The Cosmos is not an object, but a 
celebration, a sacred love affair we co-create and co-discover. To enter life engages a sensitivity 
and responsiveness in mutuality, and this arises as intelligible and inconceivable at the same 
time. As the cosmos evolves and develops, there will always be more to discover-create, in total 
mutuality.  
 
The World is Super. The World is Natural. To touch the Superness of Nature, all we need to do 
is change the way we sense, think, move, touch, commune and communicate (comical: “all we 
need to do” . . . funny because it demands a total revolution, and also because we cannot “do” it). 
We can enter the wonder that already is this World—by which we can mean a mystical 
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participation, in a sophisticated and positive sense. It is an already-World, an altogether-World, a 
Magical World in a non-woo sense of “magic”. This challenges our ego and our narrow 
paradigm. Kripal speaks of “an apocalypse of thought”: “I am afraid of this book. There is 
something about it, something explosive and new. It is not a neutral book. It is an apocalypse of 
thought waiting for you, the reader, to actualize” (1). It would be wonderful if we could 
experience an apocalypse of thought, and I only wish to someday write such a book. The present 
one is not enough. 
 
Kripal goes on with words that could serve as a preface to our considerations here: “The world 
will not really end as you turn these pages of course.” The world, in some literal sense, will not 
end. But the world of delusion we have entangled ourselves in could end, as could the conditions 
of life upon which we all depend. The Sun depends on us to help it across the sky. We have to 
come out of our cave to do that work. 
 
Continuing with his preface to our inquiry here, Kripal says that his and Strieber’s book explores 
“the proposal that we are all embedded in a much larger, fiercely alive and richly conscious 
reality that is only, at best, indirectly addressed by everything that the human species has ever 
thought or believed” (1-2). He says the book is an attempt “to understand, to really understand 
that we are already and always have been living in a super natural world, that we ourselves are 
highly evolved prisms or mediums of this super nature coming into consciousness, and that many 
of the things that we are constantly told are impossible are in fact not only possible but also the 
whispered secrets of what we are, where we are, and why we are here” (2). 
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I quote Kripal specifically because of his collaboration with Whitley Strieber, one of the most 
well-known authors in the ufology literature. How would the typical philosopher read an 
“abduction” account? How does the typical philosopher read any anomalous data? 
 
We could think of at least some of this anomalous data as advantageous data . . . we could 
consider Visions, Synchronicities, Prophetic Dreams, and so on as “advantageous data,” or 
perhaps “advantaged data,” “prerogative data” or “concessionary data,” or even, with a nod to 
Dewey, “consummatory data”—the exact opposite of consumption, and thus a rebellion against 
the dominant culture and its way of doing science—or, with a nod to Aldrich, “data of 
achievement”—which in our inquiry references the sacred epistemology of practice-realization. 
We could then replace “data” with Experience. Experiences arising during, or in one way or 
another due to, practices of meditation are an example of advantaged or consummatory “data”. 
Why? Because they come from having advanced along a Way, from having practiced until 
Sophia has granted us concessions, gifts, graces, insights and inspirations that come in, through, 
as, with our immediate intimacy with the perfect-and-complete (consummate) nature of 
ourselves and reality. That doesn’t quite get at it, but it’s not the worst kind of metaphorical 
formulation.  
 
In the limited scientific domain, we could call the much of the data “privileged data”. There, we 
would note how “privileged” one must be to acquire such data. It takes tremendous resources to 
build, power, and operate a particle accelerator, and to go through the necessary education to 
understand what to do with one, how to use it with some effectiveness, how to interpret the data 
it generates. In the broadest sense, we could also call such data advantaged and even, in some 
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cases, consummatory, but it is more privileged than advantaged in the most ethical sense. True 
consummatory data, data worthy of that name, can only emerge in a proper spiritual context. 
Discovery of the Higgs boson is hardly consummatory in any proper philosophical sense—a 
consummation of “knowledge” perhaps, and perhaps even a consummation of elegance 
theorizing, and thus a certain kind of beauty, but certainly lacking wisdom and love, and bereft 
of any rich sacredness. 
 
The etymologies of all of the terms come into play. For instance, “privileged” relates to 
“private,” and today we must sense how it associates with the duality between public and private 
in general, as well as with particular dualities such as private wealth and public illth, organism 
and environment, culture and nature. Today we can speak of “priv lit,” which signifies literature 
written by authors of privilege, authors (often with white skin) who have the income and leisure 
to pursue certain kinds of experiences, and to write about them in particular ways. We don’t want 
a science of privilege, a science of wealth and illth, of private against public. 
 
But we can also recognize the advantages of a good education. We can see that, with proper 
education, Nature will grant us certain concessions and prerogatives. The root of “prerogative” 
goes back to words signifying “going straight” and “reaching out one’s hand.” What hand 
reaches out in the prerogative we speak of here? The hand of Nature, the hand of Sophia reaches 
out to us the moment we go straight, the moment we reach out in nonreaching, the moment we 
reach out in nonaggression, the moment we reach out in sacredness and wonder, the moment we 
reach out in nongrasping, without trying to “get” anything or “do” anything. The getting and 
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doing put us on a crooked road instead of the straight Path (Way, Dao), with all its nonlinearity, 
its spirals and curves, its astonishment and inconceivability. 
 
We could suggest a general need for advantaged or consummatory experience. Calling some of 
these experiences “non-ordinary” functions in one sense, if we understand “ordinary” to mean 
“asleep,” like someone sleepwalking into catastrophe. Non-ordinary then means awakening (in 
the extreme, awakened), or non-habitual, non-fettered, non-domesticated, non-aggressive, non-
fragmented. But people often refer to “non-ordinary” states as if they are not to be trusted. This 
shows a rather silly bias. It is like calling the practice of Aikido “non-ordinary falling.” Anyone 
who reflects with care would rather fall in such a “non-ordinary” way than in the typical, 
unskillful, reactive way. Moreover, we need to admit that our science depends on a wide array of 
non-ordinary thoughts, practices, and experiences. We foolishly subject the natural world to 
incredible interventions in order, for instance, to make “particles” and advance our notion of 
physics, chemistry, and science in general. We do this for all sorts of sciences. We extract, 
process, heat, burn, bang, smash, dissect, inject, damage in very non-ordinary ways (we do these 
things even with sentient beings). We go to extremes in order to “know”. How extreme is 
spiritual life in comparison to what we do in the name of science? We must ethically evaluate 
both the ordinary and the non-ordinary. 
 
Ironically, the most advantaged experience is the most humble: Just to be what we are, how we 
are, why we are. Just to accept ourselves in genuine modesty takes us to a greater extreme than 
the strangest scientific experiment, to arrive at the place we stand takes us on a greater journey 
than the wildest scientific expedition. The transcendence of all theories demands and reveals a 
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greater genius than any theoretical genius humanity has ever seen. Being together, living as an 
act of love, demands more courageous insight and gentleness than any ordinary scientist has ever 
had to muster in the name of knowledge, more beauty than any artist has ever produced, more 
wisdom than any sage has ever been able to express in words. To touch someone, to touch the 
World, truthfully, authentically . . . this is everything. 
 
Such truly nonaggressive, non-ego-centric experience also arises from seemingly “extreme” 
practices, such as Shamanic drumming, ecstatic dance, remote viewing, psychic experiences, 
near-death experiences, dream work, ingestion of certain kinds of Medicine, a wide variety of 
rituals, rites, and ceremonies, and many kinds of meditation. These practices help to liberate us 
from the ordinary forms of bondage we subject ourselves to, the forms of bondage we practice in 
an ongoing way. We are, most of us, stuck. We have stuck ourselves inside a bag of skin. Mind 
is “in here”. We are “in here”. Practices of advantaged or artful, graceful experience help us to 
leap beyond what our limited notions tell us and condition us to see. Even our most serious 
science can turn us toward the soul’s calling, the calling beyond our opinions and ideas, a call to 
leap beyond atomism and aggression, suffering and stagnation, a call to enter the darkness, to 
enter the wildness of the Cosmos. But, oddly enough, many scientists and philosophers try to 
limit science itself, declaring that any invitation to leap beyond our limited and limiting notions 
is a leap beyond the world, a leap beyond rationality or reasonableness, a leap into superstition, 
and so on.   
 
Even experiences related to “aliens” may invite us into the kind of leap we need. Whitley 
Strieber says of these experiences, “Instead of shunning the darkness, we can face straight into it 
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with an open mind. When we do that, the unknown changes. Fearful things become 
understandable and a truth is suggested: the enigmatic presence of the human mind winks back 
from the dark” (from Strieber and Kripal, 111). He writes,  
I don’t mean to say that it’s entirely in the mind, but that the mind might not be 
entirely in us. In other words, mind might not be entirely confined to the brain. 
Since the moment I began to apprehend the actual dimensions of the experience in 
all its wonderful improbability and confusing physicality, I have been dogged by 
that improbability. I can’t get away from it though. My intellect says that it cannot 
be true. My life bears witness to its truth. (34) 
 
Can we transcend the divide between the “rational” and the seemingly irrational potentials of our 
own experience? Our most serious science tells us we live in a connected Cosmos, an interwoven 
and entangled Cosmos, a nonlocal Cosmos—which includes what we call mind. But our 
“intellect” tells us this cannot be so, and we struggle against it. Militant scientists and politicians 
make war on it. 
 
To be quite clear, Strieber does not really write about “alien abduction” but about non-ordinary 
experience. He writes,  
Having been the object of their visitations over a period of years, and the recipient 
of hundreds of thousands of narratives from others who had similar experiences, I 
wish to suggest from the outset that this phenomenon is much larger than any of 
the usual explanations, including alien visitation and such interpretations as brain 
seizure. It is far richer, more complex, and more ambiguous than we commonly 
suppose . . . (23) 
 
Gradually, superstitions about everything from seasonal changes to the 
appearance of diseases and natural disasters and much else gave way to logic and 
scientific understanding. However, there is one area that remains outside of 
understanding, and which is by far the most culturally potent of them all. . . . it is 
what we now call the supernatural. It has reemerged in the form of the alien and 
UFO stories that abound in our time, and threatens to degenerate into a new 
superstition if it does not receive the study necessary to determine what it actually 
is. (21-2)  
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Should we ever come into more general contact with what I encountered . . . they 
will not be offering us plans for a starship or a trade in exotic electronics. What 
will be on offer . . . is a journey into a whole new understanding of reality and the 
part we play in it. The “alien” is as much a herald from the dark of the universe as 
it is a signal from the depths of our own minds. The discovery of the reality 
behind UFO and alien apparitions and the discovery of our own truth will prove to 
be profoundly intertwined. When this discovery is finally made, we will at that 
moment become immeasurably larger. Free at last from the constricted vision that 
now so limits us we will begin the journey toward which we have been struggling 
from time immemorial into a new relationship with the universe and a new 
understanding of mind and the natural world. (24) 
 
In working with this advantaged data, Strieber and Kripal take a middle way: Not hallucination, 
and also not literally “space men”. Strieber writes, 
Despite the fact that I can’t explain them, I frequently see and interact with 
nonphysical and quasi-physical beings. They seem to be part of nature just like we 
are, but . . . in some “super” way for which we have neither an adequate religious 
model nor present science. . . . 
 
They also have, at least in my life, what has come to seem a rather clear aim. 
They want to challenge me with questions too provocative to be left unanswered, 
but which I cannot, in all frankness, answer in anything approaching an objective 
manner. (29) 
 
Why would I bother reading this literature for the purposes of an inquiry into a space of knowing 
that I suggest we need to learn how to enter? Because, whatever is going on here, it involves a 
way of knowing, and more importantly it seems an awesome invitation to know—to know 
differently, rather than follow the conquest impulse of explaining it all away. Strieber is not 
some lone lunatic. When he made his experiences public, he started receiving letters from others 
who reported similar experiences. For a time, he was getting 10,000 letters a month (31). He 
estimates that between 1987-2000 he received half a million letters (32). I shouldn’t have to note 
how astonishing that is. When he tried to gather up all this material and offer it for study to 
neurologists, psychologists, and so on, “There was not just no scientific interest, but the reaction 
was often hostile” (33). Perhaps we need to consider how unsurprising that is, and how 
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unfortunate. Strieber claims that, “Most members of the academic, scientific, and intellectual 
communities, let alone our serious media, have to this day no idea how extensive the experience 
actually is” (33). Our interest could change, says Strieber, only if “the most interesting aspect of 
the phenomenon, which is its ambiguity, is to replace the either/or debate” (33).  
 
The either/or is the, “either it’s aliens or it’s delusion or deceit.” But this only expresses the 
narrowness of our context, our perception, and our imagination. What might be here that most of 
us don’t perceive? In Beyond Words, Carl Safina shows us that we are surrounded by minds—
surrounded by Mind, by the Mindedness, Mindfulness (sati), and Sacredness of Nature. But we 
have cut ourselves off from it, and we don’t walk around experiencing ourselves as alive and 
alove in a womb of sentience, presencing the mystery of a primordial awareness. Thus, there is a 
sad irony in all of the projected techo-fantasies we see both in the ufology literature (and its 
dismissals and/or elaborations in popular media) and in our society in general. We are so closed 
off to the magic all around us that the Soul can only get some of us to listen by means of these 
techno-fantasies, which we then take literally—that “tech” can save the world, that aliens have 
“tech” that may destroy us or help us, that deluded people think they have been taken into alien 
spacecraft. It is obviously possible that there are “alien” “visitors,” but even then we must realize 
that each case of seeing lights in the sky or seeing various beings may be unique. Some of these 
experiences might be the soul speaking, while others may even be “aliens” speaking (or some 
Other, every bit as natural as dolphins and jaguars, and perhaps living “here” with us, as alien as 
they may seem). Ultimately they are, all of them, both.  
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The Soul Speaks in whatever way it can, and our job is to listen, sense, touch, taste—open, 
opening even to apparent madness. There was a time when the Soul made use of fairies and 
sprites. There was a time when the Soul spoke by means of Wolf, and even the Spirit of Wolf or 
Wolf Medicine. We could go out and commune and communicate with Wolf, Bear, Mountain. 
Coyote could speak. The right kind of soul attunement allows for advantaged experiences, artful, 
graceful experiences, consummations of our lives. Being “abducted” by “aliens” is, in some 
sense, the same basic kind of spiritual experience as a Shamanic Journey—only we lack the 
proper context, the proper Culture, and so the experiences remain virtually wasted. As Strieber 
wisely puts it, “There is a big mystery here. But the first place to look is not to the skies—it’s to 
us. We must look into ourselves . . .”216 
 
But this does not mean Coyote cannot “actually” speak. There, we lurch back into our skin-bag. 
If we want a new way of knowing, I would humbly suggest we should really consider how we 
could hear Coyote and know with him. Black Elk relates an example of the kind of knowing our 
inquiry seeks to help us co-discover-create: 
We stayed on Clay Creek in Grandmother’s Land all that summer and the next 
winter when I was sixteen years old. That was a very cold winter. There were 
many blizzards, game was hard to find, and afterwhile the papa (dried meat) that 
we had made in the summer was all eaten. It looked as though we might starve to 
death if we did not find some game soon, and everybody was downhearted. Little 
hunting parties went out in different directions, but it is bad hunting in blizzard 
weather. My father and I started out alone leading our horses in the deep snow. 
When we got to Little River Creek we made a shelter with our bison robes against 
a bank of the stream and started a fire. That evening I saw a rabbit in a hollow 
tree, and when I chopped the tree down there were four rabbits in there. I killed 
them all, because the snow was so deep they could not get away. My father and I 
roasted them and we ate all four of them before we went to sleep, because it was 
hard walking in the snow and we had been empty a good while. 
                                                 
216 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qAdlV8icOGc 
739 
 
The wind went down that night and it was still and very cold. While I was 
lying there in a bison robe, a coyote began to howl not far off, and suddenly I 
knew it was saying something. It was not making words, but it said something 
plainer than words, and this was it: “Two-legged one, on the big ridge west of you 
there are bison; but first you shall see two more two-leggeds over there.” 
My father had dozed off, so I wakened him and said: “Father, I have heard 
a coyote say that there are bison on the big ridge west of us, and that we shall first 
see two people over there. Let us get up early.” 
By this time my father had noticed that I had some kind of queer power, 
and he believed me. The wind came up again with the daylight, and we could see 
only a little way ahead when we started west in the morning. Before we came to 
the ridge, we saw two horses, dim in the blowing snow beside some bushes. They 
were huddled up with their tails to the wind and their heads hanging low. When 
we came closer, there was a bison robe shelter in the brush, and in it were an old 
man and a boy, very cold and hungry and discouraged. They were Lakotas and  
were glad to see us, but they were feeling weak, because they had been out two 
days and had seen nothing but snow. We camped there with them in the brush, 
and then we went up on the ridge afoot. There was much timber up there. We got 
behind the hill in a sheltered place and waited, but we could see nothing. While 
we were waiting, we talked about the people starving at home, and we were all 
sad. Now and then the snow haze would open up for a little bit and you could see 
quite a distance, then it would close again. While we were talking about our 
hungry people, suddenly the snow haze opened a little, and we saw a shaggy 
bull’s head coming out of the blowing snow up the draw that led past us below. 
Then seven more appeared, and the snow haze came back and shut us in there. 
They could not see us, and they were drifting with the wind so that they could not 
smell us. 
We four stood up and made vows to the four quarters of the world, saying: 
“Haho! haho!” Then we got our horses from the brush on the other side of the 
ridge and came around to the mouth of the draw where the bison would pass as 
they drifted with the wind. (93-5) 
 
Can we hear Coyote today? I am not sure we can, though I am quite confident that Coyote 
speaks, and that we could hear if we learn how to listen better, how to know better. 
 
We have to be led to listening, led to it by means of our humiliation. That may sound strong. It 
only means that, at the very least, we require humbleness, or even humbition (Walter 
Kaufmann’s term for a perfect balance of humility and ambition or high intention). At the same 
time, there can be a need to sense our own stupidity in ways that may feel uncomfortable. In the 
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study of LoveWisdom, sensing our stupidity often arises in our varied attempts to cover over our 
stupidity. We try to not appear stupid. We either sense our ignorance and try to avoid it, or we 
actually miss our ignorance. In either case, there are questions we need to ask but fail to ask. We 
fail to open ourselves to Wisdom, that openness of mind that scares us away at the outset because 
of its resemblance to madness, because the frightened ego does not want to give up its central 
status, and we cannot transcend the patterns of control that go along with its presence.  
 
It is not knowledge that dispels stupidity (not knowledge as we have conceived it) but Wisdom 
alone (a gnosis, a knowing that remains in touch with the sacred mystery, a knowing that is 
loving, a knowing that is beauty). We require a sincere willingness, even if it’s shaky and tender 
at first, to be wrong, foolish, to make a fool of ourselves, to say, “I really don’t know.” Socrates 
could honestly say, “I don’t know,” even if he wonderstood that knowledge will not solve our 
problems. In other words, Socrates might have been Wise indeed, and he might have found it 
impossibly strange that we think we can run our lives on the basis of “knowing”. Wisdom arrives 
at the aporia—the threshold, the Bardo, the entrance to Mystery—and not at the place we think 
we know.  
 
Perhaps we can find many academics who think, “If everybody would just be more rational,” or, 
“If everybody would just read Kant,” or something like that, “then we’d have a better world.” 
Humorously, I often think the issue has to do with studying, practicing, and realizing 
LoveWisdom in a more realistic and skillful way. Of course, my colleagues likely think the same 
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thing, in their own way.217 Hillman too thought that psychology could actually help us, if we 
could more skillfully and realistically orient ourselves. He shared this sense of things with Jung, 
who in turn shared a sense of psychology as a practice of LoveWisdom, a practice of philosophy. 
 
We return again and again to the central importance of LoveWisdom, which it seems to me the 
culture and the profession do not honor as they could. Hillman, as we noted, might also have said 
something like this, “We have had years and years of academic philosophy, the dissemination of 
‘reason,’ the repeated analysis of passages by Kant and other intellectuals. Almost every student 
who gets a college degree will have some exposure to philosophy—probably much more 
exposure to philosophy, relatively speaking, than their exposure to psychological theories and 
practices for overcoming their maladies of soul. Some people probably consider this a golden 
age of philosophy, and there are more people today calling themselves philosophers than perhaps 
the total of all the people who so called themselves in the previous 2500 years. And yet the world 
is getting worse in very crucial and tragic ways.” We have contemplated how this constitutes a 
crisis in philosophy and in our culture. We can turn to Jung for a nice suggestion in relation to 
this point as well: 
As the most complex of psychic structures, a man’s philosophy of life forms the 
counterpole to the physiologically conditioned psyche, and, as the highest psychic 
                                                 
217 Although, not many of my colleagues would include in that more skillful and realistic way 
practices that go beyond reading and analyzing texts, and, when we do read texts, to make sure 
we read texts that come from non-western traditions, and also non-male philosophers. Not only 
do few philosophers think meditation and art belong in philosophy classes, but they may find it 
odd to suggest serious study of Indigenous and other non-western traditions. Even Buddhist 
philosophies have barely a toe hold in western universities. Nor do very many male philosophers 
have a serious dedication to presenting non-male perspectives. Good philosophers deserve our 
attention, whatever their gender, whatever their culture. But, we may have to contemplate 
dropping from the syllabus certain figures the contemporary academy continues to adore—or at 
least changing the manner that understanding is practiced and realized. Something has to give. 
Will it be the syllabi or the conditions of life? 
742 
 
dominant, it ultimately determines the latter’s fate. It guides the life of the 
therapist and shapes the spirit of his therapy. Since it is an essentially subjective 
system despite the most rigorous objectivity, it may and very likely will be 
shattered time after time on colliding with the truth of the patient, but it rises 
again, rejuvenated by the experience. Conviction easily turns into self-defence 
and is seduced into rigidity, and this is inimical to life. The test of a firm 
conviction is its elasticity and flexibility; like every other exalted truth it thrives 
best on the admission of its errors. (CW16, para. 180) 
 
Our philosophy is complex, and it determines our fate. As we have suggested, it is our whole 
way of life, so intimate that we cannot see it. It guides the life of each of us, and it guides the life 
of the World. The World is lived by our LoveWisdom—or it is lived by our ignorance. And we 
are that World. Our philosophy, all the philosophy of the dominant culture, has collided with the 
truth of the World and the truth of our soul and the souls of all beings. What are our errors? Can 
we properly identify and admit them? Can we really have an open mind (aside from taking 
LSD)? This is a practice, not a belief about ourselves. As Luangpor Teean writes, 
When we talk about a method to end dukkha [suffering], the words are one 
thing and the practice is quite another. The method of practice is a method of 
developing sati (awareness) in all positions: standing, walking, sitting and lying. 
This practice has frequently been called satipatthana (the grounds of awareness), 
but whatever you call it the point is to be aware of yourself. If you are aware of 
yourself, then moha (delusion) will disappear. You should develop awareness of 
yourself by being aware of all your bodily movements, such as turning your 
hands, raising and lowering your forearms, walking forward and back, turning and 
nodding your head, blinking your eyes, opening your mouth, inhaling, exhaling, 
swallowing saliva, and so on. You must be aware of all of these movements, and 
this awareness is called sati [often translated as mindfulness, here as awareness, 
but, for us, with the proper etymological connotation of re-membering]. When 
you have awareness of yourself, the unawareness, which is called moha, or 
delusion, will disappear.  
To be aware of the movements of the body is to develop sati. You should 
try to develop this awareness in every movement. When you are fully aware of 
yourself, there arises a certain kind of panna (knowing) in the mind that knows 
reality as it is. To see yourself as you are, to see Dhamma (actuality; the way 
things are; the truth of nature, of existence). To see Dhamma isn’t to see deities, 
hell or heaven, but to see oneself turning the hands, raising and lowering the 
forearms, walking forwards and back, turning and nodding the head, blinking the 
eyes, opening the mouth, inhaling, exhaling, swallowing saliva, and so on. This 
roop-nahm. Roop is body, nahm is mind. Body and mind are dependent upon each 
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other. What we can see is roop, and the mind that thinks is nahm. When we know 
roop-nahm, we know reality as it is. When you see with the eyes, you should be 
aware of it. When you see with the mind, you should also be aware of it.218 
 
It seems we cannot avoid the basic teachings of philosophy: That we must train the mind, and 
remain exquisitely aware in our ongoing activity, in order for Sophia to grant us the concessions 
of gnosis, the consummations of Wisdom, Love, and Beauty. And such a practice, to speak 
loosely, takes place in a context.  
 
Jung admits that our context may present a grave challenge, that what seems like the most 
vitalizing context for a better way of knowing in some sense feels like a relic to us: 
What I have spoken of is, alas, to a great extent the past. We cannot turn the 
wheel backwards; we cannot go back to the symbolism that is gone. No sooner do 
you know that this thing is symbolic than you say, “Oh, well, it presumably 
means something else.” Doubt has killed it, has devoured it. So you cannot go 
back. I cannot go back to the Catholic Church, I cannot experience the miracle of 
the Mass; I know too much about it. I know it is the truth, but it is the truth in a 
form in which I cannot accept it any more. I cannot say, “This is the sacrifice of 
Christ,” and see him any more. I cannot. It is no more true to me; it does not 
express my psychological condition. My psychological condition wants 
something else. I must have a situation in which that thing becomes true once 
more. I need a new form. When one has had the misfortune to be fired out of a 
church, or to say, “This is all nonsense,” and to quit it—that has no merit at all. 
But to be in it and to be forced, say, by God, to leave it—well then you are 
legitimately extra ecclesiam [outside the church]. But extra ecclesiam nulla salus 
[outside the church there is no salvation]: then things really become terrible, 
because you are no more protected, you are no more in the consensus gentium, 
you are no more in the lap of the All-compassionate Mother. You are alone and 
you are confronted with all the demons of hell. That is what people don’t know. 
Then they say you have an anxiety neurosis, nocturnal fears, compulsions—I 
don’t know what. Your soul has become lonely; it is extra ecclesiam and in a state 
of no-salvation, and people don’t know it. They think your condition is 
pathological, and every doctor helps them to believe it. And, of course, when they 
say, and when everybody holds, that this is neurotic and pathological, then we 
have to talk that language. I talk the language of my patients. When I talk with 
lunatics, I talk the lunatic language, otherwise they don’t understand me. And 
when I talk with neurotic, I talk neurotic with them. But it is neurotic talk when 
                                                 
218 http://www.mahasati.org/oneWhoFeels.html 
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one says that this is a neurosis. As a matter of fact it is something quite different: 
it is the terrific fear of loneliness. It is the hallucination of loneliness, and it is a 
loneliness that cannot he quenched by anything else. You can be a member of a 
society with a thousand members, and you are still alone. That thing in you which 
should live is alone; nobody touched it. nobody knows it. You yourself don’t 
know it; but it keeps on stirring, it disturbs you, it makes you restless, and it gives 
you no peace. 
 So, you see, I was forced simply through my patients to try to find out 
what we could do about such a condition. I am not going to found a religion, and I 
know nothing about a future religion. I only know that in certain cases such and 
such things develop. For instance, take any case you want: if I go far enough, if 
the case demands it, or if certain conditions are favourable, then I shall observe 
certain unmistakable things, namely, that the unconscious facts are coming up and 
becoming threateningly clear. That is very disagreeable. And therefore Freud had 
to invent a system to protect people, and himself, against the reality of the 
unconscious, by putting a most depreciatory explanation upon these things, an 
explanation that always begins with “nothing but.” The explanation of every 
neurotic symptom was known long ago. We have a theory about it: it is all due to 
a father fixation, or to a mother fixation; it is all nonsense, so you can dismiss it. 
And so we dismiss our souls—“Oh, I am bound by a fixation to my mother, and if 
I see that I have all kinds of impossible fancies about my mother, I am liberated 
from that fixation.” If the patient succeeds, he has lost his soul. Every time you 
accept that explanation you lose your soul. You have not helped your soul; you 
have replaced your soul by an explanation, a theory. (CW18, para. 632-3) 
 
This seems about where we stand with our current way of knowing. After all of our work 
together, we may want to pause to take this in: If we succeed here, we will lose our soul. 
Because, “success” is still judged on the basis of the old way of knowing. Any typical reader of 
our time reads these words in a style of consciousness still under the influence, still intoxicated 
from conquest and degradation. We have been thrown out of the Garden, and we now insist there 
never was a Garden. At least prior to his experience in the Bardo of dying, Jung seems to have 
felt, at least somehow, extra ecclesiam. We philosophers have been thrown from the lap of 
Sophia, and so we may have effectively become what Nasr suggests: misosophers.  
 
But Jung also had his own experiences of other ways of knowing. He seems to have struggled 
profoundly with what the Soul wanted to reveal to him on the one hand, and what science 
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demanded of him on the other. He is already looked upon as a fringe figure I think, but things 
would have fared far worse for Jung had he gone further into the Soul—which he may have done 
in the dying process. In any case, Jung elsewhere writes, 
We believe that we can make assertions about God, define him, form an opinion 
about him, differentiate him as the only true one amongst other gods. The 
realization might by this time be dawning that when we talk of God or gods we 
are speaking of debatable images from the psychoid realm. The existence of a 
transcendental reality is indeed evident in itself, but it is uncommonly difficult for 
our consciousness to construct intellectual models which would give a graphic 
description of the reality we have perceived. Our hypotheses are uncertain and 
groping, and nothing offers us the assurance that they may ultimately prove 
correct. That the world inside and outside ourselves rests on a transcendental 
background is as certain as our own existence, but it is equally certain that the 
direct perception of the archetypal world inside us is just as doubtfully correct as 
that of the physical world outside us. If we are convinced that we know the 
ultimate truth concerning metaphysical things, this means nothing more than that 
archetypal images have taken possession of our powers of thought and feeling, so 
that these lose their quality as functions at our disposal. The loss shows itself in 
the fact that the object of perception then becomes absolute and indisputable and 
surrounds itself with such an emotional taboo that anyone who presumes to reflect 
on it is automatically branded a heretic and blasphemer. In all other matters 
everyone would think it reasonable to submit to objective criticism the subjective 
image he has devised for himself of some object. But in the face of possession or 
violent emotion reason is abrogated; the numinous archetype proves on occasion 
to be the stronger because it can appeal to a vital necessity. This is regularly the 
case when it compensates a situation of distress which no amount of reasoning 
can abolish. We know that an archetype can break with shattering force into an 
individual human life and into the life of a nation. It is therefore not surprising 
that it is called “God.” But as men do not always find themselves in immediate 
situations of distress, or do not always feel them to be such, there are also calmer 
moments in which reflection is possible. If one then examines a state of 
possession or an emotional seizure without prejudice, one will have to admit that 
the possession in itself yields nothing that would clearly and reliably characterize 
the nature of the “possessing” factor, although it is an essential part of the 
phenomenon that the “possessed” always feels compelled to make definite 
assertions. Truth and error lie so close together and often look so confusingly 
alike that nobody in his right senses could afford not to doubt the things that 
happen to him in the possessed state. John 4: 1 admonishes us: “Beloved, believe 
not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false 
prophets are gone out into the world.” This warning was uttered at a time when 
there was plenty of opportunity to observe exceptional psychic states. Although, 
as then, we think we possess sure criteria of distinction, the rightness of this 
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conviction must nevertheless be called in question, for no human judgment can 
claim to be infallible. (CW14, para. 787) 
 
We include this passage in our considerations to ask if we in the west are not under the influence 
of an archetype. Which would it be? What could explain our apparent stuckness, which we 
rationalize so well? There is the general consideration Nietzsche raised, which is that “every 
drive wants to be master—and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit” (BGE 6).  Maybe that 
can only happen if we cover it over with “reason”. But maybe there is something more 
archetypal at work.  
 
There are at least two ways to think along such lines. On the one hand, we can maybe follow 
Jung in a more limited manner and suggest that conquest consciousness arises as a mind under 
the influence of the god of war. We are Martians living on Earth—children of Mars rather than 
children of Sophia/Gaia/Eros/Cosmos. We may further contemplate that by considering the fact 
that Mars rules the constellation of Aries, the ram. The focus on the head, on banging one’s head 
into things, even with the clever tactics of war, is not the same as the presencing of our total 
intelligence. To localize our intelligence in the head may be part of an enactment of the Martian 
archetype (Vonnegut’s Plutonians were possibly Mars-Pluto hybrids, in the sense that Pluto is 
the god of money in a certain sense, but in a deeper sense the archetype of unconscious or 
underworld energies, while Mars is volition and, in the encumbered form, certainly aggression).  
 
But we may also explicitly discern the difference between an encumbered and an unencumbered 
archetype. In that sense, we could say Apollo has us enraptured, but this is Apollo in an 
encumbered form, for the unencumbered Apollo was the patron of the famous Oracle of Delphi, 
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the one who proclaimed the wisdom of Socrates—a feat she would have performed on the basis 
of enthusiamos, inspiration from the divine.  
 
We can think of this encumbered relationship as the threat Apollo feels from another energy of 
the psyche or the soul. We can think of Psyche and Soul as basically synonymous. Our word 
“psychology” comes from the Greek word psyche. But, for the Greeks, Psyche was Soul. There 
is an old story about Psyche, who is depicted as an incredibly beautiful woman. The Oracle of 
Apollo—again, the Oracle of the god of “reason,” a paradoxical manifestation of Reason and 
Madness—tells her father the king that his daughter is destined to marry a monster whom no 
human or even a god could resist. That’s an important detail.  
 
Who is this “monster” that the oracle of “reason” spoke of? It is Love. Love is the “monster” no 
human or god can ultimately resist, and Love is a monster because Love will devour our ego and 
its limited and limiting “reason”. A monster is a terrifying unknown, and we must lean into the 
unknown—and, finally, the inconceivable—in order to fully open ourselves to Love. “Reason” 
has to do with what we “know,” and what we “know” is very often what creates suffering for 
ourselves and others. We return here to the Eros of Sorenson, the LUV of McKenna, and the 
problem of hatred as the near enemy of knowledge. An encumbered archetype of “reason” and 
“rationality” may develop unconscious hatreds—unconscious perhaps because it is not “rational” 
to hate, and/or because “reason” must repress “the body”—but, in any case, unconscious, and 
therefore not available for rational reflection, which would drive toward rationalization in any 
case. These are archetypal energies at work. We are lived by powers we pretend to understand. 
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In the myth, Psyche falls in love with Eros, the god of Love, and Eros falls in love with Psyche, 
the Soul. She has to go through a big ordeal—including accomplishing impossible tasks with the 
help of sentient beings such as ants, an eagle, and a river and his reeds; among other things she 
must journey into the underworld—in order to properly establish her love with Eros. This is why 
she may be depicted with Butterfly wings, and associated in general with the Butterfly, symbol 
of transformation.  
 
The importance of this myth cannot be overstated: Our Soul longs for Love—which means it 
longs for Beauty and Wonder too, for the god of Love is both beautiful and wondrous. In order 
for the Soul to relate skillfully with Love, in order for the Soul to realize Love, the Soul must 
establish a relationship with Nature, with “the natural world” and its “beings,” for the Soul of the 
World is not separate from our own Soul.219 Moreover, the Soul must enter the underworld, the 
unknown, and finally the inconceivable. A transformation must occur, in which we die to what 
                                                 
219 Again, we can consider Dewey’s suggestion: “The so-called separation of theory and practice 
means in fact the separation of two kinds of practice, one taking place in the outdoor world, the 
other in the study” (1922: 71). We live in an “outdoor” World, and trying to live “indoors,” “in 
the study,” amounts to an attempt to force a human agenda onto life. It cannot succeed. If we do 
not establish right relation with Nature, and practice-realize the nonduality of Nature and 
Culture, Nature and Experience, then we will not only bring the degradation of our World to 
tragic fruition, but we will never realize the fullest attunement with WisdomLoveBeauty, with 
the divine, with our true Nature. 
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we have been, in order to become what we truly are.220 Thus we can see why the Butterfly is one 
of the true “spirit beings” of LoveWisdom, one of Sophia’s “Sacred Totem Animals”.221  
 
Today we speak rather commonly about “psychology,” and it’s still an important subject, but in 
many of its manifestations it seems to have forgotten about the Soul, or covered it over, or 
minimized its meaning and significance. And we have not honored as we should the lesson that 
the Soul longs for Love first and foremost (longs for be-longing), that the Soul longs for Beauty 
and Wonder, that the Soul must achieve intimacy with Nature and the beings of Nature, and that 
the feeling of Love flowing through us, and the feeling of wonder and appreciation of Beauty in 
the here and now, is itself the heart of true joy and true well-being. It is what we most earnestly 
seek. 
 
Soul doesn’t drive a capitalist economy. Soul is what brings us beyond capitalism, beyond 
consumerism, beyond crooked politics, beyond war, beyond racism, beyond violence of every 
kind, beyond money and materialism—in short: beyond all our beliefs.  
                                                 
220 This matter of transformation and the death that must happen to make way for it had long 
been central to LoveWisdom, and has become almost entirely excluded from philosophy in the 
modern university. The fact that Socrates and Plato saw LoveWisdom as “training for death,” 
and as a kind of “practice of dying”—dying to what doesn’t work, what doesn’t accord with 
reality—and the fact that they invite us into radical transformation, gets almost no serious care 
and attention, and thus students (who become citizens, and who become aging juveniles, never to 
realize adulthood and become Elders of a real Culture) are left adrift, and the structures of power 
and domination co-opt us all into a pattern of insanity which only the transformations of the Soul 
can dispel.  
221 “Animal” comes from “Anima,” the Latin word for Soul, which in turn comes from a root 
word for Breath and Breathing, including associations with Wildness and Wild Beings of Breath, 
and with a special lineage that gives us our word “deer,” the “being that breathes”—which makes 
sense if we have heard a panting buck chasing after a potential mate during the “Season of Love” 
for deer . . . and significant if we know the story of Saint Hubert and the Deer, a myth created 
more recently than the myth of Psyche and Love, but with many beautiful and wise elements. 
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Thus our inquiry suggests that something we could call soul presents us with new options for 
living our lives together. We can think of it as the source of all creativity, and it has creativity 
enough to give us a better vision of ourselves than the one we currently live—if we will hear It 
speak, and trust its voice, trust the process of entering the chrysalis, entering the underworld, 
entering the unknown, and finally realizing the inconceivable. LoveWisdom puts us in touch 
with the soul. That’s all a book like this can try to do: facilitate the practice-and-realization of the 
soul. The realization of our soul is not something anyone can do for us, but there are many things 
that can help us along our way, ideas, images, practices that can provide nourishment and aid. 
 
One thing that might help is to think of Soul as the Nature of Mind. We have mind on the one 
hand, and the Nature of Mind on the other. Mind is samsara, and the Nature of Mind is Sophia. 
Sophia is the Soul. Mind is all the thinking we do, all the stories we tell ourselves, all the worries 
and cravings, all the self-criticism, all the reactions, all the things that hook us, distracting us 
from what we are and what life is, what reality is, what the divine is, what Wisdom, Love, and 
Beauty are. 
 
Soul is like a beautiful spaciousness. It is not a container but the exuberant openness that allows 
the Cosmos to arise. Things can actually happen through the soul and “in” the soul. Things only 
happen in and through the soul. We can notice, for instance, how various things arise in our 
awareness. A cup of coffee arises in awareness. We sip it. We taste it. We taste various aspects 
of it. Then it’s gone. Cups of coffee don’t stay around. Nothing does. There is a fluidity in life. 
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You see these words now, because the other words have gone. Your eyes keep moving, and 
everything continues to arise in our awareness, without any stuckness.  
 
Imagine if you kept seeing only the first page of this book. Nothing but the first page. No matter 
where you looked, you just saw the first page of this book. Then imagine everything else became 
like that: You could only hear one sound, your body was frozen in one pose, your mind stuck on 
one thought. Your life would fall apart—and many of us experience various forms of falling 
apart because of holding onto things, of experiencing an old mental formation instead of what 
could be actually opening up in, through, and as us.  
 
Life depends on an unstuckness that is the essence of soul (an openness that, as we saw with 
Carhart-Harris et al. (2016b), LSD can put us in touch with, and which all philosophical/spiritual 
traditions seek to help us practice and realize). Soul is the flowing relationality of all things. If 
we relax and allow ourselves to calm down and see more clearly, we begin to attune with this 
fluidity and relationality. We begin to think, speak, and move in a more elegant and effective 
way. It takes time, but we can get a taste of it in short order. 
 
For this to happen, we have to rebel a bit, or a lot, against Captain Clock and the anxious pace of 
fake living, the post-truth, post-sacred, post-Nature-Culture landscape. It may seem that life has 
become very fast-paced, and there is always something happening. But, again, our inquiry 
questions these happenings. In the world of false happenings, things happen so fast that by the 
time we register them, they are already irrelevant. But what if this fast pace, what if this 
obsession with the latest trend is all a cover for the fact that nothing is really happening? We’re 
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on a treadmill that goes faster and faster in a confected, post-happening landscape: nothing 
actually happens, and we are only pretending to get somewhere. Jung tried to get at this in the 
passage we considered about the symbolic life. Nothing seems to really happen. What has 
happened in philosophy in the past hundred years or more—what has happened that matters to us 
all? 
 
This is how it is in samsara thinking: Nothing actually happens. Worse yet, anything that appears 
to happen hinges totally on a set of precarious assumptions about what is real. Only in Sophia 
Thinking (which is Original Thinking, what we can call thinking in the fullness of our being) can 
things actually happen, because only then do we participate in reality, which means participating 
in something genuine that transcends us, rather than something superficial that hooks us.  
 
Superficial things can seem “bigger” than we are, and so that gives them a semblance of 
meaningfulness. The university as an institution seems bigger than all the philosophers in it. But, 
like any institution, it rests on practices that invest meaning into it, that cathect into it. We can 
invest meaning in anything at all, and as we do that, it becomes bigger than us in a way. But if 
we invest meaning in something (an apt economic metaphor), rather than allowing meaning to 
arise in a simultaneous co-discovery-creation that offers genuine refuge in reality, we are setting 
ourselves up for suffering—and everyone else too. Real meaning is a matter of soul, our real 
values and our real purpose in this life. 
 
Soul is a difficult word. It can make certain people freak out—including professional 
philosophers, even though Socrates was always telling people to Care for their Soul, like it was 
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his only message. Many non-professional philosophers (by which I mean, all the other human 
beings) have some feeling for it, some appreciation of the word or affinity for the concept, but 
they may not be able to say exactly what they mean by it (is it just “me” minus the body?).  
 
I don’t think we should “know” exactly what we mean by it—especially if it is crucial to a better 
way of knowing. Like all the most important words in philosophy, religion, and spirituality, we 
should keep an attitude of not-knowing. We often use words like Wisdom, Love, Beauty, 
Compassion, Sacred, Soul, Knowledge, and so on as if we really “know” what we mean—or 
demand that others tell us what they mean, because of our assumption that it can be told. If we 
keep a more open heart and mind, we can allow greater intimacy to arise, and we can make these 
words much more real. An epistemology of practice-realization invites us to discover and create 
their meaning, in and through our flesh and bones life, a life that transcends all intellectual 
concepts. In order to make it real, we would approach soul with a heart and mind of not-
knowing. It’s a very intimate thing.  
 
Since soul participates in the symbolic life Jung referred to, it is a good way for us to enjoy life, 
since life is so much more enjoyable when things are really happening. With stupid jobs, fake 
news, bogus democracy, rising inequality, boring committee meetings, and ongoing degradation 
of the World, nothing happens for us but more medicating, repression, denial, unwellness, 
unhappiness, feeling adrift, feeling a sense of meaninglessness.  
 
In a way, we might suggest that soul is the realization that nothing needs to “happen” at all—that 
is, nothing in the current sense of “happening” that our culture emphasizes. All of this busyness, 
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all of these trends, all of the headlines, all of the noise is all nothing-really-happening. It seems 
like something is happening when we get that new car, that new job title, that new piece of 
jewelry, that new publication acceptance, that new level of tenure or pay scale, that new romantic 
partner. There is a merger of spectacle, politics, economics, science and technology, 
epistemology, ethics, and more that makes it seem like fascinating things are happening.  
 
But we may also feel—gradually or suddenly—that these things are not real events. Our team 
won. Our candidate got elected. Our book finally came out. Are these real happenings? They 
may have real consequences, and our investment in them has consequences. We do invest in 
them. In fact, we buy them. These events are products, which is part of why we try to make them 
real—to get our money’s worth, to get our energy’s worth, and because we so desperately want 
something real to happen, and because we are suffering, and we worry that we might not be able 
to buy a happening, which makes us try all the harder. We can put a lot of energy into that team, 
that title, that candidate, that event.  
 
If we look with a lot of tenderness for ourselves, a lot of tenderness for what really matters to us, 
tenderness for what we love and for the people we love, we may see that most of these 
happenings amount to very little. It’s all a distraction from the real happening of life that we long 
to get in touch with, the happening of life that is itself inherently free, such that our engagement 
with it is already liberation—already a better way of knowing. This is the essence of our inquiry. 
We don’t have to put our liberation off. We don’t have to postpone joy, love, gnosis. 
WisdomLoveBeauty is just this happening of the Cosmos—with, through, as our awakening to 
it. Soul can help us enter it and bring it to fruition. So, as we talk about soul, knowing, wisdom, 
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and all the rest in order to orient us in a positive way for practice, we have to keep in touch with 
a spirit of not-knowing that allows that practice to bring something wondrous to realization. 
 
Our inquiry may suggest to us that the soul itself is our context, the context of philosophy, and 
we have denuded and degraded the soul. Validity, knowledge, and science all have roots in the 
soul, and sensing this could reorient our practices. Jung has some important reflections that bear 
on this context of soul: 
The epithet “psychologism”222 applies only to a fool who thinks he has his 
soul in his pocket. There are certainly more than enough such fools, for although 
we know how to talk big about the “soul,” the depreciation of everything psychic 
is a typically Western prejudice. If I make use of the concept “autonomous 
psychic complex,” my reader immediately comes up with the ready-made 
prejudice that it is “nothing but a psychic complex.” How can we be so sure that 
the soul is “nothing but”? It is as if we did not know, or else continually forgot, 
that everything of which we are conscious is an image, and that image is psyche. 
The same people who think that God is depreciated if he is understood as 
something moved in the psyche, as well as the moving force of the psyche—i.e., 
as an autonomous complex—can be so plagued by uncontrollable affects and 
                                                 
222 A philosopher might raise the objection of “psychologism” with reference to someone they 
think has a certain breed of bad idea about knowledge. The term refers to any suggestion that 
“knowledge” depends on the psychology of the knower. In a strong form, it might put us in a 
situation in which someone would ask, “Is that true?” and another would answer, “Well, if you 
have the typical psychology of a human being, you would definitely find that true.” But it seems 
uncomfortable or even absurd to say that the truth of “2 + 2 = 4” depends on human psychology. 
We think of some things as true independently of our psyche or psychology. However, we 
usually point to rather boring examples, like “2 + 2 = 4”. As Nietzsche suggested out, having 
contemplated some of the apparent implications of evolutionary theory, evolution doesn’t care if 
our beliefs or perceptions are “true”. Rather, evolutionary theory suggests our beliefs need only 
function—well enough for us to survive. Mark, Marion, and Hoffman (2010) ran mathematical 
simulations showing, as Nietzsche suggested, that nonveridical perception can have a higher 
survival value than veridical (i.e. “true” or “accurate”) perception. Nietzsche may strike some 
readers as outrageous when he says we have evolved on a condition of untruth or falsity. Yet 
many have come to see this as a commonplace. One psychologist writing on a general audience 
platform declared that, “Nietzsche expressed the idea that people need their illusions, and that 
when all is considered, they live in a lie. He couldn’t have been more correct. Besides the 
defense mechanisms employed with frightening regularity, we have grown into a culture that, 
despite proclaiming a desire for the truth, would actually prefer to be lied to.” 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-second-noble-truth/201403/the-big-lie 
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neurotic states that their wills and their whole philosophy of life fail them 
miserably. Is that a proof of the impotence of the psyche? Should Meister Eckhart 
be accused of “psychologism” when he says, “God must be born in the soul again 
and again”? I think the accusation of “psychologism” can be levelled only at an 
intellect that denies the genuine nature of the autonomous complex and seeks to 
explain it rationalistically as the consequence of known causes, i.e., as something 
secondary and unreal. This is just as arrogant as the metaphysical assertion that 
seeks to make a God outside the range of our experience responsible for our 
psychic states. Psychologism is simply the counterpart of this metaphysical 
presumption, and is just as childish. Therefore it seems to me far more reasonable 
to accord the psyche the same validity as the empirical world, and to admit that 
the former has just as much “reality” as the latter. As I see it, the psyche is a 
world in which the ego is contained. Maybe there are fishes who believe that they 
contain the sea. We must rid ourselves of this habitual illusion of ours if we wish 
to consider metaphysical assertions from the standpoint of psychology. 
A metaphysical assertion of this kind is the idea of the “diamond body,” 
the incorruptible breath-body which grows in the golden flower or in the “field of 
the square inch.” This body is a symbol for a remarkable psychological fact 
which, precisely because it is objective, first appears in forms dictated by the 
experience of biological life—that is, as fruit, embryo, child, living body, and so 
on. This fact could be best expressed by the words “It is not I who live, it lives 
me.” The illusion of the supremacy of consciousness makes us say, “I live.” Once 
this illusion is shattered by a recognition of the unconscious, the unconscious will 
appear as something objective in which the ego is included. . . . 
It is, in fact, a change of feeling similar to that experienced by a father to 
whom a son has been born, a change known to us from the testimony of St. Paul: 
“Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.” The symbol “Christ” as “son of man” is an 
analogous psychic experience of a higher spiritual being who is invisibly born in 
the individual, a pneumatic body which is to serve us as a future dwelling, a body 
which, as Paul says, is put on like a garment (“For as many of you as have been 
baptized into Christ have put on Christ”). It is always a difficult thing to express, 
in intellectual terms, subtle feelings that are nevertheless infinitely important for 
the individual’s life and wellbeing. It is, in a sense, the feeling that we have been 
“replaced.” but without the connotation of having been “deposed.” It is as if the 
guidance of life had passed over to an invisible centre. Nietzsche’s metaphor, “in 
most loving bondage, free,” would be appropriate here. Religious language is full 
of imagery depicting this feeling of free dependence, of calm acceptance. 
This remarkable experience seems to me a consequence of the detachment 
of consciousness, thanks to which the subjective “I live” becomes the objective 
“It lives me.” This state is felt to be higher than the previous one; it is really like a 
sort of release from the compulsion and impossible responsibility that are the 
inevitable results of participation mystique. This feeling of liberation fills Paul 
completely; the consciousness of being a child of God delivers one from the 
bondage of the blood. It is also a feeling of reconciliation with all that happens, 
for which reason, according to the Hui Ming Ching, the gaze of one who has 
attained fulfilment turns back to the beauty of nature.  
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In the Pauline Christ symbol the supreme religious experiences of West 
and East confront one another: Christ the sorrow-laden hero, and the Golden 
Flower that blooms in the purple hall of the city of jade. What a contrast, what an 
unfathomable difference, what an abyss of history! A problem fit for the crowning 
work of a future psychologist! 
Among the great religious problems of the present is one which has 
received scant attention, but which is in fact the main problem of our day: the 
evolution of the religious spirit. If we are to discuss it, we must emphasize the 
difference between East and West in their treatment of the “jewel,” the central 
symbol. The West lays stress on the human incarnation, and even on the 
personality and historicity of Christ, whereas the East says: “Without beginning, 
without end, without past, without future.” The Christian subordinates himself to 
the superior divine person in expectation of his grace; but the Oriental knows that 
redemption depends on the work he does on himself. The Tao grows out of the 
individual. The imitatio Christi has this disadvantage: in the long run we worship 
as a divine example a man who embodied the deepest meaning of life, and then, 
out of sheer imitation, we forget to make real our own deepest meaning—self-
realization. As a matter of fact, it is not altogether inconvenient to renounce one’s 
own meaning. Had Jesus done so, he would probably have become a respectable 
carpenter and not a religious rebel to whom the same thing would naturally 
happen today as happened then. 
The imitation of Christ might well be understood in a deeper sense. It 
could be taken as the duty to realize one’s deepest conviction with the same 
courage and the same self-sacrifice shown by Jesus. Happily not everyone has the 
task of being a leader of humanity, or a great rebel; and so, after all, it might be 
possible for each to realize himself in his own way. This honesty might even 
become an ideal. . . .  
All this is a step in the evolution of a higher consciousness on its way to 
unknown goals, and is not metaphysics as ordinarily understood. To that extent it 
is only “psychology,” but to that extent, too, it is experienceable, understandable 
and—thank God—real, a reality we can do something with, a living reality full of 
possibilities. The fact that I am content with what can be experienced psychically, 
and reject the metaphysical, does not amount, as any intelligent person can see, to 
a gesture of scepticism or agnosticism aimed at faith and trust in higher powers, 
but means approximately the same as what Kant meant when he called the thing-
in-itself a “merely negative borderline concept.” Every statement about the 
transcendental is to be avoided because it is only a laughable presumption on the 
part of a human mind unconscious of its limitations. Therefore, when God or the 
Tao is named an impulse of the soul, or a psychic state, something has been said 
about the knowable only, but nothing about the unknowable, about which nothing 
can be determined. (CW13, para. 75-82) 
 
There is some sort of razor’s edge here, some way to say we live in the soul, but that doesn’t 
make everything a “nothing but” sort of experience. How can we get at it? 
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Recall that Jung expressed some degree of concern for our situation. A lot of academics may feel 
extra Ecclesiam, and then intuitively sense or fear, extra Ecclesiam nulla salus. Philosophers 
might, as Jung did, feel a certain obligation, on behalf of their students and their fellow citizens, 
to look into the matter, to find out what we can do. Our inquiry suggests we can enter into 
mystery. If anyone reading thinks they know what to do, they should by all means do it. If 
someone has answers, let them speak up. Otherwise, perhaps we can quiet down and open up to 
something strange, something befitting the strangeness of our context, and the superness of the 
Cosmos.  
 
Jung suggests that, if we feel we cannot return to these old symbols—because they have been 
degraded, conquered and exploited, ruined like a mountain top minding site—then we can go on 
the Quest. He wrote in a letter, “You must go in quest of yourself, and you will find yourself 
again only in the simple and forgotten things. Why not go into the forest for a time, literally? 
Sometimes a tree tells you more than can be read in books” (1973: 479). Elsewhere he says that, 
if a person cannot find a home in the old symbols, 
then he has to go on the Quest; then he has to find out what his soul says; then he 
has to go through the solitude of a land that is not created. I have published such 
an example in my lectures—that of a great scientist, a very famous man, who 
lives today. He set out to see what the unconscious said to him, and it gave him a 
wonderful lead. That man got into order again because he gradually accepted the 
symbolic data, and now he leads the religious life, the life of the careful observer. 
Religion is careful observation of the data. He now observes all the things 
that are brought him by his dreams; that is his only guidance. 
 We are in a new world with that; we are exactly like primitives. When I 
went to East Africa, I went to a small tribe in Mount Elgon and I asked the 
medicine-man about dreams. He said, “I know what you mean; my father still had 
dreams.” I said, “You have no dreams?” And then he wept and answered, “No, I 
have no dreams anymore.” (CW18: 673) 
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We know how the rest of the story went: No more dreams because the District Commissioner 
knows all that will “happen,” just as our politicians, economists, scientists, techno-capitalists, 
and academics know what will “happen”.  
 
Recall that Jung said, “When you are in the darkness you take the next thing, and that is a dream. 
. . . the one who is going alone and has no guidance, he has the somnia a Deo missa . . .” (674). 
In other words, we ourselves are the Oracle. The inspiration sent by the divine is open to anyone, 
either because of fate or because of practice. Tragedy here is conscious purpose that cuts us off 
from divine inspiration. We ignore the Oracle because we never open up to receiving guidance in 
the first place—ironically, because the unencumbered archetype of Apollo becomes a patron for 
the Oracle. Reason then becomes Sacred, because it participates in Sacredness, participates in the 
Mystery rather than trying to explain mysteries away.  
 
We are in the dark—filled as it is with artificial light. Nevertheless, it is time to dream. 
 
To enter the dream means entering the Bardo. Dreaming is only one set of arts, arts of awareness. 
There are many ways of working with dreams, and it behooves the contemporary philosopher to 
find one and begin working. Doing nothing more than beginning to share dreams, and to record 
them if necessary, is a good first step. But here, “It is time to dream” really means, “It is time to 
step into the darkness—to confront, to embrace, to enter the darkness we are already in. It is time 
to enter the Bardo, to enter the experience of meditation and mystery.” This is not mystery in the 
sense of “making obscure” or the “woo-ification” of all things. It means participation, co-
creating the happening of life.  
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We can turn here to another psychologist for a little guidance. Bernstein (2005) details his own 
experience of having to face the Bardo. Appropriately, he titled his book, Living in the 
Borderland: The Evolution of Consciousness and the Challenge of Healing Trauma. The title 
expresses themes of the book that resonate with themes of our inquiry: Healing, Entering the 
Liminal, and dispelling the duality between Mind and Nature, Nature and Culture, self and other, 
sacred and profane. Bernstein opens the book as follows: 
A psychotherapist whom I supervise opened our supervisory session with the 
following: “So what’s with the animals out there? Everyone in my practice is 
coming in and talking about animals. What’s going on?” I replied that I think that 
what’s going on is that the western psyche is being reconnected to nature, and that 
nature themes in general, and animal themes in particular, reflect what I have 
called “Borderland consciousness,” a phenomenon that is emergent 
in the culture and becoming increasingly prevalent in clinical settings. (xv) 
 
Here, too, we find a phenomenon prevalent but likely unfamiliar to philosophers. Entering into it, 
inquiring into it, we may have to accept something that seems irrational, but which Bernstein, 
like others, prefers to call “transrational”: 
By transrational reality I mean objective nonpersonal, nonrational phenomena 
occurring in the natural universe, information and experience that does not readily 
fit into standard cause and effect logical structure. These are the kinds of 
experience that typically are labeled and dismissed as superstition, irrational, and, 
in the extreme, abnormal or crazy. A major theme of this book is that there is an 
increasing number of people who have transrational experiences that are real 
– not real seeming, not “as if” experiences, but real. One problem that these 
individuals experience in our very left-brain, ratio-centrically, cogni-centrically 
biased culture, is that there is no construct, no frame for receiving and integrating 
such experience. That bias – culturally and psychologically – does not allow for 
the possibility of transrational reality. Thus people who claim to have such 
experience often are ostracized, dismissed out of hand, or worse, branded as 
pathological or crazy. 
There are thousands of people in our culture – people I refer to as 
“Borderland personalities” – whose transrational experience is nothing short of 
sacred. There are many who would not be able to function in our society without 
their deep personal connection to that domain. And most of them feel forced to 
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conceal that dimension of their experience, even from their loved ones, out of fear 
of being ostracized and branded as abnormal. 
There are still others who suffer psychological wounding and who pursue 
psychotherapy in an attempt to heal and to find ways of coping and living in a 
wounded and wounding world. A number of these people have a Borderland 
connection that sustains them. Even so, they fear revealing this dimension even in 
their therapy, lest it be labeled, profaned, and spoiled. Still others are confused by 
their own Borderland experience and wonder themselves whether what they 
experience and cherish is not an extension of pathology and somehow must be 
given up in the name of something they do not understand. And worse, some are 
wounded by the therapy itself if the therapist, because of his rational bias and lack 
of receptivity to transrational experience (and perhaps his own discomfort with 
the very notion of the transrational), labels as pathology what for the patient is 
experienced as authentic and deeply meaningful. Many testimonials in this regard 
follow in this book.  
Moreover, the western ego construct is the organ of rationality. The 
exclusion of transrational reality from consideration leaves it unchecked by any 
power outside itself and prone to profound and dangerous inflation . . . I suggest . 
. . such inflation threatens the very survival of our species. The western ego 
construct buttresses its stance of omnipotence and omniscience with a claim to 
superior and absolute knowledge through its scientific construct. The phrase “its 
scientific construct” is used advisedly. For science is a construct of the mind, and 
not, as some would assert, an independent system determining objective 
knowledge and truth. For all of its correctness and the benefits that flow from it – 
modern medicine for one – science remains, nonetheless a construct of the mind, 
in the context of other constructs, which, if received, could add to the general 
well-being of all of life. Alan Lightman, in a review of Einstein’s Miraculous 
Year: Five Papers that Changed the Face of Physics, observes, “Modern 
textbooks on science give no sense that scientific ideas come out of the minds of 
human beings. Instead, science is portrayed as a set of current laws and results 
inscribed like the Ten Commandments by some immediate but disembodied 
authority.” (xv-xvii) 
 
Bernstein does as we have tried to do: resist attempts to close down on the transrational, resist 
the commands of an encumbered rational archetype to shoot these experiences full of the arrows 
of “reason” and “outrageous fortune”: 
To insist on a rational response to transrational experience, i.e. “It is or it isn’t . . 
.,” aborts the possibility of recognizing a different metaphor of reality. When, for 
example, my patient Hannah reports “feeling” the sadness of the cows, I 
consciously avoid the question of what she “really” did experience. That word 
“really” puts the discourse into a left-brain cause and effect linear metaphor and 
denies the validity of the truth she was struggling to claim. Truth is what it is – 
whether it makes sense to us or not. Our discomfort with what is alluded to in the 
762 
 
moment does not justify denying the other’s reality. Whatever Hannah’s 
experience, it was not that metaphor. We may not be able to put into words what 
her metaphor was, but we can share that she experienced something beyond what 
such questions imply. So in some passages of the book, the reader is thrown back 
on himself to struggle with what is alluded to and what is conjured up in the 
reader, both on a mental and on a body level. (xviii) 
 
Among other things, Bernstein’s study of the Borderland,  
 
incorporates the Navajo medical model as a paradigm for bridging the mind–body 
duality in western medicine. It explores a clinical model that might result from a 
joining of Navajo and allopathic approaches to medicine and healing. It 
demonstrates, through multiple case presentations, how modern medicine could 
benefit from transrational data in the diagnosis and treatment of serious illness. 
(xix) 
 
Similarly, we have suggested in our inquiry that we might heal by means of a better way of 
knowing, one that we can properly call transrational, in something like Bernstein’s sense, and 
that we might find valuable guidance in Indigenous Cultures, and that in any case our better way 
of knowing is a kind of re-Indigenizing. We can see Bernstein’s study as another critical data 
point. Let us consider a longer artefact, having to do with a patient referred to as Hannah, who, 
prior to working with Bernstein, had been in therapy for 12 years, and still suffered greatly. 
Bernstein initially resisted entrance into the Borderland, but his eventual humility allowed him to 
take Hannah’s Liminal Experience more seriously, and to begin a real journey to health, 
wholeness, holiness: 
Given Hannah’s history, I began our work with a traditional approach. I 
explored her family experiences and pursued in depth the issues of substance 
abuse, sexual abuse, and parental neglect. I employed the whole repertoire of 
techniques involved in a good psychoanalytic-psychotherapeutic approach, as we 
call it. This was helpful to some extent. But always during our sessions, I had the 
feeling that something was missing, something was not happening – some part of 
her was absent. 
When Hannah brought her paintings into the sessions, things livened up 
considerably. I wasn’t sure if this was because her painting offered her a way of 
dealing with her depression, isolation, and despair, or if it was more than that. 
Yet, noticeably, we both sensed relief. 
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One day, a year or so into the work, she arrived at my office very 
distressed. Driving home from our previous session, she had found herself behind 
a truck carrying two cows. Her feeling was that the cows were being taken to 
slaughter. I pursued the standard approach of suggesting that she was projecting 
onto the cows, i.e. how she saw her life circumstance in the plight of these cows. 
She went along with me for a time. But then she protested in frustration: “But it’s 
the cows!” I pointed out to her that her response was an identification with 
animals she experienced as abused. She acknowledged the truth of my 
interpretations. She began to talk about all the animals in the world that exist only 
as domesticated beings, and their sadness. And again she burst out: “But it’s the 
cows!” After that last protest – by now at the end of the session – I became aware 
in myself of Hannah’s distress and her identification with the plight of these cows. 
And I also became aware of a different feeling in the room. The feeling was 
attached to Hannah, yet it was separate from her. It seemed of a different 
dimension. It was a new experience for me. 
Some weeks later, Hannah recounted how she had gone for a long walk in 
the country and was followed by some stray dogs. As she described the 
experience, the room filled with pain and remorse. I asked her what she was 
feeling. Again we had a go-round like the one with the cows. And again she 
acknowledged her projection onto the dogs. But this time, out of character 
for her, she became angry – so angry that she took her shoe in her hand and hit the 
floor with it. “You just don’t get it!” she shouted, and slammed the floor again 
with her shoe. “It’s the dogs!” It was as if she were saying the dogs were 
projecting something onto her. The urgency of her tone and her uncharacteristic 
anger jolted me into the realization that my standard interpretations 
were not enough and somehow off the mark. Something other was happening in 
the room. 
The next week Hannah came to our session with a dream suggesting the 
threat of sexual violation by me. The dream jarred me, and I knew I had better 
hear her. I began to listen to her more closely and tried diligently to shut off my 
mind and training. I tried to listen as I sensed the medicine man listens.  
Over the next months Hannah struggled to wrench out of her unconscious 
the words to talk to me. Clearly she was extremely intelligent, yet at times it 
seemed she was groping for a vocabulary that was beyond her reach – a 
vocabulary that perhaps didn’t yet exist. Gradually, however, she did begin to 
communicate her feelings to me. And as she did, I was startled to realize that the 
things she was telling me I had heard once before. 
During my analytical training I had also been learning from native elders 
and healers, particularly from my Navajo friend, Carl Gorman, from a Hopi elder 
whom I called Grandpa, and from a Hopi medicine man, Homer. These men were 
teaching me a new way of looking at life. I realized that here were people whose 
involvement with nature was completely different from the utilitarian, often 
adversarial if sometimes sentimental, attitude toward nature that had characterized 
the western mind for thousands of years. For the Navajo, religion and healing are 
the same. The psychic connection with nature is the source of – and at the same 
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time is inseparable from – spiritual and physical health. Illness is a 
“disconnection” with one’s psychic roots.  
As I listened to Hannah struggle to articulate her emotions, I did “get it.” It 
was indeed the cows. I realized that what Hannah was telling me was precisely 
the same message the native elders and healers were teaching me – and what my 
own unconscious was telling me through my dreams: Everything animate and 
inanimate has within it a spirit dimension and communicates in that dimension to 
those who can listen. . . . 
Hannah is a “Borderland personality.” She lives in the Borderland. She 
embodies and reflects an evolving psyche that is not only new unto itself but one 
that in profound ways is strange and alien to her, as do many others. Such people 
are the frontline recipients of new psychic forms that are entering and impacting 
the western psyche. They experience the tension resulting from split-off psychic 
material reconnecting with an ego that resists and is threatened by it.  
Borderland people personally experience, and must live out, the split from 
nature on which the western ego, as we know it, has been built. They feel (not feel 
about) the extinction of species; they feel (not feel about) the plight of  animals 
that are no longer permitted to live by their own instincts, and which survive only 
in domesticated states to be used as pets or food. Such people are highly intuitive. 
Many, if not most, are psychic to some degree, whether they know it or not. They 
are deeply feeling, sometimes to such a degree that they find themselves in 
profound feeling states that seem irrational to them. Virtually all of them are 
highly sensitive on a bodily level. They experience the rape of the land in their 
bodies, they psychically, and sometimes physically, gasp at the poisoning of the 
atmosphere. Often they suffer from “environmental illness.” This psychic identity 
with the animate and inanimate objects of nature is a phenomenon that 
anthropologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl recognized among native cultures, and which 
he called participation mystique. It is a psychic identification from which, up until 
recently, westerners have been totally alienated. My experience working with 
Hannah brought into focus phenomena I had observed both inside and outside my 
practice over the past 20 years – phenomena that until now had made no sense. 
The Borderland is a phenomenon of the collective unconscious. It is an 
evolutionary dynamic that is moving the western psyche to reconnect our 
overspecialized ego to its natural psychic roots. It is my view that we are all in the 
grip of this unfolding. Indeed, it is possible that our very survival as species Homo 
sapiens may depend on this shift that is taking place. The people I have dubbed 
Borderland personalities experience and incarnate these new psychic forms into 
their lives – and directly and indirectly into ours as members of the western 
cultural collective. In the case of Hannah, I felt I was observing the impact of this 
evolutionary process on a specific individual. (7-9) 
 
Our inquiry invites a return to Mystical Participation—as the better way of knowing we should 
seek—but again with a radical revaluation of that term, one which our current conquest 
consciousness cannot accomplish. It seems that, only by means of surrendering that 
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consciousness, giving up what we cannot keep in exchange for what we are, can we come to 
wonderstand “mystical participation” and truly enter the sacredness it invites us to practice-and-
realize.  
 
It seems highly significant that, with Hannah, Bernstein finally came to insight regarding 
something that evaded him for so much of his career. As we have seen, this appears to be the 
situation with conquest consciousness: It cannot perceive properly, with sufficient skill and 
grace. The anomalous can help liberate it only to the extent that the anomalous can stop that 
consciousness in its habitual operation—a functional inhibition of default patterns of thought, 
speech, action and perception. Thus, we can perhaps also follow Jung’s lead in the recognition of 
the Bardo and the Mysteries of life. Like Bernstein (and dozens of other reasonable people we 
could cite), Jung did not long for mysteries and then create a psychology with space for them. 
Precisely the opposite: He felt the infections of “reason” and “science” as much as anyone in the 
academy, but reality kept knocking him on his backside. I think most of us are trying very hard 
to be satisfied with “reason” and “science,” and, like Jung, we may open ourselves, however 
uncomfortably at first, to things we may call transrational. In an important essay, Jung refers to,  
certain observations and experiences which, I can fairly say, have forced 
themselves upon me during the course of my long medical practice. They have to 
do with spontaneous, meaningful coincidences of so high a degree of 
improbability as to appear flatly unbelievable. I shall therefore describe to you 
only one case of this kind, simply to give an example characteristic of a whole 
category of phenomena. It makes no difference whether you refuse to believe this 
particular case or whether you dispose of it with an ad hoc explanation. I could 
tell you a great many such stories, which are in principle no more surprising or 
incredible than the irrefutable results arrived at by Rhine [one of the early 
scientific researchers into what we call ESP], and you would soon see that almost 
every case calls for its own explanation. But the causal explanation, the only 
possible one from the standpoint of natural science, breaks down owing to the 
psychic relativization of space and time, which together form the indispensable 
premises for the cause-and-effect relationship. 
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My example concerns a young woman patient who, in spite of efforts 
made on both sides, proved to be psychologically inaccessible. The difficulty lay 
in the fact that she always knew better about everything. Her excellent education 
had provided her with a weapon ideally suited to this purpose, namely a highly 
polished Cartesian rationalism with an impeccably “geometrical” idea of reality. 
After several fruitless attempts to sweeten her rationalism with a somewhat more 
human understanding, I had to confine myself to the hope that something 
unexpected and irrational would turn up, something that would burst the 
intellectual retort into which she had sealed herself. Well, I was sitting opposite 
her one day, with my back to the window, listening to her flow of rhetoric. She 
had had an impressive dream the night before, in which someone had given her a 
golden scarab—a costly piece of jewellery. While she was still telling me this 
dream, I heard something behind me gently tapping on the window. I turned 
round and saw that it was a fairly large flying insect that was knocking against the 
window-pane from outside in the obvious effort to get into the dark room. This 
seemed to me very strange. I opened the window immediately and caught the 
insect in the air as it flew in. It was a scarabaeid beetle, or common rose-chafer 
(Cetonia aurata), whose goldgreen colour most nearly resembles that of a golden 
scarab. I handed the beetle to my patient with the words, “Here is your scarab.” 
This experience punctured the desired hole in her rationalism and broke the ice of 
her intellectual resistance. The treatment could now be continued with satisfactory 
results. 
This story is meant only as a paradigm of the innumerable cases of 
meaningful coincidence that have been observed not only by me but by many 
others, and recorded in large collections. They include everything that goes by the 
name of clairvoyance, telepathy, etc., from Swedenborg’s well-attested vision of 
the great fire in Stockholm to the recent report by Air Marshal Sir Victor Goddard 
about the dream of an unknown officer, which predicted the subsequent accident 
to Goddard’s plane. (CW8: 981-3) 
 
We consider this artefact for several reasons, perhaps foremost among them the following: If 
anyone should ask me what I recommend in order to help with the practice-realization of a better 
way of knowing, I would suggest, “Cultivate Synchronicity.” Such a recommendation comes 
altogether with recommending a spiritual way of life, a life that includes sati (awareness of 
everyday actions, and a remembering of oneself, the world, and the imperatives of philosophy), a 
life that includes ethical vows and wise intentions, a life of Wisdom, Love, and Beauty that 
Synchronicities express, expound, and lead us further and further into. Synchronicities rupture 
the barriers of “reason,” they shift the encumbered archetype of rationality and open us to 
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unencumbered ways of thinking and knowing. Synchronicity ruptures the barriers that prevent 
our perception of the mystical participation we can never escape. The intimacy of 
interwovenness that we ourselves already are has perhaps no better name than “Mystical 
Participation,” and any way of knowing worthy of our attention and care must somehow arise 
altogether with that interwovenness.  
 
Related to this, the second reason the artefact above holds special significance rests in the 
resistance of the client, the rationality and “education” that has fostered a resistance to healing 
and holiness that only a rupture can dispel. Without synchronicity, and/or without holotropic 
medicines, and the spiritual practices that go along with these, today’s academic, and much of 
our culture, may remain resistant to healing and the possibility of verifying the sacredness of life. 
 
With respect to these considerations, we can consider something Pauli wrote: 
Sometimes I think that I will only be able to reach the longed-for coniunctio 
[sacred marriage] if I could say something or formulate something that would 
greatly shock both the representatives of conventional religion and the 
representatives of conventional science. But I do not yet know exactly what it is. 
(from Gieser, 255) 
 
Pauli’s sentiment resonates with our inquiry—though we could add conventional philosophers, 
academics, and even citizens to the mix. At the same time, somehow there is something that 
wants to be said and wants not to be said here, in this inquiry. In part, it cannot be said. In part, 
as much work as we have done, we have not done enough to say what we might need to.  
 
We might at least say that, whatever we want to call the Sophianic process that created our 
Cosmos, our home, perhaps only delusion keeps us from sensing that it created relationally—in, 
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through, as relational openness—and that it itself must be relational. Our science and 
psychology, it seems, need to embrace this, on the basis of an epistemology rooted in it. As Pauli 
wrote in another letter: 
To sum up, I should like to say that it seems that there must be very deep 
connections between soul and matter and, hence, between the physics and the 
psychology of the future, which are not yet conceptually expressed in modern 
science. [–––] Such deep connections must surely exist, because otherwise the 
human mind would not be able to discover concepts which fit nature at all. 
(from Gieser, 2005: vii) 
 
It says a lot that Pauli refers here to a physics and psychology that does not currently exist—it 
didn’t in his day, and it seems not much of a venture to suggest it still doesn’t today. We come 
face to face with this again and again: The dominant culture, including its sciences of “mind” 
and “matter,” require a paradigm shift, and this means the nature of reality remains obscure to us, 
in ways that have become critical. In yet another letter, Pauli writes, 
The layman usually means, when he says “reality,” that he is speaking of 
something self-evidently known; whereas to me it seems the most important and 
exceedingly difficult task of our time is to work on the construction of a new idea 
of reality. (Gieser 2005: 268). 
 
Not only the layman. Perhaps because this letter is earlier than the previous one, he forgets to 
mention the scientist, and of course doesn’t bother to mention the philosopher, and yet all of 
them need a new vision of reality.  
 
William James suggested that, “Where there is no vision the people perish. Few professorial 
philosophers have any vision” (1987: 705). He discusses Fechner as an example of a philosopher 
with vision: “Thus is the universe alive, according to this philosopher! I think you will admit that 
he makes it more thickly alive than do the other philosophers who, following rationalistic 
methods solely, gain the same results, but only in the thinnest outlines.” (708) This thinness 
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James finds troubling. He says “If philosophy is more a matter of passionate vision than of 
logic,—and I believe it is, logic only finding reasons for the vision afterwards,—must not such 
thinness come either from the vision being defective in the disciples, or from their passion 
[compared to that of someone like Fechner] being as moonlight unto sunlight or as water unto 
wine?” (710) 
 
Somehow, our inquiry seems to invite us into a more passionate vision, a more passionate 
relationship with ourselves, each other, and the sacred, living World. The barrier seems to be 
something interwoven out of fear, delusion, pride, an ego-centric style of consciousness 
cultivated powerfully in the west, active misknowing, conscious and unconscious dynamics, the 
things we call science and philosophy, politics and economics. It’s a complicated story in a way, 
and also a simple one in some sense. 
 
Somehow, we have to experience a philosophical thunderbolt to startle us out of our slumber. As 
Charles Seif wrote in the journal Science, “Every once in a while, cosmologists are dragged, 
kicking and screaming, into a universe much more unsettling than they had any reason to expect” 
(2005: 78). Scientists dragged, kicking and screaming—I think some philosophers would do 
worse. Why is this? Doesn’t it seem to come from apparent certainties about what the Cosmos 
simply cannot contain as possibilities? Doesn’t it come from a kind of foreclosure on what we 
will allow? What makes us the arbiters of the possible? 
 
Hans-Peter Dürr suggests that, 
If it had been originally assumed that in the course of the progress of the sciences 
the ‘transcendental’ would be increasingly suppressed, because in the last resort 
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everything would be capable of rational explanation, it now turned out, on the 
contrary, that the material world which is so tangible to us increasingly proves to 
be apparition and dissolves into a reality where it is no longer things and matter, 
but form and shape, which dominate. [----]  
Quantum physics made it clear again that our scientific experience, our 
knowledge of the world, does not represent the ‘inherent’ and ‘ultimate’ reality, 
whatever one wishes that to mean. (from Gieser 2005: 252) 
 
One can find lots of little tidbits like this amongst the physicists and other “serious” scientists of 
the past century or more—so many that it remains puzzling why so many academics, especially 
in the case of scientists and philosophers, remain hostile to what might transcend their notions 
about “ultimate” reality. One finds this hostility expressed outside of academia in the literature 
that presents itself as “skeptical” “rational” “scientific” discourse, such as the various skeptical 
blogs and wiki pages. Will any of that skepticism help philosophy as a discipline, or help sentient 
beings on a planet in which a breakdown of mystical participation has gone altogether with the 
degradation of that planet, in a manner which we have tried to consider as in some sense causal, 
and not mere correlation? What if there is something we are just not seeing with the mind we 
take to be normal? We can also ask this from the standpoint of what we might fail to see from the 
standpoint of the science we take to be normal. William James suggested that, “Repugnant as the 
mystical style of philosophizing may be,” it may yet be that paying attention to mysticism could 
put a philosopher in “the best possible position to help philosophy,” and, given the sense of 
“philosophy” we have cultivated in our inquiry, this would in turn put the philosopher in the best 
possible position to help the sciences, the arts, the World and its beings. Here is the larger 
artefact from James: 
“The great field for new discoveries,” said a scientific friend to me the other day, 
“is always the unclassified residuum.” Round about the accredited and orderly 
facts of every science there ever floats a sort of dust-cloud of exceptional 
observations, of occurrences minute and irregular and seldom met with, which it 
always proves more easy to ignore than to attend to. The ideal of every science is 
that of a closed and completed system of truth. The charm of most sciences to 
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their more passive disciples consists in their appearing, in fact, to wear just this 
ideal form. Each one of our various ologies seems to offer a definite head of 
classification for every possible phenomenon of the sort which it professes to 
cover; and so far from free is most men’s fancy, that, when a consistent and 
organized scheme of this sort has once been comprehended and assimilated, a 
different scheme is unimaginable. No alternative, whether to whole or parts, can 
any longer be conceived as possible. Phenomena unclassifiable within the system 
are therefore paradoxical absurdities, and must be held untrue. When, moreover, 
as so often happens, the reports of them are vague and indirect; when they come 
as mere marvels and oddities rather than as things of serious moment,—one 
neglects or denies them with the best of scientific consciences. Only the born 
geniuses let themselves be worried and fascinated by these outstanding 
exceptions, and get no peace till they are brought within the fold. Your Galileos, 
Galvanis, Fresnels, Purkinjes, and Darwins are always getting confounded and 
troubled by insignificant things. Anyone will renovate his science who will 
steadily look after the irregular phenomena. And when the science is renewed, its 
new formulas often have more of the voice of the exceptions in them than of what 
were supposed to be the rules. 
No part of the unclassified residuum has usually been treated with a more 
contemptuous scientific disregard than the mass of phenomena generally called 
mystical. Physiology will have nothing to do with them. Orthodox psychology 
turns its back upon them. Medicine sweeps them out; or, at most, when in an 
anecdotal vein, records a few of them as “effects of the imagination” a phrase of 
mere dismissal, whose meaning, in this connection, it is impossible to make 
precise. All the while, however, the phenomena are there, lying broadcast over the 
surface of history. No matter where you open its pages, you find things recorded 
under the name of divinations, inspirations, demoniacal possessions, apparitions, 
trances, ecstasies, miraculous healings and productions of disease, and occult 
powers possessed by peculiar individuals over persons and things in their 
neighborhood. We suppose that “mediumship” originated in Rochester, N. Y., and 
animal magnetism with Mesmer; but once look behind the pages of official 
history, in personal memoirs, legal documents, and popular narratives and books 
of anecdote, and you will find that there never was a time when these things were 
not reported just as abundantly as now. We college-bred gentry, who follow the 
stream of cosmopolitan culture exclusively, not infrequently stumble upon some 
old-established journal, or some voluminous native author, whose names are 
never heard of in our circle, but who number their readers by the quarter-million. 
It always gives us a little shock to find this mass of human beings not only living 
and ignoring us and all our gods, but actually reading and writing and cogitating 
without ever a thought of our canons and authorities. Well, a public no less large 
keeps and transmits from generation to generation the traditions and practices of 
the occult; but academic science cares as little for its beliefs and opinions as you, 
gentle reader, care for those of the readers of the Waverley and the Fireside 
Companion. To no one type of mind is it given to discern the totality of truth. 
Something escapes the best of us—not accidentally, but systematically, and 
because we have a twist.  The scientific-academic mind and the feminine-mystical 
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mind shy from each other’s facts, just as they fly from each other’s temper and 
spirit. Facts are there only for those who have a mental affinity with them. When 
once they are indisputably ascertained and admitted, the academic and critical 
minds are by far the best fitted ones to interpret and discuss them—for surely to 
pass from mystical to scientific speculations is like passing from lunacy to sanity; 
but on the other hand if there is anything which human history demonstrates, it is 
the extreme slowness with which the ordinary academic and critical mind 
acknowledges facts to exist which present themselves as wild facts, with no stall 
or pigeon-hole, or as facts which threaten to break up the accepted system. In 
psychology, physiology, and medicine, wherever a debate between the mystics 
and the scientifics has been once for all decided, it is the mystics who have 
usually proved to be right about the facts, while the scientifics had the better of it 
in respect to the theories. The most recent and flagrant example of this is “animal 
magnetism,” whose facts were stoutly dismissed as a pack of lies by academic 
medical science the world over, until the non-mystical theory of “hypnotic 
suggestion” was found for themwhen they were admitted to be so excessively and 
dangerously common that special penal laws, forsooth, must be passed to keep all 
persons unequipped with medical diplomas from taking part in their production. 
Just so stigmatizations, invulnerabilities, instantaneous cures, inspired discourses, 
and demoniacal possessions, the records of which were shelved in our libraries 
but yesterday in the alcove headed “superstitions,” now, under the brand-new title 
of ‘‘cases of hystero-epilepsy,” are republished, re-observed, and reported with an 
even too credulous avidity.  
Repugnant as the mystical style of philosophizing may be (especially 
when self-complacent), there is no sort of doubt that it goes with a gift for 
meeting with certain kinds of phenomenal experience. The writer of these pages 
has been forced in the past few years to this admission; and he now believes that 
he who will pay attention to facts of the sort dear to mystics, while reflecting upon 
them in academic-scientific ways, will be in the best possible position to help 
philosophy. (1987: 680-2) 
 
It is interesting how James relates an interest in mysticism with scientific genius—perhaps 
because at least some famous scientists seem to exhibit or wrestle with a mystical impulse, but 
also perhaps because James, like Pauli and Jung, sensed how important it seems to be in our 
historical context to inquire into the nature of mind and arrive at some real understanding of the 
relationship between what we have called “mind” and what we have called “matter”.  According 
to Gieser, Pauli’s studies of Kepler indicated that, “Kepler retained a mystic element in the 
science of his time, but from modern science this element, this value, has totally disappeared. 
Pauli asks: Where can it have gone? There can only be one solution to the problem: science must 
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also include ‘knowledge of salvation’” (Gieser 2005: 257). In other words, science must become 
more philosophical, more mystical, more ecological—more skillful and realistic. It seems that 
taking James or Pauli seriously implies the possibility that academic-scientific thinking itself 
needs revisioning on the basis of mystical experience. And thus we face all the challenges and 
interesting potentials we have touched on in our inquiry. 
 
The importance James senses in mysticism also relates to his own work as a psychologist. He 
tells us in Varieties of Religious Experience, 
I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in 
psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first made 
in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the consciousness of the 
ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the 
shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and 
outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as 
conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I 
call this the most important step forward because, unlike the other advances 
which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely 
unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature. No other step forward 
which psychology has made can proffer any such claim as this. (1987: 215) 
 
The most important step forward? And it has to do with Liminal Awareness, crossing a 
threshold, entering into a margin, entering a Bardo. We see this even today, not only in the so-
called parapsychology literature (peer-reviewed and rigorous as much of it is), but even in the 
once-taboo but now acceptable study of advanced meditators who can enter non-ordinary states. 
James, it seems, was onto something. Near the end of his life, in The Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods, James made “A Suggestion about Mysticism”: 
The suggestion, stated very briefly, is that states of mystical intuition may 
be only very sudden and great extensions of the ordinary “field of consciousness.” 
Concerning the causes of such extensions I have no suggestion to make; but the 
extension itself would, if my view be correct, consist in an immense spreading of 
the margin of the field, so that knowledge ordinarily trans-marginal would 
become included, and the ordinary margin would grow more central. 
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Fechner’s “wavescheme” will diagrammatize the alteration, as I conceive it, if we 
suppose that the wave of present awareness, steep above the horizontal line that 
represents the plane of the usual “threshold,” slopes away below it very gradually 
in all directions. A fall of the threshold, however caused, would, under these 
circumstances, produce the state of things which we see on an unusually flat shore 
at the ebb of a spring-tide. Vast tracts usually covered are then revealed to view, 
but nothing rises more than a few inches above the water’s bed, and great parts of 
the scene are submerged again, whenever a wave washes over them. 
Some persons have naturally a very wide, others a very narrow, field of 
consciousness. The narrow field may be represented by an unusually steep form 
of the wave. When by any accident the threshold lowers, in persons of this type—
I speak here from direct personal experience—so that the field widens and the 
relations of its center to matters usually subliminal come into view, the larger 
panorama perceived fills the mind with exhilaration and a sense of mental power. 
It is a refreshing experience; and—such is now my hypothesis—we only have to 
suppose it to occur in an exceptionally extensive form, to give us a mystical 
paroxysm, if such a term be allowed.  
A few remarks about the field of consciousness may be needed to give 
more definiteness to my hypothesis. The field is composed at all times of a mass 
of present sensation, in a cloud of memories, emotions, concepts, etc. Yet these 
ingredients, which have to be named separately, are not separate, as the conscious 
field contains them. Its form is that of a much-at-once, in the unity of which the 
sensations, memories, concepts, impulses, etc., coalesce and are dissolved. The 
present field as a whole came continuously out of its predecessor and will melt 
into its successor as continuously again, one sensation-mass passing into another 
sensation-mass and giving the character of a gradually changing present to the 
experience, while the memories and concepts carry time-coefficients which place 
whatever is present in a temporal perspective more or less vast. 
When, now, the threshold falls, what comes into view is not the next mass 
of sensation; for sensation requires new physical stimulations to produce it, and 
no alteration of a purely mental threshold can create these. Only in case the 
physical stimuli were already at work subliminally, preparing the next sensation, 
would whatever sub-sensation was already prepared reveal itself when the 
threshold fell. But with the memories, concepts, and conational states, the case is 
different. Nobody knows exactly how far we are “marginally” conscious of these 
at ordinary times, or how far beyond the “margin” of our present thought trans-
marginal consciousness, of them may exist.223 There is at any rate no definite 
                                                 
223 James includes the following footnote here, the end of which seems particularly important, as 
it seems not so much a matter of preference but scientific conscience: “Transmarginal or 
subliminal, the terms are synonymous. Some psychologists deny the existence of such 
consciousness altogether (A. H. Pierce, for example, and Münsterberg apparently). Others, e. g., 
Bergson, make it exist and carry the whole freight of our past. Others again (as Myers) would 
have it extend (in the “telepathic” mode of communication) from one person’s mind into 
another’s. For the purposes of my hypothesis I have to postulate its existence; and once 
postulating it, I prefer not to set any definite bounds to its extent.” 
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bound set between what is central and what is marginal in consciousness, and the 
margin itself has no definite bound a parte foris. It is like the field of vision, 
which the slightest movement of the eye will extend, revealing objects that always 
stood there to be known. My hypothesis is that a movement of the threshold 
downwards will similarly bring a mass of subconscious memories, conceptions, 
emotional feelings, and perceptions of relation, etc., into view all at once; and that 
if this enlargement of the nimbus that surrounds the sensational present is vast 
enough, while no one of the items it contains attracts our attention singly, we shall 
have the conditions fulfilled for a kind of consciousness in all essential respects 
like that termed mystical. It will be transient, if the change of threshold is 
transient. It will be of reality, enlargement, and illumination, possibly rapturously 
so. It will be of unification, for the present coalesces in it with ranges of the 
remote quite out of its reach under ordinary circumstances; and the sense of 
relation will be greatly enhanced. Its form will be intuitive or perceptual, not 
conceptual, for the remembered or conceived objects in the enlarged field are 
supposed not to attract the attention singly, but only to give the sense of a 
tremendous muchness suddenly revealed. If they attracted attention separately, we 
should have the ordinary steep-waved consciousness, and the mystical character 
would depart. (1987: 1272-4) 
 
James here works in his own way with the notion of the threshold, the liminal, the Bardo. He 
goes on to consider experiences of a mystical character, including a dream experience of his 
own. In contemplating it, we can note the fear we reflected on earlier, when considering Mayer’s 
experience of extraordinary knowing. The fear seems to go together with whatever energy our 
system invests in keeping us anchored in a sense of self, keeping the range of mind states fairly 
restricted, keeping us in a supraluminal state, keeping a sense of control and of a controller, 
keeping a sense of the known, keeping the Bardo at bay. We seem to need the right kind of 
context to drop off the body and mind we habitually identify with and enter the mystery of what 
we are. This dream experience may not seem strange to us, and perhaps all we can do is imagine 
a dream experience that somehow ruptures the ordinary solidity of the self, dispelling our ability 
to conveniently hide behind our own skin: 
 
On the following night (Feb. 12 13) I awoke suddenly from my first sleep, 
which appeared to have been very heavy, in the middle of a dream, in thinking of 
which I became suddenly confused by the contents of two other dreams that 
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shuffled themselves abruptly in between the parts of the first dream, and of which 
I couldn’t grasp the origin. Whence come these dreams? I asked. They were close 
to me, and fresh, as if I had just dreamed them; and yet they were far away from 
the first dream. The contents of the three had absolutely no connection. One had a 
cockney atmosphere, it had happened to some one in London. The other two were 
American. One involved the trying on of a coat (was this the dream I seemed to 
wake from?) the other was a sort of nightmare and had to do with soldiers. Each 
had a wholly distinct emotional atmosphere that made its individuality 
discontinuous with that of the others. And yet, in a moment, as these three dreams 
alternately telescoped into and out of each other, and I seemed to myself to have 
been their common dreamer, they seemed quite as distinctly not to have been 
dreamed in succession, in that one sleep. When, then? Not on a previous night, 
either. When, then? and which was the one out of which I had just awakened? I 
could no longer tell: one was as close to me as the others, and yet they entirely 
repelled each other, and I seemed thus to belong to three different dream-systems 
at once, no one of which would connect itself either with the others or with my 
waking life. I began to feel curiously confused and scared, and tried to wake 
myself up wider, but I seemed already wide-awake. Presently cold shivers of 
dread ran over me: am I getting into other people’s dreams? Is this a ‘telepathic’ 
experience? Or an invasion of double (or treble) personality? Or is it a thrombus 
in a cortical artery? and the beginning of a general mental ‘confusion’ and 
disorientation which is going on to develop who knows how far? 
Decidedly I was losing hold of my ‘self,’ and making acquaintance with a 
quality of mental distress that I had never known before, its nearest analogue 
being the sinking, giddying anxiety that one may have when, in the woods, one 
discovers that one is really ‘lost.’ Most human troubles look towards a terminus. 
Most fears point in a direction, and concentrate towards a climax. Most assaults of 
the evil one may be met by bracing oneself against something, one’s principles, 
one’s courage, one’s will, one's pride. But in this experience all was diffusion 
from a centre, and foothold swept away, the brace itself disintegrating all the 
faster as one needed its support more direly. Meanwhile vivid perception (or 
remembrance) of the various dreams kept coming over me in alternation. Whose? 
whose? WHOSE? Unless I can attach them, I am swept out to sea with no horizon 
and no bond, getting lost. The idea aroused the ‘creeps’ again, and with it the fear 
of again falling asleep and renewing the process. It had begun the previous night, 
but then the confusion had only gone one step, and had seemed simply curious. 
This was the second step—where might I be after a third step had been taken? My 
teeth chattered at the thought. 
At the same time I found myself filled with a new pity towards persons 
passing into dementia with Verwirrtheit, or into invasions of secondary 
personality. We regard them as simply curious; but what they want in the awful 
drift of their being out of its customary self, is any principle of steadiness to hold 
on to. We ought to assure them and reassure them that we will stand by them, and 
recognize the true self in them to the end. We ought to let them know that we are 
with them and not (as too often we must seem to them) a part of the world that but 
confirms and publishes their deliquescence. . . . 
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The distressing confusion of mind in this experience was the exact 
opposite of mystical illumination, and equally unmystical was the definiteness of 
what was perceived. But the exaltation of the sense of relation was mystical (the 
perplexity all revolved about the fact that the three dreams both did and did not 
belong in the most intimate way together); and the sense that reality was being 
uncovered was mystical in the highest degree. (1276-9) 
 
The evocation of compassion seems like a nice benefit, and it also seems significant that we have 
ourselves suggested an intimacy between Wisdom and madness. It seems we must tread 
carefully, lest we slip off the razor’s edge of Wisdom and fall into delusion or psychopathy. And, 
in case the reader underestimates the intensity of this experience or its effect on James, we can 
consider a footnote he places with the above account, in which he refers to the experience as 
involving a kind of devastation: 
In my own case the confusion was foudroyante [devastating, or perhaps terrible, 
sudden, violent]—a state of consciousness unique and unparalleled in my 64 years 
of the world’s experience; yet it alternated quickly with perfectly rational states, 
as this record shows. It seems, therefore, merely as if the threshold between the 
rational and the morbid state had, in my case, been temporarily lowered, and as if 
similar confusions might be very near the line of possibility in all of us. 
There are also the suggestions of a telepathic entrance into some one else’s 
dreams, and of a doubling up of personality. In point of fact I don’t know now 
‘who’ had those three dreams, or which one ‘I’ first woke up from, so quickly did 
they substitute themselves back and forth for each other, discontinuously. Their 
discontinuity was the pivot of the situation. My sense of it was as ‘vivid’ and 
‘original’ an experience as anything Hume could ask for. And yet they kept 
telescoping! 
Then there is the notion that by waking at certain hours we may tap 
distinct strata of ancient dream-memory. (1987: 1278-9) 
 
In addition to his own experience, James examines the experience of someone else. Of his 
reflections on both of these experiences, he concludes this way: 
I have treated the phenomenon under discussion as if it consisted in the 
uncovering of tracts of consciousness. Is the consciousness already there waiting 
to be uncovered? and is it a veridical revelation of reality? These are questions on 
which I do not touch. In the subjects of the experience the “emotion of 
conviction” is always strong, and sometimes absolute. The ordinary psychologist 
disposes of the phenomenon under the conveniently “scientific” head of petit mal, 
if not of “bosh” or ‘‘rubbish.” But we know so little of the noetic value of 
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abnormal mental states of any kind that in my own opinion we had better keep an 
open mind and collect facts sympathetically for a long time to come. We shall not 
understand these alterations of consciousness either in this generation or in the 
next. (1987: 1280) 
 
This notion of uncovering something already there, but beneath the threshold of supraliminal 
awareness, pervades the whole of our inquiry, and it seems to pervade the whole of philosophy in 
one way or another. It is never “cutting-edge” wisdom that we invent out of nothing, never a bag 
of tricks we present in the manner of “cutting-edge” science and technology, but rather insights 
that deserve the name Wisdom because of how they touch the obvious that had somehow 
become lost. This does not mean Wisdom never goes altogether with new “knowledge,” but that 
Wisdom is the precondition for anything that deserve to be thought of as based on knowing, 
rather than rooted in ignorance. Knowledge rooted in ignorance does not seem worthy of being 
called knowledge, but simply a set of techniques, a bag of tricks, a program of cleverness. 
 
Jung gets at this “already there” quality James alludes to, and somehow we have to try and 
approach a sense of it that does not lurch into the “myth of the given”. The nonduality of unity 
and diversity, self and world, and so on makes it challenging to wonderstand the difference 
between the giftedness of life and the myth of the given.  
What if there was a living agency beyond our everyday human world - something 
even more purposeful than electrons? Do we delude ourselves in thinking that we 
possess and control our own psyches, and is what science calls the “psyche” not 
just a question mark arbitrarily confined within the skull, but rather a door that 
opens upon the human world from a world beyond, allowing unknown and 
mysterious powers to act upon man and carry him on the wings of the night to a 
more than personal destiny? (CW15, par. 148) 
 
Lived by powers we pretend to understand, the ego tries to maintain an illusion of boundedness 
and control. Nevertheless, transdermal and in general non-cranial factors seem real, and seem to 
influence our lives and our loves. Jung referred to these factors or powers, at least some of them, 
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as archetypes. In his collaboration with Pauli, the physicist got him to carry the notion of the 
archetype beyond the psyche. In a lecture delivered in honor of Jung’s 80th birthday, Pauli said, 
Although in physics one does not speak of ‘archetypes’ which reproduce 
themselves, but of ‘statistical laws of nature with primary probabilities’, both 
formulations meet in the tendency to amplify the older more narrow idea of 
‘causality (determinism)’ to a more general form of connection in nature, toward 
which the psychophysical problem also points. This way of consideration leads 
me to the expectation, that the ideas on the unconscious will not be developed 
further in the narrow frame of their therapeutic applications, but that their junction 
with the general stream of the natural sciences of the phenomena of life will be 
decisive for them. (Gieser, 345) 
 
We see here an intimation of a non-dual reality behind or under or pervading what we call 
“mind” and what we call “matter”. Pauli seems, then, to demand a new kind of science, a new 
kind of “natural law” that will account for both “physical” and “mental” phenomena. It does not 
seem that neuroscience is any closer to leaping into such a science than is physics or psychology. 
There is yet a role here for the philosopher and the psychologist if they can remain experimental, 
and if they can get beyond mere “therapy” and enter into the therapeia of old, reinvigorating it.  
 
Based on a study of the many letters exchanged between Pauli and Jung, Gieser explains some 
key features of Pauli’s view as follows: 
It is the occurrence of similar concepts and thought models in both physics and 
psychology that makes Pauli so certain that they rest on a foundation of shared 
structures. It ought to be possible to express these structures in a generally neutral 
language. As yet we know remarkably little about this depth structure, but one 
thing is certain – to understand it we must seek a new type of natural law, one 
which can include psychic reality as well as physical. This natural law must also 
encompass the irrational, in the sense of the creative and unique. In this way Pauli 
wants to unite the classical search for an objective worldview with the 
epistemological revolution implied by Kant and his successors. The irrational 
enters into science with the observer and the moment of observation, where every 
observation becomes to some extent an act of creation. By including the observer 
– not only as a measuring instrument but as a person – in the description of 
nature, we must also include psychology. The most evident psychological role in 
science is naturally that played by our intellectual apparatus: the possibility of 
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processing, interpreting and understanding our observations. But man as a 
psychological being consists of much more than a recording intellect. Man 
consists of impulses, feelings, fears, fantasies and convictions which are based on 
archetypal models. 
 One of the ways in which such a psychological factor expresses itself is in 
the fascination of the practitioner of science with a subject, a fascination which is 
at best a commitment and at worst an obsession. If one is gripped by entirely 
different visions, a scientific discussion is difficult, if not impossible. An 
epistemological insight into the religious side of scientific work might be able to 
prepare the way for a more humble and fertile meeting of different schools and 
disciplines. The insight into the fact that science rests on irrational foundations, in 
other words that rational conceptualization and scientific theory rest on a 
preliminary stage of figurative and intuitive viewing, was developed by Pauli in 
his essay on background physics. It became important for Pauli to emphasize that 
one can never achieve a complete knowledge of the process of scientific 
conceptualization if one does not take this preliminary stage into account. For it is 
here that the creative side of scientific activity is based. Pauli divided up science 
into two distinct parts: on the one side the discovery of laws of nature and the 
advent of theories, on the other the confirmation or application of them. The 
greatest gains of science quite often take place in an ‘unscientific’ manner, via 
feelings, intuitions, impulses and sudden flashes of inspiration – even via dreams 
and visions. Developing these inspirations by hard work and testing into 
applicable and fertile instruments is of equal importance. . . . 
[Pauli] seems nonetheless to have entirely accepted the idea that the 
archetypes are associated with numinosum, a force which expresses itself in 
everything from pure instinct to the most spiritual striving. At the same time Pauli 
was fully convinced that the archetypes in themselves could not be defined as 
purely psychic factors. It is quite evident that it was Pauli’s pressure that led Jung 
to widen his concept of the archetype in a more non-platonic, non-visual and non-
mentalist direction and resort to the concept psychoid, as a reference to the 
possibility that perhaps the archetypes are not of a solely psychic nature. A further 
step in this direction was taken with the idea of a potential, constellating 
archetype ‘becoming’ and ‘emerging’ at certain qualitative moments in life 
closely associated with a widening and evolution of consciousness. 
Might it be possible that the archetypes also structure matter? Pauli 
appeared convinced of it. That this is so is suggested by the fact that it is 
apparently possible to understand matter on a basis of mathematics, a discipline 
which both Kepler and Poincaré saw as ‘the archetype of the beauty of the world’. 
From this angle Pauli constructs an epistemological theory entirely of his own 
which we do not find in Jung: at a certain level of abstraction our internal images 
and the structures of the external objects come into congruence and overlap. 
When this happens man has an a-ha experience. 
Towards the end of his life Pauli came increasingly to place feeling in the 
centre of his view of things. Feeling goes as deep as thought, claimed Pauli, amo, 
ergo sum is at least as well-founded as cogito, ergo sum. The strongest of all 
sensations is the experience of numinosum. Just as in the case of the archetypes, 
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he did not wish to limit this phenomenon to purely psychic experience. In line 
with his other ideas, he believed that the deepest processes of the psyche must 
have an equivalent in a generally valid natural process or natural law. What is 
expressed on a psychic level in a turbulent a-ha experience and in the experience 
of meaning and purpose – in other words the experience of having gained insight 
into a wider context – was something that he wished to link with a purposeful 
holistic regulation of life phenomena. These holistic structuring factors lie beyond 
psyche and matter and they are relative to time, space and causality. They possess 
an organizing and synthesizing character and express themselves in unique, 
creative forms. When such forms and systems are observed in external nature, we 
use words like purposefulness to describe their occurrence. If on the other hand 
one meets these factors in one’s personal life they are experienced as an 
intervention from a higher order, often rich in meaning. 
Pauli understood his late ideas as speculative and hypothetical. It is also 
quite clear that these perspectives and outlooks had the character of questions 
rather than of answers. But if both psyche and matter form an expression of a 
common, objective, underlying order – then one may also imagine that changes in 
the underlying order have repercussions on the whole world of phenomena, both 
psychic and physical, possibly according to some kind of parity principle in the 
cosmos. One may then imagine that by penetrating the foundations of matter one 
comes into contact with this deep level, and thereby also influences psychic 
reality. In the same way one would have an effect on matter by penetrating the 
deepest layer of the psyche. Pauli was at any rate convinced that psyche and 
matter reflect each other or as he speculates in his last letter to Jung, that the 
archetype is a ‘kind of mirror which manifests itself as reflections’ in psyche and 
matter. Concretely this implied that every individual, in particular every scientist, 
bears a great responsibility for his psychic attitude but also for what he does with 
matter. (345-8) 
 
Somehow we can imagine a patterning that constellates what we call mind and what we call 
matter. This is indeed a Platonic-feeling suggestion, and we should—perhaps importantly—think 
of the energy of the numinosum in relation to the Eros discussed by Sorenson, the LUV 
experienced by McKenna, and the Love of LoveWisdom, as presented by Plato. Interestingly, 
Bateson too found his work in sympathy with Plato’s. He places the following passage from St. 
Augustine as an epigram for his book, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity: 
Plotinus the Platonist proves by means of the blossoms and leaves that from the 
Supreme God, whose beauty is invisible and ineffable, Providence reaches down 
to the things of earth here below. He points out that these frail and mortal objects 
could not be endowed with a beauty so immaculate and so exquisitely wrought, 
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did they not issue from the Divinity which endlessly pervades with its invisible 
and unchanging beauty all things. 
 
Bateson did not seem to set out to write a Platonic work, but describes a process in which the 
Platonic dimension sort of dawned on him as he developed it. He found himself  
laying down very elementary ideas about epistemology . . . that is, about how we 
can know anything. In the pronoun we, I of course included the starfish and the 
redwood forest, the segmenting egg, and the Senate of the United States. (MN: 4) 
 
We have tried to look with this same inclusiveness in our inquiry. Bateson goes on to write, 
 
It is the Platonic thesis of the book that epistemology is an indivisible, integrated 
metascience whose subject matter is the world of evolution, thought, adaptation, 
embryology, and genetics—the science of mind in the widest sense of the word. . . 
. 
But epistemology is always and inevitably personal. The point of the 
probe is always in the heart of the explorer: What is my answer to the question of 
the nature of knowing? I surrender to the belief that my knowing is a small part of 
a wider integrated knowing that knits the entire biosphere or creation. (87-8) 
 
This knitting . . . it is what Bateson calls “the pattern that connects.” Kohák writes: “The logos is 
the order of the cosmos” (10). Cosmic vision can reveal an Ordering, Logos, Dao, the Good, the 
Great Mystery, the Creator, the Patterning, the Dharma, Pratityasamutpada, Wildness. We can 
call it what we like. Call it God, or the Mind of God. In any case, Bateson, Jung, Pauli, and 
others suggest there is a patterning the pervades all things, “guiding alike the flight of the 
sparrow and the life of the sage” as Kohák puts it (10).  
 
We can sense this in a “scientific” mode, but our science seems too young, too partial, too 
limited. This is perhaps why Bateson repeatedly emphasizes the aesthetic, and in some ways 
preferred the company of even the anti-scientific. We will see him reference the potential value 
of an anti-scientific mind in a moment, but we can for now at least recall that he lived at Esalen 
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and seems to have preferred the minor insanities he perhaps encountered there to the major 
insanity gripping the dominant culture, including its “science”. 
 
Bohm, too, tried to touch this from a scientific perspective or with a scientific sensibility: 
The ‘quantum’ context thus calls for a new kind of description that does not imply 
the separability of the ‘observed object’ and ‘observing instrument’. Instead, the 
form of the experimental conditions and the meaning of the experimental results 
have now to be one whole, in which analysis into autonomously existent elements 
is not relevant. 
What is meant here by wholeness could be indicated metaphorically by 
calling attention to a pattern (e.g., in a carpet). In so far as what is relevant is the 
pattern, it has no meaning to say that different parts of such a pattern (e.g., various 
flowers and trees that are to be seen in the carpet) are separate objects in 
interaction. Similarly, in the quantum context, one can regard terms like ‘observed 
object’, ‘observing instrument’, ‘link electron’, ‘experimental results’, etc., as 
aspects of a single overall ‘pattern’ that are in effect abstracted or ‘pointed out’ by 
our mode of description. Thus, to speak of the interaction of ‘observing 
instrument’ and ‘observed object’ has no meaning.  
A centrally relevant change in descriptive order required in the quantum 
theory is thus the dropping of the notion of analysis of the world into relatively 
autonomous parts, separately existent but in interaction. Rather, the primary 
emphasis is now on undivided wholeness, in which the observing instrument is 
not separable from what is observed. (1980: 169) 
 
We can think of our typical way of knowing as something like one part of a pattern pointing out 
other parts of a pattern. If we were woven into the fabric of reality, and we pointed at some other 
part and said, “That is a flower,” in some profound sense, we would have gotten things 
incredibly wrong—most especially if that is what we focused on being able to do in terms of our 
practice of life. The truth is that “we” are a patterning, alive and alove, and we are part of the 
same patterning as the “flower” (its threads go right through us), and thus, in the statement, 
“That is a flower,” patterning “points” “at” patterning, ignorant of its self-sameness, its 
nonduality of unity and diversity. Because of the nature of this error, we essentially become 
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thirsty while swimming in a lake. Taking up conscious purposes on the basis of this error results 
in pervasive negative side-effects. 
 
Lee tried to help readers understand Trobriander culture by evoking the notion of pattern: 
What we consider a causal relationship in a sequence of connected events, is to 
the Trobriander an ingredient of a patterned whole. He names this ingredient 
u’ula. A tree has a trunk, u’ula; a house has u’ula, posts; a magical formula has 
u’ula, the first strophe; an expedition has u’ula, a manager or leader; and a quarrel 
contains an u’ula, what we would call a cause. There is no purposive so as to; no 
for the purpose of; there is no why and no because. The rarely used pela which 
Malinowski equates with for, means primarily to jump. In the culture, any 
deliberately purposive behavior—the kind of behavior to which we accord high 
status—is despised. There is no automatic relating of any kind in the language. 
Except for the rarely used verbal it-differents and it-sames, there are no terms of 
comparison whatever. And we find in an analysis of behavior that the standard for 
behavior and of evaluation is non-comparative. (91) 
 
Perhaps one might find a parallel in our culture in the making of a sweater. When 
I embark on knitting one, the ribbing at the bottom does not cause the making of 
the neckline, nor of the sleeves or the armholes; and it is not part of a lineal series 
of acts. Rather it is an indispensable part of a patterned activity which includes all 
these other acts. . . . 
  . . . It is because they find value in pattern that the Trobrianders act 
according to nonlineal pattern; not because they do not perceive lineality.  
But all Trobriand activity does not contain value; and when it does not, it 
assumes lineality, and is utterly despicable. For example, the pattern of sexual 
intercourse includes the giving of a gift from the boy to the girl; but if a boy gives 
a gift so as to win the girl’s favor, he is despised. . . . 
  . . . it is probable that the Trobrianders experience reality in nonlineal 
pattern because this is the valued reality; and that they are capable of experiencing 
lineally, when value is absent or destroyed. (93) 
 
Bateson wrote in his book, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, that the book could have been 
called “the pattern which connects” (his emphasis), and that this phrase is “a synonym” for the 
book’s title. Of this pattern which connects, Bateson writes,  
The pattern which connects. Why do schools teach almost nothing of the pattern 
which connects? Is it that teachers know that they carry the kiss of death which 
will turn to tastelessness whatever they touch and therefore they are wisely 
unwilling to touch or teach anything of real-life importance? Or is it that they 
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carry the kiss of death because they dare not teach anything of real-life 
importance? What’s wrong with them? 
 
What pattern connects the crab to the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and 
all the four of them to me? And me to you? 
 
What is the pattern which connects all the living creatures? 
 
Let me go back to my crab and my class of beatniks. I was very lucky to be 
teaching people who were not scientists and the bias of whose minds was even 
anti-scientific. All untrained as they were, their bias was aesthetic. I would define 
that word, for the moment, by saying that they were not like Peter Bly, the 
character of whom Wordsworth sang 
 
A primrose by the river’s brim 
A yellow primrose was to him; 
And it was nothing more. 
 
Rather, they would meet the primrose with recognition and empathy. By aesthetic, 
I mean responsive to the pattern which connects. (8) 
 
And thus we must declare philosophy a fundamentally aesthetic discipline. Let us inhibit our 
habits of reifying, subject-object duality, noun-verb structuring, and so on by calling that to 
which our practice of beauty responds the Patterning That Connects, the Sacred-Creative-
Patterning-in-through-as-Relational-Openness. That must seem cumbersome, and it is not 
necessarily more accurate than calling it responsiveness itself—the responsiveness Bateson just 
referred to as “aesthetic,” and which we could call Wisdom-Love-Beauty. We could also just call 
it the sacred. 
 
This patterning is Mind, in the sense of Nature, and in the sense of Nature of Mind and its 
immediate, intimate manifestations. To say Mind is not a thing but activity marks no major 
revelation in the dominant culture in terms of intellectual speculation, analysis, and argument, 
but it does suggest a major realization yet to come, a revelation still waiting for a better practice 
to bring it to fruition.  
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Epistemology means a way of knowing-by-being the patterning that relationally cultivates life 
forward, what functions now, in, through, as us. The patterning is a play of correspondences, a 
dance of synchronicities, a spiraling out of archetypes by means of sacred powers and 
inconceivable causes—not “knowable” as objects, but realizable as intimacy, as divine madness, 
as holy sanity.  
 
Archetypes are patternings of activity or behavior, which we should relate to the concept of habit 
(partially described by Dewey, who noted that habit precedes “thought”) and the concept of 
instinct as discussed by Jung, and the patterning that connects (partially described or inquired 
into by Bateson, who thought he was doing something akin to a Platonic epistemology, i.e. an 
epistemology of living, loving patterning, which we might think of as an epistemology of ideas, 
but with some caveats as to how that relates to the conventional—and boring—interpretations of 
Plato, who was nothing if not a rather delightful mystic, even if only a moderately accomplished 
one). We can expand Bateson’s questions:  
 
What Is It? What patterning connects the crab to the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and 
all the four of them to us? What connects me to you? What connects the dream you had to the 
happenings of the World? What connects your soul to the souls of other beings, humans, lions, 
tigers, wolves, whales, fishes, in Africa, South America, the Pacific, the Himalayan mountains? 
What connects all those souls, yours and mine and all the rest, to the Cosmos, such that 
meaningfulness reveals itself anytime we attend, anytime we remember to look, listen, feel, rest 
as the Nature of what we are?  
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Philosophically, all of these questions can be condensed into one: Who am I? 
 
All arts of awareness function as attunements to the patterning, attunement in, through, as the 
patterning. These arts of awareness include the following: 
Spiritually rooted interbeing with Nature (and thus ethically, aesthetically, epistemologically 
rooted interbeing with Nature—all of the arts of awareness depend on wisdom, love, and beauty) 
Meditation 
Interbeing with Horse and other non-human beings 
Koan, Spiritual Common Law 
Mandala 
Drumming 
Dance 
Shamanic Journeying 
Yijing 
Music 
Synchronicity 
Labyrinth walking 
Dream work: Social dreaming, lucid dreaming, dream yoga, cultural dream practices 
Alexander Technique and other forms of psychophysical education 
Holotropic Medicines (Ayahuasca, Psilocybin, Peyote, etc.) 
Breath work, including holotropic breathing 
Tarot and similar practices 
Astrology 
Jungian Active Imagination 
Art 
Focusing 
Demon Feeding (Machig Labron’s practice, adapted by Tsultrim Allione) 
Tantra 
Myth 
Ceremony, Celebration, Ritual 
Dialogue: Insight, Bohmian, Platonic, Socratic, Community Circles 
Fasting 
Prayer 
 
The Art of Awareness itself is central to epistemology, and by this we can mean that the practices 
have to do with intimate realization of awareness itself, or the Nature of Mind itself. The Art of 
Awareness is the Art of Living, the Art of Renunciation, which means forgetting, letting go of 
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the narrow sense of self in the fundamental activity of attunement with the World, with the 
Sacred. The arts of awareness are not arts of our own skills, so to speak, but arts of return to the 
fundamental awareness of Sacredness itself. We cultivate not an individual mind (though we do 
that in some sense) so much as the Mind of Life. We cultivate sacredness in, though, as 
sacredness.  
 
This sacredness transcends the ego and yet is the consummation of the Self. This sacredness is 
not somewhere else, or at some other time. Our knowing comes alive and alove in the here and 
now—nowhere else. As Ajan Chah invites us to see: 
In samadhi [well-put-togetherness, in mental terms a state of concentration or 
focused attention] that is sure and stable, even when the eyes are opened, wisdom 
is there. When wisdom has been born, it encompasses and knows (‘rules’) all 
things . . .  Samadhi doesn’t reside in having the eyes closed, the eyes open, or in 
sitting, standing, walking or lying down. Samadhi pervades all postures and 
activities. Older persons, who often can’t sit very well, can contemplate especially 
well and practice samadhi easily; they too can develop a lot of wisdom. How is it 
that they can develop wisdom? Everything is rousing them. (14-15)224 
 
Everything is rousing us—rousing us to know better, rousing us to receive wisdom-love-beauty. 
What a lovely invitation. What a lovely way to sense the World, to make sense of our life, to 
know ourselves and the nature of reality. Sophia sends us countless messages: “Come Home! 
Come Home to Us!”  
 
In this particular passage, Chah may not have as broad a meaning as we can receive from it. In a 
more focused way, Chah means the rousing of the body by means of discomfort: “When [older 
people] open their eyes, they don’t see things as clearly as they used to. Their teeth give them 
                                                 
224 https://www.ajahnchah.org/pdf/everything_is_teaching_us.pdf 
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trouble and fall out. Their bodies ache most of the time. Just that is the place of study” (4). First 
of all, we should allow not only our own pain to rouse us, but also the pain of others, the pain of 
other humans, the pain of non-human beings, and the pain of the World. The World calls to us at 
every moment, sentient beings call to us at every moment: Please awaken! 
 
But just this is always the place of study: Just this Moment, just this arising. Always, always: just 
this, just Sophia saying, “Here! Now! Just this!” Knowing is always, “Just this”—which never 
excludes, “and also,” “and more.” Just this already bursts the barriers of the ego, ruptures space 
and time, gallops along in placelessness even as it roots us to place. 
 
This orientation makes spirituality and epistemology painfully simple, obvious, and even fun, 
joyful, peaceful, relaxed—even if it’s not necessarily “easy”. Nothing hidden. Nothing obscure. 
Nothing “esoteric”. Our fear of facing our own lives stokes a hunger for hidden secrets, esoteric 
concepts, and complicated analyses. All we need to do is stop fighting and relax, stop knowing 
and open, stop evading and attend. When we fail to attend, Sophie sends divine messengers. She 
has five angels permanently in place: Birth, Aging, Sickness, Negative Side-effects, and Death. 
Any of us can listen to these angels: “when [we] chew on something hard [we’re] soon in pain. 
Right there the devaduta (divine messengers) are talking to [us]; they’re teaching [us] every day” 
(15). They teach us to become valid knowers, attendant knowers, attendant care-givers, attendant 
lovers. To know only means attending awakening. 
 
Chah asks, “What do you want to meditate on? Who will you learn meditation from?” (15) This 
is like asking, “What do you want to know? Who will you learn knowing from?” The answer: 
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Sense the body in the body, sense the World in the World, sense sensations in sensations, feel 
feelings in feelings. Do we truly see, do we truly sense our life, our body, our World—our World 
together, our altogether-World? Or do we turn away, in fear? Do we grasp elsewhere, in hope or 
craving?  
 
If we open the heart: Everything appears! We learn knowing from the World and all its beings, 
and everything is rousing us, rousing us to awaken from our slumber and know. We need only 
practice well-put-togetherness to verify just this, to verify the appearing, the play, the dance of 
Mind. As Chah puts it: “You have to see it within yourself. When you sit, it’s true; when you 
stand up, it’s true; when you walk, it’s true. Everything is a hassle, everything is presenting 
obstacles—and everything is teaching you. Isn’t this so?” (15-16) Thus, we should never say that 
it’s too hard to meditate or too hard to know, to become truly wise, loving, and beautiful, 
appreciative of the wisdom, love, and beauty all around us. That is like saying it’s too hard to 
live, too hard to open our eyes and let the World appear, too hard to stub our toe and let it hurt, 
too hard to wreck ecologies and let that break us open in compassion, break us open to wisdom, 
love, and beauty.  
 
In the noise of our clinging, we do indeed make it difficult for the World to appear, just as it is, 
so to speak (with no “myth of the given,” but only an end to ego-centrism and human agendas). 
When we think ourselves happy, we don’t think we need spiritual practice. When we feel 
uncomfortable, we just want the feeling to go away. But often the discomfort comes on angel’s 
wings, because we needed a little clarity, needed something to get our attention and return us 
home, return us to Sophia’s loving embrace. As Pema Chödron puts it: 
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Generally speaking, we regard discomfort in any form as bad news. But for 
practitioners or spiritual warriors—people who have a certain hunger to know 
what is true—feelings like disappointment, embarrassment, irritation, resentment, 
anger, jealousy, and fear, instead of being bad news, are actually very clear 
moments that teach us where it is that we’re holding back. They teach us to perk 
up and lean in when we feel we’d rather collapse and back away. They’re like 
messengers that show us, with terrifying clarity, exactly where we’re stuck. This 
very moment is the perfect teacher, and, lucky for us, it’s with us wherever we 
are. (2005: 14) 
 
Now more than ever, as we sense the suffering we have brought to ourselves and countless 
sentient beings in countless degraded ecologies, we need a terrifying clarity, and the strength of 
heart to turn toward that terror, with warmth and openness.  
 
The important point is that epistemology requires the incorporation of practices of awareness, 
requires training the mind to attend, to realize openness and presence, for when do we think 
knowing will arise except in the present moment? And how can we receive it if we are always 
trying to escape, if we are so often mindless, distracted, tired, and in various ways suffering? 
Hasn’t our inquiry indicated the many ways we seek to escape or avoid the present moment, the 
liminal, the Bardo of Here-Now? There might be sheer terror that holds us back from knowing, 
and this too relates to our resistance to the mystical: It is no “easy,” “rational,” controllable path. 
It is not mean, stupid, irrational, or merely chaotic in the pejorative sense. But, it involves 
various things that worry the ego, and these days we must add to the list the religious sensibility 
the mystic often exhibits, however atheistic they may have started off. But, to say it again, 
“religious” here does not mean “dogma” or “dogmatic,” and it has only to do with 
experimentation and verification. For the philosopher in us all, we intend a greater intimacy with 
Wisdom, with Sophia, and thus we can enthusiastically read the most religious mystics and 
receive “God” in each case as “Sophia”. For instance, consider this passage from Eckhart: 
792 
 
I am often asked if a man can reach the point where he is no longer hindered by 
time, multiplicity, or matter. Assuredly! Once this birth has really occurred, no 
creatures can hinder you; instead, they will all direct you to God and this birth. 
Take lightning as an analogy. Whatever it strikes, whether tree, beast, or man, it 
turns at once toward itself. A man with his back toward it is instantly turned round 
to face it. If a tree had a thousand leaves, they would all turn right side up toward 
the stroke. So it is with all in whom this birth occurs, they are promptly turned 
toward this birth with all they possess, be it never so earthy. In fact, what used to 
be a hindrance now helps you most. Your face is so fully turned toward this birth 
that, no matter what you see or hear, you can get nothing but this birth from all 
things. All things become simply God to you, for in all things you notice only 
God, just as a man who stares long at the sun sees the sun in whatever he 
afterward looks at. If this is lacking, this looking for and seeking God in all and 
sundry, then you lack this birth. (Walshe 2009: 59) 
 
By means of a rupture of space and time (“no longer hindered by time, multiplicity, or matter”), 
all things become the divine, the sacred, Sophia, and we notice only the sacred in all things. This 
is the same as touching the patterning, becoming attuned in, through, as, with the patterning. 
 
G.K. Chesterton gets at this in relation to St. Francis, who married Sophia in the form of Lady 
Poverty. This sacred marriage facilitated a transformation of his soul, and a transition into 
sainthood—recall Kohák: “The logos is the order of the cosmos, guiding alike the flight of the 
sparrow and the life of the sage” (10). (The link of sparrow and sage is most apt in the case of 
Francis.) As Chesterton saw it: 
The transition from the good man to the saint is a sort of revolution; by which one 
for whom all things illustrate and illuminate God becomes one for whom God 
illustrates and illuminates all things. It is rather like the reversal whereby a lover 
might say at first sight that a lady looked like a flower, and say afterwards that all 
flowers reminded him of his lady. A saint and a poet standing by the same flower 
might seem to say the same thing; but indeed though they would both be telling 
the truth, they would be telling different truths. For one the joy of life is a cause of 
faith, for the other rather a result of faith.225 
 
                                                 
225 http://www.gkc.org.uk/gkc/books/St_Francis.html 
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We can offer a humble correction to the last line—and anyway, Chesterton himself already had it 
better written in the first line. The consummatory joy of life that the saint or sage experiences 
does not arise from faith, but from an intimate experience of sacredness. Spirituality is precisely 
not “a matter of faith,” but a mattering of practice-realization. As for the comparison with the 
poet, we may remind ourselves here of the great composer Haydn. Haydn was most certainly a 
genius, and his opus stands in no one else’s shadow. He supposedly had a very simple method of 
dealing with any blocks in his creativity—one that not only every artist could adapt in their own 
way, but also every scientist and every philosopher as well. When Haydn felt the flow of 
creativity and insight getting stuck, he would step away from the music and pray the rosary. So 
simple, yet so tremendously effective. Why would we ever bother composing with limited 
human capacities when we can allow the divine to compose the music for us?  
 
If we work with Sophia, She can compose the music of our lives and set us dancing. She can 
illustrate and illuminate all things, including our own soul. This is the way LoveWisdom 
functions in general, and we needn’t rely on a particular image for that to happen (and, 
ultimately, we must transcend all images in order to fully realize ourselves and fully liberate our 
vision and our imagination).  
 
 
In one of his poems, Rumi writes about Moses coming across a shepherd calling out to God. The 
shepherd was asking, “Where are you?” and telling God how he wanted to comb God’s hair, 
bring God milk, and even kiss God’s “little hands and feet” when it’s time for God to go to bed.  
Moses scolds the shepherd, telling him how inappropriate his words and intentions are, 
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essentially calling them worse than foolish and irreverent. The shepherd feels a deep sense of 
repentance. He tears at his clothes and wanders off into the desert. But then, in a moment of 
cosmic profundity, God’s voice speaks to Moses: 
    You have separated me 
from one of my own.  Did you come as a Prophet to unite, 
or to sever? 
 
        I have given each being a separate and unique way 
of seeing and knowing and saying that knowledge. 
 
What seems wrong to you is right for him. 
What is poison to one is honey to someone else. 
 
Purity and impurity, sloth and diligence in worship, 
these mean nothing to me. 
 
          I am apart from all that. 
Ways of worshiping are not to be ranked as better 
or worse than one another. 
 
            Hindus do Hindu things. 
The Dravidian Muslims in Indian do what they do. 
It’s all praise, and it’s all right. 
 
It’s not me that’s glorified in acts of worship. 
It’s the worshipers!  I don’t hear the words 
they say.  I look inside at the humility. 
 
That broken-open lowliness is the reality, 
not the language!  Forget phraseology. 
I want burning, burning. 
 
     Be friends 
with your burning.  Burn up your thinking 
and your forms of expression!  
 
Rumi then tells us that God “began speaking deeper mysteries to Moses. Vision and words, 
which cannot be recorded here . . .”  He tells us: 
It’s foolish of me 
to try and say this. If I did say it, 
it would uproot our human intelligences. 
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It would shatter all writing pens.  
 
Sophia shatters all writing pens, fries all laptops and tablets, melts down all servers and NSA 
spying devices. The voice of God in this poem is the voice of Wisdom. And Wisdom’s question 
holds for all of us: Are we here to unite or to sever? We must all cultivate prophetic vision 
(prophetic fire) to at least some degree, and we must each decide whether we will become 
visionary forces for Good, or narrow-visioned forces of evil. Are we here to unite or to sever, to 
cultivate and let ourselves be cultivated by wisdom, love, and beauty—or their “opposites”? 
 
As for Moses, he wanders into the desert, searching for the shepherd, perhaps with the same kind 
of energy with which one searches for a loved one or a lost child. Moses finally finds him and 
tells the shepherd about what God revealed. Moses tells the shepherd to worship in whatever way 
he wants. The shepherd then tells Moses that he has transcended all of this:  
“The divine nature and my human nature came together. 
Bless your scolding hand and your arm. 
I can’t say what has happened. 
What I’m saying now 
is not my real condition. It can’t be said.” (Barks 1995: 166-8) 
 
It is possible in such cases that we enter a realm of things we cannot know. By this we must 
mean at least the following: We are not allowed to know them, so they must be not known. The 
epistemic policing of the culture makes it so that certain phenomena cannot be known, because 
the laws of a certain way of knowing have declared them unacceptable. Our scientists, 
philosophers, academics, intellectuals, politicians, and so on, playing the part of Moses, come 
along and tell us how we are allowed and not allowed to know, what we are allowed and not 
allowed to know. It doesn’t matter if someone claims to know them, for these knowledge claims 
will be dismissed out of hand. What such a person “knows” must be explained on the basis of 
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brain events or some version of deception, even self-deception. What does it take to enter that 
territory? Isn’t it an act of rebellion? It may not seem as though things are so controlled, and in 
many cases it seems that we are dealing with subtleties, but on a large scale things are rather 
stark, as the dominant culture’s way of knowing ourselves and our world spreads. 
 
Even the suggestion that science requires spiritual practice may seem odd. Our science is set up 
as if it didn’t need any relationship to wisdom. As we now try to have it (going against the grain 
of reality), the scientist can be mindless, distracted, lacking presence. They don’t need to 
cultivate mindfulness, wholesomeness, generosity, inclusiveness, concentration, and other 
epistemic virtues, because they have ways to spread mind out into the ecology, in such a way 
that the pieces can catch something, as if in a net, and the larger ecology carries the burden of the 
negative side-effects that arise. Think of the startling contrast this marks in comparison to all our 
traditions of wisdom: To arrive at wisdom requires presence, while arriving at knowledge only 
requires cleverness and a bag of tricks (the notebook, the laptop, the beaker and Bunsen burner, 
the fMRI machine, the research team, the funding). What do we think will happen when we 
proceed as if knowledge can be gathered independently of our spiritual development? How does 
that ever make sense, considered broadly and deeply? What would we even end up with in such 
an approach? We don’t know, because we don’t know what we have gotten from science. We 
know aspects of it, but we don’t really know, because science gives no meaning in and of itself. 
Science is interwoven with life, but behaves as if it weren’t.  
 
On the other hand, philosophy proceeds as if it were science that could get answers by doing 
nothing more than producing and analyzing equations—no experimentation, no verification in 
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any serious way, no examination of the broadest array of side-effects. Another way to think of 
philosophy’s approach would be to compare it to an attempt at food production by means of 
argumentation and analysis alone, with no seeds planted, no harvest gathered, no hunting, no 
fishing, no active work in living ecologies. 
 
Neither of these approaches will function to keep life going, neither the delusion of science 
without philosophy nor the delusion of some sort of pure philosophizing that has no blood and 
guts, no lived connection to the Earth, no need for realization of wisdom-love-beauty in a 
moment-to-moment way. There are a few ways of characterizing how our inquiry suggests we 
proceed: That we need the cultivation of an ongoing activity of mind liberated into larger 
ecologies; or, more metaphorically, that scientists and philosophers in particular need to become 
more like eco-sensually awakening alchemists, magicians, healers, servants, artists, and 
therapists.  
 
Perhaps it would help, as a way of closing our journey together, to consider briefly how we 
might think of this narrowly as a kind of ongoing state of insight and inspiration, and how we 
might broadly consider it as mystical participation. 
 
As ongoing inspiration and insight, it involves the cultivation of serenity and wonder, something 
familiar to many ancient schools of philosophy in the east and west, and familiar to most 
spiritual and religious traditions. But, we can consider it scientifically. One of the most valuable 
studies on this was done by Petitmengin-Peugeot (1999). Not only is it one of the few detailed 
studies of the state of inspiration or intuition, but it is well-done, and outlines major gestures of 
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awareness and insight that go together with intuitive insight. Petitmengin-Peugeot writes that, 
“Our research comes as the result of our surprise at the silence surrounding the intuitive 
experience, though it seems to be at the heart of human experience” (45). Why the silence? 
Throughout the history of human thought and in every field of knowledge 
intuition has played an essential role. It is therefore very surprising that so few 
studies have been dedicated to the study of the subjective experience which is 
associated with it.  
For example, the history of the sciences from Archimedes to Ampère, 
Gauss, Kékulé, Pasteur, Poincaré, Hadamard, Heisenberg . . . is full of testimonies 
of scientists telling about how a new idea came to them in a sudden, unexpected 
manner, without any discursive activity. A lot of attention has been paid to the 
content of these intuitions, and a considerable amount of energy spent on 
exploring their consequences. However, even though a discovery has had 
important repercussions in our daily lives, very little attention has been paid to the 
experience itself, what the scientist was living through at the very moment of the 
intuitive breakthrough: ‘the art of knowing has remained unspecifiable at the very 
heart of science’ (Polanyi, 1962, p. 55). Astonishingly enough, this ‘forgetting’ of 
the intuitive experience also affects philosophy. Yet there are very few 
philosophic systems that do not work with the notion of intuition. From Plato’s 
intuition of Idea, to Descartes’ intuition of simple natures, to Hegelian and 
Husserlian intuition, ‘intuition represents the ideal of all knowledge, the ideal of 
understanding of being in general’ (Heidegger, 1993, p. 167.) Nevertheless, 
compared to the volumes and volumes consecrated to the definition of the concept 
of intuition, to the description of the content of philosophic intuitions, and to the 
theoretical exploration of their consequences, how many pages have been written 
on the intuitive experience itself?  
. . . . The intuitive experience is not studied for itself, neither in the field of 
artistic creation, nor in the field of psychotherapy, nor in that of managerial 
decision-making, not even in daily life, where intuition often appears although in 
a more subtle form. When studies on intuition are not just limited to the recording 
of anecdotes, their objective is usually to prove the existence of the intuitive 
phenomenon, or to identify popular beliefs about intuition, or even to evaluate the 
intuitive capacities of a given population, but not to describe the actual subjective 
experience associated with the intuition.  
Why evade the subject? Can we explain this through the weight of 
rationalism, which, considering knowledge as an analytical, deductive process, 
can only ignore intuition, or bring it down to the level of an unconscious 
inference, which is the same as denying the phenomenon? Can it be explained 
through the weight of positivism, which, only considering objective phenomena 
as objects of science, rejects the study of the subjective experience? (43-4) 
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Our inquiry here might suggest that, not only does an emphasis on rationalism tend to push 
intuition into the shadow of the psyche, but that our way of knowing doesn’t teach us how to 
know in this way, which clearly exceeds conscious control and relies on something beyond the 
little box of the ego. It is the hypothesis of this inquiry that all our insight depend on these larger 
ecologies, and that we tap into them often in spite of ourselves, and typically in ways co-opted 
by the ego and its agendas, which are in turn structured by the dominant culture and the conquest 
consciousness that pervades it. That is not necessarily the most precise way of putting it, but the 
point remains: The dominant culture is not a culture that educates its participants to know, and 
thus to live, in an ongoing way that involves liberation into larger ecologies of mind. It cannot 
maintain itself this way, so we are permitted only to take from those ecologies, not to live in, 
through, as them. And thus, even people who draw from them regularly may have a lack of 
clarity about how they accomplish this, and they may not root their way of coming to insights in 
a holistic ethical-spiritual life. The quote from Polanyi stands out: “the art of knowing has 
remained unspecifiable at the very heart of science.” This “art of knowing” comes from the arts 
of awareness. 
 
Petitmengin-Peugeot found ways to get participants in the study to examine the details of the 
intuitive process. They also relied on two written accounts. They included artists, scientists, 
psychotherapists (who rely on insights into the client’s psyche), and ordinary people who 
experienced intuitive insights in daily life. They found the following: “To our surprise, we saw a 
generic structure of the intuitive experience emerge from this work of description and analysis. 
This structure is made up of an established succession of very precise interior gestures with a 
surprising regularity from one experience to another and from one subject to another” (45). 
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These “precise interior gestures” are part of the artfulness of practices that allow us to wake up a 
bit from the slumber of the ego. Oddly, as we shall see, the transcendence of the self we think we 
are liberates us into a sense of wholeness that feels like a more authentic experience of what we 
truly are. But, first, let us consider the basic gestures, which have a certain kind of correlate in 
many if not all of the arts of awareness in our list: 
Out of this modelling and comparison of different descriptions emerged a generic 
structure of the intuitive experience, which is made up of a succession of very 
precise interior gestures. Four of them can be found in a large number of the 
explored experiences: 
 
[1] the gesture of letting go, of deep-rooting, of interior self-collecting, and of the 
slowing down of the mental activity, which makes it possible to reach a particular 
state of consciousness, the ‘intuitive state’ (described in 22 interviews). 
 
For several of the people interviewed, access to this calm state is made easier 
through some preliminary work of interior clarification, a work of deep 
transformation carried out thanks to daily practicing, which is integrated into a 
long-term process. 
 
[2] The gesture of connection, which makes it possible to enter into contact with 
the object of the intuitive knowledge (a human being, an abstract problem, a 
situation…) (described 14 times). 
 
[3] The gesture of listening, with an attention that is at the same time panoramic 
and very discriminating, focused on the subtle signs announcing the intuition 
(described 13 times). 
 
[4] The intuition itself, of which certain of the subjects have acquired (or acquire 
during the interview) a sufficiently discriminating consciousness to point out three 
distinct moments: the moment preceding the intuition, the intuition, the moment 
following the intuition. (59) 
 
Eight other gestures appear in only a few descriptions. Their absence in the other 
descriptions can be explained by the fact that either they were not the object of a 
clarification because they stayed at a pre-thought state, or the gestures in question 
effectively present no reason for existing in certain particular cases of intuition. 
 
* The gesture of maintaining, which makes it possible to remain in the intuitive 
state (5 times) 
* The gesture of anchoring, which makes it possible to rediscover the intuitive 
state more easily by associating a sensorial stimulus to it (once). 
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* The process of disconnecting (once). 
* The process of getting out of the intuitive state, of getting back to the usual 
mode of functioning (4 times). 
* The gesture of protection, found only in certain cases of intuition: when the 
object or the person one has come into contact with carries an energy that could 
be harmful (twice). 
* The process of distinguishing intuition/projection, which makes it possible to 
distinguish a real intuition from a projected desire or fear thanks to subtle interior 
criteria (3 times). 
* The process of interpreting the content of the intuition when it is not sufficiently 
explicit (1 time). 
* The process of translating the content of the intuition into a communicable 
form: words, drawing, scientific hypothesis… (6 times). (60) 
  
The detailed study is worth reading, but let us focus on just a few of the most essential features, 
as they relate to everything we have considered. For one thing, the gesture of awareness involves 
a kind of attention that is, “very attuned, sensitive to the slightest detail”. Petitmengin-Peugeot 
quotes one participant as reporting: 
More attuned and wider perceptions. I feel myself in a very focused state of 
consciousness, very, very present in the moment. (. . .) I have the impression of 
being a little bit like a funnel, a very long funnel with a very small opening, a 
little bit like a laser beam, which is at the same time there, very present, and at the 
same time I’m conscious of everything that is happening around me. (Francis, 
28). (67) 
 
The attention releases conscious purposes. This is a delicate thing, because those purposes sadly 
continue to function. Intuition has a context. This is why a better way of knowing cannot simply 
teach these sorts of “techniques,” because they can be co-opted. The point, in part, has to do with 
the way our typical mindset of agendas and clocks stands in direct contrast to the knowing 
required to arrive at important insights:  
Intuitive listening is characterized by the absence of any precise intention, of 
research of a defined goal. On the contrary it is being ‘open’ enough to let the 
unexpected come. It is relaxed, detached, light. It does not involve any effort. It is 
a peaceful waiting, patient, which is not expecting anything in particular. 
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I lay my hands down and I wait; it’s as if it didn’t depend on me. 
The huss [sensation] is going to come or isn’t going to come, but I 
can’t do anything about it. (Amel, 150) 
 
What’s needed is putting your hand, then you wait. And then little 
by little things are described in your hand. If you have an idea of 
what you are going to feel or want to feel, you don’t feel anything, 
or just false things. (Monique, 77) 
 
Intuitive listening corresponds to a state of receptivity, which consists not of 
looking for and grasping at, but of letting it come and welcoming it. 
 
To see in receiving, isn’t casting your gaze towards something, 
projecting it, holding it out, but really it’s letting the thing imprint 
itself in you. You are completely passive, and you let the color, the 
landscape, come to you. You aren’t going to look for it, you’re 
going to gather it in. You’re there and you receive it. (Monique, 4) 
 
This receptive gazing enables us to find the sensation in all its immediacy and 
freshness: 
 
When you look in this way, there’s no filter in your head. It’s more 
alive. Things are much more alive, more real. (Monique, 158) 
 
Listening in a receptive way is not trying to recognize the sensations, to identify 
them immediately, and to pull out some information at all costs: 
 
The aim of ‘poised’ attention cannot be instantaneous 
understanding, immediate placing among things known. (Reik, 
1948, p. 165) 
 
It is a question of having a sufficiently attuned ear to listen to one’s own 
sensations, one’s own fledgling thoughts which ‘walk on dove’s feet’, before 
conceptualizing anything: 
 
I suggest that the seeker forget what he has learned, neglect what 
he has heard and read, and listen to his own response. (Reik, 1948, 
p. 303) (67-8) 
 
The spiritual practice of not-knowing comes into full bloom in this way of gnosis. In some cases, 
we might imagine a rebellion against the known that finally gives way to a relaxing into not-
knowing, into a kind of vitalizing renunciation. We cannot expect something that will fit into our 
agenda or our system of knowledge. We must open to wonder, relax into serenity, surrender 
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control, throw out our agenda, and even let go of what we think we are, so that what we truly are 
can function:  
Even if it is possible to prepare, to encourage the appearing of an intuition, 
this appearance always retains a capricious, unpredictable character; it escapes all 
control. All of the subjects — this is an invariable characteristic of the intuitive 
experience—notice a state of passivity at the moment when the intuition springs 
forth. ‘It escapes from me’, ‘It happens to me’, ‘It doesn’t depend on me’, ‘It’s 
given to me’ . . . this kind of statement is found in all the descriptions. 
This feeling of passivity can be partially explained by the absence of 
mental activity at the moment when the intuition appears. Recourse to concepts 
and rules, or learned knowledge, all form of memory like all form of 
premeditation, are excluded. 
This feeling of an absence of control is linked to a transformation of the 
feeling of individual identity. The sensation of the floating of the limits of the ego 
felt in the preceding phases is accentuated: at the moment of the intuition, the 
sensation of being an ‘ego’ distinct from the world vacillates and even dissolves: 
 
You forget yourself. (Alain, 86) 
 
I no longer exist. (Sylvie, 5) 
 
You forget who you are. You lose consciousness of yourself. I am 
no longer there. (Barbara McClintock, in Fox Keller, 1983 , p. 155) 
 
Paradoxically, at the same time the person feels that he has found his wholeness, 
that he has become unified, body and spirit, in harmony with his inner being. 
 
Body, emotion, spirit, all of a sudden it’s as if these three were 
linked, indissolubly linked. In a kind of lightning state. (Muriel, 
121) 
 
She feels deeply in correspondence, in harmony with her surroundings. She has 
the feeling of being wholly herself, in the right place. 
 
I feel more myself than I have ever been. (Judee, 159) 
 
I feel that at that very moment I am the right person in the right 
place to be doing that thing. (Catherine, 50) 
 
All of the subjects interviewed have the impression of living something very 
important, even when the intuitions have an innocuous content. They feel 
completely mobilized, captivated by the experience: 
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The huss [experience] is a thing that gets hold of you in your 
totality. A little bit like a music that takes hold of you completely. . 
. . It’s a little bit like a thing of life or death. (Amel) 
 
They feel that they enter into contact with something essential for a few instants. 
 
I have the impression that when I go down into my center, God is 
waiting for me there. (Monique, 204) 
 
For some of them this experience brings on a sensation of astonishment, 
amazement—of being struck—or of fear: 
 
I was afraid. I had the feeling that I was in contact with something 
I could not understand, that we cannot play with that. (Sylvie, 43) 
 
For a lot of them it is a very moving experience, which brought tears when they 
told about it during the interview: 
 
One of the first vibrations that I felt was so beautiful in my hand 
that I had two big tears that flowed. (Monique, 42) 
 
 . . . The intuition does not always emerge in a precise, complete, immediately 
understandable form. Most often it first caresses the consciousness as a hazy 
image, a vague sensation, diffuse, a line of interior force. 
The threshold of awareness of the sensations varies considerably from one 
person to another, and essentially depends on the degree of practice in pre-
intuitive gestures. The more a person practices bringing on the calm inside and 
listening, with the special mode of attention which characterizes intuitive 
listening, the more precocious will be his awareness, the more subtle will be the 
sensations perceived. 
According to the people with the most experience, of those we 
interviewed, intuitive sensations are always present; the only variable is the 
attention we bring to them. 
 
The day that I realized that I felt in a different way, I became 
aware of it suddenly, but it was already there. It was obvious. 
Because I had probably been living it for years, it seemed obvious 
to me; I knew how it functioned. (Antoine, 42) 
 
It even seems that intuitive sensations can influence our behaviour before they 
reach the threshold of awareness. (71-2) 
 
How many philosophers can say they came to insight by means of contact with something 
“within” that scared them, something that so transcended them that they felt it could not be toyed 
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with, but instead demanded a conversion in their way of life? The fear that liberation can evoke, 
along with its wildness and transrational quality certainly helps to explain why we don’t practice 
knowing this way. But so does the fact that living such a way of knowing might rupture the 
deceits and delusions upon which the pattern of insanity depends for its perpetuation. 
 
If, then, such a way of knowing seems so transrational, why not compare it with “magic”? If 
above all we first understand magic as an art of awareness—let us call it the art of awareness 
centered on relationship with the Sacred, most typically as manifested in, through, as Nature. In a 
way, given all we have considered, magic involves relating to Mind as Sacred. That’s not the 
strangest notion.  
 
The poet W.B. Yeats wrote, 
I believe in the practice and philosophy of what we have agreed to call magic, in 
what I must call the evocation of spirits, though I do not know what they are, in 
the power of creating magical illusions, in the visions of truth in the depths of the 
mind when the eyes are closed; and I believe in three doctrines, which have, as I 
think, been handed down from early times, and been the foundations of nearly all 
magical practices. These doctrines are— 
 
(1) That the borders of our minds are ever shifting, and that many minds can flow 
into one another, as it were, and create or reveal a single mind, a single energy. 
 
(2) That the borders of our memories are as shifting, and that our memories are a 
part of one great memory, the memory of Nature herself. 
 
(3) That this great mind and great memory can be evoked by symbols. 
 
I often think I would put this belief in magic from me if I could, for I have come 
to see or to imagine, in men and women, in houses, in handicrafts, in nearly all 
sights and sounds, a certain evil, a certain ugliness, that comes from the slow 
perishing through the centuries of a quality of mind that made this belief and its 
evidences common over the world.226 
                                                 
226 http://www.ricorso.net/rx/library/authors/classic/Yeats_WB/prose/Ideas_G-Evil/Magic.htm 
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First let us note that these three principles of magic are the principles of cognitive science as we 
have considered it, even if they seem to move to the outermost edge of what that science is 
comfortable allowing—allowing in its activity of epistemic policing. It is not up to anyone living 
a magical life to describe some mechanism that accounts for these principles. Our science may 
yet have no explanation. Our job is to verify them, not merely to theorize about them, to engage 
in elegance theorizing on the basis of a limited and limiting worldview which seems long 
overdue for a paradigm change. The work of Varela, Di Paolo, Bateson, Rosch, Jung, Pauli, 
McConnel, Bohm, and others gives us a way to understand the principles Yeats offers, and we 
can at least understand them in a partial way, in a qualified way, from within the current 
paradigms—especially when we consider how poor a job we have done at incorporating the shift 
from classical to non-local physics, classical to non-local psychology, classical to non-local 
cognitive science, and classical to non-linear mathematics. We can note that classical philosophy 
has always had nondualistic varieties, but that non-local epistemology seems largely absent from 
all but Indigenous Cultures, and this marks one of the biggest challenges faced by children of the 
dominant culture, and any child of conquest consciousness.  
 
When we contemplated Sorenson’s observations about how the invasion of conquest 
consciousness affected liminal awareness, we considered the possibility that western education 
practices and realizes a breakdown of truth, intimacy, resonance with Nature, attunement with 
the sacred—and we can reflect in resonance with Yeats and call this the breakdown of magic, 
thereby giving us a different way of understanding that term. This breakdown happens possibly 
because conquest consciousness goes altogether with aggression, competition, self-centeredness, 
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deceit, the need for medication, the pressure of time, the forcing of agendas, and so on. It is not 
to say there is nothing good in western culture, or that it is only these negative things, or that 
people in other cultures never practice and realize delusions, deceits, fears, cravings, and other 
forms of suffering. The issue has to do with a basic style of relating, and we may suggest that 
conquest consciousness may often mean the end of magic, especially if that conquest 
consciousness has co-opted what we call reason to justify and perpetuate itself by means of 
rational arguments and rational efficiencies.  
 
We considered this in many ways, and several artefacts come to mind now, including the one 
from Gary Snyder about Cabeza de Vaca—that he stopped performing healings when he got 
back to “civilization”—and the one from Martin about how magic went away with the arrival of 
the white man—“ . . . the conjuror does not exist any more with us, for there is no need of one,” 
and “our dreams and our prophecies are no longer true, and “The spirits do not come to help us 
now. The white men have driven them away.” The despoiling of the sacred is a despoiling of the 
Earth—the kind of despoiling we should sense as forbidden, in accord with Locke’s notion of 
what the divine does not allow us to do with its creation—and it brings an ugliness to the World. 
We can develop a sensitivity to it. But at first, we may be blind to it—or we may repress our 
vision. 
 
Aldo Leopold wrote that,  
One of the penalties of an ecological education is that one lives alone in a world 
of wounds. Much of the damage inflicted on land is quite invisible to laymen. An 
ecologist must either harden his shell and make believe that the consequences of 
science are none of his business, or he must be the doctor who sees the marks of 
death in a community that believes itself well and does not want to be told 
otherwise. (1993: 165) 
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Any serious philosopher would say the same about LoveWisdom: To study any Way with heart 
makes us sensitive to wounds and wounding in every direction. Much of the damage inflicted on 
the soul remains repressed and unconscious, essentially invisible to the general public. The 
absence of liminal awareness goes without conscious notice, and everyone walks asleep yet 
frenetic along the edges of a threshold they do not perceive and are seduced to ignore. We can 
become sensitized, and we can notice a missing wildness, a missing magic, and an invasive 
profanity, even as we continue to sense the sacredness of the World that makes this spreading 
degradation all the more horrific. So many of us simply do not know what we are missing, even 
if we suspect, even if we become sleepless, agitated, stressed, full of self-doubt and self-
loathing—because we have forsaken what we are and what the World is.  
 
In the same essay, Leopold writes, 
One the marvels of early Wisconsin was the Round River, a river that 
flowed into itself, and thus sped around and around in a never-ending circuit. Paul 
Bunyan discovered it, and the Bunyan saga tells how he floated many a log down 
its restless waters.  
No one has suspected Paul of speaking in parables, yet in this instance he 
did. Wisconsin not only had a round river, Wisconsin is one. The current is the 
stream of energy which flows out of the soil into plants, thence into animals, 
thence back into the soil in a never ending circuit of life. . . . 
We who are the heirs and assigns of Paul Bunyan have not found out 
either what we are doing to the river or what the river is doing to us. (158) 
 
There is a marvel, a wonder—already in the World, as the World—and there is a penalty for 
ignoring it. No ignorance of wonder goes unpunished, no degradation of sacredness comes 
without a self-wounding. How many philosophers today can say they know what they do to the 
river or what the river does to them? To find out means entrance into Nature, self-liberation into 
ecologies of Mind that we can call the practice of magic and mystery. Again, we intend no 
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obscurantism, irrationalism, or airy-fairy foolishness. We are talking about a paradigm shift. And 
the liberation, the magic, has to do with a kind of attunement with what Bateson calls the pattern 
that connects, an inhibition of the tendency to point at parts of the pattern and take them as parts 
in a linear, mechanistic conception of causality, and instead to intimately realize a deeper, non-
linear ordering. 
 
The horseshoe crab marks an interesting case to consider here. The horseshoe crab has been 
called a living fossil. It has been around for 450 million years, thus surviving 5 mass extinction 
events. But, it may not survive humanity.227 We err if we think that “climate collapse” is killing 
off this and other species. Rather, human activity and human thinking (specifically, unwise, 
unskillful, human activity, on the basis of conscious purposes) is the properly identified “cause” 
of extinction. We may think of the extinction in relation to “climate change,” and then trace that 
back to human interventions. But perhaps a better way to think of it is that humans are out of 
whack, and things are falling apart. We don’t see what we do to the crab and what the crab does 
to us. It looks like some sort of primitive cause-effect chain, but it is the intimacy, the 
interbeingness, the interwovenness of human and crab that can reveal itself. If humans could get 
back in touch with themselves, back in attunement with Dao, Divine, Sacredness, Sophia—call it 
what you will—then beings would not go extinct as they are. 
 
Jung tried to touch this with the Synchronicity principle. In the Visions seminars, Jung relates a 
story that he frames as illustrating “being in Tao”. Tao (or Dao, 道) in a functional sense means 
                                                 
227 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/03/horseshoe-crab-population-at-risk-
blood-big-pharma 
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the pattern that connects. Indeed, Dao is closely related to Li (理), which refers to the patterns in 
jade or the grain in wood (we can follow li to become attuned with Dao, and attuned with Dao 
we can work with li). There is a vast literature in Chinese philosophy that works with the Li 
principle, and even the word physics incorporates this principle (wuli), as do Sino-Japanese 
words for logic and psychology. Dogen, following the Indian sage Bodhidharma, uses 道理 —
literally “the way of reason”—to define meditation. Bodhidharma says there are two ways to 
practice philosophy: Practice with the mind, and practice with the body. Practice with the mind is 
called “the way of reason,” and this practice is defined as—meditation. Why? One way to get at 
why involves sensing that whatever we mean by “reason” has to become transcended yet not 
defiled—a kind of synthesis of apparent opposites. In a famous passage, Dogen describes a 
spiritual common law case (koan) that goes like this: 
Once, when the Great Master Hung-tao of Yueh shah was sitting [in meditation], 
a monk asked him, “What are you thinking, [sitting there] so fixedly?”  
The master answered, “I’m thinking of not thinking.”  
The monk asked, “How do you think of not thinking?”  
The master answered, “Nonthinking.” (from Bielefeldt 1990: 147) 
 
We can work with these concepts as follows: Thinking means habitual mind and its conscious 
purposes, which we follow without really seeing what they are; not thinking means an 
interruption of this, a preliminary rupture that marks the beginning of a spiritual/philosophical 
life; and nonthinking means the nondualistic functioning of a better way of knowing, which 
cannot be called “thinking” in the normal sense, since the “thinker,” the limited ego, has been 
forgotten. Dogen uses this to introduce the practice of meditation: 
Once you have regulated your posture, take a breath and exhale fully. Swing to 
the left and right. Sitting fixedly, think of not thinking. How do you think of not 
thinking? Nonthinking. This is the essential art of zazen. Zazen is not the practice 
of meditation: it is just the reality gate of ease and joy. It is the practice and 
verification of ultimate awakeness. The fundamental point of wisdom realized, 
baskets and cages cannot get to it. (adapted from Bielefeldt, 181) 
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Note, Dogen indicates that he is not talking about “meditation” in the sense of something cut off 
from life. He is talking about a threshold, a bardo, an entrance to the joyfulness of reality. To try 
and clarify this, Dogen offers these reflections: 
Although the employment of nonthinking is crystal clear, when we think of not 
thinking, we always use nonthinking. There is someone in nonthinking, and this 
someone maintains us. Although it is we who are [sitting] fixedly, [our sitting] is 
not merely thinking: it presents itself as [sitting] fixedly. Although [sitting] 
fixedly is [sitting] fixedly, how could it think of [sitting] fixedly? Therefore, 
sitting fixedly is not the measure of the Buddha, not the measure of awakening, 
not the measure of comprehension. (189) 
 
This gets us some understanding of Dao, because all of this simply means attunement with Dao. 
Dao is the reality to which we awaken, and nonthinking is the awakened thinking of our original 
mind, the mind rooted in Dao. Dao is what already maintains us, maintaining us even in our 
delusions. This nonthinking we can call synchronistic thinking, or magical thinking in a 
thoroughly positive sense. 
 
Here is Jung’s story: 
As an example of “being in Tao” and its synchronistic accompaniments I will cite 
the story, told me by the late Richard Wilhelm, of the rain-maker of Kiaochau: 
“There was a great drought where Wilhelm lived; for months there had not been a 
drop of rain and the situation became catastrophic. The Catholics made 
processions, the Protestants made prayers, and the Chinese burned joss-sticks and 
shot off guns to frighten away the demons of the drought, but with no 
result. Finally the Chinese said, ‘We will fetch the rain-maker.’ And from another 
province a dried up old man appeared. The only thing he asked for was a quiet 
little house somewhere, and there he locked himself in for three days. On the 
fourth day the clouds gathered and there was a great snow-storm at the time of the 
year when no snow was expected, an unusual amount, and the town was so full of 
rumours about the wonderful rain-maker that Wilhelm went to ask the man how 
he did it. In true European fashion he said: ‘They call you the rain-maker, will 
you tell me how you made the snow?’ And the little Chinese said: ‘I did not make 
the snow, I am not responsible.’ ‘But what have you done these three days?’ ‘Oh, 
I can explain that. I come from another country where things are in order. Here 
they are out of order, they are not as they should be by the ordinance of heaven. 
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Therefore the whole country is not in Tao, and I also am not in the natural order 
of things because I am in a disordered country. So I had to wait three days until I 
was back in Tao and then naturally the rain came.’” From “Interpretation of 
Visions,” Vol. 3 of seminars in English by C. G. Jung (new edn., privately 
multigraphed, 1939), p. 7. (This is note 211 in CW 14, page 1375 in the digital 
edition, and it also appears in Sabini, 2002) 
 
Commenting on this story, Jung says the following: 
 
It is a miracle only to someone who thinks along the lines of causality, but if one 
thinks psychologically, one is absolutely convinced that things quite naturally 
take this way [speaking of the rainmaker’s ability to create rain]. If one has the 
right attitude then the right things happen. One doesn’t make it right, it is just 
right, and one feels it has to happen in this way. It is just as if one were inside of 
things. If one feels right, that thing must turn up, it fits in. It is only when one has 
a wrong attitude that one feels that things do not fit in, that they are queer. When 
someone tells me that in his surroundings the wrong things always happen, I say: 
It is you who are wrong, you are not in Tao; if you were in Tao, you would feel 
that things are as they have to be. Sure enough, sometimes one is in a valley of 
darkness, dark things happen, and then dark things belong there, they are what 
must happen then; they are nonetheless in Tao. (This too is from the Visions 
Seminars, and it appears in Sabini, 2002: 213) 
 
This of course sounds exceedingly strange. It brings to mind another sort of anecdote, this one 
from Gilles Quispel. It has to do with one of Jung’s influential students, Erich Neumann who 
earned a Ph.D. in philosophy, and then went on to get a medical degree and to work in the field 
of psychology. Quispel relates that, 
Erich Neumann was a sweet soul, but he had a ruthless mind. His logic was as 
prosaic and rectilinear as a certain Berlin avenue called the “Kurfürstendam”: the 
world is a projection, your wife is a projection, the neighbor is a projection, God 
is a projection. And now Jung left the limitations of the psyche and found in the 
cosmos meaningful correspondences, which made sense and seemed to convey a 
message. This played havoc with Erich’s views. And perhaps he had premonitions 
of his premature death which was to follow soon afterwards. He became more 
open to reality and disciplined the fancies of his reason. With great emotional 
relief he told a fascinated audience in 1952 that there was a “Self field” outside 
the psyche, which created and directed the world and the psyche, and manifests 
itself to the Ego in the shape of the Self. And this Self in man is the image of the 
creator. Erich Neumann had found peace with himself, with the world, and with 
God. (from Segal 1992: 249-50) 
 
This in turn brings a passage from Benjamin to mind: 
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If one had to expound the teachings of antiquity with utmost brevity while 
standing on one leg, as did Hillel that of the Jews, it could only be in this 
sentence: “They alone shall possess earth who live from the powers of the 
cosmos.” Nothing distinguishes the ancient from the modern man so much as the 
former’s absorption in a cosmic experience scarcely known to later periods. Its 
waning is marked by the flowering of astronomy at the beginning of the modern 
age. Kepler, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe were certainly not driven by scientific 
impulses alone. All the same, the exclusive emphasis on an optical connection to 
the universe, to which astronomy very quickly led, contained a portent of what 
was to come. The ancients’ intercourse with the cosmos had been different: the 
ecstatic trance [Rausch]. For it is in this experience alone that we gain certain 
knowledge of what is nearest to us and what is remotest from us, and never of one 
without the other. This means, however, that man can be in ecstatic contact with 
the cosmos only communally. It is the dangerous error of modern men to regard 
this experience as unimportant and avoidable, and to consign it to the individual 
as the poetic rapture of starry nights. It is not; its hour strikes again and again, and 
then neither nations nor generations can escape it, as was made terribly clear by 
the last war, which was an attempt at new and unprecedented commingling with 
the cosmic powers. Human multitudes, gases, electrical forces were hurled into 
the open country, high-frequency currents coursed through the landscape, new 
constellations rose in the sky, aerial space and ocean depths thundered with 
propellers, and everywhere sacrificial shafts were dug in Mother Earth. This 
immense wooing of the cosmos was enacted for the first time on a planetary scale 
– that is, in the spirit of technology. But because lust for profit of the ruling class 
sought satisfaction through it, technology betrayed man and turned the bridal bed 
into a bloodbath. The mastery of nature (so the imperialists teach) is the purpose 
of all technology. But who would trust a cane wielder who proclaimed the 
mastery of children by adults to be the purpose of education? Is not education, 
above all, the indispensable ordering of the relationship between generations and 
therefore mastery (if we are to use this term) of that relationship and not of 
children? And likewise technology is the mastery of not nature but of the relation 
between nature and man.228 
 
We can possibly return here to the notion of Mysticism and sense the Mystical spirit suggested 
by these considerations. Evelyn Underhill famously defined Mysticism as “the art of union with 
Reality. The mystic is a person who has attained that union in greater or less degree; or who aims 
at and believes in such attainment.”229 
                                                 
228 Benjamin, To the Planetarium: https://retinalechoes.com/2013/05/03/fragment-012-walter-
benjamin/ 
229 from Practical Mysticism, available online:  
http://www.anglicanlibrary.org/underhill/UnderhillPracticalMysticism.pdf 
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Underhill herself admits that, “It is not expected that the inquirer will find great comfort in this 
sentence when first it meets his eye.” She continues: 
The ultimate question, “What is Reality?”—a question, perhaps, which never 
occurred to him before—is already forming in his mind; and he knows that it will 
cause him infinite distress. Only a mystic can answer it: and he, in terms which 
other mystics alone will understand. Therefore, for the time being, the practical 
man may put it on one side. All that he is asked to consider now is this: that the 
word “union” represents not so much a rare and unimaginable operation, as 
something which he is doing, in a vague, imperfect fashion, at every moment of 
his conscious life; and doing with intensity and thoroughness in all the more valid 
moments of that life. We know a thing only by uniting with it; by assimilating it; 
by an interpenetration of it and ourselves. It gives itself to us, just in so far as we 
give ourselves to it; and it is because our outflow towards things is usually so 
perfunctory and so languid, that our comprehension of things is so perfunctory 
and languid too. The great Sufi who said that “Pilgrimage to the place of the wise, 
is to escape the flame of separation” spoke the literal truth. Wisdom is the fruit of 
communion; ignorance the inevitable portion of those who “keep themselves to 
themselves,” and stand apart, judging, analysing the things which they have never 
truly known.  
 
This does not elevate “the mystic” above the rest of us—no more so than we would elevate the 
physicist by defining what it should mean to know about quantum mechanics. We might say that 
only a physicist can answer the question, “What is a quark?” since it takes training of a certain 
kind, knowledge and above all experience of a certain kind, to answer such a question with any 
depth. Underhill’s discussion does not reduce to, “You aren’t a mystic! Neener, neener, neener!” 
In any case, we intend it here to try and get at the intimacy Sophia demands. Knowing does not 
happen at a distance or in abstraction.  
 
LoveWisdom has to do with sensing the mutual embracing of life and entering that embracing. 
As we have noted, certain anthropologists and psychologists have a term that kind of fits this 
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practice-realization: Mystical Participation. But the term is used in a slightly negative way, even 
by fairly progressive thinkers.  
 
The phrase “mystical participation” sometimes appears in its French form (participation 
mystique), since the French scholar Lucien Lévy-Bruhl coined the term. Lévy-Bruhl associated 
“mystical participation” with a “primitive” mindset. From a western perspective, a “primitive” 
mindset allows for “supernatural” dimensions to reality. The western mindset thinks that the 
“primitive” mindset is not realistic, that it is deluded somehow. But, of course, from the 
standpoint of such “primitive” mindsets, the western mindset appears quite deluded—and if the 
present conditions of life become grounds for evaluation, we should side with the “primitive” 
view and call the western mindset troubled, troubling, and even insane. In all cases, we cannot 
lay hold of anything monolithic: We no more find a single “primitive” mindset than a single 
“western” one. But, we do find some trends and general features—perhaps a familial 
resemblance.  
 
The arrogant western mindset looks down on the “primitive” mindset that accepts “supernatural” 
dimensions to reality—since the western mindset has apparently determined the true 
metaphysical nature of reality, and it knows without doubt what is real and what is not. 
According to the western view, the “primitive” believes in things that do not exist. The western 
view may refer to the “primitive” mindset as a “mystical” mindset, because the “mystical” too 
gets disparaged by the western mind, written off as obscurantist, deluded, superstitious, and so 
on. 
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But this all amounts to gestures of intellectual hubris. “Mystical” means, etymologically, one 
who has been initiated, and life is an initiatory experience. We cannot hide from it. We cannot 
escape. And yet we must actually enter, just like an initiate must enter a sacred space and time, 
enter into a vision quest (in one form or another), enter into and receive their soul purpose, thus 
entering the World and their society, giving and receiving the World. We live in a participatory 
Cosmos, and that means we have to learn how to participate, learn the skillful and realistic Ways 
of participation. To learn these, which is a matter of co-discovery-creation, and thus teaching-
learning, is to enter into our life together. It is to become a mystic, which is the most practical or 
pragmatic relationship with ourselves, each other, all beings, all of sentient being.  
 
Mystical participation is not “primitive,” but is precisely the opposite: Mystical participation is 
the most sophisticated way of life—wise, loving, and beautiful. 
 
Of course, mystical participation exudes an aura of wonder, and this terrifies the rationalistic 
mind. This wonder is the wonder of childhood—but not the encumbered child archetype. The 
“primitive” seems “immature” to the rationalistic mind. The “primitive” seems childlike, and so 
it seems unsophisticated. But, we can note the irony there, since western culture, we have 
suggested, does not orient itself to producing adults and Elders. It may be that, in some important 
sense, western culture produces mature children, advanced juveniles, many of whom remain 
trapped in more encumbered versions of the child archetype. This arises from the culture’s self-
taming and also from its fragmentation, since we cannot truly mature if we only cultivate 
fragments of ourselves. It would be like an oak tree focusing on the production of acorns alone, 
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and never becoming more than a sapling. For a little sapling, the weight of all those acorns is not 
healthy.  
 
Jung tried to face some of these ironies of reason, and yet he still falls into the camp of seeing 
“mystical participation” as some kind of limited mindset. In the “Definitions” section of his work 
of psychological types, he defines “mystical participation” this way:  
Participation Mystique: This term originates Lévy-Bruhl. It connotes a peculiar 
kind of psychological connection with the object wherein the subject is unable to 
differentiate himself clearly from the object to which he is bound by an immediate 
relation that can only be described as partial identity. This identity is based upon 
an a priori one-ness of subject and object “Participation mystique”, therefore, is a 
vestigial remainder of this primordial condition. It does not apply to the whole 
subject-object relation, but only to certain cases in which the phenomenon of this 
peculiar relatedness appears. It is, of course, a phenomenon that is best observed 
among the primitives; but it occurs not at all infrequently among civilized men, 
although not with the same range or intensity. Among civilized peoples it usually 
happens between persons—and only seldom between a person and thing. In the 
former case it is a so-called state of transference, in which the object (as a general 
rule) obtains a sort of magical, i.e. unconditional, influence over the subject. In 
the latter case it is a question of a similar influence on the part of a thing, or else a 
kind of identification with a thing or the idea of a thing. (CW6, para. 781) 
 
Perhaps because he was still young, and so far from even the principle of Synchronicity, let alone 
the bardo of dying, Jung seems to fall into the trap of western egotism, and thus reveals how well 
the conquest consciousness held him, how much he had to struggle against. He pathologizes a 
mind he has not experienced, lumping it together with fragmented versions of itself. He sees the 
“primitive” mind as a mind caught up in projection, in which that mind cannot distinguish itself 
and its own contents with others and their experience (a deluded unitivity, rather than something 
nondualistic, or a union of opposites—sacred marriage—in accord with Jung’s own vision). This 
is all atomistic. Jung elaborates on the pathologies in other passages. For instance: 
The further we go back into history the more we see personality disappearing 
beneath the wrappings of collectivity. And, if we go right down to primitive 
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psychology, we find absolutely no trace of the idea of the individual. In place of 
individuality we find only collective relationship, or “participation mystique” 
(Lévy-Bruhl). But the collective attitude prevents the understanding and 
estimation of a psychology which differs from that of the subject, because the 
mind that is collectively orientated is quite incapable of thinking and feeling in 
any other way than by projection. What we understand by the concept ‘individual’ 
is a relatively recent acquisition in the history of the human mind and human 
culture. It is no wonder, therefore, that the earlier all-powerful collective attitude 
almost entirely prevented an objective psychological estimation of individual 
differences, and forbade any general scientific objectification of individual 
psychological processes. It was owing to this very lack of psychological thinking 
that knowledge became psychologized, i.e. crowded with projected psychology. 
Striking instances of this are to be seen in the first attempts at a philosophical 
explanation of the universe. The development of individuality, with the resulting 
psychological differentiation of man, goes hand in hand with a de-psychologizing 
of objective science. (CW6, para. 12). 
 
Here Jung gives us insight into pathologizing at the cultural level. One can still find strong 
currents of this thinking, even in “progressive” thinkers who have been influenced by Jung’s 
work. There is an effort But Jung is taking a page from Nietzsche here, and those familiar with 
Nietzsche’s work know that Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality is not strictly speaking a work of 
“literal” genealogy. It is a spiritual and philosophical diagnosis of the western soul. We can see 
in the above passage from Jung the bias that human beings had to become “individuals,” and that 
the “individualistic” western psyche gave birth to the “miracle” of “science”. Before this western 
innovation—the “individual”—people were stuck in “the collective”. This sounds so obviously 
like a trope—really, like propaganda (for instance, versions of this argument are offered as 
justifications for “capitalism”)—that one can hardly believe someone as progressive as Jung 
bought into it—that is, if it weren’t for the fact that his own view of the psyche explains why he 
would buy into it, and the other facts, such as his critical views of western science and western 
culture (but, of course, one hears this in all of today’s “progressive” thinkers as well, as they try 
to justify western culture, making it “necessary” for the world soul, rather than just engaging in 
the truth and reconciliation we need to heal are karmic wounds). 
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The pathologizing becomes clearer on an individual level in the following passage: 
I am reminded of another mental case who was neither a poet nor anything very 
outstanding, just a naturally quiet and rather sentimental youth. He had fallen in 
love with a girl and, as so often happens, had failed to ascertain whether his love 
was requited. His primitive participation mystique took it for granted that his 
agitations were plainly the agitations of the other, which on the lower levels of 
human psychology is naturally very often the case. Thus he built up a sentimental 
love-fantasy which precipitately collapsed when he discovered that the girl would 
have none of him. (CW7, para. 231) 
 
This too is an earlier work, and in this passage he describes only a failed, fragmented, unskillful 
“mystical participation.” We must either call this a terribly deluded mystical participation, or just 
call it delusion. It would be no different than someone’s justifying genocide on the basis of 
Christian or Buddhist teachings. We can only consider such activity as ideology, spiritual 
materialism, delusion. We must admit that ALL practices can be turned to delusion, violence, 
and so on. But that does not mean anything as far as characterizing the Mystical and the Spiritual 
orientation as skillful and realistic. 
 
Returning to Underhill, one quibble we might make with her contemplation of mysticism relates 
to her suggestion that, as to the question, What is reality? “Only a mystic can answer it: and he, 
in terms which other mystics alone will understand. Therefore, for the time being, the practical 
man may put it on one side.” Rescuing the terms Mystic, Mystical, and so on means ridding 
ourselves of certain “esoteric” or “impractical” connotations. Sophia is eminently practical, and 
Underhill could have and perhaps should have written the opposite: “The practical person, if they 
want to live well, if they want to live skillfully, wisely, compassionately, and beautifully, must 
become a mystic, and must wonderstand the Nature of reality.” 
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The Greek notion of sophia related to skillfulness, and the word “philosophy” comes to us under 
the influence of Socrates, who labored as a stone cutter. Life is activity, not abstract thinking, not 
speculation, pondering, navel-gazing, being absorbed in thinking or contemplation in the 
intellectual sense. Thinking must be living thinking, and we must evaluate our thinking on the 
basis of its skillfulness or lack of skillfulness, from the perspective of all beings, from the 
perspective of the Mystery itself, and not from the perspective of our narrow human purposes. 
Sophia presents a threat to all intellectualism and egotism, and also to all forms of domination, 
fear, craving, and ignorance—including present forms of “civilization,” for Sophia is the 
Wildness of the World. Zeus, the authoritarian leader of the gods, knew that Wisdom would give 
birth to something that would overthrow him, so he swallowed Wisdom in order to try and 
control Her (like a lot of men, he tried to gulp down without tasting). She must have laughed at 
his antics. Since She is everywhere, the attempt to control this or that manifestation of Her only 
leads to suffering. 
 
Synchronicity is a moment of dispelment, a dragon moment that dispels the delusions of time 
and space, opening the heart to the spaciousness of the Windhorse of the Soul—we go galloping 
along with Sophia. A dragon moment is an all-accomplishing moment. Our doing drops away, as 
does body and mind. Synchronicity places us in the placeless place (atopos) of the mandala of 
the soul, simultaneously placing us, rooting us, in the living landscape of the loving World, 
realizing the adornment of the Cosmos, the inconceivable Beauty of sentient being. We 
intimately practice-and-realize the self-liberating essence of the being-moment, the beauty-
moment, the love-moment, the wisdom-moment as the magical interwovenness that it is, that we 
are. Such a moment might do no more than bring us much needed levity, a first free breath after 
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so much tension and obstruction. Only in the context of LoveWisdom, only in the spiritual 
ecology of a life rooted in WisdomLoveBeauty can it become the moment of total revolution we 
all need right now, in this most challenging of historical contexts. 
 
We do need to throw out the clocks. But this by itself will not suffice. We do need to cultivate 
Synchronicity. And this too, by itself, will not suffice. There is no “by itself.” We can never not 
practice our life, but we only do so more or less Wisely, Lovingly, Beautifully—which means 
more or less skillful and realistic, more or less poised and graceful. We need the living activity of 
grace in place of the activities of busyness, the hustle of business, the irritating movements of 
traffic, the meaningless transfers of data, the endless shiftings of entertainment and distraction 
that capture our capacity to attend, to make space for Synchronicity to enter, for everything 
rousing us to rouse us, for the dispelment of insanity, and the entrance of sacred madness to work 
its miracles and its magic. We have to cultivate a context of magic, ecologies of magic, in order 
to experience magic.  
 
Part of our context involves making an artificial world and then giving ourselves a lot to “think” 
“about”. We “think” too much. We need to give ourselves an invitation to engagement with life 
and love, with mystery and magic. Encountering life is nice, but entering life is necessary. We 
can encounter everywhere, and the only true Good to arise from that is entering life, entering 
always. We enter into a participation, an intimacy that goes so deep it transcends unity and 
diversity, and thus realizes the Self. When we participate in a team, we may feel like a member 
of the team. But at other times we feel we have participated in something transcending self and 
other. The whole thing comes alive and alove. A mundane example—from the standpoint of the 
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Sacred, nothing is mundane—but a more “ordinary” example would be singing in a choir in such 
a way that overtones and undertones resonate with such magic that something beyond a 
collection of voices arises, a transcendent voice that is the voice of the choir and the cathedral as 
a whole, something holy. This happens through a process of living Thinking, a nonthinking. 
Each singer must go beyond “singing the note,” and must listen deeply, adjusting their voice to 
what is happening holistically. The magic appears beyond “notes”.  
 
In our context we have reduced our capacity to experience magic. We have done this in a variety 
of ways, including the reduction in our capacity to experience the stability and clarity of Mind. 
Magic is less likely when the mind is distracted. We have trained ourselves to be distracted, and 
this, in a way, includes thinking in abstract, offline ways. We cannot actually “think offline,” but 
we can behave as if we can. If we need to make a decision about the future, we might sit around 
and have an abstract conversation, write pros and cons on a piece of paper, make mathematical 
calculations, draw up plans and proposals, and so forth. Such an approach lacks intimacy. It 
seems to function, it seems to allow us a measure of control over life and its energies. But this is 
all delusion—not in the sense that it doesn’t function in a relative way, but that it doesn’t 
function overall, when we step back far enough to enter our own lives with enough intimacy to 
really look. It actually doesn’t take too much work on our part. We need only examine the 
negative side-effects of such an approach to begin to sense this. We may be tempted to think the 
issue is one of scale, that if we did the things we do now on a much smaller scale, then it would 
be alright. If we hold such a view, it really does require a lot of intimacy to overcome it.  
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But we could also just make the attempt to think in the fullness of our being. To make a decision, 
we could instead tap into Transcendent Mind or Original Mind in various ways—integrated into 
a spiritual/philosophical life—like gathering together in community, participating in various 
ceremonies and rituals, sharing our dreams, sitting quietly, telling stories. Dreaming, the 
imaginative in general, would need rejuvenation. We have already suggested that this seems a 
grave challenge for the culture, and perhaps especially for philosophers. Consider this passage 
from the great scientist JBS Haldane, in which he contemplates an imaginary organism with a 
very special sensory awareness: 
But how would the real world appear to a being with a complete series of 
senses which perceived periodic disturbances as qualitatively different, like our 
own senses of tone and colour? We will give it a range of seventy octaves, which 
would make it aware of the whole range of vibrations from one per second up to 
the unimaginably but not incalculably high frequency of γ rays from radio-active 
elements. And within each octave we will endow it with what we possess in our 
tone sense but not in our colour sense, a capacity for analysing mixed vibrations 
into their components, as a spectroscope does. Like a musician, too, it will be able 
to place the various types of radiation in a scale like that of musical notes. It is a 
curious fact that we men can place musical notes in their natural order by 
intuition, while it required the genius of Newton to do the same for colour. What 
is more, we know that an octave in one part of the scale is equivalent to an octave 
in another, and hence our musical scale is quantitative. Indeed, in the chromatic 
scale the notes are so arranged that to each interval between two of them 
corresponds the same difference in the logarithms of their frequencies. The piano 
keyboard is really a rather inaccurate table of logarithms, a fact which I believe is 
equally ignored in the teaching of mathematics and of music. 
But to return to our hypothetical organism, one can point at once to some 
of its powers. It could distinguish any chemical substance from any other by the 
difference in their capacities for absorbing radiation. We men can distinguish a 
few by their capacities for absorbing visible rays, which give them their different 
colours, though our colour sense is so inadequate that we have to fall back on the 
spectroscope. Our organism could also tell the temperature of any object by 
analysing the radiation from it. So that from the qualitative point of view it would 
know far more than we about objects within the range of its senses. But it would 
only arrive at their shapes, sizes, positions, and motions by a most complicated 
process of deductions, the reverse of the process which we use to discover the 
nature of the periodic disturbances in molecules. With no other sense than that 
described above, its task of world-making would be more hopeless than that of a 
blind and deaf man. We must allow it a rudimentary appreciation of space and 
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motion, just as we have a rudimentary appreciation of radiation in our colour 
sense. It must have at least one movable organ, and be conscious of moving it. It 
will, however, take colours, if we may so describe the data of its vibration sense, 
for granted, and build up everything else on this basis. It will, of course, analyse 
all kinds of motion into periodic components, just as we analyse them into 
movements in various directions. But it will also, at first, at any rate, regard 
matter as merely a kind of vibration, or colour, and only very gradually, if ever, 
reach a point of view like our own. 
Now, the oddest thing about its endeavours is that they are of the greatest 
importance for physicists to-day, and probably of the greatest practical 
importance to our grandchildren. A century ago physicists began to give up the 
corpuscular theory of light, which had satisfied them for two thousand years, in 
favour of a wave theory. Among the practical consequences flowing from this 
theory were wireless telegraphy and telephony. And in the last two years a much 
more surprising step has been taken. The wave theory of matter, enunciated by de 
Broglie, and developed by Schrödinger, has already rendered the mechanics of the 
atom relatively intelligible. It has further enabled mathematical physicists to 
predict several extremely surprising results which have been verified. In 
consequence some of the ablest men in the world are at present in the position of 
the mythical creatures which I have tried to describe. They take as their data the 
frequencies of the radiation emitted or absorbed by various kinds of matter, and 
very naturally come to regard the matter itself as merely a special type of 
undulatory disturbance. 
So far as an outsider can judge, even Schrödinger’s world, fantastic as it 
is, contains many relics of ordinary thought which the creatures that I have 
imagined would hardly have taken for granted. However, Heisenberg and Born in 
Germany, and Dirac in Cambridge, are busily clearing away these vestiges of 
common sense. In the world of their imagining even the ordinary rules of 
arithmetic no longer hold good. The attempt to build up a world-view from the 
end which common sense regards as wrong, is, at any rate, being made, and with 
very fair success. I suspect that it is of far greater importance for metaphysics than 
the entire efforts of the philosophers who, from Kant onwards, have attempted to 
build on the ground cleared by Hume. If it were successful it might lead to 
philosophical systems in which the real elements in the external world were the 
secondary qualities of colour, tone, and so forth, rather than the primary qualities 
of the materialist’s world. One may perhaps speculate that in colour vision we 
have a real perception of light quanta, though the analogy with hearing renders 
such a theory dubious. 
A natural philosophy of such a kind would be a step in the direction of 
idealism. The idealists have held that the spiritual alone is the real. They have 
failed to account in detail for the phenomenal world on this basis, the most 
magnificent of such failures being Hegel’s. (I call to mind an admirable picture by 
a deceased friend entitled ‘An Hegelian setting the Dialectic in motion.’ A small, 
bald, and myopic philosopher is turning the handle of a vast and complicated 
machine, fed from sacks labelled ‘Ideen.’ It has numerous doors at different 
levels. That which happens to be open is disgorging rabbits of various colours. 
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That below would have presumably produced plants, that above ‘subjective 
minds.’) But the failure of these philosophers in detail does not prove that they 
were not correct in a general way. Secondary qualities, such as colour, are 
generally regarded as having less claim to independence of the mind than primary 
qualities, such as size and shape, and a working theory of the universe which 
started from them would certainly be a long way nearer to idealism than is 
present-day science. If, as Leibniz held, the universe consists wholly of minds, the 
transition to such a physics would only be a step in the right direction, but 
possibly subsequent steps might be easier. Perhaps an understanding of the 
psychology of social insects might help us to make them. 
I greatly doubt if they will be made by professional philosophers. And 
though to-day the theoretical physicist is and ought to be the principal type of 
world-builder, the biologist will one day come to his own in this respect. And one 
day man will be able to do in reality what in this essay I have done in jest, 
namely, to look at existence from the point of view of non-human minds. Bergson 
has of course made this attempt, but not, as it seems to me, very successfully. 
Success is, indeed, impossible in view of our present ignorance of animal 
psychology, and that is why a purely speculative essay like the present can claim 
some degree of justification at this moment. Our only hope of understanding the 
universe is to look at it from as many different points of view as possible. This is 
one of the reasons why the data of the mystical consciousness can usefully 
supplement those of the mind in its normal state. Now, my own suspicion is that 
the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can 
suppose. I have read and heard many attempts at a systematic account of it, from 
materialism and theosophy to the Christian system or that of Kant, and I have 
always felt that they were much too simple. I suspect that there are more things in 
heaven and earth than are dreamed of, or can be dreamed of, in any philosophy. 
That is the reason why I have no philosophy myself, and must be my excuse for 
dreaming.230 
 
We should note the surprising contrast here between what the scientist has to say and what our 
philosophers had to say about “more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of, or can be 
dreamed of, in philosophy.” Recall that the authors of the Philosopher’s Toolkit considered that 
this might be the case, that there might be more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in 
philosophy, and that this might then recommend the mystic’s approach. But, the tongue-in-cheek 
feeling of their response—“Then again, perhaps not”—seems to suggest philosophy’s 
imagination, and its practices, are just fine. By now we have come to sense that the opposite may 
                                                 
230 http://jbshaldane.org/books/1927-Possible-Worlds/haldane-1927-possible-worlds.html#start 
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hold: That philosophy lacks imagination, and that its lack is a symptom. This may explain why 
many a scientist would rather reject philosophy altogether, and instead turn to dreaming. As we 
have noted, dreaming is a primary spiritual exercise in many traditions of philosophy as a way of 
life, both in the west and in cultures all over the world. One could argue that the only issue we 
have in the west comes to perpetuating an anemic vision of philosophy, such that philosophy 
cannot vitalize and empower our dream life and our dream practices, and that consequently our 
dream life and dream practices have no real chance of helping us realize the ideals of our 
philosophies.  
 
Dreaming is thinking in the proper sense—what we can call, following Dogen, nonthinking. 
Dreaming is an art of awareness, and such arts are nonthinking. We don’t have to talk to 
ourselves and “think” “about” things. Trees don’t “think” “about” things. Trees nonthink leaves, 
roots, fruits, and oxygen into being. We nonthink things into being too—like mountains, rivers, 
trees, leaves, birds, butterflies—but, not sensing this, we think abstractions that lead to more 
abstractions, and we think an artificial world into being, we think division into being, we think 
our own cut-offness into being, so that we are at odds with reality, at odds with our own ideals, at 
odds with each other, at odds with ourselves, and living at an ever greater virtual distance from 
life itself, Sophia, the divine, the sacred natural, super natural World, and our own true Nature.  
 
In a more Natural setting the beings treat their context as their Home. It is natural to rub up 
against a tree because of an itch, to roll in the mud in order to get clean. Humans still put mud on 
their faces, but it’s a “sophisticated” thing to do, one that sometimes costs a lot of money. We 
don’t treat the Natural World as our home and as the broader context of thinking—not merely 
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“context” as in an inert container, but context as nondual relationality (e.g. the “nonduality of 
organism and environment”), such that the context does the nonthinking, not simply “with” us, 
but in a way in which we don’t live as if separated from it. It is a living ecology of Mind, and our 
stand against it, the delusion of separation, amounts to taking a stand against life. LoveWisdom 
typically prescribes the experience of ecstasy to dispel this delusion. 
 
Ecstasy (ec-stasy, standing outside the self, consummation of the atops) is the Mystic’s 
Experience. It is the gift we all seek. Socrates was atopos, a being with no “place,” no label, no 
category, no agenda, no Cartesian coordinates. If we fit into the Cosmos itself, then no ordinary 
place can hold us. We don’t hide in the hovel of the ego, the fabricated life of a narrow, fearful, 
craving, and ignorant mind. We stop hiding behind the skin and the skull. Each time we try to 
take sides against reality, we try forcing ourselves to be in place, to stand in place. We stand in 
our mind, and we don’t stand up for Love, for Life. Ecstasy means a displacement out if habit, 
out of agendas, out of conquest consciousness. Our perspective gets displaced, our ignorance 
gets displaced, our self-centeredness gets displaced, our self-inspection gets displaced. We stop 
our fixed standing, our attempts to stand firm against reality, our attempts to defend something, 
and we enter the spaciousness of the dance, where no standing is possible. The dance never 
stands still, even as it flows in nonduality with its own stillness. Ecstasy is still, not moving. It is 
still, but not fixed—like the Dance. As T.S. Eliot properly describes it (likely stealing from the 
Upanishads and the Gita), nondual stillness is already movement, and nondual movement is 
already stillness. We enter the harmony of the Cosmos, the blissful equilibrium of the Nature of 
what we are. 
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Entering is central. We are always already in the womb and being birthed. Wisdom is the womb 
of compassion (sunyatakarunagarbham, sunyatakarunabhinnam), and we everywhere at all times 
give birth to love and compassion. We enter temples, we enter the Ways, enter the path, enter the 
teachings, enter the doctrines, enter the spiritual life, enter the traditions—and we verify them. 
We always already enter and encounter. Encounter is not, “I am here and you are there and we 
encounter one another.” Encountering everywhere means entering everywhere, everywhere 
rousing, everything rousing, everything in mutual nourishment and mutual illumination. We 
encounter the divine everywhere, already entered into sacredness. You and I already enter one 
another, arise entangled with one another, your roots and shoots growing as mine, your thread of 
the patterning running through my loom, in total interwovenness. We enter reality through a 
gateless gate, because there is no gate, no entrance to reality. And yet we must enter it. We live 
as outsiders until we enter our own lives and loves, cross the threshold, letting go of the known. 
Love is the ultimate entrance, and we cannot fully enter Love without entering reality, cannot 
enter reality without entering Love. 
 
This entering is painful, even frightening, when we do not look. I have fallen many times, hurt 
myself physically, mentally, emotionally, spiritually. I have many scars. Sophia has humiliated 
me countless times for not entering when the gate is always already here, open. She beckons, and 
I have turned a deaf ear again and again. She does not want to hurt us, but when She beckons and 
we are distracted, hurried, mindless, afraid, graspy, tense, narrow, dazed, confused, foggy, then 
of our own doing we suffer. She beckons us out of our self-torture, our spinning wheel of trauma, 
stress, strain, worry, fear, hatred, anger, jealousy, envy, craving, desire. All the nonsense makes 
noise. We walk in noise, breathe noise into us, breathe noise out. We are like insane trees filling 
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the atmosphere with toxins instead of oxygen, making suffering out of light instead of nourishing 
ourselves and our World. We could walk in Beauty instead—as the old Navajo prayer tells us:  
With beauty before me, I walk 
With beauty behind me, I walk 
With beauty above me, I walk 
With beauty below me, I walk 
From the East, beauty has been restored 
From the South, beauty has been restored 
From the West, beauty has been restored 
From the North, beauty has been restored 
From the zenith in the sky beauty has been restored 
From the nadir of the earth beauty has been restored 
From all around me beauty has been restored231 
 
We could walk like this, restore life like this. But we get distracted, and we lack a practice of 
Beauty. 
 
I have hurt myself and others ultimately out of distraction. If the gate is always already right 
here, what else would we call missing it again and again? It’s right HereNow. How can we miss 
it? We actively misperceive. We actively misknow. We call it perception. We call it knowing. It 
is not perception or knowing. It is a very precise misknowing and misperceiving. It is so sharp 
that it hurts all the time in one way or another, hurts all the way into each other, even if we feel 
relative happiness here and there in the midst of it. That can sound so harsh and depressing. But 
it’s actually refreshing. Why? Because it’s honest, and it points toward a total shift. We could 
give up all of our nonsense. That would feel very refreshing. It would feel light. We could drop 
the whole burden of our existence, including the burden of trying to be happy, or trying to ignore 
                                                 
231 This prayer is fairly well-known. See Martin (2000: 25) for a nice context, and for another see 
https://americanindian.si.edu/education/codetalkers/html/chapter5.html 
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the suffering of others. We could return to Nature, to Mind, to the sacred presence already 
waiting for us, already in our blood: 
Come into Animal Presence 
By Denise Levertov 
 
Come into animal presence. 
No man is so guileless as 
the serpent. The lonely white 
rabbit on the roof is a star 
twitching its ears at the rain. 
The llama intricately 
folding its hind legs to be seated 
not disdains but mildly 
disregards human approval. 
What joy when the insouciant 
armadillo glances at us and doesn't 
quicken his trotting 
across the track into the palm brush. 
 
What is this joy? That no animal 
falters, but knows what it must do? 
That the snake has no blemish, 
that the rabbit inspects his strange surroundings 
in white star-silence? The llama 
rests in dignity, the armadillo 
has some intention to pursue in the palm-forest. 
Those who were sacred have remained so, 
holiness does not dissolve, it is a presence 
of bronze, only the sight that saw it 
faltered and turned from it. 
An old joy returns in holy presence.232 
 
Assume for just a moment that this old teaching is correct. It is a teaching found in one way or 
another in countless traditions of LoveWisdom: We are missing something right now. Imagine 
that there is something we are not seeing, right HereNow, and that this not seeing is the source of 
                                                 
232 Available in Selected Poems (2003), New Directions. 
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all our suffering. What might it be that we are not seeing? Where is it? What is it? How can we 
see it? 
 
If it is truly already Here, it cannot be an object. We cannot look for it like looking for a lost 
wedding ring. We cannot search like searching for gold or diamonds. We cannot argue for it or 
analyze or think in the ordinary way.  
 
The new epistemology is already here. A way to cultivate ecologies of Wisdom, Love, and 
Beauty is already here. We are it. There is nothing else but to arrive at aporia, release into 
rebellion and rupture, and begin the path of LoveWisdom. Countless sentient beings depend on 
our practice. 
Appendix I: Basic Love and Compassion Practice 
First: Set your intentions. Think about what matters most to you. I recommend for this practice 
that you don’t pick any kind of variable intention. In some forms of practice, we may want to 
heal a specific wound or address a specific demon. But those are sub-intentions, smaller 
intentions within the ecology of our larger intentions. In love and compassion practice, we can 
include those smaller intentions, but we always begin with our highest intention, the thing we 
would say our life is about. If our life is about love, then that’s the intention: To practice and 
realize love. Maybe we would say: My highest intention is to love and care for my family. Or 
maybe: I want to truly know myself and this wondrous World, for the benefit of all beings. Or: I 
want to truly embody Wisdom, Love, and Beauty for the sake of all beings. Whatever we think is 
the highest intention we could possibly have, we bring that to mind. If, for instance, we know 
that we need to practice compassion for someone who is suffering, we honor them by framing 
the practice in the context of something a little more Cosmic. We can Intend their well-being too, 
but we begin with a broader vision. We thereby weave them into the deepest meaning of our life 
and the mystery of being. It places them and us in an expansive space, with limitless energy and 
potential. 
 
Next, think of a time when you experienced a moment of genuine love and happiness. Picture the 
person who was present with you, the person with whom you experienced this love and 
joyfulness. It can be a human person, a dog person, a tree person, a horse person, any person at 
all (or even a place, as long as you experience it as sentient). We are complicated beings, so you 
don’t have to worry about the whole relationship with this person. Just think of one moment, one 
very specific moment when you knew, or you know now, was a moment of love and happiness. 
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Picture that person, and let that feeling of love and joyfulness blossom in your heart. Allow 
yourself to really feel it. Allow it to bloom in the heart. 
 
Then, think about that person, and send them that warmth of heart, that feeling of love you now 
experience in the center of your being. You can think these words: “May you be truly happy, and 
may you know the causes of true happiness.”  
 
To love someone is to wish for their genuine happiness, to put their happiness above our own. 
Maybe we can only manage that sometimes, and hopefully at important times. But the ideal is 
that our beloved’s happiness is more important than our own, and we discover thereby that when 
we let go of self-centeredness, we are happier. Our true happiness lies in letting go of self-
centeredness. Thinking about and taking action for the well-being of others brings us great joy. 
This does not mean becoming a slave to someone or neglecting our well-being. We must never 
lose discernment. Love and Wisdom must go together. To the extent that we lack Wisdom, we 
lack true Love; to the extent we lack Love, we lack true Wisdom. 
 
But that is just a side note to bracket distracting thoughts and fears. Focus on the love. You just 
send that thought. You can send the words, saying them in your mind like an affirmation or 
recitation, or you can picture love going to them visually if you like, in the form of warmth, light, 
or however you would like to imagine it. Do that for at least a few seconds. You can do it for 
several minutes.  
 
This first practice is the practice of love. It is sometimes called LovingKindness meditation. It’s 
just Love, but the “Kindness” part is there to remind us that we can send that love to anyone at 
all, and it is not a matter of romantic feelings or family connection. 
 
Next, recognize that this person you have held in mind, held in your heart, may experience 
suffering. Recognize that you would like them to be free from suffering. Then send them this 
thought: “May you be free from suffering and all causes of suffering.” You can repeat these 
thoughts again and again. If your mind strays, return to the thought of that person, and return to 
sending compassion. 
 
Then, recognize that you too suffer. Sometimes we ignore our suffering, or even think we 
deserve it. We can be quite cruel to ourselves. But if we are suffering, this means the World has 
that much more suffering in it, and this affects those we love, as well as everyone else. For your 
own benefit, and for the benefit of all beings, including those dearest to you, you deserve to be 
free from suffering.  
 
When we are suffering, we are more difficult to be around, and we may do things that cause 
suffering in others, even accidentally or unconsciously. When people experience our suffering, it 
brings them suffering. For all these reasons, we begin to see that lack of self-compassion is itself 
selfish, and the practice of self-compassion is itself generous.  
 
Practicing love and compassion for ourselves can sometimes prove challenging, but we can 
begin to see that everyone benefits if we can become truly free from suffering, even a little, and 
even for a moment. So, send the thought: “May I be free from suffering and all causes of 
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suffering.” Do it for several seconds, or even several minutes. You may even like to send this 
thought to yourself while placing one or both hands on your heart, in a gesture of kindness and 
warmth. That’s not about being precious, but about being honest, direct, and warm. It’s about 
acknowledging our own empowerment. 
 
Finally, recognize that you too deserve to be happy. Even if you are scared to allow yourself to 
be happy (that can be an unconscious fear, not so easy to detect), you can see that the people you 
love, and the world in general, would be better off if you were happy. If you write me an email 
saying you feel very happy, I feel happy too, and I do not have to suffer because of your 
suffering. You are nicer to be around, and I don’t have to worry about you. So, my happiness is 
interwoven with yours. Therefore, for your own benefit, and for the benefit of all beings, you 
deserve to be happy. So, send those same feelings and thoughts to yourself: “May I be truly 
happy, and may I know the causes of true happiness.” The “truly happy” part means we aren’t 
wishing deluded happiness on ourselves or others. We want genuine happiness, not mere hedonic 
pleasures. 
 
Start small with this practice. Doing 2 or 3 minutes per day, just once, is better than zero. And 2 
minutes per day will transform you over time. No way around it. But, as you gradually build up 
to 14 or even 24 minutes a day, you will notice increasing effects. And we have hard science to 
back up that claim. These practices alter brain structure and even affect us at a cellular level. 
 
Gradually, you can add two more parts to the practice: Wishing that the person you start out 
focusing on (and then you yourself) may know true peace and joy. The joy part is different than 
the happiness above, because it’s about practicing sympathetic joy. Sometimes we get a little 
freaked out by the joy and success of others. We even take pleasure in the downfall of others. 
The Germans call it schadenfreude. They are not alone in feeling it, even if we use the German 
word to describe it. So, we practice really wishing the joy of another to continue, and to grow. 
Then we wish true peace for them, which means their well-being is not based on success or 
failure, on pain or pleasure, praise or blame. If they feel truly peaceful, they feel really wonderful 
at the bottom of their being, even if something difficult arises. Similarly, they don’t get pulled 
and hooked by pleasures. You would wish these for another, and then for yourself. You would 
use phrases like this: “May you never be separated from true joy. May you abide in peace and 
equanimity.” 
 
Always practice in mutuality: Self and other. Self-compassion seems to be particularly 
challenging for westerners (especially Americans), and that is an important spiritual symptom to 
ponder. This challenging nature makes self-compassion very important for us, for a variety of 
reasons. For instance, the work of Kristen Neff has shown that practicing self-compassion gets us 
what attempts at self-esteem aim for but fail to deliver. Self-compassion is not self-esteem. Self-
compassion is not self-indulgence, it is not self-gratification, it is not self-obsession, it is not self-
pity. Self-compassion is about seeing that you can handle seeing. Self-compassion is about 
allowing yourself to do the alchemy of the soul, discovering and creating your capacity to handle 
the heat, your capacity to be medicine for the World. 
 
Self-compassion is practiced as a part of general training in cultivating wisdom, compassion, 
love, joy, and peace, and working toward the liberation of ourselves and all beings. It’s a come-
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and-see thing and an altogether thing, which is the essence of Sophia Thinking. Compassion 
means the heartfelt wish to alleviate suffering wherever it arises, and engaging in endless 
creativity to help, benefit, and liberate all beings. If suffering arises “here,” then we deal with it. 
If it arises “there,” we deal with it. And we deal with it in an altogether Way. We are all 
interwoven (we are interwovenness, which is not a “thing”), and our practice of life is an 
altogether practice, not something we can “do” in pieces, even if pieces often deliver valuable 
relief from suffering measured in a narrow way.   
 
After you work with the above practice for several weeks, you can gradually expand the practice 
from 2 people (someone you love, and then yourself), to four people. These are all individuals. 
The two people to add are a stranger and then a difficult person. The stranger could be someone 
you pass on the street, a shopkeeper, a neighbor you see often but never really interact with, or 
anyone else who seems right. Each time you practice, choose a unique individual (you can work 
with the same person over many sessions if you like, but choose a specific person for each 
session). Then, try a challenging person. Don’t start with anyone too intense. Maybe try a person 
you had a little argument with, or someone who gets on your nerves a bit. After a lot of practice 
you can move on to much more challenging people, but never push yourself. The practice should 
be done in a gentle way, so that you feel healthy, even if frequently challenged. You can work 
with the same difficult person over as many sessions as seems fitting, and you can gradually 
move on to very intense people. But don’t start with someone who has traumatized you. 
 
As you progress in experience, you can send these feelings, these immeasurable goodnesses, to 
larger and larger groups of people, and then finally you can beam them out in all directions, 
throughout the whole Cosmos (the brain waves of advanced practitioners doing that latter 
practice were so unprecedented that the scientists running an experiment on them thought  
machines had a malfunction).233 
 
These practices were developed in part to help heal the psyche.234 We can find ways to engage 
with these practices no matter our current state of being. But, for those who have experienced 
trauma, it can take extra Patience (which means Inclusiveness) and Gentleness to Allow these 
                                                 
233 Just Imagine . . . we know so little about our own HeartMindBodyWorldCosmos that a 
scientific result related to meditation and compassion initially appears as if it must be due to a 
malfunction in our equipment. I find this a remarkable fact. It was not included in the original 
study, but was reported by Richard Davidson, a lead investigator in the study, in the course of a 
presentation at Stanford University in June of 2016. 
234 One finds these practices in the oldest layers of Buddhist philosophy. I have heard that certain 
love and compassion practices were prescribed by the Buddha to help practitioners in the grips of 
various “demons”. In our more prosaic, modern discourse we might say these monks were 
suffering from trauma, neurosis, and various other maladies of the soul. Given the intensely 
psychological orientation of Buddhist LoveWisdom, this is not such a horrible way of putting it, 
since many philosophers in Buddhist traditions are quite explicit that “demons” are simply 
obstructions to liberation, and that it makes little sense to try and think of “demons” as self-
existing “creatures” roaming around “outside” of us. In other words, all demons are ultimately 
inner demons. But, to arrive at that, we must see the nonduality of inner and outer, and we must 
see the archetypal dimension of the energies that flow through us, directing our lives.  
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Practices to Heal the Psyche. The Healing will Come, with Patience and Sustained Effort, a kind 
of Joyful Perseverance. We must be Sensitive to the needs of anyone we introduce these 
Practices to, but they have proven quite safe and reliable, and are perhaps the safest form of 
Meditation with which any of us can begin, and which most all of us should always keep up 
with.  
 
There is a growing, impressive body of science on compassion and other meditation practices. 
Frankly, our neuroscience is still in its infancy, and there is a lot we need to learn, though we will 
consider some of that science as we go along. I rely mainly on the 2500 years of philosophical 
elaboration and practical engagement with these practices, and on my own experience with them, 
including teaching them to students. I have seen profound changes in my own life and in the 
lives of my students. The main thing is to try it for yourself and see what you discover and 
create. 
 
 
 
“Whatever kinds of worldly merit there are, all are not worth one 16th part of the release of 
mind, the heart deliverance by LovingKindness; in shining, glowing, beaming and radiance the 
release of mind, the heart deliverance by LovingKindness far excels and surpasses them all.” ~ 
Siddhartha 
 
“As a mother even with own life protects her only child, so should one cultivate immeasurable 
Love towards all living beings.”  ~ Siddhartha 
 
“Indeed, Allah enjoins justice, and the doing of good to others; and giving like kindred; and 
forbids indecency, and manifest evil, and wrongful transgression. He admonished you that you 
may take heed.”  ~ The Koran, 16:91 
 
“And as for those who strive in Our path — We will surely guide them in Our ways. And Indeed, 
Allah is with those who are of service to others.”  ~ The Koran, 29:70 
 
“A guidance and a mercy for those who do good.”  ~ The Koran, 31:4 
 
“Therefore, as God’s chosen people, holy and dearly loved, clothe yourselves with compassion, 
kindness, humility, gentleness and patience. Bear with each other and forgive one another if any 
of you has a grievance against someone. Forgive as the Lord forgave you.”  ~ Colossians 3:12-13 
 
“Praise be to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of compassion and the God 
of all comfort, who comforts us in all our troubles, so that we can comfort those in any trouble 
with the comfort we ourselves receive from God.”  ~ 2 Corinthians 1:3-4 
 
“The Lord is gracious and righteous; our God is full of compassion.”  ~ Psalm 116:5 
 
“Thus if a man does kindness on earth, he awakens loving-kindness above, and it rests upon that 
day which is crowned therewith through him. Similarly, if he performs a deed of mercy, he 
crowns that day with mercy and it becomes his protector in the hour of need. So, too, if he 
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performs a cruel action, he has a corresponding effect on that day and impairs it, so that 
subsequently it becomes cruel to him and tries to destroy him, giving him measure for measure. 
The people of Israel are withheld from cruelty more than all other peoples, and must not manifest 
any deed of the kind, since many watchful eyes are upon them.”  ~ The Zohar, 3.92b 
 
“Therefore if you have any encouragement from being united with Christ, if any comfort from 
his love, if any common sharing in the Spirit, if any tenderness and compassion, then make my 
joy complete by being like-minded, having the same love, being one in spirit and of one mind. 
Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value others above 
yourselves.”  ~ Philippians 2:1-3 
 
“And the word of the Lord came again to Zechariah: “This is what the Lord Almighty said: 
‘Administer true justice; show mercy and compassion to one another. Do not oppress the widow 
or the fatherless, the foreigner or the poor. Do not plot evil against each other.’”   
~ Zechariah 8-10 
 
Blessed are the merciful, 
    for they will be shown mercy. 
Blessed are the pure in heart, 
    for they will see God. 
Blessed are the peacemakers, 
    for they will be called children of God. 
   ~ from the Sermon on the Mount 
 
 
“God has given each of you a gift from his great variety of spiritual gifts. Use them well to serve 
one another.”  ~ 1 Peter 4:10 
 
“Finally, all of you should be of one mind. Sympathize with each other. Love each other as 
brothers and sisters. Be tenderhearted, and keep a humble attitude.”  ~ 1 Peter 3:8 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II: Dangerous Wisdom, Philosophical Diagnosis, and Confidence in Love 
 
As this inquiry unfolded, one of the most consistent concerns about it kept coming up. What if 
the “real” story comes to something like this: 
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Our main problem is not a crisis in our whole way of knowing, but simply the (relatively) 
mundane issue that we need to listen to the knowledge we have? After all, our scientists are the 
ones who told us about the threat of climate change, and they warned us with plenty of time to 
make changes. Why, then, critique science—even worse, critique it as part of a sweeping critique 
of the dominant culture, including its politics, media, and more? It’s dangerous, and it actually 
fuels the fire. 
 
One of my readers put it rather well: This inquiry could be read as “more of the same,” more of 
the same thinking that has gotten us where we find ourselves—a sad and ironic furthering of the 
pattern of insanity. When did that particular reader first learn about climate change? Roughly 40 
years ago! Where did they read about it? The newspaper! Based on what evidence? That given 
by scientists! We had time to take action, but we didn’t. The “why” of that failure could be 
explained in ways far different from the inquiry presented here, and the recommendations would 
come to things like this: Read the newspaper, have confidence in the findings of science, take 
political action, make sure our children go to school and study well, listen to what scientists and 
other experts tell us we need to do to make things better. The reader in question would certainly 
put all of this in more compelling terms, but in some sense I hope this captures the spirit of the 
critique. 
 
Considered in this light, our inquiry may indeed be downright dangerous, for it further questions 
science, questions media, questions politics, questions education, questions the possibility of 
knowledge given the way we try to know. If the diagnosis given in this inquiry proves correct, 
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then it has significant value, no matter how uncomfortable or unfortunate. However, if the 
diagnosis proves incorrect, it may have caused further trouble, and though it aimed to alleviate 
suffering, it may yet bring about a great deal of it. 
 
This concern, in various forms, has weighed upon the inquiry in the whole of its unfolding. We 
have tried in our reflections to differentiate what we considered from the kinds of things said by 
certain post-modern, new age, and political commentators. Plenty of what we considered could 
be compared to things claimed by political extremists, hate groups, abstruse intellectuals, and all 
manner of new agey thinkers. Many of these thinkers sound very confident in their claims. How 
can we be sure the present inquiry is correct? Why does it sound confident, when so many people 
are saying, “Things are not what they seem! Here, take this red pill!” 
 
It seems first and foremost essential to acknowledge the reason why “take the red pill” resonates 
with people, why The Matrix was so popular, and why so many groups might hit on this theme: 
It is the heart of LoveWisdom, and thus we all resonate with it, possibly because we all sense 
that things are in fact not quite what they seem.  
 
We may want to discount this suggestion and say that we merely hope or wish things were not 
what they seem, so that we can fantasize about a better life and explain our current suffering. But 
this requires a profound insult to almost all spiritual traditions, and it may indicate a clinging to 
the style of consciousness exemplified by the dominant culture. Every philosopher senses how 
The Matrix appears rather straightforwardly as a techno-dystopian update to Plato’s allegory of 
the cave, how Neo seems like a quasi-buddha, how the whole story manifests the archetypal 
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hero’s journey. Does the archetype force us all to see a need to take the red pill, or is it that, 
again, and again, and again, people have taken the red pill and verified something, something the 
sacred-creative-ordering seduces us into verifying because of its necessity for life?  
 
Consider the Dalai Lama’s words again, as quoted in the inquiry: 
After having talked to numerous scientist friends over the years, I have the 
conviction that the great discoveries in physics going back as far as Copernicus 
give rise to the insight that reality is not as it appears to us. When one puts the 
world under a serious lens of investigation—be it the scientific method and 
experiment or the Buddhist logic of emptiness or the contemplative method of 
meditative analysis—one finds things are more subtle than, and in some cases 
even contradict, the assumptions of our ordinary common-sense view of the 
world. 
 
Science, too, asks us to take the red pill. But, nothing quite compares to the way the spiritual 
traditions ask this of us, and what happens to us when we navigate the journey it sweeps us into.  
 
It also seems important to note a couple of things about the scientific diagnosis of our situation. 
Let’s first go back to the beginning of our inquiry and recall my confession that, if I want to 
“know” something about some set of phenomena, I will almost inevitably consult the available 
science. Again, this is not always the very first thing I do, and I never take the science as the 
final word, but I surely treat it with great respect. 
 
Having said that, I find scientists’ capacity to tell us the world is in trouble far from impressive. 
It doesn’t take much to notice that the rivers are polluted, that species are going extinct, and so 
on. We may say, “Ah! But outlining the ‘greenhouse effect’ decades ago did require scientific 
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insight and analysis. It took science to give us a warning of decades.” This strikes me as 
problematic for a number of reasons. 
 
First of all, if an alcoholic gets into a car and then crashes into my home while I am asleep, and 
for some reason I don’t hear it, then he will most certainly reveal something to me if he throws 
stones at my bedroom window until I awaken, and then gives me the news, many hours before I 
might have awoken to find out for myself. He has maybe given me enough warning to save some 
things from being looted, or perhaps being damaged in a coming rainstorm. I may be thankful to 
him. Nevertheless, he’s part of the trouble.  
 
Our scientists helped to give us automobiles, rockets, missiles, and more. Add up all the 
ecological interventions resulting from all the scientific experimentation of the past century, and 
one surely has no small heap of suffering for the world, whatever the good we insist came out of 
it. 
 
Our inquiry suggests that this is not merely a “material” issue, as if we could take out a ledger 
and count up how much environmental degradation can be specifically attributed to “science” 
and “scientists” in one column and add up all the good in another. The trouble goes much deeper, 
for there are countless sages, including many Indigenous Elders of the past and present, who 
would simply ask, “Why did you burn all those fossil fuels to begin with? On the basis of what 
knowledge did you think it was okay?” Have the scientists consistently told us, since the 
inception of science, that the world is so sophisticated and complex that we should not try and 
control and intervene? Have they cultivated in us a sense of reverence, a sense of sacredness? 
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In one sense, we might suggest that what we face is not a scientific problem. That scientists 
noticed it does not make it a problem they can resolve. That it was reported in newspapers does 
not make newspapers a medium for LoveWisdom. Newspapers might become a medium for 
LoveWisdom, but they certainly do not practice such a function now, and few of us would turn 
to newspapers in order to find much genuine wisdom—not that it’s completely absent, but that it 
seems rare. In the regime we have, reporters aren’t meant to be wise, and though they might 
interview wise beings or write from a rootedness in and dedication to wisdom, love, and beauty, 
I cannot see how, by and large, media escapes the critiques provided by people like Edward 
Herman, Noam Chomsky, Chris Hedges, and Matt Taibbi. Fortunately we have an impressive 
alternative press, and there are quite a few courageous and insightful journalists in the World. I 
am fairly confident that we should try our best to read their work—though we still require the 
wisdom of discernment to know what to read and what to make of it. 
 
In any case, even if one has no sense that the problems we face are primarily of a philosophical 
or spiritual nature—and all the more so if they are—it is to philosophy and spirituality that we 
must turn to cultivate discernment and to take wise, loving, and beautiful action. The traditions 
and practices that in the dominant are referred to as science have no intimacy with traditions and 
practices that merit the designation of wisdom. The scientific traditions, and the journalistic 
traditions too, have much more to do with an attitude of manipulation than one of reverence. By 
and large, the wisdom traditions can offer us teachings and practices that can empower us to 
experience the World as sacred, and this would seem a better attitude than whatever it is we 
currently practice. 
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After all, if we look at the state of the World, does it seem like we hold it as sacred? Does it seem 
like we treat the rivers as a gift from the divine, as the very presence of sacredness, as a direct 
and intimate teaching of Sophia? And it seems that so many traditions would agree that receiving 
the teachings of the river means taking the red pill, while treating it as we have goes altogether 
with Sorrowville. Science as we know it is part of the functioning of Sorrowville. That seems 
radical in its implications, and thus may make us uncomfortable enough that we wish to evade it, 
but it seems so far from radical in its sense as to strike me as unavoidable.  
 
A further problem seems evident: Even if we grant that it takes some epistemic traction (so to 
speak) to notice that we need to change things (and leaving open the question of what that 
means), and even after we set aside the culpability of that epistemic orientation in creating the 
trouble, how do we make the change? In telling us about the “greenhouse effect” decades ago, 
science may as well have been telling us, “You are stooping! Stand up straight!” “You are 
stooping” still seems an unimpressive diagnosis. As for, “Stand up straight!” we have considered 
how that seems a useless directive. If a “doing” orientation got us into the climate catastrophe, if 
a certain style of consciousness bears any responsibility, then all efforts from that style of 
consciousness, all efforts at “doing” something to fix the problem, may result in more error. If 
conscious human purpose got us into the trouble, it strikes me as incredible—and incredibly 
tragic—hubris to think conscious purpose will get us out of it. Isn’t part of our lesson here that 
we cannot “control” the World? And isn’t science rooted in “predict and control”? That may not 
even be the most compelling way to make the link, to expose the style of consciousness at work 
here. This whole inquiry may not have exposed it enough for the skeptical reader. But I feel no 
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compunction for suggesting that science, media, politics, and so on will not likely dispel the 
pattern of insanity, and that they seem to be manifestations of it. 
 
Yet another part of the problem with the skeptical attitude toward the dangerous suggestions of 
our inquiry comes from the way that skepticism seems, at base, to embrace the dominant 
culture’s assumptions about “history” and “progress”. We do need to recognize growth, 
evolution, insight, and so on. But something strange happens in the dominant culture’s narratives 
in relation to these things, and the “scientific” character of that culture is taken as a kind of 
superiority. Philosophically speaking, this seems dubious at best. These sorts of hypothetical 
exercises often seem quite silly, but perhaps it makes some kind of point to say that, given a 
choice between living in a “primitive” society properly rooted in wisdom, love, and beauty, or a 
“technologically advanced” society lacking this rootedness, it seems advisable to choose the 
former, since there is currently no vitalizing connection between science and wisdom, and no 
logical connection between science and happiness. It does not take wisdom to discover 
environmental degradation at the scale we have achieved it, nor is it particularly wise to suggest 
that we should stop it. Rather, saying that we need to stop environmental degradation seems 
rational, given the simple premise that we’d like to survive. It would have taken wisdom to tell 
us not to engage in the degradation to begin with, or to have caught it and warned against it long 
before any “scientific” data were compelling enough to warrant political action in a “free” 
economy. 
 
Aside from these considerations, we might open ourselves to the possibility that standing up 
straight may itself mean a revolution in science. In other words, “You are stooping! Stand up 
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straight!” seems in some sense to be a surprising version of, “Things aren’t what they seem! 
Take the red pill!” That may seem odd, and admittedly one could easily avoid even the hint of 
having to choose to take the red pill in the mundane act of sitting and standing, but it 
nevertheless seems to be there, if we are willing to look with sufficient care—thus the many 
spiritual common law cases about utterly ordinary activities like clearing one’s throat or drinking 
a cup of tea. 
 
It’s worth noting that Morpheus never says, “Take the red pill!” No one does, except zealots and 
other fools, who are typically unreliable, exhibiting as they do a kind of blindness that leads 
themselves and others into suffering. It is in himself and Morpheus as a person that Neo trusts, 
not any “truth” that Morpheus offers. And Morpheus insists that Neo must choose for himself, 
and then verify for himself. Without the possibility of verification, we remain stuck in blind 
faith. 
 
In a sense, when responding to the charge that this inquiry is more of the same, the first reply 
goes something like this: “What did you expect? This is a work of philosophy. If it didn’t offer a 
red pill, offer the choice of it in the kind of framing Socrates, Buddha, and even Morpheus 
provide, it would have to make one hell of a case for abandoning all the venerable spiritual 
traditions of the world, its author has no idea how to do that, for he has himself practiced within 
those traditions, not outside of them. No one can help the fact that this archetypal patterning has 
become co-opted by all sorts of insanity. That is what we must expect to happen, for all the 
reasons discussed in this inquiry and in the many traditions that recognize problems of spiritual 
materialism, including its manifestation as political ideology. Moreover, the inquiry does not 
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choose on behalf of those who engage with it. If they contemplate with care, and then decide to 
take the red pill, that is their business. In any case, they should not take the red pill without first 
grounding themselves in some kind of ethical commitment, including the most basic 
commitment to only take the red pill (and do the work that follows) in order to benefit all beings, 
and to do everything possible to avoid harming them.” 
 
How do we determine which red pill on offer to take? We shouldn’t rush into it. Someone well-
grounded in a venerable tradition seems a much better choice than someone with a political 
agenda. That is not to say spirituality is a space of practice free of “the political,” but that we can 
certainly discern the difference between, for instance, a Sufi teacher or Tibetan monk on the one 
hand, and an internet conspiracy theorist or “law of attraction” guru on the other. After watching 
such a person for an extended period of time, we may begin to gain some confidence in them, 
their lineage, and their teachings. I admit a considerable level of confidence in some of the 
teaching lineages that make appearances in this inquiry.  
 
But this raises a question that some readers of the text have raised: What am I actually confident 
about, and about what do I insist on saying, “I really don’t know”? 
 
The things of which I would admit confidence are not easy to discuss. First of all, it seems very 
“western” to make a list of confidences, which we might call an inventory of beliefs or a 
personal knowledge assessment. All of that seems misguided, in part because “belief” might be a 
silly concept, and further because, as Heinrich Zimmer famously quipped, the best things can’t 
be told, and the second best are generally misunderstood—the second best being the attempted 
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tellings of the best. So, we could begin by saying I am pretty confident that life is a come-and-
see affair, that wisdom-love-beauty require intimate verification, that we can at best find 
guidance in texts and tellings, but in the end what we realize cannot be separated from what we 
practice. Furthermore, the altogetherness of things, the alive, alove interwovenness of Sophia’s 
sacred mystery means that texts and tellings cannot ever capture anything. Any list of 
confidences would leave things out, and give the impression that confidences are separable. The 
intimacy of life resists such notions.  
 
I can’t give enough caveats on something like a confiding of confidences, but perhaps I still owe 
such a thing to the reader, since they may misunderstand the text, and take certain kinds of 
confidence for arrogance, projecting false certainties in places where there are in fact many 
unknowns and a great deal of precariousness. With all of that said, here are some confidences: 
 
I am very confident in the venerable traditions of LoveWisdom found all over the World, 
including many Indigenous traditions. I am confident that a person can enter the spiritual path 
(take the red pill) and experience something genuinely revolutionary. In the practice and 
realization of these paths, one dispels “more of the same,” even as one risks working with 
dangerous wisdom, handling it the way one would handle poisonous snakes. I am very confident 
that the alternative is much more dangerous. 
 
Apropos of the above, I am pretty confident that this inquiry is, to the best of the author’s ability, 
consonant with many strands in a variety of these venerable traditions. I am fairly confident I am 
not the philosopher who cried wolf. Setting aside the stupidities of how some cultures have 
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treated Wolf, I am saying I feel pretty confident that the situation seems serious. I have little 
confidence that I could declare once and for all that science and technology cannot “save” us. 
For all I know, the very thing we need will come out of academia and/or Silicon Valley. For all I 
know, we somehow “needed” to degrade the World as we have. For all I know, the Rapture may 
come, or we may all discover that life here never had to be treated as sacred. One cannot allow 
such “what if’s” to stifle one’s compassion, however limited it may be. Thus, even though I risk 
being labeled the philosopher who cried wolf, I have tried to be the philosopher who cried 
wisdom—not my own wisdom, but that of the traditions that have given vitalizing guidance to 
countless human beings. While some of the suggestions of this inquiry do challenge certain 
aspects of these traditions, the main stalk expresses common themes, and even the novel 
suggestions can find reconciliation in these traditions (e.g. nonlocal epistemology). 
 
I am pretty confident that there are errors in this text, various places of confusion that arise from 
the author’s own confusions, since the author is not a sage, and even if the author were a sage, 
human fallibility remains with us, as do caveats of context. The suggestions about the altered 
state of philosophizing apply to all philosophers, especially those who cannot escape the 
busyness of the university and the general insanity of the dominant culture. I am not confident 
about whether the scholarly aspects of the errors in this text matter as much as I sometimes think 
they do. There are many things in this text which experts might contest, because we have become 
so specialized that we go on a quest for certainty that can even function as an unspoken quest for 
uncertainty. It is as if we all have to agree to not know very much except a tiny area of 
specialization, and our vast expertise in that narrow field seems to make us uncomfortable saying 
much at all that would serve us in our real lives. It is as if we can only ever offer more questions, 
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and this inability to arrive at a kind of knowing that would help the World, that would help 
sentient beings in their hour of need, seems to perpetuate the pattern of insanity. We need 
action—not foolhardy action, not action based on conscious human purposes, not action without 
reflection, not action as portrayed in action movies—action rooted in Wisdom, Love, and 
Beauty, to our best ability to presence those, to practice and realize them in the midst of activity 
and on the basis of an ethical, spiritual life, including plenty of practice in stillness (so to speak). 
 
I am fairly confident that Socrates, Siddhartha (the Buddha), Jesus, the Peacemaker, and other 
great sages were not scholars. At the same time, I am not very confident about saying scholarship 
is not important for most of us. At times I feel pretty confident in saying we read too many 
books, and at other times it seems we don’t read enough of them.  
 
Sadly, I am pretty confident that the U.S. in particular is an anti-educational culture—which 
means anti-book, if the book is, for instance, a book of LoveWisdom—and I am fairly confident 
that this is so because it serves structures of power. Our best books are dangerous to structures of 
power precisely because they invite people to practice and realize wisdom, love, and beauty, and 
thus to establish justice, righteousness, peace, and true freedom and equality. I am thus wary of 
the ways I have found it necessary to criticize intellectuals, because the anti-educational forces in 
the culture express themselves as anti-intellectual, and this is a problem, because I am quite 
confident that the best of our intellectuals offer us vitalizing invitations into wisdom, love, and 
beauty. But this in turn comes with a fair degree of confidence that the practices of academia 
(where so many intellectuals reside) are too narrow to allow us to realize the fuller potentials of 
wisdom, love, and beauty. Indeed, though I am fairly confident that the pattern of insanity of the 
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dominant culture survives by keeping the general public away from books like the ones cited in 
this inquiry, I also feel fairly confident that we should read them with a grounding in compassion 
(and ethics generally) and some set of practices for verifying what they invite us to make real. 
We need practices that can help us realize wisdom, love, and beauty, and reading alone does not 
seem sufficient. 
 
When it comes to books of LoveWisdom, books of spirituality, they seem to offer much that we 
should practice and realize. And that often means we have to read then with the kind of care 
good scholars try their best to practice. I am quite confident that I am not a very good scholar, 
and it is not merely on the basis of “scholarship” that I would seek to earn a degree in 
philosophy. As the inquiry itself seeks to show, there is more to LoveWisdom than scholarship. 
In any case, I remain confident that most of the readings of the artefacts in this inquiry are at the 
very least useful, even if they may raise red flags for some scholars. I am confident that any 
interpretation offered here of any artefact—of anything at all—is far from the last word. I am 
somewhat confident that even the most dangerous suggestions and interpretations offered here 
may be genuinely beneficial, and that there is something at least passingly skillful in them—not 
because of any intelligence on my part, but because they come from a sincere dedication to the 
traditions of LoveWisdom that allow all of us access to inspiration. 
 
I am very confident that arts of awareness are essential for fulfilling the potentials of our own 
souls and the soul of the World. Even if the philosophical diagnosis offered here is somehow off 
about the relationship between LoveWisdom and the ecological and other crises we face, the 
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ethical-aesthetic epistemology of practice and realization still seems fundamentally valuable, and 
the arts of awareness it recommends seem to offer the potential for paradigm-shifting insight. 
 
I am very confident that the World is so interwoven that if any significant part of this inquiry 
seems “right,” then the dangerous diagnosis it presents needs to be taken quite seriously. I don’t 
see how the criticisms regarding science, media, education, and politics avoid being radical. 
 
I am very confident that we need to keep trying to educate ourselves and our children, but I am 
not confident about what that means. I feel pretty confident that education is broken, but that 
doesn’t mean I wouldn’t send my own child to university, if I had one. I am fairly confident that 
structural inequalities contribute significantly to the diseases of education, locally and globally.  
 
For instance, a recent study from Georgetown University’s Center on Education and the 
Workforce shows that a kindergarten child who scores in the bottom half in their school tests still 
has a 70% chance of reaching a high socio-economic status in life—if their parents have one. On 
the other hand, in the case of a child from poor parents, even if that child scores in the top half of 
their class in school tests, they have only a 30% chance of reaching a high socio-economic status 
in life—in other words, a child may demonstrate intelligence, but if they are poor they have a 
70% chance of not enjoying affluence.235 Though we think of education as a matter of equal 
opportunity for all, and think of the dominant culture that way, it does not function as such. And 
the reforms, often guided by wealthy elites (such as Bill Gates and Betsy Devos) who typically 
do not send their own children to public school, and may not have attended public schools 
                                                 
235 https://cew.georgetown.edu/cew-reports/schooled2lose/ 
851 
 
themselves. When one looks at the society, seeing how the rich are somehow incapable of failure 
because of the many safety nets built in for them, and how the poor are almost destined to lose in 
spite of any talents and capacities they may harbor in their souls, it seems that reform in 
education has become a massive rationalization: If only the poor would get educated, they would 
have a fair shot at the wealth which the affluent have “earned”.  
 
According to MIT economist Peter Temin, these and other symptoms are indications of a dual 
economy, which is typical of developing as opposed to developed economies, and that in turn 
would mean we have regressed in ethical, political, and even economic terms.236 Plenty of other 
thinkers have noticed the same set of symptoms. For instance, the economist Gregory Clark has 
also done interesting work in this general vein. According to Clark, “America has no higher rate 
of social mobility than medieval England, or pre-industrial Sweden.”237 If you had to place a bet 
about how well off a child in the dominant culture would end up in life, and you could only 
choose one factor upon which to base that bet, it would be foolish to choose their intelligence, 
grace, virtue, caring, compassion, nascent love of wisdom, or any other such factor. The single 
best predictor of material success seems to be the level of affluence enjoyed by a child’s parents. 
If you come from wealth, you will likely be wealthy, even if you are particularly unskillful, as in 
the case of some of our presidents, as well as many others in the society. And any hard work one 
                                                 
236 In Republic, Plato spoke of oligarchy as being not one city but two (551d). Temin’s paper is 
available at http://ineteconomics.org/ideas-papers/research-papers/the-american-dual-economy-
race-globalization-and-the-politics-of-exclusion      
237 The quote can be found at http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2014/11/26/uc-davis-economics-
professor-there-is-no-american-dream/, while the analysis to support it can be found in his book, 
The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility. See   
http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/the_Son_Also_Rises.html for information on his 
book and other writings. 
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does often comes as a result of support that the impoverished have no access to. The poor cannot 
afford private tutors, cannot take unpaid internships, cannot go to family for bailouts, cannot rely 
on a relative to give them shot at a career-making job. 
 
Institutional inequalities trouble any philosopher who has confidence in education as a general 
principle. I have great confidence in it, and a good deal of confidence that it is currently in 
terrible shape—principally because the culture is not rooted in wisdom, love, and beauty, and 
also (relatedly) because education has not taken into itself the kinds of insights we wrestled with 
in our inquiry, including the basic insight that knowledge depends on our way of knowing. I am 
pretty confident in that insight. 
 
Related to all of this, I am most confident in you, the reader. That is why I have not proposed 
many “solutions” to the challenges raised by this inquiry. My confidence lies in each person’s 
capacity to practice and realize wisdom, love, and beauty. I don’t know what we should do. I 
don’t know what you should do. I am confident that we can find out. 
 
But I am pretty confident that this is not an individualized process. I feel no compunction for 
suggesting that we need to get beyond our own egos. I am fairly confident in the assessment that 
validity, knowledge, truth, wisdom, love, beauty, peace, joy, justice, and all good things depend 
on transcending the ego. This does not mean “communism” or some other kind of fascistic 
regime in which beings get captured by “the collective”. Rather, it means that each of us already 
has tasted how we are most ourselves when we transcend the ego. In terms of an ethically and 
aesthetically rooted epistemology, it means we have to let the World speak to us. It is a mutual 
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empowerment. The river cannot think without us, and we cannot properly think without the river. 
Coyote, Wolf, Raven, Blue Whale, Red Tailed Hawk, Aspen, Honeybee, Horse, and countless 
other beings cannot fully realize the potential of their thinking without us, nor can we fully 
realize our potential without them. I do not hear many voices in the dominant culture inviting us 
to think along with these beings. I hear more of the same, more human agendas, more techno-
fantasies. The scientists who tell us that things are bad do not tell us to listen to The Others for 
guidance, to listen to the World, to listen to Sacredness, to listen to Nature, to establish a proper 
Nature-Culture in the sense our inquiry has invited us to touch. That gives me very little 
confidence that the gestures coming from the dominant culture, including its science, really get 
beyond “more of the same”. Again, it seems like hubris, and the aim of this inquiry is to invite us 
into a broader humility. 
 
That has at times involved some strong rhetoric. If we in the dominant culture cannot make fun 
of ourselves and our intellectual traditions, we may be lost. But I am not at all confident that we 
should avoid reading Kant and Descartes altogether. I am not very confident that inquiry into the 
question of how many grains make a heap might not lead us to life-saving insight. But, again, I 
don’t claim to “know” much.  
 
I remain confident that the central issue of our inquiry has to do with samsara thinking, the mind 
of Sorrowville, the conquest style of consciousness, and that the diagnosis offered here actually 
seems rather predictable and mundane in some sense—far from “dangerous” except in the ways 
Buddha tried to get at in his great philosophical warning. We have come to a point at which we 
can see the real costs of remaining in a state of suffering and ignorance. It may have seemed to 
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us that our suffering was mostly personal, and that it could not poison rivers and extinguish 
species. It may seem that plastic is only a bad idea when we don’t make it in moderation. But the 
problem goes much deeper, and our interwovenness reveals itself as we plumb those dangerous 
depths—again, dangerous to the ego and to structures of power and domination. Thus, any 
suggestion that our inquiry is “more of the same,” while I may share some of its concerns, seems 
to end up requiring a defense of fragmentation and a case against interwovenness, a defense of a 
great deal of samsaric thinking and a case against much of the spiritual wisdom of a wide 
spectrum of traditions. I don’t think it appears that way to those of us raised in the dominant 
culture. I think it appears to us that our science and our culture in general must have a great many 
positive aspects. I feel pretty confident that this is true, but it does not mean there is not also 
something fundamentally ignorant in our practice and realization of life. It may seem that reason 
alone should be able to correct this problem, but so many traditions recommend arts of 
awareness that go beyond “reason” that one can only find this rather dubious at best, and perhaps 
a bit hubristic, because that “reason” surely takes certain key assumptions of the dominant 
culture for its premises. It is also quite a different thing to look at the World and think, “Wow! 
Things are really screwed up!” and quite another to be present in the World and feel its wounds, 
feel the suffering of countless beings. This requires nothing more than the capacity for wisdom 
and compassion that all of us share, and it doesn’t take too much effort to practice and realize 
this level of compassion. It does not require sainthood or sagehood. But it does take more than 
mere reason seems to provide—hence the need for an actual practice of compassion. 
 
It’s good that we don’t need to be sages to practice compassion, for I am quite confident that I 
am not a sage. Thankfully the practice of compassion may help us to realize our spiritual 
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potential. And we should also remind ourselves that anyone who says they aren’t wise must say 
it with care. In an old spiritual common law case, a student asks a realized teacher, “What is a 
truly awakened being?” It is like asking, “What is Wisdom? What is Love? What really matters? 
What would it mean to live a truly philosophical life? What is Socrates? What is someone who is 
awake? What is someone who is fearless?” The student condenses it to just one of these, but all 
of them get caught up in the question—the whole point of spirituality and religion, the whole 
point of life, in one question. The question has a sincerity and urgency to it. We imagine an 
experienced student here, one who has practiced a long time, and suddenly sees just how much 
they still don’t understand. They have struggled. They may even have gotten to that point we 
sometimes get to, when we try and try and try, and then we can’t go on, and in the very act of 
throwing up our hands and saying, “I give up,” the situation resolves itself perfectly.  
 
The teacher listens to the student’s question, and replies like this: “If I tell you, will you believe 
it?” We can hardly overstate the significance of such a question. Why wouldn’t we believe the 
answer? What could the answer be? Something mystical? What is mystical? How could it be that 
we wouldn’t believe the answer to this question? The student gives voice to this, asking, “Why 
wouldn’t I believe your sincere words?”  
  
So, the old teacher tells the student: “You yourself are it.” 
 
I am confident that you, the reader, are it, and that the World, that Sacredness itself, that 
WisdomLoveBeauty itself is it with you. Please take good care of it. 
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